Many might have seemed surprised by the fall of the Awami League government led by Sheikh Hasina on 5 August 2024. Still, those closely observing Bangladeshi politics recognised the signs well in advance. By 2021, it was evident that Sheikh Hasina was nearing the end of her tenure. Since 2020, two critical areas of control have begun slipping away: her political organisation and economic policy-making.

Control of her organisation shifted to her party’s General Secretary, who was politically incompetent and focused more on consolidating his position than on strengthening the party. Consequently, many qualified political leaders were marginalised, causing numerous dedicated leaders and activists to become alienated from the organisation and ultimately rendering them inactive. Concurrently, in the economic policy-making sphere, Sheikh Hasina became reliant on a small group of businessmen who assumed control of key ministries, such as finance and commerce, through their influence and wealth. These individuals appointed an unqualified central bank governor at their discretion and initiated several redundant projects funded by exorbitant foreign loans solely for legal and illicit profit. Similarly, the trade of essential goods was monopolised by this cartel. As a result, the development trajectory and stability of consumer goods markets that Sheikh Hasina’s government had maintained until 2018 shifted drastically, and economic activities became largely stagnant during the year-long impact of COVID-19.

Since 2020, the escalating prices of essential commodities began generating resentment among the general populace, and this discontent was exacerbated by continuous social media reports of irregular loans taken by businessmen close to Sheikh Hasina. There were also widespread allegations on social media that these loans were being laundered abroad. In an attempt to quell this social media uproar, Sheikh Hasina made an ill-conceived decision to turn all but two newspapers, all digital media platforms, and private TV channels into government mouthpieces. Consequently, the public increasingly turned to those two newspapers and social media for news.

Opposition groups, particularly Jamaat-e-Islami Bangladesh, effectively capitalised on this opportunity. They established a robust social media network using their expatriate members and extensive funding. Moreover, Jamaat-e-Islami’s strategists, having anticipated the likely execution of their key leaders in 2012, adopted a decade-long plan. They focused on providing community services and religious instruction, targeting women and adolescents, with an approach designed to align them ideologically with Jamaat-e-Islami.

On the other hand, the youth vote that brought Sheikh Hasina to power in 2008 led to the formation of the Ganajagaran Mancha, a movement aligned with the core politics of the Awami League. Although its impact is now a topic of history, neither Sheikh Hasina nor several senior leaders favoured this platform because of its young participants gaining popularity so quickly, fearing that these youths could soon become their rivals within the party. Sheikh Hasina, too, became wary of the Ganajagaran Mancha as a political threat to her legacy, believing that someone from this platform could emerge as a future leader, like her father, Sheikh Mujib—a simple young man who became a national leader—or as a competitor to her son or daughter.

To prevent political competition for her legacy, Sheikh Hasina began eliminating competent young leaders from party leadership and halted college and university student elections during her 16-year rule. Her main political rival, Khaleda Zia, also shared this stance, keeping these elections suspended during her tenure to secure her political legacy. Thus, she made no demands regarding this issue despite numerous demands from her Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) during Hasina’s rule. The mutual consensus between Sheikh Hasina and Khaleda Zia created opportunities for the student wing of Jamaat-e-Islami, Islami Chhatra Shibir, which infiltrated both major political student organisations—the Chhatra League of Sheikh Hasina’s Awami League and the Chhatra Dal of Khaleda’s BNP—to cultivate their leaders and activists within these groups.

In response to the emergence of the Ganajagaran Mancha in support of Hasina’s politics in 2012, a group named Hefazat-e-Islam was formed with direct assistance from Khaleda Zia’s party and the outside forces in Bangladesh. It was a coalition based on Qawmi madrasas that denounced the Ganajagaran Mancha as atheistic and launched violent street movements. Initially, Sheikh Hasina took a tough stance against Hefazat-e-Islam but later established amicable relations in exchange for financial and other incentives, following the advice of her then-military secretary, who even publicly participated in Hefazat’s gatherings. At their recommendation, the curriculum was increasingly Islamised, and numerous madrasas were established, allowing Hefazat to grow under government patronage.

Another major transformation occurred in Bangladeshi politics during this time. Ideologically, Hefazat-e-Islam opposed Jamaat-e-Islami’s ideology. However, since Sheikh Hasina’s then-military secretary was a follower of Jamaat-e-Islami, he succeeded in bridging the ideological divide between these two Islamist organisations to work against Sheikh Hasina in secret.

In line with their strategic plan, Jamaat-e-Islami launched a ten-year program in 2012 to promote “Dawati”—service and religious instruction. While this program was supposed to run until 2022, by 2020, just eight years into the plan, Jamaat-e-Islami’s support base had expanded to become four times stronger than in 2012, surpassing any previous political strength. In 2022 and 2023, those closely monitoring Bangladesh’s political landscape observed an unprecedented rise in support for Jamaat, particularly among a segment of the youth, women, and even academics and intellectuals.
Moreover, Jamaat exploited this opportunity since Sheikh Hasina accommodated Hefazat by aligning social and state policies with religious doctrines. Through Hefazat, they managed to instil their so-called religious discipline within society, especially in higher educational institutions and among families of Awami League members, creating a significant “soft” support base for Jamaat beyond its dedicated followers over the last 12 to 13 years.

Thus, as extremists became more organised and economic management deteriorated, pushing commodity prices beyond people’s reach, a major “time bomb” began ticking in Bangladesh. Adding to this was the lack of opportunity for citizens to vote in local government and general elections since 2014. While there was participation in local government, Awami League leaders consistently exerted undue influence to ensure their candidates’ victories, weakening the grassroots organisation and making ordinary people part of this ticking time bomb.

Those observing Bangladesh’s politics with impartiality anticipated since 2023 that the explosion of this “time bomb” was just a matter of time. Conversely, Sheikh Hasina believed she could neutralise it through administrative power. Those who know Bangladesh’s history—and even Sheikh Hasina herself should have recognised from her past experiences—understand that in a small, ethnically homogeneous country like Bangladesh, attempting to defuse such a bomb through coercive measures is likely to backfire. Historically, during widespread discontent in Bangladesh, the most organised institution—the military—has always withdrawn its support for the ruling power. The situation was even more precarious this time, and it is a mystery why Sheikh Hasina and her local and international allies either failed to consider it or lacked accurate intelligence.

By the end of July, it was apparent that Sheikh Hasina’s government was on borrowed time, and by August 3rd, it was clear that power was no longer in her hands. However, what transpired on the morning of August 5th remains ambiguous to political observers. Nevertheless, since this outcome seemed inevitable, there has been little need to focus on the specifics.

Ultimately, the “time bomb” Sheikh Hasina was sitting on exploded when military support was withdrawn. Unlike previous times in Bangladesh, when political transitions occurred, the streets were controlled by political parties. This time, however, they were under the control of extremist forces in various disguises, making the events following Sheikh Hasina’s fall far more severe and uncertain than ever before.

Many knew Sheikh Hasina was about to leave the country on August 5th. However, most people officially learned of her departure from the army chief’s address to the nation, where he stated that Sheikh Hasina had resigned from her position as Prime Minister. It was later revealed that she had left without formally resigning, making her technically still the Prime Minister according to the constitution. The current government in Bangladesh, which emerged under the “doctrine of necessity” (resembling a ruling by the Pakistani court in 1958), lacks constitutional legitimacy despite wielding power through a muscle-flexing Supreme Court ruling.

This government has no constitutional or legal legitimacy. Even if the dissolved parliament was flawed due to election irregularities, the president’s dissolving it and forcing the Speaker’s resignation were ultra vires to the constitution.

While the army chief reassured the people in his address, he did not declare martial law or assume power by having the president declare emergency law. Instead, in the three days of governmental vacuum, attacks on homes of Hindu communities and other ethnic minorities took place, resulting in numerous deaths. Official reports indicate that only nine Hindus were killed in these attacks, but over 10,000 houses belonging to the Hindu community were burned. In the current state of Bangladesh, there is no opportunity to gather accurate information because any attempt to do so could be fatal.

Immediately after Sheikh Hasina left the country, over 440 police stations were attacked by Jamaat, Hefazat, and other extremist groups. Officially, it was stated that 44 police officers were killed in these attacks, but a former Secretary, speaking on condition of anonymity, claimed that around 4,500 police officers had been killed. Experts believe that the perpetrators of these killings were trained as they employed methods like amputation, beheading, and hanging corpses, reminiscent of Taliban techniques in Afghanistan.

In the second week of October, all individuals involved in the killings from August 5th to 15th were granted indemnity through an executive order from the Ministry of Home Affairs. This means there will be no justice, not only for the murdered police officers but also for the killings of minorities and the looting of their property. Those responsible have been exempted from any legal action.

Additionally, 12 other High Court judges were forcibly made to resign beyond just the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court. The Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, who was also forced to resign, now faces multiple murder charges, and his bank accounts have been frozen. A series of murder cases have also been filed against journalists, writers, and historians.

Moreover, the deaths that occurred during the movement to overthrow Sheikh Hasina’s government have been labelled as genocide, and the perpetrators are being tried in court for war crimes. The chief public prosecutor of this court was a joint secretary of a Jamaat offshoot (AB Party) and had served as a lawyer for war criminals tried under Sheikh Hasina’s rule. The chief judge appointed to this court was a collaborator opposed to Bangladesh’s independence.

Furthermore, the family of the current head of the government, Dr Yunus, had collaborated with the Pakistani army during the Liberation War of 1971. Dr. Yunus’s younger brother was arrested in 1972 under the Collaborators Act as a Pakistani collaborator and remained imprisoned until Sheikh Mujib’s general amnesty. The fathers of two other advisors were also direct collaborators. Hefazat’s leader is an advisor to the government, while the primary driving force behind the government is Jamaat-e-Islami Bangladesh.

It is natural to question what relations neighbouring countries will maintain with such a government, which is constitutionally illegitimate and heavily influenced by pro-Pakistan fundamentalists. Moreover, even before taking charge, the head of this government made undiplomatic remarks about India’s Seven Sister states, remarks that no previous legitimate or illegitimate government in Bangladesh had made.

Such a government must perpetuate extremism among its core supporters to stay in power. The more unrest they can incite in India’s Seven Sister region, the more frenzied their base will become. India may assume that providing essential goods to Bangladesh, which is currently in a crisis, could make the country dependent on them and divert attention from the Seven Sisters. However, the reality is that the government’s principal capital is anti-India sentiment, centred around the Seven Sisters. Additionally, the players who supplied arms to insurgents in the Seven Sister region and attacked India’s internal security have been released by the government without regard for the law. None of them are likely to remain inactive.

Matarbari Port in the Bay of Bengal was planned as a game-changer for the development activities surrounding India’s Seven Sister region, with benefits anticipated for Bangladesh, India, Nepal, Bhutan, Japan, the US, Australia, and several Southeast Asian countries. However, instead, an illegitimate government is now in power in Bangladesh, which has dismantled the police, civil, and judicial administrations. They attempt to resolve every problem through mob violence rather than the law. Minorities, political dissidents, businesspeople, and even ordinary citizens are barely surviving under an unofficial jizya tax. The government claims there is no minority persecution at present, but in reality, minorities are surviving by paying this unofficial jizya to fundamentalist supporters of the government. In a country where all institutions have collapsed, and law and order have reached rock bottom, there is no logical basis to hope Matarbari Port could become an economic game-changer.

Recently, when the UN’s local representative met with Mr. Yunus, he suggested creating a safe zone in Arakan for the Rohingya, akin to Hamas in Gaza. Yunus, who is considered the mastermind behind Sheikh Hasina’s ousting, was recently seen in New York meeting with the terrorist wing of Hamas, the Young Muslims of New York, during his UN visit. Pictures of this meeting have surfaced on social media, and their authenticity has been verified through fact-checking.

The current illegitimate government of Bangladesh wants to create another permanent conflict zone near the Chattogram border, Arakan’s Sittwe Port and India’s Seven Sister states. There are also reports of increased arms flow to the Pakistan-backed Rohingya terrorist organisation ARSA. Moreover, during the anti-Hasina movement, it was noted that many protesters were shot in the back. Initially, Brigadier Sakhawat, who headed the Ministry of Home Affairs, questioned how these weapons had reached the public. After speaking the truth, he was removed from the Ministry.

Overall, Bangladesh is now in a state of profound uncertainty. A significant segment of the country’s youth is radicalised and extremist. If they are not contained strictly, they pose a threat not only to neighbouring countries but also to any nation’s internal security, as evidenced by attacks on Delhi’s Parliament and the US’s 9/11. The dilemma is that if elections are held soon, these radicals could come to power, potentially even more dangerous than in 2001-2006. On the other hand, if the current illegitimate government continues, its fundamentalist core may soon turn to Jihad after stabilising minor crises like commodity shortages. Given these circumstances, global powers concerned with human rights and anti-terrorism, as well as democratic neighbours, must take initiatives to establish a strict governance structure in Bangladesh that can sustain itself long enough to weaken these radical elements. Only then should issues like elections be considered.

Author Brief Bio: Robayet Ahmedis a Former Politician and NGO Worker.

In the tapestry of human civilisation, secularism and a uniform legal code stand as hallmarks of societal progress and development. While religion initially emerged as a response to the transcendent, it now influences both sacred and secular life. However, religion’s domain should be confined to the sacred realm, recognising that worldly life, though intertwined, is distinct from religious life. These spheres, differing in nature, mode, and purpose, must not be conflated, especially in pluralistic societies. Failure to recognise this distinction leads to complex challenges that must be addressed for peaceful coexistence. Addressing these issues requires conceptual clarity and rigorous logical analysis to delineate their distinctions and interrelations. This is especially pertinent when considering a Uniform Civil Code to govern the secular affairs of all citizens. Such a code is not an imposition on unwilling segments of society but rather a rational acknowledgement of the necessity and utility of legal uniformity in certain aspects of life.

While these issues are fundamentally sociological, they often acquire religious and political dimensions from these perspectives. They pertain to the lifestyles of a religiously diverse society, where various groups adhere to different sets of beliefs and practices, often claimed to be sanctioned by religious tradition. However, in a secular framework, these matters are not inherently spiritual, and religion should not dictate civil life. This contrasts sharply with theocratic societies, where civil life is inextricably bound to a particular religion. Regardless of how one defines secularism—be it state indifference to all religions, equidistance from all faiths, or equal regard for all beliefs—the spheres of religious and civil life must be demarcated. While human life is an organic whole, and its various aspects cannot be entirely separated, they can and should be distinguished and addressed separately when necessary. This is similar to how different organs in a body, while interconnected, can be examined and treated individually for medical purposes.

Implementing a Uniform Civil Code becomes further complicated when distinctions are drawn between majority and minority communities based on religion. In a truly secular system, such distinctions are illogical, as the very concept of secularism precludes such divisions. However, practical realities often diverge from logical ideals, especially when vested interests become entrenched. In democracies with lower education levels and prevalent vote-bank politics, these sociological issues frequently take on political hues. Exploiting the religiosity of the masses, self-proclaimed protectors of faith may mislead people into believing that these issues are intrinsically tied to their religious identity. Political leaders, in turn, may seek refuge in these religious figureheads for electoral gain.

It is imperative to understand that no satisfactory solution can emerge if these issues are approached from misguided religious or political perspectives. Such considerations obscure the real problems and generate discord among different sections of society, jeopardising peace and harmony. We aim to forge a path towards a more integrated and harmonious society by addressing these challenges through a lens of rationality and secular principles. Implementing a Uniform Civil Code grounded in secular principles and applied equitably across all communities is crucial to achieving this goal. It offers a framework for legal consistency that transcends religious boundaries, promoting social cohesion while respecting the diverse cultural fabric of society.

The intricate tapestry of religious and social dynamics in pluralistic societies presents formidable challenges to implementing a Uniform Civil Code. The protagonists of various religious traditions often resist solutions or dissolutions to these problems, as the perpetuation of such issues serves their self-aggrandisement. This resistance stems from a complex interplay of historical, cultural, and political factors that have become deeply entrenched. Attempts at inter-faith dialogues and similar conciliatory measures often prove ineffective for two primary reasons:
• Firstly, the issues are not genuinely religious despite being framed as such.
• Secondly, those who engage in these dialogues must be more open-minded and positive in their intent for productive discourse. The veneer of religiosity applied to these essentially sociological issues creates a barrier to rational discussion and resolution.

Political approaches to resolving these challenges are equally fraught with difficulties. Parties in power and those aspiring to govern must navigate the treacherous waters of vote bank politics, often prioritising electoral support over principled policy-making. This political calculus frequently leads to the perpetuation of divisive practices and the postponement of necessary reforms, including implementing a Uniform Civil Code. The suggestion of utilising referendums to gauge public opinion on these matters must be revised. Such processes are often susceptible to manipulation by vocal minorities who wield disproportionate influence over public discourse. The masses, who may need more comprehensive knowledge or accurate information about the issues, can be swayed by charismatic leaders claiming to represent their interests. This dynamic results in a situation where the views of a minor, albeit influential, elite are misrepresented as the majority’s will.

It is crucial to distinguish between influence and scientific validity. Only a scientific mind, characterised by dispassionate objectivity and logical reasoning, can approach these issues without succumbing to partisan biases. Cultivating such a mindset through proper education is essential for disseminating rational solutions among the concerned populace. While the practical implementation of this approach may seem daunting, it is manageable given sufficient determination and resources. In the context of Bhārata, a democratic and secular republic, the issue of a Uniform Civil Code has persisted since independence. The judiciary has repeatedly expressed concern about this matter, highlighting constitutional anomalies that require rectification by the Indian Parliament. Lawmakers cannot abdicate their responsibility by arguing that the Supreme Court’s pronouncements are merely suggestions rather than directives. Similarly, the fear that enacting a Uniform Civil Code might lead to further societal fragmentation is an insufficient justification for inaction.

These arguments often serve as smokescreens for vested interests seeking to maintain the status quo. The constitutional amendment that introduced the concept of ‘Secularism’ into the Indian Constitution demonstrates that political will makes fundamental changes possible. Implementing a Uniform Civil Code, a logical corollary to secularism, should be equally feasible. The fact that demands for a Uniform Civil Code may originate from one section of society and face opposition from another does not diminish its necessity or desirability. In a truly secular state, the law should transcend religious boundaries and apply equally to all citizens, regardless of their faith or cultural background. This principle is essential for fostering national integration, gender equality, and social justice.

Implementing a Uniform Civil Code in Bhārata, as in other diverse societies, requires a multifaceted approach. It necessitates sustained efforts in public education, fostering inter-community dialogue, and building political consensus. Policymakers must work to dispel misconceptions about the nature and intent of such a code, emphasising its role in promoting equality and social harmony rather than erasing cultural identities. Moreover, drafting a Uniform Civil Code should be inclusive and consultative, considering various communities’ concerns and perspectives while adhering to constitutional principles and international human rights standards. This approach can help mitigate fears of cultural erasure and build broader support for reform.

The judiciary can play a crucial role in this process by highlighting the need for legal uniformity and providing reasoned judgments that underscore the importance of secular governance. Civil society organisations, academic institutions, and media outlets are also responsible for facilitating informed public discourse on this issue, countering misinformation and promoting a nuanced understanding of the benefits and challenges of a Uniform Civil Code. Ultimately, the implementation of a Uniform Civil Code in Bhārata and similar pluralistic societies represents a critical step towards realising the ideals of equality, justice, and secular governance. While the path may be fraught with obstacles and resistance from various quarters, the long-term benefits to social cohesion, gender equality, and national integration far outweigh the short-term political challenges. It is incumbent upon lawmakers, jurists, and civil society leaders to work collaboratively towards this goal, guided by the principles of constitutional democracy and the vision of a genuinely secular state.

The discourse surrounding the Uniform Civil Code (UCC) in Bhārata has long been controversial, often obscured by religious and political rhetoric. However, to truly address this issue, we must approach it from a scientific and sociological perspective, transcending the narrow confines of sectarian interests and vote bank politics. The failure to recognise the UCC as a sociological rather than a religious or political matter has led to a persistent misunderstanding of its nature and implications. A crucial distinction must be made between reforming the personal laws of specific communities, such as Muslim Personal Law, and implementing a comprehensive Uniform Civil Code. These concepts, while related, are not synonymous. The scope of a UCC is far broader, encompassing all sections of Indian society, whereas changes to personal laws affect only specific communities. This distinction is vital for framing the debate in its proper context and avoiding the pitfall of perceiving the UCC as targeting any particular religious group.

The case for a Uniform Civil Code stems from the foundational principles of equality and secularism enshrined in the Indian Constitution. It represents a step towards creating a more cohesive national identity while respecting the rich tapestry of Bhārat’s diverse cultural heritage. The Supreme Court’s repeated advisories on this matter, beginning with the landmark Shah Bano case, underscore the constitutional imperative for such a code. However, these judicial pronouncements should not be misconstrued as singling out any specific community but rather as a call for comprehensive reform across all sections of society. To navigate this complex issue, it is essential to distinguish between religious identity and sociological reality. For instance, while Islam as a religion remains constant globally, the sociological entity of “Muslims in Bhārat” is distinct and shaped by the unique historical, cultural, and social fabric of the nation. This nuanced understanding allows us to address the concerns of Bhāratīya Muslims as citizens first, without compromising their religious identity. The same principle applies to other religious and cultural groups within the Bhāratīya mosaic.

The argument that personal laws, particularly those based on religious scriptures, are immutable and beyond the scope of reform needs to be more logically and historically accurate. As interpreted and applied by humans, divine injunctions have always been subject to reinterpretation in light of changing social conditions and advancements in human knowledge. Many Islamic countries have successfully modified their laws to align with contemporary needs while maintaining their Islamic character. This demonstrates that change is not only possible but often necessary for the progress and well-being of society. Moreover, the fear that a Uniform Civil Code would erode the cultural identity of minority communities is unfounded. Identity is a multifaceted concept, of which legal codes form only a tiny part. A well-crafted UCC would aim to harmonise civil laws across communities while respecting cultural diversity in other spheres of life. It would focus on ensuring gender equality, protecting individual rights, and promoting social justice – principles that transcend religious boundaries and are essential for developing a modern, egalitarian society.

Implementing a UCC is not merely a legal exercise but a step towards realising the constitutional ideals of equality, liberty, and fraternity. It is particularly crucial in addressing the persistent inequalities women face across all communities in Bhārat. A UCC would go a long way in empowering women and ensuring their equal status under the law by providing a common framework for marriage, divorce, inheritance, and adoption. The process of drafting and implementing a Uniform Civil Code must be inclusive, consultative, and sensitive to the concerns of all communities. It should be seen as an opportunity to codify the best practices from various personal laws, creating a syncretic legal framework that reflects the composite culture of Bhārat. This approach would not only allay fears of cultural erasure but could also serve as a model for other diverse societies grappling with similar challenges.

Conclusion

In conclusion, implementing a Uniform Civil Code (UCC) in Bhārat is a legal and sociological imperative. It marks a significant step in Bhārat’s journey towards genuine secularism and social equality. Although the path to this goal may be challenging, Bhārat must undertake this journey to realise its potential as a modern, progressive nation. By addressing this issue with a scientific, sociological perspective and a commitment to shared values, we can develop a civil code that unifies rather than divides and strengthens rather than weakens the fabric of our diverse nation.

The UCC represents a commitment to constitutional equality, justice, and fraternity ideals. It aims to harmonise civil laws across Bhārata’s diverse communities while respecting cultural uniqueness, addressing gender inequality, and promoting national integration. It is important to note that the principles applicable to Muslim Personal Law are equally relevant to Hindu, Christian, Parsi, and other religious and cultural groups in Bhārat. Various harmful customs within these communities, including tribal groups, must be addressed through the UCC. This noble endeavour requires mutual trust, which can only be fostered through proper education—the key to addressing many of our country’s issues.

The success of the UCC depends on several factors: clear separation between religious and civil spheres, an inclusive and consultative drafting process, widespread public education, and strong political will. The UCC is not about erasing diversity but creating a common ground of civic rights and responsibilities applicable to all citizens, regardless of their religious or cultural background. As Bhārat evolves as a modern, democratic nation, implementing a UCC is a testament to its commitment to secularism and equality. It is a bold yet necessary step towards a unified and just society, honouring diverse heritage while moving confidently towards a shared future. The successful implementation of the UCC could serve as a model for other pluralistic societies, demonstrating that legal uniformity can coexist with cultural diversity. In the final analysis, the journey towards a Uniform Civil Code is not just about legal reform but about realising the full potential of Bhārat’s democracy. While challenges may arise, the long-term benefits to national unity, gender equality, and social cohesion outweigh the short-term difficulties. We stand at a crucial juncture and have the opportunity to make a decisive move towards a more integrated, equitable, and progressive society. This endeavour will resonate for generations to come.

Author Brief Bio: Vandana Sharma ‘Diya’ is an Assistant Professor, Department of Philosophy, Zakir Husain Delhi College, University of Delhi. She is also a Researcher with Indian Institute of Advanced Study, Shimla and a Member, Central Board of Film Certification.

References:
· Shah Bano Begum v. Mohd. Ahmed Khan, AIR 1985 SC 945 (Supreme Court of India, 1985). (The Shah Bano case, formally known as Mohd. Ahmed Khan v. Shah Bano Begum (1985) is a landmark case in Indian legal history highlighting issues surrounding personal laws and gender equality.)
· Shourie, Arun, A Secular Agenda: For Saving Our Country, For Welding It, Rupa & Co., New Delhi, 1998.
· Chavan, Nandini, and Qutub Jehan Kidwai, Personal Law Reforms and Gender Empowerment: A Debate on Uniform Civil Code, Hope India Publications, New Delhi, 2006.
· Larson, Gerald James (Ed.), Religion and Personal Law in Secular India: A Call to Judgment, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 2001.
· Gandhi, Jatin, Law Commission’s Report on Uniform Civil Code Not Before 2018, Hindustan Times, April 8, 2016.
· Muslim Women Fight Instant Divorce, BBC News, accessed August 20, 2024. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-42280013.
· Sarva Dharma Samabhava is often translated as “All religions are the same” or “All paths lead to the same destination (In a religious sense)” However, its literal meaning is closer to “All dharma/faiths are possible.
· Sharma, A. “Secularism and the Uniform Civil Code: A Constitutional Perspective.” Journal of Indian Law and Society 8, no. 1 (2012): 79-91.
· Mishra, R. “The Need for Uniform Civil Code in India.” Journal of Constitutional and Parliamentary Studies 10, no. 1 (2014): 55-67.
· Kumar, R. “Uniform Civil Code: A Step Towards Gender Justice.” Indian Journal of Gender Studies 22, no. 2 (2015): 235-245.
· Jain, M. P. Constitutional Law of India. LexisNexis, 2019.
· Bhatia, G. “The Uniform Civil Code and the Secularism Debate.” Economic and Political Weekly 46, no. 50 (2011): 24-26.

Introduction

China’s foreign policy principle of “non-interference,” presented at the Bandung Conference in 1955, was a strategic move to distance itself from the Cold War bloc politics. China strengthened its relationships within the global non-aligned movement by promoting a non-interventionist stance. This concept of non-intervention took on new significance under Deng Xiaoping in the late 1970s, as he prioritised a “low profile” in foreign policy to focus on economic development. Chinese leaders believed that pursuing an assertive foreign policy could hinder China’s economic progress by limiting trade partnerships or diverting resources toward military spending rather than economic investment (Sofer, 2012).

Deng carefully employed the “keeping a low profile” (KLP) strategy to achieve selective progress. According to Deng, a balance should be maintained between achieving success in some areas and not overreaching in others. He emphasised the importance of safeguarding China’s core values, including sovereignty, regime security, and national interests. Deng also stressed the need to support the rights of developing countries, promote global and regional stability, and work towards a fair, reasonable, and just international economic and political order. However, he warned against seeking global leadership or hegemony, arguing that China should avoid overextending itself in pursuing such ambitions (Wei, 2020).

The 2008 global financial crisis and China’s subsequent rise as the world’s second-largest economy sparked debate among Chinese scholars about shifting from the ASA strategy (Attaining Some Achievements) to a more proactive international engagement proportional to its growing economic power (Chen & Wang, 2011). China officially endorsed this idea, asserting that countries should take on global responsibilities in accordance with their national strength, stating, “China will assume more international responsibility as its comprehensive strength increases” (White Paper, 2011).

When Xi Jinping came to power in 2013, the ASA strategy was revitalised and expanded into what he described as “striving for achievement” (fenfayouwei). Xi advocated for active peripheral diplomacy to secure a favourable environment for China (Yamaguchi, 2014). The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is a notable example of this shift. The BRI has significantly increased China’s involvement in international mediation. Research by the Mercator Institute for China Studies indicates that China engaged in nine mediation efforts in 2018, compared to just three in 2012, the year after the BRI was launched. As a result of the BRI, Beijing’s mediation efforts have expanded to South Asia, the Middle East, and East Africa—strategically essential regions to the initiative (Legarda, 2018).

China’s engagement in conflict resolution

China’s engagement in conflict resolution has two dimensions: its contribution to international efforts as a member of the UN and its mediation efforts along the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). China views the UN as a legitimate platform for anchoring its role as a global security provider while simultaneously working to reform the international liberal order by promoting Chinese norms. Initially, China opposed the UN, considering it a mandate of the Western bloc. However, it later shifted its position, recognising the UN as a forum for international cooperation and conflict resolution. China has since become one of the largest providers of peacekeepers among the five permanent members of the UN Security Council.

Despite this, China actively contests some of the normative foundations of UN peacekeeping operations, particularly Chapter VII of the UN Charter, which outlines measures for maintaining peace and security. Specifically, China resists the third pillar of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) principle (Arrey, 2023). R2P is based on three pillars: “the responsibility of each state to protect its populations” (pillar I), “the responsibility of the international community to assist states in protecting their populations” (pillar II), and “the responsibility of the international community to protect when a state is manifestly failing to protect its populations” (pillar III) (Simonovic, 2016). China views the third pillar as conflicting with its long-held principles of non-interference and mutual respect for sovereignty. It is wary of states using R2P to justify actions motivated by self-interest, including the forceful imposition of liberal norms (Fung, 2016).

China’s most vigorous critique of the R2P principle emerged following the 2011 military intervention in Libya, which was carried out without the host state’s consent. This was the first instance in which the UN Security Council authorised the use of force for humanitarian purposes without the permission of the involved state. Historically, China’s approach in the UN has been to ensure the legitimacy of the governments in question. For instance, during the 2006 conflict in Sudan, China was pivotal in persuading Khartoum to agree to deploy peacekeepers in Darfur. Similarly, in late 2008, China actively urged the governments of Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) to resolve the conflict in eastern DRC, exacerbated by Rwanda’s support for rebel groups (Saferworld Report, 2011). However, the Libya intervention and the Council’s failure to block the resolution despite objections from members sceptical of using force prompted China to rethink its stance on R2P (Gowers, 2012). Beijing is also concerned that R2P could be used to justify military interventions or sanctions aimed at promoting regime change or influencing China’s policies in sensitive regions like Xinjiang and Hong Kong (Li, 2019).

Moreover, China does not fully adhere to Western norms of peacemaking and peace-building. Chinese officials and diplomats often adopt a cautious and measured approach when discussing peace, preferring terms such as “sustaining,” “supporting,” and “safeguarding” rather than “building” or “making.” This choice of language reflects China’s focus on maintaining stability and preserving the existing order rather than actively engaging in peace-building or peacemaking as understood in Western contexts (Mariani, 2022). In official Chinese discourse, “hotspots” or “hotspot issues” often refer to conflict zones.

During a press conference on March 7, 2024, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi said, “Constructive engagement in settling international hotspot issues is a due responsibility for China as a permanent member of the U.N. Security Council. China learns from international practices and draws wisdom from Chinese culture, and has found the Chinese way to address hotspot issues.” Wang outlined four commitments regarding China’s approach to hotspot issues: non-interference in internal affairs, a commitment to political settlement, “commitment to objectivity and impartiality,” and “commitment to addressing both symptoms and root causes.” China’s commitment to addressing root causes has been evident in its conflict resolution efforts in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA).

China’s Developmental Peace agenda under the UN and involvement in African Peace and Security

Drawing from its own developmental experiences, the Chinese model of peace emphasises addressing the root causes of conflict through economic advancement. It views economic development as a crucial precondition for achieving sustainable internal peace. Unlike the liberal peace agenda, which imposes governance structures to safeguard civil and political rights (Kuo, 2020), the Chinese approach opposes such external impositions. Instead, it advocates for the involvement of outside parties in peace-building only in an auxiliary or necessary capacity. Dai Bin, China’s Deputy Permanent Representative to the UN, underscored that national reconstruction is primarily the country’s responsibility. He emphasised the need for the UN and the international community to help these countries enhance their development capacities (Yuan, 2022).

Chinese scholars and officials argue that underdevelopment is a fundamental cause of conflict. They assert that through trade, investment, and development assistance, China contributes to Africa’s economic growth, promoting peace and security. They also point to a positive correlation between conflict reduction and development, which justifies China’s increasing role in the economic aspects of peace-building in post-conflict nations. In 2015, Xi Jinping committed $1 billion to support the United Nations’ peace and development efforts over ten years. By 2020, the PRC-financed fund had invested approximately $100 million in nearly 100 projects to support the UN’s work in peacemaking, preventive diplomacy, poverty reduction, and development. The fund prioritised collaboration with regional organisations, especially the African Union. It focused on strengthening peacekeeping capacities in regions such as the Horn of Africa, the Sahel, West Africa, North Africa, and the Middle East.

At the fund’s fifth-anniversary commemorative conference, the official PRC summary highlighted the benefits the fund brings to the UN system in promoting peace and security while fostering cooperation among member states, particularly in Africa. (Freeman et al., 2023). In a message to the Security Council, UN Secretary‑General António Guterres stressed the importance of China-Africa cooperation for the UN’s peacekeeping missions, noting that African nations are the largest regional contributors of troops and police. Despite significant political and economic security challenges, these countries remain committed to peacekeeping operations. China’s support for African contributors aligns with the Secretary-General’s 2018 Action for Peacekeeping initiative, demonstrating tangible results in countries like the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and South Sudan. Moreover, the African Union and its member states have made substantial progress in enhancing their effectiveness, self-reliance, and collaborative efforts in peacekeeping (UN Press, 2019).

Critics argue, however, that China acts as a neo-colonial power, using its developmental peace agenda in Africa primarily to secure access to natural resources. This perspective is bolstered by the fact that a significant portion of trade between Africa and China consists of natural resources. The World Bank reported that, in 2006, loans from the China Export-Import Bank for infrastructure projects amounted to over $12.5 billion, with much of this aid directed toward resource-rich countries such as Nigeria, Angola, and Sudan. This pattern suggests that Beijing’s assistance is closely tied to its strategic interests. A prominent example is the 2005 agreement in which Angola received a $2 billion loan from China in exchange for 10,000 barrels of oil daily (Saferworld Report, 2011).

The Saferworld report also highlights that one of China’s strategic motives for deepening its economic and security relations with Africa is to bolster its ‘One China’ policy regarding Taiwan. Except for the Vatican, Taiwan is officially recognised only by a few developing countries, four of which are in Africa. African support has played a crucial role in blocking repeated proposals to allow Taiwan to participate in the United Nations, thereby reinforcing China’s diplomatic position. This support has aided China’s rise as a global power and strengthened its relationships with neighbouring countries.

While the report acknowledges China’s policy drivers in its security engagement with Africa, it also raises concerns about the risks of over-prioritising the developmental peace agenda for conflict resolution. In some cases, the revenue generated from resource sales to China has been used to purchase weapons, exacerbating conflicts, as seen in Sudan (Saferworld Report, 2011). More broadly, such revenue has enabled regimes operating through patronage systems to consolidate their power and amass wealth. Over time, this dynamic can weaken governance structures, perpetuating cycles of instability and violence.

China’s mediation efforts along BRI

Mediation diplomacy involves resolving disputes through diplomatic channels rather than military or legal means, with the agreement of all involved parties. China has increasingly prioritised mediation diplomacy to enhance its global presence and influence in recent years. In its approach, China typically focuses on issues of significant global importance where international mediation efforts are underway, particularly concerning security matters related to countries involved in the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) (Rumi, 2022). Notable examples include China’s active mediation in the Syrian conflict, the Israel-Palestine war, and the Rohingya crisis between Bangladesh and Myanmar, which reflect its focus on security concerns in BRI regions. China’s emphasis on maintaining stability along the BRI stems from a desire to ensure the smooth flow of commerce and investment in unstable regions. This strategy goes beyond economic interests and aims to enhance security conditions for Chinese citizens and businesses operating in these areas. A failure to maintain stability in crucial BRI countries could present significant obstacles and potentially jeopardise the success of the entire initiative (Legarda, 2018).

One of the motivations behind China’s peace-brokering efforts in the Middle East is the security of BRI investments. The BRI has expanded across Asia, the Middle East, Africa, Latin America, and Oceania and has seen investments exceeding $1 trillion. By 2016, China had already positioned itself as the leading foreign investor in the Middle East, committing $29.7 billion to new projects in the region. Chinese investments have primarily targeted countries such as Egypt, Iran, Israel, Oman, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), focusing on port and infrastructure development. China has also secured agreements with Egypt, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states, and Israel to enhance telecommunications infrastructure, despite Israel facing U.S. diplomatic pressure to reconsider such partnerships. The reconciliation between Saudi Arabia and Iran could significantly bolster the security of BRI projects, including safeguarding transportation routes and vital infrastructure. Improved coordination between these two nations could reduce geopolitical risks and uncertainties, creating a more stable environment for BRI operations. This would also promote energy cooperation and facilitate the diversification of partnerships along critical BRI routes, strengthening the initiative’s overall success and resilience (Baabood, 2024).

The BRI, which includes many Arab and Muslim-majority countries, is seen as a factor influencing China’s evolving stance on the Israel-Palestine conflict. Historically, China has tried to maintain a delicate balance, supporting both sides diplomatically. Initially pro-Arab, China was a strong advocate for an independent Palestinian state while simultaneously maintaining commercial relations with Israel, mainly to protect its investments and assets along the BRI. However, during the 2024 conflict between Hamas and Israel, China faced criticism for failing to uphold a neutral stance (Banerjee, 2023). In October 2023, as the conflict escalated along the Gaza Strip, Beijing refrained from directly criticising Hamas, which it has not officially designated as a terrorist organisation. A week later, Chinese authorities stated that Israel’s bombings had gone beyond self-defence, condemning them as “collective punishment.” This stance contrasted with the ongoing support for Israel’s military operations in Gaza from many of its Western allies (Ahmadi, 2024).

China’s Vision of a Global Security Provider

On February 21, 2023, China released a concept paper on the ‘Global Security Initiative’ (GSI), calling for “a new vision for common, comprehensive, cooperative, and sustainable security.” While the paper offered proposals for addressing conventional and unconventional global security issues, it has primarily been seen as a declaration of China’s ambition to position itself as a global security provider in the future international order. The GSI is the latest addition to several initiatives, such as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the Global Development Initiative (GDI), reflecting China’s vision for reshaping the international order. The GDI, introduced by Chinese President Xi Jinping at the UN on September 21, 2021, was presented as a solution to the economic challenges exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic. The GSI, seen as the political counterpart, was proposed in response to the global security crisis triggered by the Russia-Ukraine war. China has turned to the GSI as a strategic response to the growing security challenges accompanying its expanding economic and geopolitical influence on the international stage. While China has traditionally maintained a cautious approach to security engagements, particularly in conflict resolution in regions like Africa, its rising status as a global power with significant economic and military clout is prompting a broader international outreach. Emphasising multilateralism, China is now championing the creation of Sino-centric organisations to promote its vision of conflict prevention and security development (Das, 2023).

Conclusion

Emerging as a sovereign state during the Cold War, China’s foreign policy was initially grounded in non-interference principles and national sovereignty preservation. It deliberately avoided involvement in conflict resolution and power politics, maintaining a low profile while focusing on domestic economic growth. However, as China transformed into a significant global economic power, there was increasing pressure for it to take on greater international responsibilities. In response, China began actively participating in security affairs, mainly through contributions to UN peacekeeping efforts, while introducing its standards and approaches to peace-building. Drawing heavily from its developmental peace model, China shifted its focus to security issues in Africa and the Middle East, where it sought to contribute to peace and protect its foreign assets and investments in fragile states. This developmental peace approach is the cornerstone of its broader global security framework.

However, questions remain about how China intends to ensure global security, particularly as its own Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) faces numerous challenges (Economic Times, 2022). Additionally, there is growing concern about China’s perceived lack of commitment to respect the sovereignty of other states, as evidenced by its assertive security actions in the South China Sea, which seem to contradict its longstanding non-interference stance. Furthermore, the intensifying rivalry between the U.S. and China for influence presents a significant challenge to international security cooperation. Building a stable and secure global environment requires constructive engagement, dialogue, and collaboration among all stakeholders, including the U.S., China, and regional actors. Without such cooperation, the prospects for effective international security governance may remain elusive.

Author Brief Bio: Shivani Deswal is a Phd Research Scholar, Department of Political Science, Maharshi Dayanand University, Rohtak.

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On the night of 14-15 August 1947, Mr Nehru, India’s first Prime Minister, delivered his now famous and oft-quoted tryst with destiny speech to the Constituent Assembly in an address telecast over the radio. The speech, a carefully crafted masterpiece, was a defining moment in India’s history, holding great promise for the future. “A moment comes”, he said, “which comes but rarely in history, when we step out from the old to the new — when an age ends, and when the soul of a nation, long suppressed, finds utterance”.

It was an interesting play of words: “a soul long suppressed.” The meaning of the phrase was never amplified. In the decades following this powerful oratory, there was no mention of what the elected government proposed to do to unshackle the hearts and minds of the people and enable their souls to find utterance. There was little clarity also on what exactly was suppressed that Mr Nehru referred to. Was it just political suppression and economic subjugation that India needed to be freed from? Or was it something much deeper?

Referred to in our ancient texts as Bharat, the subjugation of this land was far more than political and economic subjugation. It was a brutal assault on our culture, beliefs, spirit, and our very way of life. It was a subjugation of our scriptures, our sacred spaces and our core identity.So what did India’s rulers do about setting right this very grievous wrong? A reasoned assessment of the actions of various governments in the first few decades after independence shows that far from doing anything to address historical wrongs, they set about further exacerbating old wounds.

Using the legislative route, the Central Government passed The Places of Worship (Special Provisions) Act, 1991—a legislation that sought to maintain the status quo of the religious character of any place of worship as it existed on 15 August 1947. The Act was merely to stay action on claims by the Hindu community to restore sacred sites of many Hindu temples, such as the Krishna Janmabhoomi Mandir at Mathura,—a place revered by Hindus who believe that this was the birthplace of Sri Krishna. The Mandir was demolished by Aurangzeb in 1670 CE, and a mosque was constructed atop its ruins—a fact supported by the official court bulletin of February 1670. This is just one example. Many others abound, the more prominent being the Gyanvapi mosque in Varanasi, constructed over a destroyed Hindu Mandir, as evidenced by the Archaeological Survey of India (ASI) findings.

The reclamation of all Hindu sacred spaces should have taken place soon after independence, for that would have given utterance to the soul of India, long suppressed. But that did not happen. A false sense of what it means to be secular kept all such issues at abeyance. The grievous hurt extended to other matters, too. The state control of important Hindu mandirs and pilgrimage places was legislated, but no similar legislation for mosques, churches or Gurudwaras was ordained. To exacerbate matters, the Waqf Boards set up in 1913 to manage waqf properties were, post-independence, given extraordinary powers to the extent that they became unanswerable to any authority. This led to piquant situations where these boards started usurping private and government land. Why such powers were given had much to do with vote-bank politics, wherein certain political parties sought to consolidate the Muslim vote in their favour. In the process, it created schisms in the very fabric of India and resulted in the rise of communal politics in the country.

In the field of education, rather than creating a conducive education environment which drew inspiration from India’s past, to preserve the soul of India, we outsourced education to the left-leaning cabal. As stated by Sanjeev Sanyal, “The Left dominance over the intellectual establishment has its roots in the systematic ‘ethnic cleansing’ of all non-Left thinkers since the 1950s”. As a result, “there were no non-Left academics remaining in the social sciences field in India by the early 1990s”.^[1]

These self-declared intellectuals trampled over Bharat’s traditional and progressive cultural practices, jettisoning our rich cultural values. Speaking at a book discussion on the unveiling of the book The Indian Conservative by Jaithirth Rao, Dr Abhay Firodia, President Force Motors, made the point that the history taught today is “malicious, synthetic and fabricated, which is trying to break our affinity to our land, destroy our confidence and make us hate ourselves”.^[2] Many intellectuals have expressed similar sentiments over the years, but only now do we see some signs of change, as indicated in the new education policy which has been promulgated.

On the economic front, for many years, India’s intellectual establishment remained wedded to the idea that Nehru’s socialist economic model was the right course for India to emerge as a developed country. All that was required was proper implementation. This, again, was a product of leftist thought and had no rationale or model to back it. India’s stagnation, even three decades after pursuing the Nehruvian dream, was not attributed to the failure of socialism but, quite perversely, to the majority community of India. It was an economist of the establishment, Raj Krishna,  who derisively coined the term “Hindu rate of growth”^[3] to show India’s failure to the world as one resulting from its people who professed the Hindu faith. This was insulting. We do not see the term Muslim rate of growth being applied to countries like Pakistan, Bangladesh, Somalia and Afghanistan. Nehru steered India through difficult times, but his economic and social models were not recipes for success. One of the reasons was that they were an artificial import, not suited to the genius and culture of Bharat.

In another 23 years, India will commemorate a century of freedom. However, steps to free the long-suppressed soul of India began in a real sense only in 2014 when the people of India gave a thumping mandate to the BJP-led NDA government and repeated the same in 2019.  Over the last decade, we have seen the construction of the Ram Temple in Ayodhya, the abrogation of Articles 370 and 35A, the abolition of instant Triple Talaq, the introduction of the New Education Policy, and various such initiatives in multiple fields. In the economic sphere, we are now the fifth largest economy in the world and will soon become the third largest; the GDP and the per capita income are on the rise, we have successfully weathered the downturn caused by the Chinese virus, and despite the conflicts prevailing in India’s neighbourhood, we are the fastest growing large economy in the world. Today, there is a renewed sense of pride in our civilisational heritage and ethos, and the world looks up to India.

India’s culture, cuisine, and ethos are respected worldwide. Yoga, India’s gift to the world, has become a household word. This is no small achievement.

However, many challenges still need to be addressed and overcome. Despite a reduced mandate in the 2024 elections, the coming decade promises to be exciting, purposeful, and challenging. But the difference now is that we have finally started shedding the hesitancies of the past and reclaiming our lost heritage. The soul of Bharat has found utterance. Bharat is in churn, but the churn reflects the ‘SamudraManthana’ or ‘churning of the ocean’as depicted in the Vishnu Purana, Bhagavata Purana, and the Mahabharata. It is truly a time for hope and rejuvenation.

Author Brief Bio: Maj. Gen. Dhruv C. Katoch is Editor, India Foundation Journal and Director, India Foundation

^[1] http://www.sanjeevsanyal.com/home/article_detail/86

^[2] https://www.hindustantimes.com/cities/indian-conservatism-has-not-received-academic-recognition-jaitirth-rao/story-NCBSGMyxska32KenM3TeyJ.html

^[3] https://www.livemint.com/economy/the-history-behind-hindu-rate-of-growth-in-charts-11678370005198.html

The Context

The Indian state has a highly complex relationship with religion. The relationship is complicated by 1000 years of history of oppression and colonisation of the Indigenous people on the basis of religion and a continuous 1000-year effort of resistance overtly and covertly by the oppressed majority to have a voice in government. A short reading of Indian history would show that it has been a tendency for outsiders who have ruled India to bring in their co-religionists and appoint them to positions of power and influence in the state or the kingdom they formed. This was as true about the Turkish sultans as the Mughals and the British. Unless absolutely necessary, the indigenous locals, who were primarily Hindus, were not appointed to government positions. Undoubtedly, during all these rules of foreigners ruling India, there were some exceptional Indians and Hindus who rose to great prominence. However, they were exceptions and not the norm. Though there has been a tendency post-independence to show as if in all the period for the last 1000 years, Hindus were equally appointed in positions of governance, an objective study would clearly show that it was by far not the case. The ruling dispensation of the period clearly preferred their co-religionists to Hindus when appointing people to power.

This has been a source of grievance and anger amongst Hindus historically. During the end of the British Raj, one of the places of great contestation was the appointment of Indians to the bureaucracy and the judiciary, especially the bureaucracy. The appointments to the bureaucracy are the genesis of today’s debate about reservations on religious lines.

It had been the specific grievance of explicitly Muslim politicians during the period after the first war of independence in 1857 that Muslims, who were the rulers of this country and who had a right to rule, were being displaced by Hindus in government appointments by the British. There was much angst that ‘martial’ Muslims were being replaced by ‘effeminate’ Hindus, and especially Bengali Hindus, in the governance of the country. The argument was that Hindus who had adapted themselves to the British Raj and had learnt English with the help of Western education were being taken into the bureaucracy in very large numbers by the British. The Muslim intelligentsia and the elites were especially aggrieved by their perceived displacement from their positions of power after the events of 1857.

The Muslim struggle leading up to the partition of this country was primarily based on that very grievance. At the heart of the demand for the formation of the state of Pakistan was that Muslims of India were not adequately represented in the executive and legislature. The British, supported by the Indian National Congress, tried to alleviate these fears by providing various measures, including separate electorates and reservations in the bureaucracy and public employment and education. Unfortunately, instead of allaying these unjust demands, these actions catalysed the road to the partition of the country and the formation of Pakistan. Reservations based on religion once given were never enough.

It is, therefore, important to remember this when addressing the question of religious reservations in India.

The Constitutional Debates on Religious Reservations

When the Constitution was being framed after the country’s partition on religious lines, the Constituent Assembly came to discuss the issue. On the question of providing safeguards for minorities, Shrimati Vijay Lakshmi Pandit, during the debates on 20^th January 1947, famously said:

“The Resolution before us stresses complete freedom for the individual and concedes guarantees to every legitimate group. Therefore, in this, there is no justification for fear for the minorities. Even though certain minorities have special interests to safeguard, they should not forget that they are parts of the whole, and if the larger interest suffers, there can be no question of real safeguarding of the interest of any minority.”

Sardar Patel,in the discussion on the Report on the Advisory Committee on Minorities on 11^th May 1949, made specific observations of reservations for religious minorities, harking back to the history of reservations for religious minorities in India:

“the advisory committee concluded that the time has come when the vast majority of the minority communities have themselves realised after great reflection the evil effects in the past of such reservation on the minorities themselves, and the reservations should be dropped.”

He further concluded the debate by stating firmly:

“the Muslim representatives put forward this plea that all these reservations must disappear and that it was in the interests of the minorities themselves that such reservations in the Legislature must go. The report states that it is no longer appropriate that there should be statutory reservation of seats for minorities except the Scheduled Castes and the Tribals.”

Naziruddin Ahmed observed that:

“Sir, I believe that reservation of Muslim seats, especially now, would be really harmful to the Muslims themselves. In fact, if we accept reservations and go to the polls, the relationship between Hindus and Muslims, which now exists, will deteriorate. The great improvement in the situation that has been achieved will be lost. The Hindu-Muslim relation of the immediate past will be recalled, and feelings will be embittered…8.91.153 Sir, reservation is a kind of protection which always has a crippling effect upon the object protected. So, for all these reasons, I should strongly oppose any reservation for Muslims. Now, Mr. Lari’s amendment is to the same effect that there should be no reservations for Muslims, and I welcome it so far as Muslims are concerned.”

The danger of reservation for religious minorities was expressly recognised. It was decided explicitly during the framing of the Constitution that even though such reservations preexisted the Constitution, it had no place in the Constitution of India, which came to be framed.

The Supreme Court on Religious Reservations

The Supreme Court has not addressed the question directly and clearly. However, the issue has been brought before it several times, especially in the context of repeated attempts by governments of so-called “secular parties” to bring in reservations in employment for religious minorities disguised as reservations for Other Backward Classes. However, the broad line of the Court can be made out when the Court was confronted by a live religious reservation in the legislature, which was a historical legacy. Broadly, while addressing the question of reservations even though in the context of representation in the legislature in the Sikkim Assembly of the Buddhist Sangha, which had a reservation in the historical context of the state, the Court in a Constitutional bench decision observed in  R. C. Poudyal v. Union of India, 1994 Supp (1) SCC 324 at page 388:

137. The Sangha, the Buddha and the Dharma are the three fundamental postulates and symbols of Buddhism. In that sense, they are religious institutions. However, the literature on the history of the development of the political institutions of Sikkim, adverted to earlier, tends to show that the Sangha had played an important role in the political and social life of the Sikkimese people. It had made its own contribution to the Sikkimese culture and political development. There is material to sustain the conclusion that the ‘Sangha’ had for long associated itself closely with the political developments of Sikkim and was interwoven with the social and political life of its people. In view of this historical association, the provisions in the matter of reservation of a seat for the Sangha recognises the social and political role of the institution more than its purely religious identity. In the historical setting of Sikkim and its social and political evolution the provision has to be construed really as not invoking the impermissible idea of a separate electorate either. Indeed, the provision bears comparison to Article 333 providing for representation for the Anglo-Indian community. So far as the provision for the Sangha is concerned, it is to be looked at as enabling a nomination, but the choice of the nominee is left to the ‘Sangha’ itself. We are conscious that a separate electorate for a religious denomination would be obnoxious to the fundamental principles of our secular Constitution. If a provision is made purely on the basis of religious considerations for the election of a member of that religious group on the basis of a separate electorate, that would, indeed, be wholly unconstitutional. But in the case of Sangha, it is not merely a religious institution. It has been historically a political and social institution in Sikkim and the provisions in regard to the seat reserved admit of being construed as a nomination and the Sangha itself being assigned the task of and enabled to indicate the choice of its nominee. The provision can be sustained on this construction.”

According to the Supreme Court, any reservation based on religion is anathema to the Constitution.

The New Political Game

The new political game of trying to circumvent this Constitutional bar by incorporating religious minorities into the Other Backward Classes category and thereby pushing reservations in employment and education for them under Articles 15 and 16 of the Constitution in a large number of states by so-called “secular” political parties must therefore be seen in that light. It is clearly an attempt to do something which is expressly unconstitutional in a way so that it does not look as if it is against the constitutional bar against reservations based on religion. It must be called out as it is: a colourable action with unholy motives.

The Endgame

 

It is surprising (or maybe not surprising at all) that 70 years after the culmination of the disastrous policy of religion-based reservations, resulting eventually in the partition of India with substantial human costs, calls for the same thing are being raised again.  The coalition calling for it is the same coalition of interests that did the same in pre-partition India.  A coalition of leftists, so-called enlightened liberals and Islamists are again leading the same movement. Like those in pre-partition India, the trend started with the completely made-up report of the Sachar Committee, whose data has never stood up to scrutiny. Just like in pre-partition India, the Westernised elites have primarily been complicit in this scheme to be able to hang on to power when they see it slipping away from their hands in the face of growing calls for democratic representation. This is a fool’s game and, more importantly, a very dangerous one considering the history of grievances and documented history of discrimination against Hindus till the partition of India and the sensitivities surrounding the same.

As those invested in India, we must actively, openly, and aggressively thwart this badly thought-out design. As we learned during partition, the cost of not resisting it successfully is just too high. Therefore, we must resist this demand with all our might right at the beginning or risk our very existence again, like in the medieval tale of the dwarf and knight.

After all, “Those who don’t learn from history are condemned to repeat it.”

Author Brief Bio: Shri Vikramjit Banerjee is a Senior Advocate, Supreme Court of India and Additional Solicitor General ofIndia. The views expressed by the author are entirely personal and have nothing to do with the Government.