A rather peculiar phenomenon which is now appearing on the political landscape and in the mainstream and social media, is that anyone who is anyone, feels compelled to comment on the country’s Armed Forces, more so on the actions of the Army. The trend gained traction after the  terror attack on the Air Force Station at Pathankot in January 2016, which caused casualties to own forces before the terrorists were eliminated. This was followed a month later by a terror attack on  a government building in the outskirts of Srinagar which resulted in the loss of three para commandos including two Captains, before the lone terrorist was eliminated. Then in September, 17 soldiers lost their lives in a sneak attack on a brigade HQ in Uri sector, which rightly caused rage and indignation across the country and led to the Indian Army responding by a surgical strike across the border, successfully targeting a number of terrorist bases. Finally, in November, the terrorists struck once again, this time at an artillery unit in Nagrota, killing three soldiers, including one Captain.

2017 has not yet seen the type of high profile attacks of 2016 on military targets, which perhaps points to the success of the Army in keeping the area under effective domination, but civil disobedience in the form of pelting stones at the security forces has taken on a more ominous dimension. It was to save the lives of election officials and their protection party from a thousand or so stone pelters intent on creating mayhem that Maj Gogoi, who was detailed to rescue the beleaguered officials, tied up a stone pelter in front of his jeep and carried out the rescue without mishap in April this year. But then all hell broke loose, with exaggerated concern being expressed for the human rights of the tied up stone pelter, but muted or no criticism being showered on the murderous stone pelters and their attempts to thwart the election process. The Army supported the action of Gogoi, with the Chief giving him his commendation card while stating at the same time that though not the norm for the Army, different situations required different responses. A former Army Commander of Northern Command however openly expressed his displeasure to the act of tying up a stone pelter, taking the high moral ground that such an act had no place in the Army’s ethos. The Government supported the Army Chief, but predictably, the opposition came out all guns blazing, indicting the Centre and the alliance government at the State  for its perceived failure in bringing peace and normalcy to the Valley and infringement of the human rights of the civilian stone pelter.

Soon public opinion was divided on the issue. Editorial pieces in the Indian Express slammed the Army, the Telegraph termed the sequence of incidents as shocking and unbecoming and the Hindustan Times bluntly stated “The General has it wrong”. Karan Thapar, the son of  a former Chief also jumped into the fray, stating that it was ‘not the Indian Army I know’. But other mainstream papers supported the Army, support pouring in overwhelmingly also from the social media. In all the brouhaha, the basic issue however got ignored.

Commanders need to take decisions in real time in situations which are akin to war. Their actions cannot be judged in terms of right or wrong — but on whether their action was done in good faith. How an action will eventually pan out can never be pre-determined and young commanders must always have the backing of their superiors in the chain of command for taking on the spot decisions. Otherwise, our junior leadership will lose confidence in the higher leadership with disastrous consequences for the Army and the nation. More importantly, as said so eloquently by Sadguru, decisions on the battlefield must be left to the commanders who are facing the bullets and cannot be the subject of debate in the media. Every action cannot be put open to public gaze. The Army is the instrument of final resolve and its edge must never be allowed to be eroded. Which is why the Chief supported his officers fighting on the battlefield. On a different note, Karan Thapar may be right when he stated that this is not the Army he grew up in. It most certainly is not. The present Chief upheld the interests of the Army. Sadly, that did not happen when his father was the Chief and we suffered humiliation at the hands of the Chinese in 1962.

(The writer is Director of India Foundation)

The article was published in Salute magazine, April-May 2017 issue. 

China organized it’s first Belt and Road Forum (BRF) Summit in Beijing on 14^th-15^th May 2017 which was attended by 29 Heads of States and as many as 129 countries including delegation from other South Asian countries, except India and Bhutan. It also included leaders and officials from Russia, US, Japan, UK, Germany and France. The initiative which was proposed in 2013, is the clearest expression of President Xi Jinping’s determination to break away with Deng Xiaoping’s dictum to “hide our capabilities and bide our time”. More recently, China made a robust call in ‘defense of globalization’ at Davos, World Economic Forum (WEF) meet 2017, in same line and vigour.

The ambitious project is backed by top Chinese leadership and draws on the strength of China’s USD 10 trillion economy, with spending of nearly 150 billion USD a year, in the 68 countries that have signed up to the initiative. .Considering the unfolding nature of OBOR project, its opportunities and challenges cannot be set out in clearer terms at present. The project aims to link Asia, Africa and Europe, with an eye to establish free-trade area in the Asia-Pacific region and linking it further to Europe through Land and Maritime Silk Road so as to make it global project whose influence exceeds China’s immediate borders. The ‘grand strategy’ of OBOR looks both to the East and West. Although driving on ‘economic exceptionalism’, it has strategic underpinnings to counter ‘Pivot to Asia’ of United States in the Asia Pacific region and causing shifts in global governance model with new identity and vision. To mention, the initial impression for having multi-model link from Asia to Europe was found in India’s desire for an International North-South Transit Corridor (INSTC), in September 2000, bringing together India, Iran and Russia.

Despite China’s covert objectives to redefine ‘global norms and institutions’ through OBOR project, the idea faces some key challenges at both domestic and global fronts.

Firstly, Beijing expects around USD 100 billion of infrastructure investments in Asia from newly created institutions like AIIB and NDB (BRICS Bank), which seems less likely to realize before 2020. Although AIIB aimed to lend more than USD $1.7  billion in 2016, the amount remains less to the intended projections for OBOR. Secondly, the OBOR project also faces push from different stakeholders in China, considering the involvement of three ministries at the official launch of vision document on OBOR which was released in March 2015. With likely ambition of the project related with provincial interest of Western China, it has chances of being ‘over stretched’ to China’s domestic politics. Thirdly, there is growing tendency for ‘risk aversion’ in China’s financial institutions that forms a key challenge against taking lead in investments abroad.

On the global front, concerns remain on questions of ‘debt repayment’ to China being faced by countries like Ukraine, Zimbabwe, Cambodia and Sri-Lanka. According to IMF report 2016, out of Cambodia’s USD 3.9 billion bilateral public debts with China, 80 percent is owned by China. Further there is also concern on the flow of Chinese goods and services in countries along the Land and maritime route of OBOR. Considering the over capacity of Chinese economy, there are doubts if OBOR aims to link production centers in China to the markets in Eurasia.  The project also attaches need to deal with political risk and operational insecurity in Central Asia, South Asia and the Middle East for Chinese investment.

The project also has not found approval from India due to the fact that$46 billion China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) passes through Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK), with officials declaring that the venture violated Indian sovereignty. The China was unwilling to agree with New Delhi’s requests for consultations on the objectives, nature and financing of the BRI. India has made its position clear that China cannot ignore its concerns on territorial integrity and Chinese will have to adhere to One India policy. As per some reports in media, the likely deployment of 30,000 Chinese ‘security personnel’ to protect the projects along the CPEC, in addition to 15000 troops from Pakistan army make the situation alarming for India. To remember, the standoff on Demchok and Chumar (2014) due to Chinese incursion has drawn concern from India’s highest leadership. India’s future strategy thrust on CPEC must be based on a careful assessment of geopolitics and economics.

Moreover, in the maritime domain China is set to increase number of its marine corps from 20,000 to one lakh at strategic Gwadar port in Pakistan and in military base of Djibouti.. In recent years, China has moved aggressively to increase its power projection capabilities through the rapid modernization of its navy and has increasedits military spending. Given the case of Indian opposition, a ‘meaningful dialogue’ between both is necessary giving due consideration to India’s sovereignty concerns and upholding of ‘One India’ policy. China needs to address the context of rising tension with India in the larger framework of realizing the dream of ‘An Asian Century’.

As the BRF summit concluded major European nations like France, Germany, Estonia, Greece, Portugal and Britain refused to sign the trade document citing concerns on public procurement and environmental standards. The challenge before China is to communicate that its objective and vision for BRI does not represent a threat for regional stability, territorial sovereignty and equitable world order.

(Abhishek Pratap Singh is a Fellow, South Asia Democratic Forum (SADF), Brussels and Doctoral Candidate, Centre for East Asian Studies (Chinese), Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi.)

But India’s staying away from the OBOR mega show will not affect bilateral relations adversely

Belt and Road is China’s most ambitious initiative in history. Popularly known as One Belt One Road (OBOR), this infrastructure project of gigantic proportions attempts to bring under its sway more than 60 countries, from the Scandinavian world to the South Pacific Islands, in its land and maritime versions. The ancient Silk Route is said to be the inspiration for this initiative launched in 2013.

For President Xi Jinping, Belt and Road is a project of personal ambition and honour. His government has not left any stone unturned to make it a reality in a span of less than four years. In the first three years, various projects have seen the signing of contracts worth more than a trillion US dollars.

In a world of competing economic and trade alliances, OBOR has overtaken many others active in the region and beyond. The European Union has some 27 member countries; the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) has 13 countries; the East Asia Summit has 18 countries; even a religious grouping like the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) has only 57 countries as members. APEC, TTP, SCO — none comes anywhere near the Belt and Road initiative which boasts of the involvement of more than 60 countries.

By all means, this is singularly the biggest constellation of nations in the 21st century. One prominent nation missing in this mega show is India. Like other countries, India too was invited to the Beijing conclave, with invitations reaching six different ministries for participation in various forums during the summit. The Chinese were hopeful till the last moment about Indian participation. But the government of India decided not to send its representatives to the summit.

Belt and Road is essentially a Chinese project. Two major Chinese financial institutions are supposedly taking responsibility for arranging the necessary finances for participant nations. When completed, the rail, road and maritime routes of this project are expected to boost bilateral and multilateral trade in a big way.

Where the project is a matter of pride for the Chinese leadership, it is also mired in controversy over sovereignty questions and fears about debt servicing obligations. Projects like this one, involving multiple countries, are launched only after proper deliberations among the beneficiary countries and after addressing their concerns.

In the case of Belt and Road, however, the Chinese have opted for a different course. They first announced the project and then initiated the dialogue process with various stakeholder nations. It suited some; for some, like Nepal, it is too big a proposal to be rejected. India is probably the only country that didn’t find it virtuous or beneficial to join this mega alliance.

India’s reservations need to be looked at from the sovereignty perspective. China routinely threatens countries when it finds issues even remotely connected to its own sovereignty question being “violated”. Not just China, no country compromises with its sovereignty for the sake of some trade and commerce interests.

India’s Achilles’ heel is the China Pakistan Economic Corridor, popularly known as CPEC. The CPEC is seen as a part of the Belt and Road initiative although it started much earlier. In fact, when the Chinese entered into an agreement with Pakistan in 1963 to build the Karakoram Highway in the Pakistan occupied Kashmir (PoK) region, India had vociferously objected to it on the very question of sovereignty. The region through which the highway was to pass belonged to India and has been under the illegal occupation of Pakistan. The Chinese side, thus, has full knowledge of India’s concerns about the region.

The CPEC today passes through the same region of PoK called Gilgit Baltistan (GB). India has time and again raised its concerns over Chinese activity in the region, the latest being in 2011 when information came out about the presence of thousands of Chinese troops in the region. Adding insult to injury for India is the very name of the project, CPEC, although the region through which it passes doesn’t belong either to Pakistan or to China. In such a scenario, for India to participate in the summit would have meant acceptance of the CPEC proposition.

There is no reason to assume that India’s decision will affect bilateral relations with China adversely. Both India and China have a mature leadership under Modi and Xi. Both work together on many other multilateral forums like the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), Asian Infrastructure and Investment Bank (AIIB), BRICS Forum, etc. In bilateral relations, there are certain irritants that have either been inherited over time or are a result of realpolitik. That includes China’s position on Pakistan and terrorism sponsored by it on Indian soil. India hopes that China appreciates its concerns and takes mutually satisfactory and reassuring measures.

However, being not just a nation but a civilisation in itself, China has time and again betrayed its own style in diplomacy. In his book The Hundred Year Marathon, Michael Pillsbury suggested that Chinese strategists have a definite road map for their country to overtake all other world powers, including America, by the time their Maoist Revolution completes a hundred years in 2049, becoming the sole super power. But President Jinping seems to be a man in a hurry. He wants to achieve it much earlier.

As pointed out by The Economist magazine, China today talks not in terms of the China Model or the Beijing Consensus as it used to. The terminology used these days is “China solution” and “guiding globalisation”. Its initiatives, including OBOR, need to be viewed from the perspective of these newly coined phrases.

(Ram Madhav is National General Secretary, BJP and Director, India Foundation.)

(The article is originally carried in the Indian Express, 17^th May, 2017 at http://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/columns/turning-down-china-one-belt-one-road-4659155/ )

The reaction of China against Dalai Lama’s visit to Arunanchal Pradesh holds no ‘valid reason’ except political anxiety.

The visit of His holiness the Dalai Lama to India’s state of Arunanchal Pradesh in the month of April, has drawn noticeable concern from China. In an unceremonious set of reactions, China displayed its anguishes with the visit by relating it with an ‘unsettled border dispute’ with India in the eastern sector, also referring for its commitment to defend its ‘core interest’ vis a vis India. However, the context of this visit and background of India-China relation in regard to Tibet makes a compelling case for Chinese ‘unfounded concern’ in the given context.

Looking back to the history of India-China border dispute, the ‘Tibet card’ has been well played by Chinese at different periods of time.  Firstly, this became a point of context for China in their diplomatic negotiations with India on border dispute from 1957 to 1962. China also seems to have overplayed the notion of India’s involvement in Tibetan uprising in mid 1950s. This was the time when role of the United States (US) investigative agency CIA was more vital and decisive in order to escalate problems in Tibet (JK Knaus, Orphans of Cold War, 1999)

Secondly, the use of Tibet card also forms key component of ‘Forward Policy School’ of thought in China and in West in regard to 1962 India-China war which always shifts the blame of instigating the war on Indian policy choices at that time. In both the cases, the objective assessment of fact suggests a rather different and truthful theory. Interestingly, in both cases India’s role was peaceful and justified with no provocation to China.

Rather than questioning the presence of Thubten Norbu in US since July, 1951 as a ‘motivating factor’ behind Tibetan uprising in 1950s, China seems to have ignored the Indian reprimand of Gyalo Thondup in 1953 at Gangtok to warn him in person not to carry out political activities on Indian soil. Simply put, India has no such role in CIAs covert operation in Tibet. Rather China took the advantage of India’s weak positioning and security intelligence to its favour in 1962 war.

Thirdly, it is largely accepted that Tibet had become independent when the Manchu Resident and the remnants of his military escort left its soil in January 1913. In between 1913 to 1949, China was using more ‘assertion’ rather than ‘exertion’ over Tibet based on historical maps. After PLAs march into the Tibet in October 1950 and signing of ‘Peaceful Liberation of Tibet (17 Point Agreement), Tibet almost found itself incorporated with the China.

During the signing of ‘Panchsheel Agreement’ in April 1954 between both the countries, India recognized the ‘Tibetan region of China’ as a part of the PRC. But the same was not reciprocated by China in terms of India’s sovereignty on Jammu and Kashmir (J&K). China has also not even spoken officially on the ‘One India Policy’ as put forward by Indian Minister of External Affairs, Smt. Sushma Swaraj.

China must understand that ever since his stay in India, the Dalai Lama has never been allowed to ‘play politics’ because India does not want to playthe Tibet card with China. This was the‘sixth visit’ of His Holiness to the state of Arunanchal Pradesh, which is an integral part of India. HH Dalai Lama enjoys respect in the heart of every Indian as a ‘religious leader’ and so he is widely celebrated amongst all. So the reaction of China against his visit holds no valid reason except political anxiety.

China started referring to Arunachal Pradesh as ‘Southern Tibet’ since 2006 in their official records. If we look back to history, this stands true with the Chinese ‘changing position’ on border negotiations with India.

At times when the theatre of global politics has shifted to Asia, the political cooperation between India and China is necessary. This is preliminary to realize the dream of 21st century as ‘Asian Century’ as enunciatedby Prime Minister Narendra Modi. While Manmohan-Jintao era witnessed the ‘Strategic Partnership’ between India and China, the new leadership led by Modi-Xi desires to move towards ‘Comprehensive developmental partnership’ between both countries. There is enough space for both to prosper and secure their national interest.

In the given context some wider economic cooperation in terms of ‘sectoral engagement’ between both the countries has increased in areas like sister cities, railways, infrastructure and manufacturing. However, the political context of bilateral relations has not moved forward. On the issue of India’s membership to NSG and listing of Pakistan based terrorist Masood Azhar in UN list of terrorist, China has found less reasonable excuses against India. And now its opposition to HH Dalai Lama’s visit has witnessed profound reactions in India. China must realize that it needs to reflect upon aspirational India and not allow any untimely opportunity to effect Indian sensitivities because it takes much time to regain the ‘lost trust’ between two countries. In case of India and China the level of ‘high trust deficit’ is already an accepted fact.

China must acknowledge that India beinga ‘civilizational state’ has allowed Dalai Lama to establish his religious abode in Dharamsala, in recognition to the distinct linguistic, cultural and religious traditions of Tibetans. The nature of this relationship is more cultural than political. In China too a growing number of people are rediscovering the country’s dormant Buddhist traditions inspired from Tibetan Budhism. At the time when new age Chinese people are seeking ‘religious revival’ through Buddhism this newly found and more vocal ‘hard stand’ of China against its preacher seems largely mistaken. This not only cause damage to China’s soft power credentials but its respect for cultural prudence as well.

Considering China’s desire to be a dominant World power, it must act in more prudent manner rather than being more reactive to a rightful visit by any religious leader who symbolizes the message of peace and non-violence.

(Abhishek Pratap Singh is a Fellow, South Asia Democratic Forum (SADF), Brussels and Doctoral Candidate, Centre for East Asian Studies (Chinese), Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi.)