A country’s foreign policy relies on the stability of its government, national unity, and the clarity of its economic strategy—and on the state’s ability to implement it. Geopolitical relationships become strong, friendly, or strategic only when the domestic government is stable and has widespread public support. An interim government indicates systemic collapse.
That Bangladesh’s current government is weak is clear—and acknowledged by its advisers. On 10 August 2025, at a discussion hosted by a prominent think tank, Brigadier (ret.) Sakhawat Hossain—an adviser to Bangladesh’s interim government—stated that core state structures have collapsed and have yet to be restored. It remains uncertain whether the present government can move swiftly to credible elections. Given the parties it seems willing to include, there is little hope for a genuinely inclusive contest.
The Awami League (AL) government collapsed due to a street movement and had numerous faults. Nevertheless, it is a historic party: through its politics, a government formed by elected MPs, and an armed struggle waged under that government, Bangladesh came into being. Although the AL later adopted policies seen as appeasing religious fundamentalists, the principles on which Bangladesh was founded—Bengali culture and Bengali nationalism—and the soft power rooted in that tradition remain important national assets.
The Islamist tilt and the ‘King’s Party’
The interim government has, to a great extent, put that asset at odds with itself. It is supported by the centre-right Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP). It maintains close links with religious groups such as Jamaat-e-Islami (an Islamist political party), Hizb ut-Tahrir (a transnational Islamist organisation), and Hefazat-e-Islam (a clerical network). It is also trying to form a so-called “king’s party” (a pro-government group made up of select student leaders from last July’s movement) that similarly aligns with hardline factions.
Holding an election while sidelining constituencies rooted in Bengali culture and nationalism will not be inclusive—and, more importantly, is unlikely to change Bangladesh’s unstable, religion-influenced political landscape. Fundamentalist forces risk gaining greater freedom to operate. The political and state character of the country could shift, raising questions about Bangladesh’s acceptability on the international stage.
The rise of fundamentalism is recognised not only within Bangladesh but also by its partners, who are geopolitically and economically connected to it. Even if the government manages to conduct the election it desires, Bangladesh’s foreign policy is unlikely to change significantly; the next administration would be little different from the current one.
India Ties: From Routine Friction to Open Chill
Since this government assumed office, relations with India have steadily worsened, marked by repeated actions that have disrupted bilateral trade. Bangladesh’s interim leader (Chief Adviser), Muhammad Yunus, had a brief informal interaction at a hotel lobby with the Indian prime minister on the margins of the 6th BIMSTEC Summit in Bangkok (4 April 2025). Additionally, Bangladesh’s foreign affairs adviser, Md. Touhid Hossain, met with India’s external affairs minister, S. Jaishankar, on the sidelines at the UNGA in New York (September 2024) and again in Muscat (16 February 2025). Over the past year, these exchanges—and an August 2024 telephone call from the Indian prime minister—have effectively been the only visible direct contacts.
Following the BIMSTEC meeting in Thailand, when Bangladesh’s interim head of government met India’s head of government in the hotel lobby, the two sides issued conflicting press statements. This is not a good sign in diplomacy or foreign policy.
Earlier, during a visit to Dhaka, India’s Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri delivered a solo media statement on 9 December 2024, stating that New Delhi would maintain its daily engagement with the current authorities but would earnestly work with any government formed from an inclusive election. He also expressed India’s call to put an end to the persecution of minorities (Hindus, Buddhists, Christians, and indigenous communities) and to bring the perpetrators to justice.
Later that same day, following the foreign secretary’s remarks, Bangladeshi government adviser Syeda Rezwana Hasan told a press briefing that a certain number of attacks against minorities had been recorded and that the cases were under police investigation. Nevertheless, the government later reaffirmed its previous stance: the ongoing abuses were political, not communal, because the victims supported or voted for the previous ruling party.
Having adopted this stance, it remains unclear what position, ultimately, not only India but also other countries that champion human rights will take. Furthermore, compared to many other nations, the issue of minority rights in Bangladesh has long been overlooked; consequently, it has seldom featured in Dhaka’s foreign policy considerations. Even the United Nations— which allocates considerable attention elsewhere to minority persecution and related issues—has paid little heed to Bangladesh’s minority concerns. For this reason, the matter is unlikely to significantly influence foreign policy—unless and until international organisations and Western partners recognise the realities on the ground.
Trade as a Pressure Valve: Project Pauses and Border Frictions
Conversely, India has pulled back from several ongoing economic initiatives in Bangladesh and has not launched any new development programmes during this government’s tenure. There has been no apparent effort from Dhaka to revive or sustain those projects. While India is reducing its economic activities, Bangladesh has halted purchasing the yarn that was previously imported from India via the land border. In response, India has restricted the entry of various Bangladeshi products at land ports—most recently jute products—a move that Bangladeshi business analysts describe as a major blow to the jute sector.
Meanwhile, Bangladesh’s Commerce Minister has stated that not importing yarn from India will benefit the domestic industry. Conversely, Indian authorities have not commented on whether India has gained or lost from restricting the entry of several Bangladeshi items via land borders. After India closed the facility that allowed Bangladesh to export garments and other goods using Indian airports, the Bangladeshi government issued no formal response—only some reciprocal trade steps—though businesspeople have said privately that losing this facility has been seriously damaging.
Additionally, India has tightened visa issuance for Bangladeshis across all categories. This has caused practical difficulties for many countries that keep their main embassies in New Delhi and require Bangladeshis to apply there. After these difficulties emerged, Bangladesh’s interim chief adviser summoned the heads of those countries’ offices in Dhaka and invited their New Delhi-based representatives to come and consider opening primary or issuing offices in Bangladesh—but this has not happened so far.
Visas Tightened—Beyond India
India has not clarified why it tightened visa issuance. Although the initial restrictions seemed to mainly impact Bangladeshis seeking Indian visas, it now appears that not only India but also many countries in Southeast Asia and the Middle East, the European Union’s Schengen zone, and especially the United States have limited visa issuance. Even Thailand, the next destination after India for Bangladeshi tourists and patients, where visas had long been easily accessible, has made the process significantly more complicated and markedly reduced the quota. Visas that once took seven working days to process now require considerable effort to obtain, and far fewer are being granted. Those countries have not given a clear reason for restricting Bangladeshi citizens’ access to visas, nor has the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Bangladesh provided any explanation. Despite repeated media reports, the ministry has not issued an update to the public on the issue.
When a country’s citizens face widespread visa restrictions, it is generally assumed that, for various reasons, other states have raised concerns about that country’s foreign or domestic policies. The arrest of 36 Bangladeshi militants in Malaysia has also entered the public mind as a potential factor. Beyond India, the countries that have limited visas for Bangladeshis have not issued any official statements. Even when India has officially spoken, it has maintained that its visa policy remains unchanged. The reality seems to be different, and there is no visible effort between Bangladesh and India to move beyond the current situation.
The Coldest Phase in Bilateral Ties
It is also true that Bangladesh’s relations with India are now at a level of coldness not seen before. In the past, India alleged that separatists were being sheltered and trained inside Bangladesh—allegations later borne out. Conversely, Bangladesh alleged that India trained and sheltered separatists from the Chittagong Hill Tracts and, at one point after 1975, even provided armed training to young Awami Leaguers; some of them carried out attacks inside Bangladesh—claims that likewise proved true. It also became clear that Indian separatists based in Bangladesh carried out attacks in Assam, Tripura, and other Indian states.
Yet even then, ties in trade, diplomacy, and at the level of heads of government were never as frigid as they are today. Even before General Ziaur Rahman and General Ershad became elected leaders, there were state visits between the two countries at various levels, including at the very top. Under the present government, aside from routine official-level meetings, there have been no state visits at any level. Over the past year, there have been no visits at the policymaking level.
Competing Narratives: Security Concerns versus Political Hosting
No one is pinpointing the exact cause of the problem. What has consistently emerged is that India is concerned about its internal security, and that, according to Indian media and several think tanks, fundamentalists heavily influence Bangladesh’s current government and are anti-India.
Bangladesh’s position is clear that Dhaka does not accept India’s granting of refuge to former Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina or her using social media platforms from there to discuss or participate in Bangladesh’s politics. Bangladesh insists that India must cease this. Additionally, the Bangladeshi government has issued an executive order banning activities of Sheikh Hasina’s party, the Awami League.
India is the only country whose foreign ministry spokesperson has said that banning the Awami League’s activities is unreasonable and unjustified. India’s Prime Minister has also informed Bangladesh’s interim Chief Adviser that India is a democratic state and that its government does not have the authority to deprive anyone of the fundamental right to use their social media or forum for personal expression.
Extradition Request versus “Honoured Guest” Status
Because Sheikh Hasina’s trial has begun in Bangladesh, the government has repeatedly stated that the Indian government should return her. However, in practice, neither country has revealed much about how formally Dhaka has sought her return, leaving the issue shrouded in ambiguity. Conversely, India, through an all-party decision, has granted Sheikh Hasina refuge as an honoured guest.
Do such incidents explain the downturn? Even so, it is hard to argue that one or two such episodes alone could cause a deterioration of relations on this scale. There is little precedent for that – not in international diplomacy, nor in Bangladesh’s diplomatic history. Bangladesh’s pattern is that governments do not typically change through routine electoral processes; they change through street movements or military coups. It is therefore unsurprising that victors on the streets are not benevolent towards the previous government: they haul them to court or apply other forms of pressure.
The present government has limited options to deviate from that pattern. Although it initially sought to portray its street victory as a “revolution,” it lacked the ideology, programme, and explicit political stance that typically define a revolution. Now, it has shifted to prosecuting the previous government and listing its faults—partly to secure the future safety of those who mobilised on the streets and to strengthen the new government’s legitimacy. This, to some degree, reflects the political culture in Bangladesh. The previous administration likewise prosecuted—or kept under prosecution—many leaders of its main rival, the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), including Tarique Rahman, who lives in London.
Tarique Rahman was not granted asylum in the United Kingdom in the same way that India has hosted Sheikh Hasina. However, the former Bangladeshi government did not accuse Britain of any wrongdoing regarding the proceedings against him, and relations with the UK remained unaffected. Therefore, the argument that India’s sheltering of Sheikh Hasina harmed India–Bangladesh relations is not particularly convincing in diplomatic terms.
Is There a Deeper Cause Behind the Freeze?
A natural question arises: beyond the fact that the previous Dhaka government was friendly to India and India’s hosting of Sheikh Hasina, is there a deeper internal complexity driving these ties to an impasse? Sheikh Mujib’s government was friendly to India; after its fall, once General Ziaur Rahman’s military government quickly restored stability, ties with India largely normalised. Nor does the claim hold that relations must worsen simply because Sheikh Hasina is in Delhi: Tarique Rahman’s presence in London did not cool Sheikh Hasina’s government’s relations with Britain—indeed, they remained warm. Therefore, Sheikh Hasina’s being in Delhi is not the main reason relations have become their coldest to date.
Since Dhaka claims it attempted but failed to build relations with India, analysts might wonder whether the key difference this time is that, although past street-led changes of government took place, the country nonetheless maintained stability; fundamentalists did not flood the streets; and no government established a local UN human rights office, thus preventing the country from being categorised like Gaza or Sudan. Is that the main reason? Are neighbours avoiding a state marked by political instability, law-and-order issues driven by fundamentalist mobs, and the presence of a UN local office?
The China Factor
Many argue that the increasing distance between India and Bangladesh has created an opportunity for China to strengthen its influence in Bangladesh. Beijing has already invited leaders of Bangladesh’s fundamentalist parties to visit. It has also approached the centre-right Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), which has held power several times. Over the past year, BNP sent a high-level delegation led by Secretary-General Mirza Fakhrul Islam Alamgir to China for party-to-party discussions at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing (June 23–28, 2025). Within Bangladesh, Chinese representatives have also engaged with leaders from religious parties. In mid-July 2025, Jamaat-e-Islami’s leadership visited China at the invitation of the Chinese authorities for meetings with CPC bodies and institutions.
When India limited medical visas for Bangladeshis, China tried to establish an alternative treatment route centred on Kunming. However, since lower‑income Bangladeshis—who most often travel to India—might find the Kunming option less affordable or practical, much of this remains at a pilot stage.
At the same time, China has not initiated new visible investments over the past year. Previously, in 2021, Beijing withdrew from several Bangladesh Railway projects (including the Joydebpur–Ishwardi double-tracking and parts of the Akhaura–Sylhet conversion). China’s promise to build a hospital in northern Bangladesh is mainly a former plan: China has established an industrial zone in that region where many Chinese workers and officials live, and a China‑run hospital (featuring Chinese doctors and medical protocols) is primarily intended to serve that expatriate community and nearby operations.
Although Muhammad Yunus did meet China’s president at a private forum, China’s Bangladesh policy—namely, interest‑bearing lending for Bangladesh (the model linked with its large project financing)—has not been prominently active over the past year. Here, as with several other partners, the indication is that Beijing has adopted a “wait‑and‑see policy” towards Bangladesh’s current circumstances.
It is worth recalling that when the Taliban took control of Afghanistan, China was the first to initiate talks with Taliban representatives. However, Beijing seems to be resuming its copper-mining venture there (for example, the long-discussed Mes Aynak project) only now, at a time when countries like India are also engaging with the Afghan Taliban.
Another idea gaining prominence is that many of China’s investments in Africa, the Middle East, and other nations affected by fundamentalist movements are not in a positive state; likewise, its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) experience in Taliban‑controlled Afghanistan has been problematic. Conversely, in South Asia, the Sheikh Hasina government in Bangladesh was the first to sign a BRI agreement with China—and it did so during a period when Dhaka had created a relatively stable environment by suppressing fundamentalist groups.
Pakistan’s Power Chess: Risks to China’s Stakes
Although China maintains friendly relations with Pakistan, the suggestion that the United States is encouraging Pakistan’s army chief to orchestrate a change of power raises two significant considerations for Beijing. Pakistan’s most popular leader, Imran Khan, is more favourable towards China, but the army chief is not aligned with him; many believe Washington has backed the army chief, who already holds informal influence that surpasses that of the prime minister. Observers perceive two apparent reasons for this U.S. tilt: to distance Pakistan somewhat from China and to prepare Pakistan for potential future contingencies involving Iran. For China, the main issue is its investments in Iran and Pakistan—investments that could face problems if Asim Munir consolidates power as a military ruler in Pakistan.
Conversely, considering Bangladesh’s growing ties with Pakistan, it is important to evaluate how beneficial the likely impacts within Bangladesh would be from China’s perspective. As Pakistan’s relationship with Bangladesh strengthens, Bangladeshi fundamentalists are likely to gain influence; and if that occurs, Rohingya fundamentalists based in Bangladesh will also become more powerful. There is already some evidence that Rohingya militants have conducted activities within Bangladesh, and more will likely emerge in the future. These Rohingya militants could particularly threaten China’s plans to utilise Myanmar’s Arakan (Rakhine) coast commercially as a seaport, along with its gas pipeline and EPZ projects in Arakan. Furthermore, the issues caused by Rohingya militants in Myanmar might eventually impact Bangladesh, India, and China alike. Much will depend on how far Pakistan’s government and the militant groups it supports can, under various pretences, establish operational spaces inside Bangladesh. If their activities extend into India, China’s role at that point is a matter that cannot be ignored.
“An Amazing Meticulous Design”: External Hands?
Whatever anyone says about how the change of government occurred in Bangladesh, we must take as true what the country’s chief adviser has said in his own words: “It is an amazing, meticulous design.” He conveyed that this was not merely a student uprising but the product of a meticulous design—and he said so in the United States at the Clinton Foundation, informing his close acquaintance, former U.S. president Bill Clinton. The very act of informing Clinton in this way indicates that Clinton did not know beforehand. Although Clinton is a former president, why was he not informed about such a “meticulous design” despite their close relationship? If an external state was heavily involved in that meticulous design, does that not more strongly suggest Pakistan—acting outside the knowledge of both the United States and China?
Clearly, after the change of government in Bangladesh, Dhaka has moved closer to Turkey and Pakistan than to China and America. In the early days of Sheikh Hasina’s government, Turkey, like Pakistan, was strongly opposed to her administration. Later, around the Rohingya refugee issue and for less obvious reasons, relations with Turkey began to improve. Of course, by then the policies of the Hasina government had also changed significantly: those in power were busy appeasing fundamentalists, and many influential figures—whether in the administration, politics, or business—were essentially aligned with fundamentalist forces.
If Turkey and Pakistan—both close to America—find opportunities to enter Bangladesh under various guises, we will have to wait to see how that reshapes Bangladesh’s politics and its geopolitical stance, and how investment-friendly or politically congenial that will be for China.
Trade and Tariffs
The new tariff war waged by America worldwide can be seen as an economic form of a Third World War. America’s targets are China’s vast market and India’s large market. India and China are likely to compete based on their respective capabilities. Although there are differences in economic and military strength between India and China, countries of that size rarely limit their alliances to just one or two nations; they primarily build influence on their own strength. One more point worth noting is that birth rates are falling in America, while China’s aging population has grown. In contrast, the labour force in India is considerably younger. For that reason, America will find it difficult to sustain a long-term trade war against these two large markets and a workforce like India’s.
A key question now is whether this trade war will, in effect, shift the maritime contest—the struggle over the Quad or the South China Sea, involving sea lanes and maritime resources—towards a trade-off. At the most recent Quad foreign ministers’ meeting, trade gained greater emphasis. Conversely, the pressure generated by America’s trade war will open up more opportunities for China in Southeast Asian countries. India and Japan will also look to capitalise on some opportunities.
In this context, as an economic game changer for Bangladesh and parts of neighbouring India, the previous Bangladeshi government began work on the Matarbari deep-sea port, which was supposed to reach full operation quickly. Many believed the port would play a significant role in both a global trade war and any maritime conflict. Bangladesh’s economy suffered a shock from the street-driven change of the previous government—particularly from the attacks on factories after the change of power—making it now much harder to regain the confidence of foreign investors. In economic diplomacy and many other diplomatic arenas, Bangladesh has been pushed to the sidelines. In this situation, the future of the Matarbari deep-sea port and its importance to Japan, China, the United States, and India have come into question.
Japan’s Vector—and India’s Land Ports
In Asia, Japan is the central pillar of the Quad/Indo-Pacific coalition for the United States. Japan is undertaking a major investment drive in India’s Northeastern states. That investment was intended to extend into Bangladesh, specifically around the Matarbari deep-sea port. At this moment, India has closed imports and exports of many Bangladeshi goods through most of its land ports; naturally, that will lead Japan and India to channel the momentum of Japan’s investment in a different direction. Meanwhile, Japan and the United States appear to be expanding the economic profile of the Quad to include the Philippines, Indonesia, and Malaysia. In South Asia, the maritime-resource states of the Maldives and Sri Lanka, as they move closer to India, likewise imply a linkage with the Quad economy.
For now, all that can be said about the current global trade war is this: its pace will sometimes slacken, sometimes intensify, and at times change direction. In reality, no one can say for certain who will turn the compass needle and when. Everything will depend on time. Although it is often assumed that the world remains under the control of a single great power, the economic positions of many countries have already altered that reality. During this period, Bangladesh has largely fallen behind the economic curve. With fundamentalists moving openly, will that easily make the country credible to America, China, and India? Conversely, the realities of those countries where America and the United Nations end up as enablers of fundamentalism are also recognised around the world.
A Culture-Based Nationalist Force—What Remains?
Bangladesh’s distinction from those countries, however, lies in a culture-based nationalist force. Only once it becomes clear how much of that force remains will it be possible to determine whether, in this triangular position among India, China, and America, that nationalist force can assert itself—and how and when it can strengthen itself as circumstances demand. As Dr. Hossain Zillur Rahman, a former adviser to the Bangladesh caretaker government and BRAC chair, states, the current government has “replaced justice with vengeance.”
In the arena of world politics, any country must act based on its strength. Bangladesh, too, will need to wait to build its capacity. That will only happen once Bangladesh can establish the rule of law through an inclusive election. Only then will Bangladesh gain the measure of strength needed to decide how, and to what extent, it will engage with two major economies and neighbouring countries—and how much support it will receive from each.
Author Brief Bio: Swadesh Roy is a journalist and editor honoured with Bangladesh’s highest civilian state award. He is the Editor of Sarakhon: The Present World.
