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Anti-CAA demonstrations took a violent turn in some Muslim dominated districts of the country. Rowdy crowds have inflicted huge damages on public property. This raises an important question. Have the people of this country taken to the spirit of democracy during the seventy-three years of popular governance? In the course of its long stint in power since independence, the Congress has been claiming with great élan that it is making an enviable experiment of moderating Indian Muslims by using a proven tool called secular democratic dispensation as is enshrined in the Constitution. The objective has been to help the Muslim community integrate into the national mainstream. In other words, Congress meant to assert that Islam and democracy/secular democracy, seemingly a contradiction in terms, are reconcilable. The intentions were unassailable, and as a matter of simple logic, if any segment of Indian Muslims doubts or contradicts the paradigm, the logic will not be on their side.

Nevertheless, the sudden outburst, first at three or four universities in the country, with the Muslim tag appended to them notionally or virtually, and then the escalation of violence and vandalism in almost all important Muslim dominated pockets in various states of the country, ruthlessly demolished the edifice of de-radicalising of Indian Muslim community which the Congress claims it assiduously built over decades by adopting pro-Muslim pacifist and even solicitous policies at different levels. Many a time, the national mainstream expressed unease at this overdone conciliatory stance. Nevertheless, standing by its characteristic quality of tolerance, the masses of Indian people did not make an issue out of the ongoing large scale vandalising that could have the potential of disrupting and endangering civilian life and property.

The misfortune of the Congress is that after its grand old titans phased away, and the second and third rung leadership donned the mantle, it gradually dawned upon them that they were far behind their pioneers in popularity and public response. The generation gap was wide enough and would not let them cash on the big names for all times. Therefore, a new mechanism of retaining political ascendency had to be created. Simultaneously, they were confronted with the emergence of a new socio-political phenomenon called the culture of identity in the Indian civil society. It posed a serious challenge to the popularity and status of the traditional Congress party.  After all, the impact of the steady growth of the Indian economy could not be underestimated. The rise of the culture of identity was a glaring manifestation of that impact. The task of the Congress to maintain its supremacy was becoming more and more arduous.

Unfortunately, the Congress, looking out for political crutches, committed the grave blunder of shifting its ideological goalpost from passionate and universal nationalism to the narrow confines of the national minority of Indian Muslims. In doing so, it first deliberately built the “oppressed, discriminated and deprived” profile of the Indian Muslim community, and then, on that premise, began to legitimise its policy of appeasement and pusillanimity towards the Muslim community. This was the beginning of an ugly and disastrous phase of Indian democracy, namely the vote bank politics. In carrying forward this policy, Congress, out of sheer lust for power, created an icon (Indian nationalism) to whose doorsteps it would bring all imaginable blames.

They branded the Indian nationalists variously like “tyrannical majority,” “Hindu terrorism” and even “Nazi dictatorship”. With that, the Congress party claimed that only they could provide security and prosperity to the Muslims of India while the rest of them, particularly the nationalists, were their detractors. Had Congress confined itself to the economic and social uplift of the Muslims of India and not created a political concoction, it would have immensely contributed to the integration of the Muslims into the national mainstream. The street rages and vandalism that we see today in Muslim dominated sectors in the entire country is what the Congress and its close associate the Left, nurtured for so many decades. They sadistically sowed the wind and the Indian nation must now reap the whirlwind.

If the Muslims of India have remained outside the national mainstream, the cause is firstly the wrong approach of Congress and secondly the absence of right-thinking leadership among the Indian Muslims. By succumbing to the egotistic socio-political philosophy of the Congress, the Muslims of India not only sidelined themselves from the national mainstream but also unwittingly created a wedge between them and the national majority. The widespread protestation by a section of the Indian Muslims that has emerged in the aftermath of CAA is part of the political game of Congress and its dissenting allies to create disorder in the country. It will be noted that Congress has resorted to these tactics after it exhausted all other options of derailing the elected government at the Centre.

It is for the first time since independence that some Indian Muslims have come out openly and violently against the elected government in the country and against the sovereignty of the Indian Parliament. Interestingly, the anti-India and anti-Indian majority campaign is being waged while brandishing the Indian tricolour, unlike the Kashmiris who generally brandish either the black or the Pakistani/ISIS flags in their anti-India demonstrations. Waging violent demonstrations under the shadow of Indian tricolour is certainly a method in the madness called takkiya in Islamic terminology.

By these exclusivist protest rallies, this section of Indian Muslims have indicated that they reject the Indian secular democratic dispensation as did the founders of Pakistan seven decades ago. The question is: If this section of Indian Muslims do not want a democratic dispensation, what do they want then? Do they want to force the Indian nation to ask for a declaration of India as a Hindu state like Pakistan? We have a word of admiration for the Modi government which did not lose its cool during the ongoing scenes of vandalism, arson, loot and violence in the country. This is how the government of the world’s largest democracy should behave. The Hindu community leaders equally deserve appreciation for not allowing the masses of people to go mad after a handful of miscreants. How regrettable that the chief of the Congress has publicly announced her party’s support to the students but has not said a word of warning or advising them to desist from vandalism, and respect the law of the land. She clings to the vote bank, and surprisingly she learnt nothing from her son having to run away from his traditional constituency in UP to a predominantly Muslim dominated constituency in Kerala. It appears that Ms Gandhi needs to support the elements in or out of the country that aspires and work for disintegration of India.

The widespread protestation by the Indian Muslims is not just a local affair. We are aware of various inimical forces on the international plane working towards the breaking of the Indian Union. After having played and exhausted its role in the Middle East, the rabid Islamic jihadists and suicide squads have shifted the scene of the contemporary war of civilisations from the Middle East to India. The concentration of all terrorist jihadists and suicide bombers of Pakistan along the Indo-Pak border, Pakistan’s repeated threats of using weapons of mass destruction, China’s dangerous posture in the Indo-Pacific oceanic region, outright anti-India stance of Turkey, Egypt and Malaysia, and the vast scale propaganda and disinformation unleashed by sections of biased national and international media, all point toward a global conspiracy purporting to destabilise the elected government in New Delhi and disintegrate the Union of India just because Indian Prime Minister is fighting Islamic terror at many world forums. Many countries are enviously looking at India’s growing economic and scientific power as a challenge to their status in the international arena. Many anti-national elements within the country or the Urban Naxals are accomplices in these perfidious acts. It is a shame for the opposition, one and all, that at a time when our enemies on the west and the east have forged an unholy alliance and are poised to strike at India in various ways, the opposition is contributing to its own disaster.

It must be noted that the protestation methodology adopted by anti-CAA crowds country-wide, is precisely the replication of the methodology adopted by the Kashmiri militants, dissidents and secessionists viz. stone-throwing and attacks on the police, torching public property and public and private vehicles, using black masks to avoid identification, contriving media, males disguising as females, raising slogans of ‘Azadi’ and responding to police authorities by saying that their respective localities are peace-loving but miscreants come from other localities etc. The only difference is that while the Kashmiris raised Pakistani or ISIS flags, the Indian Muslim crowds raised the tricolor only to be humiliated rather than respected.

This perfidy has to be uprooted. History has shown that the Indian nation has the inherent strength to survive through cataclysms and catastrophes. Today, the nation is in the hands of an honest, able and bold leadership, led by a man of the masses. Indian Sanskriti, disowned and then despised and reviled by the invaders is reborn and will thrive in full glory. This Sanskriti is the common heritage of all those who call themselves Indians. That is why, it behoves the Muslims of the country not be misled by a few disgruntled elements amongst them who preach vitriolic hate and strive to weaken the nation through a divisive ideology and through vandalism. These elements are doing great harm to the Muslim community, which needs to stand up and reject their hate-filled ideology. It is time for all Indians to rise as one and build the foundations of a strong country.

*The writer is the former Director of the Centre of Central Asian Studies, Kashmir University

The present time is colloquially being called the Asian Century for all the right reasons. If the 19^th century was Britain’s Imperial century and the 20^th was American, then the 21^st century is becoming the Asian century. By 2020, the economic growth (in purchasing power parity terms) of Asian giants put together will surpass the rest of the world and that is likely to be the future trend as well.

The Indian Ocean Region (IOR) has played and continues to play a vital role in creating this Asian prosperity through the “road of development in the twenty-first century.” Today, the Indian Ocean has become a major conduit of international trade as it was until a few centuries back. While occupying almost 20 per cent of the earth’s surface, the IOR is inhabited by 35 per cent of the world’s population staying in 38 littoral states. Over 100,000 ships transit through the Indian Ocean every year, accounting for 66 per cent of the world’s oil cargo, 50 per cent of container cargo and 33 per cent of bulk cargo.^[1] India’s 90 per cent trade by volume and 70 per cent trade by value is dependent on the Indian Ocean. The major fuel for growth for most of the Asian countries is oil. For the Asian countries, the supply of oil comes from West Asia—the Gulf region—while the major consumers, India, ASEAN, China, South Korea and Japan lie to the East. This oil, which fuels the growth of Asia is transported eastward from the Gulf via the Indian Ocean. The security of the production centres, as well as its transportation across the sea lanes, is thus vital for Asia and any disruption could put a huge question mark on the emergence of the 21st century as the Asian century. Oil thus is the most important governing factor of geopolitics these days andowing to its criticality the word “ge-oil-itics” needs to be introduced into common strategic parlance.

Asian economies have grown to be heavily dependent on oil imports to satisfy their growing demand. Crucially, Asian economies purchase most of this oil from the Gulf. As a share of oil imports, the Gulf region accounted for 44% of oil imports for China, 63.6% for India, 86% for Japan and 77.1% for South Koreaaccording to 2017 data compiled by the Observatory of Economic Complexity. Off late, some incidents impacting on oil security have exposed the vulnerability of Asian powers to events occurring in the Gulf. The mine attack, which blew of the hull of a Japanese oil tanker at a UAE port and 30 Indian sailors being detained by Iran who were on board a British tanker which was carrying the flag of Panama are cases in point.^[2] But of even greater concern is the attack which took place on Saudi oil facilities on 14 September 2019. This attack has not received the attention it deserves, but if oil facilities continue to be targeted in the Gulf, the Asian century is unlikely to materialise any time soon.

The attack on Saudi oil facilities took place on 14 September through stealthy air attacks using drones and cruise missiles. The attack was claimed by the Houthi rebels in Yemen, but evidently, there are other powers behind the attack, using the Houthis as a front. This is a situation that should rightly be causing anxiety to both economists and strategic thinkers, but for some reasons, the danger signals are not being correctly read. If the conflict in Yemen escalates and spirals out of control, it would cripple the capability of Gulf oil suppliers and adversely impact the world economies, with the impact on the Asian economies being severely devastating. It is a matter of concern that as seen in the attack on the Saudi Aramco facilities, small budget precision aerial weapons could defeat heavily guarded installations of national importance. If it could happen in one of the heaviest guarded facilities in the world, then India needs to also pay attention to the security of its refineries (like Reliance refineries at our West coast). Attack on oil facilities will push up the price of oil which in turn will adversely impact India’s economy and will have the potential to dent India’s GDP growth rate. For example, according to Nomura, a Japanese financial holding company,an increase in oil prices by USD 10 per barrel will lead to a drop in India’s GDP by 0.2 per cent points.^[3]

This attack by drones and cruise missiles has brought out the lethality and accuracy of Airpower while defeating another pillar of Airpower which is air-defence (detection, identification, timely interception and destruction). This is a lesson which Indian policymakers, strategists and tacticians must learn fast and evaluate India’s Airpower preparedness for this kind of attack from land or maritime borders.

Did it Happen Suddenly?

It took the world by shock when news of an attack on Saudi Oil installations in Abqaiq and Khurais hit the media channels. The undetected attacks carried out by unmanned aerial vehicles with high precision left people wonderstruck, especially as the attack was claimed by Houthi rebels. The sheer unexpectedness of such an attack being successfully mounted on a very heavily guarded facility by a small rebel force, albeit one that had external support, made some observers term the incident as a ‘Black Swan’ event. The attack disabled the largest crude processing facility of Saudi Arabia and disrupted Saudi oil supply capability by almost 50 per cent. The estimate was that the oil operations were down by 5.7 million barrels a day, which was approximately 5% of the daily global oil supply. James Rogers, a security expert with expertise in drones and a visiting research fellow at the Department of International Security Studies at Yale University, observed “It is quite an impressive, yet worrying, technological feat, long-range precision strikes are not easy to achieve and to cause the substantial fires in Abqaiq and Khurais highlights that this drone has a large explosive yield.”^[4] It was a small budget attack by non-state actors (maybe state-sponsored) having strategic repercussions.WimZwijnenburg, a senior researcher on drones at a Dutch peace organisationanalysed it further saying, “The drones gave the Houthis an edge because they were cheap to produce, hard to detect and shoot down, and able to cause damage and disruption hugely disproportionate to their cost. While the Houthis’ exact capabilities are not known, they have developed over time.”^[5]

Was this attack possible without thorough planning and practice? A timeline of recent attacks on Saudi targets claimed by Houthisshould prove the old proverb correct – ‘with practice comes perfection’. This timeline has been obtained from the article titled ‘Timeline: Houthis’ drone and missile attacks on Saudi targets’ published post the attacks on 14^th September on the Aljazeera news platform.

• 5 January 2018: Saudi state-owned media saidthe kingdom’s defence forces intercepted a Houthi missile over the Najran province, on the southern border with Yemen, before it could hit its intended target. The rebel group claims responsibility for the attack, saying on Twitter it had a “successful launch of a short-range ballistic missile at a military target in Saudi Arabia”.
• 31 March 2018: Saudi Arabia said it intercepted a missile fired by the Houthis targeting the southern city of Najran.
• 24 June 2018: Saudi Arabia said its air defence forces intercepted and destroyed two Houthi ballistic missiles over Riyadh. At least six loud explosions were heard and bright flashes were seen in the sky over Riyadh. The Houthi-run Al Masirah TV said Burkan missiles were fired at the Saudi Ministry of Defence and other targets.
• 25 July 2018: Houthi rebels attacked a Saudi oil tanker in the Red Sea, causing slight damage, according to the Saudi-UAE-led coalition. The tanker was attacked in the west of Yemen’s Hodeidah port but the Houthis’ Al Masirah TV reported that the group targeted the Dammam warship off the western coast of Yemen.
• 9 August 2018: Saudi Arabia intercepted two missiles fired by the Houthis at its southern Jizan province, the official Saudi Press Agency quoted a military spokesman. Al Masirah TV said the Houthis fired several ballistic missiles at Saudi Arabia, targeting the border provinces of Jizan and Aseer.
• 3 April 2019: Coalition said it intercepted two drones launched by the Houthis towards the city of KhamisMushait.
• 14 May 2019: Saudi Arabia said armed drones struck two of its oil-pumping stations west of Riyadh. The Aramco East-West pipeline, stretching across the country to the port and oil terminal at Yanbu, was damaged in two places.
• 20 May 2019: The Saudi military said it shot down two ballistic missiles reportedly heading towards the cities of Jeddah and Mecca. The Houthis denied their missiles were targeting Mecca, a pilgrimage site some 70 kilometres from Jeddah and 50km from Taif. The group called to claim a tactic by Riyadh to rally support for its war.
• 12 June 2019: Houthi rebels fired a missile at Abha airport in southern Saudi Arabia, wounding 26 civilians in the building’s arrivals hall, according to the Saudi-UAE-led coalition. The coalition said a projectile hit the arrivals hall at Abha airport, causing material damage. Three women and two children were among the wounded.
• 17 June 2019: Houthi rebels launched a drone attack targeting Abhaairport, the group’s Al Masirah TV said. There was no immediate Saudi confirmation of the attack.
• 20 June 2019: The rebels hit a power station in Jizan province with a “cruise missile,” Al Masirah TV said. The coalition confirmed Houthi forces fired a “projectile” at a desalination plant in the al-Shuqaiq city but said no one was wounded and there was no damage caused to the facility.
• 2 July 2019: Another Houthi attack on Abha airport wounded nine civilians, the coalition said. The Houthis said they “launched a wide operation aimed at warplanes at Abha international airport” with drones, according to Al Masirah TV.
• 1 August 2019: Houthi rebels said they fired a long-range missile at the port city of Dammam in Saudi Arabia, hundreds of kilometres away from Yemen.
• 5 August 2019: Houthi forces launched drone attacks on Saudi Arabia’s King Khalid Airbase and Abha and Najran airports, according to a spokesman for the group. The spokesman said the attack on Abha airport “hit its targets” and air traffic was disrupted at both Abha and Najran. However, the coalition says the drones were intercepted and downed.
• 17 August 2019: A drone attackclaimed by the Houthis sparked a fire in a remote oil and gas field in eastern Saudi Arabia. A Houthi military spokesman said the group targeted the Shaybah oilfield with 10 drones, calling it the “biggest attack in the depths” of the kingdom. Saudi Aramco says the attack caused no casualties or disruption to production.
• 25 August 2019: The Houthis said theyfired 10 Badr-1 ballistic missiles at Jizan airport, killing and wounding dozens. The coalition said it intercepted and destroyed at least six ballistic missiles fired by the group targeting civilians in Jizan, in the southwest of the kingdom. It gave no details about casualties or damage.
• 26 August 2019: Houthi rebels claimed to have attacked a military target in Riyadh. According to a spokesman for the rebels, the attack was carried out with an armed drone. Saudi Arabia denied there was an attack by the Houthis.
• 10 September 2019: The coalition forces intercepted a drone over Yemen’s Saada province, Saudi Press Agency reported.
• 14 September 2019: Drone attacksclaimed by the Houthiscause fires at two major oil facilities run by Saudi Aramco.^[6]

The reported 18 attacks before the most effective attack on 14 September simply tell that Houthis were progressing in both technology and intention to threaten the Saudi regime. All the previous attacks were carried out using aerial weapons like cruise missiles or drones. Hence Saudi security forces were well aware of the capability of the Houthi rebels and should have been better prepared to intercept the attack of 14 September. In any case, they should not have been taken by surprise. The features of this attack like well-chosen targets to cause maximum damage to Saudi reputation, deliberation on centres of gravity (CsOG) in the target system (crude oil stabilisers, natural gas storages), distance; direction and pattern (ultra lowlevel) and time chosen etc show that the planning was done by skilled air attack professionals.^[7] Whosoever was behind this attack, one thing is clear; this did not happen all of a sudden. This was not a Black Swan event. This was a Grey Rhino event.^[8]

This attack has brought out that non-state or state-sponsored non-state actors have acquired sophisticated systems that can impact the global economy and cause collateral damage of unprecedented nature. The threat in the Indian context is real with Pakistan sponsored non-state actors looking for opportunities to cause collateral damage within Kashmir and even across India. The drone attack can target high-value national leaders, critical infrastructure, power grid system, oil refineries, military installations and population centres. Drones are highly versatile and can deliver explosives, biological, chemical agents, and also act as the eyes and ears of the terrorists.^[9] And this is not mere speculation because recently drones from Pakistani side have carried out missions of dropping weapons in Punjab. A large number of AK-47 assault rifles and grenades dropped in Amritsar by heavy-lifting drones that came from across the border, is speculated to be aimed at creating trouble in Jammu and Kashmir. The drones carried out eight ‘sorties’ in 10 days in the month of September to drop the weapons, including satellite phones. These flying machines with a capacity to carry up to 5 kg flew fast and low to evade detection.^[10] Since then, activities of these drones have increased on India’s western borders and security forces are being put on alert. If one can see the similarities in the pattern of usage of drones by non-state actors against a state, it shall appear as the beginning of a larger plot against India. Indian security forces thus need to prepare to negate any such threats.

Safety of the Gulf

Presently, the US has a strong naval presence in the Gulf (and in IOR as well) and has traditionally safeguarded its energy security (including SLOCs) and that of its allies. However, its relative energy dependence on the countries of the region is diminishing with the exploitation of shale oil and gas at home front and it is no longer dependent on oil from the Gulf. However, the US continues to provide a security umbrella over the region, though it now seeks greater contribution from both India and China to contribute to the security architecture. During the last few years, discussions with the US have brought up the issue of India and China being free riders, depending upon American naval assets to protect their access to energy supplies from the Gulf without making any significant contribution themselves.^[11]

The more worrisome fact is that none of the big Asian economies has vocally raised the level of concern on the deteriorating security environment in the Gulf. If the Saudi oil facilities can be attacked, so can the facilities of Iran, Iraq, the UAE, Kuwait and others. If such an eventuality were to occur, then the Asian economies would be crippled. The shy response of the four Asian powers surfaces the absence of any strategy in Asia’s capitals for dealing with security in the Persian Gulf if, or when, the Americans decide that they no longer want to get involved.^[12] These four powers—India, China, Japan and South Korea are all heavily dependent on oil imports from the Gulf for meeting their energy requirements. While the latter three claim to have sufficient cushion of strategic reserves, India’s oil reserves are inadequate to cope with such turmoil in oil supply from western Indian Ocean Region and would place in jeopardy, India’s dream of becoming a USD five trillion economy by 2024. In all senses the future of geopolitics in the region will be controlled by “ge-oil-itics”.

The recent events in the Gulf should act as a wake-up call to India to review its role in the IOR in light of a reduced American presence and an ever-increasing Chinese footprint. It is thus time to strengthen India’s defence policy while focusing on an Air and Naval Power doctrine for maritime security. India’s maritime borders are exposed from three sides and there are many high-value assets located on Indian coastlines. Given the limited assets and constraints of the defence budget, conventional and non-conventional aerial threats can only be tackled through a rejuvenated Air-power philosophy focused on better integration of naval and air force assets. It would not only give India an insurance for its predicted economic rise but also give assurance to neighbouring IOR countries for mutual growth.

*Wing Commander Vikas Kalyani is Visiting Fellow at India Foundation. His area of research is defense and strategic studies. He is currently studying relations between India and IOR countries.

^[1] Gupta Arvind, Whither Indian Ocean maritime order? 2016, pp-221

^[2]HasanAlhasan, https://www.asiatimes.com/2019/09/opinion/big-asian-players-too-quiet-on-threats-to-gulf-security’

^[3]HasanAlhasan, ibid

^[4] Nada Altaher, Jennifer Hauser and Ivana Kottasová, Yemen’s Houthi rebels claim a ‘large-scale’ drone attack on Saudi oil facilities, https://edition.cnn.com/2019/09/14/middleeast/yemen-houthi-rebels-drone-attacks-saudi-aramco-intl/index.html September 15, 2019.

^[5]Narender Kumar, https://www.vifindia.org/article/2019/october/01/saudi-arabia-drone-attack-sign-of-changing-character-of-hybrid-war, 15 Oct 19

^[6] https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/09/timeline-houthis-drone-missile-attacks-saudi-targets-190914102845479.html accessed on 16 Oct 19

^[7]First quoted by SumitMukerji, in a formal discussion organised by South Asian Institute for Strategic Affairs (SAISA) and Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung at Nehru Memorial Museum and Library, New Delhi on 01 October 2019.

^[8]First quoted by DhruvKatoch, Director, SAISA in a formal discussion organised by SAISA and Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung at Nehru Memorial Museum and Library, New Delhi on 01 October 2019.

^[9]Narender Kumar, https://www.vifindia.org/article/2019/october/01/saudi-arabia-drone-attack-sign-of-changing-character-of-hybrid-war, 15 Oct 19

^[10]Mohammed Ghazali, https://www.ndtv.com/india-news/pakistani-drones-flew-low-dropped-weapons-in-8-sorties-in-punjab-say-sources-2106713, accessed on 16 Oct 19

^[11]Shyam Saran, A Strategic Perspective, Whither India Ocean Maritime Order – 2016, pp 28

^[12]HasanAlhasan, ibid

They scorched the snake, but could not kill it! In late February this year, US President Donald Trump asserted that the US had defeated “100 percent of the (ISIS) caliphate”^[i]. However, many US officials, like National Security Advisor John Bolton, disagreed with him then and acknowledged that the monstrosity was not defeated, but had slithered away into the desert with a large portion of its wealth, weaponry and warriors still intact to fight another day.^[ii],[iii]

This fact has been reiterated in a recent report by the US Institute for the Study of War (ISW) that claims that ISIS purposely retreated during the US-led campaign from Mosul, Raqqa, and other important Syrian cities in order to relocate its fighters and their families to remote ‘support zones’ in Iraq and Syria^[iv]. Intelligence officials of the US-led international coalition also claim that ISIS currently sits on a “mountain of stolen cash and gold” (estimated by independent experts to total about USD 400 million)^[v], which its leaders were able to stash away before ceding territory to international forces.

In fact, far from being vanquished in Iraq and Syria, ISIS is said to be staging resurgence now through a “capable insurgency”^[vi]. In addition, the transnational menace has increased its activities in other parts of the world and has even conducted one of its worst terrorist strikes on Easter Sunday in Sri Lanka (21 April 2019), which claimed over 260 lives.

Method in the Mayhem

According to the ISW report, ISIS was quick to asses that it would be difficult to stop Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR) launched by the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) from taking over Mosul and then Raqqa back in mid-2017. Therefore, ISIS carefully sidestepped the military juggernaut and focused instead on arranging safe havens for its forces fleeing from the battlefield in remote parts of Iraq and Syria.

Thus, when the US and ISF troops laid a siege on Mosul, they remained unaware that ISIS fighters were already escaping the city by way of a wide and complex network of tunnels.Thus, US military experts aver: “ISIS fighters likely went to ground near Mosul; regrouped in Tel Afar in Iraq or the Middle Euphrates River Valley in Syria; or relocated to Hawija, Iraq”.^[vii]

In order to facilitate this process of troop dispersal, ISIS even allowed civilians to leave the cities in large numbers, so that their fighters could blend with the crowds. Specific patterns have been found in the mode of the migrants’ dispersal and destinations, which shows that ISIS “deliberately planted fighters and ideologically committed supporters (among the civilians) across both Iraq and Syria”.^[viii]

With the recapture of Mosul and Raqqa, US officials appeared to grow complacent and believed that the ISIS had given up the fight. In October 2017, Lt. Gen. Paul Funk of the US military, then serving as CJTF-OIR commander, surmised: “They’re (ISIS) giving up … [and] their leaders are abandoning them.”^[ix] Even the then-secretary of defense James Mattis said: “The caliphate is on the run, we’re breaking them.”^[x]

These statements of triumph reflected the initial enthusiasm of CJTF-OIR forces over liberating cities from ISIS control. However, it was only later that the US began to understand the error in its assessment. By February 2018, then secretary of Homeland Security Kirstjen Nielsen noted that ISIS fighters in Syria were “going underground, dispersing to other safe havens, including on the internet, and returning to their home countries.”^[xi]

Even the Iraqi government took its eyes off the ball after the recapture of Mosul in late 2017, as its focus shifted towards the referendum conducted by Iraqi Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) for breaking away from Iraq in September of that year. The crisis disrupted coordination between the Internal Security Forces (ISF) and Peshmerga fighters, which allowed ISIS to regroup and move about along the Disputed Internal Boundaries (DIBs). With his government facing charges of nepotism and corruption, then Iraqi premier Haider al-Abadi hastily declared the victory over ISIS in Iraq on 9 December 2017 as a major achievement of his term in office. He claimed that the ISF had successfully seized the last city held by ISIS in Anbar Province and routed the terror group out of the country.

His administration then got preoccupied with contesting the May 2018 parliamentary elections and got little time to focus on post-ISIS stabilisation. The elections gave a fractured mandate and led to a political deadlock. With growing civil unrest after the elections in provinces of southern Iraq and the city of Basra, Iraqi forces were taken away from ISIS-infested areas in the west of the country. ISIS fighters on the run took full advantage of the situation as they regrouped and planned the launch of a new insurgency.

Thus, it was embarrassing that by December 2018, when Iraqi government was indulging in anniversary celebrations of its ‘victory’ over ISIS, reports were streaming in that members of the supposedly defunct terror group were carrying out guerrilla attacks, bombings, murders, kidnappings and road blockages across various governorates of the country.

Veteran leader of the Kurdish Democratic Party MasoudBarzani issued a dire warning to Iraq around that time: “Da’esh(ISIS) has returned to a lot of the areas much worse than before.”^[xii] He then gave names of few of the governorates where ISIS had started spreading its terror—Nineveh, Diyala and Salahuddin. Even Shiite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr warned on twitter: “Mosul is in danger and terrorist cells remain active there”.^[xiii] He added that the deteriorating situation has been caused by the misrule of corrupt politicians.

By then, even ISIS had started chiding the international forces about the so-called victory of their forces against the terror group. ISIS spokesman Abu Hassan al-Muhajir reproached in April 2018: “What victory do you speak of oh America, when the mujahidin … [have] a condition that is better than the one from which you fled in Iraq several years ago?”^[xiv]

ISIS soon reconstituted its command and control centres, its media apparatus, and its high-end explosive capability along with reorganising its scattered militants to fuel a new insurgency. The terror group even managed to develop an underground global financing network with branches stretching from the Middle East to Africa to Europe. This infrastructure was built during Saddam’s regime to bust sanctions and is known as Al-Rawi Network, which invested “tens of millions” of dollars of ISIS money in real estate, car washes, and other legitimate businesses worldwide.^[xv] ISIS ‘wilayahs’ (or global provinces) also started pouring in funds into their headquarters in Syria and Iraq from late 2018 onwards.^[xvi] Since then, the terror group has been awash with funds.

Increased VBIED Detonations

Then on August 22, 2018, Baghdadi made an audio announcement marking the commencement of ISIS’ new military campaign in Iraq and Syria. He asserted that the U.S. “boasted of its so-called victory in expelling the State (ISIS) from the cities and countryside in Iraq and Syria, but the land of Allah is wide and the tides of war change.”^[xvii]

The message was followed by waves of detonations carried out across Iraq and Syria by Vehicle-Borne Improvised Explosive Devices (VBIEDs). These attacks targeted people in markets and restaurants, particularly in newly liberated cities of Raqqa and Mosul, as well as at military checkpoints and convoys in regions of Iraq and Syria. Later, ISIS repeatedly conducted VBIED strikes in the cities of Mosul, Kirkuk City, Tikrit, Raqqa, and Idlib. With thesenew tactics the terror group was successful in sapping public confidence in the Iraqi and Syrian security forces. By 2019, the scope and scale of VBIED attacks has further increased.^[xviii]

The Ingress in Af-Pak

In fact, ISIS kick started a new phase in its global operation from the month of Ramadan in 2019. After conducting the devastating Sri Lanka attacks on 21April, it dubbed its new global campaign as ‘the Battle of Attrition’ on 31May. As part of this campaign, ISIS claimed responsibility for attacks in Iraq, Syria, Afghanistan, Libya, Central Africa, West Africa, Somalia, Pakistan, and the Sinai Peninsula.^[xix] It has also announced the creation of three new provinces (wilayah) in Democratic Republic of Congo, India (mainly in Kashmir and Bengal), as well as in Pakistan.^[xx]

It is important to note here that the presence of ISIS in Afghanistan (known as ISIS-K, with ‘K’ standing for Khorasan) has further vexed the security situation in that country. According to the report issued by the US Department of Defense issued to Congress in June 2019, ISIS-K has made significant “territorial gains” in the country’s eastern provinces (notably Kunar) between December 2018 and May 2019. The group also carried out a suicide blast at a wedding reception on 17 August 2019 that claimed 80 lives and halted the country’s independence-day festivities.

The ISIS-K is trying to take advantage of an uncertain phase in Afghanistan, when the US is seeking a peace accord with the Taliban for the gradual withdrawal of its troops from the country, which the upstart terror group knows would create power vacuum in various areas and could prove useful in consolidating its positions.

When the group was formed in early 2015, many Afghans dismissed it as an insignificant incipient, led by dissident Tehreek-i-Taliban militant Hafiz Saeed Khan (its chief) and former Afghan Taliban commander Abdul Rauf Aliza (its deputy). However, both these leaders were taken out by the US by air^[xxi] and drone strikes,^[xxii] almost after a year of the group’s formation. But the group received a boost in 2016 when the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) joined it. To curb its growing menace thereafter, the US dropped the largest non-nuclear bomb (GBU43B Massive Ordinance Air Blast – MOAB) on the group’s cave complex in Achin District in Nangarhar Province on 13 April 2017. The so-called ‘Mother of all bombs’ reportedly killed 36 of ISIS-K fighters and decimated its tunnel network.^[xxiii]

ISIS attaches great importance to its presence in Afghanistan because of the region’s historic and religious significance in the jihadist lore. In fact, the modern jihadist movement originated in Afghanistan. A few Hadith sayings purportedly prophesize the rise of an “army of true believers from the Khorasan” before the apocalypse, which ISIS has made central to its eschatological claims.^[xxiv] “Operations on the Afghanistan-Pakistan border region also enable ISIS to directly challenge its rival group Al-Qaeda for the leadership of the global jihadist movement.”^[xxv]

The ISIS-K makes inroads into Kunar and Nangarhar, it seeks to tap into the frustration of hardline Taliban fighters unimpressed by their leadership’s supposed concessions in negotiations with the US. Therefore, Taliban defectors joining ISIS-K may increase in the months to come.^[xxvi]

On the Prowl in Bangladesh

In addition to expanding its influence in the nursery of global jihad—the infamous Af-Pak region, ISIS has increased its prowl on the eastern front of India with its growing footprint in Bangladesh. It is curious that Bangladesh authorities have repeatedly denied the presence of both ISIS and al-Qaeda in their country, despite the fact that these groups have conducted several attacks over the years and taken responsibility for many of them. The most recent of such strikes came as late as 30 August 2019, when two policemen were injured in a blast near the car of a minister in Dhaka. It is believed the bomb was thrown from a footbridge at night, but the minister escaped injury. Hours later, ISIS took responsibility for carrying out the blast.^[xxvii]

On 6 August, the Bangladesh unit of ISIS came out with a video titled ‘The Best Outcome is for Pious’, which was released by the Amaq Agency and pro-ISIS Telegram channels. The eight-minute video showed four masked ISIS operatives, two wearing suicide jackets, criticising in Bangla language the current Sheikh Hasina government and the Rapid Action Battalion (RAB) engaged in counter terrorism operations. The speaker ends his speech by calling on Muslims to join ISIS. It is important to note here that ISIS had increased its activities in Bangladesh in the immediate aftermath of the Sri Lanka Easter bombings, when it announced the appointment of a new ‘emir’ (a certain Abu Muhammad al Bengali) to lead its charge in India and Bangladesh towards the end of April this year.^[xxviii]

It is worth noting that Bangladesh witnessed the first major ISIS-claimed attack in South Asia, outside of Afghanistan and Pakistan in July 2016. This was the assault on the Holey Artisan Bakery in Dhaka, which killed 22 civilians. With foreigners as the main target, ISIS-Bangladesh claimed responsibility for the attack, which was carried out by the ISIS-affiliated group, Dawlatul Islam, Bengal. The group—consisting of individuals who had defected from Jamaat-ul-Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB) and Jund at-Tawhidwal-Khilafah—was formed in 2015 and led by Muhammad Saifullah Ozaki, a Bangladeshi-Japanese individual whose current whereabouts are unknown. Ozaki is reported to be the leader of ISIS-Bangladesh. Curiously, despite ISIS’s claim, the Bangladesh government back then denied that the Dhaka attackers had any connection with ISIS, and alleged that they were instead members of a breakaway group of JMB.^[xxix]

Inroads into Sri Lanka, Maldives

Even as Sri Lanka hobbles towards normalcy, after a four month long emergency rule following the devastating Easter Sunday attack on 21 April 2019 that killed over 260 lives is revoked, investigations into the first ISIS attack on the country continue. The ISIS attack were themselves followed by rioting in the country’s North Western Province that destroyed hundreds of Muslim properties. The fear is ISIS might seek to exploit resentment after these mob attacks blamed on Buddhist extremist groups against the Muslim community, which constitutes 10 percent of the island state’s population, to spread its tentacles in the country.^[xxx]

The Sri Lankan government has stated that the eight suicide bombers which carried out the bombings belonged to two local Islamist groups—National ThowheedJamaath (NTJ), led by ZahranHashim, and JamatheiMillathu Ibrahim (JMI). According to authorities, those directly responsible for the bombings have been killed or arrested.^[xxxi]

The picture from the island paradise of Maldives is quite disconcerting when it comes to growing resonance of the ISIS message among its population. According to the Soufan Group report, the small country with a population of just over 400,000 surprisingly found 200 of its youth migrating to ISIS territory in Iraq and Syria, a number surpassing other regional countries — India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh with far larger Muslim populations.^[xxxii]

The Rising Threat for India

As demonstrated above, ISIS on its comeback trail is seeking to increasingly focus on the Indian subcontinent. With its third largest population of Muslims in the world, India appears an attractive catchment areas for the global jihadist group to swell its ranks. In the words of CNN journalist Tim Lister: “Its propaganda suggests ISIS sees India as promising territory and is intent on aggravating Muslim-Hindu tensions there.”^[xxxiii] For this purpose, ISIS announced the formation of an exclusive province of its fictitious caliphate in India (Wilayat-al Hind) on 10 May 2019^[xxxiv] and has since increased its focus in Jammu and Kashmir, West Bengal and Assam, as well as in southern states of Kerala, Tamil Nadu and Karnataka.

It is noteworthy that the ISIS statement about the establishment of its exclusive province in India corresponded with a police report that a militant affiliated to a transnational group named Ishfaq Ahmad Sofi was killed in an encounter in Shopian the very day.^[xxxv]The Islamic State announced in early February 2016, its intention to expand into Kashmir as part of its broader Khorasan branch.^[xxxvi] The presence of Islamic State in J&K progressed gradually during 2017. Islamic State flags have been waved during rallies and protests around the valley. While this claim is still pending official verification, Islamic State’s Amaq news agency claimed responsibility for an attack in Srinagar on November 17, 2017, which killed an Indian policeman. The terrorist killed in the attack, Mugees Ahmed Mir, is suspected to have been inspired by the Islamic State’s online propaganda and was found wearing an Islamic State T-shirt at the time of the attack.^[xxxvii]Since late 2017, the pro-Islamic State J&K-focused media group al-Qaraar has engaged in a social media campaign, directing messages tailored to inspire a Kashmiri audience.

In December 2017, a pro-Islamic State video in Urdu was shared via its Telegram channel, using the hashtag “Wilayat Kashmir,” in which a masked man representing “Mujahidin in Kashmir” pledges allegiance to the Islamic State and specifically invites al-Qaeda-affiliated group AnsarGhazwat-ul-Hind to join the caliphate.^[xxxviii]

According to a media report, in its publication (‘Amaq’ November 2018), ISIS claimed responsibility for the attack on a police post at Zakura on the outskirts of Srinagar, on November 17.^[xxxix] In this incident, one militant, Mugees Ahmad Mir and a J&K policeman were killed in a shootout on November 16 at Zakura. Mir was wearing a black T-shirt with IS stamp and later at his funeral, his body was wrapped in a black flag. Police sources were quoted in the media report that Mir was actually a district commander of Tehreek-ulMujahideen and was loyal to the now deceased AnsarGhazwat-ul-Hind commander Zakir Musa.

When it comes to the spread of ISIS influence in south India, it should be noted that the mastermind of the Sri Lanka Easter bombings HashimZahran had travelled to India, Maldives and Gulf states to spread the following of his group National ThawheedJamaath (NJT). In India, “his sojourns were mostly in the Malappuram District of Kerala and the Coimbatore, Trichy, Thirunelveli, Vellore, Nagapattinam, Kanyakumari and Ramanathapuram districts of Tamil Nadu. All these districts have sizeable Muslim populations. He openly advocated the ISIS cause in these places and canvassed for volunteers to join the fighting forces of ISIS. It is during this time that Zahran came to the attention of Indian intelligence services”.^[xl]

Since the Easter Sunday bombings, India’s National Investigation Agency (NIA) adroitly foiled a suicide attack in Kerala by arresting an ISIS suspect who was inspired by the blasts in Sri Lanka. Since then, the NIA has busted a suspected module and arrested several ISIS suspects in Kerala and Tamil Nadu.^[xli]

Civil Discord: The Subtext of Terror

With the end of the territorial caliphate, ISIS has redoubled its efforts to carry out terrorist attacks across the globe and seems keen on increasing its footprint in populous countries with large Muslim populations, such as India. More than causing terror, ISIS has perfected the art of carrying out attacks aimed at polarising societies by seeding discord through the subtext of its violent messaging. Terrorism is a form of non-verbal communication and ISIS sent a sick message by choosing an Easter Sunday to demonstrate its resurrection in order to tease its prime enemy, “the Crusading Christian forces”.^[xlii] Easter also represents the “Christian doctrines that Islam manifestly rejects: that Christ was crucified and died; that he was resurrected; and that by special virtue of the latter, he is the son of God”.^[xliii]

Similarly, ISIS killed a Muslim Jordanian pilot by fire, a mode of punishment prohibited in Islam but used only by Imam Ali against apostates, which ISIS repeated to draw Shiite ire.^[xliv] ISIS claims that it learnt this tactics of ‘nikayah’ (emotional injury) from its ideological mentor Abu Musab al Zarqawi, who had claimed to have perfected the technique and may have even masterminded the 2006 al-Askari Shrine bombing (where the 10th and 11th Shia Imams Ali al Hadi and his son Hasan al Askari are buried) to incite a civil war between Iraq’s Shiites and Sunnis.^[xlv] ISIS’ magazine Dabiq explains and extols the dubious benefits of this tactics of creating civil discord, thus:

“Shaykh Abu Mus’ab (rahimahullah) implemented the strategy and required tactics to achieve the goal of Khilafah without hesitation. In short, he strived to create as much chaos as possible … He would order to carry out nikayah operations dozens of times in a dozen areas daily, targeting and killing sometimes hundreds of apostates from the police forces and Rafidah. In addition to that, he tried to force every apostate group present in Iraq into an all out war with Ahlus-Sunnah (Sunnis). So he targeted the Iraqi apostate forces (army, police, and intelligence), the Rafidah (Shia markets, temples, and militias), and the Kurdish secularists (Barzani and Talabani partisans). In his speech titled “HadhaBayanullin-Nasiwa li YundharuBih” (This Is a Declaration for the People That They May Be Warned by It), he threatened war on any Sunni tribe, party, or assembly that would support the crusaders.

Then when some so-called ‘Islamists’ entered into the democratic political process – ignoring what it entails of clearcut major ‘shirk’ (worshipping someone besides Allah) – he officially declared war on them in his speech titled ‘Wa li TastabinaSabilul-Mujrimin’ (And Thus the Way of the Criminals Becomes Evident).”^[xlvi]

When one looks at the aftermath of the Sri Lanka Easter bombings, we find that the social hostility and sectarian violence that followed the blasts put a strain on the social fabric of the country. The above text shows that ISIS plans civil discord through its attacks in its bid to turn a peaceful nation into a radical and polarised society, which could then become a hotbed for its radicalisation and terrorist activities.

The tactics of ‘nikayah’ will play a key part in the strategy of attrition that Baghdadi declared in his last video release. When it comes to India, it is important that security forces and the general public remain alert not only about the physical threat posed by ISIS terror attacks, but also the underlying provocation and trauma it entails. A concerted anti-radicalisation and counter-radicalisation campaign needs to be launched to immunise vulnerable communities and sections of Indian society. In this regard, the development and propagation of a national ethical code to create socially responsible citizenry may help in combating the threat of terrorism and its plans to cause civil unrest.

A closer and more cohesive society, where Muslim citizens play a key role as the bulwark against trans-national terrorism, will be of immense significance. Greater coordination between our security forces and intelligence agencies of neighbouring states like Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Maldives, the UAE etc. could prove critical in thwarting the resurgent threat of ISIS and other jihadist groups lurking on the horizon.

*Dr Adil Rasheed is Research Fellow at Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA). He is author of the book ISIS: Race to Armageddon

Endnotes

^[i]‘ ISIS is not defeated. Neither Trump nor Democrats should pretend it is’, The Post’s View (Opinion), Washington Post, 10 August 2019 (https://www.washingtonpost_from_the_posts_editorial_board/?ref=readnext)

^[ii]Sonmez, Felicia. ‘“ISIS threat will remain” John Bolton says’, Washington Post, 10 March, 2019 (https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/the-isis-threat-will-remain-john-bolton-says/2019/03/10/8e28290c-4340-11e9-8aab-95b8d80a1e4f_story.html)

^[iii] Lister, Tim. ‘Destroyed on the battlefield, ISIS begins new chapter of terror’, CNN, 1 May 2019, https://edition.cnn.com/2019/04/28/world/isis-sri-lanka-international-threat-intl/index.html

^[iv]Cafarella, Jennifer with Wallace, Brandon and Zhou Jason. ‘ISIS’S Second Comeback: Assessing the Next ISIS Insurgency’, Institute for the Study of War, Washington DC, June 2019 (http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/ISW%20Report%20-%20ISIS%27s%20Second%20Comeback%20-%20June%202019.pdf)

^[v] Warrick, Joby. ‘Retreating ISIS army smuggled a fortune in cash and gold out of Iraq and Syria’, The Washington Post, 21 December 2018 (https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/retreating-isis-army-smuggled-a-fortune-in-cash-and-gold-out-of-iraq-and-syria/2018/12/21/95087ffc-054b-11e9-9122-82e98f91ee6f_story.html)

^[vi] Ibid

^[vii] “Security Official: Birth of an Organization Close to ISIS and Al Qaeda in Hawija,” Shafaaq, June 4, 2017

^[viii]Cafarella, Jennifer with Wallace, Brandon and Zhou Jason. n4

^[ix] Michaels, Jim. “1,000 ISIS Militants Surrender as Iraq Retakes Key Town of Hawija,” USA Today, October 5, 2017 (https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2017/10/05/1-000-isis-militants-surrender-iraq-wins-islamic-state-loses-key-iraqi-town-1-000-militants-surrende/736901001/)

^[x]Garamone, Jim. “Mattis Says Operations Against ISIS Will Change in 2018,” U.S. Department of Defense, December 29, 2017 (https://www.defense.gov/Newsroom/News/Article/Article/1406064/mattis-says-operations-against-isis-will-change-in-2018/)

 ^[xi] Schmitt, Eric. “Thousands of ISIS Fighters Flee in Syria, Many to Fight Another Day,” New York Times, February 4, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/04/world/middleeast/isis-syria-al-qaeda.html

 ^[xii]Nowzad, Kosar. ‘Fight against Islamic State harder after military defeat: MasoudBarzani’, Kurdistan 24, 28 November 2018, https://www.kurdistan24.net/en/news/48c42da8-7812-4fcb-a842-7639e94e3605

^[xiii] Al Droubi, Mina. “Iraqi cleric Moqtada Al Sadr warns of ISIS resurgence in Mosul”, Reuters, 21 November 2018 https://www.thenational.ae/world/mena/iraqi-cleric-moqtada-al-sadr-warns-of-isis-resurgence-in-mosul-1.794389

^[xiv] “IS Spokesman Disputes Trump Narrative that Group is Defeated, Threatens Iraqi Elections,” SITE Intelligence Group, April 22, 2018 (https://ent.siteintelgroup.com/Multimedia/is-spokesman-disputes-trump-narrative-that-group-is-defeated-threatens-iraqi-elections.html)

^[xv] The U.S. Treasury Department imposed sanctions against the Al-Rawi Network in December 2016. However, it has remained operational. Warrick, Joby. “Retreating ISIS Army Smuggled a Fortune in Cash and Gold Out of Iraq and Syria,” Washington Post, December 21, 2018,

 ^[xvi] Office of the Inspector General, “Operation Inherent Resolve and Other Overseas Contingency Operations: October 1, 2018 – December 31, 2018,” U.S. Department of Defense, February 5, 2019,

 ^[xvii] “IS Leader Vows ‘Dark Days’ to the Enemy, Incites for Lone-Wolf Attacks in West, and Muslims to Rise Up in Jordan and Saudi Arabia,” SITE Intelligence Group, August 22, 2018 https://news.siteintelgroup.com/Jihadist-News/is-leader-vows-dark-days-to-enemy-incites-for-lone-wolf-attacks-in-west-and-muslims-to-rise-up-in-jordan-and-saudi-arabia.html

 ^[xviii]Cafarella, Jennifer with Wallace, Brandon and Zhou Jason. n4

 ^[xix] “IS Launches ‘Battle of Attrition’, Claims Killing 18 Regime Elements in Deirez-Zour and Homs,” SITE Intelligence Group, June 1, 2019 https://news.siteintelgroup.com/Jihadist-News/is-launches-battle-of-attrition-claims-killing-18-regime-elements-in-deir-al-zour-and-homs.html

^[xx] Robert Postings, ‘ISIS announces new India and Pakistan provinces, casually breaking up Khorasan’, The Defence Post, 15 May 2019 https://thedefensepost.com/2019/05/15/islamic-state-pakistan-province-al-hind/

 ^[xxi]“Top ISIS commander killed in U.S. airstrike in Afghanistan”. BNO News. 12 August 2016 https://bnonews.com/news/index.php/news/id5030

 ^[xxii]“Afghanistan drone strike ‘kills IS commander Abdul Rauf'”. BBC News. 9 February 2015. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-31290147

 ^[xxiii] Cooper, Helene &Mashal, Mujib. ‘U.S. Drops “Mother of All Bombs” on ISIS Caves in Afghanistan’, New York Times (April 13, 2017). https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/13/world/asia/moab-mother-of-all-bombs-afghanistan.html

 ^[xxiv] “Misappropriating the Black Flag,” Quilliam Foundation, December 16, 2014; McCants, William. “How ISIS Got Its Flag,” The Atlantic, September 22, 2015, https://www.quilliaminternational.com/misappropriating-the-black-flag/

 ^[xxv]Gambhir, Harleen. ‘ISIS in Afghanistan: Backgrounder’, Institute for the Study of War, 3 December 2015 http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/ISIS%20in%20Afghanistan_2.pdf

 ^[xxvi] Paul Lushenko, ‘ISKP: Afghanistan’s New SalafiJihadism’ Middle East Institute, 19 October, 2018. https://www.mei.edu/publications/iskp-afghanistans-new-salafi-jihadism

 ^[xxvii] ‘Two policeman injured in ISIS attack targeting Bangladesh minister in Dhaka’, The Hindu, 1 September 2019 (https://www.thehindu.com/news/international/2-policemen-injured-in-isis-attack-targeting-bangladesh-minister-in-dhaka/article29314343.ece)

^[xxviii] ‘ISIS plans to carry out attacks in India and Bangladesh, appoints new “emir” for the region’, International Business Standard, 1 May 2019, (https://www.business-standard.com/article/current-affairs/isis-threatens-to-carry-out-attacks-in-india-bangladesh-names-new-emir-119050100141_1.html)

 ^[xxix]TasneemKhaleel, ‘Meet the Mastermind of the Holey Attack’, Dhaka Tribune, 25 July 2017 (https://www.dhakatribune.com/bangladesh/crime/2017/07/25/holey-attack-mastermind)

 ^[xxx] ‘Sri Lanka Ends Emergency Rule Imposed after Easter bombings’, AlJazeera, 23 August 2019, (https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/08/sri-lanka-ends-emergency-rule-imposed-easter-bombings-190823134350525.html)

 ^[xxxi]Viraj Solanki, ‘The Increasing Presence of ISIS in South Asia’, IISS, 1June 2019, (https://www.iiss.org/blogs/analysis/2019/06/isis-south-asia)

 ^[xxxii]Siddhartya Roy, ‘The Maldives: The New Kid on the Islamist Block’, The Diplomat, 4 March 2019 (https://thediplomat.com/2019/03/the-maldives-the-new-kid-on-the-islamist-block/)

 ^[xxxiii] Lister, Tim. ‘Destroyed on the battlefield, ISIS begins new chapter of terror’, CNN, 1 May 2019, https://edition.cnn.com/2019/04/28/world/isis-sri-lanka-international-threat-intl/index.html

 ^[xxxiv] ‘Islamic State claims ‘province’ in India for first time after clash in Kashmir’, Reuters, 11 May 2019 https://in.reuters.com/article/india-kashmir-islamic-state/islamic-state-claims-province-in-india-for-first-time-after-clash-in-kashmir-idINKCN1SH07Z

 ^[xxxv] Ibid

 ^[xxxvi]Praveen Swami, “Islamic State threatens to Expand to Kashmir,” Indian Express, February 3, 2016.

 ^[xxxvii]“IS claims Zakura Attack,” Tribune (India), November 20, 2017. https://www.tribuneindia.com/news/is-claims-zakura-attack/500289.html

 ^[xxxviii]“Kashmiri group pledges allegiance to Islamic State,” BBC Urdu, December 26, 2017.

 ^[xxxix] ‘Islamic State claims responsibility for attack near Srinagar, J&K police rule it out,’ Indian Express, November 20, 2017, https://indianexpress.com/article/india/islamic-state-claims-responsibility-for-attack-near-srinagar-jk-police-rule-it-out-4945506/

 ^[xl]Karmon, Ely (Dr.). ‘The Sri Lanka Jihadist (ISIS?) Attacks: How Real the Change’, International Institute for Combating Terrorism, May 2019, https://www.ict.org.il/Article/2383/The_Sri_Lanka_Jihadist__Attacks#gsc.tab=0

 ^[xli] ‘NIA questions more Tamil Nadu ISIS terror suspects in Kerala’, My Nation, 1 September 2019, https://www.mynation.com/india-news/nia-questions-more-tamil-nadu-isis-terror-suspects-in-kerala-px5dre

 ^[xlii] Ishaan Tharoor, ‘ISIS calls for holy war find an echo in pro-Trump movement’, Washington Post, 16 Nov. 2016, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2016/11/16/isis-wants-to-fight-a-holy-war-so-do-some-trump-supporters/

 ^[xliii] Raymond Ibrahim, ‘Why is Easter a Magnet for Islamist Violence’, Middle East Forum, 17 April 2017, https://www.meforum.org/6648/easter-islamist-violence

 ^[xliv]‘Experts React to ISIS’s Gruesome Execution of Jordanian Pilot’, The Rand Blog, February 4, 2015, https://www.rand.org/blog/2015/02/experts-react-to-isiss-gruesome-execution-of-jordanian.html

 ^[xlv]Michael Crowley, ‘How the Fate of One Holy Site Could Plunge Iraq Back into Civil War’, TIME magazine, 26 June 2014, https://time.com/2920692/iraq-isis-samarra-al-askari-mosque/

 ^[xlvi]Dabiq Issue 1 (1435, Ramadan) : From Hijrah to Khilafah, can be accessed at http://www.clarionproject.org/news/islamic-state-isis-isil-propaganda-magazine-Dabiq