Introduction.  

Under the Indian Constitution, legislature, judiciary and the executives are the three pillars of the State. It is based upon certain doctrines which has established rule of law based modern democratic societies. Some of the examples of such principles are a). Separation of power, b). Doctrine of check and balance and c). Transparency in the state affairs.

To keep a check on three pillars of the government it has been provided with an accountability mechanism amongst each other. Executive is accountable to the legislature and judiciary both. Judiciary is also accountable to the legislature. Similarly, the power of the legislature is also checked by the judiciary as it cannot make any law which is ultra-vires. But finally, it is only the legislature which has been made accountable to the people which has elected it to rule over them. Therefore, judiciary and executive both are accountable for the legislature and ultimately, it is only the legislature which is answerable to the people.

The focus of this article is on two aspects: One, is the Parliament fulfilling its role with respect to the judiciary and two, whether the Supreme Court is meeting its mandate with due observance of the above said basic democratic principles of the governance model adopted in our Constitution?

 24^th Amendment

Article 368 as adopted by the Constituent Assembly was debated as Draft Article 304 of the Constitution on 17^th September 1949. After debating this provision, it was adopted without any change.^[1] Article 368 has been through three amendments: the 7^th, 24^th and 42^nd Amendments. These were necessitated to maintain the supremacy of the Parliament in view of some judgments passed by the Supreme Court curtailing power of the Parliament to amend the Constitution. The 24th Amendment stated: (i) Notwithstanding anything in this Constitution, Parliament may in exercise of its constituent power amend by way of addition, variation or repeal any provision of this Constitution in accordance with the procedure laid down in this article.”^[2]

The power to amend gives the Constitution the capacity to cater to the changing needs of society and to evolve organically. The wide powers given by the 24^th amendment thus gave Parliament the power to overcome the judgment passed by the Supreme Court in Golaknath Case (1967). The Constituent Assembly debates indicate that the original framers of the constitution were well aware of the consequences of having a rigid Constitution. It was never their intent that the Supreme Court should be the final arbiter to decide whether an amendment made under Article 368 is valid or otherwise on Constitutional parameters. At that time, Members were even against allowing State Governments any say in exercise of this power by the Parliament, but in deference to the federal structure of the state, ratification by state clause was accepted by all.

Basic Structure Doctrine

Rigid Constitution comes with its own problems as seen by the example of the Constitution of the Republic of Ireland, which requires the consent of the people through Constitutional Referendum, before any amendment can be made.^[3] Considering the vastness and population of India, a referendum clause would have been counterproductive, which is why this power has been left to be exercised by the elected Parliament, without any limitation. Hence the ratio laid down in Golaknath Case that Parliament cannot amend Part III of the Constitution was overruled in 1972 in the Kesavananda Bharati case^[4] by affirming the Constituent power of the Parliament under Article 368 and that the Act made under Article 368 is not a ‘law’ as mentioned under Article 13. However, the Kesavananda Bharati case also introduced the doctrine of the Basic Structure of the Indian Constitution, and held that this cannot be abrogated, even by a Constitutional Amendment.

What constitutes the Basic Structure now includes an ever-expanding list, which the Supreme Court has taken upon itself to determine, on a case to case to basis. In this series, independence of judiciary was also recognised as a basic feature of the Constitution under the doctrine of Separation of Power in Second Judges Case of 1993, i.e., SCAORA Vs. UOI^[5].

Appointment of Judges

Vide Article 124, every judge of the Supreme Court is to be appointed by the President after consultation with the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court as the President may deem necessary for the purpose. In First Judges case of 1982, i.e., S. P. Gupta Vs. UOI^[6], the Supreme Court, held that under Article 124, the word “consultation” does not mean concurrence. The President was thus not bound to make a decision based on the consultation of the Supreme Court. This meant that the appointment of judges is a function to be exercised by the President (through executive) as per the principle of natural justice that no one should be the judge on his own cause for accountability of the judges under the Doctrine of Checks and Balances.

However, this majority view was overruled in SCAORA Vs. UOI (supra), also known as the ‘Second Judges Case’, wherein a nine-judge bench overruled the decision given in S. P. Gupta case (supra) and gave primacy to the Chief Justice of India (CJI) over the President on appointment of judges and transfer matters by holding that the word ‘consultation’ would not lessen the primary role of the CJI in judicial appointments and started interpreting it as ‘concurrence’ by relying upon the doctrine of separation of power and independence of judiciary. This has later been formalised in the form of Collegium System in 1998 in Third Judges case and since then, the five senior most judges in the Supreme Court are appointing judges of the Supreme Court and High Courts and having the final say in transfer matters also. Therefore, elevation to the bench from the bar since 1993 has become the sole function of the senior most judges of the Supreme Court or Juristocrats of the Supreme Court. It must be noted that this practice of judges appointing judges is unique to India and exists in no other country.

Invention of Basic Structure Doctrine: Permissible Limit of ‘Amendment’

In a constitution which makes no separate provision of total revision but simply prescribes the machinery to amend the Constitution, can such power of amendment include the power to make total revision and substitute the Constitution by another? The Supreme Court, by inventing the concept of ‘un-amendability of the basic structures’ by way of interpretation has held that certain essential parts of our Constitution are so basic that its amendment will change the character of the Constitution itself and hence cannot be amended and that Parliament does not enjoy absolute Constituent Power under Article 368 for this purpose.

But what if the Constitution was required to be amended fundamentally. How would we go about amending the same, without a formal procedure? Some countries have overcome this problem by providing separate provisions for revision in their Constitution. The Constitution of Switzerland provides for referendum before initiating partial amendment or repeal/total revision of the Constitution. The Constitution of West Germany (1949) has a provision that states that if the existing constitution of 1949 is to be replaced in toto or to be replaced by new one, it can be done only by a plebiscite of the ‘German people’ while the partial amendment is left by Article 79 in the hands of Federal Legislature. However, the basic principles contained in Arts. 1-20 are not subject to any amendement. Traces of the Doctrine of Basic Structure adopted by the Supreme Court of India and the necessity behind such adoption can be found here. On the scope of Art. 79(3) it was held by the German Court that “The purpose of Art. 79 para 3 is a check of the legislators amending the Constitution to prevent both abolition of the substance or basis of the existing constitutional order, by the formal legal means of amendment and abuse of the Constitution to legalise a totalitarian regime.”

In the Indian Constitution such power is deliberately absent, and it is not a mistake. The Supreme Court can bar any amendment to the Constitution which it deems to be affecting the basic structure of the Constitution. But what if such an amendment was required? Will it not be the prerogative of the people of India to decide the same by referendum and not the Supreme Court? The judiciary cannot be the final authority to decide on our Polity. This is a matter that can only be exercised by the true representative of people.

The Conflict of two Doctrines

In Keshvananda case, Sikri, C.J. held that ‘the doctrine of basic structure will act as a safety valve against the arbitrary use of amending power by Parliament’. This certainly serves a great purpose in safeguarding the freedom and liberty of the citizen in a case of a totalitarian regime like the emergency imposed by the Indira Gandhi government for 21 months between 1975-1977. But what if the courts start applying the principle of doctrine of basic structure in every case against the popular will of the country and starts interfering with the power of legislature in violation of doctrine of separation of power itself under the garb of independence of judiciary? Should not the Doctrine of Checks and Balances apply to the judiciary too?

Additionally, what constitutes ‘independence of Judiciary’ and when can we say that such independence is being violated or will be violated? Is the judiciary immune to follow the fundamental basics of a rule of law based democratic country, which is the very foundation of its power? Will this not lead to a new form of aristocracy in our country where ‘juristrocrats‘ will have a veto power on deciding the polity & broad policy of the nation?

The Supreme Court itself has already held in Keshavananda Case, State of Bihar V. Bal Mukund Sah,^[7] and then in I R Coelho V. State of Tamil Nadu^[8], that the ‘Principle of Separation of Powers’ between Legislature, Judiciary and Executive is part of ‘basic structure’. It is hence apparent that these two doctrines are in severe conflict with each other.

Legislation should always be a business of political will of the people in a democratic political society. If the judiciary also starts legislating, then it will not only make law more confusing but would also amount to breach of doctrine of Separation of Power as held in a judgment in the year 2020 in the case of Dr. Ashwini Kumar Vs. UOI & Anr^[9]. This can but lead to ‘judicial aristocracy’ where law starts emanating from a selected few intellectual of the Constitutional Courts.

Parliament, working under the Constitution, cannot also change the basic element of the same such as substituting democracy with monarchy or the federalism enshrined in our Constitution as rightly observed by the Sikri C.J. in Keshvananda case. What is needed then is a fine and calibrated balance between judicial powers barring Parliament from making specific new amendments to the Constitution. However, in all other cases, they must have the power to legislate on behalf of the citizen as per their will and their need, which is very essential for organic stable growth of the society and law.

Today what constitutes those certain basic features of Constitution, which are un-amendable and for which Parliament can’t exercise its power, is uncertain and confusing which can only be decided on case-to-case basis as per the satisfaction of the Supreme Court. In Ashok Kumar Thakur V. Union of India (2008) 6 SCC 1; the Court observed that “to determine if a constitutional amendment violates the basic structure, a two-step ‘Effect Test’ as laid down in I. R. Coelho case is to be applied on a case-by-case basis and it has to be examined in each individual case keeping in mind the scheme of the Constitution…”. So, today it’s a complete judicial discretion to hold any amendment in Constitution valid or invalid on the basis of doctrine of basic structure. How then do we deal with judicial reforms, which are a pressing need today?

Brief History

Judicial interpretation of the powers vested in Article 368 first came to the fore in 1951, within a year of the Constitution coming into force, when the Constitution (First Amendment) Act was passed. The amendment sought to curtail the Right to Property guaranteed by Article 31. Its constitutionality was challenged and the matter was decided by a 5 Judge bench of the Supreme Court in Sankari Prasad Singh Deo v. Union of India^[10]. The judgement held that Fundamental Rights are also subject to the amending power of the Parliament under Article 368. The Court distinguished between the Ordinary Legislative Power and Constituent Power and held that this is a constituent power and not ordinary legislative power. The judgement went on to state that…the terms of article 368 are perfectly general and empower Parliament to amend the Constitution, without any exception whatever. Subsequently, in Sajjan Singh V. State of Rajasthan^[11], the Apex Court, in a majority judgement, held that ‘amendment’ includes any change and not necessarily a change by way of improvement. Hence it would include repeal or substitution.

This issue was again considered when the 17^th amendment was challenged and heard before an eleven Judge bench in Golak Nath V. State of Punjab (1967) 2 SCR 762;  though the majority did not give categorical answer regarding the scope of Art. 368, a view was expressed (obiter) by some Judges that it should not go to ‘the extent of abrogating the present Constitution and substituting it by an entirely new one’. In this case it was held that no provision of Part III or Fundamental Rights can be altered by an amendment under Article 368. Thereafter, to provide solution and overcome the difficulty caused due by the Golaknath case for enabling agrarian reforms & to bring right to property outside the ambit of fundamental rights, the ambit of the amending power under Art. 368 was sought to be clarified by enacting the Constitution (24^th Amendment) Act, 1971 which, inter alia, inserted cl. (1) in Art. 368, containing the words ‘amend by way of addition, variation or repeal any provision…’ The validity of this Amendment Act was unanimously upheld by the Special Bench in Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala, (1973) 4 SCC 225.

The language used by the several Judges who constituted the majority in the Keshavananda case was not identical. The common ratio however was that the limitation to the power conferred by Art. 368 came from the very meaning of the word ‘amend’. Justice Khanna observed in Para 1427: The words “amendment of this Constitution” and “the Constitution shall stand amended” in Article 368 show that what is amended is the existing Constitution and what emerges as a result of amendment is not a new and different Constitution but the existing Constitution though in an amended form. The language of Article 368 thus lends support to the conclusion that one cannot, while acting under that article, repeal the existing Constitution and replace it by a new Constitution.” 

Similarly, the limitation of the amending power was observed by Justice Mathew in Para 1567 as also by other judges. Justice Mathew summed up his conclusion in Para 1162, stating that… Parliament could under Article 368 amend Article 13 and also the fundamental rights, and though the power of amendment under Article 368 is wide, it is not wide enough to totally abrogate or what would amount to an abrogation or emasculating or destroying in a way as would amount to abrogation of any of the fundamental rights or other essential elements of the basic structure of the Constitution and destroy its identity. Within these limits, Parliament can amend every article. In this view of the scope of the amending power in Article 368, I hold the Twenty-fourth Amendment valid, for it has the same amending power as it existed before the amendment.”

However, contrary to the above majority view, another proposition, advanced by some other Judges (Ray, Palekar, Mathew, Beg, Dwivedi and Chandrachud JJ.) though in minority, negates any implied restriction to be imposed on the powers of the Parliament with respect to Article 368 and held it as against the wish of the framers of our Constitution. Ratio of the arguments can be summarised as observed by Justice Dwivedi in Para 1888 as under:

The grants of legislative power are ordinarily accorded the widest amplitude. A fortiori, the constituent power in Article 368 should receive the same hospitable construction. The word “amendment” should be so construed as to fructify the purpose underlying Article 368. The framers of the Constitution have enacted Article 368 for several reasons. 

• First, the working of the Constitution may reveal errors and omissions which could not be foreseen by them. Article 368 was designed to repair those errors and omissions.
• Second, the Court’s construction of the Constitution may not correspond with the Constitution-makers’ intention or may make the process of orderly government difficult.
• Third, the Constituent Assembly which framed the Constitution was not elected on adult franchise and was in fact not fully representative of the entire people. Fourth, at the apex of all human rights is the right of self-preservation. People collectively have a similar right of self-preservation. Self-preservation implies mutation, that is, adaptation, to the changing environment. It is in the nature of man to adjust himself to the changing social, economic and political conditions in the country. Without such adaptation the people decays (sic) and there can be no progress.

Justice Dwivedi, after analysing Constituent Assembly Debates and Constitutional Jurisprudence worldwide against the implied limitation being imposed on Article 368 in the form of basic structure, observed that Article 368 is the master, not the slave of the other provisions. Acting under Article 368, Parliament is the creator, not the creature of the Constitution for the organic and natural growth of the society as per the need of every generation. Para 1890 goes on to state: It is difficult to believe that those who had fought for freedom to change the social and political organisation of their time would deny the identical freedom to their descendants to change the social, economic and political organization of their times. The denial of power to make radical changes in the Constitution to the future generation would invite the danger of extraordinary constitutional changes of the Constitution.

The Doctrine of Basic Structure

With a narrow margin of 7:6, it was held in the Keshvananda’s Case that there are certain basic features of the Constitution which are un-amendable and Parliament can’t exercise its power under Article 368 on similar line as of Constituent Assembly to amend ‘Basic Structures of the Constitution’ and it can only be done by replacing the existing Constitution. Three modes have been suggested to replace the existing Constitution or amend the basic features: (a) Complete Revolution (b) Parliament converting itself into a Constituent Assembly & (c) Referendum/Plebiscite.

After Keshvananda’s Case the scope of Parliamentary Power to amend the Constitution under Art. 368 have been curtailed and came under the purview of judicial scrutiny, whether it is violative of basic structure of the Constitution or not.  According to Sikri, C.J. the ‘basic structure’ was built on the basic foundation i.e. the freedom and dignity of individual; He observed in (As per Shelat & Grover JJ.)

“Para 582. ….. If the historical background, the preamble, the entire scheme of the Constitution, relevant provisions thereof including Article 368 are kept in mind there can be no difficulty in discerning that the following can be regarded as the basic elements of the constitutional structure. (These cannot be catalogued but can only be illustrated):

(1) The supremacy of the Constitution.

(2) Republican and Democratic form of government and sovereignty of the country.

(3) Secular and federal character of the Constitution.

(4) Demarcation of power between the Legislature, the executive and the judiciary.

(5) The dignity of the individual secured by the various freedoms and basic rights in Part III and the mandate to build a welfare State contained in Part IV.

(6) The unity and the integrity of the Nation. 

After Golak Nath Case no fundamental right could be taken away or abridged. But After Keshvananda’s Case it is for the Court to decide whether a fundamental right is a basic structure or not. In Indira Gandhi V. Raj Narain (AIR 1975 SC 2299), the Supreme Court added the following features as ‘basic structure’ to the list of basic features laid down in Keshvananda’s Case:          

1. Rule of Law
2. Judicial Review
3. Democracy, which implies free and fair elections
4. Jurisdiction of Supreme Court under Article 32.

Further in Minerva Mills Ltd. V. UOI (AIR 1980 SC 1789); the Hon’ble Supreme Court by 4:1 majority struck down clauses (4) & (5) of Art. 368 brought by 42^nd Amendment Act, 1976 to overcome the doctrine of basic structure. It has been struck down on the ground that these clauses destroyed the essential feature of basic structure of the Constitution. The Court held that the following are also the basic features of the Constitution:

1. Limited power of Parliament to amend the Constitution
2. Harmony and Balance between fundamental rights and directive principles
3. Fundamental rights in certain cases
4. Power of judicial review in certain cases.

Doctrine of Basic Structure as it Stands Today

After the re-affirmation and extension of the applicability of the doctrine of Basic Structure in the Minerva Mill’s Case, it is now evident that so long as the decision in Keshvananda’s Case is not overturned by another full bench of the Supreme Court, any amendment of the Constitution is liable to be interfered with by the Court on the ground that it affects one or other of the basic features of the Constitution.

Independence of Judiciary and Collegium system for appointment of Judges

In a recent case challenging the Constitutional validity of 99^th amendment to the Constitution which paved the way for NJAC, Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Assn. v. Union of India, (2016) 5 SCC 1; the Supreme Court has struck down the amendment brought with overwhelming political consensus to bring transparency in judicial appointments as an alternative to collegium system on the basis of violation of independence of judiciary being one of the basic structure of the Constitution by majority of 4:1. It has held indirectly that collegium system is a basic feature of our Constitution! But it is flying on the face of the doctrine of Separation of Power, the Doctrine of Check and Balance and transparency in all public affairs of the State including judicial appointments.

However, the dissenting view delivered by Justice Chelameshwar also held independence of Judiciary as a part of basic structure but observed that the 99^th Amendment was not violative of any of such basic features of the Constitution and indeed was necessary for increasing the efficiency and accountability of the Judiciary. In his dissenting view Chelameshwar J. precisely tried to balance both conflicting doctrines in Para 1212: Primacy of the opinion of judiciary in the matter of judicial appointments is not the only means for the establishment of an independent and efficient judiciary. There is abundance of opinion (in discerning and responsible quarters of the civil society in the legal fraternity, jurists, political theorists and scholars) that primacy to the opinion of judiciary is not a normative or constitutional fundamental for establishment of an independent and efficient judiciary…” 

Judicial Reform: The Mystery of Elevation and Designation

On careful analysis the minority view taken by Justice Chelmeshwar appears more correct. Independence of judiciary will not be compromised if the executive or parliament have a say in the appointment process. On the contrary, it will increase transparency and confidence of the people in its process. The 99^th Amendment with the National Judicial Accountability Bill was brought to fill the legislative vacuum created after adoption of the Collegium System to codify the process of appointment of judges. The common aspiration of the people was in its support to start with this judicial reform as there were allegations regarding methods being adopted for elevation of few selected classes of the advocates to the Constitutional Courts.

Opacity in the issue of representation among the judges is a matter of great concern, which can easily be assuaged by adopting basic democratic principles adopted to establish the Rule of Law for executive and legislative wing of the State. The issue of designation as senior advocate by the Constitutional Courts is also marred with doubts of favoritism. To become a senior advocate, there is an impression that one has to be very close and known to the judges. Differentiation in the legal profession, as created under the British System between Barristers (UK law Graduates) and Vakils (Indian law Graduates), continues today under Advocates Act, 1961, as Senior Advocates and Advocates.

Today, overall, the Constitutional Courts are rightly under the accusations of opacity and favoritism to give good career prospects to a few selected class, which is continuing to enjoy the independence of judiciary in their own benefit. Therefore, the mystery of elevation to the benches and designation as a senior advocate by the Juristocrats needs to be solved. In judicial appointments and designations both we should start applying the legal principle propounded by Lord Hewart, the then Chief Justice of England in Rex Vs. Sussex (1924) “Justice must not be done but also be seen to be done”, with respect to fairness and transparency in elevation and designations.

Conclusion

In the light of the above discussion, it can be said that the basic structure doctrine lays down a vague and uncertain test. Can anything be called ‘basic’ which is not prone to any definite definition and of which even its creator is not sure about its contour? Further, the basic rational behind an amending provision in any Constitution is to provide an opportunity to the future generations to make suitable adjustments in it and thus bypass the fear of revolt/Constitutional breakdown. If this is the position, then how can it be assumed that certain basic provisions of the Constitution would never require amendment?

History has seen primarily three forms of government, viz monarchy or autocratic dictatorial regimes, aristocratic forms of government, and democratic governance models. Occasionally, in the timeline of history, we find one form of government yielding to another. Inefficient and bad democratic model of governance during the times of Socrates resulted in the rise of autocratic empires in Europe following the teachings of Aristotle. Monarchy of China and Czars of Russia succumbed ultimately to the communist models of governance in China and in the then USSR. Similarly, colonial imperialism gave way to the modern democratic rule-based governance model in USA and Bharat. Which system is better over the other is hugely contested, the entire cold war being based on these fault lines. Even today, it plays a crucial role when we see continuous reflux in the polarity of the world. But history is testament to the fact that conversion from one governance model to the another, is invariably due to bad governance, inability to provide stability and justice and failure to meet the popular will of the people.

We need to avoid the apparent conflict between the Judiciary and Legislature. The reconciliation between ‘Basic Structure Doctrine’ and ‘Doctrine of Separation of Powers’ can only be achieved if the different organs of the State adopt the ‘Doctrine of Self Restraint’. The institutions which enjoy infinite power can only maintain such power if such institutions can preserve its dignity and respect in a democratic society in the long run. Arbitrary and wanton exercise of such extraordinary powers may in future limit the scope of such power itself.

Author Brief Bio: Ayush Anand & Shubhendu Anand are Advocates, Supreme Court of India.

References: 

^[1] https://www.constitutionofindia.net/constitution_of_india/amendment_of_the_constitution/articles/Article%20368

^[2] See Section 3 of the Constitution (Twenty-fourth Amendment) Act, 1971

^[3]https://www.citizensinformation.ie/en/government_in_ireland/irish_constitution_1/constitution_introduction.html

^[4] (1973) 4 SCC 225

^[5] (1993) 4 SCC 441)

^[6] AIR 1982 SC 149

^[7]  (2000) 4 SCC 640

^[8] (2007) 2 SCC 1

^[9] (2020) 13 SCC 585

^[10] AIR 1951 SC 458

^[11] AIR 1965 SC 845

Origins of Hijab in Islam

The practice of veiling predates Islam in the Arabic peninsula. “Khimar” as it is referred to is a head scarf that was practised by both men and women in the pre-Islamic world, which basically is a scarf that is worn to cover the head and extends below on the back of a person. Depending on the length of the “Khimar”, several words in Arabic exist to describe the garment worn by a person. Reference to the Khimar can also be found in verse Surah al-Nur 24:31^[1] of the Quran, which basically prescribes women to use the “Khimar” and use it to cover the chest. Hence, this semantic difference has to be understood in order to understand the debate about Hijab/Burqa being an essential practice in Islam.^[2]  The other Surah in the Quran that discusses cloaking women in Islam is the Surah-al-Ahzab 33:59, which mandates the following,

“O Prophet! Tell your wives and your daughters and the women of the believers to draw their cloaks (veils) all over their bodies (i.e. screen themselves completely except the eyes or one eye to see the way). That will be better, that they should be known so as not to be annoyed. And Allah is Ever Oft-Forgiving, Most Merciful.”

Essential Religious Practice vs Fundamental Rights in India

While arguments including a Karnataka High Court judgement in the Resham v. State of Karnataka and Others (2022) claim “Hijab as a non-essential part of Islam”^[3],[4], it is necessary to understand the fact that the word “Hijab” in its form cannot be found in the Quran. As discussed previously, the word is “Khimar”. It is hence clear from these verses that an objective analysis of veiling or cloaking in Islam can be viewed as “essential practice”. Although this expression “essential practice”, purely from the academic point of view is based on references to the Quran and other religious scriptures of Islam, it has no legal basis. In India, the essentiality test is defined as, “Test to determine whether a part or practice is essential to the religion – to find out whether the nature of religion will be changed without that part or practise”, as per the Commissioner of Police v. Acharya Jagdishwaranand Avadhuta (2004) judgement^[5] of the Honourable Supreme Court. An in-depth discussion on establishing Hijab as an essential practice in Islam and its practice as a fundamental right can be found in Shashwata Sahu’s article.^[6] Although the premise of the argument is centred on individual rights, fundamental rights as well as education of Muslim women, it is clear from Article 25 and Article 19(2) that restrictions on fundamental rights too can be imposed in order to maintain public order, morality and health. Hence, the argument of Hijab as an essential practices from the perspective of restriction on fundamental rights, does not stand on firm ground. Additionally, the Karnataka High Court judgement as referred earlier, also cites examples of how practitioners of Islam, do not always wear the Hijab in public life, therefore, deeming it not as an essential practice.

Hijab in the Global Context

So, what exactly is Hijab and how does one have to reconcile the practice of veiling and contextualise it in contemporary Indian society? The term Hijab itself in Arabic means “barrier” or “partition”, and is applicable to both men and women in Islam. It however, overtime assumed patriarchal connotation and has resulted in its imposition only on veiling women. While, most societies across the world contain one form of patriarchy or the other, Hijab however is viewed as one of the most regressive of patriarchal impositions on women. It is interesting to note that the discussion on “Hijab as an essential practice” in India is contemporaneous with protests against “Hijab” and oppression of women in Islamist regimes like Iran. It is also important to note that even a country like Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is witnessing a slow but steady move towards liberalism and women’s rights under Mohammad bin Salman.  Mohammad bin Salman himself, much to the chagrin of conservative elements of the Saudi society, has made it clear that the practice of Abaya or Hijab is not mandated by Islam and the country is currently undergoing a wave of progressivism.^[7] It is therefore ironical that India is witnessing unending debates on the practice of Hijab, when the country where Islam originated is moving away from regressive patriarchal impositions.

Muslim Women’s Rights are a part of Women’s Rights

While political debates on issues like Hijab in India muddy the waters of women’s progress, it is essential to have a nuanced view on the discussion. Taking political sides in order to shape narratives is detrimental to Muslim women’s rights and reinforces control over them by the religious clergy. The time is ripe in India to initiate serious debates and discussions on the implementation of uniform civil laws in India, which on paper remains secular, yet courts intervene in matters of religious importance such as in the case of the Sabarimala verdict, Ayodhya verdict and even the Triple Talaq abolition. In a sense, Indian courts have assumed the status of religious authority, while the constitution of India declares the country as a secular state. Muslim women in India have been at the receiving end of “protecting secularism” for long, especially if one witnesses the reversal of Supreme court judgements such as in the Shah Bano case of 1986. While freedom of religion is guaranteed by India’s Constitution in Articles 25-28, it is also necessary that religious elements and practices that are deemed unsuitable for the current day be identified and restricted, for the country to progress ahead. It is vital to recognise today, that the onus of upholding freedom of religion should not rest on the shoulders of Muslim women or should not be viewed from the point of view of minority rights. Issues that are faced by Muslim women should only be viewed from the prism of women’s rights. This fundamental change in our judicial processes and public debates has to be emphatically established in order to move beyond religious debates.

Political Agendas as an Impediment to Muslim Women’s Rights

One can argue that there are concerted efforts going on globally and in sections of Indian intellectual class to portray India as undemocratic or being oppressive to minorities. Such efforts are primarily carried out to tarnish the current political dispensation and can effectively be countered by appropriate counter-narratives. Agenda driven and motivated movements should not become an impediment for the progress of Muslim women in India. What such movements essentially do in a country like India are the following:

• Encourage regressive Islamist elements to hijack the debate
• Keep Muslim women oppressed under patriarchal practices
• Prevent Muslim women from achieving their potential

With close to 200 million followers of Islam in India and with half of them being women, the progress of Muslim women in India is integral to the nation’s progress. As the world’s fifth largest economy and soon to become the world’s largest country by population, India is on the cusp of an era of tremendous transformation. It is in this context that Muslim women be equipped with necessary skills, vocational training and education, for them to join the mainstream of the society and contribute in a major way towards India’s economic progress. With women’s progress comes reform within the society, and in India’s Muslims, reform is long overdue. Several issues related to radicalisation, ghettoisation and discrimination against “non-believers”, can be achieved with the emancipation of Muslim women. While, women in India’s other religious denominations have achieved tremendous progress and contribute in a major way to national progress, Muslim women in India are being denied such opportunities and worse, are being subjected to debates on issues like Hijab. This only encourages regressive elements to dictate terms and conditions on the behaviour of Muslim women and hence such elements must be denied that opportunity to do so.

Uniform Civil Laws and Oppressive Elements in Islam

Today, every India is aware of how medieval mindsets have resulted in the complete annihilation of minority rights in Islamist nations like Pakistan. The country is a failed state and has totally marginalised any liberal voice that is critical of elements that have hindered the country’s progress. From abduction and forced conversions of underage girls to intolerance against Hindus, Pakistan is a basket case of religious extremism and its impact on Muslim women’s progress. Similarly, in Afghanistan, women are today accorded second class status with severe restrictions on their rights. In the case of Iraq and Syria, the emergence of ISIS has led to women of Yazidi and Kurdish heritage being viewed merely as sex-slaves and objects for gratification of men’s desires. Europe, thanks to the influx of immigrants from countries like Libya, Syria, Morocco, Tunisia etc, has become unsafe for women, with countries like Sweden figuring among countries with most number of rape cases. Mass molestations and underage girls being groomed for sexual favours are being witnessed from countries ranging from Greece to Germany and from France to the UK. “Sharia no go zones” where even law enforcement agencies cannot effectively enforce law have mushroomed across countries like Belgium, Netherlands, Norway etc.

In such a scenario, the only way to ensure Muslim women are safe is by bringing in civil laws that bring them on equal footing with women from other religious backgrounds in India. Uniform civil laws in India are a major step in the direction of gender equality in India, especially in terms of inheritance and maintenance. Medieval practices like Nikah, Halala and Polygamy are still common in India and Muslim women have for long been victims of such practices. Muslim women often find themselves at crossroads as large sections are kept so oppressed and away from any education that they are even unaware of laws and legality. In such a scenario, discussion around uniform civil laws will make Muslim women of India aware of what their future course of action should be in order to achieve equity with their counterparts from other religious denominations.

Conclusion

There is a need to bring forth discussions related to uniform civil laws in India in an effort to narrow the gap between rights enjoyed by non-Islamic women and Muslim women. Discussions raking up religious sentiments and efforts to divert the discussion away from Muslim women achieving the optimal potential or to keep them oppressed under oppressive patriarchal practices are detrimental to the larger national cause towards progress and development. The onus of secularism by imposing norms like Hijab and Niqab should not lie on the shoulders of Muslim women in India. Muslim women’s rights should purely be viewed from the point of view of women’s progress without political or religious agendas that are the motivation behind the scenes. Finally, the only way for Muslims of India to join the mainstream and contribute in a major way to the nation’s progress is by emancipating the Muslim women, who as professionals equipped with skills to survive in the 21^st century, are likely to usher in the much-needed reform.

Author Brief Bio: Zeba Zoariah is a final year LL.B student at O.P Jindal Global University and is a Bachelors in Global Affairs from the same university. She writes articles on women’s rights, technology and law.

References:

^[1] http://quransmessage.com/articles/a%20deeper%20look%20at%20the%20word%20khimar%20FM3.htm

^[2] LANE. E.W, Edward Lanes Lexicon, Williams and Norgate 1863; Librairie du Liban Beirut-Lebanon 1968, Volume 2, Page 807-808

^[3] https://theprint.in/judiciary/hijab-not-integral-to-islam-says-karnataka-high-court/873548/

^[4] https://www.livelaw.in/pdf_upload/75-resham-v-state-of-karnataka-15-mar-2022-412165.pdf

^[5] https://main.sci.gov.in/jonew/judis/25984.pdf

^[6]https://www.ijllr.com/post/the-hijab-row-a-case-study-of-karnataka

^[7]https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=I1BmwaFIJ0c

The Indian economy recently cemented its position as the world’s fifth-largest economy overtaking the United Kingdom. The Prime Minister of India at the SCO summit 2022 projected GDP growth at 7.5% which would be the highest among the world’s biggest economies.

Amidst these ground-breaking milestones, India needs to stay cautious of the impending dangers surrounding this growth especially from its hegemonic and hostile neighbour China. The threat from China is manifold from the tangible and downright threat of military engagement on the borders to the intangible and largely uninterrupted threats through virtual/technological means. 

The Financial Debt Threat

Driven by its quest for ultimate global dominance and in a bid to out-muscle the US stronghold in strategising military resources in critical locations globally, China has, in the last decade, adopted every trick in and out of the book. The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is one such example, where China is engaged in the financing of infrastructure projects of poor, developing countries in a series of long-term loans at seemingly high interest rates. The consequences of this financing are slowly coming to light with the most recent example being the usurping of the Hambantota International Port of Sri Lanka which is of critical geopolitical importance with respect to exercising control in the Indian Ocean.

A Time magazine article described Chinese debt as methamphetamine of infrastructure finance: readily available, highly addictive and with long-term negative effects that far outweigh any temporary high. A 2021 study titled “Review of How China Lends: What Did 100 Chinese Lending Contracts Teach Us?” Is revealing. The study, which analysed the terms of 100 Chinese infrastructure lending contracts, found a lack of adequate disclosure of terms and conditions and an existing vagueness in the terms. Additionally, it revealed that post-pandemic, debtor capability of repayment of these debts has been greatly endangered owing to the nature of the economic status of the borrowing nations, which simultaneously increased the risk of dire consequences for the borrower nations.

The geo-political locations of the countries who have been beneficiaries to the Chinese loans greatly affect the diplomatic interests of India from a national security point of view. Debt-trapping nations and seizing infrastructural assets of border countries offers the Chinese potent resources to establish strategic military units increasing their ability to acutely monitor and strategise attempts to infiltrate and influence other growing economies like India.

The Data and Cyber Threats 

Christopher Wary, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) of the USA, in a 2020 event spoke on the economic and national security threat posed by China to the US. He called the attempted economic espionage threat the greatest long-term threat to the US. He then elaborated on the means used by China to carry out Intellectual Property Theft to bolster their technological innovation. He also spoke of the use of cyber resources to procure high volumes of critical citizen data which China then uses to monitor activity and pose a serious irreversible threat.

State-funded cyber-attacks on top US tech companies poses danger not only to the US citizens but also puts global user data at risk. The growing threat of data attacks and lack of adequate means of detection and seemingly inadequate regulations around data protection make India a soft target for cyber-attacks. The trade and use of data for undesirable purposes not only puts the privacy of citizens at risk but also adds a serious national security threat. A 2021 German study classified all the elements of personal data misuse in 11 different categories including use for derivation of coercive incentives, creating religious and racial disharmony, influencing political narratives, social engineering, organised crime, evidence manipulation, torture, bullying among others.

Considering these threats, India needs a strictly enforced and robust data protection framework. This is the prominent reason why the government has stressed upon the requirement of locating data processing units and data servers of foreign companies within the territorial limits of the country also termed as ‘Data Localisation.’ It is of particular importance to preserve the privacy of the citizens of the country and ultimately secure the sovereignty of the nation and not hinder its socio-economic development through blatant intangible weaponising means of data and cyber-attacks.

An adversarial, resourceful, powerful neighbour, which has hostile intentions against India, and which has ready access to information on all aspects of citizen activity, poses a serious threat to India’s security, sovereignty, integrity, and development. 

The Threat in India

In India, where direct financing, military engagement as well as diplomatic intimidation approaches have failed, China has resorted to more capricious means for causing disturbances in the socio-economic setup. This, after China unleashed the wrath of biological warfare on the world which considerably slackened the growth of the global economy except its own. It is a combination of two of its weapons widely used in the global scenario—finance (debt) and abusing large-scale citizen data.

During the pandemic, China flooded the Indian market with several digital lending apps which fell outside the purview of the RBI’s regulations and carried out large-scale individual lending to desperate borrowers in need of money due to the unfortunate circumstances led by the pandemic. The government bodies, then focused on dealing with the mass hysteria surrounding the crises of the pandemic, failed to take note as it occurred. The modus operandi of the apps was entering into outsourcing agreements with NBFCs (Non-Banking Financial Companies) to carry out digital lending on the furnishing of First Loss Default Guarantees to them.

The hidden aspects of their arbitrary operation included charging fluctuating interest rates and exorbitant penal charges, unclear terms and conditions, illegal data collection, data export and unauthorised processing. The apps engaged Recovery Agents who used sensitive data (extracted without the knowledge and authorisation of the users from their devices) as leverage to blackmail innocent borrowers in paying unreasonably high interest and penal charges. The consequences are only being slowly discovered and acknowledged now, nearly two years after the onslaught of operations of these apps. The borrowers have faced the brunt with incidents of harassment and blackmailing, leading to some borrowers even committing suicide.

It is now being discovered that many of these apps had no legal standing whatsoever and have been since banned from operating in a series of notifications issued regarding the same. The disproportionate, unnecessary, and unauthorised data collection by these apps and particularly exporting of all the data back to China has been the prominent reason why the government has recently, in more instances than one, moved to ban several Chinese apps. It comes as a major threat to the privacy of citizens and has the potential for far-reaching consequences in the future—data monitoring, influencing social/political decision-making, targeted advertising, offshore data trading, social engineering, predictive policing etc.

The other immediate threat of capturing innocent buyers in debt traps makes a sizeable portion of the workforce insolvent and renders them incompetent to contribute to their personal growth thereby restricting the overall growth of the nation. 

The Scope of Illegal Operations 

A recent Directorate of Enforcement (ED) investigation revealed that the Instant Loan Providing Digital Apps also known as Fintech companies backed by Chinese funds carried out large scale digital lending activities on entering into MoU agreements (Memorandum of Understanding) with NBFCs without any interference or checks. The Lending Apps took control of the social media data of the clients. High interest rates and late fees were imposed. The investigation also reveals the major decisions related to the operations of these Fintech companies were instructed by Chinese owners based in Hongkong. 12 NBFCs are said to have been involved in such agreements with various foreign backed Fintech companies having disbursed a total sum of ₹4430 crore leading to a total profit of ₹819 crore.

The entire sum of ₹819 crore is being regarded as proceeds of crime and being further investigated under the provisions of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002. The operations of the Chinese Digital Lending Applications are indeed audacious. In short, they operate on agreements (with questionable validity) with NBFCs, (several of them said to have expired licenses), exploiting desperate borrowers by charging them unreasonably high interest and variable charges, extracting and exporting high volumes of unauthorised citizen data including personal and financial data, blackmailing and harassing them by hiring recovery agents acting as extortionists, disrupting the financial stability of citizens of the unorganised sector, hindering financial growth of the nation, posing a serious financial and national security threat and quite audaciously making a huge profit out of it all.

The Action: Too Little Too Late? 

The RBI had been aware of these threats by the Digital Lending Apps and a Working Group on Digital Lending was established on 13 January 2021. The Working Group submitted its report of recommendations on 18 November 2021. On 10 August 2022, through a press release, the RBI adopted certain parts of the recommendations of the Working Group for immediate implementation. Finally, on 2 September 2022, an official circular was issued providing further clarity on the details of implementation of the recommendations and brought forth strict guidelines on the operation of Digital Lending Apps and Lending Service Providers. It emphasised the direct movement of funds to and from the bank accounts of the regulated entities and the bank account of the borrower. It also laid down instructions on data collection, storage, and processing mechanisms to be strictly followed by the apps. A deadline of 30 November 2022 was given for the apps to make their systems compliant with the terms issued under the guidelines.

Additional legislation with respect to data protection is long overdue with the government having recently withdrawn the Personal Data Protection Bill, 2019 after a Joint Parliamentary Committee recommended a host of amendments to the bill. A new piece of legislation is expected to be introduced, incorporating the recommended amendments as early as in the winter session of the Parliament which shall be the governing law in matters relating to data protection in the country.

It can be argued that the RBI perhaps waited too long to intercept and investigate the practices followed by Digital Lending Apps and probably did not take the scope of their operations all too seriously. It is however, for the best that further delay has been avoided and affirmative action has been taken. Material efforts are now being seen to be put in order to regulate Indian and foreign backed lending companies, whose operations were indubitably putting a strain on the financial stability of a major section of population. To counter and prevent compromising of citizen data privacy, strict provisions have been issued in the latest guidelines on Digital Lending.

Conclusion 

The Indian economy being on the ascendant and India’s good relations with most nations in the South and South-East Asian region is probably a cause of concern for Beijing. The CCP has consequently adopted various means to cause disturbances in India such as creating tension on India’s border with Tibet, exerting undue influence over countries like Nepal and Bhutan which have traditional strong ties with India and by providing strategic loans under its BRI to strengthen its geopolitical and military stance by encircling India with investment in infrastructure projects in countries all around it. China is leaving no stone unturned in its no-holds barred attempt to interrupt the overall socio-economic development of India.

The underlying threat, pursuant to the illegal collection and processing of data, should not be taken lightly and a strong model to detect data breaches and efficient countering mechanisms need to be established. The downsides and negative uses of data can have alarming consequences given the tense political climate within the country. It could be used to further hateful agendas and contribute adversely to the already highly polarised society.

Furnishing unregulated debts predominantly to those in the unorganised sector is bound to have an adverse impact in the economic stability of the entire sector. Steps need to be taken to mitigate the harm already done and ensure the prevention of any further damage. Furthermore, instances like these will serve to cause severe apprehensions about emerging technologies and their potential uses, particularly in finance. It will make public trust and acceptance a difficult prospect for future government policy initiatives in adopting these technologies in banking, finance, and other sectors. The net result being a large chunk of the population may well miss out on the convenience and truly beneficial aspects of the technological advancements.

These attempts are, in all probability, just one example of how China is trying to cause major imbalances in the overall socio-economic fabric of India. Future threats need to be anticipated in the interest of the citizens and the larger interest of preservation of the sovereignty of the country. This can be done through vigilance and caution and by keeping abreast with the ever-evolving realm of technology.

Author Brief Bio: Siddharth Acharya is a practicing advocate in Supreme Court of India. Apart from legal profession he has directed acclaimed documentary films on Kashmir and CPEC. He writes extensively and frequently on Constitutional issues and judgments pronounced by Supreme Court.

References

• Directorate of Enforcement (ED) Press Release 3^rd August, 2022

https://enforcementdirectorate.gov.in/sites/default/files/latestnews/HYZO%20Loan%20APP%20PAO%20No%203.pdf

• RBI Guidelines on Digital Lending, Circular issued 2^nd September 2022

https://rbidocs.rbi.org.in/rdocs/Notification/PDFs/GUIDELINESDIGITALLENDINGD5C35A71D8124A0E92AEB940A7D25BB3.PDF

• The Threat Posed by the Chinese Government and the Chinese Communist Party to the Economic and National Security of the United States, Christopher Wray (Director Federal Bureau of Investigation) – Hudson Institute, Video Event: China’s Attempt to Influence U.S. Institutions Washington, D.C. July 7, 2020

https://www.fbi.gov/news/speeches/the-threat-posed-by-the-chinese-government-and-the-chinese-communist-party-to-the-economic-and-national-security-of-the-united-states

• China Cyber Threat Overview and Advisories – Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, United States of America

https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/china

• Financial Stability and National Security in an Era Of Hegemonic Rivalry: The Need To Tighten United States Securities Disclosure Requirements by Joel Slawotsky (University of Pennsylvania Journal Of Business Law, 2020)

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1603&context=jbl

• It’s A (Debt) Trap! Managing China IMF Cooperation Across The Belt And Road – Dylan Gerstel (Researcher at Center for Strategic and International Studies)

https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/181017_DebtTrap.pdf?MKq76lYIBpiOgyPZ9EyK2VUD7on_2rIV

• Johnston, Lauren A, Reviewing How China Lends: What Did 100 Chinese Lending Contracts Teach Us? (April 30, 2021)

Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4070631 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4070631

• Balding, Christopher, Chinese Open Source Data Collection, Big Data, And Private Enterprise Work For State Intelligence and Security: The Case of Shenzhen Zhenhua (September 13, 2020).

Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3691999 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3691999

• Kröger, Jacob Leon and Miceli, Milagros and Müller, Florian, How Data Can Be Used Against People: A Classification of Personal Data Misuses (December 30, 2021).

Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3887097 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3887097

• RBI’s Report of the Working Group on Digital Lending including lending through Online Platforms and Mobile Apps

https://rbidocs.rbi.org.in/rdocs//PublicationReport/Pdfs/DIGITALLENDINGF6A90CA76A9B4B3E84AA0EBD24B307F1.PDF

• “China harvests masses of data on Western targets”

https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/china-harvests-masses-of-data-on-western-targets-documents-show/2021/12/31/3981ce9c-538e-11ec-8927-c396fa861a71_story.html

• WHO-convened Global Study of Origins of SARS-CoV-2: 14 January-10 February 2021, Joint Report

https://www.who.int/emergencies/diseases/novel-coronavirus-2019/origins-of-the-virus

• WHO calls for further studies, data on origin of SARS-CoV-2 virus, reiterates that all hypotheses remain open

https://www.who.int/news/item/30-03-2021-who-calls-for-further-studies-data-on-origin-of-sars-cov-2-virus-reiterates-that-all-hypotheses-remain-open

• WHO Director-General’s remarks at the Member State Briefing on the report of the international team studying the origins of SARS-CoV-2

https://www.who.int/director-general/speeches/detail/who-director-general-s-remarks-at-the-member-state-briefing-on-the-report-of-the-international-team-studying-the-origins-of-sars-cov-2

• The Open Data Market and Risks to National Security:

https://www.lawfareblog.com/open-data-market-and-risks-national-security

• https://time.com/5381467/china-africa-debt-us-security/
• imf.org
• https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Aurora
• https://www.ft.com/content/f27a543b-7678-4130-9c05-db0492d9c240
• https://www.cnbc.com/2019/06/12/chinas-loans-causing-hidden-debt-risk-to-economies.html

 

Rami Desai: Let me begin by asking you about the civilisation state. What does it mean and what in your opinion does it really entail?

Swapan Dasgupta: Well, you see, I think India is a very unique case. The normal yardsticks by which people measure a nation state, you know commonality of either faith, language, ethnicity and things like that, somehow don’t work and it hasn’t worked in the case of India. The usual Treaty of Westphalia model is not applicable in the case of India. What makes India and what binds it together is a form of culture. Now, culture is sometimes very difficult to define. Why is it that one part of India feels attracted to another part of India? I would put it that India is not a nation state in that sense but a civilisational state, bound by a sense of oneness, bound by emotional bonding. It’s very difficult sometimes to define it. Some people have called it ‘sacred geography’, some people have called it something else, but whatever it is, I think, a civilisational state does epitomise this thing where a lot of people live together in harmony. You know, it used to be said, India is as much a nation as the equator. The reason why people didn’t quite get the hang of it is because they never thought that culture or civilisation and the commonalities of that, could actually be the basis on which a nation state can be built. India has demonstrated that.

Rami Desai: So, as it becomes more popular where people are talking about the civilisational state, what changes in society as one comes to accept this terminology?

Swapan Dasgupta: Nothing changes in society, society evolves. And in India what has happened is, the mere fact that there has been a greater degree of communication, there has been a unifying feature of the markets, etc. It appears now, that on top of the civilisational state, some other form of political unity is also coming into being. That’s a more recent phenomenon and a lot of people have attached much importance to it. What gives it salience, I believe is that in the context of twentieth and twenty-first centuries, its gives purposefulness in the way we act as a country. On top of the civilisational state, we now have a certain measure of political unity.

Rami Desai: We find America, China and  India all being called civilisational states. Are there very stark differences in the way China and the US are seen as compared to India?

Swapan Dasgupta: We of course see them. In China there is a certain measure of Han uniformity, and they have tried to achieve uniformity in terms of their language also, which is not something we do in India. Here we have different linguistic expressions. America also has this thing about the melting pot, whereby a certain measure of uniformity is tried to be imposed. It is not forcibly imposed, but it sort of works in that way. In India we don’t. We actually celebrate diversity and look at our civilisation as a mosaic, with different parts complementing each other. This is difficult to explain, but there are various features whereby India is seen as one entity, and this has always been the case. India has lacked political unity. India never had a single state, but there was a sense of ‘Bharatvarsha’, a sense of India which always existed and people in their minds, in their imagination always thought of India as a single entity. This sense has been there for a very, very long time.

Rami Desai: So, as this term becomes more popular not just in India but even abroad, do you think that it impacts foreign policy, as also the way the world looks at India and the way India looks at the world?

Swapan Dasgupta: Well, I don’t think it’s become totally popular. I think there are a lot of people who still resist the idea that Indian is a civilisational State. They try to measure India in terms of other yardsticks and often find it wanting and therefore a lot of the academic discussions on India sometimes concentrate disproportionately on the fissiparous tendencies that may or may not exist in the country and on how India is shaping up. India, firstly, is not a power which has existed on the basis of conquest. This is one of the unique features of India. There’s never been any examples of Indian conquest. Indeed, influence yes, not conquest. India had a certain influence in Southeast Asia, you know parts of Bali, Indonesia, Cambodia, present day, Cambodia, even Sri Lanka. There’s been no lot of Indian influence there. But you cannot say that India physically made that a colony. That I think is very very important. Secondly, I think the reach of India in terms of its civilisational impact and in terms of its attractiveness was because there was no single centre. In China, there is this sense of the centre — the middle kingdom. In India, there’s never been this idea of a centre, so each of these complementary parts have a certain degree of autonomy and are equal in that sense. There’s no hierarchy in these constituent parts, and that is an important thing to note. Now in terms of foreign policy, it’s been some time; it’s been a while before it has made considerable gains. Earlier, from the time of Nehru and Krishna Menon, India saw itself as a moral force in world affairs. But the problem was that preachiness was not accompanied by any measure of economic strength. There was this caricature of India with a  begging bowl, leading a hand to mouth existence, begging for sustenance. Now, that phase is well and truly over. There is today an understanding in the world that even though India may not be the topmost of the developing countries, it certainly has a unique place in the world and does not need to rely on others for its sustenance. Today, many Asian countries and some African countries look at India, not merely as a leader in terms of its ability to head organisations such as NAM and G 20, but more as an alternative centre of economic well-being. So, the civilisational state has meshed in with the idea of India as a growing economic power. And I think it’s complementary. In India, we often emphasise the soft power approach far greater than we approach the hard power. The former approach has also worked in terms of our ability to make a dent in the IT sector in terms of our brain power which we’ve actually too generously exported to the world without necessarily sometimes looking at ourselves. That is the Indian footprint we see all over the world.

Rami Desai: Coming back to India as a civilisational state framework, how do you see recent flashpoints such as the hijab controversy?

Swapan Dasgupta: Well, the question will always be asked: How does a civilisational state work with the Constitution? This is because the Constitution is based on certain rules, certain understanding of how society is to be ordered. Now, in the case of something like the hijab controversy, for example, you could say, well, it’s not really offensive in any way. It doesn’t affect people outside the Islamic world, and affects only a part of Islamic Society. It should, therefore, be left alone and the normal rules of gender equity, which should be there in a modern state, need not apply. And if we take the idea of a civilisational state to be its diversity, we can simply let the matter rest there. But we are also talking about certain common, consensual values here. When those consensual values are offended in some way, whether it happens under the framework of a Hindu or Muslim custom, or the custom of any other religion, it has to be set right. A civilisational state does not necessarily exclude the humanitarian basis, the humanness of any civilisation. In the case of the hijab controversy, it is also seen as an affront to the women concerned. It offends their self-respect, their dignity and their status in the public eye and that is why there has been a movement against it. Now obviously it’s not gone unchallenged and those who support it state that it is based on their scriptures.  I am not getting into that controversy, whether that is the case or not. All I can  say is that a civilisational state does not necessarily mean that the civilisation is frozen in antiquity, that the civilisation is not modern.

Rami Desai: So, if the Constitution often seems to become the battleground when we talk about civilisation state, do you think that there would be challenges when legislation such as the Uniform Civil Code is brought in?

Swapan Dasgupta: Well, the Uniform Civil Code is an aspiration which is written in the Constitution, but we are from actualising the same, partly because we haven’t got a draft for a common code to actually take shape. The people need to know the changes that will come about by the UCC. Till the time it is applied, until the time it is made into part of Indian law, we should have a system whereby all the other civil codes which exist are based on certain common notions of humanity and that gender equity is respected. That’s the interim stage leading to the point where you can have Common Civil Code based on our ability to extrapolate all the good features of all the different cultures and traditions which are there. But this is a very difficult task to accomplish. To start the process, we need a draft which can be discussed.

Rami Desai: Considering the fact that India is uniquely, ethnically and theologically diverse, how do we synthesise it all under a civilizational state?

Swapan Dasgupta: Well, you’re right in saying it’s ethnically diverse. Let us take the case of customary law, which is one of the biggest problems we are going to face, particularly in northeastern India. How do we weave that in? Where do we give the space for local cultures and traditions? Now that’s a big challenge. Why should local traditions and cultures be actually suppressed and made uniform, in a one size that does not necessarily fit all. So, we can have a common Civil Code, but where do we accommodate differences? Now that is both an intellectual and a legal challenge. That is why I say, it’s not something which should be taken very casually. That is why a draft is very, very important. We need a working paper first, where people can come to terms with what is acceptable and what is not. I don’t think human ingenuity is lacking, so customary law can be brought. And then there is the tradition of common law which exists in the United Kingdom, in which customary law actually fits in various ways.

Rami Desai: I think that is a point very well made because we have large tribal populations with ancient practices that we don’t quite understand.

Swapan Dasgupta: We understand it on their own terms, but we do not understand it when it comes to how it engages with the modern world.

Rami Desai: Absolutely. One of the problems that I face while studying these areas is the fact that even the academic tools that we use are outsider tools, such as anthropology or sociology and thus, this remains an intellectual challenge. But having said that, we also have been talking a lot about the freedom of temples from state control. Again, you know it’s been in the news. It’s been controversial. What are your views on that?

Swapan Dasgupta: Well, I think it’s not that complicated an issue. In India, most religious shrines are controlled by their own people. For the Gurdwaras, it is the SGPC which exercises control in terms of a 1920s enactment. You have certain self-regulating bodies for the mosques. But when it comes to temples, some have self-regulation, but the larger ones are controlled by the state-controlled bodies. Now, initially, the purpose behind it might have been to weed out some corrupt practices and other distortions which might have crept in. But I think we have gone beyond that now and a demand exists in a society that the Hindus too, must regulate their own religious practices and their religious institutions. And when that is not happening, the majority community feels discriminated against and that is a very dangerous thing to happen, for it could lead to a strong backlash. I think it is time now for the Hindu community to regulate its own temples, and for that the state can act as a facilitator. Look on it as Privatisation. How do we facilitate privatisation in a smooth and orderly manner, where the new controlling authorities are also accountable. It is more of a management challenge than anything else.

Rami Desai: But then on the other side you also have the Waqf Board controversy.

Swapan Dasgupta: Yes, some of these Waqf Boards are extremely badly managed and some are extremely corrupt also, as stated by members of the community itself. The Waqf Boards also cannot be left to their own devices. I think the Waqf Boards too need a certain degree of reform and accountability. Who are they catering to? Are they catering to the community or are they catering to a small group of people who are the management trustees? The idea behind the workforce has been defeated.

Rami Desai: Quite right. But having said that, why do you think all of these controversies are coming up now? Have people become more aware of all these issues, or has it been gradually happening?

Swapan Dasgupta: No, I think there has been a fundamental change in the way people are looking at the polity. There was a time when it was believed that the only thing which really mattered was the economy, the need to improve the living standards of people, the GDP etcetera. The importance of religion and religious institutions was consciously underplayed. It was always an important factor, but it was never formally recognised in the structures of power. So, it existed as an informal grey area. But now, such grey areas have assumed greater significance for the people and have become very important. They are part of the larger institutions of life, and social existence is based also on these things. That is the reason why the internal workings of these institutions are being examined with a more critical eye, than was hitherto the case. I think what we are seeing is that the legitimacy of religion has been acknowledged in India. While it was always there informally and we as the people of the country knew ourselves to be deeply religious, there was a mismatch between what was perceived by the people and how the same was viewed by the state and by the polity. The polity thought that religion would become less and less important in the lives of people as modernity set in. But that was an erroneous conjecture.

Rami Desai: Would you say that was true of, let’s say, the European world or the Western world?

Swapan Dasgupta: Well, that was certainly the belief in India among the elites as far as the 1980’s/90’s. Right from independence, that was the sort of elite aspiration that we will become something in the nature of a mini Europe in terms of our values if not anything else and in fact progress was assessed in terms of how much closer you’ve arrived to America or to Europe. I don’t think those assumptions are true any longer.

Rami Desai: Yes, public awareness has increased a great deal and perhaps people are reading a lot more. Or perhaps it is the social media that has created such a general awareness that India seems to have come into its own.

Swapan Dasgupta: Well, it’s a combination of social awareness and other factors, but I think economic progress has got a lot to do with it. When you develop a greater degree of self-confidence in yourself, you’re able to stand up to people and say, look, you know, I don’t need your charity. So, you don’t become victims of condescension and view yourself as people who are successful and who have abilities in their own right. I think that’s the change which has happened. This sort of self-deprecation really took place at a time when India had been drained of its wealth by foreign rulers and had lost political and economic sovereignty; it didn’t happen prior to that. But the fact that despite such onslaughts over the past millennium, we still retained some measure of ourselves and preserved our core identity, bespeaks the strength of a civilisational state. There may be areas of it which are slightly battered. But it’s there. The fundamentals are intact.

Rami Desai: Quite right. So let me come to my final question now. There’s also been a lot of discussion around reservations for the EWS, the economically weaker sections. This has now been largely accepted. Do you think this debate now trumps the kind of caste-based reservations and the idea that we had of that sort of discrimination?

Swapan Dasgupta: Well affirmative action is always a problematic issue. It’s you know what and who are you benefiting? Now in India, at one level we are talking about a casteless society, but on another level constitutionally, we’ve accepted caste as a category. The last caste census was carried out in 1941 and today, we are again harking back to it. †here has been the politicisation and the empowerment of certain castes, which has become a major factor. Castes are important politically and in other ways too. Now, reservations for  the economically weaker section is an attempt to find a way out for those who just got left out and who felt shortchanged by the entire process. It is a way of trying to coexist two different principles altogether. One is based on caste, and the other is not based on birth but your circumstances. So, we are trying to mesh two very different systems. Per se, I don’t see anything wrong with it, but I don’t think caste is likely to go away. I think we’ve revived caste in a big way. What we can hope for is that casteism goes away and maybe caste exists as a social category. But I may be being too wildly optimistic on that front because I think this is a problem. This is going to be a serious problem in terms of our future development if caste becomes more than just the social category.

Rami Desai: You just said that we’ve sort of revived it. How have we revived caste in a big way.

Swapan Dasgupta: You know caste was again thought to be something which will gradually erode. But it appears to have formalised into the Indian system. Firstly, there was reservation for the scheduled castes and tribes. This was then extended to the backward castes. Again, there’s a tussle about who could become backward and who could not. So, everybody wants a share of the reservation pie and in that context, you find the EWS coming in. They too want a share of the pie. All this has led to caste being revived in a big way. Because it’s seen as the category, it’s seen as the unit in which a certain privilege can be obtained.

Rami Desai: So, you don’t see a social shift happening?

Swapan Dasgupta: Alas, no. I think caste is going to remain, but I hope its influence is not malevolent.

Brief Bio:

Shri Swapan Dasgupta is a Former Member of Parliament, Rajya Sabha.

Ms. Rami Niranjan Desai is Distinguished Fellow, India Foundation

 

Ukraine became an independent country in 1991, following the break up of the Soviet Union. On 24 February 2022, Russian forces moved into Ukraine, to halt what Moscow perceived to be a deliberate attempt by NATO to continue with its eastward expansion, which could potentially result in Ukraine joining the grouping. That was a red line which Moscow would not allow to be crossed, and was presumably the trigger that led to Russian forces invading Ukraine. But the events leading up to the Russian attack had been brewing since the Orange Revolution of 2004. Ukraine became an area of contestation between the European Union and Russia, which in turn divided the country into two blocs: A pro-European Western Ukraine and a pro-Russia Eastern Ukraine. This tussle led initially to the Orange Revolution, then to the Euromaidan protests of 2014 and finally to the Russian invasion of 2022.

In 1954, the Russian-populated oblast of Crimea was transferred from the Russian to the Ukrainian Soviet Republic. At that time, since both were part of the Soviet Union, it mattered little, but control of Crimea, which had a 75 percent Russian ethnic majority was vital to the security interests of Russia as its Black Sea Fleet was headquartered there. Following the Euromaidan protests in 2014, Russian forces seized control of the Crimean region on 18 March 2014. In April of that year, fighting broke out between the Ukraine army and pro-Ukraine forces on one side against those supporting an independent Donetsk People’s Republic (DPR) and Luhansk People’s Republic (LPR), which had been self-proclaimed in April 2014. That conflict, since then has led to thousands of people being killed and over a million being internally displaced.

The Minsk accords, first agreed in September 1914 and later revised in February 2015 as Minsk II, could have led to peace and stability but they were violated and the self-governance promised to the Donbas region did not come about. Tensions between Russia and Ukraine continued to rise, till on 22 February, Russia formally recognised the DPR and LPR and then two days later, invaded Ukraine.

Most military observers were of the view that the Russian military would bring the war to a quick closure. Russian aims were initially limited to affect a quick change in regime and install a government which was not hostile to Russian interests and which would commit Ukraine to not joining NATO. A combination of military ineptness on the part of the Russian military leadership plus the rallying of the people by President Zelensky has seen the war drag on now for over 10 months, with no signs of the conflict coming to an end any time soon. Russia has taken most of the Donbas region, and the Zaporizhzhiya and Kherson oblasts to give it control over the entire northern coastline of the Black Sea bordering Ukraine, less the city of Odessa. This has linked Crimea to the Russian mainland by the land route, passing through Donbas and Zaporizhzhiya, and has secured Russian access to the Atlantic via the Mediterranean Sea. But at the same time, a fresh set of challenges, which make conflict resolution a distant dream has been thrown up.

For Russia, it would be politically unacceptable to give back what it has gained on the battlefield. Similarly, for Ukraine, the minimum acceptable solution is a return to the status quo. How such irreconcilable positions can be addressed remains to be seen.

This book, “Russia Ukraine War: The Conflict and its Global Impact” delves a bit into history, but for the most part is focussed on the conduct of military operations. The last quarter of the book looks into the geo-political impact of the war and the economic consequences for the world which the war has caused, especially as it comes just when the world was emerging from two years of an economic slowdown caused by the Covid Pandemic.

How the war has been fought so far has been analysed with clinical professionalism, to include the planning and preparatory phase of operations, followed by the actual conduct of operations by the Russians as well as the counter offensive by Ukraine. The wealth of details brought forth in the book makes it a delight for the military professional to understand various aspects of the war-fighting that has taken place as also, where things went wrong for the Russians in terms of conduct of operations at the operational and tactical levels as also weaknesses at the military leadership level. The host of military and political lessons which the war has thrown up need to be seriously studied, for they have applications for India as well as all other militaries and governments across the world.

The last quarter of the book gives out a set of scenarios which could bring about the end game, but the book also looks into the possibility of the war degenerating into a nuclear conflict which could have horrific consequences. The Russia-China convergence has also been covered as has the NATO angle in this war. Importantly, the book looks into the global impact of the war and how this could lead to a new world order. It ends with a well-thought essay on the lessons which India could learn from the war.

The war is not over and doubtless, much of the information about the conduct of operations remain classified and not open to the public. But even so, the book remains an important source document, with a wealth of analysis on different aspects of the war as well as on its geo-political and geo-economic impact. The author, Col Ajay Singh as well as those who contributed to it deserve to be congratulated on taking out this very educative volume. Meticulously researched and impeccably presented, the book is strongly recommended for all those who have an interest in the military and in international relations as also for the lay reader.

Author Brief Bio: Maj. Gen. Dhruv C. Katoch is Editor, India Foundation Journal and Director, India Foundation

The information age has truly empowered the individual to levels which were unimaginable even at the turn of the century, barely two decades ago. Today, even individuals at the lower end of the economic spectrum carry out digital financial transactions with consummate ease, converse in social groups such as FaceBook and WhatsApp and are reasonably well informed of current happenings in their immediate neighbourhood as well as on issues which impact the country. The digital revolution has also empowered people through schemes such as the ‘Jan Dhan Yojana,’ which has led to financial inclusion for millions of households who earlier had no access to banking facilities.^[1] “Ayushman Bharat,” a flagship scheme of Government of India that was launched in 2017, is focussed on providing Universal Health Coverage (UHC) to the masses, with a commitment to “leave no one behind.”^[2] Similarly, India’s Covid vaccine programme is based on digital technology, through the digital platform, ‘CO-WIN’. This user-friendly mobile app for recording vaccine data is working as a beneficiary management platform having various modules.^[3]

The benefits of digitisation are immense especially in the field of governance. However, just as the smart phone and the internet have empowered the individual, the ubiquitous nature of information technology has also thrown up a range of opportunities for their misuse through disinformation, distortion of the truth, false flag operations, spoofing, spam mail, and the like, to create divisions and turmoil within society. The Information Environment (IE) is truly global in nature, with information flows cutting across physical and artificial boundaries and impacting all segments of society. This is both enabling as well as has potential for misuse. The wide range and diversity of actors in the global IE has great aggregate influence, much akin to that of a state and more often, even far in excess of what the modern state exercises. Non-state actors have also made their presence felt and seek to create influence in furtherance of their objectives. Towards this end, influencers are used, who unwittingly or otherwise lend their name to a social cause or movement, sometimes unknowing of the real intent of the provocateurs and at others, because of monetary inducement or being ideologically aligned to the cause. Non-state actors also use the media and exploit advances made in information communication technology to undermine governments and exert influence in furtherance of their aims.^[4]

An example of the above is the efforts made by interested groups to undermine the BJP led NDA government ever since it won the Lok Sabha elections in 2014. A concerted campaign was launched by motivated groups in the months following the 2014 elections to showcase India as an intolerant nation. Here, an attempt was made to create religious discord by highlighting certain isolated incidences of vandalism that had taken places in churches as deliberate targeted attacks, when in fact they were nothing more than cases of petty theft, the likes of which were routine and had taken place in earlier years too. When viewed holistically with data analysis over the past ten years, there was no upward spiral of such cases, as alleged.^[5] Such incidents had also happened with Hindu places of worship but that fact was glossed over. By the time the truth finally came out, India’s image stood tarnished, with even the then US President, Mr Barack Obama, who had come to India as the Chief Guest for the 2015 Republic Day Parade, making remarks on ‘religious intolerance’ and repeating the same on his return to Washington. The vicious attacks against India were motivated and designed to pressure India on its foreign policy and domestic policy options, with religious intolerance being used as a tool to make India conform to Western dictates.

The subsequent years saw protests on various issues, fanned by interested groups exploiting the social, audio-visual and print media. The year 2016 witnessed a series of agitations by student groups, who shouted slogans in support of a terrorist who was convicted for his role in the attack on India’s Parliament in 2001 and who was executed in 2013! The agitating students, supported by left wing and islamist groups, raised slogans seeking the break up of India and calling the act of execution of the convicted terrorist an act of murder. Similar agitations continued on various pretexts over the next two years. Then in 2019 there were huge protests against the Citizens Amendment Act (CAA) which brought parts of the nation’s capital to a standstill, peaking in February 2020, to tarnish the nation’s image when US President Donald Trump was visiting India.^[6] And in September 2020, massive protests broke out against the three farm laws passed by Parliament, which peaked during the Republic Day celebrations in 2021. In all these protests there was a hidden agenda of undermining the elected Indian government, India’s democratic framework as well as India’s composite cultural ethos. Information was weaponised and used to draw crowds to disrupt normal life. This remains part of the agenda of external forces to exacerbate internal issues and fault lines. In this, segments of the opposition parties within India lend a helping hand in their bid to get back to power. In the end, it is the people of India who suffer.

The desire to shape opinions remains the key motivator for organising mass movements against the elected government. This suits the agenda of foreign powers who view India’s rise as a potential threat to their economic interests. It is therefore incumbent on the state to preempt hostile agendas by anticipating what disruptors might do and taking preventive action well in time. This can be done by shaping public perceptions through a long-term vision and with strategic patience.

A potential flashpoint is the current controversy created by the Muslim clergy wherein they seek an alteration to the rules with respect to wearing of school uniforms, so as to allow Muslim girls to wear the hijab. This is a clever ploy by the Muslim clergy to keep Muslim women under subjugation, by invoking their right to study and also invoking their constitutional right to religious freedom. The narrative being spun is that Muslim girls are being denied their right to wear the hijab. This is patently false as there are no restrictions on Muslim women to wear any dress they choose. The restriction is only in the classrooms where the children have to abide by the school dress code. Comparisons with a Sikh male child who wears a turban in class are frivolous as the hijab is not mandated by the Quran to be worn by women and is also not an essential religious practise. The larger danger in interfering with school dress code rules is that if the hijab is permitted, then the Muslim girl child will lose her right of choice, as the clergy will use the power of religious coercion to force her to wear the hijab as a necessary condition to be accepted in their society. This is retrograde and a push back to medievalism.

Another social media favourite of certain groups of people is targeting Diwali and other Hindu festivals. The former always comes up for attack on grounds of pollution, with claims that firecrackers pollute the air. What they fail to address is the poor air quality throughout the year, which has nothing to do with Diwali. Throughout the year, the air quality index (AQI) levels in Delhi and the NCR remain in the poor to very poor category. Diwali is celebrated only on one day and is not a contributory factor to the year long pollution, though the AQI levels do rise for a day after Diwali. Attacks on Diwali are thus motivated and designed to create communal friction. The pollution causing factors which should be addressed are construction activities and vehicular traffic which account for most of the pollution throughout the year. As a long-term measure, an efficient bus service within Delhi and the NCR can reduce the use of private vehicles by about 50 to 75 percent. For that, perhaps an additional five thousand buses need to be added to the existing fleet. This preferably should be run by the private sector and not the government. A long-term ban on new residential construction would also be useful on two counts. One, it would mitigate to a great extent, the particle pollutants that escape into the air. Two, it would halt the unchecked population growth in the NCR through migration, which is creating a severe strain on the existing infrastructure. Population control has also to be a part of the larger picture to control pollution levels as human beings are the only polluters in the planet. Suitable narratives which are gender neutral and religion and caste neutral need to be propagated to get wide acceptance from all segments of society and to change behaviour patterns. A proactive stance in shaping perceptions will go a long way in reducing friction and in addressing societal fault lines to prevent internal and external hostile forces from creating disruptions in society. This assumes importance as the spotlight will be on India for the coming year, when it takes on the Presidency of the G20 this December.

Author Brief Bio: Major General Dhruv C Katoch is Director, India Foundation and Editor, India Foundation Journal

References:

^[1] https://pmjdy.gov.in

^[2] https://nha.gov.in/PM-JAY

^[3] https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=1679181

^[4] https://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/making-sense-information-environment

^[5] https://indianexpress.com/article/india/india-others/false-church-attack-claims-to-humiliate-bjp-govt-says-vhp/

^[6] https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/us-president-donald-trump-in-delhi-key-points/articleshow/74296423.cms

Introduction

India is readying to commence its year-long presidency of the influential Group of Twenty (G20) nations on 1 December 2022, and public interest in all matters relating to the multilateral economic governance institution has begun to grow. What is this group, how did it gain prominence, and why is India’s presidency in 2022-23 so important?

The G20 is the premier global forum for dialogue and cooperation on global economic and financial issues. It is over two decades old and holds the attention of experts and students alike for its intricate interaction between the geo-economics and geopolitics of the contemporary world. It is a unique grouping in which developing and developed countries come together with equal status. Understanding its mission, past trajectory, institutional mechanisms, work methods, and the multiplicity of challenges it addresses, is critical today and requires a serious examination.

What is and what is not the G20, therefore, is relevant. The G20 is “not a treaty-based multilateral organisation capable of taking legally binding decisions, much less implementing them,” says Stewart M. Patrick, Director of the International Institutions and Global Governance programmes at the Council on Foreign Relations, New York. “It is a consultative forum that allows the world’s most important advanced and emerging economies to harmonise their approaches, when so inclined, to the world’s biggest challenges.”^[i] The G20 today represents 85% of global GDP, 75% of international trade, and 2/3^rd of the world’s population.”^[ii]

This essay traces the emergence and evolution of G20 as a global forum of vital importance; explains how it works through its two principal tracks and hundreds of meetings of ministers, officials, and non-governmental experts as well as the annual Leaders’ summits, and finally, decodes the context, implications, priorities, and challenges for the forthcoming Indian presidency.

Creation and Evolution

The G20, at the summit level, came into being after the western financial and sub-prime crisis of 2008 when the advanced economies led by the Group of 7 (G7) had to be bailed out of a potential bankruptcy by the developing countries, particularly India and China. That gave these two emerging economies and some other key developing countries (Indonesia, Turkey, Mexico, Argentina, Brazil, South Korea, and Saudi Arabia) a seat each in the decision-making councils on global economy and finance so far dominated by the advanced economies. It reflected the shift of a chunk of economic power and influence from the west and the north to the east and the south. It was an admission that developed countries by themselves were unable to resolve the global economic problems, and desperately needed the cooperation of countries such as India, China, Russia and Brazil among others, for this vital task.

Before the G20, there were the G7 and the G77

The G7 was established in June 1976, although its origin is traced to an informal meeting of four finance ministers viz. US, France, West Germany, and the UK, held in March 1973 amid the oil crisis. Canada, Japan, and Italy were added thereafter. Later, the G7 admitted Russia, thus transforming itself into the G8 in 1997. However, after Russia was expelled in March 2014 in the wake of its annexation of Crimea, the G7 resumed its original composition. It continues to be powerful and united, and its latest summit was hosted by Germany in June 2022.

Preceding the G7 was the forum of developing countries – G77 – established in June 1964. It has 134 members now but retains its old name. It is known as ‘G77 and China’ when it holds meetings jointly with China. It is much less influential today than it was during the Cold War. A smaller grouping of developing countries – G15 – comprising select developing countries from Asia, Africa, and Latin America was set up in September 1989. The aim was to foster cooperation in trade, investment, and technology within the South and provide inputs to G7 and the WTO. Later, its membership rose to 18, but the name remained unchanged. Regular summits were held during the 1990s and subsequently. The last summit was held in 2012.

The G20’s origins were in the Asian-turned-global financial crisis of 1997–1999, which the G7 was unable to resolve by itself.  Paul Martin, the Canadian finance minister, and Larry Summers, the US treasury secretary, convened a meeting of select finance ministers and governors of the central banks in December 1999. The G20 functioned at that level for nearly a decade. When the financial crisis struck the US in 2008 and quickly turned global, G20 was elevated to the summit level, with the presidents and prime ministers holding regular bi-annual and later annual confabulations with the single goal of preventing another global financial crisis. But like most well-meaning initiatives, it began to expand its scope, including the areas of development. The crisis in Syria led to a migration crisis in Europe, making the shift to this issue inevitable, which was included in the G20 economic agenda.

The engagement of the highest political leaders legitimised the progressive expansion of the G20 agenda beyond finance, fiscal and monetary policies. The grouping now represents a ‘whole of the government’ approach. This was on display when the COVID-19 pandemic hit the world in early 2020, threatening lives and health security, livelihoods, and economic stability and growth. The G20, more than the UN, was tasked with finding solutions to the economic and health problems during Saudi Arabia’s G20 presidency year.

The composition of G20 is varied. For instance, different segments of the G20 should be carefully noted, as below.

• All G7 countries are its members: the US, Japan, Germany, France, the UK, Italy, and Canada.
• All BRICS members are included in it: Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa.
• All the P-5 (Permanent Five) members of the UN Security Council are in G20: the US, the UK, France, Russia, and China.
• The members of the new MITKA group have also been included: Mexico, Indonesia, South Korea, Turkey, and Australia.
• Two countries not covered by any of the above groups, namely Saudi Arabia and Argentina, are also members of G20.
• The original plan was to include Nigeria, but it was dropped. Instead, the European Union (EU) was included.
• Besides the 20 members, the IMF and World Bank, Financial Stability Board, the UN, ILO, WTO, and WHO attend the G20 meetings. Spain is a permanent guest and so are the African Union (AU), the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD). In addition, the country holding the presidency has the privilege of inviting guests of its own. Singapore and the Netherlands are almost always invited.

How it works

The G20 has two clear goals before it: i) to promote financial stability and economic growth, and ii) to make globalisation work for the benefit of all by devising consensus in policymaking on a wide spectrum of government issues. “Both directly reflect the intense connectivity that defines the 21st-century world.”^[iii]

Official Fora

This grouping has a rotating presidency and does not have a permanent secretariat. That role is played by the country which holds the presidency. It is assisted by the Troika, comprising the past, present, and future presidency countries, much like the Rotary Club. As a legacy of the era when the G7 ruled the roost, OECD continues to provide considerable intellectual and policy advisory support to the presidency, keeping the influence of the G7 intact.

The G20 works on the Finance Track and the Sherpa Track. The first deals with economic, financial, and monetary issues through regular meetings of the finance ministers and governors of the central banks. It has eight workstreams: Global Macroeconomic Policies, Infrastructure Financing, International Financial Architecture, Sustainable Finance, Financial Inclusion, Health Finance, International Taxation, and Financial Sector Reforms.

The rest is handled by the Sherpas. Each country has a ‘sherpa’ who is the main interlocutor and coordinator of the G20 leadership. They prepare the ground and ensure the harmonisation of numerous Ministerial Meetings and Working Groups. The Sherpa Track has 12 workstreams: Anti-corruption, Agriculture, Culture, Development, Digital Economy, Employment, Environment and Climate, Education, Energy Transition, Health, Trade and Investment, and Tourism.

Engagement Groups

Beyond the governments, the G20 benefits from wide-ranging discussions and studies undertaken by 10 Engagement Groups of the private sector, civil society, and independent bodies. These are: Business 20, Civil 20, Labour 20, Parliament 20, Science 20, Supreme Audit Institutions 20, Think 20, Urban 20, Women 20, and Youth 20. Each sub-forum has its meetings and its summits, resulting in a crowded and busy annual agenda for the host country and other members.

Of these engagement groups, the two most important are the Think 20 and the Business 20.

Think 20 (T20) is a network of think tanks from G20 countries that provide intellectual support to G20 leaders through research-based policy recommendations. It is often called the “ideas bank”^[iv] of the G20 process. The first T20 summit was held during Mexico’s G20 presidency in 2012 and has since become a constant feature in the G20 process. Members of the T20 are leading think tanks from across the globe. Hence, the T20 ‘thinks’ for the G20, and provides constructive evidence-based solutions to various global challenges.

Akin to the G20 leaders’ format, engagement groups also follow the Sherpa system. In the case of the T20, think tanks and research institutions from G20 states are nominated as Sherpas. The Chair-Sherpa is a leading think-tank from the G20 host state and acts as the nodal point of coordination for the T20.  Some countries like Indonesia appoint a single think tank sherpa, but others like Japan, appoint more than 10 sherpas for their presidency year.

Every year sees two priority areas: one, which is a continuous G20 agenda, and the other which is identified by the G20 president country’s chosen agenda. For example, Indonesia’s G20 presidency focussed on three priorities: 1) Global Health Architecture, 2) Digital Transformation, and 3) Sustainable Energy Transition,^[v] and the same was reflected in the T20 agenda as well.^[vi] Through task forces, each focus area is further explored in a cross-disciplinary manner.

The main outcome of T20 is the communique, a vision document that is released by the chair at the T20 summit. The T20 communique lists proposals and recommendations for G20 leaders to consider during the summit. Some of these salient proposals eventually make their way into the G20 Leaders’ communique.

Business 20 (B20) is an exclusive G20 engagement group created for greater interaction with the global business community. As the corporate face of the G20 framework, the B20 strives to accommodate business interests within the broader global economic agenda. The B20, therefore, is a dialogue platform for leaders of business and industry to present, share and suggest policy options to the G20 leadership.

The B20 was the first engagement group founded within the G20, and its first meeting was held during the presidency of South Korea in 2010.^[vii] However, the concept of B20 was formally introduced during France’s G20 presidency in 2011.

The B20’s usual focus includes international trade reforms, financial regulation, monetary system, global financial architecture, energy efficiency, sustainable investment, and digitalisation. For each focus area, a task force is constituted comprising industry leaders. The B20 network comprises business and trade organisations. Each G20 country is represented by trade organisations/associations that are nominated as Sherpas by their respective governments. While the apex chamber is usually appointed as the business sherpa, sometimes other chambers are too are given this designation. For instance, during the Turkish presidency in 2015, seven business chambers were assigned the work of the B20 Sherpa and focused on Small and Medium Enterprises and entrepreneurship.

From Bill Gates to Jack Ma, the B20 has witnessed the participation of prominent corporate leaders in the past, and their attendance speaks volumes. From India, business magnates such as Anil Ambani of Reliance Industries, Adi Godrej of Godrej Industries, Sunil Mittal of Bharti Enterprises, and others have been part of various B20 task forces/meetings in the past. Apart from the corporate world, policymakers, scholars from academia, and think tanks are also invited to participate in the B20 forum. The World Economic Forum and the International Chambers of Commerce are usual invitees and participate in the B20 network.

Besides the official engagement groups, there are unofficial engagement groups like the Young Entrepreneurs Alliance, the Girls20, and the Interfaith Dialogue.

The most important document that emerges from the presidency country each year is the ‘Leaders’ Declaration’, issued at the conclusion of each summit. It is backed by and is based on joint statements that are issued by the Ministerial and other meetings. The G20’s formal work through an expanding agenda is significant.  Equally important is the opportunity the annual summit affords to the top leaders of member countries to meet, interact, and build personal relationships and “recast bilateral ties.”^[viii]

Trajectory so far

The journey of the G20 may be classified into three periods: i) 1999–2008, ii) 2008–2019, and iii) 2019–2022.

1998-2008:

The first decade comprised regular meetings of the finance ministers and governors of the central banks. The agenda for their discussions extended progressively, to include financing for terrorism in the wake of the war in Afghanistan. A major focus was the reform of IMF which resulted from the decision to give the emerging economies a proportionately bigger share in the vote of its executive board.

2008-2019:

The second decade began with the global financial crisis raging in the West, which necessitated the G20’s elevation to the summit level. The first Leaders’ summit was held in November 2008. From 2009 to 2010, two summits a year were held. Then the grouping followed the practice to hold an annual summit until 2019. The UK, Canada, South Korea, Russia, China, Argentina, and others got the opportunity to host the summit. The G20 thus became an integral part of international economic governance. A few presidencies left a longer-term impact such as those of South Korea for pushing the cause of South-South cooperation, and Germany for advancing the ‘Compact with Africa’.

2019-2022:

The third period began with the Covid-19 era. Two summits were convened by Saudi Arabia in 2022 to address the unprecedented challenges created by the pandemic. The Debt Service Suspension Initiative (DSSI) proved a major achievement. Three summits were held in 2021 under the Italian presidency to tackle the continuing problems of Covid-19, the US-NATO handover of Afghanistan to the Taliban in August 2021, and the normal Leaders’ summit.

The Indonesian presidency of 2022 with its mission of ‘Recover Together, Recover Stronger’ had barely begun when the Russia-Ukraine conflict flared up in February 2022, resulting in new geopolitical tensions. If there was a hope of keeping geopolitics away from the G20 agenda, that was disbanded as positions hardened, and complexities rose. President Joko Widodo attempted to play a mediatory role, securing limited success and assurances from the leaders of Russia and China to attend the summit in Bali in October 2022. The Russian annexation of four regions of Ukraine in September 2022, however, raised serious question marks over the prospects of the Bali summit.

Scholars interpret the nature and degree of success of the G20 summits in different ways. V. Srinivas, a senior Indian official who studies the G20, says that G20 has usually been upbeat.  “In the past, G20 has witnessed several major successes in multilateralism, and there is optimism that renewed multilateralism efforts can succeed.”^[ix]

John Kirton of the University of Toronto’s G20 Centre has studied the past work of the G20 and suggests that the grouping be judged by six criteria comprising i) domestic political management, ii) deliberation for the collective conclusion, ii) principled and normative direction-setting, iv) collective commitments, v) compliance with commitments, and vi) institutional development of global governance. His macro verdict over two decades of the G20: “Charting G20 performance on these dimensions at each of its 16 summits shows the G20’s comprehensive rise to an impressive performance at Hamburg in 2017, then a substantial decline, and a revival at Rome in 2021.”^[x]

Spelling out three key economic priorities for G20 in mid-2022, Kristalina Georgieva, managing director of IMF, highlighted the need for reduction in inflation, tightening of fiscal policy, and imparting of a fresh impetus for global cooperation – “led by the G20.”^[xi] Today, the economic challenges facing the world are as pressing as they were in 2008 which led to the G20’s elevation to the highest political level. Worrisome for the hosts of the G20 summits this year and the next i.e., Indonesia and India, is the deteriorating state of geopolitics, casting a dark shadow on this largely economic forum.

India’s Presidency

India’s presidency of the G20 comes at a critical time, both for India and the G20 countries. Due to last for a year from 1 December 2022, it coincides with the 75^th year of India’s Independence. The G20 summit will be a major milestone for the country’s democracy and diplomacy, bestowing a key leadership role on India on the world stage. But the stage is strewn with thorns on both the economic and geopolitical fronts. The Bali summit, followed by the Delhi summit, will demonstrate if the world – and the two host countries – can tackle the immediate issues of war and conflict as well as focus attention on the need for financial stability, peace, and sustainable development.

Handling it with finesse and balance is particularly important as the G20 has an unprecedented opportunity: it will be led by four developing countries in a row, starting with Indonesia in 2022, India in 2023, and Brazil and South Africa in 2024 and 2025 respectively. It is a chance to show whether the G20, a forum of the North and the South, can do justice to the needs and expectations of both the developed and developing countries as well as those outside the G20 family, in an equitable measure.

India will host the 18^th summit of G20 in New Delhi on 9 and 10 September 2023. Nine country guests have already been invited: Bangladesh, Egypt, Mauritius, Netherlands, Nigeria, Oman, Singapore, Spain, and the UAE. In addition, the International Solar Alliance (ISA), the Coalition for Disaster Resilient Infrastructure (CDRI), and the Asian Development Bank (ADB) are invited as Guest-International Organisations (IOs)

India is expected to host over 215 events at 55 different locations across the country. At most of these meetings, the G20 world will be represented by 42 delegations of ministers and officials. The summit in September 2023 will bring nearly 12,000 international delegates, media, security, and associated personnel to Delhi.

The summit’s theme and priorities may be announced formally in December 2022. But the following media statement made by the Ministry of External Affairs on 13 September reflects the present official thinking:

Whilst our G20 priorities are in the process of being firmed up, ongoing conversations inter alia revolve around inclusive, equitable and sustainable growth; LiFE (Lifestyle For Environment); women’s empowerment; digital public infrastructure and tech-enabled development in areas ranging from health, agriculture and education to commerce, skill-mapping, culture and tourism; climate financing; circular economy; global food security; energy security; green hydrogen; disaster risk reduction and resilience; developmental cooperation; fight against economic crime; and multilateral reforms.^[xii]

While speaking at the UN General Assembly on 25 September, External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar observed, “As we begin the G-20 presidency this December, we are sensitive to the challenges faced by developing countries. India will work with other G-20 members to address serious issues of debt, economic growth, food and energy security, and particularly, of the environment. The reform of the governance of multilateral financial institutions will continue to be one of our core priorities.”^[xiii]

India’s presidency will be stamped by its past contribution to the deliberations and decisions of the G20. India’s leaders – finance ministers, Reserve Bank governors, former Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh, and Prime Minister Narendra Modi – have been proactive and influential in shaping the outcomes of the meetings and summits in the previous years. India has used the G20 forum to address its concerns on terrorism financing well. PM Modi addressed all the summits from 2014–21 and articulated the country’s concerns on black money and tax avoidance; countering international terrorism; effective measures against fugitive economic offenders; the need to maximize digital technology for social benefit; and the imperative to make available ample climate finance for developing countries.^[xiv]

Guided by a mix of motivations – to promote its national interest, leave a mark on the G20, maintain the forum’s primacy as an effective instrument of global governance, and insulate it from rising geopolitical tensions, India has four choices:

• First, it can be content with a unique branding opportunity offered by the presidency i.e., to project India’s success as a democracy that delivers on development.
• Second, as part of a four-country chain (Indonesia, India, Brazil, and South Africa) that holds the presidency during 2021–25, India can consolidate their synergy and solidarity to advance the interests of the Global South.
• Third, the three IBSA countries (India, Brazil, and South Africa) will chair the forum from 1 December 2022 to 30 November 2025, thereby giving this trinity, somewhat somnolent at present, a chance to promote the interests of democracies moving on the development path and fulfill the G20 promises made by the advanced economies to developing countries.
• Four, as the chair of the G20, India can (and should) take a broader view of its global responsibilities and attempt to coordinate and synthesize diverging perspectives of different constituencies within the G20 family and beyond.

A sober and balanced view suggests that these four choices are not mutually exclusive. “It is possible to weld them together to create a holistic and comprehensive approach for the Indian presidency.”^[xv] India’s performance and ability to lead the G20 will be judged, above all, on this specific score.

Finally, India must invest in the G20 by putting more of its best resources into it, so that developing countries and advanced economies stand at the same level, making equal contributions. As Dr. Raghuram Rajan, former governor of the Reserve Bank of India, told Gateway House in 2015, “We must, across the emerging world, realise that some of the reasons why global governance seems to be sort of against us are because we are not putting enough resources into this… It makes a big difference who has the pen. Because what you write is very different [from what industrial country markets do].”^[xvi]

Author Brief Bio:

*Amb. Rajiv Bhatia is a Distinguished Fellow at Gateway House, the author of three books, and a former ambassador who writes regularly on multilateral governance.

*Manjeet Kripalani is the Co-founder and Executive Director of Gateway House.

 

References:

^[i] Stewart M. Patrick, ‘The G20 Was Made for Moments Like This’, Council on Foreign Relations, 25 October 2021. https://www.cfr.org/blog/g20-was-made-moments

^[ii] ‘India @2023, G20 Presidency’, PowerPoint presentation by Harsh Vardhan Shringla, India’s Chief Coordinator for G20 at a business conference in Mumbai, 5 September 2022.

^[iii] James McBride and Anshu Siripurapu, ‘The Group of Twenty’, Council on Foreign Relations, 15 November 2021. https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/group-twenty

^[iv] See, Multiple Authors (2012). Think-20 Meeting: Report to Sherpas. URL. www.g20.utoronto.ca/t20/2012-FINAL_Think-20_Report_to_Sherpas.pdf

^[v] Issue Priorities (2022). G20 Indonesia 2022. URL https://www.g20.org/g20-presidency-of-indonesia/#priorities

^[vi] Indonesia had 9 T20 task forces roughly covering sustainable investment, digital connectivity, energy transition, food security and sustainable agriculture, inequality and human capital, global health security, global SDG financing, infrastructure resilience, international finance, and economic recovery.

^[vii] For details see Rajiv Bhatia, “The G20’s virtual year” in India in the G20: Rule-taker to Rule-maker (Manjeet Kripalani ed.), Routledge.

^[viii] James McBride and Anshu Siripurapu, ‘The Group of Twenty’, Council on Foreign Relations, 15 November 2021. https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/group-twenty

^[ix] V. Srinivas, Talk on G20@2023: The Road Map to Indian Presidency, New Delhi. ICWA, 2 August 2022. P. 10.

^[x] John Kirton, ‘The G20’s Growing Governance, 2008–2022’,

http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/biblio/Kirton_G20_Governance_UPH_220224.pdf

^[xi] Kristalina Georgieva, ‘Facing A Darkening Economic Outlook: How The G20 Can Respond’, IMF Blog, 13 July 2022. https://www.imf.org/en/Blogs/Articles/2022/07/13/blog-how-g20-can-respond

^[xii] ‘India’s forthcoming G20 Presidency’, 13 September 2022, Ministry of External Affairs. https://mea.gov.in/press-releases.htm?dtl/35700/Indias_forthcoming_G20_Presidency

^[xiii] ‘India’s Statement delivered by the External Affairs Minister, Dr. S. Jaishankar at the General Debate of the 77th session of the UN General Assembly’, Ministry of External Affairs. 25 September 2022. https://www.mea.gov.in/Speeches-Statements.htm?dtl/35757/Indias_Statement_delivered_by_the_External_Affairs_Minister_Dr_S_Jaishankar_at_the_General_Debate_of_the_77th_session_of_the_UN_General_Assembly

^[xiv] For details, see: V. Srinivas, Talk on G20@2023: The Road Map to Indian Presidency. Pp. 13–17.

^[xv] Rajiv Bhatia, ‘The G20 and New Delhi’s choices’, The Hindu, 25 August 2022.

^[xvi] ‘T20 Mumbai Keynote by Dr. Raghuram Rajan’, 19 October 2015. https://www.gatewayhouse.in/raghuram-rajans-t20-mumbai-keynote/

Background

Created in the aftermath of the devastating World War II, it is important to underline that the United Nations and its Security Council as well as the Breton Woods institutions and the G7 reflect the world order which prevailed immediately after the World War II as well as the new power balance created by its victors. The G 20 is a reflection of an emerging order, which brings the G7 together with other major economies as equal partners. It also includes the P5 with other major emerging economies.

Conceived as an international mechanism for governance of the global economy, the G20, which includes all the major economies, has evolved over time into one of the most powerful economic and financial groupings. At present, it comprises 85% of global GDP, 75% of international trade and two/thirds of the global population. It represents the world’s key body for handling global economic and developmental issues.

Held under a rotational Presidency on an annual basis since 2011, the G20’s initial focus was on broad macro-economic policy. Formally known as the “Summit on Financial Markets and the World Economy”, the G20 has made continuous efforts until the pandemic toward achieving robust global economic growth. It re-doubled its efforts after the pandemic. More recently, the G20 focus shifted to include a wide range of global issues including climate change and energy, health, counter-terrorism and migration.

What is the composition of the G20? It comprises 19 countries (Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, Mexico, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Turkey, UK and USA) and the European Union (EU). It has become a relevant and influential global grouping. The regular participation of international and regional organisations such as the African Union, NEPAD and ASEAN as invitees in the G20 process makes it both inclusive and representative.

The G20’s initial focus was on financial and socio-economic issues. Since it was raised to the level of Heads of State and Government, the G20 has evolved to address every contemporary issue and challenge. There are 20 Working Groups between the Sherpa and Finance Tracks and 10 Engagement Groups, which bring together the civil societies, think tanks and other key stakeholders of the member countries.

Existing G20 Tracks

The G20 currently comprises several tracks including:

-‘Finance Track’, with 8 work streams (Global Macroeconomic Policies, Infrastructure Financing, International Financial Architecture, Sustainable Finance, Financial Inclusion, Health Finance, International Taxation, Financial Sector Reforms).

-‘Sherpa Track’, with 12 work streams (Anti-corruption, Agriculture, Culture, Development, Digital Economy, Employment, Environment and Climate, Education, Energy Transition, Health, Trade and Investment, Tourism). Shri Amitabh Kant is the Indian Prime Minister’s Sherpa for this period.

-‘10 Engagement Groups’ of private sector/civil society/independent bodies (Business 20, Civil 20, Labour 20, Parliament 20, Science 20, Supreme Audit Institutions 20, Think 20, Urban 20, Women 20 and Youth 20).

India’s Presidency

India has been a member of the G20 since its inception in 1999. As an important member of the grouping, India ensured that its perspective on issues of vital national importance did not go unheard in the global financial narrative. India will be assuming chairmanship of the G20 for one year from 01 December 22.

India’s Presidency comes at a watershed moment coinciding with a period of flux, internationally. The global community is facing multiple challenges, politically and economically. The Russia-Ukraine conflict has vitiated relation between Russia and the industrialised Western countries, most of which are members of the G20. The conflict and the resulting unilateral sanctions imposed by the West has upset the post pandemic global recovery, sharply impacted oil and gas prices as well as food availability. As always, the impact is felt most sharply by the most vulnerable, the developing countries and LDC’s.

India would, in the true spirit of Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam (the world is one family), seek to find pragmatic global solutions for the well-being of all. India’s vision for the global development agenda is shaped by the rapid transformation of its economy and society launched by the Prime Minister, particularly green and digital transformations. The after-effects of the pandemic are also of importance, as it underlined the importance of resilient healthcare and global co-operation.

PM Modi has transformed India’s foreign policy to focus on the ‘global common good’. Through its G20 leadership, India hopes to extend this principle towards finding sustainable solutions to some of the key global challenges emerging out of the interconnectedness of the world, such as climate change, new and emerging technologies, food and energy security, etc. As the incumbent G20 President, India will set the agenda, identify the themes and focus areas, conduct discussions and deliver the outcome documents. India will identify, highlight, develop and strengthen international support for priorities of vital importance in diverse social and economic sectors, ranging from energy, agriculture, trade, digital economy, health and environment to employment, tourism, anti-corruption and women’s empowerment, including in focus areas that impact the most vulnerable and disadvantaged.

India is currently part of the G20 Troika (current, previous and incoming G20 Presidencies) comprising Indonesia, Italy and India. From December 22, during India’s Presidency, Indonesia and Brazil along with India would form the Troika. This would be the first time when the Troika would consist of three developing countries and emerging economies. It is hoped that as a result there would be a shift in the balance of power within the G20. It is time for emerging economies to have a greater share in decision making at this grouping.

India will host the G20 Leaders’ Summit at the level of Heads of State / Government on 9^th and 10^th September 2023, in New Delhi. Under its Presidency, India is expected to host over 200 G20 meetings across India, commencing from December 2022. India is preparing to hold up to 190G20 meetings on a pan-India basis. In our effort to organise an Impeccable and Uniquely ‘Indian’ G20, we strive to take this mega event closer to the lives of the people of India making it ‘People’s G20’.

Establishment of G20 Secretariat

A G20 Secretariat has been established with Cabinet approval. Former Foreign Secretary Harsh V. Shringla has been appointed as India’s chief G20 Coordinator at Secretary Level. His tenure commenced on 1^st May 22 till 31^st December 23. The G20 Secretariat will be responsible for implementation of overall policy decisions and arrangements needed for steering India’s Presidency.[i]

The Secretariat will be responsible for smooth transition from the previous Presidency, preparations and conduct of all G20 meetings during the year, consultation and coordination with stakeholders and finally handing over to the next Presidency in December 2023. The Secretariat will also enable capacity building, including knowledge and expertise, for supporting India’s leadership on and contribution to global issues in multilateral forums in the years ahead.

The Secretariat will handle work relating to knowledge, technical, media, security and logistical aspects of the Presidency. The Cabinet Secretariat said in a statement: “It will be manned by officers and staff from the Ministry of External Affairs, Ministry of Finance, and other relevant line Ministries/Departments and domain knowledge experts. The Secretariat will be functional till February 2024”.

The India Trade Promotion Organisation (ITPO) has almost completed re-development of Pragati Maidan for setting up of a world class Integrated Exhibition-cum-Convention Centre (IECC) at a cost of Rs 2254 crore. It is the venue of the Summit.[ii] The Government has commenced the process of recruitment to the Secretariat. In a tweet citing a tweet by Ministry of External Affairs Spokesperson Arindam Bagchi confirming that recruitment had started, Prime Minister tweeted: “This is an exciting opportunity…”[iii]

 In accordance with past tradition, the Presidency usually invites some ‘Guest’ countries and International Organisations (IOs) to its G20 meetings and Summit. MEA has announced that as President, India will invite Bangladesh, Egypt, Mauritius, Netherlands, Nigeria, Oman, Singapore, Spain and UAE as ‘Guests’. Bangladesh is the only South Asian neighbour invited as ‘Guest’ to the Summit.

Further, in addition to regular International Organisations (UN, IMF, World Bank, WHO, WTO, ILO, FSB and OECD) and Chairs of Regional Organisations (AU, AUDA-NEPAD and ASEAN), India, as G20 Presidency, will be inviting as ‘Guest IO’s’ the ISA (International Solar Alliance), the CDRI (Coalition for Disaster Resilient Infrastructure) and the ADB (Asian Development Bank).

Priorities of the Presidency

What would be the priorities of the Indian Presidency? According to MEA: “Ongoing conversations…revolve around inclusive, equitable and sustainable growth; LiFE (Lifestyle For Environment); women’s empowerment; digital public infrastructure and tech-enabled development in areas ranging from health, agriculture and education to commerce, skill-mapping, culture and tourism; climate financing; circular economy; global food security; energy security; green hydrogen; disaster risk reduction and resilience; developmental cooperation; fight against economic crime; and multilateral reforms.”[iv]

Among its key priorities are climate, digital and health. The Presidency provides an opportunity to showcase India’s leadership inter-alia in climate action and climate commitments. Prime Minister Modi has pointed out that India’s dedication to climate commitments is clear. India has achieved the target of 40% energy capacity from non-fossil sources, nine years before the deadline. At the COP26 Summit last year, Mr Modi announced the ‘Panchamrit’ or five major areas of climate action commitments by India, including creating a net zero economy by 2070. Access to climate finance and technology would be critical in facilitating these ambitious goals particularly for developing countries.

Prime Minister emphasised the importance of behavioural change for catalysing climate action and highlighted the need for collective action by the global community as part of a movement called LIFE – Lifestyle for Environment.  These are most relevant for the G20 today. On digital, India hopes that our start-up sector and our proven capabilities to create tech models that balance the need for global integration and priorities at a national level can be internationalised. Digital India would go global. A new tech order must combine cross-border flows of technology and investment with development and growth aspirations.

On health, India has demonstrated new and innovative approaches to tackle complex challenges including Covid 19. India’s efforts to track the COVID pandemic’s spread relied on the success of the Aarogya Setu digital platform. India’s successful vaccination campaign which saw 2 billion vaccines administered across our populace, was underpinned by the Co-WIN digital platform. Under India’s Presidency, efforts would be made with other G20 partners to create mechanisms that strengthen the capacity of developing countries to tackle health crises like the Covid19 pandemic.

The Indian Sherpa

The Sherpa plays a crucial role in ensuring that the priorities of the Indian Presidency under P M Modi are supported by G20 member states. India’s G20 Sherpa, Amitabh Kant, is an officer of the Indian Administrative Service (IAS), who headed the NITI Aayog for last month six years before his selection as Sherpa by PM. He is supported by the G20 Secretariat.

Kant led an official Indian delegation to the third G20 Sherpa meeting of Indonesia’s G20 Presidency, held in Yogyakarta from 26^th to 29^th September 2022. (The first Sherpa meeting under the Indonesian Presidency was held in December 2021 and the second in July 2022). At the meeting, according to MEA: “Amitabh Kant reaffirmed India’s commitment and active support to Indonesian Presidency’s efforts…He emphasised the need for G20 to bring enhanced global focus on and strengthen international cooperation and efforts in key priority areas such as sustainable growth, accelerated progress on SDGs, addressing climate change including through Lifestyle for Environment (LiFE), tech-enabled development and digital public infrastructure, multilateral reforms and women’s empowerment”.[v]

Significantly, Kant also highlighted Prime Minister Modi’s recent statement on 16 September: “Today’s era is not of war… diplomacy and dialogues are things that touch the world”. On the sidelines of the G20 Sherpa meeting, Kant held bilateral interactions with his visiting Sherpa counterparts from Brazil, France, Germany, Japan, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Korea, Spain, UK and USA. According to informed sources, the Indian delegation led by Kant through its constructive interventions was able to infuse greater positivity and optimism in G20 deliberations, in preparation for the Indian Presidency.

Challenges Identified by the Sherpa

On 5^th September 22, on Twitter, Kant provided a unique insight into PM Modi’s vision for the Indian Presidency. He gave a broad-brush perspective on the core issues of importance noting: “India believes that the G20 countries must close ranks and work together. While the agenda and priorities for the Presidency are still evolving, India is committed to focussing on issues of critical importance to the world[vi].

The world is facing huge challenges due to post pandemic blues, debt distress, food and energy security and the triple planetary crisis of climate change, biodiversity loss and pollution, along with instability and conflict that are impacting people globally.

The global development agenda is facing monumental challenges at present. The pandemic came on the eve of “Decade of Action” and has disrupted decades of developmental progress globally on many fronts. These effects are compounded by the additional effects of ongoing conflict in Europe. India believes that a conversation on economic growth with sustainability is the need of the hour. The G20 should lead the discussion on how countries can work together to ensure return to economic growth, but one which is rooted in sustainability and sustainable lifestyle.

The concept of LiFE was introduced by PM Modi during the 26^th UN Climate Change Conference of Parties (COP 26) in Glasgow 21. India hopes to highlight LiFE as a critical focus area for discussion and action during our Presidency. India believes that digital technology and digital public platforms are key to deepening engagements of government with citizens. Our belief is that digital identity, content-based framework and payments are key building blocks for a digital future. Digital solutions to traditional problems have transformed and elevated the lives of people across the world. During India’s Presidency, we would like to help take this discussion forward.

We aim to deliver outcomes in areas of critical intent such as integrating the climate and development agenda, accelerating progress towards achieving the 2030 agenda, furthering development cooperation, supporting small and marginal farmers, enhancing food security and nutrition, addressing global skill gaps, promotion of blue economy and coastal sustainability, digital health solutions, green hydrogen and tech-enable learning.

India also hopes to bring into the G20 discussions a focussed conversation on Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR). The average annual loss from disasters globally is approximately USD 218 billion. We believe that a working group on DRR would help the global efforts in reducing the loss of life and livelihood. India believes that the G20 countries must come together to deliver on matters of crucial importance to the world and not let the Russia-Ukraine crisis dominate the broader agenda. The G20 should show the necessary leadership and flexibility to accommodate differences among its members to effectively deliver outcomes”.

While concluding, Kant stated: “The G20, in India, will comprise around 200 events to be held across all the States and Union Territories. The intention is to execute them to perfection and send back every guest as a brand ambassador of India. Our aim is to create a uniquely Indian experience, which is spiritually invigorating and mentally rejuvenating. India’s achievements—both nationally and internationally—have earned us goodwill. India’s stature is extremely tall in the hearts of people. The G 20 will elevate it to even greater heights”.[vii]

Ukraine-Russia Conflict as a possible Spoiler

India has thus so far meticulously prepared for the Presidency. While the focus will be on sustainable economic growth, there are many challenges ahead with the Ukraine-Russia conflict being a possible spoiler. This is despite PM Modi’s determination not to let it become the spoiler.

The G20 Presidency coincides with the domination of a neo-conservative US approach with regard to Russia. Of concern is also a negative narrative on India emanating from some sections of the Western media as well as politicians, the most recent being the Greens German Foreign Minister. This could be due to resentment at India’s rise and India’s independent stand on Ukraine-Russia. Calls for a negotiated end to the conflict have gone unheeded by the West who seems determined to bring down President Putin. More unfortunate, Russia’s recent reverses seem to have whetted the appetite of NATO to reduce Russia to a subordinate status.

The West seems to be in no mood to listen to Kissinger who at 99, in a recent article, had invaluable advice to offer to the West: “The question will now be how to end that war. At its end a place has to be found for Ukraine and a place has to be found for Russia — if we don’t want Russia to become an outpost of China in Europe.”[viii]

The war has entered a crucial stage and the Russian armed forces have been forced to retreat from some strategic areas it had conquered. President Putin has ordered a partial mobilisation. For the first time, ordinary Russians are feeling the impact of the war.  A businessman in Moscow describes a growing sense of vulnerability by quoting from Kipling’s ‘Jungle Book’, which is a favourite of President Putin as follows: “When a leader of the pack has missed his kill, he is called the Dead Wolf as long as he lives, which is not long”.[ix]

President Putin’s dilemma of whether to consolidate gains which are being reversed by expanding the range of weapons (which is implicitly acknowledging the possibility of using tactical nuclear weapons) is bringing the international community closer to a major conflict than any other time since the Cuban Missile Crisis.

The contradictions in US position on Ukraine has been high-lighted as follows: “First, that of enabling Ukraine to mount a robust defence – a humanitarian intervention; second, and emphasised in repeated bulletins from President Joe Biden’s administration, the intent to “cripple” Russia, not only in the current conflict but in any future (unspecified) military adventurism. This, far from offering protection to Ukraine, guarantees that the war will drag on, with ever greater levels of death and destruction. It has also led to both Russia and the US on hair-trigger launch policy, raising the spectre of two equally catastrophic “next steps”: a grievously wounded Russia lashing out – as Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov has threatened as much – or, accidental or inadvertent nuclear action by, for instance, computer error”. For now, one hopes that Benjamin Abelow’s last word is not prophetic: “False narratives lead to bad outcomes.”[x]

Several Western writers and thinkers have a similar perspective. They regret the insistence of the West to dominate the world even when economic power has shifted to Asia. Jeffrey Sachs says: “We are at the 60th anniversary of the Cuban missile crisis, which I’ve studied all my life and I’ve written about, having written a book about the aftermath. We are driving to the precipice, and we are filled with our enthusiasm as we do so. And it’s just unaccountably dangerous and wrongheaded, the whole approach of U.S. foreign policy. And it’s bipartisan”.[xi]

 As incumbent President of the G 20, P M Modi has spoken several times to both President Putin and President Zelensky and most recently to President Zelensky. India is ready to support all efforts at de-escalation. India insists that the global order should be anchored in the principles of the UN Charter, international law and respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity of all States. There can be no doubt that the direction of this conflict may cast a long shadow on India’s Presidency.

Concluding Reflections

In the post-pandemic period, this will be undoubtedly the most important multilateral event being organised outside the UN.  India had hosted NAM and CHOGM Summits in 1983 and International Solar Alliance Summit in 2018. These meetings, though important, did not include all P5 and major countries. The G 20 Presidency will be at the beginning of Amritkaal, the next 25 years after the 75^th anniversary of India’s independence, which makes it both futuristic and inclusive. India is also Chair of SCO (Shanghai Cooperation Organization) from September 2022 to September 2023 and President of the UN Security Council for the month of December 2022.

As the world’s largest democracy, the third largest economy of the world in PPP terms and 2^nd most populous country of the world, India will make a meaningful contribution in the G 20 to support faster, sustainable and inclusive growth. The G 20 Presidency would place India on the global stage, and provide an opportunity for India to place its priorities and narratives on the global agenda.[xii] It would also provide a unique opportunity to showcase India’s progress and developments as well as its rich culture heritage and diversity.

India hopes it can contribute to a speedy end to the Ukraine Russia conflict during its Presidency. India’s hopes for its G 20 Presidency can be summed up in this verse from the Rig Veda:

“May the stream of my life flow into the river of righteousness.

Loose the bonds of sin that bind me.

Let not the thread of my song be cut while I sing;

And let not my work end before its fulfillment”.[xiii]

 

Author Brief Bio: Amb. Bhaswati Mukherjee is a career foreign service officer. She is one of the most experienced diplomats on Indo-EU relations. In a distinguished career of over 38 years, she has been the Indian Ambassador to The Netherlands as well as India’s Permanent Representative to UNESCO in Paris.

References:

[i] “Harsh V Shringla is G20 chief coordinator”, The Economic Times, Retrieved October 21, 2022, from https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/india/harsh-v-shringla-is-g20-chief-coordinator/articleshow/90752084.cms

[ii] Mishra, Asit Ranjan. “Cabinet Approves Setting up of G20 Secretariat Ahead of India’s Presidency.” Business Standard News. Business-Standard, February 15, 2022. https://www.business-standard.com/article/economy-policy/cabinet-approves-setting-up-of-g20-secretariat-ahead-of-india-s-presidency-122021501426_1.html#:~:text=Last%20Updated%20at%20February%2015%2C%202022%2019%3A55%20IST.

[iii] “PM Shares Recruitment Opportunities at G20 Secretariat under India’s Presidency.” Press Information Bureau. Accessed October 21, 2022. https://pib.gov.in/PressReleaseIframePage.aspx?PRID=1863453#:~:text=PM%20shares%20recruitment,an%20exciting%20opportunity%E2%80%A6%E2%80%9D.

[iv] “India’s Forthcoming G20 Presidency” Accessed October 21, 2022. https://mea.gov.in/press-releases.htm?dtl/35700/Indias_forthcoming_G20_Presidency

[v] “MEA: Statements: Press Releases.” Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India. Accessed October 21, 2022. https://mea.gov.in/press-releases.htm?dtl%2F35773%2FIndia%2Bparticipates%2Bat%2Bthe%2Bthird%2BG20%2BSherpa%2Bmeeting%2Bin%2BYogyakarta%2BIndonesia.

[vi] Kant, Amitabh. “India Taking over Presidency of G20 This Year. What It Means.” The Week. The Week, September 5, 2022. https://www.theweek.in/columns/amitabh-kant/2022/09/05/india-taking-over-presidency-of-g20-this-year-what-it-means.html.

[vii] Amitabh Kant Twitter, Accessed October 21, 2022. https://twitter.com/amitabhk87/status/1577537738811372032?s=48&t=Zb2g6mn-Zmm01_tIaWooBw

[viii] Ferguson, Niall. “Henry Kissinger at 99: How to Avoid Another World War.” The Sunday Times Magazine | The Sunday Times. The Sunday Times, June 12, 2022. https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/henry-kissinger-at-99-how-to-avoid-another-world-war-lwt6q5vbq.

[ix] “What next? A Special Report on the World Economy | OCT 8th 2022.” The Economist. The Economist Newspaper. Accessed October 21, 2022. https://www.economist.com/weeklyedition/2022-10-08. p-22

[x] Speedie, David C. “Did the West ‘Bring War’ to Ukraine?” Asia Times. Asia Times, September 3, 2022. https://asiatimes.com/2022/09/did-the-west-bring-war-to-ukraine/.

[xi] Jeffrey D. Sachs. “The West’s False Narrative about Russia and China.” Jeffrey D. Sachs. Jeffrey D. Sachs, September 16, 2022. https://www.jeffsachs.org/newspaper-articles/h29g9k7l7fymxp39yhzwxc5f72ancr.

[xii] “India’s G20 Presidency Aims to Strengthen Global Support for Diverse Social & Eco Sectors.” The Economic Times. Accessed October 21, 2022. https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/india/indias-g20-presidency-aims-to-strengthen-global-support-for-diverse-social-eco-sectors/articleshow/93506804.cms.

[xiii] Rig Veda 11.28. 1-9

 

 

1. The global context of climate and energy

The latest reports from the United Nations Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC-2022)^[1][2] leave no doubt for the global community that climate change is widespread, rapid, and intensifying[3]. The UN Secretary-General António Guterres said the IPCC Report was nothing less than “a code red for humanity. The alarm bells are deafening, and the evidence is irrefutable.”[4]

Economic shocks, disruptions in supply chains, fiscal and monetary responses triggered by the COVID-19 pandemic, and disrupted production and trade in food and energy markets due to the war in Ukraine have further aggravated the climate crisis. The renewed search for energy security and the higher energy prices of oil and gas is leading to a reversion to carbon-intensive fuels that risk reversing the gains made in the last decade on energy transition. Higher food and energy prices and higher debt distress are also sliding the world’s poor back into extreme poverty[5]. These interlinked stresses on poor and emerging economies are making it even more difficult for governments to enhance energy access, transition, and security. Simultaneously, the availability of public funds to improve their people and communities’ adaptation and resilience to climate and extreme weather events is getting scarer.

This article presents a suite of proposals for the incoming G20 Presidency of India to guide an ambitious global response on climate and energy transition during these interlinked global stresses on economies, communities, and people.

2. G20’s impact on global climate efforts

All countries of the G20 grouping generate 80% of the world’s GDP, conduct 75% of world trade, and make up 60% of the global population[6]. G20 countries cause 76% of global greenhouse gas emissions[7]. Driving global economies towards a net-zero pathway will require deep cuts (~50%) in emissions throughout the G20 by 2030. Climate mitigation and adaptation actions undertaken by G20 countries will determine whether the next generations of humans will have a habitable planet or not.

At COP 26 in Glasgow in Nov 2021, the G20 countries[8] announced national long-term decarbonization pledges. Many G-20 governments have also implemented national policies and regulations to turn these pledges into actions in the last year. However, the BNEF’s G-20 Zero-Carbon Policy Scoreboard 2022 analyzed that while G-20 governments made ambitious pledges in 2021, none have implemented sufficient policies to plausibly achieve deep decarbonization, though some are closer than others.[9] This leaves an important and urgent role for all G20 countries to lead by example and implement policies and regulations to drive the mitigation and adaptation measures for effective global climate change response.

The current G20 Presidency, Indonesia[10], and the previous Italian Presidency[11] have made substantial efforts to move the energy transition[12] and climate agendas under the Sherpa Track. The agreements on enhancing climate action struck under the G20, like the directional shift of “Climate Action by ALL” in the declaration of the 2014 G-20 Summit[13] in Australia, have also found their way into and guided inter-governmental negotiations on critical geopolitical issues under the UNFCCC COP in Paris in 2015[14]. Given the emissions profile of G20 countries and the impact of the actions undertaken on the global economy, the agreements struck on climate and energy transition agendas under the G20 processes have a significant bearing on the worldwide response to climate change and energy transition.

3. India’s leadership on global climate and energy transition issues

    a). Climate and energy transition pledges

At Glasgow COP in 2021, the Hon’ble Prime Minister of India presented five nectar elements, ‘Panchamrit’[15], to deal with the climate challenge. These included:

I) Take non-fossil energy capacity to 500 GW by 2030.

II) Meet 50 per cent of its energy requirements from renewable energy by 2030.

III) Reduce the projected carbon emissions by one billion from now till 2030.

IV) By 2030, reduce the carbon intensity of its economy by more than 45 per cent.

V) By the year 2070, achieve the target of Net Zero.

In line with the PM’s statement in Glasgow, the Indian Union Cabinet, on 3rd Aug 2022, approved India’s Updated Nationally Determined Contribution[16]. This update to India’s existing NDC translates the ‘Panchamrit’ announced at COP 26 into enhanced climate targets. The update is also a step towards achieving India’s long-term goal of reaching net zero by 2070.[17]

    b). Recognition of ongoing domestic climate and energy transition actions

The IEA report, “India 2020- Energy Policy Review[18]” congratulated,[19]  the Indian government on its outstanding achievements in extending citizens’ access to electricity, affordable, efficient lighting, and clean cooking in record time through historic schemes like SAUBHAGYA[20], UJALA[21] and UJJWALA[22]. The Report recognized efforts by the Indian Govt to pursue energy market reforms and facilitating the swift deployment of renewable technologies. The Report also highlighted the strong growth of renewables in India, which now account for almost 23% of the country’s total installed capacity. The review also found that energy efficiency improvements in India avoided 15% of additional energy demand, oil and gas import, air pollution, and 300 million tonnes of CO2 emissions between 2000 and 2018.

India was the most attractive emerging market for clean power investment in 2021[23]. India has also consistently ranked among the top ten emerging markets covered by Climatescope[24], BNEF’s flagship report analyzing market attractiveness for energy transition investment. All these efforts and the climate mitigation and energy transition impacts solidify India’s credibility to lay out an ambitious G20 agenda on these issues.

    c) International climate leadership

Building on her domestic action and credibility, India has emerged as a global leader on climate and energy transition action. Under the leadership of the Hon’ble PM of India, the Government of India has also launched two global climate change response initiatives.

          I). International Solar Alliance:

The International Solar Alliance (ISA)[25], launched at the UNFCCC COP in Paris in 2015, aims to address issues related to climate mitigation by managing energy access, security, and transition with solar projects. The ISA now has 110 member countries with nine active programmes[26] promoting 10 GW of off-grid and grid-connected solar projects in developing countries to promote energy access and transition. The ISA has an ambitious global agenda to help mobilize USD one trillion in solar investments for enhancing energy security, access, and transition.

          II). Coalition for Disaster Resilient Infrastructure

On the adaptation and resilience front, the Government of India has launched the Coalition for Disaster Resilient Infrastructure (CDRI)[27]. The CDRI brings together nations, multilateral agencies and public and private partners to address issues of infrastructure resilience more systematically and comprehensively.

Both these global initiatives strive for a new model of South-South cooperation and exchange of experience and knowledge of new development paradigms as developing nations mitigate and adapt to climate change while addressing their development imperatives, like poverty alleviation, food security, and economic growth. India has also played a leadership role in various UN Summits related to climate and energy, like the India and Sweden co-leading Industry Transition track[28],  and has committed to progressively enhance climate action in various plurilateral and bilateral agreements with major countries and economic blocks like India-US[29], and India-EU climate agreements[30].

4. India’s G20 Presidency

Following the 75th year of her independence, India will host G20 in 2023. It would be a historic opportunity for India to advance her national interest and showcase her prowess as a global leader. Overall, India’s G20 theme could be centred around combining the elements of self-reliance and economic growth in a sustainable and climate-responsive manner. India’s Presidency could usher in a new model of global cooperation, “Atmanirbharta/self-reliance in a globalized world for sustainable development”. India could also position this new framework that would serve not just the G20 members but for the benefit of all developing countries.

With the troika of Indonesia (2022), India (2023), and Brazil (2024), the three developing countries, the Indian G20 Presidency offers a unique moment to strengthen the issues that matter more to developing countries in the global response to climate and energy transition. The author notes that there would be a continuation and path dependency of the various ministerial and working groups related to the environment, climate, energy, and sustainable financing of 2021[31] and 2022[32] G20 Presidencies. Still, each Presidency has the flexibility to guide the discussions and set the agenda.

The author proposes below a suite of concrete proposals which could be launched during India’s Presidency to strengthen India’s climate leadership through decisive domestic action and to initiate new global actions for enhancing global energy access, security and transition.

     a). Energy and climate agenda setting for the Presidency

In a recent article, India’s G20 Sherpa has outlined India’s priorities as it concerns the environment, climate, and energy and, “The concept of LiFE,[33] Prime Minister Narendra Modi introduced during the 26^th United Nations Climate Change Conference of Parties (COP26) in Glasgow, 2021. A global initiative ‘Lifestyle for the Environment-LiFE Movement’ was launched on World Environment Day[34]. India hopes to highlight LiFE as a critical focus area for discussion and action during our Presidency.”^[35][36]

India has championed the cause of developing countries in UN climate negotiations. India has been an avid supporter of the principle of “common but differentiated responsibilities”, asking developed countries to pay for climate finance and undertake a large share of mitigation actions. While the underlying historical context of climate change hasn’t changed, the contemporary geopolitical rivalries among major powers have sharpened considerably. The US-China (the two largest global emitters of greenhouse gases) dialogue on climate is stalled due to the Taiwan issue[37]. Europeans and other developed countries are shunning Russian oil and gas[38] in response to the Ukraine-Russia war and are securing carbon-intensive fuels, including restarting coal plants, to maintain energy security. Additionally, with deep aid cuts in G20 OECD countries, support for energy access and climate finance risks are being sidelined.

In this fast-changing geopolitical context, the Indian Presidency may consider shifting gears from the “power of the principle” to the “principle of power”. India could forge a new framework for driving climate action and energy transition while addressing energy security concerns of her own and other G20 countries. For developing countries, India could broker a broader deal that facilitates technological and financial support for countries to drive the energy transition and energy access agendas in times when nations are preoccupied with energy security concerns.

    b). Initiatives for Enhancing Energy Security and Transition

For agenda-setting purposes, the Presidency should reinforce principles of equity, justness, and citizen centrality to the global discourse on energy transition. It is imperative to ground the discussion on energy transition in the developmental imperatives of developing countries.

The Presidency could shape the energy security agenda so that countries broaden the energy transition discussion from the current exclusive focus on the transition away from coal to a comprehensive discussion on the shift away from all fossil fuels in a systematic and time-bound manner to cleaner energy fuels. Cooperative arrangements for enhancing investments in large-scale battery and pumped hydro storage, green hydrogen fuels and green ammonia, and cross-border trade in green electricity could also be forged to strengthen energy security and energy transition concerns simultaneously.

The Presidency could work with MDBs, DFI and Rating agencies to propose a new framework for measuring energy transition efforts for rating countries and public and private institutions raising funds from global markets. This would bring a broader perspective on the comprehensive energy transition efforts of governments and institutions rather than the current focus on coal transition or penalizing countries and companies for their coal or high-carbon energy assets and not recognizing the overall energy transition efforts of these sovereign and private actors.

Global energy transition could be expedited through a robust global push for pumped hydro storage and utility-scale battery storage technologies. With the increasing shares of green energy sources, cross-border green electricity trading has also become more relevant for the energy transition[39].

                   I). Coalition for scaling-up storage technologies

The UN Secretary-General has also called[40] for a global coalition on battery storage to fast-track innovation and deployment — a Coalition led and driven by Governments, bringing together tech companies, manufacturers, and financiers. The Presidency can bring together a Coalition of like-minded governments, tech companies, manufacturers, and financiers to scale up the battery and pumped storage technologies and projects. The Energy Storage Partnership^[41] initiative at the World Bank can be a supportive institution to build and strengthen such a global coalition.

                  II). Regional interconnections and green electricity trading

By trading energy from the sun, wind, and water across borders, countries can deliver more than enough clean energy to meet the needs of everyone on earth. This trading is already beginning to happen through discrete bilateral and regional arrangements. But to meet the sheer scale of the challenge, these efforts need to be combined and supplemented to create a more interconnected global grid. To realize the One Sun, One World One Grid vision, Hon’ble PM Modi and Hon’ble PM Johnson launched the One Sun One World One Grid-Green Grids Initiative[42] at COP 26 in Glasgow. More than 80 countries endorsed the One Sun Declaration[43] for the launch of the initiative. [44] The Ministry of New and Renewable Energy, the Government of India, with the support of the ISA[45] and the World Bank Group, has commissioned a technical study to assess the techno-commercial viability of global vision and explore 2-3 pilot projects to the East and the West of India for green electricity trading[46].

Connecting the United Arab Emirates (UAE) to the West coast of India[47] through undersea high-voltage direct current (HVDC) cables and transferring green energy produced by solar in both countries could be the first such game-changing energy transition project for realizing the global network of interconnected grid vision[48]. The UAE will host UN Climate Change COP 28 in 2023[49]. It is noted that India has invited the UAE to become part of its G20 Presidency as a guest country[50]. This provides the Indian Presidency with a unique opportunity to partner with UAE and launches regional electricity interconnection projects. India power and infra majors like Sterlite Power[51], Adani Infra and others, along with UAE investments, can play a leading role in such a regional project. The proposed initiative can be anchored under the Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) between India and the UAE.[52]

    c). Initiative for Enhancing Global Energy Access

As per the Tracking SDG 7 Report of 2022, the recent progress in universal access to electricity was mixed[53]. There were still 733 million people without access to electricity in 2020[54]. Among people without access to electricity, 77 per cent—about 568 million people—lived in Sub-Saharan Africa in 2020. Meeting the 2030 target requires increasing the number of new connections to 100 million a year.[55]

In the past few years, the Indian Government has made full electrification of its people possible through “Saubhagya” and other central and state-level initiatives. Lessons learned through these policy measures, including using off-grid solar solutions, can be instructive as the Presidency supports the energy access agenda for developing countries. This would be of invaluable support for the acute energy access needs of the Least Developed Countries. The partnership with ISA under the leadership of India at the G20 to help Africa would significantly impact the Region’s path to renewable energy.

A recent report by the World Bank has analyzed that solar mini-grids can provide electricity to nearly 500 million people in Africa and be the least-cost solution to close the energy access gap by 2030.[56] The Indian Presidency, through the ISA platform, could offer a new financial instrument for making substantial progress in energy access through mini-gird and off-grid solar projects. Hon’ble PM Modi announced[57] USD 1.4 billion in concessional financing for solar projects in ISA member countries. The uptake of these concessional funds has been slow due to COVID and the high-debt distress and political situations in the sub-Saharan African countries.

Under the leadership of India’s G20 Presidency, a risk guarantee and insurance facility by the ISA[58] and Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA)[59] of the World Bank Group can be launched in partnership with interested countries from the Africa Region to provide the necessary risk coverage for public and private investments to flow for solar projects to enhance energy access. The proposed Facility can mitigate the credit and default risks and unlock the public and private funding, including the unlocking the funds pledged in 2018 at the ISA founding ceremony. Indian solar manufacturers benefiting from the Production-linked Incentive (PLI) scheme[60] of the Government of India may also find new markets for solar products in Africa. It is noted that India also holds the ISA Presidency. Grant funding from global climate and energy foundations like Global Energy Alliance for People and Planet[61], could be secured to capitalize on the risk guarantee and insurance facility.

    d). Climate and sustainable financing agenda

For a long time, the global climate finance discussion under the UNFCCC format has been centred on the delivery of the Copenhagen promise by developed countries for collectively mobilizing USD 100 billion for supporting climate action in developing countries[62]. In the global economy, green financing has grown into hundreds of billions of dollars per year[63]. In the real economy, investors invest with financial risk and return parameters and do not pay a special premium for climate benefits. However, in the last few years, new investment frameworks are currently being operationalized to internalize climate and ESG risks into investment decisions[64].

The Indian Presidency may like to propose a new framework for climate finance by introducing a principle of climate-adjusted returns. This principle will entail discounting return expectations by specific percentage points if the investment brings climate return regarding mitigation and adaptation benefits. Or conversely, putting a financial premium on climate returns in investments’ decision-making or cheaper interest rates for climate-friendly projects. A recent proposal[65] for the provision of deeply concessional financing for climate action by MDBs, submitted at the 2022 Annual Meetings of the World Bank and International Monetary Fund by the G7 Presidency, Germany, may be worth examining in this regard. This principle would be of great value in simplifying the climate finance debate and help global efforts for scaling-up investments for addressing climate change, adaptation, and resilience activities.

For mobilizing larger pools of investments for global climate actions, the Indian Presidency can promote the use of blended finance instruments where the donor and concessional capital can be effectively utilized for mitigating risks for large-scale commercial investments from asset owners and pension funds[66]. G20 countries would consider new blended finance facilities and innovative risk mitigation instruments for scaling-up investments in large-scale battery storage and hydrogen projects in partnership with MDBs and global climate funds like the Climate Investment Funds[67] and the Green Climate Fund[68].

    e). Strengthening domestic Climate action

To meet India’s 2030 and the long-term trajectory towards a net-zero future by 2070 would require ‘whole of economy planning’ and strengthening execution capacities at all levels of the central and state governments. It is critical that other stakeholders, like the private sector, non-governmental organizations, and citizen groups, participate actively in such planning and execution processes. A robust institutional structure to guide the thinking and planning process for climate transition would provide a clear signal to public and private actors for making long-term investment decisions in critical sectors of the economy. In this regard, the Indian Presidency could also establish a comprehensive national institutional framework to guide medium to long-term policy changes for meeting net-zero targets.

In 2014, the Government re-constituted the Prime Minister’s Council on Climate Change to coordinate National Action for Assessment, Adaptation and Mitigation of Climate Change^[69]. The Council may have served its purpose and need an upgrade in its mandate. India could use the G20 Presidency period to lead by example for other G20 nations and launch a ‘Climate Transition National Mission’ and constitute a ‘Climate Transition Commission’ to drive a ‘whole of government’ thinking towards climate transition. The Mission and the Commission could be established along the lines of the Mission Karamyogi[70] and the Capacity Building Commission[71]. The Commission could have members from both govt and private sectors.

5. Sherpa Track format

Indian Presidency could explore a new format for structuring sectoral themes and meetings. Sectoral Ministerial and Working group discussions and meetings/visits can be planned to showcase the potential of the Indian industry/sectors leading strong climate and energy transition actions. Sectoral and industry champions can be identified and tasked with building these themes in close collaboration with line Ministries, corporates, and other stakeholders. Examples of such champions could be assigning Mr Anand Mahindra for EV mobility; Mr. K V Kamath for Sustainable Finance; Mr. Gautam Adani for Renewable Energy, and others.

Substantive support, including staff secondments, from WB, IMF and other IOs like IEA, IRENA and ISA can be mobilized to support the Presidency and G20 working groups. Active participation of Indian institutions to substantively contribute to agenda discussions need to be encouraged.

6. Conclusion

The G20 Presidency offers India a unique and historic opportunity to display her transformation developmental experience and growth opportunities for a climate-responsive and sustainable world. The Presidency could drive the climate and energy transition agenda by instituting bold domestic and global initiatives that are concrete and bring real change on the ground.

Author Brief Bio:  Jagjeet Singh Sareen is a Senior Policy Officer at the World Bank. He served as the Assistant Director-General of the International Solar Alliance on secondment from the World Bank. He is also an esteemed member of the India Foundation Journal Editorial Board. The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not reflect the views of the World Bank and International Solar Alliance.

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[62] https://unfccc.int/topics/climate-finance/the-big-picture/climate-finance-in-the-negotiations

[63] https://www.climatepolicyinitiative.org/publication/global-landscape-of-climate-finance-2021/

[64] https://www.cfainstitute.org/en/research/esg-investing

[65] https://www.bmz.de/de/aktuelles/aktuelle-meldungen/schulze-weltbank-jahrestagung-2022-125250

[66] https://www.blackrock.com/institutions/en-us/strategies/alternatives/real-assets/infrastructure/climate-finance-partnership

[67] https://www.cif.org/about-cif

[68] https://www.greenclimate.fund/

[69] https://pib.gov.in/newsite/printrelease.aspx?relid=111090

[70] https://dopttrg.nic.in/igotmk/

[71] https://cbc.gov.in/