Introduction 

Myanmar has been in a state of chaos since the military coup in February 2021, when the Tatmadaw seized power from the Aung San Suu Kyi-led National League for Democracy (NLD). The country entered a period of civil war, with the military junta facing numerous opposition groups, including armed ethnic organisations and the civilian-led People’s Defence Force (PDF), which was formed under the National Unity Government (NUG) in response to the military coup.

What was once seen as a military effort to restore the Constitution’s integrity and uphold the rule of law has come full circle. The Tatmadaw, which regards itself as the guardian of national unity, is now confronting Ethnic Armed Organisations (EAOs), launching attacks on military assets and democratic forces fighting to dislodge the military junta.

The junta^[1], on the other hand, has announced elections in December 2025 with the caveat that Myanmar achieve a state of relative peace and stability. The national census conducted last year in preparation for the polls was also opposed by the EAOs and prevented from being carried out in the EAO-controlled areas. Initial reports suggest that if elections were to take place, they would be in 102 out of the 330 townships in the country, as the remaining are predominantly EAO-controlled areas. While the resistance has pledged to oppose the outcome of the elections, the junta remains firm in asserting the unity of Myanmar.

Finally, the increasing internal complexity in Myanmar has significantly impacted India, which shares over 1643 km of porous land borders with the northeast region and has transnational ethnic links. Furthermore, countries such as China, Russia, and the United States have also expanded their influence, either through the EAOs or the junta, and in China’s case, through both. There are signs of intense competition over critical earth minerals and other natural resources. Therefore, the effects of the civil war-like conflict go well beyond a refugee crisis for India, leading to lasting consequences for the northeastern region.

Myanmar – Traversing From Elections in 2021 to Elections in 2025

There has been much debate about territorial control in Myanmar, with the main question being ‘who controls more territory in the ongoing conflict?’. This assessment aims to identify the ‘winning side’. While some argue that the EAOs have gained more territory, others believe it is roughly evenly split. However, when considering the population, it becomes evident that the junta controls a larger number of people.

The other issue that arises is governance and administration. While most Tatmadaw-controlled areas are functional concerning basic necessities and relative peace, the EAO-controlled regions have been isolated. With the absence of proper administration and essentials such as electricity, petrol, or even functioning schools, the outlook for the future remains bleak. The current circumstances are negatively impacting ordinary people, leading to increased migration.

However, while the junta has announced elections in Myanmar to restore democracy, it is important to note that the polls can only be held in areas under military control. UEC, via notification No. 56/2025 dated 20th August, announced the schedule for the first phase of the general election, which is set to take place on 28th December 2025. Elections will be held in 102 townships, including six in Kachin State, two in Kayah State, three in Kayin (Karen) State, two in Chin State, twelve in Sagaing Region, eight in Bago Region, nine in Magway Region, eight in Mandalay Region, five in Mon State, three in Rakhine State, twelve in Yangon Region, twelve in Shan State, eight in Ayeyarwady Region, and eight townships in Naypyitaw (National Union Territory).

EAOs and the NUG have boycotted the elections, vowing to continue their struggle for liberation against the regime of the Tatmadaw. The NUG is an umbrella body that emerged after the coup in February 2021. It has brought together, albeit loosely, most of the EAOs except for some, such as the Arakan Army from Rakhine State, among others. The EAOs under the NUG are demanding a complete separation of the Tatmadaw from politics in Myanmar, which would require amending the 2008 Constitution, as it reserves 25% of the seats in national and local parliaments. A statement by the NUG on 24^th August 2025, in response to the announcement of elections, stated that “the results of the 2020 elections remain valid” and that “they (NUG) will continue to resist by every means available – any attempt to impose a sham election at gunpoint”.

Regarding geography, Myanmar borders India and Bangladesh to the west, China to the north and northeast, and Laos and Thailand to the east and southeast. It also has coastlines along the Andaman Sea and the Bay of Bengal in the south and southwest. India shares 1643 km of porous borders with Myanmar, mainly in large EAO-controlled areas like Chin State, Sagaing Region, and Kachin State. Additionally, southern Chin State borders India and is controlled by the Arakan Army from Rakhine State.

Therefore, it becomes essential for India to remain vigilant about security implications in the near future. Against the backdrop of increased migration due to conflict and shortages of necessities, which have led to a surge in illicit activities along the border, India must develop a viable strategy to address the inevitable threats. There is also an added risk of Indian Insurgent Groups (IIGs) reviving in Myanmar, as well as international vested interests exploiting these fault lines for more intense geo-strategic confrontations.

^[2]

Increase in International Presence

China

Since the coup in 2021, China’s influence in Myanmar has only grown. Not only do they control some of the EAOs, but they also pressure the Tatmadaw when necessary. They also have a special envoy for Myanmar who often negotiates between the Tatmadaw and the EAOs. The most recent example of this assertion of influence was when Chinese special envoy to Myanmar Deng Xijun arrived in Lashio^[3] to supervise the handover of the capital of the northern Shan State to the military junta by the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA). Surprisingly, MNDAA suffered significant losses, including hundreds of soldiers who lost their lives fighting for Lashio. This territorial expansion made the military junta uneasy, leading to Chinese involvement in negotiations for a withdrawal.

The challenge for China is that the Tatmadaw has not been able to stabilise Myanmar or effectively consolidate its power. Consequently, this threatens China’s infrastructure investments. Whether it is the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC), its oil and gas pipelines, or the Kyaukphyu deep seaport, without political stability and control over EAOs, China’s alternative to its “Achilles’ heel”, the Strait of Malacca, will remain vulnerable. China’s natural gas and oil pipeline, which begins in Kyaukphyu city of Myanmar’s Rakhine State, passes through the Magway Region, Mandalay Region, and Shan State before entering China’s Yunnan region, serving as China’s springboard to ASEAN, just as the northeast region is a springboard to ASEAN for India. Importantly, Gwadar port, part of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), and Kyaukphyu port provide China with an advantage in strategically containing India and blocking access to the West and East.

Additionally, Western policies have over the years almost coerced Myanmar into turning towards China and Russia for support. Washington had even accused Myanmar’s defence ministry of importing nearly USD 1 billion worth of materials and raw materials to manufacture arms.^[4] China continues to be Myanmar’s main source of foreign investment, with 40% of its foreign debt owed to China.^[5] Furthermore, there is a risk that sanctions could worsen China’s debt trap strategy. Considering China’s projects in Myanmar that have advanced under the junta, and the ambitious Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), India has every reason to be concerned about China’s interest in a ‘back door’ access to the Indian Ocean. Additionally, Myanmar’s rich oil and natural gas reserves, along with its fragile geographical position, have made it a key focus in China’s future plans.^[6]

United States of America

The US has recently changed its stance towards the military junta and lifted sanctions on its allies after Senior General Min Aung Hlaing praised President Donald Trump. While Human Rights Watch described the move as extremely worrying, the shift in US policy is significant and abrupt.^[7]

Of late, Myanmar ranks among the top four countries in the world for producing rare earth elements. The highly profitable illegal mining, coupled with political instability, has prompted EAOS and other groups to seek markets beyond China. Unregulated mining and ongoing political turmoil have fostered an environment of clandestine dealings and profit sharing among militias and insurgent groups. Chin and Rakhine States, along with Sagaing Region and Kachin State, are also rich in resources such as aluminium, nickel, iron, chromite, oil, and gas. Most notably, these areas are abundant in heavy rare earth elements (HREE), like dysprosium and terbium, which are considered the most critical elements among rare earths.^[8] EAOs are actively seeking partners for exploration in territories under their control.

The US seems to have a vested interest in the market. Early in August 2025, with the lifting of sanctions, some junta leaders reported that the Trump administration had been approached with proposals to access Myanmar’s critical earth minerals and HREE.^[9] Incidentally, the US also lifted sanctions from the military junta leadership in July 2025, which has been seen as a thawing of relations between the US and the military junta. If the US were to get involved and shift its policy towards the military junta, India can be assured of contestations between China and the US in its own backyard.

Conclusion 

As the military junta moves forward with its plans for elections, it is expected that the offensive against the Tatmadaw by the EAOs will intensify. However, without a central figure like Aung San Suu Kyi, the resistance will find it difficult to coordinate a united offensive and develop a cohesive political strategy. Reports indicate that Suu Kyi is in poor health and under house arrest. Furthermore, the NLD has not registered for the elections. Given the current situation, it is likely that the military-backed USDP will assume power, supported by smaller political parties from EAO-controlled areas and some EAOs involved in the peace process. Considering that the 2008 Constitution grants 25% of seats to the Tatmadaw, it is probable they will remain in control.

Furthermore, the contours of the civil war have changed drastically. After the 2021 coup, it seemed like the resistance forces were gaining influence and territory, but recent counter-attacks by the Tatmadaw have altered the scenario. Multiple towns, such as Nawngkhio and Mobye, as well as towns in the Sagaing region, have been retaken by the military. This will have repercussions on India’s border states. Porous as they are, the refugee influx will remain constant.

To add to the emerging complex dynamics, the presence of international players in India’s backyard may lead to further conflicts. However, while India should closely monitor developments in Myanmar, it must also recognise that Myanmar is not easily dominated by China. India arguably shares more goodwill with the military junta, the NUG, and some EAOs than China ever will.

While China may manoeuvre strategically across faultlines in Myanmar, the reality remains that China and the Chinese do not enjoy the same level of goodwill as Indians do in Myanmar. The Chinese are perceived as purely transactional. In an interview^[10] given to Associated Press, Richard Horsey of the International Crisis Group said, “There is a deep well of anti-Chinese sentiment in Myanmar, particularly in the military, and Min Aung Hlaing is known to harbour particularly strong anti-Chinese views. I don’t think China really cares whether it is a military regime or some other type of government in Myanmar. The main issue with the regime, in Beijing’s view, is that it is headed by someone they distrust and dislike, and who they see as fundamentally incompetent.”

However, with anxieties increasing about China’s presence in Myanmar, India could respond to situations more skillfully. For instance, China is concerned about its assets in Myanmar, and to that end, it has introduced the Joint Security Venture Company (JSVC) initiative, whereby international companies can bring their own security to protect their assets. It is reported that there are over 500 Chinese nationals in Rakhine State. India could take similar steps to safeguard its Kaladan Multimodal Transit Transport Project (KMTTP). India’s best strategy is to engage with stakeholders and defend its own interests in Myanmar while providing all necessary humanitarian aid and leveraging the existing goodwill across the spectrum.

Although India’s soft power remains strong, mainly through its Buddhist connections, relying on it alone is unwise. Myanmar is likely to attract many international players competing for influence. Furthermore, the US and China may contend through Myanmar, potentially affecting India as well. Therefore, India should start strategically building strong relationships with local communities along its northeastern borders. The locals need medical aid, higher education, and other essentials. India can help by fostering a generation of Myanmarese who feel a connection to India. This involves providing basic medical support and equipment to states like Chin and Rakhine. Additionally, India can make special arrangements for conflict-affected students to study there.

For border security, it is crucial to spread accurate information to locals on both sides. There is widespread anxiety caused by rumours that the borders will be completely shut down on both ends. The Indian government’s policy should be clarified and must reassure those who legitimately trade through border haats or have family ties across the border.

The mesh wire fencing in the “Hybrid Fencing” pilot project, as observed in some areas near Pangsau Pass in the northeast, may not be adequate. There are risks of misuse. However, the electronic surveillance system is a welcome development. It is crucial that tracking and biometrics of all individuals entering are made compulsory to prevent any illegal infiltration. Refugees seeking temporary shelter must be registered.

Finally, India must strengthen its engagement with Myanmar at all levels. The more foresighted India is at this stage, the more secure its northeastern borders will become in the future. Policymakers, civilians, NGOs, scholars, religious groups, and the military must work together systematically. Myanmar is crucial for regional stability, and if India aims to maintain stability in its vicinity, it must act as a stakeholder. Although India has shown a mature diplomatic approach towards Myanmar so far, the unpredictable nature of the conflict there means that even elections might not resolve the issues. Therefore, India should develop a long-term strategic plan and engage accordingly.

Author Brief Bio: Rami Niranjan Desai is an author, anthropologist and researcher with subject expertise in the north east region of India and India’s neighborhood. She has studied at King’s College, London where she received her degrees in Anthropology of religion and Theology. Rami has spent over two decades studying insurgency, ethnic armed organisations, religion and identity issues. Her vast repository of work is based on her groundbreaking fieldwork over the years in the northeast region and in India’s neighborhood such as Myanmar. She is also well known for her research and analysis and is invited regularly by private and government organisations as a subject expert. She has also collaborated and published books on various occasions with organisations and universities such as Manipur University and Indira Gandhi National Tribal University. She regularly writes for various journals and national publications such as India Today, Open Magazine and has a weekly column called “Ramification” in Firstpost. She is also a regular television panelist appearing on all major English and Hindi news channels. As Distinguished Fellow at India Foundation she focusses on current affairs, the northeast region of India and the neighbourhood. She also curates India Foundation’s flagship event India Ideas Conclave and podcast Insight while leading other significant initiatives.

 

References:

^[1] The Tatmadaw is referred to the armed forces and the military junta to the governing power held by a council from the Tatmadaw.

^[2] Source: https://testbook.com/question-answer/imphal-is-the-capital-of-which-indian-state–602b91a8a8f29940c971bec0

^[3] Chinese Envoy in Lashio to Broker Return of Myanmar Military. (2025, April 22). Retrieved from The Irrawaddy: https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/myanmar-china-watch/chinese-envoy-in-lashio-to-broker-return-of-myanmar-military.html

^[4] The Billion Dollar Death Trade: The International Arms Networks. (2023). Retrieved from Human Rights Council: https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/countries/myanmar/crp-sr-myanmar-2023-05-17.pdf

^[5] Thein, H. H. (2022, November 22). China is pouring money into junta-ruled Myanmar to secure a ‘back door’ to the Indian Ocean. Retrieved from Scroll: https://scroll.in/article/1037882/china-is-pouring-money-into-junta-ruled-myanmar-to-secure-a-back-door-to-the-indian-ocean

^[6] Desai, R. N. (2024, November 4). From Shared Past to Uncertain Future: India’s Strategic Calculus in a Coup-Stricken Myanmar. Retrieved from India Foundation: https://indiafoundation.in/articles-and-commentaries/from-shared-past-to-uncertain-future-indias-strategic-calculus-in-a-coup-stricken-myanmar/#_ednref1

^[7] https://www.thehindu.com/news/international/us-lifts-sanctions-on-myanmar-junta-allies-after-general-praises-trump/article69853784.ece

^[8] Desai, R. N. (2023, September 29). The New Great Game. Retrieved from Open Magazine: https://openthemagazine.com/columns/the-new-great-game/

^[9] Poling, G. B. (2025, August 1). The Dangerous Allure of Myanmar’s Rare Earths. Retrieved from Centre for Strategic and International Studies: https://www.csis.org/analysis/dangerous-allure-myanmars-rare-earths

^[10] Peck, G. (2024, August 14). China’s foreign minister meets with Myanmar’s military boss as civil war strains their relations. Retrieved from APnews: https://apnews.com/article/myanmar-china-foreign-minister-civil-war-277613b65eae72e7e1dbd442232b6481

 

If India and its neighbourhood are to be summed up in one sentence, it would be ‘uncertain terrestrial and uneasy maritime neighbours’. A closer look at each is necessary.

Bangladesh has experienced turbulence over the past year since PM Sheikh Hasina was ousted in a so-called student agitation. The army facilitated her safe exit to India, where she has remained. How Prof Yunus Mohammed, a Nobel laureate, was appointed as an Advisor to an unconstitutional government comprising six Advisors makes it clear that the entire regime change was orchestrated by a major power’s deep state—a combination of foreign service and intelligence agency.

The events leading up to the downfall of the Sheikh Hasina regime highlight US concerns about China’s growing influence in the region, which could provide easier access to the Bay of Bengal. The PRC already exerts significant influence over the Junta in Myanmar, as well as the warring factions. It may be noted that China has operational control of Kyaukphu deep-sea port (located in Rakhine State and under the control of one of the warring factions), which China uses to offload Gulf crude for further transport to the oil refinery in Kunming. The port also functions as a key hub for managing container traffic from China.

The Bay of Bengal gives China access to the adjoining Indian Ocean without needing to navigate through the Straits of Malacca. The Chinese have long seen passage through the Malacca Straits as their vulnerability due to the threat of interdiction by the US and Indian navies during periods of increased tension. Hu Jintao called it the ‘Malacca Dilemma’. To challenge the Chinese, the US aimed to control Bangladesh’s St Martin’s Island, located a few miles from Myanmar. Sheikh Hasina’s refusal to agree to this demand was possibly one of the reasons behind the regime change in Bangladesh.

Post-Hasina, law and order have deteriorated significantly in Bangladesh. Large-scale killings of minority Hindus, Christians, and Sikhs have alarmed the world, particularly India. Mass migration across the porous India-Bangladesh border has compelled India to tighten border controls. Additionally, Advisor Yunus has started engaging with China and Pakistan. Chinese engineers have surveyed an abandoned airfield at Lalmunir Hat (about 135 km from the Chicken’s Neck area) for development into a fully operational airport. This could pose a security threat to India. Recently, a Pakistani general declared that they will negotiate with Bangladesh and open another front against India in the eastern theatre.

The great power competition is emerging in the Bay of Bengal region, which has so far been free from any geopolitical contestation. This could limit the Indian Navy’s operations and DRDO’s missile programme, which might come under surveillance.

That brings us to three northern neighbours, Bhutan, Nepal and the Tibet Autonomous Region (under Chinese occupation). Bhutan is a nascent democracy which shares borders with Tibet, Nepal and India. There have been some attempts by the PLA resorting to salami slicing into Indian territory through the Bhutan border, with Doklam being one such example in recent times. Bhutan has also been under pressure from China to cede some part of its northern forested territory, claiming historic rights.

Politically, Bhutan is a fledgling democracy; as such, some political parties, when in power, tend to hedge between India and China. China’s economic coercion and inducements of individual graft are effective in South Asia. The supreme authority lies with HRH the King of Bhutan, who understands geopolitics quite well and has avoided any decisions that could pose a security threat to India, which has traditionally supported Bhutan’s economic development. The Indian government regards Bhutan as its closest ally and has been supporting its education, power generation, and tourism sectors, helping it attain self-sufficiency.

Nepal is somewhat unique. Historically, some political parties in power have balanced between India and China to get the best advantages from both, despite India’s strong support in various aspects of Nepal’s development. Sectors such as tourism, transport, culture, religion, education, security, training, access to maritime trade, and oil supply are areas of close cooperation. Cultural and religious ties, along with a large Indian-origin population, in the Terai region, lead to cross-border marriages. The borders have generally remained open, and the border security forces on both sides maintain very friendly relations.

On the maritime front, India has two neighbours: Sri Lanka and the Maldives. Sri Lanka is a long-established democracy with a multiparty parliament. It has a directly elected President who wields almost all executive power. However, some issues require parliamentary approval, which the Prime Minister oversees. Much of its foreign policy is based on its understanding of geopolitical realities. The country has been observed hedging between India and China at times. Given its strategic location in the Indian Ocean and China’s energy security concerns, appeasing Sri Lanka remains a central aspect of the PRC’s foreign policy.

Under the guise of development, China has invested substantial sums in Sri Lanka, mainly through large loans for infrastructure projects. Overestimating its repayment ability, Sri Lanka has fallen into a debt trap. Consequently, public unrest emerged, leading to the president fleeing the country. An interim government was established under the leadership of HE Ranil Wickremesinghe as the consensus candidate. India stepped in to provide a loan or aid of approximately $3.3 billion, and many economic reforms were introduced. The economy appears to have stabilised. Chinese debt for equity also resulted in the leasing of Hambantota and Colombo South ports to China. It has been noted that, although China generally utilises these ports for commercial purposes, warships, submarines, and ocean survey ships occasionally use them, raising security concerns for India. The PLAN shipborne radars can monitor India’s maritime activities and missile developments. When considered alongside China’s recent attempts to ingress the Bay of Bengal via land routes through Bangladesh and Myanmar, it does not bode well for India.

The Maldives is another neighbour with a developing democracy. Having transitioned from Abdul Gayum’s dictatorship, Mr. Nasheed was elected as the first President. His approach to India was that of a friendly neighbour. India responded positively by providing developmental aid and essentials to remote islands. Given the Maldives’ geographical location, India is very significant. China saw an opportunity for economic coercion by offering large sums and faster developmental infrastructure work. Gradually, Chinese influence began to grow and aligned with the String of Pearls concept, which involves encircling India with Chinese-influenced states for long-term strategic advantage. Indian contractor GMR was asked to leave even before its contract expired. Clearly, the future of India-Maldives relations requires reconsideration.

Following the general elections, Mr Yameen came to power, and his inclination towards the PRC was well known. Although he made prudent diplomatic moves to convince India that the Maldives was its closest friend and a good neighbour, his policies were pro-China. There came a point when a specific island, which was nearest to India’s Minicoy island, was being leased to China. This caused concern in South Block, prompting senior Indian diplomats to travel to Male and express India’s serious concerns. Crossing the red line was not expected from a neighbouring state. The remaining five years under Yameen’s presidency remained challenging. Nonetheless, India maintained its friendly stance and honoured all commitments. The next election cycle resulted in a government led by Mr Solih, who was optimistic about India’s contribution to its development. However, five years later, Coalition candidate Mr Moizzu won the election on the slogan of ‘India Out’. The clear direction of his policies was towards closeness to the PRC. He observed protests on the streets by people demanding closer ties with India. This was followed by two or three severe shortages in the country, which were addressed with equal urgency by New Delhi. The President recognised the importance of India and its stature in the public eye. He called on the Prime Minister in Delhi to reset the relations and withdrew most of the proposals that were pending approval for the PRC.

Overall, there has been a fluctuating cycle of alliances. The Government of India has upheld its supportive stance, honouring every agreement and signing new ones. China’s influence operation is likely to continue as part of its foreign policy.

India’s immediate neighbourhood narrative cannot be complete without reflecting upon the most irritating neighbour, Pakistan. Born out of the two-nation theory, Pakistan is yet to find itself. Currently, the country is struggling with financial problems. Yet, it continues to harbour terrorist organisations that have been the source of terrorism worldwide. To annexe the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir, Pakistan has launched a low-intensity conflict using terrorist groups. It has practised bleeding India with a thousand cuts. On several occasions, this has escalated into a full-fledged war.

In 1971, when India intervened in East Pakistan, the region was under martial law and subjected to repression of Bengali-speaking citizens. That war led to the disintegration of Pakistan and the creation of Bangladesh. Since the current government led by Shri Narendra Modi came to power in 2014, India has responded to cross-border terrorism with military actions against known terrorist camps in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK). Terror incidents in J&K have been met with military responses across the border. There is substantial evidence that the Pakistan Army and its intelligence agency, ISI, are the main perpetrators of terrorism, financing terror groups to attack innocent civilians in J&K. Most recently, 26 innocent tourists were killed in Pahalgam. India responded through Operation Sindoor, striking at the heart of the terror network in Pakistan and causing severe damage to Pakistan’s air defence capabilities. Having achieved its objectives, India accepted Pakistan’s request for a ceasefire. However, India has made it clear that, henceforth, any terrorist attack will be treated as war and responded to accordingly.

India’s immediate neighbourhood is anything but peaceful. Maintaining peace to enable India’s growth story will remain the defining challenge of the coming decade.

Author Brief Bio: Vice Admiral Shekhar Sinha was the Commander in Chief of the operationally active Western Naval Command, responsible for maritime security of Sea Lanes of Communication in Arabian Sea and both, Gulf of Aden and Persian Gulf. Prior to assuming this assignment he was Chief of Integrated Defense Staff to Chiefs of Staff committee. He has been awarded the ParamVishishth and AtiVishishthSewa Medal for exceptional service to the Navy. He has also been conferred with two Gallantry awards.

 

In the post-COVID era, three conflicts have set in motion the process of shifting alliances: The Russia-Ukraine War, the Israel-Iran War, and the brief four-day India-Pakistan War.

The Russia-Ukraine war, which is still ongoing, started on 24 February 2022, when Russia launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine. However, the conflict can be traced back to 2014, when Russia annexed Crimea, and fighting erupted in eastern Ukraine between Ukrainian forces and Russian-backed separatists in the Donbas region.

Crimea has a fascinating history. It was a part of the Ottoman Empire till its annexation by the Russian Empress Catherine the Great in 1783, following the Russo-Turkish Wars. In the mid-19th century (1853–56), Britain, France, and the Ottoman Empire fought and defeated the Russians in Crimea. Crimea, however, remained under Russian control and increased in strategic importance, with Sevastopol established as the base of the Black Sea Fleet. Following the 1917 Russian Revolution, Crimea was established as the Crimean Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic within the Soviet Union in 1921. It was occupied for a brief period by Nazi Germany from 1941 to 44. In 1945, after the end of World War II, Crimea’s autonomy was abolished, and it became the Crimean Oblast of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR). In 1954, on administrative grounds, Nikita Khrushchev transferred Crimea from the RSFSR to the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. After the collapse of the USSR in 1991, Crimea became part of independent Ukraine, though with a majority ethnic Russian population and continued presence of Russia’s Black Sea Fleet in Sevastopol. Disputes over Crimea simmered until 2014, when Russia annexed it following Ukraine’s political upheaval.

The Russia-Ukraine war is now into its fourth year. Whether US President Trump’s efforts lead to lasting peace or not, the conflict is unlikely to persist much longer, as fatigue has set in among the leading players and their supporters. However, conflict termination will likely be on Russian terms, where Russia would retain the territories it has taken, namely the Donbas region and the Zaporizhzhia and Kherson Oblasts. It will also require some form of assurance that Ukraine will not be admitted to NATO. The deal will involve economic assistance to Ukraine. Some European powers may not be pleased with such a deal, but the U.S. could push for it to gain access to Ukraine’s mineral wealth. In April of this year, a joint Reconstruction Investment Fund was established under the Ukraine–United States Mineral Resources Agreement signed between the two countries. Under this agreement, Ukraine will contribute 50% of future revenue from government-owned natural resources, including rare-earth elements, oil, and gas. There is also a proposal that Exxon will re-enter Russia’s Sakhalin-1 and the US will purchase Russian nuclear icebreakers, while Russia will purchase U.S. equipment for Arctic LNG-2.^[i] In the final analysis, the deals will be a win-win for the US and Russia and could bring an end to the war.

With trade as leverage, another notable outcome is the agreement reached between Armenia and Azerbaijan in early August at the White House, which commits both parties to ending a four-decade-long hostility. At the centre of the dispute is the Nagorno-Karabakh region. This mountainous enclave is internationally recognised as part of Azerbaijan but is predominantly populated by ethnic Armenians. In the second Nagorno-Karabakh War in September 2020, Azerbaijan emerged victorious, regaining control of the region. Azerbaijan also took the remaining Armenian-held areas of Nagorno-Karabakh in their 2023 offensive. Now, under the deal signed between the two nations, the US has been granted a 99-year lease over the Zangezur Corridor—a narrow strip of land that will serve as a vital trade and energy route to Europe, completely bypassing Tehran. Named the Trump Route for Peace & Prosperity (TRIPP), it secures a direct role for Washington in supervising the flow of Caspian hydrocarbons to Europe, with the US managing rail and road infrastructure, telecom networks, and energy pipelines running through the corridor. US companies will now dominate regional transit for oil, gas, and goods. Essentially, the peace agreement has been established by anchoring US security guarantees, such as the economic-focused initiatives like the Abraham Accords.^[ii] This is a notable win for the US and NATO. Tehran, however, loses leverage as its ability to shape energy and trade flows in the Caucasians is degraded.

The Israel-Gaza war, which resulted from the dastardly 7 October 2023 attack on Israeli civilians, is still ongoing. This conflict spilt over into a war between Israel and Iran on 13 June, with Israel launching hundreds of air strikes on Iran’s military and nuclear infrastructure. Several key Iranian leaders were also assassinated at the start of this war. Iran responded with attacks on Israel using missiles and drones. The US entered the conflict on 21 June and struck three Iranian nuclear sites—Natanz, Fordow, and Isfahan. The U.S. brokered a fragile ceasefire that took effect on June 24, 2025. While the war has once again underscored the central role of the US in maintaining peace in the region, it has also highlighted its limitations. Iran has been weakened, and the capabilities of its proxies, Hamas in the Gaza Strip and Hezbollah in Lebanon, are considerably degraded. Iran’s nuclear facilities have also been degraded. However, Iran’s missile and drone attacks on Israel demonstrated reach and resilience, which would impose some form of deterrence. Geo-politically, the situation is still unravelling, but any future peace deal will, in all probability, have a substantial economic commitment to make it durable.

The unfolding events in Syria are also impacting the geopolitical environment in West Asia. The fall of Bashar al-Assad in December 2024 ended the civil war that was raging in Syria. But that has not brought about peace, which remains elusive. Ahmed al-Sharaa, aka Abu Mohammad al-Julani, who heads the transitional government, was an al-Qaeda operative who spent many years in U.S. detention. He founded the al-Nusrat Front in 2011. In 2016, he merged various factions to create the Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS). After taking over power in Syria, he met with President Trump in Saudi Arabia in May, following which all sanctions against Syria were lifted. This signals possible normalisation within the framework of the Abraham Accords, though such an outcome is still far from being achieved.

The situation in Syria remains fragile. Julani does not govern a unified country. In Northeast Syria, Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) control the area, including Hasakah, Qamishli, much of Raqqa, and Deir ez-Zor. The U.S. and the West support the SDF. Turkey backs the Northern Aleppo region, including Jarabulus, Afrin, and Azaz, and also has its troops stationed there. The Druze in the Sweida Province of southern Syria and the Alawites in coastal Latakia are all opposed to the Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), led by Ahmed al-Sharaa. Syria is thus fragmented and will probably remain so in the near future.

This has set in motion a different set of dynamics. Russia now faces a challenge in maintaining its military bases and political influence. Its military bases include the Khmeimim Air Base, which has been its central operational hub since 2015 and which functions as its command and control centre for its military presence in Syria. It also includes the Tartous Naval Facility, Russia’s only naval base in the Mediterranean till 2066, which serves as a logistics and supply hub for Russian naval operations. While the change of regime in Syria has decreased Russian influence there, it is exploring alternative ways to sustain it. This may involve efforts to infiltrate the Syrian economy through new front companies, creating outright dependencies, building personal networks involving Syrian political, economic, and military figures, exploiting societal divisions, and portraying itself as a protector of minority interests. Russia’s leverage would increase in a fragmented Syria, which in turn could help it maintain its influence in the country.^[iii] For the moment, the interim government in Syria is willing to temporarily legitimise the continued use by Russia of its bases in Syria, to extract concessions from the Kremlin. How this plays out remains to be seen.

Turkey is opposed to the Russian bases and views them as an obstacle to Syria achieving full national sovereignty. The regime change in Syria is also a setback for Iran, which has lost considerable influence. Its ability to support Hezbollah in Lebanon has been reduced. Israel, on the other hand, has strengthened its hold over the Golan Heights and, in conjunction with the Druze, has the capacity to extend its influence up to Damascus. For the U.S. and Western Europe, an economic deal would be viewed as a conflict resolution measure. They could also use the situation in Syria as a bargaining chip, offering concessions in Ukraine for a Russian withdrawal from Syria. Regardless of what the future holds, Syria has become a bargaining chip. The actors are the U.S., Turkey, Russia, Israel, Iran and Western Europe. The country could be carved up to accommodate the interests of the major powers.

The India-Pakistan conflict following the dastardly attack by Pakistan-based and supported terrorists has also set in motion a new set of dynamics. Pakistan was forced to seek a ceasefire within four days after its air-defence capability was severely degraded. President Trump claimed credit for the ceasefire, stating that he offered trade deals to stop the war. India debunked his claim. There is friction in India-US relations, not so much because India debunked the US President’s claim, but because India is charting its own foreign policy, in consonance with its interests, rather than seeking to please the US. A different set of dynamics is now playing out, with Pakistan cosying up to the US. India will not change its policy of strategic autonomy, regardless of the carrot of a trade deal, which, in any case, has not been offered.

While India-US relations have been strained, the long-term impact is likely to be contained. India’s interests in the Indo-Pacific converge, and neither country will want to allow the relationship to deteriorate. Temporary tensions, especially with respect to the steep tariffs imposed by the US on India, are a dampener, but India will ride the storm. Eventually, long-term interests will triumph over short-term gains. In this game of shifting geopolitical alliances, India must continue to maintain its focus on the Prime Minister’s 2047 Vision Statement. If India is to be a developed country by then, supporting its strategic autonomy is essential. The crosswinds blowing will have to be deftly navigated without giving in to the dictates of any power.

Author Brief Bio: Maj. Gen. Dhruv C. Katoch (Retd.) is a third-generation officer of the Indian Army with nearly four decades of distinguished service. An alumnus of Sherwood College, Nainital, the National Defence Academy, Khadakvasla, the Defence Services Staff College, Wellington; the Higher Command Course, Mhow; and the National Defence College, New Delhi, he holds an MPhil in Defence Studies from Madras University and was conferred a Doctor of Philosophy (Honoris Causa) by Indira Gandhi University, Rewari, in 2016. He regularly speaks on national security, defence, and foreign policy issues at conferences, on news channels, and in academic forums. He has edited/co-edited eight books and contributed chapters to over a dozen publications. His articles have been published in leading defence journals, magazines, and newspapers. He has served as the Director of the Centre for Land Warfare Studies (CLAWS), the Indian Army’s premier think tank and is presently the Director of India Foundation

 
References:

^[i] https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/us-russian-officials-discussed-energy-deals-alongside-latest-ukraine-peace-talks-2025-08-26/

^[ii] https://www.consultancy.eu/news/12340/the-armenia-azerbaijan-peace-deal-aims-to-end-decades-of-conflict

^[iii] https://www.mei.edu/publications/russias-military-presence-post-assad-syria-growing-security-liability-undermining