Abstract
Resilient logistics in border areas enhance sustenance and development. They also enable security forces to operate efficiently along the borders. These regions are particularly prone to natural disasters. Suboptimal supply lines after disasters lead to significant losses for the state, which are often overlooked. Resilience requires the restoration of normalcy to be prioritised. This area needs more attention, better anticipatory action, and a deeper understanding of the interplay between logistics, development, and national security along the border. Investment in better response will be appreciated more after a realistic assessment of the losses.
A significant area of neglect is the response to bridges in distress. The inadequate response and subsequent losses to the state have been analysed in a case study of the Irang Bridge, illustrating the magnitude of the problem and the hidden costs. The benefits of improved technology in such situations were demonstrated after the devastating floods in Kedarnath Valley, leading to significant savings and serving as an example of a well-planned, resilient response. However, this approach has not been replicated for various reasons.
Restoring normalcy means returning to optimal throughput across all logistics axes. One example of a remarkably quick and effective response is the BRO’s actions following the Sikkim Earthquake in June 2011. This situation highlights the significance of anticipatory action and commitment to execution.
The way forward should be informed by this experience, with clearly defined responsibilities and resources allocated for enhanced and resilient logistics in these border areas.
Introduction
With the increase in extreme weather events, the disaster-prone Northern and Northeastern Borders experience regular disruptions of vital logistics routes, including the washing away of bridges. Simply constructing new roads and bridges is insufficient; these must be maintained at full operational capacity in a mission-mode approach to lower logistics costs. This will accelerate the pace of development in border areas and ensure sustainable military logistics, which together contribute to national security.
Numerous examples exist of poor responses leading to the underutilisation of National Highways (NHs), which often seems to go unnoticed. Although the losses are not easily quantifiable, they are real. Visualising this requires an understanding of logistics and the economic evaluation of a highway. Economic evaluation indicates what returns can be expected from the financial investment in building an expensive road- an analysis typically performed when sanctioning funds for a highway, yet often forgotten thereafter. The benefits calculated during an economic evaluation accrue only if the NH or any road is utilised to its full capacity. If capacity drops to 25% for several years (as is occurring along the border), the losses to the state are substantial. This situation sharply increases the ratio between logistics costs and GDP at a time when the Government is concerned that logistics costs account for 14% of GDP, compared to 7-8% in more developed countries. The case study of the Irang bridge discussed here exemplifies an uncoordinated, poor response, and losses to the state have also been quantified.
New technology can be a force multiplier, as demonstrated emphatically by the rapid response to a washed-away bridge in the Kedarnath Valley, utilising a 3rd Generation Modular Steel Panel Bridge (MSPB). A decade later, it remains the only one of its kind, and the response continues to rely on outdated modular bridges from World War II technology. A well-planned and proactive response can yield significant benefits. One example of rapid action was the BRO’s response to the Sikkim Earthquake in June 2011. This case highlights the importance of anticipatory measures combined with clear delegation and determination in execution. The initiative displayed at all levels in this response is remarkable and serves as a model to emulate.
A need exists for deeper introspection to optimise logistics along our borders. The paper is, therefore, organised under the following headings:
- Recognising the Importance of Logistics Resilience in Border Areas.
- Irang Bridge- a Case Study to Quantify Losses Due to Poor Response.
- The Impact of New Technology – a breakthrough in the Kedarnath Valley.
- The Sikkim Earthquake: Lessons from an Exceptional Response.
- The Path Ahead – learning from experience.
Recognising the Importance of Logistics Resilience in Border Areas
The development of border areas and military logistics are interconnected. Recurring disasters affect both. We face this reality along the northern and northeast border areas year after year. Monsoons hitting the still-growing, unstable young fold mountains make the northern border landslide-prone; the lower reaches are flood-prone, and further northeast, during heavy rains, large tracts of land tend to sink. Together, these pose a continuous challenge to logistics. It demands resilient infrastructure, which should be planned for in our building efforts. However, much of the existing infrastructure is outdated and prone to disruption. Here, resilience requires a quick response to restore normalcy in the shortest time possible, ensuring we build better. Connectivity is key to development, and the most significant bottlenecks are bridges. In assessing the impact on logistics and ways to mitigate this, we must first understand the peculiarities of logistics in these areas and how they affect both development along the borders and military logistics.
A Holistic View of Logistics. Logistics involves transporting personnel and materials to the right location in the shortest time and at the lowest cost. Improved road connectivity contributes to this. Establishing logistics nodes closer to the served areas is also essential for reducing replenishment time while ensuring stock availability. Well-stocked logistics bases must supply a logistics chain that reaches the destination; for military logistics, this means delivering to the front line, to the forward trench, and all the way to the gun end, ensuring operations are not delayed due to shortages of supplies, ammunition, fuel, and clothing. A crucial step toward enhancing military logistics is to develop the border states as robust support bases for the troops stationed ahead.
Improved logistics also enable economic development in border areas, strengthening border security. Economic development leads to better living conditions, a higher level of education, and a more stable society. It helps reduce undesirable external influences and promotes better integration with the rest of the country- economically, culturally, and socially. This enhances the security of the region. The efficiency of the forces along the borders is also improved by local support- by a motivated population, a thriving industry, and improved availability of local resources. Ask anyone in the forces who has fought a war along the Western Borders, and they will tell you how local support acts as a force multiplier.
Optimising Transportation Costs. It is common to see movement in smaller 6-wheel trucks (Load Class 18) in border areas, primarily due to weak bridges. Few realise how much transportation costs increase when using smaller trucks. Figure 1 illustrates a cost comparison using different truck sizes. When transportation is restricted to 6-wheel trucks, costs can rise by nearly 70% compared to larger 4-axle, 12-wheel trucks. Slow traffic caused by bottlenecks further adds to costs. Altogether, this leads to a 100% increase in logistics costs. Weak bridges are prevalent in border areas, and with each disaster, their number increases. Disasters in border areas, weak bridges, and logistics costs are interconnected. The following case study will explore how and why this is the case, aimed at quantifying the losses due to the sub-optimal, uncoordinated responses typical in these regions.
Irang Bridge- a Case Study to Quantify Losses Due to Poor Response
The case study on the Irang Bridge exemplifies how disasters, weak bridges, and logistics costs are interconnected, highlighting the urgent need to address these situations more effectively. It is a story that deserves to be told repeatedly so that its significance reaches the highest levels of national decision-making.
NH 37 (Imphal-Jiribham-Silchar) was handed over to NHIDCL in November 2017 by the BRO. It serves as a lifeline for Manipur. On November 1, 2020, the Bailey bridge at Irang collapsed while an overloaded vehicle carrying sand was crossing. The army was requisitioned, and repairs to the Irang Bridge began after de-installing a similar bailey bridge constructed at Tengnoupal along the Imphal-Moreh road. Due to its age, this bridge collapsed during the launch at Irang. The BRO provided another Bailey bridge, which was successfully launched on November 27. As always, the Army’s effort was commended.[i] The bridge remained the same 52 m span, load Class 18, single-lane, and unsafe. It was far from being a resilient response.
On May 2, 2022, the Irang Bridge collapsed again. It was replaced by yet another Bailey bridge, this time procured from Garden Reach, Kolkata, with the same specifications. The procurement and construction took three months. In June 2024, the Irang crossing experienced another Bailey bridge collapse. Fortunately, the permanent bridge was nearing completion. It opened to traffic, ending the saga of Bailey bridges collapsing regularly at Irang for over four years and finally clearing a bottleneck on the NH.
Financial Impact of a Weak Bridge on NH 37. NH 37 is designed for Load Class 70, accommodating two-lane traffic and allowing wheel-trains up to 100 tons to pass over the bridges. Installing a Class 18, single-lane bailey bridge has reduced the NH’s capacity to 25%. One such bridge on the NH restricts vehicles’ load on the entire highway, limiting it to 6-wheel trucks (see Figure 1). Traffic movement also slows with a single-lane bridge on a two-lane highway. This slow traffic has additional cost implications. Furthermore, the Bailey bridge is a temporary structure with a lifespan of only 25 years and requires early replacement. Most importantly, the bridge is unsafe, leading to the loss of property and invaluable lives with each collapse.
Figure 3 illustrates the financial losses incurred by Manipur State due to this weak bridge, based on reasonable assumptions[ii]. The accumulated losses would be close to Rs 1000 crore per annum for just one highway. When all the highways along our borders, similarly affected by weak bridges, are considered, the losses to the nation reach staggering totals that have accumulated over the years due to the underutilisation of national highways, on which substantial sums have been spent.
The Irang Bridge response clearly highlights how unprepared we are for the collapse of critical bridges in border areas, leading to increasing losses for the State. Development is hindered by additional transportation costs and a lack of heavy equipment, which necessitates stronger bridges. This situation undermines the very purpose for which the roads were built and must be addressed urgently.
New Technology for Bridges – a Breakthrough in the Kedarnath Valley.
The Irang Bridge is not an isolated example. Many such incidents occur each year, and the number of distressed bridges continues to rise as existing infrastructure ages and extreme weather events become more frequent. There is a need to transition to newer technology, evolving from the Bailey Bridge, a first generation Modular Steel Panel Bridge (MSPB), to third generation MSPBs.
Figure 4 illustrates a 3rd Gen MSPB that was launched in India in March 2016. This occurred after the permanent bridge was swept away by the devastating floods in the Kedarnath Valley in June 2013. The Bailey bridge installed in its place was also washed away in 2015. The launch of a new permanent modular bridge in record time in March 2016 represented a bold initiative by the Uttarakhand Government based on advice from their project consultants.[iii]
Procuring such bridges thereafter has faced many roadblocks. Having been involved in launching the first such bridge in the country, one has participated in discussions on this. NHAI and NHIDCL agree on the urgency but are not equipped to stock such bridges. The State PWDs and the BRO feel MORTH should address this. The NDMA was unwilling to take on a role in this matter. The Northeast Council was very clear that their role was to provide infrastructure; repairing and rehabilitating was out of their purview. However, all agree that there is an urgency for it.
Quick responses require that such bridges be stored closer to where they are needed. Anticipatory action is crucial for quick response; the following example demonstrates this.
The Sikkim Earthquake – Learning from an Exceptional Response
Sikkim experienced a devastating earthquake of magnitude 6.8 on the Richter Scale at 6:10 pm on September 18, 2011 (see Figure 5). The epicentre was in Chungtang, North Sikkim. Gangtok, the state capital, was completely isolated from the rest of the country. NH 31A from Sevok to Gangtok encountered 14 major landslides (see Figure 6). Estimates for clearing the slides ranged from 4 weeks to 3 months. BRO, Project Swastik in Gangtok managed the highway, and as the Director General of Border Roads at that time, I was asked how long it would take. The first step was to gather feedback from the ground.
Chief Engineer of Project Swastik, responsible for this area, was in Kolkata at the Eastern Command HQ that day. The two TF Commanders were visiting sites and were caught on the wrong side of the slide, unable to return to their HQs. They could only connect to the Project HQ staff. The feedback around 10 pm indicated that stones were still falling. They were instructed not to attempt anything until the slides stopped. Working at night was also not advisable, so they waited.
Meanwhile, rescue teams were mobilised, and NDRF teams were flown in from Delhi. All could move to the foothills and no further. At Coronation Bridge near Sevoke, there was a pile-up of traffic, with everyone wanting to know when the road would be clear. Early in the morning, the Home Secretary requested an update. Nothing was clear even then. My cautious response was a minimum of 48 hours.
On the ground around 4 am, the dozer and excavator teams decided it was safe enough to work. They were spread along the NH, located at likely slide points identified from the previous years experience with heavy rains and slides. All the teams began clearing their stretches. At 12:30 that afternoon, I received a slip while attending a special meeting chaired by the Cabinet Secretary. It read that the road to Gangtok was open. I announced it. The road was open to Gangtok just 18 hours after the earthquake, not the six weeks (+) that the media had speculated.
This action set the pace for further efforts near Chungtang, filled with individual heroic stories and daring initiatives in the following days. The CE Swastik, during a helicopter reconnaissance, undertook a bold rescue attempt to retrieve a critical casualty from a precarious ledge, ultimately saving a life. Other construction agencies in the Chungtang area joined the effort, freely utilising their plants and machinery. The synergy was contagious.
It was one of the most dynamic responses I had ever experienced in my career. Initiative, commitment, and responsibility at the grassroots level were evident. The professional competence of the machine operators was exemplary. They demonstrated true grit and teamwork, showcasing the highest levels of motivation. The TF Commanders had anticipated and positioned their equipment effectively, providing clear directions and creating an environment for such a synergised effort. The action remains unique even today. What truly enabled this was the machinery strategically positioned in anticipation of heavy rain on NH 31 A. The legendary commitment of the BRO personnel on the ground again came to the forefront. Tragically, two of them lost their lives during the operation.
The stories received limited media coverage, partly due to instructions not to share information with the media while work was ongoing, as media coverage can be disruptive and demoralising for most on the ground. Once the event was over, little interest was shown by the mainstream media; however, a team from Doordarshan, led by Dr Deepak Vohra (a multi-talented and energetic former Ambassador of India), followed up on the story and presented detailed coverage[iv]. Dr. Vohra often refers to this experience as an anecdote during his motivational talks on ‘Rising India’ at various forums[v].
The Way Forward – Learning from Experience
Resilient logistics along our northern borders require a coordinated initiative at the national level, drawing from experience. Regular upgrades are essential. The first step is to assign a cost to the delays and inadequate responses. This will enhance appreciation for the value of quality responses, making planning more realistic. Quantifying losses to the state is challenging. The Irang Bridge case study aims to clarify the order of losses rather than determine exact costs. Many do not easily understand the concept of who will benefit from mitigating these losses. An attitudinal shift among decision-makers at all levels is necessary.
There is a need for a policy on resilient response that establishes pragmatic timelines and acceptable results, along with resources for quick response. For example, there is currently no timeframe for effective action by construction agencies for distressed bridges. Practical guidelines must be formulated so relevant agencies can prepare accordingly. To ensure a quicker response in an emergency, better Modular Steel Panel Bridges (MSPB) should be stocked and ready to reach the site within a reasonable timeframe of approximately 3 to 4 days after a mishap, enabling the highway to be restored to at least 75% of its capacity within 2 weeks. Full capacity should be targeted within a year if not sooner, to mitigate economic losses from a distressed bridge. Providing detours capable of accommodating full NH loads is also feasible with the improved MSPB. Therefore, the stocked equipment must accommodate permanent and temporary bridges, particularly in hilly terrain. The responsibility for response remains another grey area that requires attention.
Disasters are often rationalised as ‘an act of God’, rendering no one liable. However, responding to them is our responsibility and is inescapable. While many agencies construct new infrastructure, they expect others to be the first responders during disruptions. The losses do not impact them directly. A key area that needs urgent attention is the replacement of distressed bridges. The initial response when critical bridges collapse is typically left to the Army, who improvise with whatever resources they have. Although the response is widely appreciated for its speed and the determination displayed by the services, helping to relieve locals, it can hardly be deemed a resilient approach. It remains a temporary fix that stays sub-optimal for extended periods thereafter.
The Army also requires logistic bridges that can be deployed quickly. NATO specifies that two-way Class 24 bridges must have a minimum width of 5.5 meters. This width can accommodate single-lane Class 70 traffic, which is necessary for carrying the heavier loads projected by them to MORTH. This is the minimum that the Army should plan to ensure a more resilient logistics chain during operations along the Northern Borders. Additionally, any operational plan must include the ability to respond effectively to disruptions. As the first responders during disasters, the Army’s inventory could encompass such bridges, which would be advantageous for both civil and military purposes during peacetime, thereby enhancing the Army’s logistics resilience during hostilities.
The industry will gear up to meet these requirements only if there is sufficient demand and clarity regarding what is needed. The technology and design skills are not lacking; what is missing is someone to take the lead in firming up the requirements. Too many agencies require such bridges, each waiting for someone else to take the initiative.
Anticipatory action and clear delegation are crucial for a swift response. Alongside responsibility, efficiently allocating resources is essential through simple mobilisation drills. The current disaster response procedures must address the gaps identified through experience and respond to them promptly. Delays come at a significant cost. Complicating matters further is the number of agencies involved. Effective coordination necessitates an apex body to oversee operations with the authority to implement decisions, where ultimate accountability lies.
Conclusion.
To summarise, resilient logistics along our borders are essential for both the development of border areas and military logistics during peace and war. Disruptions to logistics in these areas come at an enormous cost to the state and are being ignored. Recognising the value of resilient logistics can lead to more pragmatic policies and funding for this endeavour.
The examples given here reflect the experiences of just one person. Institutional memory offers a broader perspective. Learning from these experiences must be formalised to assist with regular upgrades. Action must be coordinated at the highest level because logistics, infrastructure, and border security involve multiple ministries and numerous government agencies. They need to be synergised to enhance the resilience of logistics. Anticipatory action, informed by experience, will remain the key to a quick and resilient response.
Author Brief Bio: Lt. Gen S Ravi Shankar, PVSM, VSM, is a former Director General of Border Roads. He has extensive experience in planning and executing infrastructure Projects in challenging terrain and working under extreme conditions. He was instrumental in the launch of the first 3rd Generation Modular Steel Panel Bridge in India and has assisted in drafting the IRC Code for such bridges to enable wider application.
References:
[i] RAJKUMAR BOBICHAND. (2020, November 7). Collapse of Bailey Bridge on Irang River Throws Traffic and Safety Measures in Total Disarray» Imphal Review of Arts and Politics. Imphal Review of Arts and Politics»» Stories behind Northeast News Events. https://imphalreviews.in/collapse-of-bailey-bridge-on-irang-river-throws-traffic-and-safety-measures-in-total-disarray/
[ii] Table in Figure 2 has been prepared based on the GSDP data obtained from ‘Report on Manipur, Nov 2022 by Indian Brand Equity foundation (BEF)’ and thereafter making reasonable assumptions for the computation.
[iii] Launch of First 3rd Gen Modular Steel Panel Bridge in India. The bridge was launched at Sonprayag as a part of the Uttarakhand Disaster Relief Programme, funded by the World Bank. The author was a part of the consultancy team for design of bridges in this project. More details available in a Case Study of this Bridge published in CEAI Magazine, Viewpoint, Dec 2021 Edition, Pages 91-99, by Lt Gen S Ravi Shankar.
[iv] DGBRDelhi. (2011, November 22). BRO in Sikkim. YouTube. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=J8zEm3mfL3w&list=FLVqcmuH2roXczfHIiR5j8EA&index=58; and DGBRDelhi. (2011, October 3). Interview PartII. YouTube. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pvhCzpQyAqI&list=FLVqcmuH2roXczfHIiR5j8EA&index=58
[v] BRO and Sikkim Earthquake. (n.d.). Www.youtube.com. Retrieved April 21, 2025, from https://www.youtube.com/clip/UgkxdgW4hU3zYv2VDogHCCixiwJoasf1k7Cj
