Joyeeta Basu:The leaders of the BRICS nations met in Kazan in October 2024 for the 16th BRICS summit. What were India’s key priorities and contributions at that summit, and what goals did India achieve in the BRICS at this particular summit?
D.B. Venkatesh Varma:As you know, Prime Minister Modi represented India at the 16th BRICS summit. It was held in Kazan, Russia. The host was President Putin. India has been a founding member of BRICS, and its status has evolved over time. At the last summit, it was expanded. More countries came on board: Egypt, Ethiopia, Saudi Arabia (which has yet to join, but it has been admitted), Iran, and at least 13 countries have been asked to join as partner countries. So, there is great interest in BRICS.
BRICS began as a platform for discussing international economic issues. However, given the troubled state of the world, I believe that politics and security issues are now included in these primarily economic agendas. The Prime Minister’s approach to representing India was extremely well-received. It focused on moderating political and security conflicts while prioritising the economic agenda, which is the original mandate of BRICS. At the same time, this should be advanced in a people-centred way and, secondly, to amplify the voice of the Global South.
As you know, when we hosted the G-20 Summit last year, the Prime Minister organised three virtual summits of the Global South, which is referred to as the voice of the Global South. To ascertain the views and sentiments in the Global South on issues that concern them, India has advanced these topics into BRICS. Of course, the economic agenda also involves stabilising both the international economic and trade systems, as well as the financial systems, which are under considerable stress due to the sanctions imposed by the West on Russia. There is a trend towards de-dollarisation, along with the New Development Bank that was established some time ago. Now, we aim to further this initiative. The Prime Minister emphasised that BRICS should address Global South issues.
The New Development Bank should also address those requirements. A proposal has been made to involve the New Development Bank in the Gift City in Gujarat, which is developing significantly. The Prime Minister also presented India’s priorities for the BRICS Startup Initiative, aimed at bringing together young entrepreneurs, particularly in the technology sector, to contribute to the BRICS agenda. Additionally, I believe India consistently puts forward our proposals for the common global good. We have demonstrated this to the G-20 and brought it up in the United Nations. This includes the International Solar Alliance and initiatives to protect critical infrastructure, alongside the Prime Minister’s initiative for a lifestyle focused on tackling climate change and environmental issues.
There have been several initiatives put forward. I believe that India has a leadership role. India also plays a part in balancing extremes within BRICS. Different dimensions emerge from various perspectives. I feel that India’s role has been appreciated, and this will be advanced at the next summit, which will take place in Brasilia, Brazil, next year. Overall, I consider India’s and the Prime Minister’s participation in the BRICS summit to be a success.
Joyeeta Basu:Yes, but no summit is without its challenges. What challenges has India faced, and what opportunities exist for India regarding its strategic interests? How can India navigate the obstacles that have arisen and ensure that both its interests and those of BRICS are served?
D.B. Venkatesh Varma:Absolutely. I think you know it’s no secret that we live in a troubled world. There is a shift towards multipolarity, though it is rather uneven in some respects. The world remains unipolar since the dollar still dominates the international system. However, in terms of manufacturing, China has emerged as a significant manufacturing power. Additionally, there is a rise of subaltern quests for multipolarity from regional figures in Southeast Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America. Therefore, this shift towards multipolarity should be advanced by India in a negotiated manner that benefits humanity. India certainly views BRICS as a platform for promoting stable and organised multipolarity.
Sometimes, this is interpreted as anti-Western. Of course, there are differing views within BRICS, just as there is a quest for multipolarity in the broader world. We are also seeking multipolarity in Asia. In fact, there are multipolar tendencies within BRICS. While, for instance, China or Russia may have a very strong anti-Western agenda, this is not necessarily shared by other BRICS members. Moreover, BRICS includes a significant number of countries that are influential in energy issues. India and China are major consumers of energy resources, while Russia, Saudi Arabia, Iran, the UAE, and others are substantial producers. I believe this also serves as a platform for dialogue between energy producers and consumers. Furthermore, we aim to advance the reform of international institutions, whether it be the United Nations Security Council, the IMF, the World Bank, or multilateral lending institutions. Our goal is to move forward in a manner that benefits not only BRICS countries but also the larger international community.
If one examines India’s approach, the same issues we promote in the G-20, and those we advocate for the sustainable development goals of the United Nations, are also priorities in BRICS. India is neither anti-West nor pro-West; rather, it is pro-India. Additionally, India is gaining recognition for raising issues significant to the Global South. Claiming that BRICS is dominated by China is an exaggeration; there are diverse perspectives within BRICS and even among external countries that value India’s active participation. This involvement not only helps to counterbalance the West but also China. Overall, I believe BRICS serves as an evolving mechanism—a platform for multipolarity and for reforming international institutions. On each of these agenda items, India’s role is not only recognised but also highly valued welcomed.
Joyeeta Basu:In this context, may I ask a quick question about the BRICS currency? You mentioned China and Russia, and we know they have been advocating for a BRICS currency. What is India’s stance on it, and what future do you foresee if a BRICS currency is established?
D.B. Venkatesh Varma:You see, the BRICS currency has been discussed; it’s more in the realm of speculation rather than specific proposals. What BRICS is definitely examining is the increase in the use of national currencies in bilateral and multilateral trading arrangements. The use of national currencies has been driven by the securitisation of global interdependence due to issues like sanctions. Each country within BRICS has drawn its lessons. There is a common interest in reforming the international financial system to enhance its resilience and develop more robust supply chains. However, in my view, which is widely shared among experts analysing BRICS, the concept of a BRICS currency is a bridge too far; it will not materialise in the near future. The market conditions for a BRICS currency simply do not exist. Nonetheless, what is possible and what BRICS hopes to achieve is the creation of a basket of currencies that could serve as a reference point for international financial transactions. This is not intended to replace the dollar; it is, I think, a supplement to the dollar.
Joyeeta Basu:Ambassador, you have served as India’s envoy to Russia. Considering BRICS within the context of the India-Russia relationship, along with the strong interpersonal bond between Prime Minister Modi and President Putin, how is this fostering progress within BRICS? Additionally, there are many adverse perspectives from the West; how is India managing this? Could you also provide some insights into the future of the India-Russia relationship?
D.B. Venkatesh Varma:That’s an excellent question. As you are aware, before the Prime Minister went to the Kazan Summit in BRICS, he had a bilateral summit with President Putin earlier in the summer in Moscow. President Putin and Prime Minister Modi have met more than 30 times. They are amongst the seniormost world leaders today in terms of how much public political office experience they have. They have been leaders of their countries for a considerable period, and they personally enjoy an extremely good rapport. In these troubled times, the personal relations between world leaders are vitally important, especially with the generational change happening in the West, as many leaders like Chancellor Merkel, who led for a very long time, have moved on. We are getting a new crop of leadership with the election of President Trump in the US.
The personal relationship between Prime Minister Modi and President Putin, of course, serves as an anchor for the India-Russia relationship. The India-Russia relationship is one of strategic partnership, which has flourished for over 70 years. However, it has been periodically renewed, and I believe that the Prime Minister’s visit in July significantly contributed to this renewal, particularly by introducing new drivers, especially regarding energy security. India and Russia view each other as partners in energy security—one being a major supplier and the other a major consumer. In fact, the past three years have demonstrated that India and Russia can engage and collaborate in a manner that is not only mutually beneficial but also helps stabilise global energy prices and markets. This, I believe, has made a substantial contribution to stabilising the international economic system. We intend to build on this progress.
There are also ways to expand bilateral trade, address connectivity issues, and improve the North-South Corridor and the Chennai-Vladivostok Corridor. India has been a longstanding partner in the field of defence, and we are eager to renew that relationship. It is well known internationally that the India-Russia relationship is vital for India. This is not merely a legacy relationship; it is one that looks towards the future, which has been acknowledged to some extent by the United States. We maintain excellent relations with the US, having established a strategic partnership. The US recognises that there is a certain irreducible minimum in the India-Russia relationship that India will not forsake, and that is undeniably our intention. One of the significant successes of our diplomacy over the past few years has been our ability to navigate the troubled waters of the international system, characterised by substantial conflict between the major powers, particularly between the United States and Russia over Ukraine, and the evident conflict between the US and China. We have advanced our relations without allowing our ties with other countries to influence this dynamic.
The reason for our success also lies in the increased stature and capabilities of India within the international system. India holds significance in various ways for different countries. This totality means that all nations expect India to play an active role. There is no exclusivity in our major power relations, and we intend to advance both our relationship with Russia and our partnership with the United States moving forward. As you are aware, during the Kazan Summit, an important meeting took place between President Xi Jinping of China and our Prime Minister Modi, which has paved the way for renewed engagement between India and China. Our National Security Advisor, Mr. Doval, was recently in Beijing, and I believe very important and positive steps have been taken. While these may be limited in scope, their impact is significant in alleviating some of the tensions that have developed in India-China relations.
However, the India-China relationship has many dimensions. It is not just the border issue we face—an important challenge—but also the broader economic ties. China’s growth and its assertiveness in our neighbourhood, the South China Sea, and across the larger Eurasian continent are significant. It is clear that India will stand its ground; we do not take pressure lightly. Moving forward, I believe that if there is dialogue, discussion, and mutual accommodation of interests, this is something we would certainly advocate for. We can also expect a degree of stability in our relationship with China. With some stability between us and China, we enjoy an excellent relationship with the United States and a long-standing rapport with Russia. This bolsters India’s credibility and stature in the international arena, demonstrating that, even amidst great global turbulence, India can maintain a certain level of relationship across various fronts and sustain significant momentum in others.
Joyeeta Basu:Yes. This raises a perhaps detailed question specifically about China. When we consider India and China, we know that there are border issues and other challenges as well. Would you say that this summit and the meeting you mentioned have injected a modicum of trust into the relationship? Can we trust the Chinese? In which direction are India-China relations headed?
D.B. Venkatesh Varma:Well, you know, trust is always a byproduct. It is never the driver of any relationship, especially not with China. I think the Prime Minister’s meeting with President Xi was useful in the sense that the Chinese have clearly understood that while India will firmly protect its interests, it is also open to dialogue to resolve outstanding issues through discussions and diplomacy, as has always been the case. This trend was disrupted not by India but by China, where a unilateral assertion of rights through the use of force was met with firm resistance from our side. That is not the path we wish to pursue, but if the Chinese have come to realise that they wish to see India as a partner and aim for a gradual normalisation of our relationship, the border problem remains critical. India and China can achieve a lot in Asia as long as there is mutual accommodation of interests, both in Asia, in the Indo-Pacific, and in global affairs. Having said that, we also need to consider that there is a significant power differential between India and China
Our economic growth will support us as we move forward. India is among the fastest-growing economies of the major economies in the world. I believe we need to invest more in defence. Additionally, we must strengthen our international partnerships, including with Russia and the United States, as well as with QUAD. Our connectivity projects, such as IMEC to the west, the Chennai-Vladivostok Corridor to the east, and the International North-South Corridor through Iran into Eurasia, are vital. All these initiatives align with India’s emergence as a major economic and technological power. The economic fundamentals of India are sound. We must accelerate our growth. We possess all the necessary factors; however, I believe that in the next ten years, if we achieve a growth rate of 7 to 9%, we can expect a long-term stabilisation of the India-China relationship. I am fairly confident that this positive shift, though limited and of tactical significance, can be leveraged into strategic advantages for India over the next decade.
Joyeeta Basu:This brings us to the final question: The biggest world power currently is the United States. Donald Trump is stepping in for his second term, and Mr. Modi is here as well. How do you think India-US relations will evolve in Mr. Trump’s second term and Mr. Modi’s third term? What challenges and opportunities do you foresee, given that we hear many sound bytes from Mr. Trump? How do you envisage the relationship developing, and will there be any differences compared to the relationship India has had during Mr. Biden’s term?
D.B. Venkatesh Varma:There are two points to consider. President Trump is returning to office for a second term with a very specific domestic agenda. He and his supporters have been clear about this, and there is every expectation that he will pursue this agenda, which is focused on an America First approach. He seeks to revive the American economy, strengthen national defense, reduce bureaucracy within the United States, limit illegal immigration, and enhance America’s role in the world by decreasing its involvement in various wars. His foremost priority, as he has stated, is to achieve a swift return to peace in the Russia-Ukraine conflict, which I believe is a very positive goal for us. If this can be accomplished sooner rather than later, it would be something we would certainly welcome. It would restore peace to Europe, help reintegrate Russia into the international system, and lessen the strain that the Russia-US conflict has placed on our relationships with both Russia and the United States. Overall, that’s a positive development.
President Trump holds very strong views on tariffs as a method for addressing international trade issues. We are fortunate in a sense to have a robust foundation for the India-US relationship, which exists in Congress. There’s bipartisan support from both political parties, and a significant advantage we possess is that President Trump has formed an extremely positive impression of India during his first term. Of course, we cannot expect the second term to be merely an automatic continuation of the first. However, his relationship with Prime Minister Modi and his awareness of various issues concerning India provide us an advantage that many other countries, in a sense, do not share. That said, President Trump assumes power at a time of considerable domestic change within the United States, and we must observe how this unfolds. It also occurs against a backdrop of significant international turbulence. Thus, while we have every reason to be confident, we should not take this for granted. Although the relationship is built on very solid foundations, it requires nurturing and progression through productive engagement.
The United States is absolutely critical for us in two respects. I would say, in terms of technology, the United States is truly a global power—a superpower. I mean, all these advancements in AI, semiconductors, biotechnology, and space technology. And if there is one criterion for India that is absolutely essential for our growth, it is technology. Thus, a partnership with the United States, indeed a technology alliance, is something that India desperately needs, and we should do everything in our power to promote it. The second area is energy. The United States is not a direct or major supplier of energy for India. However, it is now one of the biggest and most powerful factors driving the global energy markets, as it is itself a significant energy producer and exporter. Moving forward, I think we would like to collaborate with the United States to explore how this entire energy structure evolves—not just in fossil fuels, but also regarding climate change, green technology, and green finance.
The third point I would highlight is defence, particularly as warfare is evolving so much; we can greatly benefit from our partnership with the United States. Lastly, of course, is the strong community-to-community relationship we have built, which stands as one of the significant pillars of our connection between India and the United States. We have observed their contributions in the past, and moving forward, these contributions will only increase. Thus, I remain quite optimistic about the India-US relationship, and I believe President Trump has some quite imaginative ideas, particularly with regard to addressing the Russia-Ukraine conflict. The United States is undoubtedly an overextended superpower. It is in our interest that the United States becomes a more focused global power, which is precisely what President Trump intends to achieve. Many of his administration appointments align with the points I have just mentioned. Therefore, I am genuinely positive and optimistic about the relationship between India and the United States.
Joyeeta Basu:Overall, you remain optimistic about BRICS, which is, of course, on the right path, as you mentioned. It’s good to hear from you that India’s relationships with Russia, China, and the US are on the right track. Thank you, Ambassador, on behalf of the India Foundation.
D.B. Venkatesh Varma:Thank you so much.
Brief Bios:
D.B. Venkatesh Varma: Ambassador D.B.Venkatesh Varma served in the Indian Foreign Service from 1988 to 2021. During his diplomatic career, he worked in the Office of the External Affairs Minister and in the Prime Minister’s Office. He served as India’s Ambassador to Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, to the Kingdom of Spain and to the Russian Federation, until October 2021.He has vast experience in India’s Security and Defence policies and served as Joint Secretary in charge of Disarmament and International Security in the Ministry of External Affairs. He was the first Recipient of the S.K.Singh Award for Excellence in the Indian Foreign Service in 2011 for his contribution to the negotiations of the Civil Nuclear Initiative.
Joyeeta Basu: Joyeeta Basu is the Editor, The Sunday Guardian.
