Introduction
India assumed the Presidency of BRICS on 1st January, 2026. Speaking at the unveiling of the Logo, Theme and Web-site of India’s Presidency on 13th January, 2026, External Affairs Minister Dr S Jaishankar referred to the various Indian festivals celebrated on the occasion of Makar Sankranti and stated that ‘’just as these festivals convey hope and goodwill, India’s BRICS Chairship will seek to bring together the potential of BRICS countries for the greater global welfare.’’
While recognising the noble sentiments expressed by EAM, it needs to be kept in mind that India has assumed this responsibility at a time when BRICS has been receiving adverse attention from President Donald Trump, even before he assumed office as President of the USA in January 2025. The world has become highly fractured and divided over the last several years. This polarisation between the East and the West, as well as between the North and the South, has been further exacerbated over the last year since Trump came to power. Fissures in the Transatlantic Partnership between Europe and the US, as well as within NATO, have significantly enhanced uncertainty and unpredictability in global affairs. Trump’s peremptory and unilateral actions in the areas of trade and security have increased anxiety and disquiet in the global community.
Alongside the unprecedented uncertainty introduced into global relations, both in the areas of security and the economy, by President Trump over the past year, the last few years have seen an expansion in the membership of the BRICS family, leading to increased diversity and incoherence in the functioning of that body. This presents its own problems and challenges in reaching a consensus on several significant political, economic and strategic issues.
The task will hence be cut out for India to manage the internal contradictions within the BRICS Grouping and to foster positive, collaborative relations with the outside world, particularly with the G7 countries and other members of the developed world, as well as with the large cohort of the Global South that are not member states or partner countries of the BRICS.
This challenge will, however, present opportunities to emerge as a viable and effective ‘bridge builder’ between the BRICS and the Global South, as well as with Western developed countries. India faced a similar, indeed a bigger, challenge when it assumed the Presidency of the G20 in 2023. That Presidency came soon after the onset of the conflict between Russia and Ukraine, with the two sides implacably polarised and opposed to each other. India’s nimble diplomacy won the day by securing a consensus New Delhi Leaders’ Declaration on the first day of the Summit on 9th September, 2023. India also secured consensus on admitting the African Union (AU) as the 21st member of the G20. This issue had been hanging fire for many years, but it needed the leadership of PM Modi and India, with its commitment to promoting the interests of the Global South, to bring all countries on the same page to approve AU’s membership. India was able to integrate all major issues of interest and concern to members of the Global South, such as debt relief, climate finance, development financing, global governance reform, fintech and women’s empowerment, into the New Delhi Leaders’ Declaration.
India hit the ground running as the BRICS Presidency in 2026, when PM Modi, addressing the Summit in Rio de Janeiro in July 2025, stated that India would give a “new form” to the BRICS grouping during its presidency. He proposed redefining BRICS as “Building Resilience and Innovation for Cooperation and Sustainability” (using the five letters of the acronym) and emphasised a people-centric approach, drawing parallels with India’s G-20 presidency, which prioritised the Global South. PM Modi affirmed that India would advance BRICS with a focus on “humanity first,” highlighting the need for joint global efforts to address common challenges such as pandemics and climate change.
The Evolution and Expansion of BRICS
In 2001, Goldman Sachs banker Jim O’Neill coined the acronym “BRIC” to refer to Brazil, Russia, India, and China – countries with large populations, large areas, and large economies – that he predicted would soon have a significant impact on the global economy. The Group evolved into a political grouping in 2009 when leaders of the four countries held their first summit in Yekaterinburg, Russia. South Africa joined a year later. The primary objective of the grouping at its inception was to secure greater voice and space for emerging economies in the evolving financial and trading system. BRICS members felt that, although their weight in the global economy had increased substantially over the previous decades, they were not being given their due by the Bretton Woods Institutions, namely the IMF and the World Bank, which were established as part of the post-Second World War global order.
The BRICS grouping expanded, increasing its membership from the original five to eleven, with six new members added at the 15th BRICS Summit in Johannesburg, South Africa, in August 2023. Four of the six new members, viz. UAE, Egypt, Ethiopia and Iran, joined the grouping on 1st January, 2024. Argentina, however, declined the offer after the election of its new President, Javier Milei, in November, 2023, and withdrew from its planned entry into the Organization. Saudi Arabia, the sixth country, has not yet decided to join BRICS, although its representatives continue to participate in some lower-level official and technical meetings. Indonesia was invited as a new member in 2024 and joined the Group on 1st January, 2025.
The eleven countries of BRICS (including Saudi Arabia) have a combined area of 47.7 million sq. km and an estimated total population of 3.9 billion. This accounts for about 32% of the world’s land surface and 48% of the global population. Four of the original five BRICS members, viz. Brazil, Russia, India, and China, are among the world’s ten largest countries by population, area, and GDP (PPP). All five original BRICS states are members of the G20, while only Saudi Arabia and Indonesia, which were subsequently inducted as new members at the beginning of 2024 and 2025 respectively, make the cut among the world’s top 20 economies.
The total GDP of the 11 BRICS nations in nominal dollar terms as of 2026 is over US$ 32 trillion, accounting for 28-30% of the global GDP. By comparison, the G7 accounts for US$ 54.52 trillion, accounting for 43% of the global GDP in nominal terms. The picture reverses when figures are calculated in Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) terms. The figure for BRICS11 comes to US$ 78 trillion, exceeding 40% of the global GDP. The corresponding figure for G7 is US$ 60.95 trillion, accounting for 27.8% of the global GDP. The combined economic output of the five original BRICS members, measured in purchasing power parity, first exceeded that of the US-led G7 in 2022. This gap has been growing since then. The BRICS+ nations are expected to grow at an average rate of 3.7% in 2026, while the G7 average is forecast to be a more modest 1.2%. The economic strength of the BRICS can be assessed by their weight in the IMF, where their quota increased from 8.4% in 2001 to 25.8% in 2022, while in the same period the G-7 quota decreased from 64.6% to 42.9%.
The new BRICS members bring more than raw GDP to the bloc. With the addition of Saudi Arabia, Indonesia, the UAE and Iran, the BRICS increased its share of global oil production to more than 40%. As some BRICS members appear interested in establishing an alternative trade and financial system, adding nations with greater natural resources becomes essential.
It is a measure of the importance the member countries attach to this Organisation that BRICS Summits have been held every year without a break since they commenced in 2009. No leader has ever missed a Summit. This is in sharp contrast to the Summits of some other groupings, such as the IBSA, the intergovernmental grouping of three democratic developing countries, viz. India, Brazil and South Africa, all of which are members of BRICS. They have held only six summits since they first started meeting in 2006, i.e. over a period of 20 years. Their last Summit was held in South Africa in 2025!
Russia, which took over the BRICS Presidency from South Africa in 2024, announced in the run-up to the Kazan Summit in October 2024 that more than 30 countries had expressed interest in joining the organisation. The rush to join BRICS was seen as less an outright rejection of Western norms and partners and more a move to hedge and create fresh options beyond those available during the era of undisputed Western global dominance. This was not to suggest that the world was turning its back on the West, and in particular the US. But there was scepticism about the West’s commitment to values such as democratic norms and international law, particularly in conflicts like that between Israel and Hamas, which had caused untold human suffering in Gaza, a sore point for many in the Global South. There was also nervousness about the unilateral use of sanctions and the weaponisation of global financial instruments by the West.
As agreed in Johannesburg, the Kazan Summit decided not to admit any new members but to create a new category of ‘’partner countries.’’ The BRICS decided to focus on integrating the five new members who joined in January 2024. The new category of “partner nations” is designed to act as a stepping stone for possible future membership and includes Algeria, Belarus, Bolivia, Cuba, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Malaysia, Nigeria, Thailand, Turkey, Uganda, Uzbekistan, and Vietnam. The enlargement strategy has allowed a more gradual expansion process, enabling the bloc to assess how new members align with its goals before further growth. The partner countries are allowed to participate in discussions at all levels but may not vote when such an eventuality arises.
Despite the many tensions among them, BRICS members share several common strands of thought that observers often overlook. Most importantly, all BRICS members see the emergence of multipolarity as both inevitable and desirable—and identify the bloc as a means to play a more active role in shaping the post-Western global order. The attitudes and policies pursued by the US and other Western countries in the Russia-Ukraine conflict, as well as in the Israel-Hamas war, have added to the concerns of a large group of countries, particularly the middle powers and those belonging to the global South. They view BRICS as an alternative to global bodies seen as dominated by traditional Western powers, and hope that BRICS membership will unlock benefits, including development finance and increased trade and investment. Dissatisfaction with the global order among developing nations was exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic, when life-saving vaccines were hoarded by rich countries. Those memories continue to haunt several developing countries.
The growing East-West confrontation in recent years, particularly between the US and China over trade and technology, and between the West and Russia over Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, has energised China and Russia to expand the BRICS grouping and move it towards a pronouncedly anti-Western position. This is not to India’s liking. This position is not supported by many new member countries, such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the UAE, which enjoy vibrant ties with the US, although Russia, China and Iran try to steer the grouping towards an unmistakably anti-Western stance.
India as a Bridge-Builder
India’s Presidency of BRICS in 2026 comes at a pivotal moment in its foreign policy trajectory. 2025 has been a difficult year for India, primarily due to strained relations with the USA, marked by the imposition of 50% tariffs on its exports to the US market, the USA’s cosy relationship with Pakistan, pressure on India to weaken its energy and military ties with Russia, the sidelining of the Quad, and pressure on H1B visa holders, among other factors. India has, however, not allowed any of this to slow its pace in instituting domestic reforms and progressing rapidly to diversify its economic partnerships. This resulted in the successful conclusion of several Free Trade Deals with diverse countries and entities in 2025, including the UK, New Zealand, EFTA (European Free Trade Association), Oman, and others.
The pinnacle of the process of economic diversification was reached in early 2026 with the conclusion of the Free Trade Agreement with the European Union, following 18 years of negotiations, on 27th January, 2026. This was soon followed by an Interim Trade Agreement with the USA, announced by President Trump after a conversation with PM Modi on 3rd February, 2026. These developments have come as a shot in the arm for India as it navigates the increasing churn and flux in global political, security, strategic and economic affairs.
The international environment in which India must now steer and promote its interests and those of the Global South is, however, becoming more demanding. The return of a Trump administration in early 2025, sceptical of multilateral institutions and non-aligned middle powers, and increasingly transactional in its engagement with the world, has narrowed diplomatic space for countries seeking to pursue independent policy pathways. Against this backdrop, India’s BRICS presidency is both an opportunity and a test: whether it can convert recent diplomatic momentum into sustained influence within a global governance system that is clearly in flux.
India’s chairmanship has followed Brazil’s presidency, which prioritised Global South cooperation to advance more inclusive and sustainable governance. India’s resistance to more radical proposals, such as a BRICS common currency or de-dollarisation, has helped preserve the grouping’s credibility while keeping it accessible to middle powers wary of being drawn into geopolitical blocs. India occupies a distinctive place within BRICS: a Global South leader that remains embedded in the existing international system, committed to reform while avoiding disruptive measures. This offers a stabilising hand at a time when BRICS risks being overstretched by internal diversity and external pressure.
India has declared that its presidency will be guided by continuity, consolidation and consensus—an approach that reflects India’s long-standing preference for pragmatic multilateralism over ideological confrontation. PM Modi has articulated a vision for BRICS centred on four main pillars: Resilience (supply chains, health), Innovation (digital public infrastructure, AI, fintech), Cooperation (reformed multilateralism, deepening partnership), and Sustainability (green finance, energy transition), while emphasising people-centred development and a ‘humanity-first’ approach to global governance.
India’s foreign policy has in recent years been anchored in multi-alignment and strategic autonomy. Washington’s dramatic reassessment of engagement with multilateral institutions and its more adversarial posture towards BRICS illustrate growing constraints on policy independence. President Donald Trump has repeatedly characterised BRICS as an “anti-American bloc” and threatened punitive economic measures against its members, signalling a more confrontational approach that seeks to deter collective action outside US-led frameworks.
In this environment, India’s leadership of BRICS assumes particular significance. Under India’s chairmanship, BRICS is more likely to serve as a platform for negotiated autonomy than as a vehicle for opposition to the West. At the same time, BRICS is not without constraints. The bloc’s recent expansion has introduced a more diverse set of political priorities and economic structures, complicating consensus-building and raising questions about institutional coherence. These internal pressures coincide with a US foreign policy that places greater emphasis on bilateral leverage over multilateral engagement, heightening risks for members of the Global South. However, these dynamics have also reinforced the rationale for collective engagement. A more transactional external environment strengthens incentives for BRICS members to preserve a forum that enables coordination, hedging, and political cover. India’s stewardship offers continuity at a moment when both expansion-related complexity and a more challenging external environment threaten to test the bloc’s cohesion.
India’s BRICS presidency offers a platform to consolidate and extend the agenda that emerging economies have recently promoted during their G20 Chairmanship. BRICS, in contrast to the G20, is explicitly oriented towards the concerns of emerging markets and developing economies. India can leverage the BRICS platform to sustain momentum on issues such as reform of multilateral development banks, innovative financing mechanisms, and enhanced representation of developing countries in global economic governance.
During its BRICS Presidency, India would do well to focus on reform of the global financial architecture. India’s support for International Monetary Fund (IMF) quota reform, expansion of the New Development Bank, and initiatives such as the proposed BRICS Multilateral Guarantee Initiative align closely with the interests of the Global South in fairer access to development finance.
In addition, artificial intelligence, digital public infrastructure, and skills development offer a promising avenue for cooperation. India’s experience with digital public infrastructure offers a practical model for inclusive development. Climate finance and preparedness must remain a priority. Building on Brazil’s COP30 agenda, India can argue for advancing just transition financing, technology transfer, and climate resilience frameworks that reflect Global South realities. India’s presidency aims to position BRICS as a crucial, constructive, and forward-looking bloc in a rapidly changing, polarised world.
India’s Initiatives
Some of India’s key initiatives during its Presidency include:
- Cross-Border Payments: India is pushing for the interoperability of Central Bank Digital Currencies (CBDCs) and real-time payment systems (such as UPI) among members to bypass the high costs of Western intermediarie
- Local Currency Energy Trade: India is increasingly settling oil and gas imports from Russia and the UAE in Rupees and Dirhams, significantly reducing its dependence on the US Dollar.
- The Digital “DPI 2.0” Push: Following the success of the G20, India is making Digital Public Infrastructure (DPI) the centrepiece of its 2026 presidency.
- India Stack Global: A formal proposal to share the “India Stack” (Aadhaar, UPI, DigiLocker) as a free public good to help other BRICS members jumpstart their digital economies.
- Economic and Financial Pragmatism: India’s approach to global finance remains cautious, prioritising stability over radical shifts.
- De-dollarisation Stance: India has clarified that it does not “actively target” the US dollar and has no policy to replace it as the global reserve currency.
- “De-risking” vs “De-dollarising”: Instead of a BRICS currency, India promotes the internationalisation of the rupee through local-currency trade settlements and Vostro accounts to “de-risk” its own trade from exchange-rate volatility.
- Alternative Finance: India continues to use the New Development Bank (NDB) to finance key domestic infrastructure and sustainable development projects.
- AI Governance: Championing “Responsible AI,” India advocates ethical frameworks that consider Global South development needs.
Conclusion
As of 2026, India finds itself at a unique geopolitical crossroads. New Delhi has positioned itself as the “Bridge Builder”—the primary link between the established Western order (the Global North) and the rising powers and developing countries of the Global South. India is possibly the only country in the world that straddles major political, security and economic divides, between the North and the South (Developed and Developing) and between the East and the West, with the US and Europe on one side and Russia and China on the other. India is the only Southern country that is a member of the QUAD, whose other members, the USA, Japan and Australia, are from the North. It has also been a regular invitee to the G7 Summits for the last several years. On the other hand, it is also an active member of both the SCO and BRICS, which include emerging economies such as Russia and China, along with members of the Global South.
India’s clout and influence in the world have grown significantly over the last decade, driven by political stability, robust democracy, free and fair elections, and a growing economy. Today, India is the world’s fourth-largest economy, standing at the threshold of becoming the third-largest over the next two years. It is the world’s fastest-growing major economy, with expected GDP growth of around 7-8% in the coming years. Its foreign policy of Strategic Autonomy and Multialignment has significantly enhanced its prestige and standing. Initiatives such as the ‘’Vaccine Maitri’’ during the COVID-19 pandemic, under which it shared more than 300 million vaccine doses with developing countries, most of them on a gratis basis, and supplied medicines to more than 150 countries, have significantly enhanced its respect and prestige, particularly amongst developing countries. In the words of European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen: “When India succeeds, the world is more stable, prosperous, and secure—and we all benefit”. She emphasised that a strong, democratic India is a vital global partner, with its growth and rising influence contributing to a more secure and balanced world order.
The foreign policy ethos of ‘’Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam’’ (The World is One Family), which formed the basis of India’s Motto of ‘’One Earth, One Family, One Future’’ during its G20 Presidency in 2023, has helped India emerge as a ‘’Vishwamitra’’ (Friend to the World). Through its policies, initiatives and actions, India has earned the trust and confidence of the world. The bold, decisive and visionary leadership of Prime Minister Modi has played a seminal role in raising India’s prestige and stature in the world.
Since India’s G20 Presidency in 2023, developed countries have also recognised the imperative of engaging with the Global South on an equal footing. For this reason, Japan, which held the G7 Presidency in 2023, worked assiduously to coordinate its actions and policies with India in its capacity as Chair of the G20. Earlier this year, French President Emmanuel Macron, who holds the G7 Chair for 2026, made a deliberate, high-profile public offer to PM Modi, framing India as the essential bridge between the G7 and BRICS. This creates a unique window for collaboration. Macron suggested that both BRICS and the G7 should work to prevent ‘’Global Fragmentation’’. He said that the G7 should not be an anti-China or anti-BRICS Club, and that BRICS should not be anti-G7. He invited PM Modi to use India’s leadership of BRICS to foster formal coordination between the two Blocs to prevent the world from sliding into a new Cold War. This collaboration would be a strategic hedge against Trump’s recent pressures on both the EU and the BRICS. It would be designed to preserve sovereignty and maintain independence in an increasingly divisive world.
India’s success as the 2026 Chair will depend on its ability to keep the group focused on functional cooperation (health, climate finance, technology, multilateral reform and trade) rather than on ideological warfare. By acting as the “sensible middle,” India ensures it remains indispensable to both the West and the Global South. Its sterling performance and achievements during its G20 Presidency would give it the requisite confidence and determination to succeed in this challenging but rewarding role.
Author Brief Bio: Amb. Ashok Sajjanhar has worked for the Indian Foreign Service for over three decades. He was the ambassador of India to Kazakhstan, Sweden and Latvia and has worked in diplomatic positions in Washington DC, Brussels, Moscow, Geneva, Tehran, Dhaka and Bangkok. Amb. Sajjanhar writes and speaks on issues relating to international relations and Indian foreign policy.
