Book: Our Constitution Our Pride

Author: Ram Madhav

Publication: Prabhat Prakashan

Year of Publication: 2025

Pages: 190

 

In the contemporary Indian political landscape, where constitutional debates frequently occupy centre stage, Ram Madhav’s monograph Our Constitution, Our Pride represents a substantial contribution to the discourse surrounding India’s foundational document. Published at a moment when the Indian Republic celebrates seventy-six years of constitutional governance, Madhav’s work offers a meticulously researched historical account that traces the evolution of the Indian Constitution from its conceptual origins through its implementation challenges. The volume navigates the complex interplay between constitutional theory and political practice, presenting a narrative that is both historically illuminating and contextually relevant to current constitutional deliberations.

Madhav starts his analysis by situating the Indian constitutional project within its historical context, demonstrating that the struggle for a constitution began not with the Constituent Assembly in 1946 but much earlier. In his references to President Murmu’s statement that the Constitution emerged from “our long freedom struggle”, the author effectively argues that constitutional aspirations were inherently woven into the independence movement. The detailed examination of early efforts, including opposition to the Government of India Act 1919 and Mahatma Gandhi’s reflections in Hind Swaraj (1909), offers significant historiographical insights that challenge the conventional periodisation of India’s constitutional history. This approach represents a notable shift from typical constitutional histories that often start with the Constituent Assembly deliberations, creating a more comprehensive genealogy of Indian constitutionalism that acknowledges its indigenous intellectual roots alongside its engagement with Western constitutional traditions.

The author’s treatment of the drafting process is notably nuanced, elucidating the intellectual contributions of various political figures while recognising the central role of Dr B.R. Ambedkar. Madhav carefully reconstructs the dialogic processes through which constitutional provisions were negotiated, revealing the complex ideological currents that influenced the final document. His thorough account of the eight committees established by the Constituent Assembly and the extensive deliberative process, comprising 7,635 amendments, 2,473 of which were discussed over 114 working days, provides readers with a nuanced understanding of constitution-making as an intellectually demanding collective endeavour. The biographical sketches of key figures like Ambedkar, who allegedly worked 18-hour days despite his poor health, humanise the constitutional project and highlight the personal sacrifices involved in its creation. This aspect of the narrative effectively counters reductionist views that attribute the Constitution solely to individual genius, instead portraying it as a synthesis of diverse intellectual traditions within Indian political thought.

Madhav’s examination of the Constitution’s core principles, which include democratic governance, an independent judiciary, and fundamental rights, displays significant theoretical depth. His investigation into how the founding generation understood these principles showcases a deep engagement with primary sources. His comparative analysis of Ambedkar’s and Gandhi’s distinct views on democracy highlights their mutual concern over unchecked majoritarianism, despite their perspectives offering different philosophical orientations. The author notes, “For Gandhi, democracy ensured the weak had the same opportunities as the strong. For Ambedkar, it involved amplifying the voices of the unheard.” This interpretive lens provides valuable insights for modern discussions on Indian democracy. Madhav’s meticulous reconstruction of these intellectual lineages allows readers to grasp the theoretical richness inherent in Indian constitutional thought while acknowledging its practical implications for institutional design.

The volume’s historical contextualisation extends beyond familiar narratives, incorporating lesser-known episodes such as Gandhi’s role in developing a constitution for the princely state of Aundh in 1939. Madhav documents how this experience, which emphasised decentralised governance, village panchayats, and fundamental rights, influenced subsequent constitutional thinking. Similarly, his analysis of the Nehru Report 1928, with its 22 chapters and 88 articles addressing fundamental rights, bicameralism, and federalism, illuminates an important but often overlooked chapter in Indian constitutional history. This archaeological approach to constitutional antecedents enriches our understanding of the intellectual ferment that preceded the Constituent Assembly’s work.

The examination of contentious constitutional issues showcases Madhav’s ability to engage with complex legal and political debates in a manner that is both scholarly and accessible. His discussion of Article 370, the Hindu Code Bill, the Uniform Civil Code, and other debated constitutional provisions offers readers a historically grounded understanding of these ongoing controversies. He maintains analytical rigour even when addressing politically charged subjects, presenting multiple perspectives before sharing his interpretations. His study of Ambedkar’s unsuccessful efforts to integrate the Hindu Code Bill into the constitutional framework, along with the subsequent legislative history of this reform, illustrates the intricate relationship between constitutional aspirations and legislative implementations.

In his chapter “Misuse of the Constitution”, Madhav offers a substantive critique of instances where constitutional mechanisms were used for partisan political purposes. His analysis of the misapplication of Article 356 (President’s Rule) and the declaration of Emergency in 1975 is particularly sharp. Drawing on primary sources and legal scholarship, he details how constitutional provisions intended as “dead letters” (in Ambedkar’s phrasing) were invoked to undermine democratic governance. This section represents one of the volume’s most significant contributions, assessing how constitutional provisions can be subverted without formal amendment. The thorough analysis of Indira Gandhi’s invocation of Article 356 fifty times during her tenure as Prime Minister provides an empirical foundation for theoretical discussions of constitutional subversion.

The chapter “Reform to Perform Better” warrants special attention for its engagement with contemporary debates about constitutional reform. Madhav thoughtfully examines various proposals, including those from the M.N. Venkatachaliah Commission established during Atal Bihari Vajpayee’s government. His discussion navigates the tension between constitutional adaptability and the “Basic Structure” doctrine established in the Kesavananda Bharati judgement. While acknowledging the need for reforms to address evolving societal needs, the author emphasises that any modifications must preserve the fundamental character of the Constitution. This nuanced position avoids uncritical constitutional veneration and cavalier reformism, suggesting principled incrementalism guided by constitutional teleology.

Madhav employs a predominantly historical-institutional approach, examining constitutional evolution through political developments and institutional dynamics. The extensive use of primary sources- including debates from the Constituent Assembly, correspondence between key figures, and parliamentary proceedings- represents a significant strength of this work. The inclusion of annexures featuring foundational speeches, such as Nehru’s address when moving the Objectives Resolution and Ambedkar’s speech on the adoption of the Constitution, grants readers direct access to seminal constitutional texts, thereby enhancing the volume’s value as a reference work. The methodological framework integrates legal formalism with historical contextualism, steering clear of both ahistorical textualism and reductionist political determinism. His work demonstrates substantial intellectual independence and scholarly integrity. His critiques of the misuse of constitutional provisions during various administrations reflect a commitment to constitutional principles that transcend partisan alignments. This intellectual honesty enhances the credibility of the work, even for readers who might not share all of the author’s normative orientations. The willingness to acknowledge constitutional failings across different political eras demonstrates an admirable commitment to scholarly objectivity.

The book’s concluding reflections on constitutional morality are particularly thought-provoking. It references Ambedkar’s assertion that constitutional morality is not an inherent attitude but requires cultivation. Madhav emphasises that the Constitution’s efficacy ultimately depends on adherence to constitutional principles and norms rather than merely formal compliance with the constitutional text. This insight resonates with contemporary scholarship on democratic backsliding and constitutional resilience, suggesting potential directions for future research on India’s constitutional trajectory. His invocation of American Supreme Court Justice Joseph Story’s warning further reinforces the essential relationship between constitutional institutions and civic culture.

The author’s prose is characterised by precision while remaining accessible, steering clear of both excessive technicality and overly simplistic generalisations. The synthesis of theoretical analysis with historical narrative results in a composition that is both intellectually robust and narratively compelling. The meticulous organisation of the content, alongside the strategic incorporation of primary sources, illustrates a degree of methodological rigour that is likely to resonate with academic audiences. The book significantly contributes to Indian constitutional scholarship by offering a comprehensive historical account and thoughtfully engaging with contemporary debates. It will prove invaluable to scholars of Indian constitutional history, legal scholars, political scientists, and engaged citizens seeking a deeper understanding of India’s constitutional foundations. Madhav’s commitment to historical precision and analytical nuance makes this book a worthy addition to constitutional literature.

 

Brief Bio: Dr. Manvi Singh is working as an Assistant Professor in Department of English at Sri Venkateswara College, University of Delhi.

“A resilient society featuring democracy, trust in institutions, and sustainable

development lies at the heart of a resilient state.”

Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy, 2016: 24

 

 

Introduction

 

Exploring the long-term threats to India’s strategic autonomy^[i] is crucial for the country. It entails understanding and institutionalising mechanisms to build resilience in 21st-century India and creating decision-making processes and rule-based participation by institutions and organisations in the Indian government, the private and corporate sectors, and NGOs, on an even playing field. To build a specialised focus on resilience, an assessment^[ii] of the same in the Indian context would require an institutionalised network of multi-disciplinary skills. In the limited time, we decided to share the burden of ploughing through the strategic conundrum by uncovering the mosaic of  “World in Transition”^[iii] In the first part, I will first give an overview as to what were the security challenges that were faced globally between 1945 and 2000 and identify how the world remained strictly bipolar till the demise of the former Soviet Union till 1991.

 

More painful was the period between 1992 and 2000. It made the monopoly of nuclear weapons, which had made the construct of superpower into a binary platform crumble and has made cyberspace become dominated by information technology^[iv]. The domination of information technology can be seen more clearly from 2001 to 2022. Therefore, the world or the global order between 1945 and 2000 can be dubbed the “World in Transition”, and from 2001 onwards, it can be labelled the “Age of Uncertainty.”

 

In the deliberation of this paper, the following issues will be covered:

1. Historical Overview of the Strategic Challenges of the 20^th Century
2. Global Security Challenges Facing India in the 21^st Century
3. Great Power Competition
4. Recommendations
5. Conclusion

 

Historical Overview of the Strategic Challenges in the 20^th Century

 

Nuclear weapons^[v] have gained a reputation for providing deterrence in the execution of warfare strategies. Technology and foreign policy were intricately interrelated. Herman Kahn had written “Deadly Logic, ” and Kissinger had perpetuated “Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy.” MacArthur was the role model for every soldier in the Western world, while Mao and Ho Chi Minh served as role models for the developing societies of South and Southeast Asia. There were no takers for Lenin or Che Guevara. War was divided into two levels – conventional and nuclear. Strategic challenges underwent three distinct phases between 1945 and 2000.

 

WW II 1939 – 1945

The impact of technology^[vi] in conducting warfare was fully evident and expanded dramatically in air, land, sea, and underwater warfare. Technology decided policy making, unleashing the power of the Atom. The possible use of weapons of mass destruction became a reality, and the strategic challenge was to win the war.

 

Cold War: 1945-1991

Ideology takes centre stage as the liberal democratic form of governance operates with market forces and competes with centrally planned economies of socialist countries to establish bipolarity. Strategic analysis was based on privileged information, leading to a government monopoly in both systems. A significant reduction in the numerical manpower strength of Western armies focused on high-end technologies to incorporate nuclear weapons “sited for all round defence” through NATO’s military alliance politics to protect Western Europe by creating a ring fence around the southern tier of the Soviet Union, which has a Muslim population, through SEATO and CENTO. West and East, represented by the US and the Soviet Union, prepared for three and a half wars at the height of the Cold War.

 

SALT-I, 1991; SALT-II, 1993; CTBT, 1996; PTBT (Partial Test Ban Treaty, 1963); NPT, July 1968, entered into force March 1970. A Review and Extension Conference was conducted in 1995, deciding that the Treaty should remain in force indefinitely. The ABM Treaty was concluded in May 1972. The Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START-I, 1991) initiated START-II in 1993 but did not come into force. Similarly, the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE, 1990) was also implemented. Soviet revisionism during the Cold War period – from Stalin to Khrushchev to Gorbachev- ultimately led to the balkanisation of the Soviet Union in 1991. The proliferation of nuclear technology and nuclear weapons spread to other nation-states, resulting in a multipolar world.

 

Challenges during the Cold War^[vii] focused on avoiding nuclear holocaust and defining and limiting the periphery of deterrence, which explains the interplay between non-proliferation and proliferation doctrine.

Post Cold War: 1991-2000

What were the conceptual issues at stake? The central question revolved around whether a new world order was emerging.^[viii] Did this signify the collapse of the existing global agenda, prompted by the disappearance of a permanent adversary and the dissolution of bipolarity following the fragmentation of the Soviet Union? Would this global transition mark the decline of the nation-state as the primary unit of international relations and political organisation? Could European integration lay the groundwork for a new supranational political architecture—a potential superstate? What would be the implications for key domains such as politics, economics, fiscal policy, monetary systems (including exchange rate mechanisms), migration, and environmental governance? And in this shifting landscape, does Europe assume the strategic and ideological role once held by the former Eastern Bloc?

What was Europe’s vision for the world in this evolving order? In the context of the so-called New World Order, Europe was confronted with several transformative dynamics:

• The erosion of collective leadership
• The decline of state capitalism
• The intersection of technology and development
• The ethical challenges posed by technological innovation
• The potential retreat of the welfare state
• The rise of the individual as a political and economic actor
• Shifts in international political economy, including regime theory and transnationalism
• Redefinitions of the nation-state, society, and identity
• The impact of technology on transnational structures and governance

 

These conceptual shifts posed fundamental questions about Europe’s role in shaping a new global paradigm.

 

Global Security Challenges facing India in the 21^st Century

 

It is abundantly clear in 2022 that the notion of Russia and China integrating into the liberal international order is beyond imagination. Instead, we are witnessing the emergence of a new era of intensified great power competition in the global arena. This great power competition differs from that of the Cold War and the early 21^st century, which saw the collapse of the Soviet Union and the rise of China as an economic and military power.

 

While the US has maintained its leadership as a superpower with its European allies and Japan, India has been emerging  as an important player in the global order with the fastest-growing economy, demonstrating potential for self-reliance and capacity building for resilience in non-military areas, such as containing the COVID pandemic.

 

While it is necessary to contemplate a world in which the United States and its allies compete with China and other autocratic regimes beneath the threshold of war, we cannot lose sight of the professed traditional mission of post-war U.S. strategy: to deter aggression by adversaries. This situation has also become more complicated as great power rivalry has intensified, along with the emergence of democratic powers like India coming to the centre stage of world events, contributing to a growing influence on world politics and becoming a leading actor in international political economy.

 

We often think of revisionist powers as countries determined to achieve global domination, such as Nazi Germany or the Soviet Union. However, revisionism rarely manifests itself in the form of all-out war. Revisionist states typically target the non-vital interests of their great-power rivals, as this generally does not provoke the kind of retaliatory strike that attacking a vital interest would. Threatening non-vital interests—for example, by attacking a non-ally—leaves the status quo power uncertain about how to respond and whether retaliation is worth the effort.

 

Of course, the term “non-vital interest” is somewhat misleading. It only holds true when viewed narrowly and in isolation. While annexation and unprovoked invasion, like the case of Ukraine, clearly constitute a breach of the peace and threaten vital interests of nation states, seizing small rocks or strips of territory poses a more ambiguous threat. Such moves appear to be of limited strategic importance until, in the aggregate, they acquire much greater value. At the outset, the fact that no treaty has been breached and the territory seems to be of limited importance is highly significant to the dynamics and psychology of any given crisis. The small strategic value of the contested territory causes the dominant power to refrain from going to war at an extraordinary cost, which would be vastly and inversely proportionate to the value the dominant power places on the disputed territory.

 

This is not a new problem. It is textbook revisionism, which poses the most complex challenge that a major power can face. The purpose of revisionism is to make deterrence extremely difficult and to encourage rival great powers to accommodate them diplomatically or to limit their response to the point of being ineffective. While a regular security dilemma between two status quo powers can be addressed through reassurance and transparency, a revisionist power will not be satisfied with the restraint of others.

 

The most crucial piece of the post-war world order is not the United Nations or international financial institutions, important as they are. It is a healthy regional order. It is a truism to accept that America’s greatest success after World War II was to create a system in Western Europe and Northeast Asia that ended German and Japanese imperialism and provided the basis for shared prosperity. One must accept as a realist that if those regional orders fall apart, so will the global order. For example, a war between China and Japan—the world’s second and third largest economies- would have massive repercussions for the global economy. A Russian incursion into the Baltic, catalysed by the Ukraine crisis, would raise the risk of nuclear war between the world’s two largest nuclear powers.

 

It should come as no surprise that China and Russia are regionally focused. After all, major powers are usually primarily concerned with their immediate environment rather than abstract notions of global leadership. However, the vulnerability of regional orders makes the global order vulnerable. If there is a significant challenge to the international order, it is most likely to occur at the regional level. This is why Russian and Chinese activities in their neighbourhoods are more reflective of their approaches to the international order than their explicit policy on global issues, although those are also important. Ultimately, a country’s willingness to honour the norm against territorial conquest is much more important than its compliance with the dispute settlement mechanism of the World Trade Organisation or voting weights at the IMF.

 

Great Power Competition

 

The concept of global security^[x] occupies a foremost position in the minds of international relations policymakers and government officials in most countries. However, maintaining global security holds significance primarily for the so-called ‘great powers’. These powers can influence the international stage, change the lives of millions, and control the future. In his book ‘The World after the Peace Conference’, Toynbee describes the concept of a great power as “a political force exerting an effect coextensive with the widest range of the society in which it operates” (Toynbee, 1926).

 

In other words, a great power is a nation with sufficient scope to exert its influence and interests on the international stage successfully. In critiquing Toynbee, it is essential to argue that a power needs the necessary resources and political will to exert itself globally and to be recognised as a great power by other foreign states and societies. For example, today, Estonia cannot send troops to remote corners of the world or lead international coalitions at the United Nations due to its limited resources and incapacity. In contrast, the United Kingdom can. Metaphorically, it has a seat at the table, and other states acknowledge the ability of the United Kingdom to impose itself on the international stage, thereby establishing it as a global power.

 

In this context, it can be argued that great power competition among the great powers threatens global security by analysing three major global powers: the United States, Russia, and the People’s Republic of China. Each of these countries can exert influence on both the international and domestic stages, which is in coherence with the critique of Toynbee. Unlike the United States, however, Russia and China aspire to ‘steal’ America’s position as world hegemon. Their ambitions to become the undisputed world power are, for now, just aspirations. As long as the United States, whether in prosperity or decline, remains the world hegemon, the security threats posed by China or Russia will remain regionally constrained, thus not posing a menace to global security.

 

I would argue that Russia’s position is not of significant international concern. The Russian threat, or what Westerners perceive it to be, is not the massive bogeyman it was in previous decades. With the Soviet Union dead, the Russian psyche must prioritise defence due to its considerable loss of perceived friendly territory. Moreover, with NATO’s expansion into what Russia could perceive as its sphere of influence, the West risks igniting tensions that shouldn’t exist. Perhaps the duality that Russia seems to embody only needs to be coaxed out to transform into a cooperative member of the European Community. A cooperative Russia would benefit both peace in Europe and global peace.

 

Lastly, when addressing great power competition that threatens global security, the role of China must be analysed. China has a rich and complex history and culture; from the Qin Empire to Xi Jinping, China’s civilisation rivals even the greatest empires of Europe. As Kissinger argues in his book On China, the Chinese view themselves as having a national destiny to be not only the dominant power in Asia but also the world hegemon (Kissinger, 2012). With China’s recent diplomatic overtures in the international arena, incursions into the South China Sea (Sevastopulo, 2021), and threats against Taiwan (Patel, 2021), they, like Russia, are testing the will of the West – but more specifically that of the United States. However, some argue that China cannot, and can never, become the world hegemon due to economic failings and domestic crises.

 

Overall, China’s ambitions to become the world hegemon are undoubtedly evident. The incursions into the South China Sea and the ambitions to overtake the United States as the largest economic power clearly indicate this desire. However, this aspiration will remain merely a dream as long as America remains the top dog. The world may face significant threats to its security in regional areas (India-China border, South China Sea, Korean Peninsula) due to China’s pursuit of being number one. Still, as long as the United States can maintain its position, global security will remain intact.

 

Recommendations

 

India needs to enhance its competitiveness in relation to China and other authoritarian powers to acquire resilience and achieve strategic autonomy. In this regard, the following recommendations are made:

 

1. Pursue military modernisation to continue reorienting India’s defence policy toward addressing major power competitors. The United States must also incorporate initiatives that enhance strategic competitiveness while rebuilding the domestic economy after the pandemic. This includes a strategic approach to technological innovation and reducing the vulnerability of certain sectors of our society to interdependence with adversaries. Strategic thinking must be integrated across all relevant government agencies and departments.
2. Next, competition with China should embody a positive and affirmative vision of the free world, which we would continuously work to strengthen and improve. This would include increasing the free world’s resilience to pressure and shocks from authoritarian states; protecting democracy and the rule of law from illiberal forces; coordinating on technology policy; enhancing cooperation on transnational challenges such as climate change and global public health; and developing a suite of capabilities to shape the international order. It must also involve an ambitious and proactive effort to help free societies and like-minded partners recover from the pandemic, including in the developing world.
3. Continue to deepen the Indo-US alliance and partnerships in the Indo-Pacific by focusing on deterrence through denial, enhancing the credibility and resilience of India’s presence in the region, encouraging cooperation among allies and partners, assisting allies and partners in responding to external coercion and interference, deepening cooperation with the US, Japan, Australia, and Southeast Asian countries while balancing against China. The time has come to strengthen ties with Taiwan.
4. Revise India’s defence spending target to encourage European allies to invest in civilian and military capabilities, such as new technologies, to help them compete with China.
5. Facilitate a national conversation about the type of strategic competition India wants to engage in. Great power competition is not a strategy but a condition we must cope with in all its dimensions. We are still at a relatively early stage in identifying different competition strategies. Over the next ten years, India must refine and develop its thinking on the objectives of the competition and the means to accomplish these accordingly.

Conclusion

 

The idea that great power competition threatens global security is indisputable—history, particularly the horrors of the 20th century, serves as a stark reminder. However, such threats are considerably diminished in a unipolar world dominated by a single hegemon. Under American leadership, the international order has enjoyed relative stability; ideally, this influence will continue to serve as a cornerstone of global security.

 

While rival powers such as China and Russia may aspire to challenge or even supplant the United States as the dominant global force, such an outcome remains improbable. The current world order will likely endure as long as the U.S. maintains its strategic pragmatism—remaining more Machiavellian, if necessary, than its competitors—and preserves internal cohesion. In this context, American hegemony remains the most reliable guarantor of international stability for the foreseeable future.

 

Acknowledgement

While composing this position paper, I have not deviated from the research method by adding many essential footnotes. However, I would be remiss if I did not acknowledge the numerous writings of scholars and professionals in the field, US Congressional Research monographs, UN reports, and several independent papers on the subject. I have taken the liberty to quote and rearrange their thoughts to provide seamless output in this deliberation, which, to my knowledge, has not appeared thus far. I want to acknowledge all the authors whose work has enriched my understanding and assessment.

 

Author Brief Bio: Professor Gautam Sen was Formerly Sawarkar Professor of Strategic Studies (1981-2007), Head Department of Defence Studies (1981-2001), Director Board of Colleges & University Development (2001-2004) Director National Centre of International Security and Defence Analysis (2002-2007) at the University of Pune. He was Director General and Member Board of Trustees, Indian Institute of Education, Pune (2006-2011), Research Professor National Security Council Secretariat, GoI, Delhi (2015-16).  He has been a Visiting Professor at Madras University, Gujrat Vidyapith, Goa University, Institute of Social and Economic Change and UGC Visiting Professor at Gorakhpur University. Air Marshal Subroto Mukherjee Chair of Excellence, United Services Institution, Delhi (2018-19). Sen has also been a FORD FOUNDATION International Fellow at Harvard and Massachusetts Institute of Technology and Twice Fellow at the International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS), London.

 

 

References:

^[i] Muraviev, A.D., Ahlawat, D. & Hughes, L. India’s security dilemma: engaging big powers while retaining strategic autonomy. Int Polit 59, 1119–1138 (2022). https://doi.org/10.1057/s41311-021-00350-z and Boradey, H. (2022, March 11). India- Strategic autonomy through non-alignment policy. The Kootneeti.

https://thekootneeti.in/2022/03/10/india-strategic-autonomy-through-non-alignment-policy/  and  Finding Strategic Autonomy in the Quad: India’s Trial by Fire. (2021, March 18). The Diplomat. https://thediplomat.com/2021/03/finding-strategic-autonomy-in-the-quad-indias-trial-by-fire/

^[ii] Fjäder, C. (2014). The nation-state, national security and resilience in the age of globalisation. Resilience, 2(2), 114–129.

https://doi.org/10.1080/21693293.2014.914771

 

^[iii] This aspect is discussed in the main text of this presentation as “Historical Overview of Strategic Challenges of the 20th Century and Global Security Challenges Facing India in the 21 st Century pp 7-10

 

^[iv]  Mallick, P. (2023). Information, Cyber and Space Domain and Its Application in Future Land Warfare.

 

^[v] For over 50 years, but especially since the end of the cold war, the United States and the Russian Federation (formerly the Soviet Union) have engaged in a series of bilateral arms control measures that have drastically reduced their strategic nuclear arsenals from a peak of around 60,000. The most recent of those measures, the New START Treaty, limits the number of deployed strategic nuclear weapons to 1,550 per State. New START is scheduled to expire on 5 February 2021; should it expire without a successor or not be extended, it will be the first time that the strategic arsenals of the United States and the Russian Federation have not been constrained since the 1970s.*

* The New START Treaty entered into effect on 5 February 2011 for a period of 10 years. It can be extended for up to five years, unless it is replaced earlier by another agreement.
Source: Federation of American Scientists.  Although nuclear weapons have only been used twice in warfare—in the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945—about 13,400 reportedly remain in our world today and there have been over 2,000 nuclear tests conducted to date.  Disarmament is the best protection against such dangers, but achieving this goal has been a tremendously difficult challenge. See https://www.un.org/disarmament/wmd/nuclear/

 

^[vi] In the long-term, nuclear weapons produce ionizing radiation, which kills or sickens those exposed, contaminates the environment, and has long-term health consequences, including cancer and genetic damage. Their widespread use in atmospheric testing has caused grave long-term consequences. See What happens if nuclear weapons are used? – ICAN https://www.icanw.org              catastrophic_harm

 

^[vii] Muggah, R., & Yves Tiberghien. (2018, January 30). 5 facts you need to understand the new global order. World Economic Forum. https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2018/01/five-facts-you-need-to-understand-the-new-global-order/

 

^[viii] Kempe, F. (2022, April 3). Op-ed: A new world order is emerging — and the world is not ready for it. CNBC. https://www.cnbc.com/2022/04/03/a-new-world-order-is-emerging-and-the-world-is-not-ready-for-it.html and Yllmaz, E. M. (2008). “The New World Order”: An Outline of the Post-Cold War Era. https://dergipark.org.tr/tr/download/article-file/19517 and Also see Perspectives on the future of the global order. (n.d.). Brookings. https://www.brookings.edu/articles/perspectives-on-the-future-of-the-global-order/

 

^[ix] Anant, Hardeep. (2015). Challenges facing India in the 21st century: An HRD perspective. 13. 1367-1375 and Also see Siwach, R. S. (2003). India’s Security in the 21^st Century: Challenges, Management and Futuristic Directions. Indian Journal of Asian Affairs, 16(1/2), 145–158. http://www.jstor.org/stable/41960508

 

^[x] Global security includes military and diplomatic measures that nations and international organizations such as the United Nations and NATO take to ensure mutual safety and security. Global security, instead, has five dimensions that include human, environmental, national, transnational, and transcultural security, and therefore, global security and the security of any state or culture cannot be achieved without good governance at all levels that guarantees security through justice for all. Security, like peace, identity and other terminologies in that fold of international political theory has attracted many definitions. Unfortunately, many contributors approach these concepts from their own ideologies. Hence, broad areas of description of the term “security” exist. If defining security is that elusive, there is little wonder why operating within its coverage is so fluid. In the name of security, people and governments have taken actions where intended and unintended outcomes have become difficult to handle. Because of its seeming lack of conceptual boundary, security, as a concept, is used to entice and whip up patronage for many political projects both at the state and international levels of politicking. Hence, Paul D. Williams argued that “security is therefore a powerful political tool in claiming attention for priority items in the competition for government attention”. The following references will be useful: Williams, Paul D. ed. Security Studies: An Introduction, Routledge, UK, 2008. Makinda, Samuel M. Sovereignty and Global Security, Security Dialogue, 1998, Sage Publications, Vol. 29(3) 29: 281-292. McSweeney, Bill. Security, Identity and Interests: A Sociology of International Relations, Cambridge University Press, 1999. Human Security Unit, United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Human Security in Theory and Practice(http://hdr.undp.org/en/media/HS_Handbook_2009.pdf). Musarrat, Jabeen. Governance Divide, Pakistan Horizon, The Pakistan Institute of International Affairs, Karachi, Vol. 56, No. 4, 2003. Beres, Louis Rene. Terrorism and Global Security: The Nuclear Threat, Westview Press Inc., 1979.

 

 

Rami Desai: To achieve the goals of becoming a developed nation, or Viksit Bharat, by 2047, there are numerous markers to consider, such as technology and social cohesion. We have witnessed significant disruption in recent years. Let me pose the first question that comes to my mind: social cohesion, which is crucial for a developed country. There has been considerable discussion and concern regarding illegal immigration into the country. Reports indicate that there are approximately 20 million illegal immigrants in India, many of whom are connected through vast and complex networks involving anti-India elements, including terrorist organisations and groups like the Rohingya. How do you think India can address the issue of illegal immigration? Additionally, how can it safeguard itself from these existing networks?

 

Ashok Malik: This calls for something more than a simple, better border-patrolling answer. If you consider Bharat or India as a civilisation, we are going through the post-1947 or post-1950 phase. For instance, a vast ancient civilisation with a lot of ambiguity in its frontiers is crystallising into a modern nation-state. It’s not an easy process; it’s a challenging process. For example, fairly open borders with migrants coming in, not sometimes as invaders- I appreciate that- but much more often as traders, as migrants, as pilgrims, back and forth. This has been a part of our history. Obviously, this is not sustainable in a modern 21st-century environment. It needs to be curbed to a necessary degree. However, India is also the biggest economy, the biggest country, the biggest magnet in the Indian subcontinent- or what some people prefer to call South Asia; I prefer calling it the Indian subcontinent. As such, not integration, but inter-linkages with our neighbouring countries, whether social, cultural, or economic, are making them part of the broader Indian economy.

 

As a mechanism to enhance connectivity, which benefits us as well, especially if you consider the states of the Northeast, access does come through border countries, for instance. Someday, if Pakistan sorts out its terrorism problem, regular economic exchanges with Pakistan could benefit our state of Punjab. Of course, I don’t see that happening right now. But what we need to do, what we are trying to achieve, is solidifying our borders, crystallising them, which have not been clearly defined for thousands of years. Still, this is in the context of the modern Indian nation-state. We must secure our borders, curb illegal immigration, while incentivising legal immigration that meets genuine economic and labour needs in our country. All of these processes have to work in parallel. It’s complex; it’s not easy. India can’t afford an open border, nor can it sustain a completely closed system like the Great Wall of India. There is a halfway house which we will have to live in for our own needs and gains. This involves negotiation between India and its neighbours, and a frank discussion we must have with ourselves. What are the metrics or parameters for how much we open and how much we do not? This varies from border to border, neighbouring country to neighbouring country, and region to region. There is no one-size-fits-all answer. Thus, the perspectives on frontiers from Delhi and those from the ground are very different.

 

Rami Desai:  But you speak about the borders, and we know that we have some of the largest porous borders any country has. We are also surrounded by countries that are, to say the very least, in flux. Recent developments on our northeastern borders have revealed a complicated relationship regarding whether we should shut it down and what the process should be. Considering that we have made significant progress in developing infrastructure in these areas, how do you envision safeguarding our borders?

 

Ashok Malik: Look, infrastructure at our borders is something we have ignored and neglected for years. We adopted a defensive posture, arguing that we couldn’t afford to improve it because it was exceedingly difficult and logistically impossible. Transporting construction materials to the border was also much more challenging, and we believed it would incentivise invading armies, reflecting a very defensive strategy. Over the past 10 years, one of the outstanding achievements of the Modi government has been the significant upgrading of border infrastructure, which is necessary and has occasionally caused other countries to feel more alarmed than they should have. This is particularly relevant given that countries like China have constructed much greater infrastructure over a more extended period. However, this is important not only for military posture but also for integrating our Indian communities and citizens living in border regions with the rest of the economy. This integration is crucial; otherwise, they remain in an isolated limbo. There is a challenge in Bangladesh today that requires a tough stance, but we have also achieved much with Bangladesh under previous governments. Our relationship with Nepal is somewhat inconsistent, but there have been achievements. There have also been successes with Bhutan. Regarding the Maldives and Sri Lanka, circumstances are looking better today.

 

Given all of this, I realise I am discussing sea borders as well as land borders. With all of this infrastructure at our borders to build connectivity, enabling commerce, promoting economic interchange, and incentivising countries and societies to live peacefully and equitably with India. Because if the economic stakes for a good relationship with India are significant, then the willingness to allow their politicians to act recklessly will be much more limited. For a country like India to deal with this neighbourhood, there is a combination of the Iron Fist and the Velvet Glove. Coercion is needed when it’s necessary. Absolutely, like right now in Bangladesh, considering what is happening and the fact that Bangladesh is being unfair to its minorities, which immediately impacts India socially, and given that Bangladesh is flirting with Pakistan and China, we must take a tough stance, and we have done so. I suspect it will get tougher.

 

On the other hand, where the environment is more welcoming, as it is currently in Sri Lanka, we should incentivise a close relationship. If that means enhancing border infrastructure or connectivity corridors, we should do so. Thus, there is no one answer for all countries in the region, and there is no single solution for any one country over time either. It changes with the posture of other countries.

 

Rami Desai: Correct. But what interests me is that while we talk about these other countries and what we should be doing with them, taking a tough stance when necessary, as we have done, we have also faced repercussions in terms of major international powers. Whether it’s cross-border issues or internal matters, major powers want to counter a rising India and an assertive India. We have seen this during the farmers’ protest, CAA, and so on. Why do you think this happens, and how should we react to it?

 

Ashok Malik: The world doesn’t owe you a living. If you are a rising power, you will face challenges, even from friends who want you to rise only to a certain point. That’s how it is in an office environment. That’s how it is in the ruthless world of global politics. You have to secure your interests. You have to protect your core priorities, which are non-negotiable. We are moving towards a world where they say spheres of influence are re-emerging as a concept, in contrast to globalisation, which created a flatter world. I don’t know whether this is true because I don’t want to make a prediction too early in the process, but assuming it is even halfway true, we need much greater influence and control in our neighbourhood. If that requires confronting even larger powers from outside the region, or those who may be friendly with us in other areas, we should be willing to do that. A former American Secretary of State at a conference in India a couple of years ago said we can walk and chew gum at the same time; if the Americans can do it, so can Indians. You can have Bhelpuri and walk at the same time.

 

Rami Desai: Absolutely, I agree, especially with the Bhelpuri. But you know, we have also made considerable advances in digitisation. That has been one of our fantastic success stories, and this government has put our digitisation story on the map. However, this also brings about some vulnerabilities that can be exploited in our weaker moments. What do you think those challenges are? How should we approach them over the next 22 years?

 

Ashok Malik: This is a good point you raised because, if you ask me what my nightmare security scenario for the proximate future is, much more than a nuclear attack, it is possibly a devastating cyber-attack that cripples our financial systems. The whole concept of what is considered critical infrastructure for our country has changed. In the old days, critical infrastructure may have included places like Bombay High or steel plants. We have four or five legacy steel plants in both the private and public sectors, which are iconic, along with other industrial facilities. However, the definition of critical infrastructure today has expanded to include our digital backbone—undersea cables, for instance, of which we are part of a global consortium. Separately, in our use and adoption of the Internet, whether through social media or email, we are also vulnerable to manipulation, just like other countries. I am not saying we are the only ones. Given how rapidly and impressively we have digitised, many countries in the Global South are looking at aspects of India’s digitisation. They may not want the entire India Stack, but they seek parts of it, whatever suits their needs.

 

It is essential for us to be at the forefront of cybersecurity. I would assert that our global partnerships, be they with European countries, France, or the US, particularly in the area of cybersecurity through the collaboration of many Indian tech professionals and cybersecurity workers in the Indo-US tech corridor, hold great promise. At the most basic level, all our public and private institutions need to invest more and more wisely in cybersecurity. Some years ago, we experienced a cyber-attack on the AIIMS Delhi database, which is notably valuable. It contains patient records and extensive epidemiological data, yet insufficient care or consideration was given to its protection. I am not casting blame here, but this should act as a wake-up call. A crippling cyber-attack is my worst nightmare, far more troubling than a nuclear attack.

 

Rami Desai: Absolutely. I must agree with you regarding how dependent the common man is on our digital infrastructure. However, let me shift to technology as well. Some would say that we completely missed the industrial revolution bus and shouldn’t miss the technology revolution bus. Whether AI, the semiconductor industry, or quantum computing, a certain amount of resources is needed. How can we compete with other countries? Where do you think we are lacking, and how quickly do we need to progress in this area?

 

Ashok Malik: We have more resources today than we did 20 years ago. I will explain what I mean by that. The other day, I was discussing this topic, which is slightly unrelated to your answer, but I will return to your answer shortly. I was talking about Hyundai, which raised money in India last year in what was India’s largest IPO. Hyundai entered India in 1995. India’s GDP at that point was about $400 billion because, in 1991, our GDP was $ 275 billion. So, I am assuming it grew to $ 400 billion by the mid-90s. Today, our GDP is $ 4 trillion. It is ten times larger. Simply put, more capital is available now, which is why Hyundai, once an investor that brought in money in the 1990s, is raising capital in India today.

 

Now, if you look at semiconductors, which is a vast and resource-intensive ecosystem- from chemicals and materials at the base to a fully-fledged fab at the top- we are currently at the 3rd or 4th echelon of a skyscraper. However, 20 months ago, we were not even at the groundbreaking level; thus, we have made appreciable progress. There’s much more to do. We have brought in technology from other countries, but much of the investment has actually come from Indian funds: Indian public money, Indian taxpayer money, and some Indian private money. Capital is undoubtedly needed, and I do not suggest that we don’t need foreign investment. Of course, we do, especially for AI partnerships with global companies, all of whom want to test their models and have different approaches toward India or with India. We must allow them access and create workable relationships that benefit them and us.

 

That will bring in capital and investment. Money isn’t as much of a problem- whether global or local- as deploying that money smartly. You are quite right about semiconductors, which are now seen as a metric of national security. We saw this during COVID when car waiting lists in India were up to a year. We need semiconductor legacy chips for the electronics and automobile industries, which is our focus. Quantum computing, although still emerging, is just around the corner, and we know it. Artificial intelligence, of course, has enormous social implications. It’s not just about weaponisation; it can enable better lives for our farmers, students, and poor people in general, improving governance. A controversial suggestion here is that we need to integrate AI into our judicial proceedings. Instead of having one person go through copious documentation, how about using AI as a filter? I suspect it will be better than many want to believe.

 

Rami Desai: Do we need an overarching commission, like the Atomic Energy Commission?

 

Ashok Malik: For new technology, there are groups within the government that bring in private sector people as well, because much of the technology here lies with the working private sector. Our semiconductor mission, for instance, uses government personnel and private sector individuals, including people of Indian origin living abroad. The AI missions, similarly, are looking at a more inclusive collaborative formulation. We are hosting a big AI conference next year. I think early next year, February next year, if I’m not mistaken, which is also seen as AI for impact and inclusion. So, I don’t think there is a need for one big technology commission, but each of these areas will require a collaborative process, and some of that is happening. Maybe it can happen better, but it’s there.

 

Rami Desai: A nation like ours needs a robust defence sector. That would contribute to the assets we require to better achieve our goals by 2047. Do you think we are on the right track, or do you believe there are challenges ahead?

 

Ashok Malik: We are both on the right track and facing some challenges. It’s like this: for many years, for various reasons- some of which were our doing and some not- we have had a dependency on Russia or the Soviet Union regarding our military platforms. We have now diversified. We obtain platforms from France; we have platforms from the US, of course, and we also get platforms from Israel. However, we do not want to replace one dependency with another. In the end, we will need to make ourselves. Of course, every country buys military platforms, defence equipment, or munitions, but we also want to establish at least a sufficient critical mass of our own. We aim to develop our platforms, which we are starting to do with aircraft carriers, for instance, and advance up the value chain.

 

But no one will hand it to you on a platter, not even your best friend. They want to keep the crown jewels to themselves. For example, when you look at jet engine technology, we are collaborating with the Americans and the French. There is also some discussion about working with the British. No one is going to give you 100%. You will need to work with all of them, triangulate your efforts, and still face a gap you must fill yourself. A strong defence manufacturing sector, one of this government’s main priorities, intersects significantly with a modern industrial economy. The two are interconnected – if you have a strong defence sector, you will have a manufacturing economy. If you possess a manufacturing economy, transitioning to defence manufacturing is natural and straightforward. The two are linked, and in a way, the defence manufacturing or the defence production, or the Atmanirbharta in defence initiative, will test how successful we are in boosting manufacturing indices in our country.

 

Rami Desai: Yes, we have achieved quite a bit, but there is still a little way further to go to achieve our goals by 2047. To make all of this happen, we need effective systems that include our bureaucracy. Are we on the right track, or do you feel that more lateral inclusions are required, where we can draw talent from subject experts?

 

Ashok Malik: I worked for five years in the government as a lateral entrant, and it was an enormous learning process for me. I think I managed to contribute somewhat; at least, I hope I did. That said, every country- whether it’s the US or China- needs a permanent bureaucracy. I don’t believe lateral entrants can replace permanent bureaucracy; they can complement it. They can come for short periods, three years, five years, or whatever, bringing their expertise and then moving on. They will move on because a career bureaucrat or civil servant thinks differently. I am not saying they think better or worse; they think differently, and that perspective is also needed in the system. Career bureaucrats are generally more cautious, and their training reflects that caution. Some of that caution is necessary, but sometimes it can become an end in itself, which is problematic. Therefore, more people from outside should come in. I also believe that government employees should be allowed to transition to the private sector for a couple of years, as in many countries, mainly European countries.

 

Osmosis is meant to be two-way; otherwise, we produce two cultures that barely interact, which is not beneficial for the government or the private sector. There is an understanding gap regarding how each side makes decisions, their motivations, and those of the private sector and civil service. These are genuine motivations. It’s not that I don’t want to do something for the sake of avoiding it. For example, a decision was to be made during my first couple of months in government. I made a recommendation that seemed straightforward to me. However, I kept receiving questions repeatedly from my senior, and initially, I felt irritated. I wondered if he was trying to provoke me because I was an outsider. Eventually, I realised he was examining my decision to give every possible justification so no one down the line could question it. I came to understand that he was teaching me. Should our system be so laborious that making a fairly straightforward decision takes so long? That is a fair question. Does our system need to be more cautious because it’s taxpayer money compared to what might happen in the private sector or a foundation? That’s also true. Therefore, there is no one answer. I also believe that the quality of ministers matters. Unfortunately, in India, the skills required to get elected to parliament and those needed to govern are increasingly divergent, posing a challenge.

 

Rami Desai: On that note, one can hope that, as you mentioned, this osmosis is essential for better functioning. I believe it would provide valuable insights to even the bureaucrats if they were allowed to experience the private sector, as there seems to be a cocooning within the bureaucracy. Thank you so much, Ashok ji, for being here and sharing this insider’s view with us. You have been in the government and truly know this from an insider’s perspective.

 

Ashok Malik: Absolutely. Thank you very much for having me.

 

Brief Bios:

 

Shri Ashok Malik is a Partner at The Asia Group (TAG) and Chair of its New Delhi-based subsidiary in India where he leads the firm’s in-market business strategy and services. Prior to joining TAG, Ashok served for three years (2019-22) as Policy Advisor/Additional Secretary in India’s Ministry of External Affairs. In that capacity, he worked closely with the senior leadership of the Ministry to help shape and explain India’s foreign policy in a crucial and eventful period for the international system. Between 2017 and 2019, Shri Ashok Malik served as speech writer and spokesperson for the 14th President of India, President Ram Nath Kovind. Before entering government, Ashok was a Distinguished Fellow at the Observer Research Foundation, one of India’s preeminent think-tanks. From 2015, he led ORF’s Neighborhood Regional Studies Initiative. Shri Ashok Malik began his career in the news media, serving in senior editorial positions in leading Indian publications that included Times of India, India Today and Indian Express. He rose to become one of India’s best-read columnists and commentators. In 2016, he was awarded the Padma Shri, one of India’s highest civilian honor.

 

Ms. Rami Desai is Distinguished Fellow, India Foundation. An alumnus of King’s College, London, she has degrees in Anthropology of Religion and Theology. She has been actively involved in research, fieldwork and analysis of conflict areas, with a special focus on the North East region of India for over a decade.