At the opening of the Bretton Woods conference in 1944, Henry Morgenthau Jr. observed: “The transcendent fact of contemporary life is this: … the world is a community.” This thought was enunciated thousands of years ago in India, where the Maha Upanishad mentions the ancient Indian philosophical concept of “Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam” (The world is a family). This global philosophical outlook was oft spoken of by India’s political leadership since independence but has gained more traction now, with the Indian Prime Minister, Shri Narendra Modi, frequently drawing reference to this concept. The larger question, however, remains: Does the idea have relevance for the 21st century?
Post-World War II, the global institutions created to govern a fractured world—the UN, IMF, and World Bank—are examining a radically different world order today. The challenges, too, are different and more complex, brought on by rapid technological advancements, the communication revolution, an exploding global population, asymmetric economic development, terrorism and climate change, to mention but a few. The world is literally “on fire,”[i] giving rise to the question: Do the existing institutions of global governance have the capacity to adapt? Or are new instruments required to replace the ones formed about eight decades ago?
No country can shield itself from the effects of global challenges. Nations can no longer remain immune from the consequences of climate change, pandemics such as COVID-19, or terrorist organisations’ activities. As transnational threats converge, their mutually reinforcing effects exceed the capacity of any single state to manage, risking a descent into a fragmented and chaotic future.[ii] The challenges to stability require concerted action and cooperation at the global level. If existing institutions fail to adapt to the emerging needs of the modern world, perhaps the time has come to reinvent new, more resilient, equitable and inclusive institutions.
Recognising the need for change, UN Secretary-General António Guterres issued a policy brief in July 2023 titled “A New Agenda for Peace.” It outlines his vision for peace and security in a world in transition, aiming to address current conflicts, foster sustainable peace, and promote international cooperation. “What is at stake,” Guterres wrote,” is not the future of the United Nations, but of our nations and humanity. The possibility of global devastation, whether from nuclear weapons, climate change, diseases or war, or even technology run amok, is tangible and increasing. Member States will need to find new ways of working together despite the increasing mistrust that has permeated international relations.”[iii]
The BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) Summit, held in Kazan, Russia, from 22-24 October 2024, is a pointer to how a future world order could emerge. The bloc was founded in 2009 to provide a platform for its members to challenge a Western-led world order. India was a founding member alongside Brazil, Russia, and China. South Africa joined a year later.
BRICS has had limited traction over the last 15 years but is now more acceptable. The Kazan Summit formally welcomed five new members: Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) to form BRICS+. About two dozen countries have applied for or are considering membership in BRICS+.[iv]
BRICS+ represents a challenge to the hegemony of the world’s wealthiest countries, as reflected in the G7 grouping. It challenges the structural advantages that advanced market economies continue to enjoy, but it is not an anti-West grouping. It allows operating within and outside groupings like the G20 for India and other middle powers. This fact precludes the world from being divided into rigid blocs, a throwback to the Cold War years. The West, for now, is adopting a wait-and-watch attitude. Still, there is no reason for alarm or confrontation, especially if the West addresses emerging powers’ concerns, legitimate hopes and aspirations.
China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) also seeks to reshape the geopolitical landscape by funnelling development finance to extend its economic and political influence. Decarbonisation will rewrite the geopolitical script by changing the value of specific resources—diminishing the relevance of fossil fuels while increasing the importance of rare earths.
The “Three Worlds” scenario, enunciated by G. John Ikenberry, an American political scientist and professor at Princeton University, makes eminent sense in this context. Ikenberry argues that the world is being restructured into “Three Worlds”—the Global West (led by the US and Europe), the Global East (driven by Russia and China), and the Global South (an amorphous grouping of non-Western developing nations). He posits that these three worlds are not blocs or coherent negotiating groups but loose, evolving factions whose dynamics are situation-specific, activated by the conflicts and controversies of the moment. He says that this dynamic is reflected by groupings such as the Quad, BRICS, SCO, and other regional alliances. He adds that Asia is at the forefront of this change, and India is emerging as a critical driver of this transformation.[v]
In his address at the Asia Society Policy Institute in New York on September 25, 2024, India’s External Affairs Minister, Dr S. Jaishankar, discussed the geopolitical shifts and emphasised the need to rebalance the global order in response to these changes. He noted that economic, political, and demographic transformations over the last eight decades have propelled several Asian countries into the top twenty world economies. Among these, India—ranked as the tenth-largest economy just a decade ago—has now risen to fifth place and is projected to become the third-largest by the decade’s end. Jaishankar argues for a multipolar world with more independent decision-making centres. He posits that international politics is redirecting toward finding convergences and overlapping interests among nations. Dr. Jaishankar identified rebalancing, multipolarity, and plurilateralism as the three defining features of this changing global order. Plurilateralism—a world beyond bilateral relations but not yet fully multilateral—enables countries to come together with limited agendas, often within specific arenas, to pursue shared interests.[vi]
The BRICS+ Summit at Kazan points to the inevitability of the global order’s reconfiguration over the coming decades. The United States will contest this change and resist efforts to alter the status quo. Conversely, China will seek to position itself as a contender for global leadership and as an alternate pole, potentially giving rise to a bipolar system. However, the global South could alter this trajectory. Although not a “pole” in the traditional realist sense, the global South functions as a collective force with system-wide influence.[vii] India will have a significant role in any altered reality.
India’s Neighbourhood
The transformation underway in the global order is reflected in India’s neighbourhood, which will see power struggles, shifting alliances, cooperation, intensified competition and contestation. Asia is central to a changing world order, driven by India’s rise, Japan’s developed economy, China’s bid to challenge U.S. dominance, a resurgent ASEAN, and West Asia’s critical energy resources. Amidst this dynamic landscape, the India-China relationship will be crucial in shaping the region’s future.
While China advocates for a multipolar world, President Xi Jinping’s vision, articulated during the 20th National Congress, aims to transform China into a “great modern socialist country” that leads the world in comprehensive national strength and global influence by 2049.[viii] A multipolar world implies a multipolar Asia, but China’s ambitions point toward unipolar dominance. This divergence will likely fuel continued competition and contestation with India.
China’s use of Pakistan as a proxy to contain India reflects this strategic rivalry, as does Beijing’s support for separatist movements in India’s Northeastern states bordering Myanmar. The ongoing border dispute in Eastern Ladakh and China’s claims over Arunachal Pradesh suggest that these tensions will unlikely be resolved soon. China’s naval expansion into India’s neighbouring countries further underscores this competition. Beijing has developed a network of strategic ports, stretching from the Kyaukphyu Port in Myanmar to Gwadar in Pakistan. While these facilities secure China’s energy routes through the Indian Ocean, they also serve as tools to encircle India strategically.
In response, India has pursued its Act East Policy, with ASEAN at its core. The Quad—a partnership involving India, the U.S., Japan, and Australia—advances India’s vision of a Free and Open Indo-Pacific and extends its influence to Australia and beyond. While India aligns with the U.S. and other Western nations in the maritime domain, differences remain on continental issues, as seen in India’s neutral stance on the Russia-Ukraine conflict.
Recent political developments in Bangladesh raise questions about the U.S.’s intentions in the region. Washington’s support for Nobel laureate Muhammad Yunus, perceived by some as a U.S. protégé, to head the interim government in Bangladesh signals pressure on India to align more closely with U.S. strategic priorities.
Some of India’s smaller neighbours—Nepal, Sri Lanka, and the Maldives—seek to maximise their advantage by balancing ties between India and China. However, India’s cultural and civilisational links with Nepal and Sri Lanka and its geographic proximity to the Maldives provide it with a strategic edge. Through its ‘Neighbourhood First Policy,’ India has prioritised deepening physical, digital, and people-to-people connectivity with neighbouring countries, along with expanding trade and commerce. Over the past decade, India has taken a generous and non-reciprocal approach to regional engagement, a strategy it will likely maintain despite occasional setbacks.
As India’s global influence grows, it would be unrealistic to expect a frictionless environment. The challenges India faces—whether geopolitical, economic, or strategic—must be factored into its long-term growth strategy. Connectivity will remain pivotal to India’s ambitions. The proposed India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC), linking India with Europe and the Atlantic, and the Trilateral Highway through Myanmar, connecting India to the Pacific, illustrate India’s increasing centrality in global trade and geopolitics. This connectivity, stretching from the Atlantic to the Pacific, will have far-reaching strategic and economic implications, underscoring India’s evolving role in shaping the future of the global order.
References:
Author Brief Bio: Major General Dhruv C Katoch is Director, India Foundation and Editor, India Foundation Journal.
[i] https://www.sei.org/perspectives/transitioning-to-a-new-global-order/
[ii] https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/default/files/document/files/2024/08/our-common-agenda-policy-brief-new-agenda-peace-en.pdf
[iii] https://dppa.un.org/en/a-new-agenda-for-peace
[iv] https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2024/10/brics-summit-emerging-middle-powers-g7-g20?lang=en
[v] G John Ikenberry, Three Worlds: the West, East and South and the competition to shape global order, available at https://academic.oup.com/ia/article/100/1/121/7506681
[vi] https://www.mea.gov.in/Speeches-Statements.htm?dtl/38341/Remarks_by_EAM_Dr_S_Jaishankar_at_Asia_Society_Policy_Institute_in_New_York
[vii] Note 4.
[viii] https://www.strategictranslation.org/articles/predicting-the-future-chinas-composite-national-strength-in-2049
