Abstract
Since the take-over of the Tatmadaw on 1 February 2021, Myanmar has seen growing internal instability. What was meant to be a move by the military to restore the integrity of the military-drafted Constitution to uphold the rule of law, three years since the coup has come full circle. The Tatmadaw, which has viewed itself as the protector of national unity, is dealing with the potential splitting of the country today. With Ethnic Armed Organisations (EAOs) launching attacks on military assets and democratic forces battling to dislodge the junta, the growing complexity of issues in Myanmar is impacting India. With over 1643 km of porous land borders with the northeast region of India and transnational ethnic relations, the repercussions of the civil war-like situation in Myanmar extend far beyond a refugee crisis for India with grave consequences for states like Manipur in the northeastern region.
Introduction
Myanmar, India’s immediate eastern neighbour, always found an essential place in the strategic thinking of post-colonial India. Geographically, Myanmar and India share a 1643-km-long boundary along the Indian states of Arunachal Pradesh, Nagaland, Manipur and Mizoram. It has been accepted that India and Myanmar are close physically, culturally, and historically (Chetty 2005, 171). The Buddhist period saw deep cultural and intellectual interaction between the two countries. During the British colonial era, Myanmar formed one of the provinces of the British Indian Empire till 1935. Due to this political connection, a large Indian community of traders and other professionals was present in Myanmar until the end of World War II. It may be reminded that leaders of the freedom movement of Myanmar and India carried on their respective struggles in parallel and were in close contact with each other, which was reflected in the close personal relationships between Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru and Colonel Aug San and Thakin-Nu (Dixit 1996, 165). Strategically speaking, there is an inextricable linkage between India’s security and peace, progress and stability in Myanmar. The following statement of Sardar K.M. Panikkar, one of India’s pioneer strategists, best encapsulates such a linkage. The defence of Burma is, in fact, the defence of India, and it is India’s primary concern no less than Burma’s to see that its frontiers remain inviolate. No responsibility can be considered too heavy for India when it comes to defending India (Panikkar 1945, 13)
V.K. Krishna Menon, then Defence Minister of India, also emphasised the strategic unity between India and Myanmar. Speaking at the UN General Assembly on 17 April 1953, he said: ‘What hurt Burma would hurt India because of links of friendship, geography and history between the two countries’ (Official Records of the UN General Assembly, 7th Session, April 1953). The above statements only revealed the intimate strategic connection between the two countries. Despite the age-old ties, the past political and cultural linkages, strategic location and geographical proximity, the history of India-Myanmar relations has been marked by many hiccups due to several external and internal geo-political factors. However, since the early 1990s, there have been persistent efforts on the part of New Delhi to improve relations with its strategically vital neighbour – Myanmar- mainly when Myanmar came under the influence of Beijing to the detriment of India’s interests. Ever-growing Chinese influence in Myanmar; India’s internal security problems arising out of insurgency movements in its troubled North Eastern Region (NER) and the concern for developing its landlocked North Eastern Region; New Delhi’s determination to expand its relations with ASEAN in the changed geo-political milieu of post-Cold War period and India’s desire to find a foothold in the resource-rich Myanmar’s economy are the critical factors which have prompted New Delhi to change its approach towards military regime in Myanmar. As a result of the consistent efforts of New Delhi, India, and Myanmar, they have come a long way in reconciling their past differences and establishing a good neighbourly relationship.
The improving relationship between the two neighbours is best reflected in the pattern of their engagements. Today, India is engaging Myanmar at the bilateral level, at the sub-regional grouping like BIMSTEC and at the ASEAN level. The relationship, however, has been disturbed by the current civil war in Myanmar following the military coup in February 2021. Three years after the military coup in Myanmar, Operation 1027 was launched against the military junta by the Three Brotherhood Alliance members comprising the Arakan Army (AA) based in the Rakhine State, the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) from the Kokang Region of Shan State and the Ta’ang National Liberation Army also from the Shan state. On 27th October 2023, the Alliance simultaneously attacked military outposts and police stations and took control over key cities and highways in the northern part of Shan State. The rebellion quickly spread to the Saigang region. By the 6th of November, the second biggest city in the country, Kawlin, fell in the hands of the ethnic armed organisations (EAOs), becoming the first district-level town to be taken by the insurgents. By the 7th of November, with the launch of ‘Operation 1107’ in support of Operation 1027, many other insurgent groups across the country joined hands. This was perhaps one of the rare occasions in the troubled history of Myanmar where insurgent groups from a variety of ethnic groups had come together to carry out meticulously coordinated attacks against the junta.
The Peoples Defence Forces (PDF), a militia group that has branched out of the shadow of the National Unity Government (NUG), also joined the fray. The NUG has the unstinted support of the United States (US) and has its office in Washington, DC, a short distance from the White House. The NUG welcomed the US Congress passed HR 5497 Burma Unified through Rigorous Military Accountability Act, 2021, which authorises appropriations to provide humanitarian assistance and ‘other’ support to Myanmar, in addition to taking upon itself to promote democracy and human rights[i]. Using Burma and not Myanmar as the name of the country by the US in the Act passed by the US Congress is seen as a provocation as the name ‘Burma’ was rejected by the Junta for ‘Myanmar’.
Myanmar-China Relations: Possible Consequences for India
The Western policies have almost over the years coerced Myanmar to look towards China and Russia for support. The Washington government had even accused Myanmar’s defence ministry of importing nearly USD 1 billion worth of materials and raw materials to manufacture arms[ii] and China remaining Myanmar’s primary source of foreign investment, with 40% of its foreign debt owed to China. Further, there is a danger of sanctions naturally exacerbating China’s debt trap policy. Considering China’s projects in Myanmar that have advanced under the junta, creating an ambitious Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), India has every reason to worry about China’s interest in a ‘back door’ access to the Indian Ocean.
Source: Sreeparna Banerjee and Tarushi Rajaura, 2021. “Growing Chinese Investments in Myanmar post-coup”. Observer Research Foundation (ORF).
Further, Myanmar’s rich oil and natural gas reserves and its fragile geographical location have made it a priority in China’s future plans. China has constructed a natural gas and oil pipeline, which starts from Kyaukphyu city of Myanmar’s Rakhine State, traversing through the Chin state to China’s Yunnan region, which is China’s springboard to the ASEAN, just the way the northeast region is springboard to the ASEAN for India. Gwadar port, part of CPEC and Kyaukphyu port, gives China an advantage in strategically containing India and blocking our access to the West and the East. Even though India-US relations have strengthened, especially after Prime Minister Modi’s visit to the US, the US concerns in the region may impact India’s Act East policy. For instance, in May 2023, Adani Group’s ports arm APSEZ had to sell its Myanmar port project for an enormous loss due to the sanctions imposed by the US on Burmese military-owned Myanmar Economic Corporation Limited. The project could have established India’s port footprint in Southeast Asia.
Myanmar is also paying the price for the world’s conflicts over rare minerals and greenhouse gases, particularly in the wake of the West’s transition to green energy. With the politics of critical and rare earth minerals, an investigation by the Associated Press, Myanmar is being called the ‘Sacrifice Zone’[iii]. Amongst other findings, the investigation revealed that even though the US Congress required companies to disclose conflict minerals with an assurance that it does not benefit armed groups, the law did not cover rare earth minerals. Rare earth elements were also found to be omitted from the European Union’s 2021 regulation on conflict minerals. Today, Myanmar is one of the top four countries in the world that produces rare earth elements. The unregulated mining combined with political instability has created an atmosphere of underhand deals and profits being shared by militias and insurgent groups. Chin and Rakhine states, as well as the Saigang region, apart from Kachin State, are also rich in resources such as aluminium, nickel, iron, chromite, oil and gas, but most importantly, rich in heavy rare earth elements, such as dysprosium and terbium, classified as the single-most critical element among rare earth.
With growing world economies and geostrategic competition based on critical minerals that will fuel these economies, areas across India’s Northeast frontier will suffer consequences. The conflict in Manipur is but a precursor to what India may have in store for the future. Conflicts like those in Manipur will demand a broader perspective and geostrategic and geopolitical understanding. Stepping away from short-sighted analysis, especially by vested Western interests who have misunderstood complex sensibilities historically, might be the first step towards unravelling the changing dynamics of a complex conflict with wider ramifications. This region’s successive US, EU and UK policy failures have already created a complex situation. For instance, while the EU was imposing its seventh round of sanctions last year, its imports from Myanmar surged, increasing substantially from the pre-coup years[iv]. Arguably, it is a better policy than sanctions that impact the ordinary citizen on the ground without facilitating a regime change. However, the alienation of the Junta has not only exacerbated the insurgency in Myanmar but also given China a stronger foothold. China not only tries to maintain a cordial relationship with Tatmadaw, but it also tries to improve its relations with conflict groups such as the Ethnic Armed Organisation (EAO) and non-state combatants by offering arms. Thus, China exploits every possible tactic to build trust with Tatmadaw and, simultaneously, with opposing groups[v].
This, however, does not mean there are no underlying suspicions between China and the Tatmadaw. Interestingly, China has refrained from recognising Myanmar’s Junta leader, Senior Gen Min Aung Hlaing, indicating continuing mistrust between the two countries. Previously, when President Thein Sein decided to open up Myanmar to the world, China was wary of its plans towards the West and vice versa. Beijing saw it as Naypyidaw side-lining China for the West or, at the very least, trying to play both sides. However, with Aung San Suu Kyi, relationships improved for a while. It was right before the elections in 2015 that brought her to power. China invited her on an official visit, where she met President Xi Jinping.
Furthermore, her policy towards the Rohingyas saw a massive backlash from the West, bringing China back to the centre stage in Myanmar, with President Xi Jinping visiting Myanmar in 2020, the first Chinese premier to do so in over 20 years. However, this blossoming friendship was short-lived with Aung San Suu Kyi’s growing proximity to the military junta during the Rohingya crisis, as well as public sentiment in Myanmar turning against China because of the visible Chinese migration. There have also been significant concerns in Myanmar over China’s illegal mining for critical rare earth minerals, leaving areas the size of Singapore in northern Myanmar uncultivable and rivers poisonous, resulting in mass protests against China.
Additionally, China’s concern with the Tatmadaw is more than just the cybercrime and gambling rackets operating from Myanmar. The problem for China is that the Tatmadaw has not been able to stabilise Myanmar nor consolidate its power effectively, which has jeopardised China’s infrastructure investments. Whether it is the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC), its oil and gas pipelines or the Kyaukphyu deep seaport, without political stability and control on EAOs, China’s alternative to its “Achilles heel”, the Strait of Malacca, will remain compromised. Though China has made its way to restarting some of the projects with its influence on EAOs, Myanmar’s balancing act has once again made them anxious.
Consequences for the Northeast region- Epicentre Manipur
Across the border in Myanmar, after the regime change in Naypyidaw, the military crackdown has caused many to be displaced. In the Sagaing region across Manipur, UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Volker Türk has said, “Since the beginning of the coup, the military has scorched at least 70,000 homes across the country, 70 per cent of which were in Sagaing region. Over 1.5 million people have been forcibly displaced with minimal access to humanitarian aid”[vi]. The porous border of Manipur has absorbed this influx, with Mizoram next door recording over 40,000 Myanmarese refugees. In addition, active anti-Junta insurgent groups, such as the Chin National Army (CNA) or the Arakan Army, are only a few outfits operating across the border of India, with many, like the CNA and Kachin Independence Army, having transnational ethnic ties with communities in the Northeast.
Manipur having borne the brunt of the influx of illegal immigrants from Myanmar, weapons to fuel the recent Manipur conflict between the Kukis and Meiteis and the increase of drug trade from Myanmar was only the precursor of what could potentially have far-reaching consequences for India’s national security. As long as instability continues to grip Myanmar, it gives incentive to insurgent groups with transnational ethnic ties to create grander designs that remain unfulfilled after the containment of the Manipur conflict. Although faultlines within communities in Manipur and Mizoram may have been made, the territorial integrity of these states remains indomitably intact. However, it would be foolhardy not to recognise the vulnerability of the over 1643 km porous borders between India and Myanmar with the Free Movement Regime – 16 km on both sides, which is still abrogated.
Strategically, after the Manipur conflict, in a not-so-remarkable concurrence of events, the Chin National Army on November 7th 2023, supported by PDFs that operate from the Chin State and Sagaing Division of Myanmar, captured key military outposts and towns on the border of India. Khampat town on the Kale- Tamu road, an important trade route and Khampat police station in the Sagaing region were the first to fall[vii]. The Indian border town of Rikhawdar in Falam township was also seized, it is the first town in Chin state that is entirely in control of the Chin National Force (CNF). It was widely reported that CNA spokesperson Salai Htit Ni described Rikhawdar as a hub for trade with India and noted that it was close to outposts of the local CNA groups[viii].
Rikhawdar is located a short distance from Zokhawthar town in Mizoram and critically has one of the two land border crossings between India and Myanmar. The Chin National Army flag flew high over the border crossing in an ominous declaration of rebel victory. The CNA and PDFs were aided by their Thantlang Drone team, which allegedly has access to drones made from commercially available parts similar to the MR-10 cargo drones used by the Indian Army. To add to their string of strategically captured towns and military installations, it took a group of 80 insurgents to take control of the Khawmawi military camps in the Chin state. Many of these groups are active along the Mizoram border. The offensive in Chin state resulted in 75 soldiers of the Junta having to take refuge in Mizoram. However, not just the Junta needs to take cover; the civilians also need to be covered. The capture of these areas prompted over 2000 civilians to pour into India within a week. With an estimated 50,000 refugees in Mizoram and countless unregistered ones in Manipur, the issue continues to be unsettling[ix].
Further, PDF Zoland, a smaller group but with an ambitious name, took over the junta hilltop base on Kennedy Peak in the Tedim township. Zo or Zou is the northern Kuki-Chin-Mizo language spoken amongst tribes in Myanmar and India. During the Manipur conflict, this transnational ethnic identity was propelled by the idea of Zalen’-gam (land of freedom for all Kuki people). In India, Zalen’-gam constitutes parts of Manipur, Mizoram, Nagaland and Karbi Anglong District in Assam; in Myanmar, it includes the Kabaw Valley, the Chin State and parts of Sagaing Division; and in Bangladesh, the Chittagong Hill tracts. The situation is reminiscent of the now partially exhausted Naga insurgency that dreamt once upon a time of ‘Greater Nagalim for Christ’. The Naga umbrella identity was founded upon bringing together over 16 main tribal groups with their distinct names and languages, with a sense of unity forged with the advent of the British administration and Christianity. The idea of Nagalim, similar to Zalen’-gam, pursued the idea of bringing tribes under an umbrella identity across the northeast region and in Myanmar.
Besides countering the dream of a ‘Land of Freedom’, which sounds innocuous but hides a subtle secessionist agenda, India should hope for a unified and stable Myanmar. The US involvement in the internal affairs of India’s neighbours, whether Myanmar or Bangladesh, will have a spillover effect. India is not new to the geopolitical games played by the US from time to time. The US- CIA involvement in the Naga insurgency is well-recorded. A paper published by the Indian Council of Social Sciences Research claimed that a former secret service agent revealed that the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) had supported and financed the Naga underground movement till the 1950s. The USA continued to be the patron and supplier of arms and ammunition to the insurgent groups of Northeast India from Bangkok in the 1970s. (Naga 2011, 95-105).
Myanmar, too, has borne the brunt of foreign interference, whether it was during the 1950s when the CIA supported the Kuomintang (KMT)[x] or pro-democracy forces in the 1980s, giving them funds and training in Thailand. Today, the NUG and the allied EAOs have reportedly asked the US Congress for $525 million in aid and $200 million in nonlethal humanitarian aid[xi]. Finally, the reality of the situation brewing in Myanmar is that it is too close for comfort for India. The conflict in Manipur has left the region and the country anxious. The fall of crucial towns, military installations and infrastructure just across the border of India will not only give impetus to anti-national elements and insurgents but also to the illegal trade of contrabands, including drugs, gold and areca nuts that are already common in these areas. The US support for EAOs will give insurgents hope for independence. Former Acting President Myint Swe, in an admission of the challenge faced by the Junta, stated that the conflict in Myanmar risked breaking the country apart. This would plummet the region into utter chaos. It is in India’s interest to hope that Myanmar will regain its stability and remain whole, not just for India’s future ambitions in Southeast Asia but also for India’s immediate concerns about stabilising the northeast region, especially Manipur.
Author Brief Bio: Ms. Rami Niranjan Desai is a Distinguished Fellow with India Foundation. An alumnus of King’s College, London, she has degrees in Anthropology of Religion and Theology. She has been actively involved in research, fieldwork and analysis of conflict areas, with a special focus on the North East region of India for over a decade.
References:
[i] https://www.cbo.gov/system/files/2022-02/hr5497.pdf
[ii] https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/countries/myanmar/crp-sr-myanmar-2023-05-17.pdf
[iii] https://apnews.com/article/technology-forests-myanmar-75df22e8d7431a6757ea4a426fbde94c
[iv] https://indianexpress.com/article/world/eu-imports-from-myanmar-surge-despite-sanctions-8860003/
[v] https://www.claws.in/chinas-investments-in-the-post-coup-myanmar-an-assessment/
[vi] https://www.unmultimedia.org/tv/unifeed/asset/3067/3067844/
[vii] https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/sagaing-resistance-seizes-indian-border-town-from-myanmar-junta.html
[viii] https://myanmar-now.org/en/news/myanmar-battlefield-updates-november-15/
[ix] https://northeastlivetv.com/topnews/fresh-fighting-in-myanmar-over-5000-refugees-enter-mizoram/
[x] https://irp.fas.org/congress/1998_cr/980507-l.htm
[xi] https://www.voanews.com/a/burma-act-debate-pushed-into-early-2024/7356280.html
