Maritime security, the blue economy, and maritime law have recently attracted significant attention due to the weakening of the once-upheld international system and the intensification of geopolitical rivalries among great and major powers. The growing divisions and rising multipolarity have indicated the decline of Western powers, most notably as the global power shift has veered towards Asia. For instance, the rise of China, the advent of India’s rise, and the simultaneous prosperity of the Global South, which represents up to 85 per cent of the global population, coupled with advances in science and technology, namely Artificial Intelligence (AI) and digitalisation, and unprecedented changes in global climate patterns observed across the continents. These developments have perpetuated a structural shift in human interactions and state-to-state interdependence. Moreover, the digital economy, cybersecurity, and the global arms race, augmented by science and technology, are shaping international relations and national security, and thus, the domains of maritime security and ocean governance must evolve and adapt to these changing environments.
The Indian Ocean should not be treated as a separate case, diagnosed merely as a vast international body of marine ecosystems with immense economic potential or as a sustainable public good for all, without serious consideration of its consequences. In fact, it offers far-reaching benefits to humanity, serving as a pulse that helps secure life energy by both injecting and retrieving abundant resources from the ocean. Simply put, life on Earth has been enriched by the Indian Ocean’s sustainability, richness, and ecological health, compared with the rest of the oceans and the world’s inland resources.
Democratisation of the Indian Ocean may enhance seamless convergence and integration. However, it does not guarantee that this will work in favour of shared economic prosperity. It thus requires bold courage from political leaders in the Indo-Pacific region to address economic inequality and settle differences in institutional and legal structures to bridge development gaps among countries in the Indian Ocean. India can deepen its strategic posture in free trade and freedom of navigation, supported by the international rule of law. The 1982 UNCLOS provides the most important legal foundation for member states to address differences over maritime boundaries, but it is by no means the single most important international instrument for addressing all issues in the oceanic or maritime spheres. This is owing to the multiple layers of complexity in disputes over claim areas and the geopolitical complications of security matters, sovereign rights over marine resources, freedom of navigation, and ownership status.
For India-ASEAN relations, the two parties are natural partners, linked by the vast Indian and Pacific Oceans. In this regard, the trinity of East Asia, namely China, Japan and Korea (CJK), is also a natural partners to ASEAN, and they have close and deep economic, security, and socio-cultural relations with the 11-member Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). The challenges for India, CJK and others, such as Australia and New Zealand, in the Asia-Pacific region are to strike the geopolitical, geo-economic and geo-security balances with each ASEAN member state and with ASEAN as a regional bloc, while weathering external pressure from the West, with the US and the European Union as dynamic “dialogue partners”.
As ASEAN remains weak, or is weakened by its vast geography and marked diversity in political culture and legal structures, the India-ASEAN dichotomy highlights fundamental challenges ahead. Take Cambodia as an example. Cambodia is the member state that has ratified the convention. After more than four decades since acceding to the UNCLOS in 1983, Cambodia ratified the convention to join the international community of 172 parties in upholding the international rule of law, with the United Nations Charter at its core and the ASEAN Charter that underpins ASEAN Centrality and its community vision 2045. Some ASEAN member states are partnering with India in BIMSTEC, which aims to position itself as an important forum for enhancing regional connectivity, promoting economic integration, and maintaining geopolitical balance. Currently, BIMSTEC includes two ASEAN member states, namely Myanmar and Thailand.[i] This arrangement appears to disregard other ASEAN maritime member states in its aforementioned overarching goals.
In this context, it serves the best interests of maritime nations to ensure coherence to streamline and harmonise strategic interests in the maritime domain, without creating unnecessary confrontation, while preserving the national interests of the respective member states in the Indo-Pacific Ocean. Therefore, consolidating the Free and Open Indo-Pacific Initiative (FOIP), the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP), the Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative (IPOI) of India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi, China’s 21st-century maritime silk road supported by China’s recently launched four global initiatives, and the UN-led pact of the future 2024.
Co-stewardship of the Indian Ocean matters for several reasons. In what follows, this article will present the rationale for collective governance of the Indian Ocean in the 21st century and beyond.
First, the diversity of maritime states in the Indian Ocean calls for our close examination of their capacities, interests, and leadership in navigating common challenges on the one hand and harnessing collective strengths on the other. The Carnegie Endowment Organisation listed the Indian Ocean as bordered by over 25 littoral and island nations across Africa, Asia, and Australia, and noted that it serves as a critical global trade route. Major countries include India, Indonesia, Pakistan, Australia, South Africa, Kenya, and Oman. Key island nations include Madagascar, the Maldives, Mauritius, Seychelles, Comoros, and Sri Lanka.[ii] By all means, the international governance of maritime security cannot rest solely with the great powers. Moreover, they are not designed for sole leadership at the expense of the rest of the oceanic and maritime states.
Second, technological divides persist among countries in the Indian Ocean. In the technology sector, India has seen exponential growth and innovation, which can be leveraged to support security initiatives in the region. As the Indian economy is picking up, projected to become the world’s third-largest economy by 2028-2030, overtaking Germany, it holds the key to injecting new impetus for economic development, peace and international cooperation. Within the next decade, India will reach a high level of confidence that its economy will be opened up and that domestic consumption will expand. This economic maturing will be offset by the cost of security protection, particularly in the maritime domains. India’s regional leadership in development contributions and security guarantees will serve as a springboard to promote Indian soft power and cushion the external shocks India will need to address.
Third, the trilateral partnership between ASEAN, India and Japan (AIJ) in maritime security governance of the Indo-Pacific region, in its pragmatic relations with other regional actors in the wider Asia-Pacific community of countries, including South Asia, East Asia, the Middle East and Europe, will necessitate a security anchor for regional production and supply chains for critical minerals and resources, energy security, and economic security. Through the shared principles and pragmatic engagement of the trilateral partnership, it entails both the responsibility and the capacity to sustain and revitalise the rules-based order in the evolving Indo-Pacific.[iii]
In conclusion, securitising maritime governance is risky. Conversely, synergising the major, middle and small powers in the Global South, particularly maritime states, on the basis of the international rule of law, leadership, and the international responsibility to contribute to regional peace, security and development is key to achieving pragmatic outcomes. Collective governance of maritime security and the marine economy, and the internationalisation of best practices, should be enhanced. In a nutshell, overcoming geopolitical distrust and hegemonic motives among maritime member states, and creating a model of productive partnership among key players, i.e., by means of inclusiveness and coherence on the basis of the international rule of law, is an essential step to exemplify and reinvigorate the global multilateralism that results from trust, respect, justice, equality and mutual interest.
Author Brief Bio: Dr. Chheng Kimlong holds a PhD in Economics from the Australian National University, a Master in Economics from Kobe University, and a Master in Business Administration from Preston University. Dr. Chheng is Director of Centre for Governance Innovation and Democracy (CGID) of the Asian Vision Institute (AVI) and is Senior Researcher at the Centre for Policy Studies (CPS), Cambodia.
References:
[i] Vajiram Content Team. “BIMSTEC Countries 2026, Area of Cooperation, Significance, Challenges”. https://vajiramandravi.com/current-affairs/bimstec-countries/
[ii] Darshana M. Baruah, Nitya Labh, and Jessica Greely. “Mapping the Indian Ocean Region”. (Working Paper, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, June 2023).
https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2023/06/mapping-the-indian-ocean-region
[iii] Shristi Pukhrem. “Reassessing rules-based order: India, Japan, and ASEAN in changing Indo-Pacific”. Wion Web Desk (March 2026)
https://www.wionews.com/opinions/reassessing-rules-based-order-india-japan-and-asean-in-changing-indo-pacific-1774278362080
