



NAXAL SECURITY TRACKER

January 2026

Chhattisgarh

Bijapur Narayanpur
Sukma



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
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Between 1 and 31 January 2026, counter-insurgency operations remained sustained across both core and peripheral theatres. Non-violent outcomes exceeded violent incidents, underscoring mounting pressure on Maoist organisational capacity. Chhattisgarh remained the primary epicenter, accounting for the majority of reported activity. Significant surrenders and weapon recoveries indicate declining cadre morale and operational resilience.

While tactical gains were evident, IED-related injuries to civilians and security forces remained a key concern. A clear week-by-week escalation peaked mid-month before tapering towards the end of January. The consistently high operational tempo indicates proactive, sustained pressure rather than reactive engagement. Overall, the trend reflects state dominance, with Maoist groups retaining only residual disruptive capability.

During the Joint Session of Parliament ahead of the Budget Session on 28th January 2026, the President of India, Smt. Droupadi Murmu reiterated the government's commitment to addressing Left-wing extremism through a holistic security-development approach. The address highlighted the significant reduction in LWE-affected districts and incidents over recent years, attributing the gains to sustained counter-insurgency operations, expanded governance outreach, infrastructure development, and welfare delivery in tribal and remote areas. While underscoring that the overall trajectory is positive and that state dominance has strengthened, the President also implicitly acknowledged the persistence of residual challenges in core pockets, reinforcing the need for continued operational pressure alongside people-centric development measures. ***"The challenge of Maoist terrorism has narrowed from 126 districts to just 8, of which only 3 remain seriously affected,"*** noted the President in her address to Parliament on 28th January 2026.

S.No.	State	No. of Districts	District
1.	Chhattisgarh	06	Bijapur, Dantewada, Gariyaband Kanker, Narayanpur, Sukma
2.	Jharkhand	01	West Singhbhum
3.	Odisha	01	Kandhamal



Balaghat (Madhya Pradesh), Gadchiroli (Maharashtra) and Mohla-Manpur-Ambagarh Chowki (Chhattisgarh) were part of the previous set of 11 LWE-affected districts but have since been dropped.

OVERALL INCIDENT OVERVIEW

January 2026 saw a steady weakening of Maoist influence across the country, with activity increasingly confined to a few core districts, mainly in Chhattisgarh. A total of 40 LWE-related incidents were recorded during the month. Importantly, non-violent incidents outnumbered violent ones, indicating growing pressure on Maoist groups.

While 14 incidents involved violence, including encounters and IED blasts, 26 incidents were non-violent, dominated by mass surrenders, arrests, arms recoveries, and camp busts. Security Forces did not suffer any fatalities during the month, though some personnel and civilians were injured by pressure IEDs, which remain the Maoists' primary weapon.

Chhattisgarh accounted for nearly three-quarters of all incidents, with Bijapur, Sukma, Dantewada, and Narayanpur emerging as key focus areas. Outside this belt, Maoist activity was limited and largely involved arrests or surrenders, suggesting a contraction rather than an expansion of the insurgency.

A major highlight of the month was the large number of surrenders, including senior and female cadres, often in groups. These surrenders were closely linked to sustained security operations combined with rehabilitation and outreach efforts, indicating that pressure is translating into exits from violence.


Security operations in January were intelligence-led and coordinated, with an emphasis on area domination, IED detection, and the dismantling of Maoist infrastructure, including arms factories and camps. This has reduced Maoist operational capability and freedom of movement.

Overall, the data suggests that Maoist violence is declining, though not eliminated. The continued use of IEDs—especially against civilians—remains a concern. However, shrinking geography, rising surrenders, and effective security responses point towards gradual stabilisation in core LWE areas.

The key challenge ahead is to consolidate gains by protecting civilians, sustaining development and rehabilitation efforts, and ensuring that reclaimed areas do not relapse into insecurity.

GEOGRAPHIC DISTRIBUTION OF INCIDENTS

Incidents reported from multiple states indicate an uneven Maoist footprint. **Chhattisgarh** dominates in both the frequency and intensity of incidents. Key affected districts show repeated activity, highlighting entrenched Maoist zones. Peripheral states report sporadic but significant actions (arrests, surrenders and recoveries). A geographic concentration of incidents enables and showcases focused counter-insurgency planning.



**All events are counted as value-neutral incidents;
this metric reflects activity volume, not severity or outcome.*

Key States: Chhattisgarh, Telangana, Jharkhand

- **Chhattisgarh:** Continued to be the epicentre of LWE activity, accounting for the overwhelming majority of incidents, including encounters, IED incidents, recoveries, and mass surrenders, underscoring both Maoist concentration and sustained security force pressure.
- **Jharkhand:** Witnessed high-impact encounters with senior Maoist leaders, including losses, indicating effective joint operations in long-standing Maoist strongholds.
- **Telangana:** Saw a notable rise in surrenders and arrests, reflecting the success of intelligence-led policing and rehabilitation-oriented outreach.

Peripheral States: Odisha, Andhra Pradesh, Maharashtra and Bihar


- **Odisha:** Reported limited but targeted security operations, including camp busting, suggesting proactive disruption of Maoist infrastructure rather than reactive engagements.
- **Andhra Pradesh:** Activity remained sporadic and surrender-focused, highlighting continued erosion of Maoist presence in the state's border areas.
- **Maharashtra:** Maoist-linked activity surfaced primarily through urban intelligence and NIA-led arrests, indicating disruption of back-end and support networks.
- **Bihar:** Recorded isolated recoveries of explosives, indicating residual Maoist logistical presence rather than active armed operations.

DISTRICT-WISE DISTRIBUTION OF INCIDENTS

For analytical clarity, districts have been categorised into core and peripheral/intelligence-linked zones based on the frequency, intensity, and nature of incidents recorded in January 2026.

Core districts — *Bijapur, Sukma, Narayanpur, and Dantewada (Chhattisgarh)* — together accounted for the bulk of LWE-related activity. These districts witnessed repeated encounters, IED incidents, recoveries of arms and explosives, civilian and security force casualties, and large-scale surrenders. The concentration of incidents reaffirms their status as the operational heartland of Maoist activity, even as sustained security pressure continues to degrade organisational and logistical capabilities.

Peripheral / Intelligence-linked districts—including **West Singhbhum (Jharkhand), Dhamtari, Gariabandh, Kandhamal (Odisha), and select districts in Telangana, Maharashtra, Bihar, and Andhra Pradesh**—recorded comparatively fewer incidents. Activity in these areas was largely characterised by arrests, surrenders, camp busting, and recoveries, suggesting residual Maoist presence, support networks, or intelligence-led disruption rather than active armed confrontation.



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NATURE OF INCIDENTS

The January 2026 incident data indicate a clear consolidation of state control in Left Wing Extremism-affected areas, with non-violent security outcomes significantly outweighing violent incidents. A sustained pattern of mass surrenders, arrests, and recoveries of arms and explosives, particularly in core districts such as Bijapur, Sukma, Narayanpur, and Dantewada, indicates mounting pressure on Maoist organisational structures and morale. While sporadic IED-related violence persists, the overall trend reflects a shift from Maoist offensive capability to defensive survival, driven by continuous security operations, intelligence penetration, and credible surrender and rehabilitation policies. Taken together, the data underscores that the government’s integrated strategy, combining force, outreach, and development-linked pressure, is yielding tangible results on the ground.


Week-Wise Distribution	Non-Violent	Violent	Grand Total
1	4	3	7
2	6	-	6
3	7	4	11
4	8	6	14
5	1	1	2
Grand Total	26	14	40

- Encounters resulting in neutralisation of senior and mid-level cadres
→ 7 encounter incidents, resulting in the neutralisation of 39 Maoists, including senior leadership (CCM/DVCM-level) in districts such as Bijapur, Sukma, Narayanpur (Chhattisgarh) and West Singhbhum (Jharkhand).
- Frequent IED recoveries and neutralisations, disrupting Maoist tactics
→ 10 IED recovery/neutralisation incidents, including pressure IEDs, command IEDs, barrel IEDs, directional and cooker IEDs, largely concentrated in core districts of Bijapur, Dantewada and Narayanpur.
High number of mass surrenders, including women cadres and commanders
→ 12 surrender incidents involving approximately 220+ Maoist cadres, including women cadres and senior commanders, across Sukma, Dantewada and Bijapur (Chhattisgarh), Telangana, and Andhra Pradesh.
- Arrests in urban and semi-urban areas reflecting intelligence-led policing
→ 3 arrest incidents, including NIA-led and state police operations in Mumbai, Hyderabad-linked networks, Chatra, and Nagarkurnool, indicating disruption to backend and support networks.
- Arms and explosives recoveries weakening Maoist operational logistics
→ 9 arms/explosives recovery incidents involving automatic weapons, BGL cells, arrow bombs, detonators, ammunition, and explosive manufacturing material.

Of the 40 incidents recorded in January 2026, over two-thirds were non-violent security outcomes, led by 12 surrender incidents, 10 IED recoveries, and 9 arms/explosives recoveries, underscoring sustained state dominance.

WEEK-WISE INCIDENTS

According to the January 2026 incident tracker, 40 LWE-related incidents were recorded during the month. Week 1 (1–7 January) saw 7 incidents, including both violent encounters and early surrender cases. Week 2 (8–14 January) recorded 6 incidents, with a balance of violent and non-violent outcomes. Activity peaked in Week 3 (15–21 January) with 11 incidents, driven largely by surrenders, arrests, and recoveries. The highest concentration was observed in Week 4 (22–28 January) with 14 incidents, dominated by non-violent security outcomes such as IED recoveries, camp busting, and additional surrenders. Week 5 (29–31 January) saw a sharp decline to 2 incidents, indicating a tapering of activity towards the end of the month. Week-wise incident data shows a mid-month peak driven primarily by non-violent security outcomes, followed by a marked decline in the final week.




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ARRESTS AND SURRENDERS

Arrests and surrenders in January 2026 highlight a clear shift towards non-violent security outcomes and reflect sustained pressure on Maoist networks. The month saw three arrests, carried out in urban and semi-urban locations, indicating intelligence-led disruption of Maoist support systems, logistics, and coordination networks rather than frontline combat engagements. These arrests suggest improved intelligence penetration beyond core forested areas.

More significantly, the period witnessed 12 separate surrender incidents, involving over 220 Maoist cadres, including women cadres and senior and mid-level commanders. Surrenders were concentrated in the core LWE districts of Chhattisgarh, with additional cases reported from Telangana and Andhra Pradesh, suggesting both operational pressure and the growing credibility of surrender and rehabilitation policies. The scale and frequency of surrenders underscore the erosion of Maoist morale and organisational cohesion, reinforcing the assessment that sustained security operations, combined with outreach measures, are yielding tangible results.



SECURITY OPERATIONS

Security force operations in January 2026 were characterised by sustained, multi-agency engagement across core and peripheral LWE districts, with a clear emphasis on area domination, intelligence-led search operations, and disruption of Maoist logistics. Operations were most intensive in the core districts of Bijapur, Sukma, Narayanpur, and Dantewada, where repeated encounters, recoveries, and follow-up sanitisation exercises were recorded throughout the month.

Joint operations involving state police units and central forces resulted in the neutralisation of Maoist cadres, the dismantling of camps and explosives units, and the recovery of arms, ammunition, and IED material. Notably, a significant proportion of operations culminated in non-violent outcomes, such as recoveries and surrenders, indicating effective intelligence penetration and sustained operational pressure rather than reactive engagement alone.

IED detection and bomb disposal operations featured prominently, reflecting a focused effort to mitigate the primary Maoist threat vector. Post-blast sanitisation, demining, and follow-on search operations were consistently conducted, particularly in districts experiencing repeated IED activity. The cumulative pattern of operations suggests a shift from episodic engagements to continuous operations, aimed at restricting Maoist mobility, degrading logistics, and holding ground.



Overall, the operational tempo and outcomes during the month underline a consolidated security posture, in which kinetic action, intelligence-driven disruption, and psychological pressure collectively contributed to weakening Maoist operational capability.

CASUALTY INDICATORS

Casualty data for January 2026 indicate a clear asymmetry in impact, with Maoist cadres bearing the brunt of security force operations. During the month, 39 Maoists were neutralised in encounters, reflecting sustained offensive pressure in core LWE districts. In contrast, no security force fatalities were recorded, although 14 personnel sustained injuries, largely from IEDs during operations and area domination exercises.


Civilian impact remained limited but significant, with two civilian deaths and two civilian injuries, primarily caused by pressure IEDs planted in movement corridors. These incidents underscore the continued Maoist reliance on indiscriminate explosive devices, even as their capacity for direct armed engagement declines.

Overall, the casualty profile indicates a favourable operational balance for security forces, characterised by high Maoist losses and contained security force casualties. At the same time, the persistence of civilian harm reinforces the need for continued focus on IED detection, area sanitisation, and civilian protection measures, particularly in core operational zones.



IED RELATED INCIDENTS

In January 2026, IED-related security actions included both IED recoveries and IED material recoveries, reflecting efforts to counter immediate and longer-term Maoist threats. IED recoveries involved the seizure and neutralisation of fully or partially assembled explosive devices ready for use, thereby preventing potential attacks on security forces and civilians. In contrast, IED material recoveries focused on seizing explosive components and fabrication items, such as detonators, wiring, batteries, and explosives, to disrupt Maoist manufacturing and logistics networks. Together, these actions highlight a dual operational approach that combined the prevention of imminent attacks with the degradation of Maoist explosive production capability.



RECOVERIES

Recoveries in January 2026 were a critical pillar of security force operations, reflecting sustained focus on dismantling Maoist logistics, weapon stockpiles, and explosive manufacturing capabilities. The month saw nine recovery incidents involving arms and

explosives, alongside multiple IED recoveries and neutralisations, concentrated largely in the core districts of Bijapur, Sukma, Narayanpur, and Dantewada.

Recovered material included automatic and semi-automatic weapons, ammunition, arrow bombs, detonators, explosives, and IED-making components, indicating targeted action against both frontline combat capability and back-end manufacturing networks. Several recoveries were carried out without accompanying violence, underscoring the role of intelligence-led search and sanitisation operations rather than chance discoveries.

The frequency and spread of recoveries highlight a systematic effort to deny Maoist cadres access to weapons and explosives, disrupt supply chains, and reduce their ability to carry out attacks, particularly IED-based operations. Collectively, these recoveries weakened Maoist operational readiness and reinforced the broader trend of state dominance through pre-emptive disruption rather than reactive engagement.

COMPARATIVE TRENDS JANUARY 2025 AND 2026

January 2025 and January 2026 both reflect sustained security force activity, but the nature and balance of outcomes show a clear progression towards consolidation in 2026. January 2025 was characterised by a high-tempo operational environment with frequent engagements across core Maoist theatres. Chhattisgarh remained the epicentre, with over 30 recorded incidents, followed by Jharkhand and smaller clusters in Maharashtra, Bihar, Telangana, and Andhra Pradesh. The operational pattern combined multiple encounters, exchanges of fire, and IED blasts with arrests and surrenders. Arrests included security force and NIA-led actions, and surrender numbers showed an upward trajectory, suggesting pressure on Maoist ranks. However, violent engagements remained a visible and regular feature of the month, indicating that Maoist armed capability remained active even as it faced sustained disruption.

In contrast, January 2026 shows a more consolidated and stabilised pattern. A total of 40 LWE-related incidents were recorded, but the most significant shift lies in the internal composition of these incidents: 26 were non-violent and 14 were violent. Non-violent outcomes—mass surrenders, arrests, arms recoveries, and camp dismantling—clearly outnumbered violent engagements. Security forces suffered no fatalities during the month, though IED-related injuries persisted. The geography of violence narrowed further, largely confined to core districts of Chhattisgarh such as Bijapur, Sukma, Dantewada, and Narayanpur, with limited activity outside this belt.

The key contrast between the two periods lies in the balance between kinetic engagement and organisational attrition. January 2025 reflected operational dominance through frequent encounters and proactive area domination, yet violence remained a persistent feature of the security landscape. By January 2026, the data indicates a stronger tilt towards erosion of the Maoist structure rather than repeated armed confrontation. The rise in mass surrenders and the predominance of non-violent security outcomes suggest deeper morale stress and reduced manoeuvrability within Maoist ranks.

Overall, while both months demonstrate security force initiative and sustained pressure, January 2026 marks a clearer consolidation phase. Violence has not disappeared, but its relative weight within the total incident profile has declined, the geographical footprint has contracted further, and the state's dominance is reflected not only in encounters but also in organisational weakening, surrender momentum, and zero security force fatalities.

PROGNOSIS

The incident patterns observed in January 2026 strongly indicate that the Government of India's calibrated, multi-pronged approach to Left Wing Extremism is entering a decisive consolidation phase. The clear predominance of non-violent outcomes—particularly mass surrenders, arrests, and sustained recoveries of arms, explosives, and IED materials—reflects a marked erosion of Maoist organisational capacity, morale, and operational freedom. The surrender of over 220 cadres during the month, including senior and mid-level operatives, underscores the growing credibility of state-led surrender and rehabilitation frameworks, reinforced by persistent security pressure.

Going forward, the strategic priority should be to prevent residual Maoist elements from regrouping or adapting asymmetrically. This requires maintaining a high operational tempo in core districts such as Bijapur, Sukma, Dantewada, and Narayanpur, with continued emphasis on intelligence-led operations, area domination, and IED detection. Sustained coordination between State Police, DRG, CoBRA, CRPF, and central intelligence agencies must remain central to counter-insurgency efforts, ensuring seamless operational continuity across jurisdictions.

At the same time, the momentum generated by large-scale surrenders presents a critical opportunity to accelerate people-centric governance in reclaimed and vulnerable areas. Strengthening rehabilitation packages, expediting livelihood support, and ensuring rapid delivery of basic services and infrastructure will be essential to translating short-term security gains into durable stability. Institutionalising village-level outreach, trust-building initiatives,

and administrative presence in former Maoist strongholds will further undercut extremist influence and reinforce state legitimacy.

While sporadic IED incidents and isolated acts of violence indicate that residual Maoist capability persists, the broader trajectory points towards containment and irreversible rollback. With sustained political will, operational vigilance, and a continued integration of security action with development-led governance, the government is well positioned to achieve its objective of decisively neutralising Left Wing Extremism and consolidating a secure, development-oriented environment across affected regions.

CONCLUSION

The January 2026 assessment indicates that Left Wing Extremism has entered a phase of sustained decline, marked by a shrinking geographical footprint, weakened organisational capacity, and a rise in non-violent outcomes such as surrenders, arrests, and recoveries. Maoist activity is now largely confined to a few core pockets, with limited capacity to mount coordinated offensive operations.

The data reinforces that the government's integrated strategy—combining intelligence-led security operations with governance outreach, development initiatives, and credible rehabilitation mechanisms—has restored state presence in previously affected areas and eroded the insurgency's ideological space. While isolated IED-related incidents persist, they represent residual disruption rather than strategic momentum.

Overall, the trends point to growing state dominance and the consolidation of gains. With sustained operational pressure and continued focus on people-centric development, the trajectory towards long-term stability and a violence-free security environment in LW-affected regions appears firmly on course.



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