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Indic thought is the most liberal that the world has ever produced. This is because it is the most democratically evolved of all. It is a product of the deep contemplation of great sages and saints, their great dialogues and discourses. A bhadra icchha, a benign wish had originated from that, and it was about abhyudaya, progress and prosperity.

Bhadram icchhantah rishiyah

swar vidayah, tapo dikshaamupanshed agre.

Tato raashtram, bala, ojasya jaatam

tadasmai devaupasannmantu

That bhadra icchha led to the evolution of the core principles of Indic thought several millennia ago. It explored all dimensions of human existence, and concluded that life is a celebration. ‘Aananda’, eternal bliss, is the ultimate objective of this. Indic Thought teaches us to celebrate life.

A few years ago, I was at a conference in China. A Chinese scholar had made a startling comment that Indians can never compete with the Chinese. I asked him to explain. “You Indians are worshippers of poverty,” he insisted, saying that Indians worship loin cloth-clad saintly men as heroes, whereas the Chinese civilisation had always worshipped prosperity.

It prompted me to wonder whether they have misunderstood our worldview. We are one people who always strived for ‘aananda’, eternal bliss.

Alexander bumps into Diogenes, a half-naked man lying on the banks of a river on his way. He asks the man, “Who are you?” The man says he is Diogenes. And then he asks Alexander, “Who are you?” A little surprised and a lot annoyed, Alexander replies, “I am Alexander the Great.” Hearing it, Diogenes laughs out aloud. “I am seeing a man for the first time who calls himself ‘the Great’,” he says.

They engage in a discussion. At the end, impressed by Diogenes’ philosophy, Alexander promises to become his disciple. “Do it today, or it will be too late,” warns Diogenes. Alexander hesitates, “I have a mission to conquer the world. I shall come back after that,” he promises. “You can never,” says Diogenes. “Can I do something for you?” asks Alexander. “Yes! I am enjoying my beautiful sun bath. You are coming in the way. Please get off,” shouts Diogenes.

Alexander was looking for his happiness in wars, conquest and subjugation. Diogenes, a saintly man, finds it in his freedom to lie down by the side of the river in his sun bath. Freedom, absolute and unmitigated, is the Indic way.

“God is dead; Man is free,” exclaimed Nietzsche. But we said, “No. God is here, and hence man is free. God is all around. He is in me. I am God, the unbound. Hence I am free.” We are a society that cherishes freedom.

Our Dharma, a view and vision of life that has evolved out of this thought, is the Dharma of happiness and celebration. ‘Sarve api sukhinah santu’ is the daily morning prayer of us all. At one level, it is purely a material prayer. It says, ‘Let all be happy; let all be free from disease; let all enjoy goods in life; let all be free of sorrow’. It is about material happiness.

But the operational word in this prayer is ‘sarvepi’ or ‘all’. We pray that everybody should be happy. In order for all to be happy, all have to also sacrifice. ‘Tyaaga’, sacrifice, is thus made a virtue for the greater aananda of society.

Indic Thought is very profound, and yet very humble. It doesn’t ordain any final word and demand that followers believe it. We are not ‘believers’, we are ‘seekers’. Indic Thought is man’s journey, an unending exploration of the Absolute.

Since we are seekers, we have to be ever open to new ideas. We shouldn’t assume that all the Indic wisdom can be available in a single gathering. Humility, the quality of accepting our inadequacy to realise the Ultimate Truth, and a constant yearning for it, is best captured in the Indic concept of ‘Neti Neti’. Scholars have interpreted it in many ways: ‘Neither this nor that’ etcetera. But Chaturvedi Badrinath’s interpretation, ‘Not just this alone’, best captures the Indic spirit. In our seeking, we must not forget that what we explore is not the entire truth. We must respect the other; continue to seek.

The seeker has no boundaries. He can find virtue anywhere in the world. “Hold your own values with one hand, close to your heart. Stretch your other hand into the universe, and collect as much wisdom as you can,” exhorted Swami Vivekananda. Indic Thought doesn’t discard any idea based on its origin, East or West. It accepts all noble thoughts.

Any effort to restrict it in a framework will be the ‘Victorianisation’ of Indic Thought. It will be the death of it.

Indic Thought wants a human to evolve in inner spaces, not just in outer morals. Semitic faiths and Victorians have emphasised ‘character’. This English word has two equivalent Hindi words: ‘sheel’ and ‘charitra’. The latter is a discipline imposed from outside. Social norms, ethics, societal morals – all these form your ‘charitra’. But ‘sheel’ is the blossoming of the inner self; it is not bound by external restrictions; it is an innate virtue.

Go to an uneducated old woman of the poorest household in a remote village in our country. Listen to her morning prayer. She might not have enough food to eat for the day, or enough clothes to wear. But her prayer will be: ‘Ganga maiyya ki jai ho; gau mata ki jai ho’, ‘Glory to the Ganges and the revered cow’. And it will end with ‘Lok kalyaan ho’, ‘Let the whole world be happy.’ It was not taught to her; it is her ‘sheel’ speaking.

Religions have imposed so-called values externally. They wanted society to have character. One should never become ‘dus-charitra’, a man of bad character. But one shouldn’t remain ‘charitravaan’, a man of external character, alone. One should become ‘sheelvaan’, a man of innate virtue. That is Indic Thought.

It is this virtue that might sometimes seem to go against societal mores, which is the real freedom that Indic Thought accords the individual. Because many a time, these norms that we construct – for ‘charitra’ – might end up subjecting some sections of people to injustice. Victims of this are true minorities. A minority is not defined numerically; it refers to those whose voice has been taken away. Discrimination on the basis of sex, caste or race, even in the name of social character, is against Indic Thought.

Draupadi is the epitome of ‘sheel’. She is in a way the first feminist of the world. A woman with five husbands, but fiercely independent, as she is not to obey any of them, and only listen to her dear colleague Krishna. Draupadi was partly responsible for the epic Mahabharata War. Yudhisthira, being Dharmaraj, was willing to settle for five villages. But Krishna turns to Draupadi, and it was she who insists that she wouldn’t settle for anything less, quite rightfully, than the blood of Dusshasana. It was Draupadi’s ‘sheel’, not Yudhisthira’s ‘charitra’ of peace and no-war that finally led to the victory of Dharma. We didn’t call Draupadi an obdurate woman; instead, we call her Maha Sadhvi, an epitome of virtue.

Indic Thought is about promoting and respecting that ‘sheel’, irrespective of whether one is born as a man or a woman, or even a transgender.

Such a profound and evolved way of thought has still not taken its rightful place in the world. It is still regarded as regressive, obscurantist, etcetera. But as Gandhiji rightly used to say, “If there is something bad in your society, don’t blame Dharma; blame yourself, that you have failed to realise it fully.” We have to realise it. More importantly, we have to articulate it properly.

That is the challenge. I have another one to proffer: think of ways to make Indic Thought fashionable, something that a 21st century young man would like to wear on his sleeve.

*This article is a summary of the inaugural address delivered by Shri Ram Madhav,

National General Secretary, BJP and Director, India Foundation at the Indic Thoughts Festival organised by India Foundation and Indic Academy at Goa on 17th December, 2017.

(This article is carried in the print edition of January-February 2018 issue of India Foundation Journal.)

1. Introduction

ASEAN and India have a rich history of maritime trade and ancient cultural linkages. Maritime relations between India and Southeast Asia date back to ancient times. India’s trade from ports such as Lothal, its coastal temples at Mahabalipuram and ancient links with My Son in Vietnam show the strength of its ties with ASEAN1. The process of acculturation of India and Southeast Asia began in ancient times from the 3rd century onwards. The exchanges via trade, the influence of Sanskrit and Indian epics in Southeast Asia are well documented2. Indian culture is an inseparable part of Southeast Asia’s customs.

In early 1990s, if one were looking around the world to find the most promising region for international cooperation, ASEAN certainly appeared at the top of the list. In 1992, India joined ASEAN as a sectoral partner, at a time when India was relatively an inward-looking economy. India started its journey to prosperity through Look East Policy (LEP). This journey has been quite well-thought since ASEAN-India relations are firmly embedded in economic, culture and strategic areas. Today’s LEP, which was in force for more than two decades, has been transformed into the Act East Policy (AEP) with ASEAN at its core. Starting as a sectoral partner of ASEAN in 1992, India became a dialogue partner of ASEAN in 1996, a summit-level partner in 2002 and a strategic partner in 2012. The ASEAN-India relations have gained constant momentum throughout this period. Undoubtedly, ASEAN and India have made impressive progress in the last 25 years to deepen their relations3.

ASEAN is more important than ever and so also India to ASEAN4. Both share land and maritime boundaries with each other. As India gained momentum, India and ASEAN became more closely interconnected. At present, India and ASEAN are home to 1.8 billion people and have an economic size of US$ 3.8 trillion and a substantial share of world resources. In three decades, webs of networks developed in different areas of cooperation, from commerce to culture to connectivity, between ASEAN and India. India is strategic partner of ASEAN. Both have strong strategic vision and complement each other regionally and globally. India’s accession to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (TAC) in October 2003 reflects the recognition of India by ASEAN as a major player in the region and the strong commitment and valuable contribution India is making to regional peace and stability.

This paper briefly presents major develop-ments occurred in last 25 years of ASEAN-India partnership and a list of recommendations as way forward.

 

2. Current Engagements

Overtime, the landscape of ASEAN-India relations has widened. Economic, strategic and cultural relations between ASEAN and India are deep rooted. India’s participation in ADMM+, EAS, ARF, MGC, ACD and RCEP are part of this process. Today, there are 30 dialogue mechanisms between India and ASEAN, including a Summit and seven Ministerial meetings in a wide range of sectors such as Foreign Affairs, Commerce, Tourism, Agriculture, Environment, Renewable Energy and Telecommunications. In the last two years, President, Vice President and the Prime Minister of India visited all the ASEAN countries which indicate the importance India attaches to ASEAN.

Table 1: Present Scenario of ASEAN-India Engagements

ASEAN-India FTA	·  Completed with the Services and Investment agreement in 2015	· Bilateral trade: US$  71 billion in 2016-17 (India’s export to ASEAN US$ 30 billion, India’s import from ASEAN US$ 41 billion) · Growing value chains, but slowly · Rising trade deficit is a matter of concern · Low utilization of FTA
RCEP	·  Being negotiated	· Till November 2017, total 20 rounds of RCEP negotiation were held.
Trade facilitation	·  Unilateral initiatives ·  WTO TFA	· ASEAN single window under implementation and India’s SWIFT working already
ASEAN-India maritime transport agreement	•Being negotiated	•Target date of signing of agreement – 2018
ASEAN-India air transport agreement	•Proposed	·         High imbalance between carriers; major ASEAN airlines (e.g. SQ or TG) utilise 100% slots ·         Ministry of Civil Aviation is planning to host the 1st meeting of the JWG in early 2018
Land transport	•Trilateral Highway & extension to CLV •Kaladan MMTTP	•Ongoing
Digital network	·  Optical fibre network between India and ASEAN	· Being negotiated

Source: Author’s own

 

Table 1 presents the current scenario of engagement of ASEAN-India relations. Economic ties between India and ASEAN are deepening day by day. In 2016, ASEAN was India’s 4th largest trading partner, accounting for 10 percent of India’s total trade. In the same year, India was ASEAN’s 7th largest trading partner. When India undertook LEP in 1992, India’s total trade with ASEAN was less than US$ 5 billion. Today, total trade between them has exceeded US$ 70 billion.

Barring the Philippines, India has completed the task of tariff liberalisation under this Agreement in December 2016. Investment flows between them have been growing constantly with more inward FDI coming for ‘Make-in-India’. The Free Trade Agreement (FTA) in goods, implemented in 2010, and the services trade and investment agreement in 2015 between ASEAN and India represent an important effort to enhance ASEAN-India integration. India has also signed bilateral CEPAs/CECAs with Japan, Korea, Singapore, Malaysia, along with a regional FTA with ASEAN. India is a partner of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), which is a comprehensive free trade agreement being negotiated between the 10 ASEAN members and ASEAN’s FTA partners, i.e., Australia, China, India, Japan, Korea and New Zealand. ASEAN India-Business Council (AIBC), set up in March 2003, has been entrusted to bring key private sector players from India and the ASEAN countries on a single platform for business networking and sharing of ideas.

2.1 Trade relations

India’s export to ASEAN has increased to US$ 30 billion in 2016-17 from US$ 25 billion in 2015-16 (Table 2). India’s import from ASEAN is very important elements to growing value chains. Driven by rising and favourable commodity prices, India’s trade with ASEAN has increased to US$ 70 billion in 2016-17 from US$ 65 in 2015-16.

 

Table 2: Trends in India-ASEAN Trade in Goods

Year	Indian Export to ASEAN	Indian Import from ASEAN	Total Trade
	(US$ billion)
2009-10	18.11	25.80	43.91
2010-11	25.63	30.61	56.24
2011-12	36.74	42.16	78.90
2012-13	33.01	42.87	75.87
2013-14	33.13	41.28	74.41
2014-15	31.81	44.71	76.53
2015-16	25.15	39.91	65.06
2016-17(P)	30.12	40.69	70.81

Note: P: Data for March 2017 is provisional

Sources: Authors own based on Export-Import Databank, Department of Commerce, Government of India and DGCIS, Kolkata

 

 

Table 3: India’s Trade with ASEAN in 2016-17*

S.No.	Country	Export	Import	Total
		(US$ billion)
1	Brunei	0.04	0.57	0.61
2	Cambodia	0.11	0.04	0.15
3	Indonesia	3.31	13.87	17.18
4	Lao PDR	0.03	0.17	0.20
5	Malaysia	5.22	8.72	13.94
6	Myanmar	1.10	1.00	2.10
7	Philippines	1.52	0.57	2.10
8	Singapore	9.11	7.44	16.55
9	Thailand	3.17	5.61	8.79
10	Vietnam	6.51	2.69	9.20
	ASEAN Total	30.12	40.69	70.81

Note: *Data for March 2017 is provisional

Sources: Authors own based on Export-Import Databank, Department of Commerce, Government of India and DGCIS, Kolkata

 

Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore are India’s top three trade partners in ASEAN (Table 3). India’s exports to Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore, Brunei and Vietnam witnessed higher than average growth. However, traditional import sources are yet to stabilize. India is gaining production linkages with Malaysia (e.g. electronics), Thailand (e.g. automobiles), Singapore (e.g. digital networks), etc. in ASEAN.

 

3. Regional Value Chains

 

Illustrated in Table 4, parts and components have contributed almost 25 per cent (US$ 6.27 billion) of India’s export to ASEAN in 2014, followed by 18 per cent (US$ 4.60 billion) to EU, 14 per cent (US$ 3.49 billion) to USA and 7.7 per cent (US$ 1.95 billion) to China. In terms of import of parts and components, India has imported 15 per cent (US$ 5.48 billion) from ASEAN, 25 per cent (US$ 9.39 billion) from China and 18 per cent (US$ 6.81 billion) from Japan in 2014 (Table 5). Overall, India’s export of final, parts and components, and processed goods to ASEAN was about 20 to 30 per cent of India’s total export to world, whereas, India’s import from ASEAN was roughly about 15 per cent in 2014. This shows that India is getting more engaged in production networks with ASEAN countries in both export and import of parts and components and processed goods[i]. Among ASEAN countries, Thailand, Singapore, Malaysia and Vietnam are India’s major import sources of parts and components.

 

Table 4: India’s Export to Major Countries and Country Groups

	Export Value (US$ Billion)						Export Share in World (%)
	Final Goods		Parts and Components		Processed Goods		Final		Parts and Components		Processed Goods
	2006	2014	2006	2014	2006	2014	2006	2014	2006	2014	2006	2014
USA	4.03	6.51	1.80	3.49	4.27	9.17	25.50	15.39	15.56	13.76	15.44	13.37
EU	3.34	6.67	2.05	4.60	5.98	11.87	7.78	4.26	7.12	7.70	9.23	12.40
Japan	1.99	2.67	1.78	2.13	2.04	3.88	21.11	15.77	17.75	18.15	21.61	17.30
South Asia	0.44	1.52	0.38	1.10	1.88	5.57	12.59	6.31	15.45	8.42	7.38	5.66
China	1.23	1.80	0.82	1.95	2.55	8.51	2.78	3.58	3.25	4.35	6.79	8.11
ASEAN	2.75	6.80	3.64	6.27	5.23	11.76	17.42	16.07	31.49	24.75	18.91	17.15
World	15.80	42.31	11.55	25.33	27.67	68.61	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00

Note:Shaded columns represent the size of value chains. The selection of HS 6 digit level product is based on BEC.

Source:AIC’s calculations based on WITS Database, the World Bank.

 

Table 5: India’s Import from Major Countries and Country Groups

	Import Value (US$ Billion)						Import Share in World (%)
	Final Goods		Parts & Components		Processed Goods		Final Goods		Parts & Components		Processed Goods
	2006	2014	2006	2014	2006	2014	2006	2014	2006	2014	2006	2014
USA	1.39	2.20	1.70	2.82	2.25	5.39	9.27	6.31	11.62	7.73	6.37	6.02
EU	3.52	5.98	2.79	5.35	4.70	9.43	23.39	17.12	19.08	14.66	13.31	10.52
Japan	2.78	4.49	3.79	6.81	4.75	8.51	18.52	12.87	25.90	18.65	13.46	9.49
South Asia	0.10	0.33	0.05	0.25	0.83	1.60	0.64	0.95	0.35	0.67	2.37	1.78
China	2.98	12.92	1.71	9.39	4.60	17.16	19.82	37.00	11.72	25.72	13.03	19.15
ASEAN	2.05	5.61	2.92	5.48	4.67	10.83	13.62	16.05	19.96	15.01	13.22	12.09
World	15.04	34.93	14.63	36.51	35.29	89.63	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00	100.00

Note:Shaded columns represent the size of value chains. The selection of HS 6 digit level product is based on BEC.

Source:AIC’s calculations based on WITS Database, the World Bank.

 

Automobile industry is an emerging sector where ASEAN and India are building regional as well as global value chains. Among ASEAN countries, India’s export of automobile parts and components to Thailand was almost 41 per cent (US$ 282.10 million) in 2014. In case of import of parts and components of automobile products, India’s import was almost 71 per cent (US$ 720.49 million) from Thailand. In terms of value chain of automobile products, India has been maintaining closer ties with Thailand, Indonesia, and Vietnam among the ASEAN countries. Indian cars manufactured by Suzuki, Toyota, Honda, TATA, etc. are getting higher market access in Southeast and East Asia. Further negotiations in ASEAN-India FTA for the automobile products having high trade potential that fall under sensitive and exclusion lists would possibly strengthen the production networks between the ASEAN and India.

Indian textile and apparels have demand in both domestic and export markets.  India’s trade relation in textiles industry among ASEAN countries like Vietnam, Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore and Thailand have been growing, among which India’s trade with Vietnam in textiles has been rapid. There are huge opportunities in textiles and apparel industry in Vietnam. Textiles and apparel industry in both India and Vietnam are more complementary than competing in nature. Both India and Vietnam have strong export market for textiles and garments, mostly to USA and EU. Both the countries have huge trade potential in textile industry to supplement and to grow in textiles value chains. Textile industry in India has specialized in complete value chain process of textile productions and also in value chain segments. Compared to Vietnam, India is raw material-sufficient, whereas Vietnam is dependent on import of raw materials from other countries, mostly China, for its textile inputs. India can be raw material supplier for manufacturing textiles products for Vietnam exports and also gain huge market in Vietnam garment business. Having huge trade potential for textile products, both ASEAN and India have to cooperate with each other for strengthening the trade and resolve the trade barriers such as Non-Tariff Measures (NTMs).

Better connectivity is the core factor for strengthening the production networks as several forward and backward linkages within and across the region have been taking place to supply intermediate parts to manufacturing units to produce finished goods. Both efficient time management (i.e., just in time) and low transportation cost would bring potential link for the value chains between India and Thailand. With the introduction of GST in India, Regional Value Chain (RVC) sectors are likely to grow as the market becomes more efficient.

4. Physical and Digital Connectivity

Aiming to boost connectivity between ASEAN and India, connectivity projects such as the India-Myanmar-Thailand Trilateral Highway (TH), extension of TH to Cambodia, Lao PDR and Vietnam, and the Kaladan Multimodal Transit Transport Project (KMTTP) are at different stages of implementation. India is already working with Myanmar in the areas of border area development, capacity building, infrastructure development, connectivity projects, and institutional development. India, Myanmar and Thailand are already negotiating the Trilateral Motor Vehicles Agreement (MVA). The ASEAN-India Maritime Transport Cooperation Agreement is being negotiated. An ASEAN-India Civil Aviation Task Force has been established to oversee optimization of air connectivity. India has called the first meeting of the ASEAN-India Working Group on Regional Air Services Arrangement in January 20186. In addition, ASEAN and India have agreed to establish a Maritime Transport Working Group between India, Myanmar, Thailand, Cambodia and Vietnam to examine the feasibility of shipping networks7. India is also working together for an early conclusion of the Agreement on Maritime Transport between ASEAN and India.

Digital connectivity is the high-speed catalyst to ASEAN and India partnership. In digital connectivity, ASEAN needs a comprehensive overhaul of both in-country and cross-border (regional) regulations, addressing both supply-side and demand-side objectives. On the supply side, countries within ASEAN should strive to strengthen the business case for investment in digital infrastructure, revisit regulations for key sectors (such as financial services), and boost the local digital ecosystem. On the demand side, ASEAN countries aim to create a Single Digital Market and take steps to aggressively expand access to broadband. Radical steps could open avenues toward boosting the ASEAN Digital economy with a clear focus on developing the ICT infrastructure. India has been setting up optical fibre network from India to Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Vietnam (CLMV) countries, Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia. India’s offer of Gigabit-capable Passive Optical Network (GPON) technology has been welcomed by ASEAN. Telecom Export Promotion Council (TEPC) has been entrusted to implement the project. Nevertheless, the potential energy security remains to be explored.

To further encourage cooperation in connectivity, India has set-up Special Facility of US$ 1 billion to facilitate projects that support physical and digital connectivity between India and ASEAN. In addition, India has set-up a Project Development Fund of US$ 77 million to develop manufacturing hubs in CLMV countries. India has three major ASEAN-India Cooperation Funds, namely, ASEAN-India Fund, ASEAN-India S&T Development Fund, and ASEAN-India Green Fund.

Plan of Action (POA) for the period 2004-2010 was developed to implement the ASEAN-India Partnership. Most of the obligations of the 2nd POA (2010-15) have been implemented. The 3rd POA (2016-20) was adopted by the ASEAN-India Foreign Ministers Meeting held in August 2015. ASEAN and India have finalised a list of priority areas for the period of 2016-2018, which would contribute towards successful implementation of the 2016-2020 Plan of Action. Out of 130 activities identified in the 3rd Plan of Action, a set of 54 activities have been already implemented.

5. People to People Contacts

To boost people-to-people contacts with ASEAN, India has been organising various programme including training programme for ASEAN diplomats, exchange of parliamentarians, participation of ASEAN students in the National Children’s Science Congress, ASEAN-India Network of Think Tanks, ASEAN-India Eminent Persons Lecture Series, etc. India is establishing four Centres of Excellence in Software Development & Training (CESDT) in CLMV countries, including the setting up of an IT Resource cum Study Centre at CDAC, Noida consisting of one existing Lab and one new Lab as well as the development of 12 e-learning courses in six identified areas. India has facilitated visit of ASEAN Musical Bands, ASEAN Youths, ASEAN Artists as part of 25 years of celebration.

To deal with such wide ranging activities, dedicated institutions are essentials. India has set-up a separate Mission to ASEAN in Jakarta in April 2015 and ASEAN-India Centre (AIC) in New Delhi in 2013 to help facilitate India’s engagements with ASEAN. To facilitate Track II dialogue, India has set-up the ASEAN Studies Centre (ASC) in Shillong in 2016, and conducted series of dialogues, seminars and conferences across the country. Delhi Dialogue (DD) is one of the flagship projects, which has gained popularity in both ASEAN and India. Besides, India has extended the e-visa facility to all ASEAN countries.

6. Other Areas of Cooperation

India has been cooperating with ASEAN by way of implementation of various projects in the fields of Agriculture, Science & Technology, Space, Environment & Climate Change, Human Resource Development, Capacity Building, New and Renewable Energy, Tourism, People-to-People contacts and Connectivity etc. For example, Space Project envisaging establishment of a Tracking, Data Reception/Data Processing Station in Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam and upgradation of Telemetry Tracking and Command Station in Biak, Indonesia; Setting up of Centres of Excellence in Software Development & Training in CLMV countries are some of the major projects under implementation.

In the field of agriculture, India and ASEAN have projects such as Exchange of Farmers, ASEAN-India Fellowships for Higher Agricultural Education in India and ASEAN, Exchange of Agriculture Scientists, Empowerment of ASEAN-Indian Women through Cooperatives etc. In the S&T field, there are projects such as ASEAN-India Collaborative Project on S&T for Combating Malaria, ASEAN-India Programme on Quality Systems in Manufacturing, ASEAN-India Collaborative R&D Project on Mariculture, Bio-mining and Bioremediation Technologies, etc.

India has been supporting ASEAN specially CLMV countries under the Initiatives for ASEAN Integration, which include projects on Training of English Language for Law Enforcement Officers in CLMV countries and Training of professionals dealing with capital markets in CLMV by National Institute of Securities Management Mumbai.

In case of security, ASEAN countries also look to working closely with India in securing the trade routes, freedom of navigation in international waters, over flights, threat or use of force to intimidate, reducing piracy along the Malacca Straits, cooperating in addressing traditional and non-traditional security challenges, including in areas of de-radicalization, prevention of violent extremism and cyber crime. They also look to India’s support in dealing with natural disaster management. The Tsunami of 2005 made us all aware, how important and essential it was to work together when faced with natural disasters. India supports ASEAN’s efforts in handling disasters and risk reduction as envisioned in ASEAN Community Vision 2025 on Disaster Management and also support ASEAN in the realization of ASEAN Declaration on One ASEAN, One Response.

7. Way Forward

There is immense importance of the human factor and cultural links in today’s contemporary discourse, where strategic ties and infrastructure and geopolitical formations have taken centre stage. Youth is needed to be engaged in this process of interaction between India and ASEAN countries in a more systematic way.

Safety of cultural heritage is related to national security and requires greater coordination and cooperation to end such transnational crimes between ASEAN and India.

ASEAN has redesigned the Master Plan on Connectivity (MPAC) 2025, which ASEAN leaders have adopted at the ASEAN Summit in Vientiane, Lao PDR in 2016. This master plan has updated design and strategy for connectivity improvement in ASEAN as well as Dialogue Partners such as India. The MPAC 2025, which succeeds the Master Plan on ASEAN Connectivity 2010, focuses on five strategic areas: sustainable infrastructure, digital innovation, seamless logistics, regulatory excellence and people mobility. We have to make a synergy with MPAC and design strong implementation mechanisms to ensure that effective coordination takes place among various agencies as well as with dialogue partners such as India. Such cooperation has the potential to absorb large investments in infrastructure and industry. India and ASEAN should improve physical and digital connectivity; develop industrial or special economic zones, logistics and customs systems, etc.

ASEAN and India shall aim for harmonisation of standards and mutual recognition, which would lead to encourage more trade and investment between the two partners. Harmonisation of standards will not only boost export competitiveness but will also improve the ease of doing business. ASEAN and India may consider setting up a mechanism for greater cooperation between the standards setting bodies of the two partners.

India may set up separate project monitoring cell of 3-4 members with necessary expertise and experience to follow on these projects with a clear mandate to ensure quality and timely execution.

ASEAN and India shall fast-track the digital connectivity projects. Connectivity with islands of the Philippines and Indonesia shall be considered in the ASEAN-India Connectivity Master Plan.

Thailand has also prepared Master Plan for CLMV countries. India can utilise the opportunity to be a part of Master Plan for CLMV countries. On the other, ASEAN shall also invest in connectivity projects being implemented in India at present. To guide designing of the ASEAN-India Connectivity Master Plan, ASEAN-India Connectivity Task Force may be constituted with participation of ASEAN HoMs.

Greater involvement of Northeast in India’s Act East Policy (AEP) is essential. Northeast India has the potential to build two gateways: one at Guwahati and another at Shillong. Infrastructure development in India’s Northeast should be our utmost priority. There is a great need to factor Northeast in ASEAN by making borders of the region vibrant, particularly in Manipur, Mizoram, Tripura, Meghalaya and Assam, in terms of connectivity, infrastructure, investment, which in turn will make the region a hub for health, education and tourism.

8. Concluding Remarks

India and ASEAN are becoming more economically integrated and there is ample scope for deepening this integration process. ASEAN and India shall continue to work closely to build or maintain strong working relations, converge towards connectivity development issues and to protect the global trading system on which both ASEAN and India so heavily depend. Time is ripe for India to continue strengthening economic partnership with ASEAN.

Given India’s diversity and geographical contrasts, an integrated transport network with Southeast Asia in particular is required to support the integration process. Stronger connectivity across India’s Northeastern Region will build a stronger network of cross-border production chains, particularly with Southeast Asia. To facilitate the production networks, free flow of investment and movement of skilled labourers across the region are must. Indian government under the leadership of Prime Minister Narendra Modi has taken up huge infrastructure development projects in Northeast India. India has remained committed to working closely with ASEAN with a view to bringing the ASEAN-India Strategic Partnership to new heights. A series of events have been organised throughout 2017-18 on the theme “Shared Values, Common Destiny”, and there will be many more in coming months.

Finally, ASEAN-India 25th year celebration will reach its culmination on the Republic Day of 26th January 2018, when all ASEAN Heads of the States will be the guests at the Republic Day 2018 and a special Commemorative Summit will be held at Delhi. The ASEAN-India relations have achieved much over the last 25 years. But its success has given rise to new challenges. It will continue to play a central role in promoting economic integration in Asia and the Pacific and inclusive development over the next 25 years.

References:-

1 Refer, Saran (2018), which presents a set of freshly written research articles on ASEAN-India civilizational links.

2  Refer, the Inaugural Address delivered by Prof. Lokesh Chandra, President, ICCR at the International Conference on “ASEAN-India Cultural Links: Historical and Contemporary Dimensions”, organised by ASEAN-India Centre (AIC) at New Delhi on July 23, 2015, available at Saran (2018)

3  Also read, External Affairs Minister’s speech delivered at RIS on 22 June 2017, http://mea.gov.in/Speeches-Statements.htm?dtl/28550/Keynote+Address+by+External+Affairs+Minister+on+ASEANIndia+Partnership

4   A series of studies were conducted on ASEAN-India relations in recent years. Refer, for example, De (2014a), De and Suthiphand (2017), AIC-RIS (2014a, 2014b, 2015a, 2015b).

5 Refer, for example, AIC-RIS (2015a, 2017) for further discussion on RVCs between India and some of the ASEAN countries.

6  Based on author’s own communication with a senior officer of Ministry of Civil Aviation (MoCA) on 15 December 2017.

7  Refer also De (2014b), AIC-RIS (2015a) and RIS (2012)

ASEAN-India Centre (AIC) – Research and Information System for Developing Countries (RIS) (2013) ASEAN-India Strategic Partnership: Perspectives from the ASEAN-India Network of Think-Tanks, AIC-RIS, New Delhi

ASEAN-India Centre (AIC) – Research and Information System for Developing Countries (RIS) (2014a) ASEAN-India Maritime Connectivity Report, AIC-RIS, New Delhi

ASEAN-India Centre (AIC) – Research and Information System for Developing Countries (RIS) (2014b) Dynamics of ASEAN-India Strategic Partnership, AIC-RIS, New Delhi

ASEAN-India Centre (AIC) – Research and Information System for Developing Countries (RIS) (2015a) ASEAN-India Economic Relations: Opportunities and Challenges, ASEAN-India Centre, New Delhi

ASEAN-India Centre (AIC) – Research and Information System for Developing Countries (RIS) (2015b) ASEAN – India Development and Cooperation Report 2015, Routledge, New Delhi

ASEAN-India Centre (AIC) – Research and Information System for Developing Countries (RIS) (2016) ASEAN-India Air Connectivity Report, AIC-RIS, New Delhi

ASEAN-India Centre (AIC) – Research and Information System for Developing Countries (RIS) (2017) Mekong-Ganga Cooperation: Breaking Barriers and Scaling New Heights, AIC-RIS, New Delhi

De, Prabir (2014a) ASEAN-India: Deepening Economic Partnership in Mekong Region, Bookwell, New Delhi

De, Prabir (2014b)“India’s Emerging Connectivity with Southeast Asia: Progress and Prospects”, ADBI Working Paper # 507, Asian Development Bank Institute (ADBI), Tokyo

De, Prabir and Suthiphand Chirathivat (eds.) (2017) Celebrating the Third Decade and Beyond: New Challenges to ASEAN – India Economic Partnership, Knowledge World, New Delhi

Research and Information System for Developing Countries (RIS) (2012) ASEAN-India Connectivity: India Country Study, RIS, New Delhi

Saran, Shyam (ed.) (2018) Cultural and Civilisational Links between India and Southeast Asia: Historical and Contemporary Dimensions, Palgrave Macmillan, Forthcoming

(Prof. Prabir De is a Professor at Research and Information System of Developing Countries (RIS) and

Coordinator, ASEAN-India Centre (AIC), RIS, New Delhi. Views are author’s own.)

 

(This article is carried in the print edition of January-February 2018 issue of India Foundation Journal.)

The end of the Cold War, a complicated security environment to India’s north-west that inhibited the development of India’s historic relations with Central Asia and beyond, and a domestic balance of payments crisis provided the context and opportunity for Prime Minister Narasimha Rao to overcome Cold War differences with the ASEAN and effect a strategic and economic turn in India’s external relations towards an economically rising South East Asia with the announcement of India’s ‘Look East’ policy in 1991. In the 25 years since India became a Sectoral Dialogue Partner in 1992, India’s relationship with ASEAN and South East Asia, has become one of it’s most defining external relationships marked not only by the steady elevation of its formal status to Full Dialogue Partnership in 1996, Summit level partner in 2002 and Strategic Partnership in 2012; Free Trade Agreements in 2003, 2009 (in goods) & 2014 (in services and investments); and participation in 30 dialogue mechanisms including the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and other security related fora, but also a robust people to people relationship grounded in history, culture, trade, investments, the Indian diaspora, travel, tourism, entertainment, and growing economic integration. For the ASEAN too, a rising India is seen as a stabilizing factor in the emerging Indo-Pacific region challenged by a powerful and assertive China and doubts about US leadership in the 21st century.

Prime Minister Modi’s initiative to invite all ASEAN Heads of State to the upcoming Republic Day for a Commemorative Summit marking the 50th Anniversary of ASEAN and 25th anniversary of our formal relationship could therefore have not taken place at a more propitious time when the world is in flux, the strategic underpinnings of ASEAN are being called into question, and new alignments are developing in the Indo-Pacific in response to the rise of China. It could mark a watershed in our relationship with a political, economic and cultural grouping that grew around a post World War II economic and political order in Asia anchored by the US, but as the Cold War came to a close and China emerged as an economic powerhouse, drew in its communist and military-led neighbours into its fold to create a very heterogeneous grouping molded by a culture of consultation and consensus, and established progressively stronger economic ties with China. In the absence of an obvious strategic adversary after the Cold War, it did not feel the need to, nor perhaps would it have had the capacity to, provide for its own collective security. Its strategic underpinning was implicitly provided by the US.

Today, that situation has changed. The remarkable rise of China over the last 30 years and more led by the Communist party of China, accompanied by its growing political, strategic and economic self confidence manifested in major diplomatic and charm offensives world wide; its shedding of inhibitions to project its political and economic models as examples for others to follow or benefit from; its calibrated military assertiveness and rapid and ambitious modernization; its strategic economic projection through the Belt and Road Initiative, the Asian Infrastructure and Investment Bank (AIIB) and other initiatives; and the unrivalled position of President Xi Jing Ping and his policies enshrined at the 19th Communist Party Congress recently, have changed the equilibrium, and equations, in the region that countries are still trying to grapple with. Just when there is a need for a steady and firm US hand in Asia, questions about its current leadership and decision-making have left a region a little nervous and looking for stabilizers.

Little wonder then that new alignments and hedging strategies are shaping up as countries from Japan to India try to safeguard their own security and strategic interests. It has catalyzed voices in Japan to review its defence and nuclear postures (possibly causing some nervousness in some quarters on account of their World War II experiences, though the context today is very different and such a scenario unlikely). Australia, Japan, the US and India have come together, albeit still tentatively, in a democratic ‘Quadrilateral’ unwelcome to China. Regional powers have accelerated naval and military exercises to deal with imaginable challenges and threats.

ASEAN itself is in a bit of a disarray on how to deal with China, the US, and contested claims in the South China Sea testing its unity and the limits of diplomacy in dealing with unilateralism and force in the matter of territorial claims and freedom of navigation as enshrined in the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. The Indo-Pacific has emerged as a new theatre of maritime competition.

Faced with concerns about China’s intentions and possible future trajectory and US unpredictability and inconsistency, the Special Japan-India Strategic and Global Partnership for peace and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific and the world forged by Prime Ministers Narendra Modi and Shinzo Abe through their annual summits, most lately in September 2017, provides an opportunity for an alternative strategy to deal with the destabilizing aspects of China’s rise through an enhanced economic partnership with ASEAN countries that relies on competition rather than confrontation and could form a part of the 25th anniversary of India-ASEAN relations and the 5th anniversary of their Strategic Partnership. Its key elements follow.

First, most current approaches to dealing with the hard aspects of China’s rise are primarily security-driven and geo-political in nature. However, a purely military-political strategy without economic content would be brittle and tend towards confrontation.

The rise of China and its global projection (through the BRI, AIIB, BRICS etc,) has been built on its economic rise, and on huge infrastructure and connectivity projects intended to power its economy and project its strategic influence worldwide. The India-ASEAN response too should be economic, but not imitative, and capitalize on their strengths. It should focus on manufacturing and services, value adding, employment generation, developing value chains, and people-centered development utilizing existing and planned infrastructure, ASEAN, Chinese, Indian and others. It should also always keep environmental protection, sustainability and impact on climate change at the forefront.

Second, such a response should address the diversity of South East Asia by crafting separate but complimentary strategies for continental or terrestrial, and maritime, peninsular or littoral South East Asia. Its littoral dimension would be suitable for large corporate-driven investment in manufacturing, services, infrastructure and the blue economy in maritime South East Asia from Philippines to Malaysia, as part of the regional and global value chains stretching from East to India, Africa, Europe and the Atlantic.

Its terrestrial and continental dimension would however require a priority towards much more bottom-up approaches building on local resources and products. The two approaches are of course not mutually exclusive. They could compliment each other and integrate as the latter grows.

Third, while acknowledging that connectivity is an imperative for economic growth, it should, particularly in its terrestrial dimension, rebalance the current mantra of connectivity with a better balance between connectivity and productivity, and between large, medium and small investments, including through cooperatives (modeled on the highly successful dairy cooperative movement of India), micro-credit and self help strategies.

It should accord priority to building on the existing rural economy of those who live off the land, water and forests (who still constitute the majority of people in the region) through environmentally sustainable development of agriculture, livestock, fisheries, forests, education, health, physical and digital connectivity and a multitude of other small projects on a large scale over large, top-down, corporate or state driven projects prioritizing large power and transport infrastructure projects that are usually environmentally and socially disruptive.

Such an approach would develop a much broader ownership and employment base benefiting a much wider cross-section of people at the base of the economy, and bring political dividends for host countries and partners. It would slightly alter the relationship between connectivity and productivity. It would use existing transport infrastructure to start with the ‘first mile’, improving and getting the local product to wider markets, with infrastructure growing organically with markets rather than starting big and worrying about the ‘last mile’ later.

Fourth, Japan could be a key partner with the Special Japan-India Strategic and Global Partnership and the proposed Africa-Asia Growth Partnership linked through ASEAN and India as its pillars. This does not mean others are excluded but that the Japanese partnership could provide the spine for the strategy, and enlarge choices for ASEAN and other countries.

Fifth, US political, diplomatic and economic support for Japan and ASEAN would remain critical, but the strategy would not be US-centric or US driven; it would be regionally driven.

Sixth, such an economic strategy should not be seen as anti-China; rather it should be seen as an alternative to China. It would be competitive, not confrontational.

As we know, competing on its own, Japan has been losing ground to China economically, globally and in Asia. India too cannot yet compete strongly with China in South East Asia and elsewhere in infrastructure building or manufacturing and exporting goods out of India taking into account cost of production, tariffs and transaction costs. But India can compete with China on the combination of cost, quality, technology, reliability and service with a suitable branding, if it invests in ASEAN, taking advantage of the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) and local factors of production in the Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Vietnam (CLMV) in particular.

A well-crafted India-Japanese economic partnership can complement each other capitalizing on their respective strengths, and revitalize and enhance Indian and Japanese competitiveness across a range of industries from small to big, agro-based and light industries, machine tools and infrastructure, generating local employment, adding value of natural resources and primary products, raising economic productivity and lifting up the industrial and technological base of the economy in general. With its diverse economic base, ASEAN could be an integral partner.

Seventh, such a strategy will require some revamping of our investment and official development partnership policies. So far, the primary instruments of our external economic policies have been on trade and more recently, development partnership including Government-to-Government Lines of Credit. The focus of our investment policy has been almost entirely on attracting inward investment. There is not much policy support for outward investment.

Perhaps this is because we tend to think of outward Indian investment as a net outflow of capital. This is an outdated view. In a globalized economy, capital flows are circular and can be ploughed back one way or another. Virtually every other major country in the world, be it Japan or China, or the US, or Germany, looks at foreign investment in terms of global economies of scale, comparative advantages, and value chains, and in strategic terms. Unlike trade which is almost by definition transactional, foreign investment conveys a long-term stake in the country and creates an economic interdependence from which both investing and host nation benefit. We need to adopt foreign investment in our extended neighborhood including ASEAN as an arm of our foreign policy.

This also means that we need to compliment the concept of Make in India with the idea of ‘Make in Partnership with India’ in our near abroad wherever possible through joint ventures with host country partners taking advantage of tariff advantages offered by the ASEAN Economic Community and local factors of production to invest in South East Asia, especially in the least developed economies of the CLMV.

Likewise, in our development partnership, virtually all our investments have been government investments in development projects and Government-to-Government Lines of Credit. This is true for our various funds to the ASEAN as well. While this is important from the point of building bilateral relations in general, we need to facilitate cheaper, commercial, buyers and sellers Lines of Credit to stimulate private sector trade and investment between India and Southeast Asia, and direct at least some of our Lines of Credit away from large, long gestation G2G credit lines to more innovative projects with more direct social impacts on the grassroots. While this may involve greater outlays on cheaper credits and risk insurance, the overall burden on the government budget should be much less.

Eighth, we need to give a special place in our investment and development policy to small and medium enterprises especially in employment intensive and livelihood based sectors like agriculture and agro-industries, but also light industries like textiles, consumer goods, pharmaceuticals, electronics and machinery; social development sectors education, health, IT, skills development etc.; and environment friendly techniques, industries and technologies.

A suitable financing facility for SMEs is of particular importance. Typically, it is much easier to find financing for large companies investing in big projects that are frequently socially and environmentally disruptive even as the dominant development narrative marketed by international and bilateral financial and development institutions is high on the jargon of ‘inclusive, equitable and sustainable’ growth. In reality, it is quite the opposite. Some handholding would also be required in the form of consultancies, entrepreneurship development, management training, and skills development. The Government of India has made a welcome beginning in this direction with a Special Purpose Vehicle of the Eximbank of India for such investments in the CLMV countries. This can be expanded much further.

Ninth, no doubt the India-Japan economic partnership has a strategic dimension, but participating in it is not an either-or choice. Rather, it will enhance ASEAN’s and member countries’ choices.

Lastly, this economic and strategic partnership does not preclude a security or political dimension or other partnerships. Ideally, this should take place through existing ASEAN fora such as the ARF, ADMM+ and EAMF, but diplomacy may have its limits against brute power and alternatives such as bilateral cooperation and collective security strategies may also need to be explored. The recent meeting of the ‘Quad’ could be a message in this direction or a hedging strategy. The ‘Quad’ also needs to find a way to include ASEAN in its dialogue on freedom of navigation and security in the Indo-Pacific which it straddles, affects it closely, and upholds.

These principles could be translated or implemented in many ways. One way, proposed here could be through the development of economic corridors for continental and maritime South East Asia.

In continental South East Asia or the GMS, we can build upon PM Modi’s idea of a North East India-Myanmar Industrial Corridor, the Trilateral Highway, and the East West Corridors of the Master Plan for ASEAN Connectivity (MPAC) to build upon a number of terrestrial economic and investment corridors from the North East of India through the Greater Mekong Sub-region up to Vietnam. These could be called the India-Greater Mekong Sub-region land corridors. Such corridors should integrate as a priority the North East of India and the CLMV countries that suffer a development deficit. The latter also enjoy some measure of protection and a grace period to harmonize their tariffs and fully integrate into the ASEAN Economic Community.

These corridors would consist of a series of agro-processing, light industrial, and services hubs based on local resources, produce and human resources utilizing existing connectivity infrastructure and building upwards and outwards to newer and bigger markets, somewhat inverting the current emphasis on connectivity first and the rest later.

To start with, it would survey the productive potential of the regions that could be serviced along these routes based on natural resources, primary produce and availability of labour; identify possible industrial hubs and zones; fill in missing links in connectivity; find energy (preferably renewable), funding and capacity-building solutions; and summon the political will to develop these east-west corridors. These corridors should be based on the development of local agriculture (rice, beans and pulses, oilseeds, horticulture, vegetables, plantation crops like rubber, cashew, tea, coffee etc.) and agri-based and traditional industries such as bamboo, cane and other local sustainable forest based products, light industries, value-adding to some extractive industries mindful of environmental and climate change impacts and implications, and the required social infrastructure. Joint ventures, consortia and other partnerships involving Indian, ASEAN, Japanese and other East Asian or Australasian companies could enable comprehensive solutions for energy, training, financing and logistics, enhance scale, and cushion risk.

Such a processing and manufacturing based strategy should avoid the Chinese model of investment in extractive industries and development of arteries of import of raw material and export of manufactured goods. If anything, it should add value to natural resources and primary produce. Indeed, competition from cheap manufactured goods from China has arguably had the effect of throttling the development of manufacturing industries in the CLMV.

Leaving aside possible rail networks for the moment and concentrating on the highways in the GMS that are part of the ASEAN Highway Network, the first of these corridors would be the Trilateral Highway connecting the North East of India at Moreh-Tamu on the India-Myanmar border southeast-ward up via several cities and crossroads to Myawaddy-Mae Sot on the Myanmar-Thailand border described as the Western Corridor in the MPAC.

The second is the East-West Economic Corridor from Mawlamyine through Thailand and Laos to Da Nang, Vietnam1. India has offered extensions of this highway northeastwards through Laos and eastwards through Cambodia which can be developed.

The third is the Southern Corridor from Dawei (Myanmar) via two routes: Bangkok–Phnom Penh–Bavet (Cambodia)–Ho Chi Minh City–Vung Tau (Viet Nam), or Bangkok–Siem Reap–Sung Treng (Cambodia)–Quy Nhon (Viet Nam).

While the first two corridors would be connected through the Asian Highway 1 from points in Northeastern India via Mandalay, the third would connect from the eastern seaboard of India by sea to Dawei on the Andamans sea coast of Myanmar, and then follow a new road to the Thai border land and routes through Thailand thereafter.

There is also a relatively neglected northern corridor starting from the AH1 at Meiktila via via Taunggyi on the Shan plateau across the Salween (Thanlyn in Myanmar) to Kyaingtong on the eastern Shan, and south to Tachilek on the Thai-Laos border to Laos and Vietnam.

A new variation to this corridor can also be developed from Kyaingtong via the newly opened Laos-Myanmar Friendship bridge over the Mekong at Xien Kok through Laos via Luang Namtha, to northern Vietnam at Pang Hoc near Dien Bien Phu and on to Hanoi and Haiphong. Apart from some stretches in NE India and Myanmar which are in the process being upgraded by 2020 and are common to all east-west routes touching India, and a short stretch from Tale to Xien Kok on the Laos border that needs up-gradation, the rest of the route is already motorable, though there are also insurgency affected areas on the India-Myanmar border and Shan plateau that will need to be addressed.

This will be the shortest and most direct route between India and Vietnam. If this cannot be incorporated into the MAPC, it could be taken up as an India-Myanmar-Laos-Vietnam corridor with Myanmar and Vietnam as investment partners.

Each of these planned and possible corridors would ultimately connect India to the Vietnamese cities and ports of Hanoi, Haiphong, Da Nang, Ho Chi Minh City, Nam Cam, Vung Tau and Quy Nhon through Myanmar, Laos, Cambodia and/or Thailand linking the fertile Brahmaputra, Chindwin, Ayeyawady, Mekong and Da and Red river valleys and the Shan plateau and unlocking the untapped agricultural, natural, industrial, tourism and other productive potential from the Northeast of India through Shan state and the Mekong up to Vietnam.

The second arm of this strategy would be the maritime-littoral corridor. This would link the eastern seaboard of India, the Bay of Bengal and the Andaman Sea, through Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia, Brunei, Thailand Vietnam and the Philippines to the East Asian economies. This would in some ways retrace ancient trade routes linking the Kalingas, Pallavas and Cholas to Southeast Asia, but link them with special, industrial and trade zones in the region to form part of a regional and global value chain linking Japan, Korea, China, Taiwan, Vietnam, Brunei, the Philippines, Thailand, Indonesia and Malaysia to India and eventually as part of the Asia-Africa Growth Corridor, to Africa, the Gulf and Europe. This artery is already receiving the attention of think tanks, industry bodies and policy makers across the region. Indo-Japanese partnership along this corridor could add synergy to it. This could be called the Asia-Africa Maritime Route. One link that could be explored on this route for industries and shipping is a Chennai-Medan corridor touching also the Andaman and Nicobar islands of India.

The third arm would use Myanmar as a springboard for a mixed corridor starting with the Kaladan Multimodal Transit Transport Project, but also the Bay of Bengal, the eastern seaboard of India and the Special Economic Zones of Kyaukphyu, Tillawa and Dawei through the East West Corridors of the Master Plan for ASEAN Connectivity to ports of Vietnam and beyond. These would involve transshipments at some points, of which Dawei could be the shortest and most important. The potential of this has hardly been explored, and should be examined urgently. This could be called the BIMSTEC-GMS corridor. Both this and the maritime corridor would be suitable for the sustainable development of the Blue Economy.

These corridors may also necessitate a revision of the regional and sub-regional cooperation architecture involving India and the Greater Mekong Sub-region like the BIMSTEC, MGC and CLMV countries. It may well be desirable to enlarge BIMSTEC to include the CLMV countries as observers and/or members in the greater BIMSTEC-GMS cooperation forum within the ASEAN.

Some of these corridors and ideas may at first sight appear unorthodox, unrealistic and contrary to current economic thinking from both a conceptual and funding point of view. In fact, funding requirements for manufacturing industries as this strategy emphasizes, are much less than for mega connectivity and infrastructure projects and can be addressed through existing initiatives with only a little additionality focusing mainly on commercial credit lines, risk coverage and technical assistance for the private sector in general and SME sector in particular.

A number of Indian initiatives like the Trilateral Highway and its proposed extensions, the Kaladan project, the US$ 1 bn Line of Credit for physical and digital connectivity in the ASEAN, the Duty Free Trade Preference (DFTP) Scheme of the Ministry of Commerce of India, ongoing bilateral Indian Lines of Credit to the CLMV countries, and the Eximbank fund for SMEs in the CLMV could be leveraged to advance the process. Initiatives under the BIMSTEC, MGC, and those oriented towards the CLMV could also be subsumed under it. Regional and international development banks like the ADB, New Development Bank (NDB), World Bank and IFC, Asian and international investors, and the international community at large too could be attracted to the idea. Indeed many of them are already advocating and working in this direction. The India-Japan strategic and economic partnership and incipient Asia Africa Growth Corridor too could be leveraged.

In the final analysis, whether or not such a strategy could work is more a question of political and economic philosophy, persuasion, strategic vision, political will and husbanding resources than funding per se.

1  Khon Kaen-Mukdahan (Thailand)-Savannakhet (Lao PDR)-Dong Ha-Da Nang (Vietnam)

 

(Shri Gautam Mukhopadhaya is a former diplomat who served as the Ambassador of India to Syria, Afghanistan and Myanmar. He has also worked in the UN Headquarters in New York as a Consultant on Social Development and has been a visiting scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.         This article has been adapted from a lecture at the National Institute of Advanced Studies, Indian Institute of Science, Bengaluru, organized jointly with the South East Asia Research Group on December 8, 2017.)

 

(This article is carried in the print edition of January-February 2018 issue of India Foundation Journal.)

On the occasion of 50th anniversary of ASEAN while creating a balance sheet of India-ASEAN partnership we look at the 25 years of missed opportunities for India – from the period 1967- 1992 and thereafter at 25 years of engagement – from 1993-2017, in an attempt to understand India and ASEAN engagement over the years, particularly in the context of the changing geo-politics of the Indo-Pacific region. The Paper begins with a brief snapshot of ASEAN and its partnership with India. In this Golden Jubilee year of the establishment of ASEAN and Silver Jubilee year of its dialogue partnership with India, this Paper endeavours to venture into the multi-dimensional nature of ASEAN and its multi-faceted relationship with India at large.

ASEAN: A Snapshot

Fifty years is usually not a long time in the lifetime of a nation-state. But for ASEAN, a regional conglomeration of ten separate nation-states in Southeast Asia, fifty years has spelled a transformational experience for the region as indeed also the world. Ever since its founding, the regional grouping apart from driving the regional conversations forward around multiple regional and global subjects in a more orderly and well-defined fashion, has injected a sense of predictability and pattern to the way regional multilateralism is conducted in this part of the world. In fact in time, it has evolved as the most institutionalised regional association in Asia. As a collective identity, the ASEAN has not only addressed a welter of issues within the grouping but projected a more potent force for action and bargaining when dealing with players and institutions exogenous to the region. In some ways, it may well be argued that the enduring and lasting success of ASEAN as a regional institution has been the primary reason why other regional entities have not quite proved to be as promising and as fulfilling as the Southeast Asian grouping, notwithstanding the different contexts and purposes for which they were founded in the first place. Perhaps it has something to do with the characteristic resilience of ASEAN as an organisation. When it started out, the Bangkok Declaration of 1967 chiefly had ‘economic, social, cultural, technical, scientific and administrative fields’ in mind apparently even as the underlying motive and the context may have been altogether different. Then the Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) in 1971 had reflected the shifting great power balance in wider Asia. Hallmark of a cautious and thinking institution, it had taken no less than almost a decade for ASEAN to meet at a summit level in 1976 when it accomplished the Declaration of ASEAN Concord and the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) with the latter formalising the core principle of non-interference as underpinning the terms of engagement among member states. Buoyed by their individual economic successes in the 1970s and 1980s, the ASEAN 6 had taken their economic agenda to a new level when they decided to establish ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA)
in 1992.

As Cold War eventually wound up, the ASEAN’s more formal initiative on regional security fructifying in the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) had once more been clearly demonstrative of the organisation’s innate ability to reinvent itself and retain its leadership role as the foremost ideologue of regional multilateralism. When the 1997 Asian financial crisis had scarred virtually all of ASEAN economies, the overtures to the three East Asian nations and shaping up of ASEAN Plus Three (APT) was an exercise emblematic of making virtue out of adversity. From shaping the contours of ASEAN Plus 3 to being at the core of the East Asian Summit, ASEAN has not only retained the reins of regionalism in its own hands, it has expanded its diplomatic weight and footprints from Southeast Asia to the broader East Asia and Asia Pacific. The 2007 Charter besides bestowing on the institution a legal personality, also sets it well on course to truly become an Economic (AEC), Political-Security (APSC) and Socio-cultural (ASCC) community.

Without doubt, ASEAN’s normative benchmarks as constituting renunciation of use of force, non-interference and peaceful settlement of disputes have served the region well for nearly five decades now. Southeast Asia once speculated as the ‘Balkans of the Orient’ has refused to fall apart simply not living up to its borrowed name, and thankfully so – unlike what befell the original Balkans in Europe unfortunately. Boasting of the world’s third largest market on the back of a population of 625 million people and with a combined GDP of US$ 2.6 trillion, ASEAN is already the 7th largest economy in the world projected to be the fourth largest by 2050. No wonder, in a glorious run over fifty years since 1967, the iconic grouping has transformed the region from one of battlefields to marketplaces! As EU increasingly gets weighed down by the post-BREXIT tremors and globalisation pushes back in the reverse, what better time than now to re-examine ASEAN and how it could perhaps carry the flag of regional multilateralism.

Balance-Sheet of
India-ASEAN Partnership

Transformation of India’s foreign policy from the rhetoric of ‘Look East’ to the action oriented ‘Act East’ has reiterated its focus on the extended neighbourhood in the Asia-Pacific. The ‘Act East’ policy was crystallised to underline the importance of East Asian neighbours of India and make them a priority in our foreign policy. It promises to inject new energy into India’s engagement with Asia in the economic, political and security domains. “It has widened the canvass by drawing Australia into India’s Eastern Strategy and the South Pacific back on Delhi’s political radar”1. In this most recent proposition to woo the Southeast Asian neighbours by reviving historical and civilisational ties and engaging in defence and security cooperation, India has raised alarms for the rival powers in the neighbourhood. Given the history of United States realpolitik of shifting alliances, priorities and commitments and its recent rebalancing strategy in the Asia-Pacific and the China’s rising influence in the region, the Southeast Asian countries are welcoming greater Indian involvement in the regional architecture of Asia. In the context of such a geo-strategic mix, they have been following interactions between China and the United States and thereby trying to maximize their strategic independence. In the shifting balance of power in the world politics, India’s Act-East policy emerges as a noteworthy characteristic determining the ‘Great Game’ politics in the Indo-Pacific.

India as a close friend and partner of ASEAN is equally affected by the developments in its extended neighbourhood. Rooted in deeper historical and civilisational ties, augmenting India-ASEAN relations have been the primary focus of our ‘Act East Policy’. In fact, India places ASEAN at the heart of its ‘Act East Policy’ and centre of its dream of an ‘Asian Century’. As ASEAN celebrates fifty years of its existence, India also celebrates 25 years of India-ASEAN Dialogue Partnership. In this relationship, we have graduated from a Dialogue Partner to Summit level interactions and finally to Strategic Partnership in recent times thereby learning lessons of deeper economic integration and comprehensive engagement with Southeast Asian neighbours. Given this background, the next section seeks to make an assessment of the Balance sheet of India-ASEAN partnership by dwelling upon the first 25 years of missed opportunities and the later 25 years of engagement and honeymoon period of India and ASEAN.

25 Years of Missed Opportunities

According to Prime Minister Narendra Modi, “ASEAN began in times of a great global divide, but today as it celebrated its Golden Jubilee, it shone as a beacon of hope; a symbol of peace and prosperity”2. “In 1967, when the whole region was seething with buzz of uncertainties, establishment of ASEAN prevented the ‘Balkanisation of Southeast Asia’, and established the thrust on search for common values, replacing conflict with economic, political, cultural and strategic cooperation”3.

Nevertheless, establishment of ASEAN was viewed with doubts in an ideologically polarised Southeast Asia where “intra-regional ideological polarisation and intervention by the external powers were marked features of geo-political landscape of Southeast Asia”4. This prevented the newly established regional community in Southeast Asia – ASEAN, to embrace India openly in spite of the cultural, religious and cvilisational linkages between the two regions. During the politics of Cold War, India-ASEAN relations were subjected to distrust and doubts about each other’s intentions and ideologies. “The narrative of India-ASEAN relations during the Cold War could be summarized as missed opportunities due to political mistrust, economic uncertainties and occasional military threats”.5

India’s opposition to the United States during its intervention in Vietnam also created suspicion in its expected role in ASEAN6.  During the Cold War politics, India and ASEAN were in ideologically opposed camps. This was seen by India as a means to contain communism, which was on the rise due to the spill over from the Vietnam War. “While South East Asian nations had approached India as early as 1967 to join the ASEAN, India remained lukewarm to their overtures because of overall geopolitical situation in the region and the ongoing Cold War redux in Indo-China at that time”7. India’s support to Vietnam as opposed to the ‘hegemonic’ desires in Indo-China during 1960s resulted in the reciprocal loss of support from the United States. Opportunity cost was in the form of the United States President Johnson postponing the planned visit by Indian Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri to the United States. It further resulted in the cancellation of a planned visit by the United States President Ford to India a decade later, thereby widening the gap between India and ASEAN member countries irrespective of the geographical proximity and historical and cultural ties between the people of the two regions8.

Another case of lost opportunity during the first 25 years of the establishment of ASEAN was visible in the India’s support to the Vietnam’s backed Heng Samarin regime in Cambodia and its strategic ambitions in rest of Indo-China. This further alienated India’s place in the United States policy prescriptions and its approach towards ASEAN member states9. “After the collapse of the Khmer Rouge regime, India recognized the new government and re-opened its Embassy in Phnom Penh in 1981 when much of the world shunned Cambodia”10. This turned out to be a major diplomatic miscalculation. The resultant strategy of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi’s cancellation of the scheduled discussions with ASEAN and internationally embracing the communist regime signified growing bitterness in India’s approach towards existing ASEAN members 11. The stalemate continued until the collapse of Soviet Union, when India became a Sectoral Dialogue with ASEAN in 1992 and established full Dialogue partnership in 1995.

Southeast Asia witnessed a major change in its political atmosphere in the aftermath of the Cold War – especially after the settlement of the Cambodian crisis and change in the ASEAN’s perception towards Vietnam as a potential ally. This contributed in a big way to the emergence of a strong strategic and defence ties between India and ASEAN member countries. This period also saw “the beginning of India’s Look-East Policy which was intended to reach out to the countries of East and Southeast Asia which had been neglected by India in spite of cultural, religious, geographical proximity and historical links”12. With the launching of India’s economic liberalisation programme in 1991, ASEAN came to be identified as being ‘pivotal’ to India’s policy in the Indo-Pacific region.

25 Years of Engagement

Post Cold War era witnessed a significant increase in the engagements between India and ASEAN member countries. They have leveraged from the large potential in synergies between their economies13. “The resolution of the Cambodian conflict brought about a fundamental change in Indo-ASEAN relations”14. There was an expansion in the membership of ASEAN to include all countries which are physically part of Southeast Asian region – irrespective of their ideological orientations and regime types. Furthermore, “the emergence of China as an ‘economic dynamo’ and its increasing trade and commercial interests and cooperation with ASEAN countries has been another motivating factor for India to enhance its own linkages with the ASEAN”15.

India-ASEAN partnership has been a noteworthy feature and provides significant underpinning to the ‘Act East Policy’ today. Though, actually envisaged at “bolstering strategic and economic ties” with Southeast Asian countries, it aims at tapping the region for greater investment and connectivity16. According to Prime Minister Narendra Modi, “our ties with South East Asia are deep rooted. Strengthening relations with ASEAN nations is an important part of our ‘Act East’ policy. It is central to our dream of an Asian century, where India will play a crucial role”. With this background, the following section looks at the political and security engagements; economic cooperation; physical connectivity; people to people relations and development partnership between India and the countries of the Southeast Asian region.

– Political and Security Engagements

The up-gradation of the relationship into a Strategic Partnership in 2012 was a natural progression to the ground covered since India became a Sectoral Partner of the ASEAN in 1992, Dialogue Partner in 1996 and Summit Level Partner in 200217. India is also an active participant in several security based ASEAN forums like the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting + (ADMM+) and Expanded ASEAN Maritime Forum (EAMF). India has set up a separate Mission to ASEAN in Jakarta in April 2015 with a dedicated Ambassador to strengthen engagement with ASEAN and ASEAN-centric processes.18 The ASEAN Post Ministerial Conference (PMC) 10+1 Sessions with The Dialogue Partners also provides opportunity for ASEAN and the Dialogue Partners to review their cooperation over the past year and further deepen their cooperation, strengthen their engagement, as well as to ensure the effective implementation of the respective Plans of Action to elevate cooperation in all areas. These meetings also served as avenues for the Ministers to exchange views on regional and international issues of mutual interest and concern, collectively and constructively address global developments and existing, emerging and trans-boundary challenges and strengthen development cooperation with ASEAN19. Measures like the signing of a “Joint Declaration for Cooperation to Combat International Terrorism,” maritime exercises with the navies of ASEAN countries, information-sharing initiatives, and defense agreements with individual ASEAN countries have added a new dimension to ASEAN-India relations.20

– Economic Engagements

For enhancing economic ties with ASEAN member countries, India signed a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) in goods in 2009 and an FTA in services and investments in 2014 with ASEAN. The ASEAN-India Free Trade Area has been completed with the entering into force of the ASEAN-India Agreements on Trade in Service and Investments on 1 July 201521. Apart from this, India has a Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement with various countries of the ASEAN region. This has resulted in concessional trade and a rise in investments22.

The ASEAN members and India together consist one of the largest economic regions “with a total population of about 1.8 billion and a combined GDP of $3.8 trillion. ASEAN and India together form an important economic space in the world”23. It is currently India’s fourth largest trading partner, accounting for 10.2 per cent of India’s total trade. India is ASEAN’s seventh largest trading partner. “India’s service-oriented economy perfectly complements the manufacturing-based economies of ASEAN countries. There is, however, considerable scope for further growth”24. As per the Ministry of External Affairs report, “India’s trade with ASEAN has increased to US$ 70 billion in 2016-17 from US$ 65 billion in 2015-16. India’s export to ASEAN has increased to US$ 31.07 billion in 2016-17 from US$ 25 billion in 2015-16. India’s import to ASEAN increased by 1.8% in 2016-17 vis-à-vis 2015-16 and stood at US$ 40.63 billion. Investment flows are also substantial both ways, with ASEAN accounting for approximately 12.5% of investment flows into India since 2000″.25

ASEAN and India have been also working on enhancing private sector engagement. ASEAN India-Business Council (AIBC) was set up in March 2003 in Kuala Lumpur as a forum to bring key private sector players from India and the ASEAN countries on a single platform for business networking and sharing of ideas. AIBC is an organization that builds relationship between India and ASEAN countries to foster stronger ties in trade and economy. It was conceptualized to provide an industry perspective to the broadening and deepening of economic linkages between ASEAN and India26.  The AIBC consists of eminent Leaders of Business in ASEAN Member States and India. They meet on the sidelines of ASEAN-India Economic Ministers’ Meeting27.

– People to People Relations

People-to-people exchanges continue to remain an important pillar of India-ASEAN relations today, and “we aim to expand them through various initiatives, such as through the exchange of artists, students, journalists, farmers and parliamentarians, as well as a multiplicity of think-tank initiatives”28. People of the two regions connect not only through political and diplomatic means, but there are historical and civilisational linkages. Ramayana and Mahabharata – two great Indian mythologies find a meeting ground in ASEAN region. Similarly, Buddhism and Bollywood are two great popular cultures capturing the imagination of the people of the region. Besides, a large number of Indian Diaspora in Southeast Asia, provide a fertile ground for linking of people and culture since long.  The cultural and intellectual exchanges between the people of two region has enabled us a better understanding of the relations between India and ASEAN. At the level of the Government, several activities leveraging people-to-people connectivity are held annually to increase interaction between India and ASEAN Community. These include, ASEAN-India Network of Think Tanks, Exchange of Parliamentarians, ASEAN-India Media Exchange Programme, Students Exchange Programme, ASEAN-India Eminent Persons Lecture Series, Special Course for ASEAN Diplomats and their training at the Foreign Service Institute (FSI) in New Delhi29. Recently held India-ASEAN Youth festival in August 2017 is an example of identifying Youth as cultural ambassadors for a deeper understanding of socio-cultural linkages between the two regions.

– Physical Connectivity

ASEAN-India connectivity has been a priority for India and central to its ties with ASEAN. In 2013, India became the third dialogue partner of ASEAN to initiate an ASEAN Connectivity Coordinating Committee-India Meeting. While India has made considerable progress in implementing the India-Myanmar-Thailand Trilateral Highway and the Kaladan Multimodal Project, issues related to increasing the maritime and air connectivity between ASEAN and India and transforming the corridors of connectivity into economic corridors are under discussion. A possible extension to India-Myanmar-Thailand Trilateral Highway to Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam is also under consideration. A consensus on finalising the proposed protocol of the India-Myanmar-Thailand Motor Vehicle Agreement has been reached. This agreement will have a critical role in realizing seamless movement of passenger, personal and cargo vehicles along roads linking India, Myanmar and Thailand. PM announced a Line of Credit of US$ 1 billion to promote projects that support physical and digital connectivity between India and ASEAN and a Project Development Fund with a corpus of US $ 50 million to develop manufacturing hubs in CLMV countries at the 13th ASEAN India Summit held in Malaysia in November 201530.  India-ASEAN Connectivity Summit was also organised in December 2017 in New Delhi. According to M. J. Akbar, “While the road component is progressing apace, maritime connectivity – the mainstay of our historical trade relations, requires urgent modernisation in the context of current geopolitical realities”. According to him, “connectivity will address investment opportunities in ASEAN-India Islands Connectivity and discuss the challenges that need to be addressed in order to sustain the progress”31. To add further, the need for not only physical connectivity but digital connectivity has also been emphasised.32

– Act East and North-Eastern Region of India

The North-eastern India as a region is landlocked, sharing most of its boundary with neighbouring countries of South and South East Asia. It is supposed to be an essential factor in extending linkages with the Southeast Asian countries and critical for India’s ambitious Act East policy to succeed. Given its strategic location, bordering on Bangladesh, Bhutan, Nepal, Myanmar and China, the region could be developed as a base for India’s growing economic links. “Though considered as the country’s most economically laggard regions, no other region in India can rival it in terms of the availability of natural resources and its potential for international connectivity”33. Over the years, “geo-political distancing of the region from its main port of Kolkata, combined with economic insulation, has weighed down the Northeast’s economy”34. Nevertheless, India has been trying to bridge this isolation through the ‘Act East’ policy by promoting trade and physical connectivity through its north-eastern borders with Southeast Asian region.

–Development Partnership with CLMV Countries

Serving as a platform for deepening and strengthening its relationship with ASEAN, the CLMV countries (Cambodia, Lao PDR, Myanmar and Vietnam) have also been a special focus area for India. “At a time when manufacturing facilities are shifting to lower-cost economies, both India and the CLMV countries enjoy an advantage. With ‘Make in India’ emerging as a key campaign for manufacturing, developing new global value chains in partnership with the four least-developed economies of ASEAN would bring benefits to both sides”35. Over the years, special focus has also been on building up of the road, rail and waterways network for developing the infrastructural links between the North-east India and its engagement with the Southeast Asian countries. India has set up a Project Development Fund for CLMV countries and EXIM Bank also provides lines of credit for projects in power, irrigation and railways. Besides, facilities for English language training, entrepreneurship development, and IT skills have also been set-up by India for capacity building in these countries.

Conclusion

India-ASEAN relations are a critical component of India’s overall external engagement with the Indo-Pacific and beyond. A balance-sheet of India-ASEAN relations over the years reveal two and a half decades of missed opportunities resulting from the  ideological misgivings and conflicts in the internal politics of the countries of the region. However, the end of Cold War and collapse of Soviet Union was a critical juncture in the world politics. It brought about a major shift in the balance of power in Southeast Asia also bringing about transformation in the internal political dynamics of the countries of the region. The end of Cold War also marked a turning point in India-ASEAN Relations in the wake of liberalisation and market oriented reforms. In the changing architecture of global politics, India adopted itself to the emerging world order, thereby beginning a new chapter as the ‘Look East Policy’ now being transformed as ‘Act East Policy’ in its foreign policy paradigm. For the last 25 years – driven by geo-strategic and economic realities, India and ASEAN moved on the path of strong political and diplomatic engagements followed by economic and strategic partnership between countries of the region.

Encompassing shared heritage of centuries old civilisational ties – India and ASEAN have provided foundation to the close cultural and historical bonds, upon which lays the edifice of deeper economic and strategic partnership between the countries of the region. To conclude, in the words of Prime Minister Narendra Modi, “for the near future, South and South East Asia will be the growth engine of the world. Hence, building connectivity with ASEAN is a key objective for India”.

References:-

1 Rajamohan (2015), Modi’s World: Expanding India’s Sphere of Influence, Harper Collins.

2 Key Points at Prime Minister’a Address at 12th East Asia Summit in Manila, 14 November 2017.  Online Edition.Accessed on 10 December 2017. URL: https://www.narendramodi.in/key-points-from-prime-minister-s-address-at-the-12th-east-asia-summit-537799

3 Speech of M. J. Akbar at the Regional Conclave on ASEAN@50 and India – ASEAN Relations, 7-8 December 2017, Bengaluru.

4 Acharya, Amitav (2001), Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia, Routledge. p. 4

5 The Diplomat (2017), “Revisiting ASEAN-India Relations”. Online Edition.Accessed on 11 December 2017. URL: https://thediplomat.com/2017/11/revisiting-asean-india-relations/

6 Clark, Helen (2016), “Why Vietnam has India in its Side” Lowy Institute.Online Edition.Accessed on 11 December 2017. URL:https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/why-vietnam-has-india-its-sights

7 Anand, Vinod (2017),”India-Vietnam Defense and Security Cooperation”, Vivekanand International Foundation.Online Edition.Accessed on 10 December 2017. URL: http://www.vifindia.org/article/2017/may/12/achievements-india-vietnam-defence-and-security-cooperation

8 Brewster D (2009),The Strategic Relationship between India and Vietnam. Online Edition.Accessed on 12 December 2017. URL:

   https://openresearch-repository.anu.edu.au/bitstream/1885/13058/1/Brewster,%20D.%20India%27s%20S trategic%20Partnership%20with%20Vietnam%202009.pdf

9 Mohammed Ayoob (1990), India and Southeast Asia: Indian Perceptions and Policies, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. pp 53-72.

10 Ministry of External Affairs (2017), India-Cambodia Relations, Online Edition.Accessed on 15 December 2017. URL: http://www.mea.gov.in/Portal/ForeignRelation/1_Cambodia_November_2017.pdf

11 Brewster D (2009),The Strategic Relationship between India and Vietnam, pp. 8.

12 Ahmad, Asif (2012), India – ASEAN Relations in 21st  Century: Strategic Implications For India – Analysis, Eurasia Review. Online Edition.Accessed on 12 December 2017. URL:

   http://www.eurasiareview.com/09072012-india-asean-relations-in-21st-century-strategic-implications-for-india-analysis/

13 Anand, Mohit (2009), India-ASEAN Relations: Analysing Regional Implications, Institute of Peace and Conflict Sudies Report 72.  Online Edition.Accessed on 12 December 2017. URL:

   http://www.ipcs.org/pdf_file/issue/SR72-Final.pdf

14Ahmad, Asif (2012), India – ASEAN Relations in 21st  Century: Strategic Implications For India – Analysis, Eurasia Review.

15 Hong, Z. (2006), India’s Changing Relations with ASEAN: From China’s Perspective, The Journal of East Asian Affairs, 20(2), pp. 141-170. Online Edition.Accessed on 12 December 2017. URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/23257942?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents

16Trivedi Sonu (2014), “Act East Policy vis-a-vis Pivot to Asia”, The Global New Light of Myanmar, November 16.

17 Ministry of External Affairs, India-ASEAN Relations. Online Edition.Accessed on 12 December 2017. URL:

   http://www.mea.gov.in/aseanindia/20-years.htm.

18 Ibid.

19 ASEAN.Online Edition.Accessed on 12 December 2017. URL:

   http://asean.org/chairmans-statement-of-the-asean-post-ministerial-conference-pmc-101-sessions-with-the-dialogue-partners-3/

20 The Diplomat (2017), “Revisiting ASEAN-INDIA Relations”.Online Edition.Accessed on 12 December 2017. URL:  https://thediplomat.com/2017/11/revisiting-asean-india-relations/

21 Indian Mission to ASEAN.Online Edition.Online Edition.Accessed on 15 December. URL: http://www.indmissionasean.com/index.php/asean-india

22 The Diplomat (2017) “Revisiting ASEAN-India Relations”,Online Edition.  Accessed on 15 December. URL: https://thediplomat.com/2017/11/revisiting-asean-india-relations/

23 IDSA (2016), “India ASEAN Approach”.Online Edition.Accessed on 15 December. URL: https://idsa.in/idsanews/india-asean-approach_080416

24Pant, Harsh V, (2017), “The ASEAN Outreach”, The Hindu, November 17.

25 Ministry of External Affairs, India-ASEAN Relations. Online Edition.Accessed on 15 December. URL:  http://www.mea.gov.in/aseanindia/20-years.htm

26ASEAN-India Business Council.Online Edition.Accessed on 15 December. URL:  http://www.asean-india.org/

27Indian Mission to ASEAN.Online Edition.Accessed on 15 December. URL: http://www.indmissionasean.com/index.php/asean-india

28Pioneer (2017), “ASEAN: sharing Values and Common Destiny”, September 6. Online Edition.Accessed on 14 December. URL:

29Indian Mission to ASEAN.Online Edition.Accessed on 15 December. URL:  http://www.indmissionasean.com/index.php/asean-india

30 Ministry of External Affairs, India-ASEAN Relations. Online Edition.Accessed on 13 December. URL:  http://www.mea.gov.in/aseanindia/20-years.htm

31 Assam Tribune (2017), “Connectivity Central to ties with India”. 12 December. Online Edition.Accessed on 15 December. URL: http://www.assamtribune.com/scripts/detailsnew.asp?id=dec1217/at061

32 Speech by Hon Minister for Electronincs & Information and Technology, Ravi Shankar Prasad at Valedictory Session on India-ASEAN Partnership@25, Kalinga International Foundation, 13 December 2017.

33 De, Prabir (2017),”Can Act East Address Northeast India’s Isolation?”.Online Edition.Accessed on 16 December. URL: http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2017/10/27/can-act-east-address-northeast-indias-isolation/

34 Ibid.

35 Banerjee Chandrajeet (2017), “From Look East to Act East”, The Hindu Business Line, February 26.Online Edition.Accessed on 16 December. URL: http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/opinion/developing-new-global-value-chains-in-partnership/article9560295.ece

(Ms. Sonu Trivedi teaches Political Science at Zakir Husain Delhi College, University of Delhi.)

(This article is carried in the print edition of January-February 2018 issue of India Foundation Journal.)