



NAXAL SECURITY TRACKER

February 2026

Chhattisgarh

Bijapur Narayanpur
Sukma



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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The February 2026 dataset records 54 incidents across multiple Left-Wing Extremism (LWE)-affected states, reflecting a continued pattern of sustained security pressure, rising surrenders, and limited Maoist activity. While sporadic violent incidents—including encounters and IED blasts—were reported, the majority of developments during the month were non-violent in nature, such as surrenders, recoveries of arms and explosives, policy initiatives, and outreach efforts.

A key trend during the month was the significant number of Maoist surrenders, particularly in Chhattisgarh, Odisha, and Telangana, with several mass surrender events under state rehabilitation campaigns. Security forces also carried out multiple search and area domination operations, leading to the recovery of weapons, explosives, and Maoist logistical dumps across forested regions. At the same time, a handful of encounters in states such as Maharashtra, Telangana, Chhattisgarh, and Odisha resulted in Maoist casualties.

The data further indicates growing emphasis on a combined strategy of security action and rehabilitation, supported by policy initiatives, surrender appeals, and community outreach. Instances of villagers removing Maoist symbols and districts being declared Maoist-free also point to a gradual decline in Maoist influence in certain areas. Overall, the trends for February suggest that while the insurgency retains the capacity for sporadic violence—particularly through IEDs—state-led operations and surrender policies continue to place sustained pressure on Maoist networks.

OVERALL INCIDENT OVERVIEW

The February 2026 data indicates a clear continuation of the weakening operational space of Left-Wing Extremism across key affected states. A total of 54 tracked incidents during the month reflect a mix of security operations, surrenders, policy initiatives, community resistance, and limited violent activity. The overall pattern suggests that the state's counter-insurgency strategy—combining security pressure with rehabilitation and development—continues to shape the trajectory of the conflict.

One of the most striking trends during the month was the large number of surrenders across states, particularly in Chhattisgarh, Odisha, and Telangana. Multiple surrender drives were recorded, including major group surrenders under rehabilitation campaigns such as Puna Margam. In Chhattisgarh alone, several coordinated efforts led to batches of cadres laying down arms, including groups of 12, 21, 22 and 30 Maoists in different districts. Odisha also witnessed significant movement, with mass surrenders in Rayagada and Kandhamal, while Telangana saw senior leaders and cadres surrender following sustained police outreach. Overall, more than 130 cadres are estimated to have surrendered during the month, reflecting sustained pressure on Maoist organisational structures.

Security operations remained active across core LWE theatres, especially in Chhattisgarh, Maharashtra, Telangana and Odisha. Several encounters took place during the month, including operations in Gadchiroli, Mulugu and Bijapur, resulting in the deaths of multiple Maoist cadres. Notable incidents include a major operation in Gadchiroli where security forces neutralised seven Maoists, and another in Telangana's Mulugu district where five cadres were killed. Smaller engagements in Bijapur and Kandhamal also resulted in Maoist casualties. In total, around 20 Maoist deaths were recorded across encounter operations during the month. Security forces suffered limited casualties, with one personnel death and a few injuries reported.

Alongside kinetic operations, weapons and explosives recovery continued to form a major component of security activity. Several Maoist dumps were discovered in the forested belts of Narayanpur, Sukma and Bijapur. Security forces recovered explosives, rifles, grenades and other war-like stores, including BGL cells, pressure-cooker IEDs and rocket launcher components. Multiple IED neutralisation operations were also carried out, particularly along

road corridors in southern Chhattisgarh, underscoring the continued Maoist reliance on improvised explosives to target security patrols and movement.

While violent incidents were comparatively fewer, IED-related incidents remained a persistent threat. Explosions in Jharkhand's Saranda region injured civilians and CRPF personnel, highlighting that despite organisational setbacks, Maoist groups retain the capability to deploy IEDs in forested strongholds. At the same time, several explosives were successfully detected and defused before causing casualties, indicating improved intelligence and operational vigilance by security forces.

Another emerging trend during the month was community resistance and declining Maoist influence in some local areas. In parts of Odisha's Malkangiri district, villagers dismantled Maoist structures and removed their symbols from villages—an indication of shifting local sentiment. Additionally, certain districts in Odisha were declared Maoist-free, reflecting sustained administrative and policing efforts over time.

Policy and governance measures also featured prominently. The Union Home Minister reiterated the government's objective of eliminating Maoism through coordinated security and development initiatives, while the Odisha government revised its surrender and rehabilitation policy to offer enhanced incentives to cadres willing to return to the mainstream. Parallel outreach efforts—such as radio campaigns, police appeals, and reintegration meetings with surrendered cadres—suggest a growing emphasis on persuasion and rehabilitation alongside enforcement.

Overall, the February dataset reflects three broad trends: sustained operational pressure on Maoist formations, increasing surrenders under rehabilitation programmes, and early signs of weakening influence in certain local communities. While sporadic violence and IED threats persist in traditional strongholds, the combination of targeted security operations, policy outreach, and development-led initiatives appears to be steadily constricting the operational space available to Maoist groups.

GEOGRAPHIC DISTRIBUTION OF INCIDENTS


Key States : Chhattisgarh, Odisha, Telangana

- **Chhattisgarh:** Continued to remain the epicentre of LWE activity, accounting for the largest share of incidents during the month. Developments included encounters, multiple IED recoveries and neutralisations, establishment of security infrastructure, and several mass surrender events, reflecting both sustained Maoist presence and intensified security force operations.
- **Odisha:** Witnessed a mix of surrenders, encounters and outreach initiatives. The state also saw policy measures such as revisions to the surrender and rehabilitation framework, alongside community-level actions against Maoist influence, indicating gradual weakening of the insurgent ecosystem in some areas.
- **Telangana:** Recorded significant developments through encounter operations and a number of surrenders, including senior cadres. Continued police outreach and reintegration efforts suggest sustained pressure on Maoist leadership and support networks.

Peripheral States: Jharkhand, Maharashtra, Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, West Bengal

- **Jharkhand:** Incidents were limited but included IED blasts, arrests and arms recoveries, indicating the continued presence of Maoist elements in forested areas while security forces maintained pressure through search operations.
- **Maharashtra:** Activity remained largely confined to security operations and encounters, reflecting continued counter-insurgency efforts against Maoist formations operating along the state's forested belt.
- **Andhra Pradesh:** Reported isolated developments primarily in the form of surrenders, suggesting reduced operational activity but continued engagement with rehabilitation mechanisms.
- **Bihar:** Recorded limited activity during the month, largely centred around the surrender of a senior Maoist leader, pointing to residual Maoist networks rather than active operational presence.

- **West Bengal:** Saw minimal activity, limited to Maoist propaganda incidents, indicating a largely diminished operational footprint.




DISTRICT-WISE DISTRIBUTION OF INCIDENTS

Core Districts: Core districts refer to areas that consistently record frequent Maoist-related incidents and sustained operational activity. These districts typically witness encounters, IED incidents, arms and explosives recoveries, security force operations, and significant surrender events. They are often located within or adjacent to long-standing Maoist strongholds, where insurgent presence, logistical networks, and mobility corridors remain relatively entrenched. For the purposes of this tracker, districts showing recurrent operational activity during the reporting period and forming part of the established LWE theatre are categorised as core districts.

- **Bijapur (Chhattisgarh):** Recorded multiple operational developments during the month, including encounters, IED detection and neutralisation operations, explosives recoveries, and surrender-related activities, highlighting its continued importance within the Maoist operational zone.
- **Sukma (Chhattisgarh):** Witnessed several security operations, explosives recoveries, and large-scale surrender events, reflecting sustained security force pressure in one of the most entrenched Maoist strongholds.
- **Narayanpur (Chhattisgarh):** Incidents largely involved recovery of Maoist arms and explosives dumps during search operations, indicating ongoing efforts to dismantle Maoist logistical networks.
- **Dantewada (Chhattisgarh):** Reported IED recoveries and neutralisation operations during security patrols, underscoring the continued reliance of Maoist groups on improvised explosives.
- **Kanker (Chhattisgarh):** Saw notable developments through the surrender of senior Maoist cadres and recovery of weapons, reflecting the impact of outreach and rehabilitation initiatives.
- **Rayagada (Odisha):** Witnessed multiple surrender events as well as propaganda-related activity, suggesting a mix of Maoist presence and ongoing efforts to encourage cadres to return to the mainstream.


- Malkangiri (Odisha): Incidents included surrenders and community-led dismantling of Maoist symbols and structures, indicating shifting local dynamics and declining insurgent influence in some areas.
- Kandhamal (Odisha): Recorded encounter operations resulting in Maoist casualties, along with surrender-related developments, highlighting continued operational engagement.
- Gadchiroli (Maharashtra): Reported significant encounter activity and recovery of weapons during anti-Maoist operations, reaffirming its role as Maharashtra’s principal LWE-affected district.
- Mulugu (Telangana): Witnessed encounter operations against Maoist cadres, reflecting continued security force presence along forested border regions.
- West Singhbhum (Jharkhand): Recorded IED-related incidents and security operations, indicating the persistence of Maoist activity in forested areas despite ongoing counter-insurgency measures.



Peripheral Districts: Peripheral districts refer to areas where Maoist-linked incidents occur only sporadically and where the insurgent presence is relatively limited or residual. Activity in these districts is generally confined to isolated surrenders, arrests, propaganda, intelligence-based recoveries, or occasional enforcement actions, rather than sustained armed engagement.


These districts lie on the margins of the core LWE belt and do not exhibit continuous operational activity during the reporting period.

- Koraput (Odisha): Reported isolated developments such as Maoist surrenders, suggesting limited operational activity during the month.
- Sundargarh (Odisha): Witnessed individual surrender events, indicating the presence of residual Maoist cadres rather than organised activity.
- Latehar (Jharkhand): Reported arrests of Maoist-linked individuals during security operations, highlighting enforcement-led disruption of networks.
- Giridih (Jharkhand): Saw arms recoveries during joint search operations, indicating residual Maoist logistical presence.
- Alluri Sitharama Raju (Andhra Pradesh): Incidents were limited to surrender events, suggesting declining Maoist operational activity.
- Munger (Bihar): Recorded the surrender of a senior Maoist leader, pointing to residual organisational presence rather than active conflict dynamics.



NATURE OF INCIDENTS

The incidents recorded during February reflect a predominance of non-violent developments alongside a smaller number of violent engagements, indicating that security force operations and rehabilitation initiatives continued to shape the overall trajectory of Left-Wing Extremism (LWE) activity during the month.



Violent Incidents:


Violent incidents during the reporting period primarily consisted of encounters between security forces and Maoist cadres, as well as IED explosions. These engagements were largely concentrated in established Maoist-affected areas and resulted in Maoist casualties in several cases. A few incidents also involved injuries to civilians or security personnel due to IED blasts. Overall, such incidents underscore that while Maoist groups retain the capacity to carry out targeted attacks, their operational engagements remain limited and episodic.

Non-Violent Incidents:

The majority of developments during the month fell within the non-violent category. These included surrenders of Maoist cadres, recoveries of arms and explosives, IED detection and neutralisation operations, arrests of Maoist-linked individuals, and the dismantling of Maoist

infrastructure or propaganda material. Policy announcements, outreach initiatives encouraging surrenders, and community-led actions against Maoist symbols were also recorded. The prevalence of such incidents highlights the increasing emphasis on security force dominance, intelligence-led operations, and rehabilitation-oriented approaches in countering the insurgency.

Taken together, the distribution of incidents suggests a shift toward containment and attrition of Maoist networks, with operational pressure and surrender policies playing a significant role alongside limited violent confrontations.



WEEK-WISE INCIDENTS

A week-wise analysis of the February dataset indicates that incidents were fairly distributed throughout the month, with a slight concentration during the first two weeks, when multiple security operations and surrender events were recorded. This pattern reflects sustained operational momentum by security forces alongside continued outreach efforts encouraging Maoist cadres to surrender.

Week 1 (1–7 February):

The first week recorded a high volume of activity, including several security operations, encounters, and a significant number of surrenders. Multiple Maoist cadres laid down arms during this period, while security forces also recovered arms, explosives, and Maoist logistical material during search operations. Policy developments and early outreach initiatives were also observed during the week.

Week 2 (8–14 February):

The second week saw continued operational activity, with several recoveries of explosives and IED neutralisation operations carried out by security forces. Strategic and policy-level developments were also recorded, alongside ongoing search operations aimed at dismantling Maoist logistical networks.


Week 3 (15–21 February):

During the third week, the dataset reflects a mix of surrenders, arrests, and limited violent incidents, including encounters and IED-related events. Outreach campaigns encouraging Maoist cadres to surrender also continued during this period.

Week 4 (22–28 February):

The final week of the month recorded encounter operations, additional surrenders, and further recovery of arms and explosives, along with community-led actions against Maoist structures in certain areas. These developments suggest sustained pressure on Maoist networks through both operational and community-level measures.

Overall, the week-wise distribution indicates consistent counter-insurgency activity across the month, with security operations, surrender drives, and policy initiatives collectively shaping the pattern of incidents.



ARRESTS AND SURRENDERS

Incidents recorded during February indicate that arrests and surrenders continued to form a significant component of counter-LWE efforts, reflecting sustained pressure on Maoist cadres and support networks alongside ongoing rehabilitation initiatives.


Surrenders:

The month witnessed a notable number of Maoist surrenders across several states, including both individual and group surrenders. In multiple instances, cadres surrendered with arms and ammunition, indicating the impact of sustained security operations as well as state-led surrender and rehabilitation policies. Several mass surrender events were also recorded, suggesting that outreach campaigns and reintegration measures are increasingly influencing lower and mid-level cadres to return to the mainstream.

Arrests:

A number of arrests of Maoist cadres and Maoist-linked individuals were also reported during the month. These arrests largely resulted from intelligence-based operations carried out by state police and central security forces. In some cases, arrests were linked to the recovery of illegal arms or exposure of support networks, highlighting continued efforts to disrupt logistical and organisational structures associated with Maoist groups.

Taken together, the trends in arrests and surrenders suggest a dual approach combining enforcement with rehabilitation, aimed at weakening Maoist organisational capacity while encouraging cadres to disengage from insurgent activities.



SECURITY OPERATIONS

Security operations during February remained a central component of counter-LWE efforts, with multiple search operations, encounters, and area domination exercises carried out across affected regions. These operations were primarily led by state police forces in coordination with central armed police forces, targeting Maoist hideouts, supply routes, and logistical infrastructure. Several intelligence-based operations resulted in the recovery of arms, explosives, and other materials from forested areas, indicating continued efforts to disrupt Maoist operational capabilities.

A number of encounter operations were reported during the month, leading to the elimination of several Maoist cadres. These engagements typically occurred during combing operations in Maoist-affected areas and formed part of ongoing efforts to maintain operational pressure on insurgent groups. At the same time, security forces conducted IED detection and neutralisation operations, successfully defusing multiple explosive devices planted along roads and forest routes. Such actions highlight both the continued use of improvised explosives by Maoist groups and the increasing emphasis on preventive measures by security forces.

In addition to combat operations, security forces undertook area domination patrols and the establishment of security infrastructure, aimed at strengthening the state's presence in vulnerable regions. These measures were complemented by intelligence-led searches and coordinated multi-agency operations targeting Maoist leadership and support networks. Taken together, the pattern of security operations during the month reflects a sustained strategy of operational pressure, disruption of logistical networks, and consolidation of security presence in Left-Wing Extremism-affected areas.

CASUALTY INDICATORS

Casualty trends recorded during February suggest that fatalities remained relatively limited and were largely concentrated in encounter-related incidents, with Maoist cadres accounting for the majority of deaths. Security force casualties were comparatively minimal, while a small number of civilians sustained injuries in IED-related incidents.

Maoist Casualties:

The dataset records multiple Maoist fatalities during encounter operations conducted by security forces across affected states. These included engagements in forested operational areas as well as follow-up operations during combing and search exercises. In total, around twenty Maoist cadres were reported killed during the month. In addition, one Maoist leader's body was recovered in a suspected intra-organisational killing, indicating possible internal tensions within insurgent ranks.


Security Force Casualties:

Security force losses during the month were limited. One security personnel succumbed to injuries sustained during an encounter operation, while a few others were reported injured in separate incidents, including IED blasts during operational patrols.

Civilian Casualties:

Civilian impact remained relatively low, with two villagers reported injured in an IED explosion in a forested area. Such incidents highlight the continued risks posed by improvised explosive devices planted by Maoist groups in remote regions.

Overall, the casualty pattern for February indicates that security forces maintained operational advantage during engagements, with Maoist cadres accounting for the majority of fatalities and limited casualties reported among security personnel and civilians.




IED RELATED INCIDENTS

IED-related activity during February continued to feature prominently in the operational landscape of Left-Wing Extremism (LWE), reflecting the continued reliance of Maoist groups on improvised explosive devices as a tactical tool against security forces. Several incidents involved the recovery and neutralisation of IEDs during search and area domination operations, highlighting both the scale of Maoist explosive stockpiles and the effectiveness of preventive security measures.

Security forces detected and safely neutralised multiple IEDs of varying capacities, including pressure-cooker devices and large road-side explosives planted along forest routes and operational corridors. These operations were primarily conducted by specialised bomb disposal squads during combing exercises, preventing potential casualties and disruption to security force movement. In some instances, explosives were recovered from Maoist dumps uncovered during intelligence-based operations.

Despite these preventive measures, a small number of IED explosions were also reported, resulting in injuries to civilians and security personnel in separate incidents. Such cases underscore the continued threat posed by improvised explosives in Maoist-affected areas, particularly along forest tracks and movement routes frequently used by security forces.

Overall, the pattern of incidents suggests that while Maoist groups continue to employ IEDs as a primary tactical device, enhanced surveillance, search operations, and bomb disposal capabilities are increasingly enabling security forces to detect and neutralise these threats before they result in significant casualties.



RECOVERIES

Recoveries of arms, explosives, and other Maoist materials formed an important component of security operations during February, reflecting sustained efforts by security forces to disrupt the logistical and operational capabilities of Maoist groups. Several intelligence-based search operations led to the discovery of Maoist dumps containing weapons, explosives, and operational supplies hidden in forested areas.

Among the materials recovered during these operations were assault rifles, grenades, mortar shells, rocket launcher components, and large quantities of explosive materials, including BGL cells and pressure-cooker IEDs. In some cases, security forces also recovered uniforms, rations, and other logistical items used by Maoist cadres, indicating the dismantling of temporary storage sites and supply caches.

In addition to arms and explosives, recoveries also included firearms and equipment from illegal arms manufacturing units, as well as weapons surrendered by Maoist cadres during rehabilitation initiatives. These recoveries highlight the role of coordinated intelligence-led operations in weakening Maoist infrastructure and restricting their access to weapons and explosive materials.

Overall, the recoveries recorded during the month underscore continued efforts by security forces to identify and dismantle Maoist supply chains, destroy hidden arms caches, and prevent the use of explosives in future attacks.

COMPARATIVE TRENDS 2025 & 2026

February 2026 recorded a higher number of total incidents compared to February 2025. However, similar to the pattern observed in 2025, the increase in incident volume appears to be driven primarily by intensified security force activity rather than an escalation in Maoist offensive operations. The majority of recorded incidents in 2026 consisted of search operations, recoveries, surrenders, and intelligence-led enforcement actions.

Geographic Concentration

Both years demonstrate a continued concentration of activity within the central LWE belt, with Chhattisgarh remaining the principal theatre. In February 2025, the majority of incidents were concentrated in Chhattisgarh, followed by Maharashtra, Jharkhand and Telangana.

The February 2026 dataset reflects a similar geographic pattern, although with greater activity across Odisha and Telangana, indicating the persistence of Maoist influence along inter-state corridors surrounding the Bastar region.

Nature of Violent Incidents

In both February 2025 and February 2026, violent incidents remained relatively limited and localized.

The 2025 data reflected sporadic encounters and IED-related incidents, with no evidence of large-scale coordinated Maoist attacks. A similar trend is visible in February 2026, where encounters and isolated IED blasts were reported but large-scale Maoist offensives remained absent, suggesting that Maoist formations continue to operate in a defensive posture under sustained operational pressure.

Arrests and Surrenders

A key point of continuity between the two periods is the prominence of arrests and surrenders. February 2025 recorded a noticeable rise in arrests and surrenders, including mid- and senior-level cadres.

In February 2026, this trend appears even more pronounced, with several large-scale surrender events and the surrender of senior cadres across multiple states. This suggests continued organisational strain within Maoist ranks and the effectiveness of surrender and rehabilitation policies.

Security Operations and Encounters

Security operations remained a defining feature in both periods. February 2025 witnessed multiple intelligence-led encounters involving coordinated operations between specialised units such as DRG, CoBRA, CRPF and state police forces.

February 2026 reflects a continuation and possible expansion of this operational approach, with multiple search operations, encounters, and arms recoveries recorded across several states.

IED Threat and Recoveries

IEDs remained a preferred Maoist tactical tool in both years, particularly for targeting security force movements along forest routes. However, both datasets suggest that improved counter-IED capabilities and intelligence-led operations have reduced the operational impact of such devices, with several explosives detected and neutralised before causing casualties.

Overall Trend

Taken together, the comparison between February 2025 and February 2026 suggests continuity in the overall trajectory of the conflict. Maoist groups appear to be operating in a defensive and increasingly constrained operational environment, while security forces maintain the initiative through sustained operational pressure, intelligence-led actions, and surrender-focused outreach. At the same time, the persistence of IED-related incidents and scattered encounters indicates that residual insurgent capabilities remain present in core LWE zones.

PROGNOSIS

The trends observed in February suggest that security forces are likely to retain operational initiative in the near term, with continued emphasis on intelligence-led operations, area domination patrols, and the dismantling of Maoist logistical infrastructure. The sustained pace of arrests, surrenders, and recoveries indicates that Maoist organisational structures are facing increasing operational and psychological pressure, particularly in core theatres.

At the same time, Maoist groups are likely to continue relying on low-cost, tactical methods such as IED deployment, small-scale ambushes, and mobility within forested terrain to offset the growing operational dominance of security forces. Such tactics allow insurgent formations to maintain a presence while avoiding direct large-scale engagements.

The geographic pattern of incidents suggests that the Bastar region and adjoining inter-state corridors will remain the principal theatres of activity, even as Maoist influence continues to contract in several peripheral districts. Security force efforts to expand infrastructure, establish forward operating bases, and improve connectivity in these areas are likely to further constrain insurgent mobility and logistical networks.

In the medium term, the continued success of surrender and rehabilitation policies, combined with sustained operational pressure, may contribute to further fragmentation within Maoist ranks, particularly among lower and mid-level cadres. However, the persistence of IED threats and isolated encounters indicates that residual insurgent capabilities will remain a security challenge, requiring continued vigilance and coordinated counter-insurgency efforts.

CONCLUSION

The February analysis indicates that the operational environment of Left-Wing Extremism continues to be shaped largely by security force initiative rather than Maoist escalation. The majority of recorded incidents were linked to intelligence-led operations, recoveries of arms and explosives, arrests, and surrenders, suggesting sustained pressure on Maoist networks across core theatres.

At the same time, violent incidents remained limited and largely localized, with sporadic encounters and IED-related incidents reflecting the continued reliance of Maoist groups on low-intensity tactical methods rather than large-scale coordinated attacks. This pattern suggests that insurgent formations are operating in a defensive posture while attempting to retain limited operational relevance in traditional strongholds.

The continued rise in surrenders and arrests, along with the recovery of weapons and explosive materials, indicates growing strain within Maoist organisational structures. While the persistence of IED threats and scattered incidents underscores the need for sustained vigilance, the broader trends suggest that counter-insurgency efforts are gradually constricting the operational space available to Maoist groups across the affected regions.



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