I. Introduction

Piracy has been a longstanding threat to maritime trade, evolving from physical attacks on merchant vessels to sophisticated cyberattacks on shipping infrastructure. The Indian Ocean, historically a critical maritime corridor, has witnessed both traditional piracy and its digital counterpart. While naval efforts have mitigated physical threats, cyber piracy remains an emerging challenge with far-reaching implications.

Modern maritime operations rely on digital technology, making them vulnerable to cyberattacks. From hacking into Automated Identification Systems[i] (AIS) to GPS spoofing and ransomware attacks on shipping companies, cyber piracy disrupts trade and compromises security. The Indian Ocean region, home to major maritime players such as India, Sri Lanka, and Indonesia, is particularly susceptible. Cybercriminals—often state-backed or linked to criminal syndicates—exploit digital vulnerabilities for economic gain or geopolitical leverage. Given the region’s importance to global commerce, securing its digital infrastructure is as crucial as protecting its physical waters.

II. Legal Challenges in Addressing Maritime Cyber Piracy

International maritime law primarily deals with physical piracy. The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) defines piracy under Article 101[ii] as “any illegal acts of violence or detention committed for private ends on the high seas.” This definition, however, does not encompass cyberattacks, making it difficult to prosecute digital piracy under existing legal frameworks. The International Maritime Organization (IMO) has taken steps to address cybersecurity threats through various guidelines. IMO Resolution MSC.428(98) (2017)[iii] mandates shipowners to incorporate cybersecurity risk management into safety management systems. The International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code (2004)[iv] provides security protocols but lacks specificity on cyber threats. The Budapest Convention on Cybercrime (2001)[v] provides a broad legal framework for prosecuting cybercriminals but lacks maritime-specific provisions. Without clear international legal instruments addressing cyber piracy, prosecution remains difficult, leaving digital vulnerabilities in maritime trade exposed.

India has recognized the cyber threat to its maritime sector and has initiated several legal mechanisms to address it. The Information Technology Act, 2000 (IT Act) is the primary cyber law in India, which penalizes hacking under Section 66[vi], identity theft under Section 66C[vii], and cyber terrorism under Section 66F[viii]. However, it does not have specific provisions related to maritime cyber piracy. The Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS) 2023 under Section 61[ix] and Section 316[x] discuss about criminal conspiracy and cheating which can be applied on cyber piracy cases.

The Admiralty (Jurisdiction and Settlement of Maritime Claims) Act, 2017[xi] primarily deals with physical maritime disputes but could potentially be extended to cover digital maritime breaches through judicial interpretation. The National Cyber Security Policy, 2013[xii] provides a framework for cybersecurity but lacks maritime-specific provisions. There is currently no direct legal provision in Indian law that criminalizes cyber piracy in the maritime domain, creating a gap that could be exploited by attackers.

While there are no landmark cases directly addressing maritime cyber piracy, some precedents in related cybercrime cases in India offer insights. The case of Shreya Singhal v. Union of India (2015)[xiii] struck down Section 66A of the IT Act, clarifying that laws on cyber threats need to be precise and narrowly defined. Anvar P.V. v. P.K. Basheer (2014)[xiv] established the importance of electronic evidence, which could be relevant for prosecuting cyber pirates. Sony Sambandam v. State of Tamil Nadu (2020)[xv] highlighted liability in cyber fraud cases, potentially relevant for shipping companies seeking damages.

III. Analysis of the Situation: Strengthening Cybersecurity in the Indian Ocean

The complexity of cyber threats in the maritime industry has grown with the adoption of smart shipping and automated logistics. Some of the most concerning cyber threats include GPS spoofing[xvi], AIS manipulation, ransomware attacks, and cyberattacks on ports. Ships rely on GPS and AIS for navigation, and cyber pirates can manipulate these systems, leading vessels off-course or disguising pirate vessels as legitimate ones. In 2019, Iranian tankers were suspected of using AIS spoofing to evade U.S. sanctions. Ransomware attacks on shipping companies have also demonstrated the financial risks involved. In 2017, Maersk, the world’s largest shipping company, was hit by the NotPetya[xvii] ransomware, disrupting operations and causing losses of $300 million. Indian ports have not been immune either. In 2021[xviii], Jawaharlal Nehru Port Trust (JNPT) faced a cyberattack that disrupted cargo handling. Given the economic impact of such incidents, cyber piracy is not just a technical issue but a national security concern. A disrupted maritime supply chain can affect energy imports, trade, and even military logistics.

The Indian Ocean region is particularly susceptible to these threats due to its high volume of trade and strategic importance. It is critical for countries, especially India, to recognize that cyber piracy is more than just a criminal issue; it is a real geopolitical menace. The rise of state-sponsored cyber warfare has added another dimension to this threat. For instance, cyberattacks on maritime networks could be used as a tool of economic coercion or as a prelude to military action. While major naval powers such as the United States and China have invested heavily in cyber defence for their maritime infrastructure, Indian Ocean nations must urgently develop similar capabilities. This necessitates drafting better laws that directly address maritime cyber piracy. Amending existing laws, such as the IT Act and the Admiralty Act, to include provisions on cyber threats at sea would be a significant step forward. Regional cooperation among Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) member states could also lead to a more coordinated approach to cybersecurity, including intelligence sharing and joint cyber patrols.

India and other Indian Ocean nations must update their legal frameworks to address cyber piracy effectively. Some proposed reforms include amending the IT Act to introduce specific provisions for maritime cyber piracy, with penalties proportionate to the economic and security damage caused. Indian courts should recognize cyber piracy as part of maritime law, allowing affected parties to seek redress under the Admiralty Jurisdiction. Regional legal cooperation should also be established through organizations like IORA and BIMSTEC to handle cross-border cyber piracy cases. Cybersecurity in maritime infrastructure must be enhanced through AI-based threat detection, blockchain for cargo tracking, and ethical hacking audits. International collaboration is also essential. India, through its Indo-Pacific strategy, has been increasing maritime cooperation. The QUAD’s Indo-Pacific Cybersecurity Initiative can help in intelligence sharing on maritime cyber threats. The Information Fusion Centre – Indian Ocean Region (IFC-IOR), based in Gurugram, can be expanded to focus more on cyber threats. Joint naval exercises such as MILAN and Malabar should incorporate cybersecurity training to prepare for potential digital threats in maritime operations.

IV. Conclusion

The shift from traditional piracy to cyber piracy presents new challenges for maritime security in the Indian Ocean. While existing laws and frameworks provide some protection, there is an urgent need for more robust legal provisions, regional cooperation, and advanced technological measures. As trade and geopolitics become increasingly digitized, securing maritime cyber infrastructure is no longer an option—it is a necessity. The Indian Ocean, a historical theatre of naval dominance, must now also become a leader in cybersecurity, ensuring that the region remains both economically vibrant and digitally secure.

Ultimately, the fight against cyber piracy is not just about protecting ships and ports—it is about securing the global economy. The Indian Ocean must transition from being a vulnerable digital battleground to a leader in maritime cybersecurity. Only then can it maintain its status as a thriving hub of global commerce in the digital age.

Author Brief Bio: Yashawardhana is a dedicated legal professional with extensive experience in research, policy analysis, and legal writing. Currently serving as a Research Fellow at India Foundation, he has interned with prominent institutions including the Supreme Court of India, multiple High Courts across India, and the office of a Member of Parliament. Yashawardhana holds a BA LLB from Jindal Global Law School. He has also completed a Winter School in Public Policy Analysis at TISS, Hyderabad. His academic interests extend to tech law, international law and governance, highlighted by his writings for multiple forums. His skills include legal research, policy writing, and leadership, with a passion for law and governance.

 

Endnotes:

[i] Global Fishing Watch. “What is AIS?” Global Fishing Watch. Last modified September 22, 2020. https://globalfishingwatch.org/faqs/what-is-ais/.

[ii] United Nations. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. Article 101. December 10, 1982. https://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/unclos_e.pdf.

[iii] International Maritime Organization. Resolution MSC.428(98). May 15, 2017. https://wwwcdn.imo.org/localresources/en/OurWork/Security/Documents/Resolution%20MSC.428(98).pdf.

[iv] International Maritime Organization. “SOLAS XI-2 ISPS Code.” International Maritime Organization. Accessed February 3, 2025. https://www.imo.org/en/OurWork/Security/Pages/SOLAS-XI-2%20ISPS%20Code.aspx.

[v] Council of Europe. “The Budapest Convention.” Council of Europe. Accessed February 3, 2025. https://www.coe.int/en/web/cybercrime/the-budapest-convention.

[vi] Government of India. Information Technology Act, 2000. Section 66. Last updated December 2020. https://www.indiacode.nic.in/bitstream/123456789/13116/1/it_act_2000_updated.pdf.

[vii] Government of India. Information Technology Act, 2000. Section 66C. Last updated December 2020. https://www.indiacode.nic.in/bitstream/123456789/13116/1/it_act_2000_updated.pdf.

[viii] Government of India. Information Technology Act, 2000. Section 66F. Last updated December 2020. https://www.indiacode.nic.in/bitstream/123456789/13116/1/it_act_2000_updated.pdf.

[ix] Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India. The Indian Penal Code, 1860. Section 61. Last modified April 1, 2024. https://www.mha.gov.in/sites/default/files/250883_english_01042024.pdf.

[x] Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India. The Indian Penal Code, 1860. Section 316. Last modified April 1, 2024. https://www.mha.gov.in/sites/default/files/250883_english_01042024.pdf.

[xi] Government of India. The Admiralty (Jurisdiction and Settlement of Maritime Claims) Act, 2017. Act No. 2 of 2017. Last updated 2017. https://www.indiacode.nic.in/bitstream/123456789/2631/1/A2017-2.pdf.

[xii] Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology, Government of India. National Cyber Security Policy, 2013. July 2013. https://www.meity.gov.in/writereaddata/files/downloads/National_cyber_security_policy-2013%281%29.pdf.

[xiii] Shreya Singhal v. Union of India, (2015) 5 SCC 1 (India).

[xiv] Anvar P.V. v. P.K. Basheer, (2014) 10 SCC 473 (India).

[xv] Sony Sambandam v. State of Tamil Nadu, (2020) 9 SCC 461 (India).

[xvi] U.S. Department of Justice. “Justice Department Announces Terrorism and Sanctions Evasion Charges and Seizures Linked to International Cybercriminal Activity.” Last modified January 15, 2021. https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-announces-terrorism-and-sanctions-evasion-charges-and-seizures-linked.

[xvii] “Throwback Attack: How NotPetya Accidentally Took Down Global Shipping Giant Maersk.” Last modified July 13, 2017. https://www.controleng.com/throwback-attack-how-notpetya-accidentally-took-down-global-shipping-giant-maersk/.

[xviii] “Cyberattack Prompts System Outage at JNPT Container Terminal.” Last modified November 23, 2020. https://www.porttechnology.org/news/cyberattack-prompts-system-outage-at-jnpt-container-terminal/.

 

The end of the Cold War heralded a brief age of unipolarity with the United States as the sole superpower. After nearly five centuries of Cold War between the US and Soviet Union, or between the forces of liberal capitalism and communism, the Soviet disintegration spelled for some analysts the “end of history.”[i] Events since 1991 have, unsurprisingly, confirmed otherwise. Unipolarity in the international system has been supplanted by multipolarity as the nucleus of power began to shift away from Western Europe and North America.

Power is no more merely gauged by military personnel, arms and ammunition, though their importance in the anarchic international system is abiding. Power has come to be defined in terms of control over supply chains, research and development in frontier technologies, norm-making, and cultural influence. Consequently, the notion of the Global South has attained salience, as countries that had heretofore been subjected to imperial domination have become economic powerhouses, specialising in distinct spheres of economic activity and benefitting from the forces of globalisation. Today, the Global South hosts 85%[ii] of the world’s population, 42% of global GDP,[iii] and over 60% of foreign direct investment inflows. Countries such as India, Indonesia, and Brazil are regional leaders, while China[iv], the world’s largest trading power, is locked in competition with the US for economic and political influence. Whereas institutions are yet to reform to adequately register these changes, the Global South has ceased to be a norm-taker, instead founding institutions steeped in its issues and geopolitical realities, and, instead of taking norms handed down by the West, reflecting the latter’s concerns. The Indo-Pacific region,[v] in particular, sits at the heart of the Global South, home to over 60% if global maritime trade and half of the world’s GDP, and several maritime choke-points like the Bab el-Mandab and the Straits of Malacca.

The Global South: Origins  

The Global South has, today, assumed agency: it is no longer the site of great power competition. However, the notion is framed from a sense of inadequacy and a history of colonial domination and resource extraction by the industrialised Global North. When Carl Oglesby utilised the concept in the context of the Vietnam War, he saw the war from the prism of continued imperial domination. The North-South dichotomy was accentuated by the drawing of the Brandt Line,[vi] neatly dividing the world into industrialised and developing/under-developed halves.

In the immediate aftermath of decolonisation and the beginning of the Cold War, the shared experience of exploitation and the resultant poverty served as a strong organising principle for the countries of the Global South that wished to create an alternative to the ideological and geopolitical rivalry between the US and USSR. Leaders of anti-colonial struggles, who eventually became founding figures of their postcolonial nation-states, convened under the banner of anti-imperial solidarity during the Bandung, Asian Relations, and Afro-Asian Conferences, eventually founding the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) in 1961. Besides the NAM, the G77 and the demand for a New International Economic Order (NIEO) accentuated the normative weight of the Global South. Undeniably, these experiments were critical in securing financial and technological assistance from both the superpowers, but the balance was, at best, tenuous: economic and technological aid came with conditionalities, and despite their moralism, members of the NAM had to make strategic and pragmatic calculations at odds with their professed beliefs,[vii] often relying on the support of one superpower or the other.

With the passage of time, it was thus inevitable for the bonds of solidarity to loosen. The countries of the Global South share an experience of colonisation and challenges of human security but little else. They are incredibly diverse[viii] in their geography, political cultures and systems, nature of economy, availability of resources, and other socio-cultural identities like religion and ethnicity. The rate of adoption of new technologies and innovation is not uniform across the Global South, implying that some countries have benefitted more from the opportunities of economic growth and integration with the world economy than others. Distinctive levels of prosperity translate into distinctive national interests and state capacities[ix] to mobilise and exhibit power. Resultantly, the Global South is fragmented, with a few emerging market economies, also influential powers in their respective regions, possessing a relatively higher influence in agenda-shaping than the smaller economies of the Least Developed Countries (LDC)[x] that are in an unprecedented debt crisis[xi] and, consequently, unable to play a decisive role in norm-making. In addition to the economic gulf within the Global South, there are active geopolitical, territorial, and internecine disputes, and wars between developing countries are far more common.

Pragmatism and Nuance  

This should not discourage proponents of South-South cooperation, however. Despite what divides them, their challenges continue to unite them. In fact, although the origin of the term “Global South” is in reference to the Global North, particularly in what the latter possesses that the Global South does not, it will not be an overstatement to treat it as an empowering term with which countries wish to get associated. Unlike the pessimism and inadequacy that it conjured in the past, the Global South today stands for pragmatism, innovation, and promise. The stance of these countries during recent crises such as the Israel-Gaza War, Russia-Ukraine War, or the pandemic indicate that they pursue a pragmatic but not value-agnostic foreign policy. For instance, India condemned the terrorist attack in Israel on October 7, 2023[xii] while supporting a two-state solution and immediate ceasefire, supporting 10 of the 13 resolutions in the UN General Assembly introduced by Palestine. India is Israel’s second-largest trade partner in Asia, and the two constitute the I2U2 with the US and UAE. Similarly, whereas it condemned Russia’s violation of Ukrainian territory as an affront to national sovereignty, Brazil has not joined the West’s call to shun Russia, instead calling for a ceasefire, and welcomed the Russian Foreign Minister during a high-profile visit in 2023. Russia is a major supplier of fertilisers[xiii] to an agriculture-dominated economy.

This underscores the Global South’s independent course in its international relations and its defence of the rules-based international order. Its rhetoric and discourses are ensconced in the lexicon of international law and institutionalism. There have been calls for reforms in the policies of global governance for better representation of the people they affect. India and South Africa, for instance, were joined by other members of the World Trade Organisation from the Global South like Kenya, Eswatini, and Pakistan to waive TRIPS obligations[xiv] on COVID-19 vaccines for sharing the technical and scientific know-how in combatting the pandemic.

Countries in the Indo-Pacific, particularly the small island developing states (SIDS) have raised advocacy and awareness around issues of climate change and just, equitable transition that negotiates the need to cut emissions with their unique development challenges. Countries like the Maldives, Seychelles, and Mauritius, which face existential crises from the climate emergency, have raised advocacy and awareness around mitigation and adaptation based on the principles of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities.[xv] At the Conferences of Parties at Sharm El Sheikh, the Global South, particularly, the vulnerable states in the Indo-Pacific, came together on a common platform provided by the G77, led by Pakistan and supported by China, and secured the Loss and Damage Fund for the losses incurred by developing states due to extreme climate events. The demand for compensations from the Global North—which, according to historical data on emissions, are responsible for over 90% excess global emissions and over 50% of the damage sustained by developing countries due to climate-related events—was raised as far back as the 1990s. It took constant pursuit and cataclysmic climate events in the Indo-Pacific, viz. the floods in Pakistan in 2022, drought in China, and heat-waves in South Asia, for the vulnerable states to secure this funding.

The Global South is, as its record shows, not a disruptor. Developing countries try to reform international institutions from within, reposing faith in their utility and the values of multilateralism. This is demonstrated by the voices for reforming the UN Security Council, the voting rights in the International Monetary Fund, and the issues encompassed by the World Trade Organisation and multilateral development banks. But they have engaged with other multilateral and minilateral forums too, depending on their national interests, especially when the procedures and pre-occupations of the US-led order have been too indifferent, reinforcing their pragmatist streak, coupled with enshrining the values crucial to the Global South. These forums have cropped up in their regional milieux, deeply embedded in the issues faced by the countries of the region. China’s regional forum diplomacy, evinced in the Forum for China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), among others, is an attempt at socialising the developing countries irate with the methods of the Global North to a China-centric world order.[xvi] China-led multilateral development banks are among the fastest-growing, providing an alternative and flexible medium of accessing development finance to plug infrastructure gaps.

To conclude, the notion of the Global South, as examined in this article, has undergone consequential shifts since the term gained currency in the context of decolonisation. From a position of inadequacy relative to the Global North, these countries have acquired agency and confidence to assert their demands and influence in regional and international affairs. Politics in the world, and the Indo-Pacific in particular, is being shaped by middle and small powers in the Global South. Whereas the concept is not inclusive of the economic, political, and cultural diversity of these countries, it unites them despite these differences to advocate for a just, rules-based international order. These countries have dexterously utilised multilateral and minilateral platforms to give tangible shape to their policy positions and have gone on to join and introduce new institutions when the existing ones seemed to have ceased to perform their role. The Global South is faced with a myriad challenges, notably climate change, supply chain disruptions, and an unjust international financial architecture. But now, unlike in the past, these countries seem to have the tools of pragmatic, interest-driven (but value-based) foreign policy to weather them and improve the living standards of their citizens.

 

Author Brief Bio: Parth Seth is a research fellow at the India Foundation. His interest lies in the themes of multilateralism, development, middle powers, and great power competition. He focuses on South Asia, the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), and Chinese foreign policy. While interning at several think tanks, he has assisted researchers in the domains of strategic studies, public policy, and international development. He has written for websites and journals on the themes of South Asia, China, MENA, and the intersection of political philosophy and policy. He completed his postgraduate studies in International Relations from the London School of Economics and Political Science and holds an undergraduate degree in political science from the Ramjas College of the University of Delhi.

 

References:

[i] Francis Fukuyama. “The End of History?” The National Interest, no. 16 (1989), pp.3–18.

[ii] Jacob Bergstrand, “How Much of the Global South Is on Ukraine’s Side?” Peterson Institute for International Economics, March 8, 2023, https://www.piie.com/blogs/realtime-economics/2023/much-global-south-ukraines-side.

[iii] UN Trade and Development, Rising Global South Needs Development Rethink to Continue Momentum – UNCTAD Deputy, https://unctad.org/news/rising-global-south-needs-development-rethink-continue-momentum-unctad-deputy

[iv] CEBR, “We forecast that China will be the world’s largest economy for only 21 years before the US overtakes again in 2057. And by 2081 India will have overtaken the US. How does this affect geopolitics?” CEBR, July 24, 2023, https://cebr.com/blogs/we-forecast-that-china-will-be-the-worlds-largest-economy-for-only-21-years-before-the-us-overtakes-again-in-2057-and-by-2081-india-will-have-overtaken-the-us-how-does-this-affect-geopoliti/

[v] US Department of State, Indo-Pacific Strategy (Washington, DC: Department of State, 2022).

[vi] Nicholas Lees, “The Brandt Line after forty years: The more North–South relations change, the more they stay the same?” BISA, November 23, 2020, https://www.bisa.ac.uk/articles/brandt-line-after-forty-years-more-north-south-relations-change-more-they-stay-same

[vii] Muhammad Badiul Alam, “The Concept of Non-Alignment: A Critical Analysis,” World Affairs, vol 140, no. 2 (1977), pp. 166-185, https://www.jstor.org/stable/20671723  

[viii] C Raja Mohan, “Is There Such a Thing as the Global South?” Foreign Policy, December 9, 2023, https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/12/09/global-south-definition-meaning-countries-development/

[ix] Fareed Zakaria, From Wealth to Power:  The Unusual Origins of American Power (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998).   

[x] Huang Tran, “Breaking down China and India’s race to represent the Global South,” Atlantic Council, October 20, 2023, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/econographics/breaking-down-china-and-indias-race-to-represent-the-global-south/

[xi] United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, A World of Debt: A Growing Burden to Global Prosperity (Geneva: UNCTAD, 2024).

[xii] Ministry of External Affairs, “Question No-1195 India’s Position in United Nations on the Israel-Palestine Conflict,” [Press Release], December 5, 2024, https://www.mea.gov.in/rajya-sabha.htm?dtl/38685/QUESTION+NO1195+INDIAS+POSITION+IN+UNITED+NATIONS+ON+THE+ISRAELPALESTINE+CONFLICT#:~:text=India%20has%20strongly%20condemned%20the,conflict%20through%20dialogue%20and%20diplomacy.

[xiii] OEC, Brazil-Russia, https://oec.world/en/profile/bilateral-country/bra/partner/rus

[xiv] World Trade Organization, TRIPS Council Welcomes MC12 TRIPS Waiver Decision, Discusses Possible Extension, July 6, 2022, https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news22_e/trip_08jul22_e.htm   

[xv] United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, art. 3, sec. 1.

[xvi] Chris Alden and Ana Cristina Alves. “China’s Regional Forum Diplomacy in the Developing World: Socialisation and the “Sinosphere”,” Journal of Contemporary China, vol. 26, no. 103 (2016), pp.151-165, https://doi.org/10.1080/10670564.2016.1206276

Introduction

The India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC), launched by India at the G20 Summit in September 2023[1], marks a transformative initiative for trade, infrastructure, and energy cooperation across Asia, the Middle East, and Europe. An MOU on IMEC was signed by India, the US, Saudi Arabia, UAE, European Union, Italy, France and Germany. The IMEC comprises of an Eastern Corridor connecting India to the Gulf region and a Northern Corridor connecting the Gulf region to Europe. The IMEC envisions greater connectivity through rail, ports, and digital infrastructure. However, one of its most critical but underexplored opportunities lies in energy transition—specifically, the interconnection of electricity grids between India and the Middle East. By leveraging clean energy resources and enhancing cross-border electricity trade, India and the Middle East nations can foster a low-carbon economic future while securing energy supplies and boosting economic competitiveness.

The Strategic Case for Electricity Interconnection

1. Abundant Renewable Energy Resources

India and the Middle East collectively hold some of the world’s richest renewable energy resources. India has an ambitious non-fossil fuels capacity target of 500 GW by 2030[2], primarily driven by solar and wind power. The Middle East, particularly Saudi Arabia and the UAE, has also embarked on large-scale investments in solar energy, exemplified by projects like the Mohammed bin Rashid Al Maktoum Solar Park in Dubai and the Neom Green Hydrogen Project in Saudi Arabia. Grid interconnection would enable efficient utilization of these resources by allowing power to flow where and when it is needed, reducing curtailment and optimizing capacity utilization.

The One Sun One World One Grid (OSOWOG) initiative, launched by Prime Minister Narendra Modi at Glasgow Climate COP26[3], aligns closely with this vision. OSOWOG seeks to create a globally interconnected solar power grid, allowing renewable electricity to be shared across continents. Integrating IMEC with OSOWOG could strengthen energy trade, promote sustainable energy distribution, and enhance resilience against climate change-induced disruptions. According to OSOWOG feasibility studies[4], India-Middle East electricity interconnection could drive significant cost savings by tapping into the region’s high solar energy potential, reducing dependency on fossil fuels, and creating a more balanced power supply across peak demand period.

2. Economic Potential of OSOWOG in India-Middle East Electricity Trade

OSOWOG aims to unlock substantial economic benefits through electricity interconnections. The economic rationale for linking India and the Middle East lies in:

• Lower Cost of Renewable Energy: The Middle East has some of the world’s lowest solar energy production costs, often below $0.02 per kWh. By integrating with India’s grid, surplus solar power can be exported to meet India’s growing electricity demand, reducing the need for expensive coal-based generation.
• Energy Security and Market Stability: India currently imports over 85% of its crude oil needs. Electricity interconnection through OSOWOG and IMEC could help reduce reliance on fossil fuel imports while stabilizing energy prices by providing a diversified energy mix.
• Investment in Infrastructure: The feasibility phase of OSOWOG conducted by EDF, France and TERI, India, highlights that regional grid integration between India and the Middle East could drive investments exceeding $100 billion in transmission infrastructure, energy storage, and renewable energy capacity expansion.
• Climate Mitigation and Carbon Reduction: The power sector contributes nearly 40% of global CO2 emissions. By enabling large-scale renewable electricity trade, OSOWOG could reduce annual CO2 emissions by an estimated 1.5 billion metric tons across connected regions.

3. Enhancing Energy Security and Resilience

Energy security is a shared priority for India and the Gulf nations. India remains heavily dependent on fossil fuel imports, while Middle Eastern countries seek economic diversification away from hydrocarbon exports. An interconnected electricity grid can serve as a stabilizing force, ensuring energy supply reliability while reducing reliance on expensive and volatile fossil fuel markets. This integration would also support grid flexibility, enabling demand-side management and efficient power balancing. Additionally, OSOWOG’s proposed policy frameworks focus on enabling financial models that encourage private sector participation and long-term sustainability of interregional power grids.

Learning from Global Grid Interconnection Examples

Global experience[5] suggests that regional electricity trade and integration have significant economic, security, and environmental benefits. Key examples include:

• European Internal Energy Market (ENTSO-E): The European interconnected grid system has reduced electricity costs by €5 billion annually while ensuring supply stability.
• Pan-Arab Electricity Market (PAEM): Estimated cost savings of $107–196 billion between 2018–2035 due to reduced reserve costs and fuel expenditures.
• Southern African Power Pool (SAPP): A coordinated integration plan saved $34 billion in investments and $3 billion in operational costs compared to uncoordinated national approaches.
• Xlinks Morocco-UK Power Project: A submarine HVDC transmission system is set to supply the UK with low-cost Moroccan solar energy, demonstrating the viability of long-distance renewable energy trade.

The successful integration of these projects highlights the feasibility of India-Middle East electricity interconnection under OSOWOG, leveraging a mix of regional cooperation, regulatory harmonization, and infrastructure investments.

Technical and Economic Feasibility of India-Middle East Grid Interconnection

1. Existing Cross-Border Electricity Infrastructure

The concept of electricity interconnection is not new. The Gulf Cooperation Council Interconnection Authority (GCCIA)[6] has already established a power grid linking Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait, and Oman. Similarly, India has strong interconnections with its neighbors, including Nepal, Bhutan, and Bangladesh. Extending these frameworks to facilitate India-Middle East electricity trade is a logical next step.

The OSOWOG framework could provide a global blueprint for structuring these interconnections, allowing Middle Eastern and Indian grids to synchronize and trade electricity more effectively.

2. Transmission Technologies and Infrastructure

High-voltage direct current (HVDC) transmission systems, which allow efficient long-distance electricity transfer with minimal losses, could play a key role in linking India and the Gulf. Submarine HVDC cables, similar to the proposed Xlinks Morocco-UK Power Project, offer a viable solution for transmitting renewable energy across the Arabian Sea. Given recent advancements in energy storage and grid management technologies, such interconnections are becoming increasingly feasible both technically and economically. The recently launched Manufacturing Mission by the Government of India[7] focusing on cleantech manufacturing such as solar, high voltage direct current transmission lines and other components. Inter-regional electricity interconnector could offer demand boost to cleantech manufacturing industry in India.

3. Economic Viability and Investment Landscape

Investments in electricity interconnections can be justified by multiple economic benefits, including reduced generation costs, enhanced reliability, and improved energy trade dynamics. Institutions like the World Bank, Asian Development Bank (ADB), and sovereign wealth funds from the Gulf could play a role in financing such projects. Additionally, multilateral agreements under IMEC could include provisions for energy cooperation, facilitating regulatory alignment and tariff structures.

Policy and Geopolitical Considerations

1. Regional and Bilateral Agreements

India and the UAE have already signed agreements[8] to collaborate on renewable energy projects, including grid integration. A structured policy framework within IMEC could formalize these commitments, enabling clearer investment and regulatory pathways. The International Solar Alliance (ISA)[9], founded by India, could also facilitate cross-border electricity trade by harmonizing standards and promoting regional cooperation. The ISA is actively progressing towards its vision, leveraging intergovernmental support to overcome challenges. With support from the World Bank, a consortium led by France’s EDF and TRI is conducting technical studies for pilot interconnections. Progress has been made in India and globally, with collaborations extending to Sri Lanka, the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Singapore. A regulatory framework for inter-regional connections is anticipated soon. ISA is actively engaging in intergovernmental discussions to pave the way for successful OSOWOG implementation.

OSOWOG and IMEC could serve as a diplomatic and technical framework for enabling these partnerships, ensuring that investments in energy interconnections align with broader global climate commitments.

2. Addressing Geopolitical Risks

While IMEC presents a promising framework for energy connectivity, geopolitical complexities must be managed carefully. Stability in the Middle East is crucial for the success of any long-term infrastructure investments. Engaging neutral platforms such as the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA)[10] of the World Bank Group could help de-risk investments and create trust-based mechanisms for grid management.

Conclusion

The IMEC offers a historic opportunity to redefine energy cooperation through cross-border electricity interconnection. By integrating power grids, India and the Gulf nations can unlock a new era of sustainable growth, energy security, and industrial decarbonization. Strategic investments in grid infrastructure, supported by enabling policies and regional cooperation, will be critical to realizing this vision. In a world racing toward net-zero emissions, leveraging IMEC for clean energy trade and aligning it with OSOWOG can position India and the Middle East as global leaders in the energy transition. Such mega projects will also boost demand for cleantech manufacturing in India under the Manufacturing Mission.

Author Brief Bio: Shri Jagjeet Singh Sareen is Partner and Global Lead, Climate Practice, Dalberg Advisors, and Member Secretary of the Bharat Climate Forum.

 

References:

[1] Press Release: Press Information Bureau

[2] 500GW Nonfossil Fuel Target | Government of India | Ministry of Power

[3] UK and India launch new grids initiative to deliver clean power to the world – GOV.UK

[4] 52e970d74272c9079053d966043b80.pdf

[5] G20 Energy Transition Working Group Report on Globally Interconnected Power Grids and Markets for a Secure and Resilient Energy Transition

[6][6] GCC Interconnection Authority

[7] Press Release:Press Information Bureau

[8] Press Release:Press Information Bureau

[9] International Solar Alliance

[10] Homepage | World Bank Group Guarantees | MIGA

Separated by over 1,300 km from the mainland, the Andaman and Nicobar Islands have long been considered a potential strategic outpost for India. However, their true strategic importance has only recently come into focus. This paper analyses the significance of the Andaman and Nicobar Islands for India and the current status of developmental activities to maximise their potential.

 

Geography and Its Impact on India’s National Strategy

Geography studies the Earth’s surface, physical features, location, size and shape, natural resources, and climate. It significantly influences a nation’s strategy across its political, economic, security, and diplomatic spheres. The unique character of the geographical entity of India includes vast expanses of land, snow-covered mountains, plains, deserts, an extended coastline, and islands. It is the seventh largest country in the world, with land boundaries of over 15000 km. India shares maritime borders with five countries. Its total coastline is 7,516 km long, comprising 5,422 km for the mainland, 132 km for the Lakshadweep Islands, and 1,962 km for the Andaman and Nicobar Islands. The Indian peninsula extends 1,980 km into the Indian Ocean.

Fifty percent of the Indian Ocean basin lies within a 1,500 km radius of India, a fact that has strategic implications. India possesses 1,197 islands in the Indian Ocean, which include 836 islands, islets, and rocky outcrops in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands—31 of these are inhabited—and 23 in Lakshadweep, with 10 being inhabited. Additionally, there are 447 islands off the western coast and 151 islands off the eastern coast. The extensive coastline affords India significant strategic access to vital sea routes, enabling monitoring and controlling of major chokepoints such as the Strait of Malacca while ensuring freedom of navigation in the Indo-Pacific region. It also facilitates strategic engagements with its Southeast Asian neighbours through the Act East Policy to counter China’s influence and foster closer ties with Middle Eastern nations for energy security on the western front. These diverse geographical features have shaped India’s defence policies, economic development, and international relations.

Geography, therefore, is highly significant in international relations and plays a vital role in shaping world order. It serves multiple functions, such as establishing sovereignty, maintaining peace and security, facilitating effective governance, and allowing a country to exert global influence in shaping foreign policy, defence strategies, and control over natural resources.^[1]

Current Global Order

The current global order is fragile and transforming at a remarkable pace. It is becoming more complex and dangerous than ever. Ever-changing geopolitical dynamics, economic realignments, and emerging challenges mark this landscape. The geopolitical churn in the Indian Ocean Region has escalated to a feverish pitch. Four major evolving geopolitical dynamics currently reshaping the global order include the following:

• Transition from a unipolar world dominated by the US to a multipolar world in which China, Russia, the EU, and regional powers play significant roles.
• The ongoing conflict between Russia and Ukraine is resulting in sanctions and geopolitical tensions.
• The Israel-Palestine conflict is causing realignments in the Middle East.
• The strategic competition between the US and China makes the Indo-Pacific region a geopolitical and economic centre of gravity.

These geopolitical developments hinder the world’s ability to establish a stable, inclusive, and peaceful global order that could promote inclusive growth and collaboratively tackle shared threats such as climate change.

The Indo-Pacific Region

 

(https://redlanternanalytica.com/india-in-the-indo-pacific-strategic-significance-and-geopolitical-dynamics/)

The Indo-Pacific region refers to the vast geographic area extending from the east coast of Africa to the western coast of the Americas, encompassing the Indian Ocean and the western and central Pacific Ocean, including the seas and straits that connect them. The term “Indo-Pacific” has gained prominence in recent years, particularly in geopolitical discussions and regional security strategies. It is home to major economies, including China, India, Japan, the ASEAN nations, and Australia. The region is home to 65% of the world’s population and accounts for 63% of the world’s GDP. Additionally, 40% of global trade passes through the South China Sea^[2]. It is fast developing into the world’s centre of gravity.

Major challenges faced by the region include the complex power dynamics stemming from economic difficulties, environmental issues, and non-traditional security threats. China’s rapid economic and military growth, maritime disputes in the South China Sea, and competing interests of the US, China, and regional powers are creating a shift in global attention towards the Indo-Pacific. Amongst the major powers, the US, China, India, the UK, and Australia all have a naval presence in the region. Over the years, several alliances and regional organisations have been established to counter the ever-expanding Chinese influence in the area. Some of the most significant are the QUAD (Quadrilateral Security Dialogue – US, India, Japan, and Australia), ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations), and RCEP (Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership). The US, India, Japan, and Australia advocate for a Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP).

In relation to India in the Indo-Pacific, China’s increasing influence has led it to engage with various friendly nations and emerging partners pragmatically. Its approach in the Indo-Pacific is built upon four pillars:

• Collaboration to address shared concerns.
• Avoid ‘alliances of containment’ – do not compel others to choose sides.
• Embrace evolution rather than revolution in regional order.
• Recognising regional institutions and groupings as a crucial foundation for the future order.^[3]

In the 21st century, the Indo-Pacific has become a pivotal region in the changing world order. Here, economic interdependence coexists with geopolitical tensions. The region’s stability will depend on how major powers manage competition and cooperation.

Indian Ocean Region

 

The vast geographical region of the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) extends from the west coast of Africa to Antarctica in the south and the Southeast Asian Region in the east. It connects the Persian Gulf, the Suez Canal, and the Strait of Malacca, establishing itself as a crucial maritime highway for international trade. The Indian Ocean has three main choke points: the Strait of Malacca in the east and the Strait of Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb in the west. The blockage of any of these would disrupt seaborne trade and lead to uncontrolled volatility in oil and commodity prices, resulting in upheavals in the global economy. In this strategically significant region of the IOR, India is situated at the tri-junction of Western, Southern, and Southeast Asia. It enjoys strategic centrality, dominating the IOR and its Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCs), making it the largest stakeholder in the region^[4]. “India is at the crossroads of the Indian Ocean…We will be more dependent than before on the ocean and surrounding regions. We must also assume our responsibility to shape its future,” Prime Minister Narendra Modi declared in a speech in Mauritius in 2015.^[5] Today, the IOR remains vital to the security and stability of shipping lanes and trade routes, representing over one-third of the world’s bulk cargo traffic and two-thirds of the world’s oil shipments, thereby ensuring global access to food, precious metals, and energy resources.^[6]

China’s Malacca Dilemma, a term coined in 2003 by then President Hu Jintao, signifies the potential factors that could impede its economic development by restricting oil imports. The strategic position of the Strait of Malacca, located between the Sumatra Islands and the Malay Peninsula, with Singapore to its east, could be easily obstructed by rival nations of China, impacting the transportation of 80 per cent of its oil imports trade.^[7] Despite the increasing power of China and its endeavours to secure military access and bases, gain support from partner countries, establish alternative routes, and enhance its naval capabilities, the Malacca Dilemma persists in a hypothetical wartime scenario.^[8] China’s ‘Malacca Dilemma’ also centres on the United States expanding its military presence in China’s periphery, particularly in the Indian Ocean Region, and developing closer relations with countries like India, which reinforce US naval capabilities to exert complete control over China’s access to Indian Ocean sea lanes. Over the years, such assessments have become a critical trigger for China’s naval expansion initiatives.^[9] In the face of these perceived threats, China feels isolated and targeted. It is pursuing alternative supply routes around Malacca through overland infrastructure projects that connect inland Chinese cities to ports in Pakistan and Myanmar. However, despite these diversification attempts, China will remain dependent on the Strait of Malacca in the short term.

An economically and militarily buoyant China is therefore looking beyond its regional influence to enhance its presence in the Indian Ocean Region and further afield through these strategic choke points. It is leveraging its economic and military power, along with the advantages that come with them, to achieve its security and strategic goals in the IOR. A significant threat in the Indian Ocean region is the rapidly growing importance of the Indian Ocean in Chinese security policies, which view this area as part of their intended sphere of influence.

Aside from SLOC dependency, China has also attempted to project power ‘in’ and ‘from’ the Indian Ocean. The expanse of China’s maritime silk route (as a component of the Belt and Road Initiative) and its strategic implications, its search for overseas military bases with Djibouti as one, its interest in protecting supply lines for commercial and military interests to Africa, West Asia and beyond, the movements of submarines, and the modernisation of its navy with warships capable of operating in the Indian Ocean – all contribute to significant unease in India-China relations. The emergence of China, not only as an economic power but also as a military power, disrupting maritime equations and the balance of power, is the dominant narrative of the 21st century. China views the Indian Ocean Region as its arena of strategic dominance, where its economic relationships are intended to be articulated based upon military power projection. However, the concern that causes India to be wary of China’s Indian Ocean aspirations lies in the intentions, as well as the means and methods that China employs to establish its ‘presence’ in this expanse of the Asiatic lifeline.

Within the context of the deteriorating maritime situation in the Asia-Pacific region—mainly due to tensions in the South China Sea, the power play between the US and China, and the growing Chinese maritime capabilities—conditions of heightened insecurity among the region’s littorals could arise over time. From the Indian perspective, Chinese attempts to dominate the maritime space in the Indian Ocean Region through increasing forays, establishing base facilities, and courting the IOR littorals for operational turnaround facilities could eventually pose a challenge to India’s island territories near the straits. However, the choke points near the Andaman and Nicobar Islands make these islands sentinels or gateways to this oceanic highway and resource-rich area, as they sit astride the SLOCs.

Andaman and Nicobar Islands and Their Locations

 

The Andaman and Nicobar Islands are an archipelagic chain of 836 islands, islets, and rocky outcrops, of which only 31 are inhabited. They extend over 720 km in the southeastern Bay of Bengal. This chain of islands is oriented geographically in a north-south direction and is divided into two main groups, namely the Andaman and Nicobar groups. The Northern Group of Islands (NGI) and the Southern Group of Islands (SGI) are separated by the Ten Degree Channel, which is 80 nautical miles wide. The Southern Group is further divided into three main groups: Carnicobar (CARNIC), the Nancowry Group, and Great Nicobar Islands (GNI). A coastline of 1,692 km grants these islands an Exclusive Economic Zone of 663,629 square kilometres and a terrestrial land area of 8,249 square kilometres. Thus, despite these islands constituting less than 1% of the mainland landmass, they provide over 30% of India’s Exclusive Economic Zone, presenting tremendous potential for mining undersea resources, which are crucial to the nation’s economy.

Indira Point in GNI overlooks the crucial Six Degree Channel, the SLOC for all significant maritime activity. Its northernmost tip, i.e., the Landfall Islands, is only 40 km from the Coco Islands (Myanmar). Indira Point, formerly known as Pygmalion Point, located at the southern tip, is about 165 km from Indonesia. The islands lie approximately 450 km northwest of Phuket in Thailand and 975 km northwest of Kuala Lumpur in Malaysia. Essentially, the Andaman Islands are closer to these littoral countries than the Indian mainland. Their location astride the strategic SLOCs leading to the Malacca Straits provides India with a strategic overview of the shipping traffic in the IOR.

Strategic Significance of Andaman and Nicobar Islands

As the sole archipelago in the Bay, striding important Sea Lines of Communication and overlooking the Malacca Strait, the Andaman and Nicobar Islands are of utmost importance for India’s strategic interests.^[10] Situated closer to Southeast Asian countries, these islands extend India’s security perimeter eastwards, providing exceptional defence in depth. Positioned astride the strategic SLOCs leading to the Malacca Strait, they also offer India a strategic vantage point over the shipping traffic in the Indian Ocean Region, facilitating Indian dominance not only over the Bay of Bengal but also over the Six and Ten-Degree Channel, as well as the entry and exit to the Malacca Strait. The capacity to monitor Chinese maritime activity in the Indian Ocean Region through these islands allows India to gather valuable information regarding the nature and intent of Chinese forces. By using these islands as the maritime pivot, the Indian Navy can counter any incursions by the People’s Liberation Army Navy’s (PLA(N)) surface combatants, aircraft carriers, or strategic submarines (SSNs/SSBNs) entering the Indian Ocean Region (IOR). These islands enhance India’s strategic frontiers and make them a valuable asset for India to extend its “Act East Policy.” Their proximity to Southeast Asian countries could be exploited to facilitate fruitful engagements with them and foster friendly relations.^[11]

Current Status of Developmental Activities

Following the Kargil Conflict in 1999, based on the recommendations of the Kargil Review Committee, the Group of Ministers approved the establishment of an integrated command in May 2001. Consequently, the Andaman and Nicobar Command (ANC), the first and only unified operational command, was raised in October 2001. The ultimate aim of establishing this command was to promote jointmanship among the services within the unique operational environment of these islands. The role of the ANC encompasses the “Defence of the Andaman and Nicobar Islands,” including its waters, airspace, humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, and the protection of future offshore installations when they are established.^[12] The ANC has continuously extended its Defence Diplomacy through coordinated patrol exercises (CORPATs) with nearly all its neighbouring countries on a biannual basis, resulting in excellent synergy with the littoral navies. Over the past 24 years, the command has expanded in terms of assets and manpower, thus enhancing its capability. However, progress has been modest compared to the roles and tasks allotted to it.

In recent years, the realisation of the strategic potential of these islands and the increased national interest in strengthening ties with Southeast Asia have prompted the current government to seek a strategy that would rationalise strategic and economic growth with environmental protection to ensure “all-round national development.”^[13] By utilising the Act East Policy, India is focusing on the holistic development of these islands through a combination of strategic investments and increasing military strength in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands. Development projects include modernised airfields, expanded jetties, enhanced logistics and storage facilities, upgraded troop accommodations, and advanced surveillance assets. India aims for these islands to serve as a force multiplier in the larger Indo-Pacific region. Strengthening defence infrastructure on the islands would send a strong message that India intends to remain the leading player in the Indian Ocean.

The ambitious Great Nicobar Island project, situated at the southernmost tip of Indian territory and just 80 nautical miles from the northernmost island of Indonesia, is now awaiting final Cabinet approval following the receipt of all necessary environmental clearances. Estimated to cost ₹1 lakh crore over two phases, the project comprises four main components: the development of an International Container Transshipment Terminal (ICTT) at Galathea Bay, a greenfield international airport, an integrated township, and a gas and solar-based power plant on the island. The vision for the ICTT is to position the island as a key player in the regional and global maritime economy of cargo transshipment. Moreover, the Andaman and Nicobar administration has signed a 30-year Memorandum of Understanding with Cochin Shipyard Ltd (CSL) to upgrade ship and boat repair yards within the island territories. Once operational, these yards will save shipping companies a costly trip to Chennai, Visakhapatnam, or Kolkata for repairs.^[14]

Conclusion

The Andaman and Nicobar Islands’ geographical location, straddling the Malacca Strait’s choke point and lying over 1200 km from the mainland while stretching over 750 km from north to south, makes them a valuable geopolitical asset. They play a crucial role in the region’s maritime competition of the 21st century. These islands hold the potential for development to further India’s rising economic, political, and military interests in the Asia-Pacific, especially as China becomes increasingly active in the Indian Ocean Region. Enhancing their considerable economic and military potential can add strategic weight to India’s posture, and the deterrence value that these islands can provide will be significant.^[15] The current focus, therefore, is on enhancing the surveillance and deterrence value of these islands through various infrastructure development, positioning military assets on the islands, enhancing communication and establishing a comprehensive economic and military engagement with the littorals. India’s strategic development of these islands is not just a defensive measure but a clear message of resolve in safeguarding its maritime interests and regional stability.

Author Brief Bio: Air Marshal PK Roy, PVSM, AVSM, VM, VSM, is a former Commandant of the National Defence College, New Delhi and the former Commander-in-Chief of the Andaman and Nicobar Command.

 

References:

^[1] https://theflags.org/geography-and-the-role-of-boundaries-in-international-relations/?utm_source=chatgpt.com#google_vignette

^[2] https://vajiramandravi.com/quest-upsc-notes/indo-pacific-region/

^[3] ‘Walter Ladwig’, The Indo-Pacific in Indian Foreign Policy, https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/policy-briefs/indo-pacific-indian-foreign-policy

^[4] Strategic Vision –2030 Security and Development of Andaman & Nicobar Islands, Air Marshal PK Roy and Commodore Aspi Cawasji, Vij Books India Pvt Ltd, ISBN 978-93-86457-18-9 (Hardback)

^[5] Text of PM’s Remarks on the Commissioning of Coast Ship Barracuda, 12 March 2015, https://www.pmindia.gov.in/en/news_updates/text-of-the-pms-remarks-on-the-commissioning-of-coast-ship-barracuda/

^[6] “About IORA,” Indian Ocean Rim Association Online, accessed on 9 February 2025 February 2025, https://www.iora.int/en/about/about-iora .

^[7] ‘Navya Mudunuri’, The Malacca Dilemma and Chinese Ambitions: Two Sides of a Coin, https://diplomatist.com/2020/07/07/the-malacca-dilemma-and-chinese-ambitions-two-sides-of-a-coin/

^[8] ‘Malacca Dilemma’ a major security challenge for PRC, https://ipdefenseforum.com/2023/10/malacca-dilemma-a-major-security-challenge-for-prc/

^[9] ‘Swaran Singh’, China’s forays into the Indian Ocean: Strategic implications for India, Journal of the Indian Ocean Region December 2011

^[10]  ‘Sohini Bose & Anasua Basu Ray Chaudhury’ The Andaman and Nicobar Islands: Indian Territory, Regional Potential https://www.orfonline.org/research/the-andaman-and-nicobar-islands-indian-territory-regional-potential Accessed on 10 February 2025

^[11] India – the bridge linking South and Southeast Asia, https://www.orfonline.org/research/india-the-bridge-linking-south-and-southeast-asia

^[12] Strategic Vision –2030 Security and Development of Andaman & Nicobar Islands,  Air Marshal PK Roy and Commodore Aspi Cawasji, Vij Books India Pvt Ltd, ISBN 978-93-86457-18-9 (Hardback)

^[13] Government of India, “Study Group Report on Comprehensive and Sustainable Development of the Andaman and Nicobar Islands”

^[14] ‘Nitin A Gokhale’ Green Knots Ironed Out, Great Nicobar Island Project Awaits Centre’s Final Clearance, https://bharatshakti.in/green-knots-ironed-out-great-nicobar-island-project-awaits-centres-final-clearance/ Accessed on 31 January 2025

^[15]  ‘Muraliprasath P’, Role of Andaman and Nicobar Islands in the Indo-Pacific: India’s Eastern Anchor, https://www.ejsss.net.in/article_html.php?did=9675&issueno=0