The issues currently dominating international geopolitics are the Ukraine Crisis, the Indo-Pacific security situation and the two-year depredation of the Wuhan virus. The complex Indo-Pacific situation came into focus during the pandemic. As nations were battling the pandemic, China became increasingly assertive. Reflexively, the QUAD and the Indo Pacific architecture started momentum and acquired substance. However, the ongoing long drawn violent Ukraine crisis has changed some ground realities which will affect the Indo-Pacific region in more ways than one. The first fundamental is that a trans-Atlantic US led consolidation and further expansion of NATO is clearly visible. The emergence of a China-Russia axis, in competition, though nebulous at present, is on the cards. Nuclearisation of South Korea and Japan is being discussed. The world is entering into an era of selective de-globalisation, decoupling and re-coupling.  Energy and food security have come into the foreground for many nations. An extended period of inflationary economic turmoil has commenced. This is occurring as climate change and environmental degradation threatens to impact the globe adversely. In this contextual framework, it is pertinent to examine the complex dynamics which are going to impinge upon and dominate the Indo-Pacific environment as a result of the Ukrainian War. However, the examination has to take into account the variable of the pandemic and its long-term effect which is simultaneously playing out and cannot be ignored.

Indo Pacific Region : An Overview

The Indo-Pacific Region extending from the East coast of Africa to the West coast of the American continent is a huge swathe. Its core is now the centre of gravity of international geopolitics and geoeconomics. Its major population centres are home to eight of the top twenty economies of the world. Major conflict areas and disaster zones lie in the Indo-Pacific region. As a corollary, most of the big defence spenders are also in this area. Global power is pivoting to the Indo-Pacific. This is hark back to the pre-colonial period and will remain so for a long time. As the power shift is taking place, global challenges have also increased manifold. The underpinning factor of the challenges is the rise of China and its ambitions in relation to other powers.^[1] China’s ambition to establish a Sino-Centric system is presaged on territorial and geopolitical assertion in its vicinity. The focus of this expansion is presently the South China Sea and Taiwan. It is also attempting to alter the status quo with India in its favour simultaneously on a constant basis. China has also spread its tentacles, outwardly through the BRI, to all parts of the globe with an aspiration to cement itself as a superpower second to none. In the process, one has seen repeated violation of the international rules-based order and an effort to supplant its own rules. The destabilising issue is that China’s regional territorial ambitions, global geopolitical aspirations and the BRI are all moving parts with huge degrees of uncertainty. The response to the Chinese expansionist adventure is the evolution of the QUAD which is now acquiring discernible reality to take on China.

The crowded maritime routes and the vast expanses of the Indo-Pacific are home to more than a handful of security problems.  At the very top of the list is Chinese assertion and aspirations to exert influence in the Indo-Pacific region. Chinese ambition to establish naval bases in the IOR and Eastern Pacific constantly threatens regional peace. At the western end of the Indo-Pacific are issues connected to terror and energy resources of West Asia. Iran, Afghanistan and the nuclear triangle of Pakistan, India and China also cast their shadow on the Indo-Pacific. At the centre is the crisis ridden Myanmar. The Indo-Pacific is also dotted with bases and territories of extra regional powers like USA, France and UK. Finally, the nuclearisation debate in South Korea and Japan has commenced to compound issues. Overall, the Indo-Pacific is a panorama of issues. Many of them have been compounded by the Ukrainian crisis.

Chinese Footprint

China continues being assertive and coercive to attain its superpower ambitions despite standing on the brink of economic stagnation. Problems in the Chinese economy stem partly due to structural issues and partly due to the consequences of prolonged pandemic risk of its Zero Covid Policy^[2]. Further, its adverse demography of falling birth rates, ageing population and decreasing work force, aggravates economic stress in the long term^[3]. Views abound that China has peaked. Despite this, it is heavily militarising in an attempt to achieve superpower status. China is in a race to get rich before it gets old. It is estimated that it has a ten-year time window to do so. This race to beat the time bar makes it more aggressive with each passing day. The markers of its ambitions in this time window will be its attempts to militarily annex Taiwan while keeping USA out of the way. It will also attempt to keep India down using all methods. China also seeks to solve the Malacca dilemma by establishing bases in the Indian Ocean Region. Very clearly, China will cause a lot of turbulence in the Indo-Pacific. As it stands, it has a wide footprint in the region which includes the Solomon Islands, South China Sea, Afghanistan, Iran, West Asia, Pakistan, BRI countries, Island nations in the IOR, and the LAC along India.

The Indo-Pacific Architecture

The Indo-Pacific security architecture consists of the QUAD and AUKUS. QUAD is the predominant structure which addresses the larger Indo-Pacific Issues^[4]. The QUAD partners – USA, India, Australia and Japan comprise a superpower and three middle-level powers. All are vibrant democracies comprising three civilisations. USA and India have strong and experienced Armed Forces. QUAD has three of the top five economies in the world. It is a healthy mixture of raw material, manufacturing, and consumer power with tremendous innovation capability. It has the economic potential of enforcing decoupling from China and creating alternative markets. QUAD has the heft to tackle China economically and diplomatically on wide-ranging issues. It can address wider issues like climate change, tackling the pandemic, and heralding new technologies. It is a larger platform that can also accommodate regional and extra-regional players like EU, ASEAN, South Korea and New Zealand. It has wider acceptability. It has global leadership potential[5].

AUKUS is a security partnership of three rich countries – USA, UK and Australia, which are old-time allies. It is a tight grouping of stable democracies with similar systems, policies, national outlooks and values. At this point in time, the partnership is about building SSNs for Australia to enhance its capability so that containment of China is more effective. AUKUS has a narrow military focus on enhancing Australian military capability with SSNs. This will redress a regional strategic imbalance in the Western Pacific in which Chinese domination is outsized. AUKUS also caters for a future scenario. If and when the Taiwanese pivot of the first island chain is lost, there will be a need to ensure that China does not have a free run to expand into the Western Pacific. The rise of an Australian force in the coming decade with considerable air, sea and underwater capabilities will prevent exactly that. The point to note is that while AUKUS is in the future, QUAD is the present and more relevant one.

Ukrainian War: Impacting Issues

Nuclearisation

The Ukrainian conflict is the first one where the nuclear card was played out unambiguously by Russia. The nuclear threat was conflated with conventional and hypersonic weapons to deter USA/NATO from interfering in the war. It also prompted Ukraine to state that, had it not made the mistake in abandoning nuclear weapons it inherited from the Soviet Union, Russia would not have dared to invade it. Ukraine was of the opinion that nuclear weapons were the only way to guarantee its sovereignty.  This nuclear paradigm has found multiple echoes in the Indo-Pacific. China might make a similar play to deter USA from interference, if and when it seeks a military reunification of Taiwan. Will USA just stand by supinely as it has done now and allow Taiwan to be gobbled up? The same play can occur if China seeks a forced foothold in Bhutan, Nepal or even Myanmar. What will India or USA or any other member of the QUAD do? On the other hand, South Korea and Japan live in the nuclear neighbourhood of China, North Korea and Russia. In both these countries, the nuclear debate got sharpened by the Ukraine situation.  South Korea feels that while North Korea is the immediate short term nuclear threat, China is the long term one. The majority in South Korea favour acquisition of nuclear weapons indigenously as the way forward. The lesser alternate for South Korea is allowing deployment of US nuclear assets on its territory[6]. Many South Koreans feel that dependence on USA is fraught with danger in a nuclear situation. They could end up like Ukraine, where USA has been kept to the side lines. South Korea could, therefore, go nuclear on its own.

Currently Japan is sheltered by the US nuclear umbrella. The Sino-Russian entente and the Russo-Ukrainian situation has prompted Mr Abe, ex PM and an influential but respected voice, to suggest that Japan should consider a nuclear-sharing arrangement with the USA similar to NATO. Which means that US weapons could be on Japanese soil. Turn to Taiwan. It has three nuclear power reactors, which produce about 10% of the island’s electricity. Taiwan apparently has the nuclear knowhow. If it ever comes to light that Taiwan has a bomb in its basement, the nuclear equations in the Eastern end of China will get complicated beyond belief. If South Korea, Japan or Taiwan acquire nuclear capability, China will in all probability change its own status and policy on use of nuclear weapons. That will trigger a domino effect on India which will result in a spiral in Pakistan. Overall, the Ukrainian war has already triggered a nuclear debate. The issue to see in future is whether it will spiral into an arms race.

India’s Rise

As the Ukrainian war has unfolded, India’s internal political strength, its balanced relations with all major powers, and its stability in the neighbourhood makes it stand apart^[7]. Additionally, it is India alone, amongst the big economies, which shows promise of high growth rates and is being seen as the only alternative to China in scale. A large part of global growth in future is predicated on India’s overall success. The fact that it has almost fully recovered from the aftershocks of the Wuhan virus is a huge plus. The Indian and US militaries are the only two militaries which can impose caution and rein in China. India’s geographic location and its military strength gives it the ability to dominate the Indian Ocean and block the Strait of Malacca. Hence, there is little doubt that there is no QUAD or Indo-Pacific strategy without India. The international realisation is that India can tip the scales, depending upon its stance on various issues. India’s strong position in the unfolding global food crisis^[8] has reinforced the view that centrality of India in global affairs has multiplied manifold. China is accustomed to dealing with US alliances in Asia, but a realigned India changes the game^[9]. India has the potential to put China in a two-front situation in perpetuity. It contributes significantly to containment of China. The way India plays its cards will have a huge impact on the Indo-Pacific region

China’s Changing Status

When the Ukrainian war broke out, the conventional wisdom pointed to only one country that stands to emerge victorious: China. Two months into the war and with the resurgence of the Wuhan virus, there is uncertainty^[10]. China has not been able to temper either the Russian invasion or the Western response. China’s inability to influence the course of events in Ukraine is stark. It has been left to stand on the side-lines with debate and decisions being taken in every other place but China. Its vulnerability specially in energy and food security has been exposed as it scrambles to secure it flanks^[11]. The Trans-Atlantic western consolidation views China as siding with Russia. This has triggered a ‘bounced’ isolation ‘off’ Russia[12]. This is evident from the recent frosty EU-China summit which was termed as ‘a dialogue of the deaf’^[13] where China wanted to talk about ‘positive’ things like ‘trade’ while Europe was ‘at war’. The talks were also ‘open’ ^[14] as per Ursula Von Der Leyen; meaning that opposing views were very clearly exchanged. China’s influence and long-time efforts to wean EU away from USA have gone southwards. The developed world does not want to see its technology end up in a Russian drone or ammunition. There is a feeling in Europe that China, far from being a partner, may be a future threat. The global inflation and food crisis triggered by the Ukrainian war has also changed the IOR landscape, especially in Sri Lanka, Pakistan, Maldives and Nepal where internal problems have been compounded. People in these countries are against China. That became most evident on the streets in Sri Lanka where the tottering Rajapaksa government is being seen as ‘sold out’^[15] to China. Pakistan is on the verge of an economic collapse as the situation worsens by the day^[16]. In this scenario, the dramatic suicide bombing which killed three Chinese has exposed the weaknesses of Sino-Pak links^[17]. It raises huge question marks on its flagship CPEC and BRI. More importantly, it exposes limits of the Chinese capability to influence events in areas it considers critical for global power projection. This could spread to other third world countries where the BRI has entered, especially in Africa. It is clear that as the Chinese economy is stalling, its influence is reducing overseas. One gets a sense of weakness in the Chinese structure and posture. It is not without reason that USA has subtly changed its stance on ‘One China’^[18].

Taiwan Factor

The Chinese are learning from the Ukrainian conflict. The Russian failure to blitzkrieg Ukraine for a quick victory has implications for China^[19]. The expected scenario for Taiwan—suppress defences, establish air superiority and achieve immediate capitulation before the United States intervenes needs a relook. If China is to be a superpower, it needs to have credible military capability. Despite China’s outsized military expenditure, PLA’s capability, including its men and material remain untested. The failure of similarly structured Russian forces to overcome Ukrainian forces raises questions on PLA ability to annex Taiwan militarily. An amphibious invasion of Taiwan is far more complex and even less predictable than the invasion of Ukraine. China’s capability to mount a cross-strait operation successfully against a better prepared Taiwan, assisted by USA, Japan and others is even more risk prone.  Chinese ability to overcome Western media and information operations, as unleashed in the ongoing Ukrainian war is bleak. The narrative will be firmly against a lonely China. On ground, ever since the Ukrainian war has commenced, Chinese air space violations over Taiwan have drastically reduced. The belligerent posturing of an impending invasion of Taiwan which was daily headline news till January has receded to be replaced by self-doubts. Suddenly, China seems to have realised that the political costs of failure in this adventure are too high. Annexation of Taiwan is an agenda in recession. This has major implications. China will be forced to continue to defend its coastline and be unable to deploy its Navy in blue waters beyond Taiwan.  China will have to keep on protesting Freedom of Navigation Operations by USA in close proximity of its shores and always face a maritime threat. This has to be seen in conjunction with the ‘felt’ threat of India’s military presence along the LAC. Overall, PLA has to simultaneously ward off the continental and maritime threats as also keep the communist regime in power. Most importantly, comprehensive national power which China flaunts has no value on the battle field as seen in the Ukrainian war.  Militaries have to fight to win. Its ambitions depend upon the doubtful quality of its military.

Russia–China Axis

At the time of the winter Olympics, Russia and China renewed their 20-year treaty on friendship and cooperation, held large-scale joint military exercises, and reached agreement to boost trade^[20]. A joint statement about a ‘new era’ of international relations was issued. In February, Xi and Putin declared there were ‘no limits’ or ‘forbidden areas’ of cooperation. Based on this, the common expectation is that the Russia-China axis will flourish. However, Russia’s aggression has disrupted global energy, food and raw material markets. Prices have increased enormously. This will hit the Chinese economy which depends on imports of a variety of raw materials to feed its export-oriented manufacturing ability. Further, the strength, unity and speed of the Western response, the severe impact of sweeping sanctions, and Russia’s resulting forced economic decoupling from much of the global economy will make China rethink^[21]. The setbacks experienced by the Russian military in Ukraine, despite their on-paper superiority will also set China thinking.  Russia as a partner might be a heavy millstone for China to carry. Overall, while the Russia-China axis is still on the cards, its efficacy on ground is still not visible. In case this axis does not roll out as visualised by their leaders, China will be left with very weak allies namely Pakistan, North Korea and Iran.

EU Factor

Before the Ukrainian war, France, Germany, the Netherlands, and the UK, as well as the EU, had published Indo-Pacific strategies or ‘guidelines’ and deployed naval resources to the region^[22]. This was despite the fact that their capacities to deploy forces and get involved in Indo-Pacific security was limited. Europe and UK wanted to be seen as reliable partners and achieve a persistent presence in the region. The Ukraine war forced these countries to stay focused on NATO and European security. They are militarising to enhance collective deterrence and defence. Resultantly, it will certainly restrict the ability of EU states to be active in the Indo-Pacific. Even France and the UK, which have considerable interest in the region, will have to rethink. However, France, which has more than 1.5 million citizens and five permanent military bases, in the Indo-Pacific has no choice but to remain focused in the area despite the Ukraine war. Overall, the EU states will toe the NATO line. In essence they will be even more dependant on QUAD to deliver results for them in the Indo-Pacific.

Maritime Issues

A major incident of the Ukraine war which is going to influence behaviour of maritime forces and militaries is the sinking of the Russian Black Sea Fleet flagship, the Slava-class cruiser Moskva^[23]. It has forced the Russian Navy units to redeploy further out to sea, beyond the range of the Ukrainian shore-based coastal defence cruise missiles. Indo-Pacific navies will have to shed their business-as-usual approach to naval capability development. Anti-ship attack systems, either sea based or land based have evolved to a point when lethal attacks on a naval task force will be increasingly difficult to defend against. As navies seem to be acquiring or building larger, more complex and more expensive naval vessels, their vulnerability also seems to be increasing. Hence their viability is under examination. To make the point, an aircraft carrier which needs to deliver long-range offensive firepower has to be defended more robustly. The use of lethal autonomous weapons and loitering munitions adds to the challenge. The combination of advanced drones and anti-ship missiles pose significant survival challenge for naval forces in highly contested environments. In the Indo-Pacific context, this has direct implications on Chinese ability to annex Taiwan in an amphibious operation or overcome the Malacca dilemma without a base. Conversely, it becomes more difficult for the QUAD navies to operate close to Chinese mainland. The recourse is that the crowded Indo-Pacific region will see enhanced competition to acquire and strengthen bases as also develop sub-surface combatants of long endurance. It is reasonable to appreciate that China will make an all-out effort to acquire a suitable island in the Spratlys to convert it into a base just as they did in the Paracels. It has already made its initial move to establish a base in the Solomon Island in the Pacific Ocean in close proximity to Australia. It will also redouble its efforts to convert Gwadar, Hambantota or Kyaukpyu into a naval base at the earliest to threaten India. Conversely, it forces India and the QUAD to look afresh at Myanmar, Sri Lanka and Pakistan to deny a foothold through diplomatic and economic pressure.

QUAD Strategy

The Russo Ukrainian war is being fought at two levels. One between Russian and Ukrainian Forces directly on Ukrainian soil. The other larger conflict is between Russia and the USA/EU/NATO combine for geopolitical dominance. When the US Defense Secretary stated ‘We want to see Russia weakened to the degree that it can’t do the kind of things that it has done in invading Ukraine,’ it signified the start of a long-drawn hybrid war being waged between USA and Russia in battlefield Ukraine. Hereafter, the hybrid war is the primary one in which the Russo-Ukraine conflict will get subsumed. The overall US aim appears to be threefold:

• Weaken Russia to the extent that it ceases to be a threat to the EU.
• Ensure that Russia can no more be an effective ally of China
• Continued consolidation and alignment of Europe with USA. This aim supports the larger aim of containment of China and re-establishment of US supremacy^[24].

Transpose this to the Indo-Pacific region and the US strategy comes across very clearly. As much as China wants to win a local war under informatised conditions in quick time, the effort will be to deny that. The Ukraine War also tells us that diplomatic, economic and military consolidation of the QUAD members and those who feel threatened by China will be beneficial. China can be drawn into a bruising long drawn war which it cannot win and will specifically attempt to avoid. Intelligence and information sharing will be a huge element of this strategy.

Terror

Terror as an instrument of state policy has been practiced by many nations in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR). Radicalism is a prevalent phenomenon amongst many people and societies in the IOR. An analysis indicates that either these nations are underdeveloped or the recruits for the terror enterprise are underprivileged/poor. In an environment of impending shortages of food and energy because of the Ukraine war, the sense of being deprived is bound to increase. Unrest due to political mismanagement and artificially created shortages is likely to be exacerbated due to the Ukraine crisis.  How this unrest and sense of deprivation gets channelized into terrorism is a phenomenon of the future. It is yet to surface. It will in due course.

Summary

The impact of the Ukrainian War on the Indo-Pacific is a work in progress. While it is premature to haphazard a guess on the second order effects of an ongoing war, certain trend lines and pointers are clear. The world is getting to be more nuclearised than before. Conventional war will continue even though hybrid war and gray-zone conflict will hog headlines. Proxy wars will be more attractive than before for great powers. Without doubt, the era of globalisation is over. A new form of restricted globalisation based on allies and partners is on the horizon^[25]. The Chinese are apprehensive about it. An indisputable fact is that countries battered by the pandemic, must now deal with rising prices for grain, energy, and fertilisers because of the Ukrainian War. It will impact the poorer of the Indo-Pacific nations more than any other region^[26]. A lingering doubt in many minds is that will USA live up to its promises or keep standing on the side-lines as it did in Ukraine^[27]. The elephant in the Indo-Pacific is undoubtedly China. The Chinese trajectory in future will be recalibrated by the Ukraine War as well as a host of other internal factors. The direction of this vector is uncertain. Lastly, there is no doubt that in the immediate wake of the Ukraine conflict, India has emerged as a critical player in the Indo-Pacific. India’s rise and its role in global affairs will dictate the tenor of the Indo-Pacific architecture. While certain trend lines are visible, there are hidden impacts yet to emerge from the Ukrainian War. We are indeed living in interesting times.

Author Brief Bio: Lt Gen P R Shankar, PVSM, AVSM, VSM, is a former Director General of Artillery. He is an alumnus of National Defence Academy Khadakvasala, Defence Services Staff College, Wellington, Army War College, Mhow, Naval Post Graduate School, Monterrey and National Defence College, New Delhi. He has held many important command, staff and instructional appointments in the Army. The General Officer is now a Professor in the Aerospace Department of Indian Institute of Technology, Madras., Chennai. He is actively involved in applied research.

References:

^[1] https://www.gunnersshot.com/2022/04/evolving-security-dimensions-in-indo.html

^[2] https://www.scmp.com/economy/china-economy/article/3177833/save-economy-china-data-paints-bleak-picture-covid-hit and https://www.gunnersshot.com/2022/01/china-middle-kingdom-to-mother-earth-by.html

^[3] https://www.forbes.com/sites/simonconstable/2021/10/30/chinas-demographic-problem-set-to-torpedo-its-economy-report-warns/?sh=4532e9c234e1

^[4] https://www.gunnersshot.com/2021/09/two-sides-of-same-coin-divergent.html

[5] https://bharatshakti.in/two-sides-of-the-same-coin-the-divergent-convergence-of-quad-and-aukus/

[6] https://www.myind.net/Home/viewArticle/nuclear-lessons-from-russo-ukrainian-conflict

^[7] https://www.gunnersshot.com/2022/03/failed-five-and-centrality-of-india-by.html

^[8] https://indianexpress.com/article/india/centre-relaxes-ban-on-wheat-export-may-13-7921670/

^[9] https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/05/17/india-china-quad-summit-modi-xi-biden/

^[10] https://www.gunnersshot.com/2022/05/china-vulnerable-super-power-by-lt-gen.html

^[11] https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202203/1254225.shtml

[12] https://www.myind.net/Home/viewArticle/nuclear-lessons-from-russo-ukrainian-conflict

^[13] https://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/3173188/eu-china-summit-was-dialogue-deaf-says-top-brussels-diplomat

^[14] https://audiovisual.ec.europa.eu/en/video/I-223245

^[15] https://theprint.in/world/sri-lankan-food-vendors-accuse-rajapaksa-govt-of-selling-everything-to-china/903504/

^[16] https://www.thenews.com.pk/latest/958498-nawaz-sharif-does-not-want-govt-to-raise-inflation-further-ishaq-dar

^[17] https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/van-blast-pakistans-karachi-kills-four-2022-04-26/

^[18] https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3177223/china-us-ties-state-department-edits-taiwan-fact-sheet and https://theprint.in/world/china-warns-us-of-deviating-from-one-china-principle/952100/

^[19] https://www.lemonde.fr/en/international/article/2022/05/15/china-draws-initial-military-lessons-from-russia-s-difficulties-in-ukraine_5983567_4.html

^[20] https://www.mei.edu/publications/putins-gift-chinas-choices-and-mideast-dilemmas

^[21] https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/what-ukraine-crisis-means-indo-pacific

^[22] https://www.chathamhouse.org/2022/04/how-ukraine-will-change-europes-indo-pacific-ambitions

^[23] https://www.maritime-executive.com/editorials/lessons-from-the-war-in-ukraine-for-indo-pacific-navies

^[24] https://www.gunnersshot.com/2022/05/outcomes-of-larger-hybrid-war-in.html

^[25] https://www.scmp.com/economy/global-economy/article/3177929/ukraine-war-propels-multilateral-momentum-china-focused-nato

^[26] https://www.newindianexpress.com/nation/2022/apr/26/ukraine-conflict-will-impact-indo-pacific-eu-chief-2446540.html

^[27] https://www.thinkchina.sg/russia-ukraine-war-implications-china-and-indo-pacific

The Central Asia Setting

The five Central Asian countries viz Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan have since the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union, been considered a sphere of Russian influence and a part of its so-called “near abroad.” This space became a part of the Russian and Soviet empires from the beginning of the 19^th century. All the five countries developed and evolved their independent identities after they broke away from the Soviet Union and emerged as free nations in 1991. All of them however, keeping in view the compulsions of geography, history, economy and culture, maintained strong and vibrant relations with the Russian Federation. Russia looms large over the policy decisions of these countries in diverse ways. The Russian labor market is a vital source of employment for many Central Asian countries particularly Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan; Russia plays key roles in the energy, and energy export sectors of Central Asia; and Russia remains the guarantor of security in the region[1].

It is hence no surprise that these countries go out of their way to ensure friendly and cordial relations with Russia. They have however, to varying degrees, become increasingly conscious of their independence, individual identities and sovereignty over the last thirty years since their independence.

Kazakhstan, which is the largest country in territorial area and comprises about 60% of the region’s GDP, FDI, trade etc., and Uzbekistan, which has the largest population in the region and is the only country to share borders with all other Central Asian countries, follow a multi-vector foreign policy and maintains warm and friendly relations with all major powers including Russia, China, USA and Europe. Turkmenistan is a neutral country and got the international community’s recognition of its legal status of permanent neutrality in accordance with the United Nations General Assembly Resolution in 1995. Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan are far too dependent on Russia for their security, remittances and economy to say or do anything to upset or displease Russia.

All the above aspects have played out fully to determine the positions of the Central Asian nations during the current Russia-Ukraine conflict. This is particularly evident in the manner in which these countries voted in the different Resolutions that were taken up in the UN over the last many weeks. Two examples in this regard are illustrative.

The Votes

The UN General Assembly (GA) Resolution titled ‘’Humanitarian consequences of the aggression against Ukraine” on 02 March 2022 (United Nations; 2^nd March, 2022; ‘’General Assembly resolution demands end to Russian offensive in Ukraine’’) strongly reprimanded Russia for invading Ukraine and demanded that it “immediately, completely and unconditionally withdraw all of its military forces from the territory of Ukraine within its internationally recognised borders.” The vote was overwhelmingly in favour of the Resolution with 141 countries supporting, 5 opposing and 35 abstentions. Amongst the Central Asian countries, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan abstained while Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan did not vote.

In the UNGA Resolution to consider expulsion of Russia from the UN Human Rights Council on 7 April 2022, (United Nations; 7^th April, 2022; ‘’UN General Assembly votes to suspend Russia from the Human Rights Council’’) 93 countries voted in favour of the Resolution, 24 against it and 57 countries abstained. Just before this vote, Russia had issued a general warning that an abstention or absence during the vote would be taken to be an ‘’unfriendly act’’ and would have grave adverse implications for bilateral relations of that country with Russia and their cooperation in the United Nations. Keeping the above in view, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan voted against the Resolution and in favour of Russia, while Turkmenistan, as before, did not exercise its right to vote.

It would be evident from the above that under normal circumstances, these countries would endeavour to safeguard their independence and sovereignty but when push comes to shove, they would fall in line with Russia and would not do anything to annoy or rile Russia. In both the above votes, Turkmenistan did not exercise its franchise taking refuge behind its status of permanent neutrality recognised by the UN.

Kazakhstan

Kazakhstan enjoys the world’s longest land border with Russia of more than 7,000 kms. About 25% of the Kazakh population comprises of people of Russian origin. This number was considerably higher when the country became independent in 1991. Soon after Kazakhstan became free, rumours were rife that its Russian origin population, based in the north of the country along the Russia-Kazakhstan border, wanted to become a part of Russia as they felt they had little in common with the people and culture of Kazakhstan. It was to nip such chatter and tendencies in the bud, that the then President Nursultan Nazarbayev decided to shift the capital from the more salubrious climate of Almaty to the severe and freezing terrain of Astana (currently Nur-Sultan) in the north of the country, adjacent to the Russia-Kazakh border.

Kazakhstan could have been expected to be grateful to Russia for the support it provided under the aegis of the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) when unforeseen violence gripped the country on 2 January 2022 because of a steep hike in the price of LPG. About 12,000 people were arrested and 240 were killed. CSTO under Russia responded with great alacrity to send troops to restore peace, stability and order in Kazakhstan.

Notwithstanding the above consideration, President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev of Kazakhstan, in an article in ‘’The National Interest’’ on 4^th April, 2022, (The National Interest; 4^th April, 2022; Turbulence Across Eurasia Will Not Slow Kazakhstan’s Progress; Kassym-Jomart Tokayev) wrote: ‘’As states that share the longest border in the world, Kazakhstan and Russia enjoy special relations of mutual cooperation. Meanwhile we also have deep traditions of friendly relations with Ukraine. We respect its territorial integrity—as the overwhelming majority of the world does.We hope for a swift and just resolution of the conflict in accordance with UN Charter.‘’

This comment by Kazakhstan’s President is indicative of an independent, autonomous stand that is far removed from that of Russia on the Russia-Ukraine conflict. Kazakh Foreign Minister Mukhtar Tileuberdi said (The Conversation; 11^th April, 2022; ‘’Ukraine conflict: Kazakhstan’s difficult balancing act between need for Russian support and popular opposition to the war’’; Bhavna Dave) that Kazakhstan does not recognise districts in Ukraine’s eastern regions of Luhansk and Donetsk controlled by Russia-backed separatists as independent. He added that ‘’it is important that our territory (Kazakhstan) is not used to evade sanctions.”[2]

Timur Suleimenov, the first deputy chief of staff to President Tokayaev said during his visit to Brussels (Ukrinform; 1^st April, 2022; ‘’Kazakhstan won’t be tool to circumvent sanctions against Russia, top Kazakh official says’’) that Kazakhstan is keen to expand cooperation with the EU and the West despite the Western sanctions on Russia. Suleimenov said that Kazakhstan will continue to invest in Russia and attract investment from Russia, because “there is no way for our economy to do it differently. However, he added ‘’Kazakhstan will not be a tool for circumventing US and EU sanctions against Russia. We will comply with the sanctions. Although we are part of the Economic Union with Russia, Belarus and other countries, we are also part of the international community. Therefore, the last thing we want is for Kazakhstan to be subject to secondary sanctions by the US and the EU…Kazakhstan respects the territorial integrity of Ukraine. We have not recognised and do not recognise either the situation with Crimea or the situation with Donbass, because the UN does not recognise them. We will only respect decisions made at the level of the United Nations.”

Kazakhstan’s Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Roman Vassilenko, in a meeting with the EU, emphasised the importance of minimising or preventing the negative effects of EU’s sanctions against Russia on trade and economic relations between Kazakhstan and EU. He added: “European companies are leaving Russia either due to sanctions or due to pressure from the public, from shareholders and ethical reasons. They want to be somewhere in the neighbourhood, and we would like to be that neighbour.’’ He said in an interview that Kazakhstan did not want to become a collateral victim of politically motivated economic warfare and if ‘’there is a new iron curtain, we do not want to be behind it.”

In addition to performing a diplomatic tightrope walk, Kazakh authorities are also keen to balance opposing local passions surrounding the war. The exchanges on social media have been vicious. An anti-war gathering in Almaty on March 6 was attended by around 2-3000 people who sang Ukrainian songs and hurled invective at Putin. (Eurasianet; 4^th April, 2022; ‘’Kazakhstan seeks to thread diplomatic needle over Russia’s Ukraine war’’; Chris Rickleton) These are big numbers by Kazakh standards, where permission for rallies is granted on an arbitrary basis, despite official claims to the contrary.

In March, Kazakhstan denied a request from Moscow to provide troops for the offensive in Ukraine. (Euractiv; 2^nd March, 2022, Georgi Gotev; ‘’Kazakhstan takes distance from Russia’s Ukraine war.’’) The import of several of the above comments/actions was however sought to be attenuated by the telephone call from President Putin to Tokayev on 2^nd April. (Kazinform; 3^rd April, 2022; ‘’President Tokayev had telephone conversation with Vladimir Putin’’) According to a readout by Kazakhstan on this conversation, the two men expressed “a common understanding on the exceptional importance of reaching agreements on a neutral, non-bloc, non-nuclear status of Ukraine.” These are among the demands made by Moscow in the ongoing talks to bring closure to the war in Ukraine.

It would appear that Putin has realised the limits up to which he can pressurise Kazakhstan and some other Central Asian states to support his position. As the Western sanctions on Russia over its invasion of Ukraine start to bite, more than 300 U.S. companies are pulling out of Russia to relocate their regional headquarters. Kazakhstan could be the ideal choice, both from the economic and geo-strategic perspective (The Hill; 30^th March, 2022; ‘’Washington’s potential hidden ace in rift with Russia: Kazakhstan’’; Sasha Toperich and Debra Cagan). Kazakh oil production fell in March amid export problems from the Black Sea Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) terminal. (Nasdaq; 4^th April, 2022; ‘’Kazakhstan oil output down in March, Chevron leads the fall -sources Reuters). This fall was because of lower intake in the CPC system owing to storm damage to loading facilities at its terminal near Russian port of Novorossiysk.

Kazakhstan reduced its oil output forecast for 2022 and dramatically trimmed its projection for economic growth in fresh evidence of the damage being wrought by the impact of Russia’s war on Ukraine. The country now expects to pump 85.7 million tons of crude in 2022, which is 1.8 million tons less than had been projected earlier. (Eurasianet; 5^th April, 2022; Almaz Kumenov; ‘’Kazakhstan sees economy slowed down by Russia’s war.’’) The government downgraded its economic growth forecast for this year from 3.9% to 2.1%. Kazakhstan will utilise its National Fund for a further 1.63 trillion tenge (USD 3.5 billion) this year to finance additional spending. Kazakhstan was looking forward to a sustained period of buoyancy following the 2.6% contraction in GDP experienced in 2020 due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Economic growth bounced back to 4% in 2021 – a rate the authorities would not be able to maintain in the current year.

Uzbekistan

The response by Uzbekistan, as in the case of Kazakhstan, has been a carefully guarded policy of neutrality. This was laid out in March 2022 by the then-Foreign Minister Abdulaziz Kamilov in remarks to the Uzbek Senate. He said that while Tashkent wanted to maintain good relations with both Moscow and Kyiv, it opposed the war. Kamilov said that Uzbekistan does not recognise the pro-Russian separatist-controlled districts in Ukraine’s Donbas, known as the Donetsk and Luhansk “people’s republics.” He called for a “peaceful solution” to resolve the conflict “by diplomatic means” and that violence must be stopped right away. He said that Uzbekistan recognised Ukraine’s independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity. Kamilov echoed Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev’s position that Uzbekistan will not join any military bloc or deploy its forces abroad. Mirziyoyev’s administration maintains that Tashkent’s “stand on the war is firm” and that neutrality is its mantra.

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has driven an exodus of IT specialists to former regions of the Soviet Union. Uzbekistan wants to capitalise on this opportunity to speed up plans to modernise its economy best known for its vast production of cotton. It took only one day after Russia’s February 24 invasion of Ukraine for Uzbekistan to launch a one-stop government relocation programme for IT specialists and companies. Offering visas, housing and child care support to individuals, and registration assistance and tax exemptions to companies, the programme has already attracted several thousand foreign IT specialists. The Russian Association of Electronic Communications, a lobby group, said on March 22 that 50,000 to 70,000 specialists had left Russia and up to 100,000 more may follow[3].

Some Uzbek policymakers have stated on condition of anonymity that it is their fear of Russia that makes them adopt the position that they do. They are afraid that they will be left alone to fend for themselves if Russia were to take any hostile action against them. That fear has led the government to maintain a tight rein on public reporting about the war. State media do not attempt independent coverage but simply repeat official positions. Private outlets in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan[4], appear to have faced strict official scrutiny when they attempted to analyse the conflict objectively or question the war. In Uzbekistan, it was reported that several reporters, editors and bloggers were called in by the State Security Service because of their coverage of Ukraine. Government officials say such measures are necessary to combat misinformation and disinformation but deny that independent media are being silenced.

Uzbekistan ceased export of Chevrolet vehicles to Russia since 9 March 2022. It makes vehicles under GM’s Chevrolet brand. These cars contain semiconductors and microchips manufactured in South Korea, which has joined Western sanctions to punish Russia for its invasion of Ukraine[5].

Remittance from Russia to Central Asia

One of the most significant factors that some Central Asian countries have to contend with is their reliance on remittances from several million of their nationals working in Russia. Remittances sent by labor migrants have an overwhelming significance for families in these countries that are supported by these funds. These accounted for 11.6% of Uzbekistan’s gross domestic product in 2020. The figures for Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan were even higher, at 31% and 27% respectively. Due to the damage to the Russian economy as a result of the western sanctions, the income of the Central Asian labourers has been severely impacted[6]. This would mean lesser chances of sending home remittances and greater possibility of reverse migration in search of livelihood. The World Bank estimates that the value of remittances from Russia would drop in the case of Uzbekistan by 21%, in Tajikistan by 22%, and by 33% in Kyrgyzstan.

According to latest estimates, remittances to Kyrgyzstan are the most dependent on Russia. Last year (January-September 2021), the share of remittances from Russia constituted 83% of all remittances to Kyrgyzstan. The same statistics for Tajikistan and Uzbekistan indicate less dependence on Russia: 58% of all remittances to Tajikistan and 55% of all remittances to Uzbekistan came from Russia. In absolute dollar amounts, remittances from Russia to Uzbekistan are the highest compared to Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, given the greater number of Uzbeks travelling abroad for work, a product of the country’s vastly larger population. In 2020, Uzbekistan migrants remitted USD 7 billion, Kyrgyz migrants USD 2.4 billion, and Tajik migrants USD 2.2 billion.

Migrants who lost jobs in Russia and whose earnings have been devalued have started returning to Central Asia. Tashkent reported 133,000 returned migrants from Russia in the first quarter of the year. Dushanbe reported 60,337 returned migrants from Russia in the same period, which was 2.6 times more compared to the same period in 2021. Polls conducted among Central Asian migrants a month after Russia’s invasion to Ukraine indicated that around 40% of migrants from Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan were ready to return home after losing jobs or income. That share is probably similar for Tajik migrants as well.

Trade

Another area where Central Asian countries are affected by Russia’s economic troubles is trade. For Uzbekistan (using 2020 data) Russia is the second largest export partner, accounting for 12.5% of exports and 21% of imports. Inevitably, Russia’s economic difficulties will push Uzbekistan to seek other markets to sell and buy, but these adjustments will take time. For Tajikistan, Russia is not a big export market but it is Tajikistan’s second largest import partner. For Kyrgyzstan, 21.8% of imports come from Russia.

The ongoing crisis in Ukraine can adversely impact on the region’s food security. On 10 March 2022, Russia temporarily banned the export of white sugar and grain crops to the Eurasian Economic Union countries. This spelt gloom for Kazakhstan and other Central Asian countries. Post the ban on export on Russian grains, Kazakh authorities decided to ban wheat exports. This step was designed to protect the domestic production and supply and to ensure that there was no shortage and no protests.

Kazakhstan’s decision to ban wheat exports was bad news for its Central Asian neighbours, which get about 90% of their wheat imports from Kazakhstan. One of the world’s major wheat growers, Kazakhstan also imports relatively inexpensive wheat from Russia to use domestically and to resell its own more expensive wheat to other countries. The Kazakh Agriculture Ministry decided to limit wheat and flour exports to 1 million tons and 300,000 tons, respectively, for three months starting April 15. Russia said it was suspending wheat, rye, barley, and maize exports until June 30 to “protect the domestic food market in the face of external constraints.” Tajikistan annually buys nearly 1 million tons of wheat from Kazakhstan, which accounts for up to 94 percent of Dushanbe’s grain imports. Kyrgyzstan gets about 40% of its imported wheat from Kazakhstan. Bishkek’s main grain supplier is Russia.

IMF has stated that rising prices for food, energy and other goods could trigger social unrest, particularly in vulnerable developing countries. Reduced supplies of oil, gas and metals produced by Russia, and wheat and corn – produced by both Russia and Ukraine – have driven up prices sharply inter alia in Central Asia and were particularly hurting lower-income households. Russia’s political and economic isolation is a chance for other interested players and stake-holders to enhance their forays in Central Asia. Among others, USA, Europe, China, Turkey, India, Iran etc. have a high possibility of increasing their presence and influence in the region.

Options for India

With every passing day, the Central Asian countries are feeling increasingly disillusioned and disenchanted with Russia’s actions and continuation of the war. In many countries of Central Asia, there is also growing unhappiness amongst the common people with policies of China in the political, economic and social sphere. Central Asia is looking for new reliable, trustworthy and supportive partners in political, strategic, economic, connectivity, counter-terrorism etc. spheres. India eminently fits the bill. It will be mutually beneficial to significantly enhance our engagement with Central Asian nations by embarking on a regular series of visits at political, official, media, business etc. level to all these countries, particularly to Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan.

It needs to be remembered that in the ongoing controversy regarding Nupur Sharma, not one of the Central Asian countries have made any comment against India. This statesmanlike behaviour of Central Asia needs to be recognised and applauded and all efforts made to further expand and strengthen our partnership with them. The next Summit of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization will take place in Samarkand, Uzbekistan on 15-16 September, 2022. It will be eminently useful if PM Modi could attend this Summit. He has attended all the earlier SCO Summits, the last being in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan in 2019, before the pandemic started. PM Modi enjoys a close rapport with the Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev. This visit will further cement the strong bonds of partnership with Uzbekistan as well as with other Central Asian countries.

The next Summit of the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia (CICA), a Grouping launched by former Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev at the UNGA in 1992, will be held in Nur-Sultan (formerly Astana) in Oct, 2022. It will be eminently desirable for bilateral ties with Kazakhstan as well as with the Region if PM Modi or some senior Indian leader were to participate actively in the forthcoming Summit. 2022 represents the 30^th anniversary of the establishment of CICA. PM Atal Behari Vajpayee had attended the first CICA Summit in Almaty in 2002.

The last India-Central Asia Dialogue was organised by EAM Dr. S. Jaishankar in December 2021 in New Delhi. It would send out the correct message about India’s continued interest in and engagement with the region if the next Summit could be hold during 2022 in either Kazakhstan or Kyrgyzstan. Uzbekistan is ruled out because the first meeting was held in Samarkand in 2019. This initiative will go a long way in advancing India’s interests in this part of our extended neighbourhood.

Author Brief Bio: Amb Ashok Sajjanhar has worked for the Indian Foreign Service for over three decades. He was the ambassador of India to Kazakhstan, Sweden and Latvia, and has worked in diplomatic positions in Washington DC, Brussels, Moscow, Geneva, Tehran, Dhaka and Bangkok.

References:

[1] https://www.indianarrative.com/world-news/the-russia-ukraine-conflict-implications-for-kazakhstan-and-central-asia-166292.html

[2] https://english.telugustop.com/the-russia-ukraine-conflict-implications-for-kazakhstan-and-central-asia-latest-eng-news-1466873

[3] https://central.asia-news.com/en_GB/articles/cnmi_ca/features/2022/04/12/feature-01

[4] https://www.voanews.com/a/fear-of-russia-drives-central-asian-response-to-ukraine-war-/6547957.html

[5] https://www.intellinews.com/uzbekistan-stops-shipping-gm-cars-to-russia-240522/

[6] https://anantacentre.in/central-asia-digest/central-asia-digest-may-2022

The Russia-Ukraine war erupted on 24 February 2022 when the world was still struggling with severe adverse impacts of the Covid 19 pandemic. The twin impact has convoluted the already feeble and transitional world order marked by several hotspots, unstable and failed regimes, climate change, terrorism and radicalisation, protectionism and ultra-nationalism, failed aspirations of the masses and geo-political, geo-economic and geo-religious contestations across the global spectrum. Sino-US and US-Russian rivalries are taking the international order to the bottom of the pit thereby creating havoc in the value and supply chains as well as inducing existential threats to peace, development and the sheer viability of the international liberal economic system which has been repeatedly knocked adversely, at least since the 2008 financial crisis later compounded by several wars and the pandemic. South Asia, with its huge developmental challenges and ongoing politico-economic challenges is no exception. Ukraine War has deepened that crisis even more.

Speaking at the Davos Economic Forum, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky warned of famine and a hunger “catastrophe,” as he accused Russia of blocking grain exports from his war-torn country — which the U.S. has described as an effort “to break the spirit of the Ukrainian people.” Accusing Russian forces of blocking his country from exporting 22 million tonnes of food products and cereals including wheat, barley, sunflower and more. Russia, on the other hand, has blockaded the Black Sea ports of Crimea and Odessa, which has provided it with a negotiating leverage as it demands a quid pro quo through the lifting of crippling sanctions against Moscow when Putin even claimed that world oil prices could go up to USD 300 a barrel. Nearly every part of the world has been impacted by the 3F crisis i.e. food, fuel and fertilisers.

As the 4^th month of this devastating war continues, its end does not appear to be on the horizon but collateral damage is far too visible on a daily basis for the developing countries which have nothing to do with it. The unique features of this war in the 21^st century have clearly been weaponisation of financial instruments by the West through unprecedented sanctions against Russia; weaponisation of food and fuel by Russia especially against the Europeans as it tries to salvage and blunt the severe economic impact of its geo-political contestation with USA. Surge in fuel and food prices are impinging on the daily lives of the people from the most developed countries to the least developed ones. US has the highest inflation in decades, with Europe following suit. UK is struggling with the lowest standards of living after the post second World War times. Russian economy will have long term impact. Public disquiet and discontent are on the rise and may have damaging repercussions not only for the economy but also on domestic politics, especially of democracies. The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations said in April that “Russia’s war on Ukraine was mostly responsible for the 17.1% rise in the price of wheat, barley, corn and other grains”.

USA and the Biden Administration which is being accused of precipitating this war and crisis continues with its policies of pumping in arms and propping up the Ukrainian government despite the ensuing destruction and displacement of more than seven million Ukrainian refugees. At a U.N. Security Council meeting on May 19, U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken, accused Russia of weaponising food and holding grain hostage “to break the spirit of the Ukrainian people.” Blinken accused Russia of seeking to control Ukraine’s ports and access to the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov since launching its invasion in February, calling it a “deliberate effort” to shut down shipping and block any safe passage.^[1]

The devastating impact of this avoidable war is being felt all across the developing world. The impact in South Asia is visible in terms of economic turmoil as also in the political domain. Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Nepal, Myanmar, Maldives and Afghanistan have particularly suffered while India, Bhutan and Bangladesh have fared better. But the adverse impact is there for all to see, since most regional economies are dependent on the 3F imports. Combined with devastating impact of the pandemic, the current situation continues to worsen especially in countries of South Asia which are heavily dependent on imports of costly energy. Several economies like Maldives and Sri Lanka, which were dependent on tourism, have their own tales of woes to tell.

Observers estimate that the impact of the Ukraine war on South Asia will be far more and be felt longer than the adverse impact of the Covid 19 pandemic as it is directly affecting the logistics and standard and essential supplies from the same very sources. Trade linkages will be affected and that is being witnessed nearly on a daily basis as Russia squeezes the Ukrainian exports through the ports and otherwise while its own exports have come under severest sanctions. This is causing a major problem for many smaller countries in South Asia in continuing with business as usual for fear of provoking the American ire and secondary sanctions. But, as the sanctions are impacting in equal or greater measure the imposers themselves let alone the developing world, the stress in adopting more of the same approach would be difficult to sustain in the long run. Russia is claiming that the sanctions have not affected it. On the contrary, Russia has profited from its oil and gas sector due to increased prices and sales both to China, Europe, India and elsewhere. Efforts by the Europeans to wean away from the Russian oil and gas will take a while but their increasingly hostile stance could create greater opportunity for the Russians to deal with countries in South Asia and elsewhere on a bilateral basis and enable them to enhance and expand their trade basket. It is already visible with India which had refused to condemn the Russian aggression and even is looking to enhance its trade ties and imports of oil at discounted prices as the Russians continue to offer the same at competitive prices. Michael Kugelman avers that ‘Russia doesn’t currently have a deep footprint in the smaller South Asian states, but it has explored some trade and investment, especially in the energy sectors in Nepal and Bangladesh and in Sri Lankan tea, of which it is a major importer.’^[2]

There has been umpteen instance where the impact of sanctions has been mixed and often dubious as countries find alternative means of survival. Gaddafi’s Libya was under huge sanctions but their access through Malta and Tunisia not only helped them wade through but also helped the economies of those countries. Similar trade diversion was observed when the United States imposed sanctions against Iran. Iran shifted to trading with some European and Middle Eastern countries, while India and China conducted barter trade with Iran, exchanging crude oil for food. But such benefits may not be sufficient to offset the cost of higher commodity prices and lower external demand for South Asian countries claims Nandalal Weerasinghe, former Senior Deputy Governor of the Central Bank of Sri Lanka^[3]. He further argues that the direct impact on South Asia will mainly occur through trade linkages, particularly through rising commodity prices as the region is a net importer of commodities. Even before the invasion, inflation in South Asian economies was rising relative to competitors in global markets. The additional shock in commodity prices will further widen the gap, increasing the relative cost of production in the region and eroding the competitiveness of cheap labour and energy-intensive industries. Moreover, lower global demand for goods and services from the region and increased volatility and uncertainty in financial markets leading to capital flight to safety will indirectly impact the region. The solution therefore is to resolve the crisis at the earliest.

Another major problem facing the world including South Asia, has been that of irreversible climate change. Summits after summits and COP26 targets may all go into a spin as the energy security at any cost becomes a major challenge for all the countries. Constrained supplies due to sanctions at a high cost will have unprecedented impact on economies and political approaches. Ordinarily, the countries would seek to diversify their sources of energy through renewables, such as nuclear energy, hydro power, wind and tidal energy and green hydrogen. But now countries are resorting to greater use of coal and hydro carbons, which will impact on global warming and may decelerate the desired objectives set out with much fanfare. On the other hand, the developed world might speed up its quest for alternate sources including renewables but for the resource restrained developing world the options will become further limited. One could, in the short term, witness ‘energy hegemonism’ acquiring greater salience leading to further carbonisation of the climate.

The Russia–Ukraine war is a wake-up call, not only for Europe but for all countries needing secure energy and food sources. Sky-high energy costs have led countries to realise that they can no longer depend on imported fossil fuels, which may drive a shift away from fossil fuels altogether.

Writing on the issue, Han Phoumin, a senior energy economist at ERIA (Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia) stated that the International Energy Agency issued 10 measures to reduce the European Union’s reliance on Russian natural gas imports[4]. These included jumpstarting renewable wind and solar projects and maximising energy generation from existing low-emissions sources such as bioenergy and nuclear power.^[5] It would be useful to see how the adverse economic impact is being handled by some countries in South Asia.

India

India is the largest and fastest growing economy in the region and has perhaps the greatest resilience with strong democratic foundations. It has handled the pandemic very effectively not only producing its own vaccine in record time but also provided the vaccine to the world, starting with her neighbours in the spirit of ‘Vasudhaiv Kutumbakam’. In addition, India swiftly addressed the economic downturn, caused due to pandemic, through ongoing economic and structural reforms as well as pro-business policies and financial incentives embedded in the Production Linked Schemes (PLI). At the same time, the country remained focussed on the “Atmanirbhar (Self-reliance with a global outlook) campaign underwritten by ‘Make in India for the world’ and ‘Local for Global’ approaches to develop and secure regional and global value supply chains. Little wonder then, that India is being projected as the fastest growing major economy in the world with both the IMF and World Bank predicting India’s GDP growth to be between 7.5 to 8%. The Ukraine war has no doubt impacted cyclically on the pace to a great extent as the fuel prices have hit the roof, leading to inflation and higher cost of living. But happily, India has been following the energy diversification policies for quite some time now and has acquitted itself creditably, especially in the renewable and solar energy sectors aiming to reach 500GW by 2030. But given the fact that India has 1/6^th of the world’s population, her demands are equally gigantic and challenges immense. Despite her own compulsions, India has emerged as a first responder in the region in any crisis.

India supplies oil and gas to Nepal, Bhutan, Afghanistan, Maldives, Bangladesh   and Sri Lanka and others and has extended substantial lines of credit, grants and finance facilities to these countries to import food, fuel and fertilisers to cope with their economic challenges. Smaller economies, whose capacities and market size are not so developed, are bearing to a far greater extent the brunt of both the pandemic and the Ukraine war and do need urgent help as the politico-economic crisis threatens their social fabric.

In the Russia-Ukraine conflict, India has maintained a principled position and has abstained on an unprecedented dozen resolutions in the UN. It continues to work for early cessation of hostilities and professes peace, dialogue and diplomacy within the ambit of UN Charter as it continues to provide humanitarian assistance to Ukraine. While enjoying the Global Comprehensive Strategic Partnership with USA and Special and Privileged Strategic Partnership with Russia, India has still maintained a principled stance in the quest for global peace and in her enlightened national interest.

On the other hand, India has called out the hypocrisy and unilateralism of sanctions by the US and Europe when they expressed their displeasure against India for importing even a little bit of oil from Russia. But India has not budged from its position and gave a fitting response when External Affairs Minister Dr Jaishankar retorted at a press conference on the side-lines of 2+2 dialogue (April 13,22) in the US: “If you are looking at energy purchases from Russia, I would suggest that your attention should be focused on Europe…We do buy some energy which is necessary for our energy security. But I suspect, looking at the figures, probably our total purchases for the month would be less than what Europe does in an afternoon. So, you might want to think about that.” Again, while in Europe (June 5 Slovakia) he reiterated that if Europe manages to procure oil and gas from Russia in a way to ensure that the impact on its economy is not traumatic, that freedom should exist for others as well. India’s decisions will be guided by her energy security needs and not by the opinion of others.

Sri Lanka

Situation is Sri Lanka cannot be uniquely attributed to the Russia-Ukraine war, as the crisis in Sri Lanka is the result of a cumulative impact of bad policy decisions, accrual of non-performing assets, crippling and unproductive Chinese debt, political corruption, pandemic and extremist events. A further stimulus by the Eurasian situation can create havoc. In March 2022, the inflation rate in Sri Lanka stood at over twenty percent, with the island nation also experiencing power cuts of over 12-15 hours due to non-availability of fuel. In addition, there were crippling shortages of food and medicine. Civil war in such situations is assumes high probability. Wrath of the masses and continued demonstrations often turned violent against the Rajapaksa Government, further accentuating the political and economic crisis. Sri Lanka, which used to get large numbers of Russian and Ukrainian tourists felt the immediate brunt of the war and its hopes of reviving the tourist inflows fell prey to the queer combination of external war and internal strife. Foreign cash inflows from tourism, which were in the region of USD four to seven billion dwindled considerably, causing further economic stress, unemployment and popular discontent.

India has tried its best to rescue the Sri Lankan situation by providing lines of credit and deferring debt repayments to the tune of over USD 4 billion, while urgently supplying relief materials including food, fuel, fertilisers and medicines to help the people of Sri Lanka and stabilise the situation there. However, the extant and intensity of the impact is far too insidious to be turned around in a short term. The intervention of IMF, World Bank and the international community as well as improvement in external environment are a prerequisite over which the Sri Lankans have little control.

Afghanistan

Since the 2020 departure of US military forces from Afghanistan, leaving the Afghan people high and dry to the mercy of Taliban, the country has remained unstable economically and politically. The world was slow to respond to their urgent needs while the pandemic raged. Even worse, the impact of the Ukraine war was that Afghanistan fell from the global radar and remained a pariah state leading to greater isolation, which has caused further deterioration in the lives of the Afghan people. India, despite the initial set back, has come forward to help the people of Afghanistan through providing food supplies and critical medicines and has been requested by the Taliban government to restart various  projects. A team visited Afghanistan in early June 2022, to assess the ground situation. In this connection a MEA Press Release recounted “it may be recalled that in response to the humanitarian needs of the Afghan people, India decided to extend humanitarian assistance to the Afghan people. In this endeavour, we have already dispatched several shipments of humanitarian assistance consisting of 20,000 MTs of wheat, 13 tons of medicines, 500,000 doses of COVID vaccine and winter clothing. These consignments were handed over to the Indira Gandhi Children Hospital, Kabul and UN specialised agencies including WHO and WFP. Furthermore, India is in the process of shipping more medical assistance and food grains to Afghanistan.”^[6] In continuation of India’s developmental partnership with Afghanistan, India has gifted one million doses of India-made COVAXIN to Iran to administer to Afghan refugees in Iran. India has also assisted UNICEF by supplying almost 60 million doses of polio vaccine and two tons of essential medicines.^[7] The Taliban has highly appreciated India’s goodwill gestures and humanitarian assistance[8].

Pakistan

Pakistan’s polity and economy have also been under tremendous stress with debt levels rising and poverty levels and cost of living increasing which have caused tremendous political discontent in the country. Former Prime Minister Imran Khan, in a rush to endear Russia, was at odds when he visited Moscow as soon as the invasion of Ukraine began. Pakistan depends a great deal on food and fuel imports hence the war had a direct impact due to high costs and limiting availability. It had maintained good relations with Ukraine in defence sector and was getting wheat and other supplies from there which were impacted immediately. As the Pakistani premier failed to manage the economy, the pandemic as also Pakistan’s foreign policy, he was forced out of office by the opposition, nudged by the deep state and military, which had decided that it was time for him to go. But the situation continues to worsen as structural issues combined with denial of the doles from Gulf monarchies are yet to be addressed. Even China, which had often paid up with increasing debt portfolio of Pakistan has also begun to understand the limitations of backing the wrong horse. Islamabad has this uncanny ability to encash its nuisance value to the fullest, especially with regard to major powers like the US, Russia and China by playing the Kabul card. But for how long is the moot question.

Pakistan’s all-weather ally China along with nations like Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) are cautious towards disbursing loans to the crisis-hit nation, Bloomberg reported.^[9] It quoted Pakistan finance minister Miftah Ismail that China, Saudi and the UAE urged Pakistan to speak first with the International Monetary Fund (IMF). “We went to Saudi Arabia, Dubai and spoke to other countries—they are ready to give money, but all of them say we need to go to the IMF first”[10]. It will be recalled that to tide over its fuel and financing issues, Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif rushed to Riyadh and Abu Dhabi immediately after taking over. His foreign Minister Bilawal Bhutto Zardari went to China and Turkey. Islamabad is mulling over buying wheat from Moscow, defying the US and western sanctions.

After fuel & power crisis, debt-laden Pakistan is grappling with major wheat supply disruption. Prime Minister Sharif slammed the chief minister of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province over the cost of10 kg. wheat flour bag. Sharif said, 10 kg wheat flour bag cost shouldn’t exceed PKR 400, else “I’d sell clothes to ensure cheap grain”. Pakistan’s wheat stocks will further slide due to mid-march heatwave, unavailability & high cost of fertilisers & water scarcity.^[11] A lot of it is directly attributable to the Russia-Ukraine war, as imports become more burdensome.

Nepal

Nepal has been facing a political crisis that has economic moorings worsened by the pandemic. At the UNGA, Nepal supported the US resolution against Russia stating that it believed in territorial integrity to be ‘sacrosanct’. Of late, US has become far more interested and influential in South Asian region especially Nepal, as its Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC with a $500 million grant for infra projects) finally was able to make a head start. Soon after the UN vote on the Ukraine war, US Secretary of State Antony Blinken spoke with Prime Minister Sher Bahadur Deuba on the phone and thanked him for his government’s decisions to endorse the MCC and the UN resolution[12]. But Kathmandu fears that huge developmental aid may get reduced due to war apart from the direct impact of the rising prices of commodities and fuel. Nepal imports more that 40% of its consumer requirements and 100% of its fuel needs. Its foreign exchange reserves are declining as the remittances have also reduced from the 3-4 million expat Nepalis. Like other countries, the Nepali students in Ukraine also had an adverse impact. Its tourism sector has been impacted due to pandemic and now war impinging on foreign exchange situation. Nepal would find it difficult to overcome the domino effect.

A divisive geo-political context:

Although adverse economic impact of the Ukraine war is clearly evident in a real time manner, what was of no less significant importance was the reactions and approaches of the South Asian governments at the UNGA and other international organisations where western countries went in a missionary mode to force and persuade countries to condemn the Russian aggression. The resolution also demanded that Russia immediately, completely, and unconditionally withdraw all of its military forces from the territory of Ukraine within its internationally recognised borders[13]. South Asian reaction was instructive and was nearly evenly divided. India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka abstained on the UNGA resolution while Bhutan, Nepal, Afghanistan and Maldives went along with the US led resolution. Like Myanmar, the Afghan UN Representative was of the previous government but Taliban advised both sides to exercise restraint. It does reflect the underlying concerns of the Asian countries who are badly impacted domestically and would rather not get embroiled in the geopolitical contestation between USA and Russia. Despite consistent western pressure, India, exercising her strategic autonomy, singularly held on to her principled position and abstained 12 times at the UN on various resolutions while decrying the invasion and humanitarian catastrophe caused by the war.

Exercising her strategic autonomy in the War and otherwise, India will take a lead and regain its relationships with the neighbours as a substantial first responder. While In Slovakia (June 22) FM Dr S Jaishankar reiterated that India would not accept any “construct” based on choosing between a Western camp and a Russia-China camp, adding that India was entitled to make its choices after examining the issues “This is the construct that you are trying to impose on me and I don’t accept it… My choices will not be cynical or transactional. There will be a balance of my values and my interests. There is no country in the world that disregards its interests. I am not sitting on the fence. I am sitting on my ground. The world cannot be that Eurocentric as it used to be in the past.”^[14]

No doubt, the impact of the Eurasian crisis is causing higher inflation, high input costs with economic deprivation resulting in lower economic growth which might lead to stagflation and recession at a later stage if the War continues for few more months. Excessive sanctions on Russia and the policy choices it will make will have a direct impact on the South Asian economies among others, but the extent will be relative to their economic linkages with Russia and Ukraine. The negative political fallout of the worsening economic situation will have to be carefully watched. Perhaps is time for the most disconnected South Asia to work on regional connectivity and mutually beneficial dependencies.

Author Brief Bio: Amb Anil Trigunayat (IFS Retd.) is a diplomat by profession and has served in Indian Missions in Cote d’Ivoire, Bangladesh, Mongolia, USA, Russia, Sweden, Nigeria, Libya and Jordan & MEA. Prior to his superannuation in May 2016, he served as Ambassador to Jordan and Libya and Malta. Amb Trigunayat is an envoy of Peace and conflict management and associated with UNITY Earth. He is the President of MIICCIA Chamber of Commerce& Industry and also a Distinguished Fellow at the Vivekananda International Foundation and Chairman, Confederation of Education Excellence.

References:

^[1] Zelensky warns of ‘hunger catastrophe,’ accusing Russia of blocking Ukraine’s grain exports (yahoo.com)

^[2] https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/02/24/russia-ukraine-invasion-india-pakistan-south-asia/

^[3] The Russia–Ukraine crisis will hurt South Asia | East Asia Forum https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2022/03/16/the-russia-ukraine-crisis-will-hurt-south-asia/

[4] https://www.eurasiareview.com/27042022-war-in-ukraine-and-rising-energy-costs-risk-hampering-asias-decarbonization-efforts-analysis/

^[5] War in Ukraine and rising energy costs risk hampering Asia’s decarbonization efforts | East Asia Forum

^[6] India’s humanitarian assistance to Afghanistan (mea.gov.in)

^[7] ibid

[8] https://indianexpress.com/article/india/taliban-afghanistan-indian-team-in-kabul-7948678/

^[9] China, Saudi Arabia And UAE Denied Loans To Crisis-Hit Pakistan, Directed It Towards IMF (msn.com)

[10] https://www.news18.com/news/world/china-saudi-arabia-and-uae-deny-lending-funds-to-crisis-hit-pakistan-5275957.html

^[11] https://www.msn.com/en-in/video/watch/it-s-down-to-pakistan-pm-selling-clothes-now-as-wheat-crisis-adds-to-economic-woes/vi-AAXUiEJ?ocid=msedgntp&cvid=277ba656abaa4ad79f3b10fa94ab22e7

[12] https://www.dw.com/en/ukraine-war-why-nepal-chose-to-go-against-russia/a-61234019

[13] https://www.newindianexpress.com/nation/2022/mar/02/india-abstains-on-unga-resolution-that-deplores-russias-aggression-against-ukraine-2425561.html

^[14] EAM Jaishankar defends oil imports from Russia (deccanchronicle.com)

West Asia has been a cradle of civilisation as well as birthplace of the Abrahamic religions and oldest known empires. Its strategic location at the junction of Asia, Africa and Europe combined with the world’s largest oil deposits gives it a dominant position in global geopolitics. Over 92% of the population in the region follow Islam. Maritime choke points of Suez Canal, Strait of Hormuz, Bab el-Mandeb Strait and the Turkish Strait lie within the region. A third of the global oil and about 16% of worlds natural gas today comes from West Asia. Notwithstanding its huge oil assets, West Asia has remained a cauldron of turmoil arising out of the deep Shia-Sunni rift, terrorism, incessant sectarian conflicts, tussle for Islamic world’s leadership and global power-play.

During first half of the twentieth century, a cartel of seven integrated Western oil companies, the ‘seven sisters’, controlled the oil fields and oil markets across the world. They, in turn, also exercised control over the oil producing countries and their politics^[1]. Very little of the wealth generated was shared with the host countries. These oil companies exercising immense power, often acted as instruments of their parent countries. After decades of being exploited, in 1960, governments of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iran, Iraq and Venezuela came together and formed the OPEC (Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries) seeking a say in issues related to the oil being extracted from their countries. OPEC, today, influences global oil prices by controlling its volume in the market. Although OPEC member countries hold 81% of the world’s proven oil reserves, as of now, they account for only about 40% of world’s oil production^[2]. US, Russia, Canada, Mexico, Brazil and Norway are major non-OPEC oil producers. In 1974, the advanced oil consuming economies formed IEA (International Energy Agency) to represent their interests. IEA member nations are required to store the equivalent of at least 90 days’ worth of oil, based on their previous year’s net oil imports so as to retain a collective capacity to respond to major unforeseen supply disruptions^[3].

Politics of oil encapsulates many dimensions such as control of production and cost, supply chains, security of the oil fields, regional security and the global geopolitical scenario. ‘Oil for Security’ is a common arrangement in the region. It is an arrangement where oil producing countries are provided protection in exchange for oil related benefits. Security cover provided to Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, UAE and Qatar are examples.

US is the biggest oil producer in the world today. 65% of its oil production in 2021 came from shale oil extraction. The average break-even cost of oil extracted from new US shale oil wells is believed to be between USD 46 to USD 58 per barrel, with the lowest being about USD 30 and the highest going up to USD 90 in some cases^[4]. In comparison, the cheapest oil from Saudi Arabia’s ‘conventional’ deposits cost under USD 10 and the average production cost of oil from onshore fields in West Asia is about USD 31 per barrel. As a consequence, shale oil firms operate under very little price margins and often slip into unprofitable zone. This factor plays a lesser known, but important role in the politics of oil.

Another important dimension of the global oil market is the petrodollar system. Petrodollar system requires countries which need to buy oil to trade in USD only. This keeps the dollar in high demand. It also ensures demand for US treasury bills, provides a steady stream of credit for US government and gives certain degree of protection to the USD from inflation^[5]. Although baby steps to move away or at least diversify from using dollar as the sole currency for foreign trade are visible, creating an alternative would be no easy task. As of now, USD accounts for about 80% of all global foreign exchange transactions, which is a whopping USD 6.6 trillion a day^[6]. In comparison, Saudi Arabia’s oil sales to China and India in 2021 amounted to USD 8.2 billion and 3.1 billion respectively.^[7] At an average price of USD 100 per barrel, the pre-Covid level global oil exports of about 70 million barrels per day would generate an annual global petrodollar supply of about USD 2.5 trillion^[8]. To pose any significant challenge to USD, there has to be a major shift away from using dollars by a much larger number of countries. EU’s aspiration for non-dollar trade was evident from its attempt to establish INSTEX (Instrument in Support of Trade Exchanges) for trade with Iran^[9]. Limited non-dollar oil trade is being carried out between Saudi-China, Russia-China, India-Iran, India-Russia etc. Considering the US dollar’s extensive use, well established credentials and deep roots, the petrodollar system is unlikely to face any major threat in the near future^[10].

Oil accounts for 33% of global energy demand followed by coal at about 27%. Oil’s dominant position combined with limited sources, problems of storage and the petrodollar dynamics gives oil a dictating status in geopolitics. Energy security and energy independence are also issues which cast shadows on the politics of oil. Energy security implies secure supplies at stable prices regardless of the source. Energy independence, on the other hand implies either self-sufficiency or restricting energy dependency only on certain preferred suppliers by carefully excluding ‘unfavourable’ regions, avoiding certain vulnerable modes of transportation, routes etc. For example, China would prefer a source like Russia whose supply cannot be interdicted at sea. Energy independence may imply paying a higher price^[11].

Natural gas with its close linkages to oil, accounts for about 23% of global energy mix^[12]. While oil markets are global in nature, markets for natural gas are generally regional. This is because transportation by pipelines is the preferred option for natural gas to avoid the need to first liquify it and reconvert into gas later. EU’s heavy dependency on Russia for natural gas is a consequence of this. This phenomenon also restricts the supplier’s flexibility to switch customers because gas contracts typically lock-in longterm price, factoring in amortisation of the cost of pipeline and its maintenance.

Ukraine crisis has further increased the global dependency on West Asia for oil. Coming so close on the heels of the pandemic, it has wrecked the global economy. The crisis has cast its complex shadow on West Asia also. Oil exporting countries like Saudi Arabia, UAE, Kuwait and Oman are reaping windfall of the energy price hike and are well placed to meet the impact of Ukraine war. But Supply chain disruptions in oil, gas, food grains, edible oil and fertilisers are causing havoc in terms of price hike, inflation and food security on the “fragile and conflict-affected” countries like Syria, Yemen, Iraq, Libya and Lebanon. They confront very negative consequences and are staring at run-away inflation, severe food insecurity and worsening humanitarian crisis^[13].

The Saudi-Iran struggle for dominance, exacerbated by the Shia-Sunni divide, lies at the centre of West Asia’s problems. Saudi and its supporters apprehend Iran trying to establish a land corridor extending from Iran to the Mediterranean^[14]. Foot prints of the two rivals are clearly visible in conflicts raging across the region. External forces led by US are also in the fray in the Saudi-Iran rivalry. The latest US State Department briefings indicate that while there is a general belief that Iran has enough enriched material for making nuclear weapons, US and its partners are working hard to get Iran to agree to a “mutual return to compliance with the JCPOA”^[15]. Iran seems closer than ever to becoming a nuclear power. Ukraine’s plight in the ongoing crisis would only have strengthened Iran’s resolve to go nuclear. If it indeed happens that way, Saudi, Israel and UAE may feel compelled to follow suit, making it difficult to visualise how events will pan out in such a scenario. Saudi Arabia is subjected to constant threat by Iran backed Houthi rebels. Saudi blames Iran for cyber-attacks and subversion of its Shia population. They also feel threatened by pro-Iranian militias in Iraq and radical Sunni elements of ISIS. Iran’s missile and unmanned aerial vehicle capability covers the whole of Saudi Arabia. Saudi is also frequently subjected to strikes from Iraq and Yemen-based rebel groups. The Aramco strike clearly demonstrated Saudi Arabia’s vulnerability. Situation in Yemen is another major security concern for Saudi Arabia. According to a SIPRI report, during 2017-2021, Saudi Arabia and India were the largest arms importers in the world^[16]. 80% of Saudi military hardware is sourced from US. Despite its significantly higher defence budget, except for a slight edge in airpower, Saudi Arabia lacks a seasoned, battle tested armed force and appropriate combat infrastructure to challenge a military threat from Iran^[17]. In terms of maritime security, Saudi Arabia is ill equipped to guard its oil producing coastal areas, it’s ports and the vulnerable choke points of Bab el-Mandep and Hormuz. Even in hybrid and proxy capability, Iran enjoys a clear advantage over Saudi. This leaves Saudi Arabia totally dependent on US for its security. Realisation of the larger implications of this vulnerability and the subtle shift seen in the US West Asia policy may have caused the recent Saudi overtures for rapprochement with Iran and even Israel. Amidst all this, Saudi Arabia also seems to be weighing its options in case Iran goes nuclear^[18].

Yemen has been in severe turmoil since 2011^[19]. Iran backed Houthi rebels challenge attempts by Saudi-US for dominance in Yemen. Factions backed by US, Saudi, Russia, UAE and Iran as well as elements of ISIS and al Qaeda are active in the country. With over 75% of its population living in poverty, Yemen is passing through one of the worst humanitarian crisis ever. Close to 400,000 people are estimated to have died and over 4 million people displaced. The UN brokered ceasefire has just been extended by another two months till 2 August 2022. But no lasting solution is in sight.

Syria is another victim of domestic fissures and intense global power rivalry. Pro and anti-regime forces have been at war since 2011. While the Assad regime is dependent on Russia and Iran for its survival, Saudi, Qatar and Turkey are aligned with the US against the regime. Hezbollah, ISIS, Al Qaeda and the Kurds are also active in Syria. Suspected locations of Iran backed groups are frequently subjected to Israeli bombings. Of the 22 million pre-war Syrian population, an estimated 6 million have been internally displaced with another 6 million fleeing abroad. More than 80% of the population live in poverty^[20]. Turkey has over 3 million Syrian refugees while Lebanon, a country of just 4.5 million population, is struggling with one million Syrian refugees. Turkey has threatened to launch military operation into Syria to establish a 30 km security zone in Northern Syria to counter Kurdish rebels and to relocate the Syrian refugees in Turkey.

Lebanon, with 27% Shias, 27% Sunnis and 21% Roman Catholics has always been captive to sectarian conflicts and witnessed a civil war from 1975 to 1990. The post-war respite ended with commencement of the Syrian crisis in 2011. Huge refugee influx, rampant corruption and an unprecedented financial crisis has made the situation worse. Israel perceives constant threat from Lebanon and regularly resorts to military strikes. Hezbollah and militias supported by Syria and Iran are active in Lebanon. The country has dived deeper into crisis after the massive Beirut Port explosion in August 2020 that killed more than 200 people and destroyed parts of the city^[21]. As per World Bank, between 2019 and 2021 Lebanon’s GDP has contracted by over 58%^[22]. Prolonged turmoil has inflicted long lasting scars on Lebanese society.

War ravaged Iraq’s political system remains deadlocked after the October 2021 parliamentary elections with no consensus between political parties owing allegiance to different Shia, Sunni and Kurd factions. ISIL and Daesh are also active. March 2022 witnessed Iranian missile strikes on suspected ‘Israeli strategic centres’ within Iraq. Turkey launches regular attacks against Kurdish groups in Northern Iraq.The simmering Kurdish movement spanning border areas of Turkey, Syria, Iraq and Iran defies a solution, adding yet another dimension to the West Asian turmoil. Iraq has been facing successive intense droughts combined with soil degradation and frequent sand storms. To make things worse, Turkey is planning to build 22 dams along Tigris and Euphrates rivers near their border with Syria and Iraq^[23]. This would cause severe water crisis in the already water starved region and is a potential flash point. It is also a pointer to the unimaginable consequences of climate change and water crisis, looming large over the entire region.

Amidst all this, during second half of 2020, US facilitated signing of the Abraham Accord between Israel, Egypt, Jordan, UAE, Bahrain, Sudan and Morocco. The accord is expected to pave the way for Saudi Arabia and Oman also establishing diplomatic relations with Israel. While it holds out potential for ushering in peace and stability in the region, it further complicates the Iran issue.

Less than a year after the Abraham Accord, another new grouping emerged, referred to as the ‘Western Indian-Ocean QUAD’, comprising Israel, India, UAE and the US. It signals recognition of the Western Indian-Ocean as a strategic maritime theatre and also preempts any possible Chinese initiatives to forge maritime alliances in the region.

China presents a basket of irresistible economic benefits to West Asia through its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). In January 2022, Syria became the 20th Arab country to join BRI^[24]. 1/3 rd of China’s energy comes from GCC countries. China is already the largest investor and trading partner with the West Asian region. Islamic countries have displayed great prudence by putting aside their religious sensitivities to keep Uighur suppression a non-issue. Beijing has invested USD 10.5 billion in 2021 in BRI related projects in Iraq^[25]. Syria’s BRI dream includes the ambitious ‘Five Seas Vision’ integrating Syria, Turkey, Iran and Iraq and linking the Mediterranean, Black Sea, Red Sea, Persian Gulf and the Caspian Sea. For Iran, the USD 400 billion 25-year Sino-Iranian Comprehensive Cooperation Plan was followed by grant of full membership of SCO. Egypt, Saudi, Qatar and Turkey are already SCO dialogue partners. West Asia is not just an energy provider for China but also an important export market^[26]. China was Turkey’s second biggest trade partner in 2021. However, despite all this, involvement of Saudi, UAE and Oman in BRI has been minimal so far. A huge share of China’s ambitious plans for West Asia span countries in turmoil which makes a near normal and stable environment in these areas an imperative for its success. Who will provide this comfort to China? US and allies are unlikely to oblige. Despite its increasing economic and diplomatic footprints, China, on its part has not shown any inclination to be a security provider in the region or to play a bigger role in the regional politics. She has also not shown much interest even in assuming a leadership role in extending humanitarian assistance and financial aid in the region. It is as if China wants US to continue playing the security provider role while China pursues its economic agenda undisturbed.

In the West Asian milieu, a security provider will be required to become part of the regional security equation and will be called upon to take clear position on many complex regional issues and even intervene militarily, when required. So far, US has been willingly shouldering this role. It is paradoxical that even China’s energy flow from West Asia had been enjoying protection of the US 6th and 7th fleet^[27]. US is now clearly signalling its intention to step back from being the primary security provider in the region and is nudging regional alliances to fill the void^[28]. Abraham Accord, Western Indian Ocean QUAD, Turkey reaching out to Saudi, Iran reaching out to Saudi and UAE, ceasefire efforts in Yemen etc appear to be in consonance with the new US approach. With this subtle toning down of its role, US is forcing China to step in and assume a security providers role in West Asia. This has created a dilemma for China. After all, China has to weigh many issues. It is still only an upper middle-income country striving to become rich before it gets ‘old’. Today, she stands without a single strategic ally. Also, China still lacks adequate skills and experience to effectively project military power far away from its own coast through globally dispersed, multinational and battle tested combat and logistics elements and the requisite command and control structures. There is a clear danger of China over-stretching itself if it takes on the security providers role in West Asia now. It is also possible that there are other actions of higher precedence, closer to its own shores in China’s bucket list now.

It is evident that while the global power-play in West Asia is set to continue, the regional fault-lines only seem to be widening. Excerpts from a recent book by former diplomat, Talmiz Ahmad states, “After a hundred years, not a single Arab state provides for any modicum of popular participation in state decision-making. National financial accounts remain non-transparent and without accountability. Though oil wealth is depleting, its revenues are still used to back state efforts at co-option and coercion—the latter now becoming more open, more crude, more vicious… and more frequent”^[29]. Similar views were voiced by a former International Affairs Editor of Financial Times, stating “Arab despotism, far from being an effective barrier to Islamism, is an assembly line for manufacturing jihadi extremists. That is unlikely to change”^[30]. Conflicts rage unabated across the region in Iraq, Syria, Libya, Yemen, and Lebanon. Saudi Arabia, Iran, Turkey, UAE, and Israel are all active participants through proxy factions. Iran seems determined to go nuclear. West Bank, East Jerusalem and Gaza strip remain contentious with simmering tension, making the Palestine problem seem unresolvable. Russia has more or less steered clear of any intervention or military support in the region except for its support to the Assad Regime in Syria^[31]. After its bitter experience in Iraq and Afghanistan, US seem to be stepping back from its role as the prime security provider in West Asia. However, it retains military bases and significant capability in the region and continues to play an active role through proxies in almost every conflict in West Asia. Saudi Arabia remains a major US ally, especially against Iran. Iran remains isolated. Afghanistan and Pakistan reflect mirror image of the West Asian turmoil on the region’s Eastern periphery. Across its Western periphery, the situation in Libya is no different. West Asia remains a fertile ground for islamist terrorist groups like ISIS, ISIL, al Qaeda, Hamas, Hezbollah etc. Hidden under the affluence of the oil exporting West Asian countries is the discomforting fact that about 2/3rd of West Asia’s 325 million people lives in conflict ridden, dangerous and poverty-stricken areas straddling Iran, Iraq, Syria, Yemen, Lebanon and Palestine. West Asia has very little to offer in terms of human resource, infrastructure, technology, manufacturing or agriculture. As the world moves away from fossil fuel to clean energy, this void could increase West Asia’s woes. A Reuters report of 2015 quotes Mahmoud Solh of the International Center for Agricultural Research in the Dry Areas (ICARDA) stating “The Middle East currently imports about USD 35 billion of food annually, and this looks set to rise to USD 70 billion in two decades as climate change impacts crop yields and the population rises”^[32]. With large parts of the region reeling under severe humanitarian crisis and widespread poverty, millions have been internally displaced. Europe is struggling to cope with the prospects of huge refugee influx from West Asia. Much of Europe’s Eastern and Southern border has been turned into one “huge arc of crisis”^[33]. As far as United States is concerned, its remoteness from the region keeps it insulated from the fallouts, much like the position it enjoys in the ongoing Ukraine crisis in Europe.

West Asia is a significant source of remittance for countries like India. India’s ties with the region are long-standing. However, India is only beginning to explore West Asia’s huge ‘beyond oil’ bilateral trade potential, spread across IT products and services, pharmaceuticals, engineering goods, automobiles, footwear, tea, leather, agriculture & horticulture products, medicare, tourism and participation in infra projects by Indian companies^[34]. To exploit this potential, India will need to tide over constant turbulence caused by regional rivalries and global power-play in the region. The Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) signed in Feb 2022 with UAE is a good beginning in this regard. India is also beginning to attract significant investments from West Asia^[35].

Geopolitically, world’s focus has shifted to Ukraine and Europe. Even the humanitarian crisis in Afghanistan, Libya and Sri Lanka have fallen off the radar. While the oil exporting countries of West Asia are reaping benefits, Ukraine war has pushed the other countries in the region deeper into crisis. Poverty, food shortages and humanitarian crisis will only get worse for them in the days ahead. Rest of the world seems to have reconciled with a West Asia mired in perpetual conflict, as long as it does not exceed the low-grade threshold. Geopolitics may undergo major changes if China decides to assume a security provider’s role in the region. But China does not appear ready for it as yet. Iran may soon get pushed deeper into the eye of the storm. Having herded the hesitant and drifting NATO back into the stable and whipped it into a strengthened, cohesive military alliance, US may be tempted to turn NATO’s attention on Iran after cessation of Ukraine hostilities or after it ‘successfully’ degenerates into a simmering self-sustaining conflict. Whichever way, for West Asia, it is going to be business as usual with ‘conflicts and turmoil’.

Author Brief Bio: Lt Gen CA Krishnan, PVSM, UYSM, AVSM (Retd), is a former Deputy Chief of the Army and a former Member of the Armed Forces Tribunal. He has been on the Board of Directors of Bharat Electronics Ltd and Bharat Dynamics Ltd, two of India’s leading public sector undertakings manufacturing defence equipment. He is a prolific writer with numerous published articles on a wide variety of subjects like strategic issues, Rare Earths, Space mining, Energy etc.

References:

^[1]Thomas Herold in Economics, Investments, Trading, Financial Terms Library (https://www.financial-dictionary.info/terms/seven-sisters-oil-companies/)

^[2] (https://www.statista.com/topics/1830/opec/#topicHeader__wrapper)

^[3] Jason Fernando, International Energy Agency, 5 Feb 2021 (https://www.investopedia.com/terms/i/international-energy-agency.asp)

^[4] Andrew Beattie, Shale Oil vs Conventional Oil: What’s the Difference?

https://www.investopedia.com/articles/active-trading/051215/cost-shale-oil-versus-conventional-oil.asp

^[5] Jerry Robinson,The Rise of the Petrodollar System: “Dollars for Oil”, 23 Feb 2012, (https://www.financialsense.com/contributors/jerry-robinson/the-rise-of-the-petrodollar-system-dollars-for-oil)

^[6]  https://asianbankingandfinance.net/foreign-exchange/more-news/global-fx-market-daily-turnover-hits-66t-in-2020

^[7] Prof Noah Zerbe, (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jg3KOVOxN1Q)

^[8] https://www.investopedia.com/terms/p/petrodollars.asp

^[9] The Hindu, 1 Dec 2019 (https://www.thehindu.com/news/international/6-european-nations-join-iran-barter-system/article30131764.ece)

^[10] Biswajit Dhar, “Is increasing non-dollar trade a death knell for globalisation?, Money Control, 5 Apr 2022, (https://www.moneycontrol.com/news/opinion/is-increase-in-non-dollar-trade-a-death-knell-for-globalisation-8318831.html)

^[11] Anand Toprani, A Primer on the Geopolitics of Oil, 17 Jan 2019, (https://warontherocks.com/2019/01/a-primer-on-the-geopolitics-of-oil/)

^[12] https://www.iea.org/reports/global-energy-review-2019/natural-gas

^[13] The Takeaway: Ukraine War Worsens Middle East Oil Gap, Al Monitor, 20 Apr 2022 (www.al-monitor.com/originals/2022/04/takeaway-ukraine-war-worsens-middle-east-oil-gap)

^[14] Jonathan Marcus, “Why Saudi Arabia and Iran are bitter rivals”, BBC News, 16 Sep 2019, (https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-42008809)

^[15] Department Press Briefing 31 May 2022, (https://www.state.gov/briefings/department-press-briefings-may-31-2022/)

^[16] https://currentaffairs.adda247.com/sipri-report-india-emerges-as-largest-importer-of-arms/

^[17] Global Fire Power, (https://www.globalfirepower.com/countries-comparison-detail.php?form=form&country1=saudi-arabia&country2=iran&Submit=COMPARE)

^[18]“Saudi Arabia will develop nuclear weapons if Iran does”,Reuters, 15 March 2018, (https://www.reuters.com/places/mexico/article/us-saudi-iran-nuclear/saudi-crown-prince-says-will-develop-nuclear-bomb-if-iran-does-cbs-tv-idUSKCN1GR1MN)

^[19] Yemen Crisis Explained, UNHCR, (https://www.unrefugees.org/news/yemen-crisis-explained/#When%20did%20the%20crisis%20in%20Yemen%20begin?)

^[20] Why has the Syrian War Lasted 11 Years?, BBC News, ( https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-35806229)

^[21] https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/international/world-news/mideast-in-shambles-but-the-world-has-moved-on-for-now/articleshow/86448806.cms

^[22] World Bank Press Release, 30 May 2022, (https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2022/05/30/lebanon-has-lost-precious-time-urgent-action-needed-now)

^[23] Connor Dilleen, Turkey’s Dam-Building Could Create New Middle East conflict, Maritime Executive, 6 Nov 2019, (https://www.maritime-executive.com/editorials/turkey-s-dam-building-could-create-new-middle-east-conflict#:~:text=Twenty%2Dtwo%20dams%20are%20slated,supplies%20in%20Turkey’s%20southern%20neighbours.)

^[24] Cynthia Chung, “West Asia Transforms: Twenty Arab States in China’s BRI sights”, 26 Jan 2022, (https://thecradle.co/Article/investigations/6144)

^[25] Zvi Mazel, “China’s Growing Economic Impact on the Middle East”, Economy, 21 April 2022, (https://www.gisreportsonline.com/r/china-middle-east/ )

^[26] Debbie Mohnblatt, “China seeks Silk Road Revival through heavy investment in Middle East”, The Jerusalem Post, 1 May 2022, (https://www.jpost.com/middle-east/article-705616)

^[27] China’s Growing Role in the Middle East, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 11 May 2022, (https://carnegieendowment.org/2022/05/11/china-s-growing-role-in-middle-east-event-7874)

^[28] Jeffrey Feltman et al. “The new geopolitics of the Middle East: America’s role in a changing region”, (https://www.brookings.edu/research/the-new-geopolitics-of-the-middle-east-americas-role-in-a-changing-region/)

^[29] (https://thewire.in/books/book-excerpt-the-diverse-forces-shaping-west-asia-and-the-implications-for-india)

^[30] David Gardner, “Autocracy has filled the ideological vacuum in the Middle East”, Financial Times, 28 Sep 2021, (https://www.ft.com/content/48d42014-2daa-4b0b-abd0-a6d2ffbfdf69)

^[31] Mark N Katz, “The Russian Approach to Middle East Conflicts and the Arab World”, IED Mediterranean Year Book 2016, (https://www.iemed.org/publication/the-russian-approach-to-middle-east-conflicts-and-the-arab-world/)

^[32] https://www.reuters.com/article/food-climatechange-mideast-idINL5N11G4AP20150911

^[33] The Economic Times,”Mideast in shambles, but the world has moved on for now”, 23 Sep 2021,(https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/international/world-news/mideast-in-shambles-but-the-world-has-moved-on-for-now/articleshow/86448806.cms?from=mdr)

^[34] Anubhav Gupta, “India’s Evolving Ties with the Middle East, Asia Society, 8 Aug 2019, (https://asiasociety.org/asias-new-pivot/india)

^[35]  (https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20220516-uae-to-invest-100bn-in-india/)

The on-going Ukrainian conflict since late February this year has major implications for China as with many countries in the world today. At stake for China are its assiduously built narratives on its “peaceful rise”, Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), “community of common destiny”, “multipolarity” but also to its regional dominance efforts and relations with the United States, European Union and others. Already affected by the debilitating novel Coronavirus that spread from Wuhan in late 2019 to the rest of China and the world, the Ukrainian conflict exposed China’s vulnerabilities. China’s short-term positions and long-term goals seems to be at complete variance.

The Russian invasion of Ukraine on February 24 came in the immediate aftermath of the conclusion of the Beijing Winter Olympics, attended by President Vladimir Putin and others, but also to the joint statement between China and Russia a day earlier to the sports event that stated to “no limits” to their strategic partnership and cooperation.^[1] Further, recently on June 16, President Xi had a telephonic conversation with President Putin, where the former stated that both “continue supporting each other on their respective core interests concerning sovereignty and security, as well as on their major concerns, deepening their strategic coordination”.^[2] This has led to speculations about China’s prior knowledge and compliance in the Russian war efforts, although denied by Beijing.

Since then, China is at pains to explain its position as “neutral” and “independent”^[3] and as the war began to take a heavy toll, China appears to have been increasingly isolated at the regional and global level – a prospect not in tune with Deng Xiaoping’s injunctions a few decades ago. Beijing abstained from the United Nations and its bodies, the Security Council, General Assembly and Human Rights Council discussions and criticism of the Russian actions in Ukraine. China stated it is for dialogue among the warring parties, ceasefire and humanitarian relief measures, even though it took an anti-US position all along. However, none of Beijing’s painstaking efforts seems to be working in its favour.

China’s position is stated to be neutral but in fact closer to that of Russia in the “united front” evolved with Moscow since 2001 against the United States in the “multipolarity’ domain. Even while China is dependent on the US and its military allies on economic and technological assistance for China rise, Beijing had crafted a policy of opposing politically the US in conjunction with Russia since 2001. Following Russian Premier Primakov’s suggestion in the late 1990s for “multipolarity”, China jumped into forming an “united front” with Moscow. Both have opposed the expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), were critical of the “coloured revolutions” as an imposition of one-set of political values on other countries, criticised the US formulation of “pre-emptive strike” strategy as unilateral in nature, and military action in Iraq and Afghanistan as violation of the UN Charter. China also expressed concerns on the US “pivot” and then “strategic rebalance” towards the Indo-Pacific region and strengthening of alliances as major challenge.

China had aligned with Russia^[4] on the NATO expansion theme since the beginning of the war in Ukraine. Beijing had questioned recently the very existence of the NATO after the Soviet disintegration. It had expressed concern on the NATO declaration at its 50th anniversary in 1999 on intervention in the internal affairs of other countries based on ethnic and religious issues and drew inferences to possibilities of such actions on Xinjiang and Tibet. It also expressed concern on NATO’s 70^th anniversary declaration in London in December 2019 that China is an opportunity but also a challenge. Even though this “London Declaration” of the NATO mentioned its primary challenges emanating from Russia, terrorism, migration and cyber domains, for the first time it also stated: “We recognise that China’s growing influence and international policies present both opportunities and challenges that we need to address together as an alliance”. NATO chief General Jens Stoltenberg said that “we must find ways to encourage China to participate in arms control arrangements”. He also said the alliance needed to start taking “into account that China is coming closer to us.” He observed: “We see them in the Arctic, we see them in Africa, we see them investing heavily in European infrastructure and of course investing in cyberspace.”  The NATO declaration also suggested to building “secure and resilient” telecommunications infrastructure in the light of China’s Huawei bidding for the 5G communications in Europe. Certain NATO members like Italy and Greece joining China’s BRI and the establishment of EU-17+1 or “Cooperation between China and Central and Eastern European Countries” posed concerns for the unity of the European Union members. China’s challenges were seen mainly in financial investments and technology, securing telecommunications infrastructure security including in the 5G; differences on some European countries joining China led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and the BRI.

In June 2022, Australia, Japan, New Zealand and South Korea were invited to the NATO-G7 meetings. In this context, NATO Secretary General Stoltenberg stated that “China poses some challenges to our values, our interests, and our security”.^[5] Several Chinese analysts viewed this as posing challenge to China in the coming years. China’s foreign ministry spokesman Wang Wenbin said that “NATO has already disrupted stability in Europe. It should not try to do the same to the Asia-Pacific and the whole world.”^[6]

However, on the other hand, during the Russian war on Ukraine, China’s discourse mainly touched upon how the NATO is divided by the US and on how it will be dissipated soon. Such rhetoric came from China without assuaging the feeling in the EU on China’s own actions in the European region. Despite the telephonic or virtual conversations that China’s President Xi Jinping conducted with Germany, France and other countries, EU members unity and solidarity in the NATO surprised China.

China’s stance on the war in Ukraine is undergoing a slow but definitive change. This is in the background of a number of domestic and external developments of China that it is concerned with. The war in Ukraine had threatened to unleash political factional struggles in the communist party as it is heading for its 20^th national congress this November. For President Xi, who is seeking a third term at the party congress, Ukraine crisis poses challenges.

Secondly, Ukraine crisis is threatening to upset energy prices across the world, and with China as the largest energy guzzler in the world, the costs are exorbitantly high. Even though China had increased its energy imports from Russia, the overall “sustainability and affordability” of the energy conundrum pose concerns for China’s economy.

Thirdly, Russia-Ukraine spat is threatening to disrupt the food supply chains on which China is also heavily dependent. China did create food reserves at Dalian but the future is uncertain as inflation is increasing. Already China’s staple food – pork – is off the shelf for millions of Chinese and the discontent is spreading.

Fourthly, China is in the forefront of critiquing the debilitating western sanctions on Russia in the aftermath of the war on Ukraine. In the backdrop of the Trump Administration’s tariff-wars and restrictions on China’s telecommunications companies in the US market, the ominous signals are clear for Beijing. If China is the next candidate for attracting western sanctions, then the country’s economy, that already took a beating with Covid-19 supply chain disruptions and domestic policies of “common prosperity” restrictions on businesses, is expected to suffer lower than estimated growth rates. With unemployment rising in China, this is expected to create further challenges to the party-state.

These concerns are reflected in President Xi addressing the Bo’Ao Forum on April 25 when he said that as the Ukraine crisis escalates “geopolitical factors are encumbering global economic recovery and further disrupting the global development cause; developing countries are bearing the brunt of the effects”.^[7] Further, President Xi addressing the 14^th BRICS business forum stated that the “Ukraine crisis has again sounded the alarm for humanity”.^[8] However, the BRICS joint statement the next day was mild in its tone, underlining the common minimum understanding between the five countries that form the grouping. For instance, on June 23, the 14^th BRICS virtual summit meeting joint statement pointed out that “We support talks between Russia and Ukraine. We have also discussed our concerns over the humanitarian situation in and around Ukraine and expressed our support to efforts of the UN Secretary-General, UN Agencies and ICRC to provide humanitarian assistance.”^[9]

China’s Narrative

China had tried to communicate to the world its position on Ukraine in vain. On May 16, Yang Jiechi, the Politburo member and former foreign minister said – “We have stepped up our holistic approach to the Ukraine crisis, explained our clear policy stance based on the merits of the matter, played an independent and constructive role, proposed ways to resolve the crisis, put forward China’s initiative on preventing a humanitarian crisis in Ukraine, and debunked and rebutted the various wrongful rhetoric and unfounded accusations against China.”^[10] Further, commenting on the US Deputy Secretary of State Wendy Sherman’s statement, China’s foreign ministry spokesman Zhao Lijian said on April 22 that “China’s position on the Ukraine issue is above board, just, objective and beyond reproach”.^[11] No clarifications, however, were provided in this regard.

So far, China’s dominant narrative in the Ukraine crisis has revolved around two inter-related aspects—a critique of the US policies and that of the NATO expansion,^[12] with the latter seen as impacting on the Asian region in the near future. China’s position in this regard is contradictory and clumsy in nature. On the one hand, Beijing is dependent on the US and its allies for its own rise as discussed since Deng Xiaoping-Jimmy Carter interactions in 1979. On the other hand, China sees the US as a threat to its ambitions to dominate Asia. That is, China is involved in a major critique of the US despite enjoying warm relations under the G-2 format for long. By critiquing the US, China is also indirectly pursuing the “united front” with Russia, even though primarily Beijing’s efforts are to stave off any western sanctions on China.

The ire of China is directed against the US in the Ukraine crisis. In fact, Zhong Sheng, a pen name used by People’s Daily, criticised the US as the “initiator”^[13] of the Ukraine conflict but has not provided refuge to the Ukrainian refugees. For another commentator Ye Zhu, it is the US “instigation” of Ukraine that the conflict between Russia and Ukraine are to be traced.^[14] Chen Zi’s observations are similar – that the US “added further fuel for fire” by supplying arms to Ukraine.^[15] A commentator Gao Ge, writing in the People’s Daily on April 26, 2022 stated that Ukraine war is a result of the NATO expansion under the US “planning” and reflects to its creating “controllable chaos” and “the U.S. hegemony is the fuse for global instability and the U.S. is the largest perpetrator of turmoil in the world.”^[16] In another commentary on April 24, Gao castigated the US for profiting from the Ukraine war.^[17]

China’s analysts’ critique is also about the NATO/EU. According to Zhang Jian, Russia-Ukraine war had exposed the fragile security system of Europe.^[18] With innumerable problems surfacing since February this year, it would be hard for Europe to cope up with the situation, leading to its polarisation. Responding to British Foreign Secretary Liz Truss’s criticism of China’s role in the Ukraine crisis, China’s foreign ministry spokesman Wang Wenbin questioned “NATO has messed up Europe. Is it now trying to mess up the Asia-Pacific and even the world?”^[19] Zhang Jun, China’s permanent representative to the UN stated “Clinging to the anachronistic doctrine of security and keen to provoke bloc confrontations and create tensions in Europe and even the Asia Pacific region and the wider world, such practices as harmful to others as they are deleterious to the perpetrators themselves, and deserve nothing less than China’s firm opposition”.^[20] With Finland and Sweden approaching the NATO for membership, Chinese scholars termed this move as further threatening “the sustainable security of Europe”.^[21]

China’s criticism of the US/NATO is also rooted in recent history, specifically the Chinese remind the NATO of the Chinese Embassy bombing incident at Belgrade in 1999.^[22] However, this is a complex issue with reports of Chinese defence attaché’s office providing vital intelligence to the Yugoslavians in lieu of securing downed stealth bomber parts. China could have been more transparent on this issue to remove the cobwebs.

Opportunities & Challenges

Despite the overall negative and fragmented approaches of China on the Ukraine crisis, it also sees the situation providing an opportunity. China’s assessment, after the inability of Russia to clinch the matter quickly in Ukraine, is that it needs to strengthen its “narrative power” and provide something concrete to the global and regional communities. One of the major exercises that China conducted is to showcase its new “Global Security Initiative”. President Xi unveiled “Global Security Initiative” at Bo’Ao Forum on April 21 that possibly includes all that China has been dishing out on the security issues, viz., “common, comprehensive, cooperative and sustainable security; respecting the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all countries, uphold non-interference in internal affairs, and respect the independent choices of development paths and social systems made by people in different countries; abiding by the purposes and principles of the UN Charter, reject the Cold War mentality, oppose unilateralism, and say no to group politics and bloc confrontation;  committed to taking the legitimate security concerns of all countries seriously; committed to peacefully resolving differences and disputes between countries through dialogue and consultation” and others.^[23]

Laudable these may be, Xi did not mention whether the principles of the UN Charter were violated in Ukraine or whether even after 15 rounds of Corps Commanders meeting to resolve “all friction points” in Aksai Chin-Ladakh region the post-Galwan situation is resolved peacefully and the sovereignty and territorial integrity of India is respected.

Despite these contradictions in statement and practice, China’s leaders have called their counterparts across the world – especially European leaders – to convince them of China’s “peaceful” intentions. China also expressed its willingness to mediate between warring states. President Xi spoke to the German Chancellor on May 11 to underline the close partnership between them and remind them of the business partnerships and inter-dependence.^[24] He also spoke to French President Macron on May 11 stressing both countries “independence” posture in foreign policies.^[25] As the French have been critical of some American policies, Xi possibly is extending the time-tested “united front” tactics. On May 13, foreign minister Wang Yi spoke to his Danish counterpart on the Ukrainian conflict underlining commercial links.^[26]

On the other hand, several challenges are posed for China in the wake of the Ukraine crisis. In addition to those enumerated above, China is seriously considering the negative fallout of the war on its image. Already due to Covid-19, a majority of the public opinion polls have expressed their negative perceptions of China where the virus originated. However, the most critical factor is that of the spillover effect of the sanctions on China. Liu Kun, China’s finance minister, speaking at the G-20 meeting stated that “China is against politicizing and weaponizing the global economy”.^[27] Another commentator Zhao Wenzai wrote in the People’s Daily that the US, by imposing sanctions on Russia, is practicing “financial terrorism” in Ukraine.^[28]

Finally, it is speculated that one of the major casualties of the Ukraine crisis domestically is possibly the demotion of Vice Foreign Minister Le Yucheng, a former ambassador to India. Le, who was tipped to replace foreign minister Wang Yi next March, was sent as a deputy overseeing radio and TV broadcasting agencies.^[29] It was reported that he was instrumental in ushering the “no limits” partnership with Russia in February. Earlier, Le Yucheng, addressing a think-tank forum meeting on May 7, criticised those who castigate China for the developments in Ukraine. Le said that the “no limits” statement in Sino-Russian joint statement is for the current and future scenarios.^[30]

Author Brief Bio: Prof. Srikanth Kondapalli is Dean of School of International Studies at Jawaharlal Nehru University.

References:

^[1] https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russia-china-tell-nato-stop-expansion-moscow-backs-beijing-taiwan-2022-02-04/

^[2] http://en.people.cn/n3/2022/0616/c90000-10110228.html

^[3] https://thediplomat.com/2022/06/what-zhong-sheng-says-about-chinas-perceptions-of-the-ukraine-conflict/

^[4] https://www.aisixiang.com/data/131869.html

^[5] https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202206/1268916.shtml

^[6] http://en.people.cn/n3/2022/0624/c90000-10114232.html

^[7] http://en.people.cn/n3/2022/0425/c90000-10088738.html

^[8] https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202206/22/WS62b2f6f3a310fd2b29e67ee9.html

^[9] http://en.people.cn/n3/2022/0624/c312369-10114254.html

^[10] http://en.people.cn/n3/2022/0516/c90000-10096955.html

^[11] http://en.people.cn/n3/2022/0423/c90000-10087921.html

^[12] https://www.aisixiang.com/data/131866.html

^[13] http://en.people.cn/n3/2022/0409/c90000-10081873.html

^[14] http://en.people.cn/n3/2022/0511/c90000-10095080.html

^[15] http://en.people.cn/n3/2022/0510/c90000-10094520.html

^[16] http://en.people.cn/n3/2022/0426/c90000-10089467.html

^[17] http://en.people.cn/n3/2022/0424/c90000-10088344.html

^[18] http://en.people.cn/n3/2022/0510/c90000-10094388.html

^[19] http://en.people.cn/n3/2022/0429/c90000-10090809.html

^[20] http://en.people.cn/n3/2022/0506/c90000-10092947.html

^[21] http://en.people.cn/n3/2022/0513/c90000-10096092.html

^[22] http://en.people.cn/n3/2022/0507/c90000-10093385.html

^[23] http://en.people.cn/n3/2022/0423/c90000-10088023.html, http://en.people.cn/n3/2022/0607/c90000-10106565.html and http://en.people.cn/n3/2022/0524/c90000-10100700.html

^[24] http://en.people.cn/n3/2022/0512/c90000-10095613.html

^[25] http://en.people.cn/n3/2022/0511/c90000-10094839.html

^[26] http://en.people.cn/n3/2022/0513/c90000-10096130.html

^[27] http://en.people.cn/n3/2022/0422/c90000-10087424.html

^[28] http://en.people.cn/n3/2022/0422/c90000-10087653.html

^[29] https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3182517/does-chinas-demotion-its-deputy-foreign-minister-signal

^[30] http://en.people.cn/n3/2022/0507/c90000-10093271.html

Gaurie Dwivedi

In India, there is a great deal of focus on the Indo-Pacific and more specifically on the Quad. How does the US view the Indo-Pacific and the role that India should play, both in the region and in the Quad?

Walter Russell Mead

What we’ve had now, I think every president from Barack Obama to Joe Biden has said in public that the Indo-Pacific is the centre of American foreign policy and national security concern. And that’s true, both from an economics perspective and from a security perspective. So, I don’t think there’s any doubt that when different politicians from such different parties, agree on this basic thing, I think we can say, for America, the Indo-Pacific really does matter. Within the Indo-Pacific, there is simply no doubt that because of its population, because of its technological accomplishments, because of its economy, because of its standing in the region, there’s really no one like India. I personally spend a lot of time working on American foreign policy talking to people in the US. I don’t know anybody who really disagrees with the idea that the relationship with India is central to the future of American foreign policy.

Gaurie Dwivedi

Irrespective of the multiple noises that come from Washington, some going two steps forward, some going three steps backward, do you think that hurts the common objective, which is to have this region being free and fair?

Walter Russell Mead

The United States and India are both democracies, and cacophony and democracy are closely related. And certainly, I could read the Indian press and see lots of comments about the United States and the difficulties of working with the United States. And I know very well there could be an election in India and a different party with a different attitude might form a government. So, this is just the way it is, when democracies work together. India has, in some ways, a problem with some of the Human Rights communities in the United States. There is a sort of a unique Indian dimension to this, which is that there are some countries where the political right and the human rights groups on the right in the US are very upset, and then others on the left, they’re very upset too. In the US, the Democrats look at some of the communal questions in India; they feel a link with the Muslim community in India and so you get a lot of human rights agitation around that from the Democratic side. On the Republican side, we get voices which are supportive of the Christian communities in India. The politician, when with such groups, will voice their support as they do not lose anything by taking the stand. This is a factor in Congress. Even with Israel, we can sometimes see the opposition to things that happen with the Palestinians or whatever. The US and the Congress will take a stand or the President will take a stand. But it doesn’t change the fact that US has a relationship with Israel and Israel is a very important ally. But yes, sometimes the Human Rights types issues, whether they are right or wrong, do get into the mix. But then, again, I think it’s true that in India too, you have political groups that have a very strong opinion about something and it can affect Indian foreign policy because it affects Indian politics.

Gaurie Dwivedi

You talk of how central identity politics is becoming a part of national discourse and hence impacting foreign policy. How do you see that shaping the foreign policy of India and the region as well, because, you know, there’s a lot of churns that is going on in the region itself? There have been elections that are trade regime changes that are happening. How do you see that?

Walter Russell Mead

If you think about India’s region, we see Pakistan where, who knows what’s going to be happening there? I think the only thing safe to say that at the end the army will be in charge the army and ISI will be in charge. Fortunately, in Bangladesh we see a fairly good situation, but in Myanmar, there is a civil war going on. There are also issues with respect to both Sri Lanka and Nepal. So, we can see that there is instability in the region. India, in that sense, I think because it has a flourishing democracy and for that matter-Bangladesh too, has some insurance against these problems because they can be vented in the political system and people can have an election. In other places, that’s more difficult.

India, in particular, I think is going through a profound historical stage, where for the most of the early decades of India’s history, the Congress Party was in charge and it had a certain vision of India. And it projected that vision to the rest of the world as being what India was. But clearly, not everybody in India has shared that vision of what India should be. And now with the BJP rising over many years, India has changed or at least Indian politics have changed. That creates a change and anytime there’s change, it affects international relationships, too, because everyone got used to one kind of India. Now we have another kind of India and we’re all curious. What does it mean? Where’s it going? This was a big change. Are there more big changes ahead? What will they be? What will be the good consequences and the bad consequences? So, that inevitably comes into Indian Foreign Policy too. It comes into the way the press covers India, I think because many American correspondents, people and diplomats, all knew the old India. They had trusted friends and sources, all of whom were connected to the Congress dominated era. So, when these people are politically unhappy with the current state of affairs, their journalist friends in America hear that from these well-informed people who have been in charge of many things and who they’ve known for many years and who, on a personal level they trust. So, we can see that the impact this change in Indian politics creates. As a result, all kinds of adjustments are happening across the world around it.

Gaurie Dwivedi

But you know, this assertive national identity comes at a time when you have a very aggressive China. As we speak, there have been reports about growing Chinese influence in the Solomon Islands. China is also now going to probably utilizs the flux in Sri Lanka to its advantage. So, at a time like this when China is the predominant threat in the region, do you think it’s important now, for the Quad member nations to be having a more assertive policy and roadmap to dealing with China?

Walter Russell Mead

I absolutely do. I thought the last Summit meeting of the Quad in Tokyo was a really positive thing. It felt to me as if all four of those leaders were making strong commitments. Everyone seemed to be aware of the danger; everyone seemed to be concerned. It was nice to see that even though Australia had just had an election and a new government had been formed, there was continuity in Australian foreign policy on this issue, despite, historically, the Labor Party being less hawkish in some ways, on China.

Gaurie Dwivedi

How would you visualise or see this region, maybe a few years down the line? I ask you this because we are talking just months ahead of Xi Jinping’s possible coronation, as President for life, which, at this stage, looks set. There’s no way to know what’s going to happen. But if that were to happen, then this region is probably going to see more intense geopolitical tensions.

Walter Russell Mead

I think that’s right. I think the big question is really Taiwan. And strategically, if China were to succeed in conquering Taiwan—invading and conquering it—not only would that be a terrible thing for the Taiwanese people, but it would mean that China has the capability to be able to cut Japan’s sea communications with the rest of the world. This would be a terrible danger for Japan. I think Japan would have to move toward China, would have to accommodate China in some way, sooner or later, if this happened. So, what happens in Taiwan is central to the future of the Quad and to this whole region. An Indian might say, well, Taiwan is really very far away. But you think about it.

Gaurie Dwivedi

For India, China has been assertive in Ladakh and Arunachal Pradesh? You know, a lot of people in India would say, that Taiwan matters, but so does Arunachal and Ladakh.

Walter Russell Mead

It does. And we have to think about Taiwan everywhere. Again, here’s something that I think India needs to think through and come to the United States with a very clear message. How does India want support from the United States on its frontier issues with China? Does India want American troops on the bay or on the frontier? Does it want a treaty so that America is legally obliged to come to India if it’s attacked; what is it that India wants? And that’s a question only India can answer. So far, I think the American understanding is that India prefers a friendship to a marriage—that, non-alignment is deep in Indian culture. There’s a concern about how a treaty relationship would bind India.

Gaurie Dwivedi

You are raising the questions which in fact are being raised in India as well, that if we are to be completely nonaligned, then how do we count our friends and enemies? How do we count our supporters? And if we want to be aligned, then how do we want our position to be in the world because you know, we are, if not a global pivot, a regional pivot on our own. This gets compromised if we become an alliance partner or a treaty partner. So these are tough questions.

Walter Russell Mead

It is tough, but an alliance with the United States is not the same as an alliance with China or Russia. Look at some of the European countries. Germany and France are in NATO, but Germany and France have a lot of freedom of action. I’m not trying to sell the treaty of alliance; I don’t have a view and a lot of people in America would question the deployment of American troops in the Himalayas. So, it would be controversial in the US as well. But it’s clear that both India and the United States need to think hard about where we stand with China, and what each of us needs from the other and what each of us can offer to the other. I think in both countries, people are looking at this much more deeply. I think probably the war in Ukraine is having an impact too, because Ukraine is a country that didn’t have treaty allies.

Gaurie Dwivedi

In fact, I was going to come to that. Just how much is Ukraine impacting the world equations right now? Many analysts have been saying that Ukraine has been given everything except for troops on ground and it has been able to fend against the Russian troops. That could be some sort of a lesson for China. Taiwan may not be the simple scoot in and invade model that China was hoping for. Do you see the similarities there? Or do you think we’re just trying to do a copy paste of a completely different model?

Walter Russell Mead

Well, they are different you know, there are different situations. Firstly, Russia currently has occupied 20% of Ukraine’s territory with huge consequences for people impacted by food shortages. In the last few days, Russia seems to have the momentum, which is why Finland and Sweden seem to have decided that they would like to join NATO having seen what happens if you’re not in NATO. So, it really depends on the nature of the threat and where you stand with regard to it. In the India-China border, the territories that China lays claims are remote and hard to access. Russia was able to attack Kyiv in the first few hours of the war. China couldn’t quite attack Delhi in that way. So, the cases are not exactly comparable also.

Gaurie Dwivedi
Ukraine and India are not comparable but on the issue of Ukraine I want to ask you this: in the initial weeks, even now in fact, until a few weeks back, many people in DC as well as analysts in Europe were deeply ‘disappointed’ by India’s position on Russia which is nuanced for many reasons, some historical, some military and off course, for following an independent foreign policy. Do you think that position has now been accepted, has been embraced and well understood?

Walter Russell Mead

I think well understood. I’m not sure of embrace. Embraced would be too strong a word.

Gaurie Dwivedi

The reason why I said embraced, is because then you can keep that in mind for future discussions. And because this is an evolving situation.

Walter Russell Mead

You see, I think, in the American context anyway, there was a sense during the Cold War that India tended to be more forgiving of Soviet behaviour than of American behaviour. So, in the Soviet invasions of Hungary and Czechoslovakia, India did not seem to feel a problem.  This was viewed by Americans as being more non-aligned against America than being non aligned equally with both. I, however have not studied the period and so I’m not going to come to any judgment there. But that is a perception—a pre-existing perception in American foreign policy, that this is the sort of thing India does. On the one hand, you’re less surprised when they do it. But on the other, people do wish India would somehow find a way to take a stronger stance.

Gaurie Dwivedi

And just on the side, the perception has also been built, because of-maybe as a consequence, or due to some other factors, such as the US-Pakistan relations have also been during the 60s, 70s, 80s. They were very, very good. And that also had an impact on how India had looked towards the US.

Walter Russell Mead

Of course, it did but I don’t think there are many people in India who think now that US-Pakistan relations are particularly good.

Gaurie Dwivedi

I think that that is behind us. I’m going to ask you two last questions on trade, a subject that’s close to my heart as well. There has not been enough discussion about just how much China has been given a free ride. There are still many people in the business community who feel that you cannot take back some of those concessions because it impacts everybody. We are part of this one big global interconnected economy. And we all stand to benefit from a cheaper destination. Do you share that view? And how optimistic are you that the ruptures that have been made in the global supply chain will benefit countries like India and America permanently?

Walter Russell Mead

Well, it’s clear that the situation, among other things, both the pandemic and the war in Ukraine, have taught a lot of people the lesson that you need to think about your supply chain. You can’t just take it for granted that at the moment you need something it’s going to be right there. And if you need two of them, they’ll be right there. But this is not about statecraft or, you know, security policy. It’s just simply, if you want to run a company and you want to be able to sell cars, you need to make sure that politics is not going to interfere with your ability to do that. Well, so what do you do? You look for places to invest where you don’t see political problems, and you also want to have more than one place one factory in one country. You want to diversify. So, in that sense, I do think that lots of people now understand that they need to diversify their supply chain. And this would not just be America. I think Japan has about 90% exposure to China. So, for Japan, when it looks to diversify, Vietnam is the most obvious close destination, followed by Philippines and maybe Indonesia. And India too is a very natural destination. So this is not simply about the bilateral US-India relationship. And it’s also not simply about governments telling people what to do and what not to do. This is common sense business. And I do think it’s interesting to me, the India seems to be working on it and has already done great work on beginning to improve its infrastructure to make it easier for manufacturers to be here.

On labor law reforms, there has been a lot of discussion in India on how to allow different states to develop their labor codes so that they can take advantage of opportunities. And this strikes me as opening the door to India having more manufacturing. I also believe that building up the manufacturing economy is really important for India, for poverty reduction and social justice. While technology is wonderful, it tends to favour people who are extremely well educated and often fluent in English, to be ready for that global market. And not everybody in India has those advantages. Manufacturing is something you can do with a basic education. From a village you can do this. And so technology is the avenue for so many Indians to reach a global level of freedom and affluence and all these wonderful things. For a lot of Indians manufacturing really matters.

Gaurie Dwivedi

Yes, India needs both manufacturing as well as technology. On that note, last question I have to ask you this is news that comes out of the world’s second largest economy impacts everybody. And the economic parameters right now are not positive for China. There are about 340 million people in lock downs in 45 odd cities. Do you see that as a blip because of the multiple lock downs? Or do you see the slowing down as a slightly long-term trend that the world needs to adjust to?

Walter Russell Mead

Well, I do think you know, trees don’t grow to the sky, even in China. And China is not going to grow at 8% to 10% a year forever, especially if its economy depends on exports. Because, if you’re growing at 10%, and your market is growing at 3%, this cannot last. So, there is a built in obsolescence to the Chinese model. Also, clearly, China has the most massive economic bubbles we’ve seen in the history of the world—a real estate bubble. You drive through a city in China, and you’ll see these 17 storey apartment buildings, almost to the horizon and no one is living in any of them. And the country’s population is not growing, the country’s population is actually beginning to decline. So, when you think about all the banks that made the loans to those buildings, all the cities that have borrowed money to create the infrastructure that supports those buildings, it appears that a lot of China’s wealth is paper wealth. And we do know that the Chinese Communist Party is going to do everything in its power to keep those bubbles inflated. And they know they cannot do this forever. So, every now and then they come back and say that they must reform, they are going to tighten up the housing market, stop wasting money on infrastructure projects and rein in local government. But when they start doing all those things, the stock market goes down and the growth rate goes with it. So they go back to pumping everything up. And they’ve been trapped in that cycle for a long time. I don’t know how this ends. What is happening in China has never happened before on this scale. The person who tells you that they know what’s going to happen next in China is either a prophet or an idiot. And there are more idiots than there are prophets.

Brief Bios:

• WALTER RUSSELL MEAD is James Clark Chace Professor of Foreign Affairs and Humanities at Bard College, Ravenel B. Curry III Distinguished Fellow in Strategy and Statesmanship at Hudson Institute, and the Global View columnist at The Wall Street Journal.
• Ms Gaurie Dwivedi is a senior journalist, columnist and author of the book ‘Blinkers Off, How Will The World Counter China’.

Dedicated to the fallen IPKF Heroes and the IPKF Veterans

The Indo – Sri Lanka Accord

In 1987 the Indian political scene was in turbulence. There were vague accusations against the Government on defence purchases. In Tamil Nadu, a hue and cry was being raised against the atrocities being committed by the Sri Lankan military on the hapless Tamil population in Sri Lanka, and the Tamil Nadu government was demanding Indian intervention to ensure the safety and security of Sri Lanka’s Tamil population.

At that time, Sri Lanka’s population of approximately 21 million, consisted of 75% Sinhalese, 18% Tamils (12% Sri Lankan Tamils and 6% Plantation Tamils) & 7% Tamil speaking Muslims. The Tamils were mainly located in the Northern and Eastern provinces except for the plantation Tamils who were concentrated in the highlands in the Central Provinces. The Northern Province consisted of 80% Tamil population, mainly concentrated around Jaffna City which was the Provincial Capital. Tamils constituted one-third of the population of Eastern Province along with one-third Sinhala & one-third Muslims (Moors).

With General Elections due in India in 1988, Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi was concerned about his party’s election prospects in Tamil Nadu. There was also concern that the movement for an independent Tamil homeland could spread to Tamil Nadu. Mr. Rajiv Gandhi hence decided to use India’s military force to coerce the President of Sri Lanka into signing the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord in July 1987.^[1] The Accord envisaged cease-fire between the belligerent parties, surrender of weapons by the armed Tamil militant parties, amendment of the Constitution of the Unitary State to create a federal structure thereby ensuring provincial autonomy for the Tamil majority Northern & Eastern Provinces. The Accord also envisaged India providing a peace keeping force if asked by Sri Lanka Government for accepting the surrender of weapons by the Tamil militants and for ensuring security in the two Provinces. The Sri Lanka Army was to be confined to barracks in the Northern & Eastern Provinces. The Accord also required the Indian Military Force to assist in the conduct of elections in the two Provinces after which the two Provinces would be merged into a single North-Eastern Province (NEP) resulting in a Tamil majority province. Thereafter, the Constitution of Sri Lanka would be amended by the 13th Amendment to create Sri Lanka as a federal political state which would give the Provincial Governments greater autonomy in governance; it was currently based on the British Westminster System which gave very little authority to the provinces.

Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi discussed this matter with the Indian Army Chief, Gen K. Sunderji who was himself a Tamil. Gen Sunderji belonged to a princely family of Travancore State and had been made an officer in the State Army at a very young age. On Travancore’s merger with India, its Army was merged with the Indian Army. Sunderji thereafter joined the Mahar Regiment and retained his original seniority, which put him in line to become Indian Army Chief at a later stage. When the Prime Minister asked his advice, Gen Sunderji assured him that the LTTE would be rounded up in a matter of weeks. But that assessment proved to be hopelessly off the mark. It took the Indian Army three years with over 1,200 killed and almost 7,000 wounded to restore order.

Growth of Tamil Militancy

LTTE in Sri Lanka is an example of a civil unrest and militancy transiting to insurgency and ultimately morphing into a terrorist organisation. The genesis of the movement lay in the grievances of the minority Tamils of deprivation and discrimination by the majority Sinhalas in Sri Lanka. The Tamils were seeking protection of their identity, language and areas of their habitation from the spread of massive Sinhala influx since 1956. The Tamil movement, starting with civil unrest, gradually escalated to open confrontation with the civil administration. The Sri Lanka response to this was to seek a military solution by launching military operation designated War of Liberation against the militant Tamil groups. The Tamil parties upped their demand to independence (Tamil Eelam) and a separate Tamil State. The main militant Tamil groups were LTTE, Tamil Eelam Liberation Organisation (TELO), People’s Liberation Organisation of Tamil Eelam (PLOTE), Eelam National Democratic Liberation Front (ENDLF) and Eelam People’s Revolutionary Liberation Front (EPRLF). Amongst the militant groups, the LTTE led by Prabhakaran achieved dominance. The ruthless action by the Sri Lankan military to isolate and starve out the Tamil areas in the Northern & Eastern Provinces led to large scale uprooting of Tamils. Over a hundred thousand fled to India in fishing boats and were housed in refugee camps in Tamil Nadu.

LTTE leader Prabhakaran was highly ambitious and ruthless and dreamt of becoming the sole arbiter of Tamil destiny. He wanted to settle for nothing less than an independent Tamil State in Sri Lanka. He systematically eliminated leaders of other insurgency groups and used this to strengthen his cult and the LTTE. The large influx and presence of Tamil refugees in Tamil Nadu which had a population of 45 million Tamils had serious implications for India. India decided to engage with Sri Lanka for a political resolution of the issue which culminated in the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord (ISLA). At the time of signing of the Accord, LTTE, PLOTE, TELO, ENDLF and EPRLF were the prominent insurgency groups. PLOTE, TELO, ENDLF and EPRLF accepted the Accord and surrendered their weapons. However, the LTTE refused to do so, which led to open conflict with the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF).

LTTE Organisational Structure

The LTTE group leaders were under Area Commanders and it was also effective in harnessing the seafaring traditions to form what was to become Women Sea Tigers. Women cadres came up formally in ground operations around 1988 onwards.

Prabhakaran was the Supreme leader. He was assisted by Anton Balasingham, political commissar, and a military council comprising of Mahendra Raja a.k.a. Mahathiya the second in command, Sathasivam Krishnakumar a.k.a. Kittu, Kumarappa in Jaffna, Pulendran (later Karuna) in the East and Pottu Amman (intelligence wing). The military council was assisted by Yogaratnam Yogi (political wing), Sornalingam a.k.a. Shankar (Air Wing), Sivanesan a.k.a. Soosai (Sea Tigers). The LTTE strength was assessed as 7,000 hard core fighters, 3,000 helpers (Pandiyan) and an indeterminate number of sympathisers. The group resorted to summary executions, burning people alive, and awarding death sentence for ordinary offences to keep both the civilian population and their rivals in check. Inability of other groups to challenge the LTTE was largely due to an absence of a charismatic leader and also due to internal power struggles within their organisations. The use of military force by the Sri Lankan government without a matching political strategy increased support for LTTE and its methods.

The LTTE financed their organisation through a variety of methods Chief among them were extortion of the shopkeepers, taxation of the Tamil population, looting banks and government treasuries and smuggling and trafficking of arms, people and drugs. They also resorted to hijacking of maritime traffic and received funds from the overseas Tamil diaspora sympathetic to their cause. Beginning from 1983 to 1897 almost all major extremist groups including LTTE had established overseas cells among Sri Lanka Tamil Diaspora particularly in London. They became a major source of support. The LTTE used the expertise among the diaspora for media management and providing real time information. It cultivated many other media persons for propaganda. It also cultivated low level government officials and political leaders overseas sympathetic to them by spending money.

Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF)

On the request of the Sri Lanka Government, India sent an infantry division to Sri Lanka in last week of July for overseeing the arms surrender process by the militants. While most militant groups complied with handing over their weapons, the LTTE refused to do so. The Division Commander was ordered by Delhi to use force to disarm them. The LTTE resorted to attacking the peace keepers. Taken by surprise the IPKF suffered large casualties and open fighting broke out between the IPKF and LTTE.

By the time India got involved, terrorist attacks by LTTE had been on the rise. Initially these attacks had been against the Sinhala population. However, early in 1987, LTTE leader Prabhakaran resorted to attacks on the other Tamil parties to wrest leadership of all Tamils in Sri Lanka. The ruthless methods of LTTE also instilled fear amongst the civilian Tamil population for obedience to the dictates of the LTTE leader Prabhakaran. After assessing the situation, the Indian Government, in consultation with the Sri Lanka Government decided that the LTTE would have to be forcibly disarmed and while doing so, the safety of the vast innocent civilians would also need to be protected against the murderous attacks on them by LTTE. Consequently, a force of five divisions (15 brigades & three para commando battalions (Special Forces) was built up in North & East Sri Lanka under a head quarter designated as HQ IPKF. In addition, para-military forces comprising one Assam Rifles battalion, two CRPF battalions, one CRPF Mahila (women) company and one TA battalion were also included. Ad-hoc complements of Indian Air Force & Indian Navy were also part of IPKF. I was appointed the Overall Force Commander of IPKF. This entailed a politico-military task. IPKF was involved in joint forces operations and in essence was a joint forces command without being designated so. This anomaly did create some problems in its operations which fortunately were overcome by personal interaction with the concerned Air Force and Naval Commands.

Prior to induction of IPKF, a civil war had been raging in Northern & Eastern Provinces. Many Tamil insurgent parties had sprung up, LTTE, EPRLF, TELO, EROS, NDLF etc. Of these the leader of LTTE, Velupillai Prabhakaran was the most cunning and ruthless. He proposed to the other Tamil party leaders to meet at Batticaloa in the Eastern Province to discuss their future plans. Most leaders complied; others sent their senior representative. Once they had assembled, Prabhakaran had all of them killed in cold blood by his LTTE cadres. From this time onwards Prabhakaran became the undisputed leader of the Tamil insurgency movement.

The Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) was inducted into Sri Lanka on 30 July 1987 initially in Jaffna which had almost 90% Tamils and was the strong-hold of the LTTE. They reacted violently and soon fighting broke out between the IPKF & LTTE. Initially, an infantry division had been inducted and the GOC (General Officer Commanding) of the division planned a surgical strike against LTTE leadership, who were reported to be meeting at their tactical headquarters in Jaffna University. The area around Jaffna University was crowded and there were only two open fields where heliborne troops could be landed in a night operation, a football field and a smaller playground; both surrounded by residential buildings. The GOC planned to land 120 para commandos of 10 Para Commando Battalion and 360 soldiers of 13 Sikh LI. On the night of 11 October, the first flight of two helicopters landed 40 para commandos on the football field. Almost immediately, they came under fire from surrounding buildings and even from tree tops. The LTTE had sophisticated radio equipment and they had broken into the IPKF frequencies and knew the attack was coming. That night, the helicopters could not land the entire assault force and only a total of 80 para commandos and 30 personnel of 13 Sikh LI managed to land. The troops on all sides were surrounded by the enemy and had to wait for morning before reinforcements could come in. The Sikh LI radio operator was killed immediately on landing and the platoon lost contact with the Division HQ. In the fog of battle the Sikh LI platoon got separated from the para commandos. Throughout the night they fought with depleting manpower and ammunition. By morning of 12 October, there were three soldiers left and had completely run out of ammunition. They fixed their bayonets and decided on one last charge against the enemy; only one man, Sepoy Gora Singh survived. He was wounded and was taken prisoner by the LTTE.

The men of 10 Para Commando had spread-out and gone after their original target – the LTTE leadership. Unable to locate the LTTE HQ and outnumbered they took up defensive positions in two single-storey buildings and for 18 hours they kept the numerically stronger LTTE at bay by preserving their ammunition and picking their targets judiciously. On the morning of 12 October, the CO of 10 Para Commando, Lt Col Dalbir Singh himself led the rescue mission with his remaining men and three T72 tanks. However, all the roads leading to the university had been mined and boobytrapped by the LTTE and the tanks found it difficult to advance. The tank commander, Maj Anil Kaul did something that the LTTE were least expecting; he took his tanks to the railway line that ran behind the university and drove on the rail track right up to the scene of battle. A little later, the rest of 13 Sikh LI along with 4/5 Gorkha Rifles broke through and took control of the area. The LTTE leader Prabhakaran was injured in the leg but fled moments before the IPKF troops entered. In this battle, 13 Sikh LI lost 29 brave soldiers. Maj Kaul was wounded in the battle and lost an eye. He was awarded the Vir Chakra for his gallant action.

There were rumblings of this debacle in the Parliament, and they were informed that an Overall Force Commander, Lt General Kalkat (I was promoted to Lt Gen) had been appointed to command the operations. The Indian PM was away at Vancouver to attend the CHOGM (Commonwealth Heads of Government Meet) and thereafter he was proceeding to Washington to address the US Congress. I was told that it would be a shame if Jaffna was not captured by the time the Indian Prime Minister was to address the US Congress. After all, India was a major Asian power with the third largest army in the world. Thus, my priority became capture of Jaffna.

After the Jaffna University debacle, Army HQ did a re-check and realised that the IPKF was undermanned, under equipped and over stretched. It needed more Infantry, T-72 tanks and amphibious armoured fighting vehicles (BMPs). Therefore, another airlift began with IL 76 & AN 12 aircraft; so heavy was the air traffic at Thambaram Airbase in Madras (Chennai) that the runway cracked. By end October, the IAF had flown 2200 transport and 800 helicopter sorties to ferry material and men for IPKF.

For the Indian soldiers, trying to bring peace in a foreign country was challenging. It was impossible to distinguish between LTTE cadres and Tamil civilians as the LTTE would often hide their weapon under the lungi (dhoti) and fire at the IPKF soldiers in crowded areas, then hide their rifle and melt away among the people. Anyone over the age of 10, male or female, could be an armed and deadly adversary.

I observed that all previous attempts to capture Jaffna had been by frontal attacks which involved fighting in highly built-up areas, involving house to house clearance, which resulted in heavy casualties to our troops. I therefore decided to launch only a feint frontal attack employing tanks and carryout a double envelopment with the infantry and attack Jaffna from the rear. The western force of the envelopment faced fierce opposition but ably led by Brig Manjit Singh they succeeded. In this action Maj Ramasamy Parameshwaran bravely fought his way and was killed in action. He was awarded the Param Vir Chakra posthumously, India’s highest award for conspicuous bravery above & beyond the call of duty. Brig Manjit Singh was awarded the Maha Vir Chakra. We captured Jaffna incurring much lesser casualties than would have resulted by the frontal approach. Mr Ronen Sen, who was the PM’s advisor on political affairs in the PMO was informed of the same on 26 October.

After capture of Jaffna Town the IPKF was assigned a new mission of conducting operations in the Northern & Eastern Provinces to bring them under IPKF control and to bring about normalcy so that elections could be conducted. For purpose of my operations, I divided the area into four sectors, each under an infantry division. The sectors were designated Northern (Jaffna Peninsula) Sector, Eastern Sector (Trincomalee District), Southern Sector (Batticaloa District), Central Sector (Vavuniya District). The sectors, conforming with the Sri Lanka administrative districts, helped coordination with the Sri Lankan Government. Language was a barrier between my soldiers and the civil population, so men from the Madras Regiment battalions were inducted and distributed to the other battalions.

At this stage the IPKF strength was about 80,000 personnel as under: –

Army

Divisional HQs: 4 (54, 4, 36 & 57)

Infantry Brigade: 15 (45 infantry battalions)

Para Commando battalions: 3

Mechanised Infantry battalions: 2

Armoured Regiment: 1

Navy

Naval Liaison Officer: 1 (Captain Rank)

Troops & Tanks Landing Ship 1; rest on as required basis

Civil shipping chartered by Indian Navy

Air Force

MI 8 Helicopter Squadron: 1

HIND Attack Helicopter detachment

AN 32 sqn: 1 (Medium carriage capacity)

IL76 det: Heavy Lift capacity

Para Military

Assam Rifles battalion: 1

TA battalion:1)

CRPF battalions: 2

Mahila (women) company, CRPF: 1

Others

DRDO: Communication Team

MEA: Political Advisor (1)

MHA: Political Advisors (2)

I & B Ministry: Doordarshan and AIR Team

P & T Dept: Telecom Detachment.

Indian Railways Team

Tamil Nadu State Electricity Board Team

Indian Red Cross Team

Maintenance of such a large force overseas was a gigantic problem; however, it was handled by the IPKF Brigadier in Charge Logistics, Brig N. K. Bahri, outstandingly. The two Provinces consisted of nearly 30% (18,000 sq km) of the total area of Sri Lanka (65,000 sq km). It became clear to me that due to the difficulty of identifying LTTE fighters from ordinary Tamils we would have to clear the area in a manner that the LTTE did not filter back. I was fighting with the caveat that innocent civilians, women and children must not be harmed. For this, the cleared areas would have to be kept sterile by sealing it with cordons. I therefore decided to operate from both flanks of each Province inwards clearing and sealing cleared areas step by step.  By following this method, we were able to drive the LTTE into the centre of each Province. The LTTE, finding themselves hedged in broke south-west into a dense jungle (forest) called Wani Jungles. It was a huge primary forest with tall trees and lot of foliage. The IPKF surrounded the Wani Jungle and isolated the LTTE from the rest of the population in the Northern & Eastern Province.

After hard fighting, the IPKF was able to wrest control of the Northern and Eastern Provinces. I found myself in the unenviable position of having to administer these Provinces comprising one-third of Sri Lanka. This meant catering for the daily life of the population. I appointed Town Commandants of Brigadier rank for Jaffna and Trincomalee. Police Service was non-existent to look after criminal activity and I asked the Indian Government for assistance. Two Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) battalions and much later a Mahila (women’s) company on my request were sent from India. To cater for electricity, staff from Tamil Nadu State Electricity Board was provided. For running the railway Tamil Nadu Railway TA company was sent. For the medical service the Indian Red Cross sent a detachment. I found myself involved in the political affairs in the two states for which the Indian Army is neither trained nor expected to do so. I asked for Indian Administrative Service (IAS) & Indian Foreign Service (IFS) officers. The IAS officers (2) were placed with the two Town Commandants, and I located the IFS officer with me as political advisor. The IFS officer fell ill due to the difficult environment and had to be evacuated to India; the IFS officers were not accustomed to living in harsh conditions and there were no takers for the job. On my persistence I was intimated that the First Secretary of the Indian High Commission in Colombo Mr Jai Shankar would act as my political advisor.

When the situation was under control, I informed both the Government of India and the Government of Sri Lanka that the conditions for conduct of election have been created and the elections may be ordered. A problem arose; there had been no census conducted for many years due to the prevailing insurgency situation prior to the arrival of IPKF and the electoral rolls had to be prepared for the election. I undertook to get it done along with the Sri Lankan Chief Election Commissioner and their Attorney General. With the help of the Sri Lanka Election Staff and my officers, we were able get the electoral rolls prepared. I had to visit Colombo often for this where I also met Mr Lalith Athulathmudali the Sri Lanka Foreign Minister. A brilliant person, he was also a Privy Counsellor of UK. He was a great help and guide.

The IPKF assisted the Government of Sri Lanka in the conduct of elections in the two Provinces without the LTTE being able to disrupt them. In many cases, IPKF secured the routes for voters from their home areas to the polling booths. The polling booths were guarded and the transportation of ballot boxes and polling staff by air and road transport was catered for. The elections were held successfully with 60% voting and consequently the Northern and Eastern Provinces were merged as one North Eastern Province (NEP) by the enactment of the 13^th Amendment to the Sri Lanka Constitution. A Tamilian Chief Minister Vardaraj Perumal of the EPRLF Party was sworn-in by President J. Jayawardene of Sri Lanka. I signalled to Delhi “Mission Accomplished; await further orders”. The response from Delhi was ‘IPFK to continue to assist the Provincial Government to establish firm roots.’ Indian Prime Minister wanted to meet the newly elected Chief Minister, so I had him flown to Delhi in IPKF aircraft. The Sri Lanka Government was not happy with this as they felt that India would control the North-Eastern Province by proxy. I feel this was a mistake on our part.

At this stage a high-level Sri Lanka delegation led by Gamini Dissanayake, a senior Cabinet Minister came to India and met Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi. I had also been called to attend it. Dissanayake conveyed satisfaction with the IPKF operations. He wanted the Sri Lankan Army to also participate with IPKF in the Eastern Province. Mr. Rajiv Gandhi asked my view on this request; I opposed it as it could end up in IPKF & Sri Lankan soldiers shooting at each other in the confusion of battle and the Prime Minister upheld my view. It later transpired that the Lankan interest in the Eastern Sector was that Trincomalee Coast sands had precious stones including their famous emeralds and they wanted to harvest them through their Army.

The elections had also enabled Sri Lanka to conduct its General Election and the result was that Mr Premadasa was elected the President of Sri Lanka, President Jayawardene having opted out. Sri Lanka has an Executive Presidency with the President having all the powers. At this stage, India’s High Commissioner, M. N. Dixit had a problem. He had been a very effective High Commissioner and had played a major role in drafting of the Indo – Sri Lanka Accord; he was jokingly referred to by his colleagues in the Foreign Ministry as India’s Pro-Consul in Colombo. The new President would not give time to present his credentials. Till the credentials are accepted, the envoy remains just an ambassador or High Commissioner in waiting. It was a polite message to India that President Premadasa did not want Mr Dixit as India’s High Commissioner. Delhi got the message and Dixit was replaced by L. N. Mehrotra whose credentials were promptly accepted by the Sri Lankan President. Mehrotra was a recognised linguist and well versed in Oriya language which is the grammar for Sinhala language.

At the Brink of War

Mr Premadasa had always been antagonistic to the Indo Sri Lanka Accord and as Prime Minister, he absented himself from Sri Lanka when the Accord was being signed, by planning a visit to Japan. In his election manifesto, he had stated that if elected President, he would expel the IPKF from Sri Lanka. Immediately after the election I got a call at my HQ in Trincomalee from the President’s office that the President was sending a letter for me by a special messenger. Meanwhile HC Mehrotra had been told of the contents of the letter by the President. He called me and said that the letter in essence was ordering IPKF out of Sri Lanka. If I did not vacate all my forces from the territory of Sri Lanka within 48 hours, he would declare IPKF an army of occupation and order his military to attack the IPKF. Mehrotra could not offer me any advice and I called Ronen Sen at the PMO which was my ‘ordered communication channel with Delhi on political matters’ and apprised him of the situation. He told me that ‘Boss-man is away campaigning’, and that he couldn’t offer any advice in this matter. I told him “In that case I will do what I have to do”.

I went to the airport to receive the President’s representative and as the plane from Colombo landed, out stepped the Sri Lanka Army Commander, Lt Gen Hamilton Wanasinghe. The SL Army Chief had the rank of Lt General as the rank of full General was held by the Chairman Joint Chiefs, Gen Cecil Ranatunga. Gen Wanasinghe was a good friend since we had been operating together and I had been to his house for dinner. He said ‘Amar, can we take a walk on the tarmac,’ so we walked together on the airfield. He said he was in a quandary; ‘his President had ordered him to serve me an ultimatum for IPKF to leave the shores of Sri Lanka within 72 hours and if we did not do so he will declare IPKF an army of occupation and order his forces to attack it.’ He asked me what should he do?

“You should obey the orders of your President,” I told him.

“If I do so, what will you do?” he asked.

“I will do what I must do; fight to defend my mandate, my soldiers and equipment. It could have unpredictable consequences,” I told him.

He said nothing more and left for Colombo without handing me the letter from the President. Mark Tully, the BBC Correspondent for South Asia had got a whiff of what was happening from his contacts in Colombo. He chartered a special plane and flew into Trincomalee. When I got back to my HQ I saw Mark Tully there, inquisitive as ever. I called my Chief of Staff, Lt Gen N. K. Kapoor and told him in the hearing of all what had transpired and asked him to take down my orders. I dictated; in case we are attacked by the Sri Lankan Forces, we will not only fight them but will also target the source of their origin. I ordered 57 Division in the North to be prepared to attack southwards and to capture Anuradhapura which was close to Colombo; 36 Division in Trincomalee to attack Westwards across the Provincial boundary and join up with 57 Division at Anuradhapura. Further objective and orders will be given later. The inference was obvious; Colombo would be the next objective. The Sri Lanka Army Liaison Officer who was attached with my HQ as per protocol was also present and soon after I finished, he quietly slipped out of my HQ and ran to the nearest telephone. As a precautionary measure I had ordered a Combat Command to take positions at the entry of the road leading to the Eastern Province from Sri Lankan controlled territory. Our T 72 tanks make a frightening sight. Sri Lanka responding likewise lining up their armoured cars which of course were no match for the T 72 tanks.

Consequently, President Premadasa changed his strategy for getting rid of the IPKF. He secretively contacted the LTTE leadership and asked Prabhakaran to send his representative to Colombo to meet him. Prabhakaran sent his ideologue Anton Balasingham who was based in London and Mahatya his military commander. President Premadasa made-up with the LTTE leaders and commenced giving them arms and ammunition to fight the IPKF. The LTTE happily joined up. President Premadasa thought that after the IPKF left his Army could then take on a considerably weakened LTTE as a result of IPKF operations, while Prabhakarn was sanguine that he could defeat the Sri Lankan military if the IPKF was not around. I came to know of these goings on as a result of an IPKF patrol intercepting a LTTE cadre. The LTTE had the practice of getting everything on record and they had secretly video-taped the meeting with President Premadasa; this LTTE cadre was carrying the video tape towards the coastline for conveying it to Prabhakaran hiding in the Wani Jungle. I immediately sent the video tape to Delhi. I also had reports of Sri Lankan helicopter landings in the Vavuniya Area in Central Sri Lanka where arms & ammunition had been delivered to the LTTE. In fact, a Sri Lanka officer, Brigadier Kobe Koduwa had been seen present. He appears to have been appointed the liaison officer for the LTTE.

At this stage, India’s Prime Minister intervened and sent his Principal Advisor Mr Deshmukh to meet the Sri Lankan President. I was also present at this meeting. It was decided that India would withdraw the IPKF from Sri Lanka. President Premadasa made full use of this meeting by leaking to the media that this meeting was regarding the withdrawal of the IPKF from Sri Lanka. He ensured that all newspapers and its sole TV Channel carried it in headlines. In fact, he got the newspapers in Colombo carry the headline “Gen Kalkat in Colombo to finalise IPKF withdrawal”. At least I made the headlines in some country! Mindful of the US and Russian withdrawals from Vietnam and Afghanistan respectively, I insisted that with a force of nearly 80,000 I will do so on my time frame and in phases. This was agreed to by all parties. I set 30 September 1990 as the date by which the withdrawal of IPKF was to be completed. In the event, we completed the withdrawal on 23 September, a full week ahead of schedule. I was the last IPKF person to leave the shores of Sri Lanka. The Sri Lankan government gave me a ceremonial send-off, replete with a ‘guard of honour’. The Sri Lanka Defence Secretary was present to see me off. Many quipped that he had been sent by President Premadasa to confirm that I had really left! During the last phase of my withdrawal, as a precautionary measure, I had our Aircraft Carrier Forces standing by, in case Sri Lanka reneged on its agreement.

Lessons

Some important lessons of India’s military intervention in Sri Lanka are as under:

• In securing the Accord, the MEA overlooked the first principle of Intervention; In Civil unrests most conflicts have a political dynamic and ultimately require a political resolution. It is only the government of a country that can give political dispensation to its citizens, not an outside power.
• Before intervening in such conflicts, the intervening country must ensure that the political commitments are guaranteed by the host government. If the host government thereafter reneges on its commitments the only alternative left would be resort to ‘regime change,’ which seldom works. US learnt this in Afghanistan and
• Managing domestic public opinion is critical. This was very well managed by the Indian Government and it ensured that there was no spillover of the separatist tendencies amongst India’s Tamils to follow the LTTE example.
• The Exit Plan must be in place before you intervene in another country.

Epilogue

Some years later, after Prabhakaran and the LTTE leadership had been eliminated by Sri Lankan Forces, a Sri Lanka delegation led by the Sri Lankan President Mr Mahinda Rajapaksa came to India. In a reception hosted in his honour by the Sri Lanka High Commission, the Indian Prime Minister Dr Manmohan Singh was also invited. I too was invited to the event. During the Reception the Sri Lankan President took me aside and told me that Sri Lanka was in grave economic situation, and he had requested the Indian government for a joint venture in development of the Hambantota Port in South Sri Lanka. I apprised Dr Manmohan Singh of the same and he said it appeared to be a good idea and he would look into it. I accordingly conveyed this to the Sri Lankan President. However, nothing happened on this issue. A few years later, when I had an opportunity to meet Dr Manmohan Singh, I asked him about the proposal. He said that due to compulsions of a coalition government, he could not get it through the Coordination Committee, chaired by the Congress President, as their Southern party allies were against it. This of course, brings home another lesson—the need for a strong centre to push through certain proposals in the national interest. As India did not take the offer, China promptly accepted it. Today, 70 percent stake in the port has been leased to China Merchants Port Holdings Company Limited (CM Port) for 99 years for USD 1.12 billion.

Author Brief Bio: A veteran of the 1965 and 1971 India-Pakistan wars, Lt Gen Amarjeet Singh Kalkat, SYSM, AVSM, VSM, was chosen to lead the Indian Peace Keeping Force in Sri Lanka as the Overall Force Commander for which he was awarded the Sarvottam Yudh Seva Medal (SYSM); the Country’s highest award for Leadership in War & Conflict, the first ever to be so awarded. Only two more have been awarded since then, both in the Kargil Operations. The IPKF Operations is a Prescribed Case Study Subject at the US Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, USA.

Reference

^[1] The award as signed is available at https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/IN%20LK_870729_Indo-Lanka%20Accord.pdf

The geopolitical and geostrategic dynamics at the beginning of the second decade of the 21^st century — have transformed the world in the light of the pandemic-stricken scenario. It would be inappropriate to call the current scenario as post-Covid. With widespread destruction of human life — accentuated by a covert biological warfare unleashed by the wildly ambitious Chinese hegemons — has put before mankind the basic question of Dharma.

Dharma is a key concept with multiple meanings in the Indic system of beliefs, as in Hinduism, Buddhism, Jainism, Sikhism etc. With no equivalence in the Western languages, the word Dharma is commonly translated as righteousness, merit, or moral duties governing individual conduct. Its most inappropriate rendition has been in the sense of religion or religious faith.

The word Dharma has roots in the Sanskrit धृ which means to hold, to maintain or to preserve, and is related to the Latin word firmus (firm, stable). From this it takes the meaning of ‘what is established or firm’, and hence ‘law’. The Sanskrit word Dharma is rendered as Dhamma in Prakrit and Pali. The word Dhamma refers to the Buddhist doctrine and is often interpreted to mean the ‘teachings of the Buddha’.  This doctrine, according to King Aśoka, was based on religious tolerance, respect for elders, and care for the old ones, kindness towards the needy; purity and truthfulness; and compassion for all sentient beings.

The word धर्म or धम्म carries a wide range of connotations:  (1) Faith, creed, piety, virtue, e.g., अहिंसा परम धर्म ;   (2) Scriptural laws or directions, e.g., धर्मसम्मत ;   (3)   A form of worship, e.g.,  तान्त्रिक धर्म ;   (4)  Theology, e.g., धर्मग्रन्थ ;  (5)  Natural quality, or behavior, or disposition, property or function, e.g.,  मानवधर्म, कालधर्म, पावकधर्म ; (6) Virtuousness, righteousness, morality, e.g.,  धर्महीन आचरण ;   (7)  Law, e.g.,  धर्मपत्नी ;   (8)  Justice, e.g.,  धर्माधिकरण ;   (9) Yama,  धर्मराज यम ;  and (10) Chastity, e.g.,   धर्मनाश |

Out of the varied connotations of the word, we find Dharma or Dhamma as natural quality, or behavior, or disposition, property or function — when we deal with the Pañcabhūta (पञ्चभूत) or the Five Elements, the basis of all cosmic creation, according to Hinduism. These are क्षिति, अप्, तेज, मरुत, व्योम; in other words, Earth, Water, Fire, Air, and Ether.  In Mahābhārata, the five Pāṇḍavas represented the Pañcabhūta. The hundred Kauravas who represented the malevolent human desire — were vanquished by the five elements of Nature. Thus, through the ultimate victory of the Pāṇḍavas, Nature has been depicted as invincible.

But when we explain Dharma in terms of human conduct, we invariably emphasize the moral obligation of treading the path of righteousness. This path of Dharma is often termed as Tao (道) in Chinese philosophy of Confucius and Taoism. Tao has been explained as the highest state of spiritual enlightenment — imbued with a just cause. However, Dharma and Tao are not the same — though some scholars have vaguely sought to paint them both with the same brush. Tao can be translated as मार्ग,   though it is quite unclear whether that मार्ग or path is of Dharma (morality) or Adharma (immorality).  In this context, धर्म निरपेक्ष often becomes equivalent to अधर्म सापेक्ष |

For imparting a value-oriented education, stories from the Mahābhārata, Kathāsaritsāgar, and Pañcatantra ought to be incorporated in the curriculum so as to imbibe ethical values among children — as Thirukkural of Thiruvalluvar is taught in schools in southern India.  The lessons in Dharma are essential in fostering social harmony, imparting righteousness and providing an urge to attain the collective objective for an anthropocentric development.

In the book Demystifying Leadership: Unveiling the Mahabharata Code[i], the authors reiterate that Dharma has been used to denote a normative action or an abstract quality of compassion, righteousness, justice and truth in the Mahābhārata. It is linked with norms, law, ethics as well as righteous execution of obligations, responsibilities and duties. The underlying expectation is that the person following Dharma will operate within the boundaries of justice, and will in word and deed, act with honor and propriety. Alternatively, the word Adharma can be understood as an action that violates the norms.

While entering into a discourse on what is Dharma, we would find how Kautilya had visualized it. In the monograph titled Understanding Dharma and Artha in Statecraft through Kautilya’s Arthashastra[ii], the ancient author has been attributed for defining Artha as wealth or power, and Dharma as political virtue or ethical and moral issues in statecraft. Kautilya realized that Dharma regulates Artha in the Indian tradition. Kautilya wanted the policymakers and leaders to be well-versed in the epics. The epics bring clear lessons on morals, both at a personal level and also while relating to statecraft. In Indian traditions, social and political conditions must exist for the pursuit of the four great ends of life — the Purushārthas — ethical virtue (Dharma), wealth and power (Artha), pleasure (Kāma), and spiritual transcendence (Moksha).

By continuing with our national subservience to the alien powers of the West, the leaders in India around 1947 — committed a series of Adharma — that jeopardized our national interests.  In the post-1947 India, there has only been petty politics (राजनीति), and no statecraft, and the least of national or state policy (देशनीति or राष्ट्रनीति). The performing of Dharma can be shown from the lost pages of our contemporary history. Netaji Subhas Bose’s deeds embodied statecraft, and formulation of a robust nation-building policy, combined with astounding foresight and an uncompromising selfless dedication and planning for national reconstruction.  Parochialism, and vested interests detrimental to the cause of national rejuvenation, with least focus attached to national security —both internal and external — deprived India of Netaji’s leadership and thus divided the country —both geographically and politically.  This partition resulted in weakening India as a nation and created a regional environment with perpetual animosity all around the territorial limits of the country. Netaji’s admonition and foretelling thus turned out to be true.

In the ancient Chinese philosophy, the five elements have been different from those of the Indic philosophy. They are Earth, Water, Fire, Tree and Metal. The Chinese do not believe in anything intangible. They are highly materialistic. And therefore, instead of Air and Ether, they got Wood and Metal. These five elements are said to originate from each other, and also said to subdue each other. The principle of the five elements as progenitors goes as follows:  Tree begets Fire, Fire begets Earth, Earth begets Metal, Metal begets Water, and Water begets Tree. Similarly, the principle of five elements subduing each other is reflected thus — Water subdues Fire, Fire subdues Metal, Metal subdues Tree, Tree subdues Earth, and Earth subdues Water. All these formulations are based on the Dharma or the natural qualities or functions of the elements.

The ancient philosophers of China had attached due importance to the spiritual welfare of human beings. This was reflected in the Chinese character 體 meaning body. A human body requires a spinal cord or backbone (骨).  Along with it, on the top, there is music (曲)—representing spiritual attainment; and below is bean, pea, or plant seeds (豆)—representing food.  The human body needs spiritual culture and material culture for its healthy existence.  But music being placed above food, is indicative of the fact that mind ruled supreme over matter— at least till the period when China was a pluralistic society. That is, till 221 BC.  The authoritarian trends in terms of governance brought along an atmosphere, wherein lay the seeds of relegating mind beyond the limits of matter.  Thus, the totalitarian inclinations witnessed an early rise through material aggrandizement in China.

The autocratic despotism and the nouveau-riche styled arrogance with which Communist China seeks to dictate the world what is ‘just’ and what it expects the rest of the countries to follow, so as to take care of its sensitivities, fully contravenes its own actions and behavior vis-à-vis other countries. China’s position is misplaced since China itself never honors sensitivities of other nations. Moreover, they adhere the least to any international law with any sense of parity. While issuing joint communiqués, China invariably makes it mandatory for other countries to recognize the PRC as the sole entity representing the Chinese people. Hence, the mention of ‘One-China Policy’ in multifarious documents. Nonetheless, China itself never agreed on adhering to One-India Policy, or honoring the territorial integrity of India. The biggest question remains—did China ever bother about India’s sensitivities, did China ever attach importance to India’s territorial integrity!  The time today mandates that India must pursue a hard-power policy and must play by the stratagem, advocated by Kautilya or Machiavelli, that China has been good at playing.

China has consistently nibbled away territories of other countries, including India’s. China seeks to harm India’s interests through myriads of means. Now is the time for India to strengthen its own inherent power to counter China by means of becoming a manufacturing nation and by becoming fully self-reliant even in manufacturing the minutest component to produce everything that used to come as indispensable commodities from China. This undoubtedly has to be India’s Yugadharma. The expansionist acts of China along India’s borders and the separatist activities with direct connivance of the Chinese state deep inside India; illegally building the CPEC through a disputed territory— are all examples of China’s flexing muscles. Now it has become quite apparent that China actively seeks to restrict the growth of India by embroiling India in hundreds of problems involving national security, economic engagements, infrastructural development, etc.

India must realize that communist China has never been a friend to India. Therefore, India must play the game of jeopardizing China’s geopolitical and geostrategic interests that underscore creating debt-trap and many other sinister designs that are detrimental to India’s national interests. The essential part of the Yugadharma that India must play so as to usher a new world order— is to actively counter such ominous ventures pursued by the Chinese.

The diabolic act that China embarked upon by spreading the Wuhan virus across the world — has been an act of Adharma which the United States of America had funded so as to capitalize from the pandemic. Now with the connivance of the WHO, the various initiatives for global vaccination by India and also some other countries are being undermined through monopoly, protectionism and racism.  The New World Order has been imposed through series of deadly competition for hegemony over the maximum resources of the world. It has not been through the conventional methods of war, but by the covert diffusion of lethal virus and its successive variants.  What we are witnessing today has been resultant of the intense trade war between China and the USA.

The top secret biological weapon plan of China, codenamed as 13579, could not be revealed in the USA in 2017 due to some unexpected turn of events. This was China’s mega plan “to weaken America, to create disorder in America, and to bring massive destruction of human lives in America.”  A Chinese billionaire businessman turned political activist Kuo Wen-Kwei, living in exile in the USA, claimed having exclusive knowledge but unable to make an exposé about the Chinese bio-war blueprint, later lamented in 2020 that “the biochemical weapons came from the Beijing Institute of Chemical Defence and this was the core project of the Chinese Communist Party’s 13579 plan at the time.” [iii]

Initially the complicity between the USA pharmaceutical syndicates— scheming to incur profits by maximizing sufferings, and the Chinese virology institute at Wuhan— turned out to be a miscalculation on the part of the American funding agencies. The world witnessed in dismay how the USA unpredictably got checkmated by China in the Machiavellian game of chess. The exiled Chinese billionaire bemoaned the tragedy behind the plot thus— “The evil acts of the CCP has brought great disaster to the United States. But on the other hand, behind the CCP, there are US dollars from the United States, American technology, the United States facilitated the CCP join the WTO, the funds of Wall Street in the US, and the technology of the US to nourish the CCP.” [iv]

Irrespective of their proclaimed ideological differences, the conspirators from both these countries actively connived in the proliferation of the disease and thus continued contending with each other, or perhaps kept on with their shadow-boxing in the public at the dreadful cost of others. And thus, both these contending hegemons committed a colossal Adharma— that the world would never be able to forget.

In the face of ecological imbalance induced by environmental destruction, causing climate change with unprecedented scale of calamity — we can well conclude that these are all results of human greed, insensitivity, vested interest and selfishness — that come under the purview of Adharma. Here, in this context, the plight of Tibet needs to be highlighted. Peace and tranquility between India and China could be preserved for centuries because of Tibet’s independent entity. India never shared a common border with China. India had been having a common border with Tibet. Once Tibet was occupied by China, the regional and sub-continental harmony evaporated into the thin air. China committed Adharma by enslaving a fellow Asian populace by their sheer proclivity to expansionism but ostentatiously by their proclaimed ‘mission of liberating’ them.  Taking full control of the water resources of entire Asia has been the reason behind China’s full-scale invasion of Tibet. Besides the fountainhead of water located in the Tibetan Plateau, the rich mineral resources, and the diverse flora and fauna of Tibet came under the control of the Chinese communists. Historically, China advanced its territorial aggrandizement through blatant campaigns towards expansionism under the garb of resistance and security. The non-Han Chinese territories were deliberately occupied and annexed to create a massive buffer zone around the central plains (中原) of the Han Chinese.

The true essence of the Chinese Dream needs to be understood clearly in the current scenario of the fast-changing world order that has been evolving following the advent of the hazardous effects of the Corona virus pandemic.  The Chinese under the communist rule since 1949 played the card of being a ‘victim’ of the Western and Japanese colonialism since 1840, and thus sought justification to avenge the ‘historic injustice’ by copying and devising the devious methods of domination. China under Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping, and now Xi Jinping conceived an elaborate strategy to gain economic and military power with the sole objective of achieving the position of Super Cop of the world, replacing the USA. The American Dream of global domination has actually been the quintessence of the Chinese Dream. It is China’s dream of becoming the sole superpower in a unipolar world. The Tao or the path adopted by China in the process has been the path of Adharma.  Touting its soft power across the world with its so-called Belt and Road Initiative, China has made a mega plan to capture all the main global assets, as well as monopolize the outer space, and create an environment of fear in the minds of the global community by emphasizing China’s primacy in every aspect of life and in every international forum.  None of the countries, that had visualized China as a civilized nation with thousands of years of history, could imagine that China’s Dharma could be to usher destruction to the mankind in a fashion quite incongruous with an Asian civilization.  That China could not cease to be on the collision path with the liberal world even after taking full advantage of all that others could offer, has generated a wave of mistrust across the world that had long reposed faith in the Middle Kingdom.

Buddhism originated in India and spread all over the Asian continent. Yet today, China deliberately seeks to obliterate that fact. The books they publish, quite consciously attempt to project China as the sacred land of Buddha and Buddhism and provide an incorrect interpretation that Buddhism is dead in India.  The way the Chinese have sought to portray themselves as the followers of Buddhism and yet carried out mass persecution of Buddhist monks and nuns in Tibet and in the Tibetan cultural spheres along the Himalayas, along with extensive destruction of shrines and monasteries that had taken place in the Maoist era and also being executed during the current era of terror under Xi Jinping, should be a matter of great concern for India. Here India needs to denounce such misdeeds of China and also to highlight that India has been the birthplace of Buddhism and the karmabhumi of Buddha. And that the Tibetan culture has been the most honest and truest repository of the original Buddhist traditions that originated from the Indic civilization.

Despite China’s outright rejection of religion, and adherence to atheism, its ostentatious display of ‘liberal acceptance’ of global religious beliefs — has now fallen flat with its imposition of authority in selecting the next Dalai Lama.  Sinicization of every religious faith entails that all religions in China must first blindly follow the dogma of the Chinese Communist Party. Xi Jinping wants all religious believers to follow the CCP over all else. Sinicizing Tibetan Buddhism, and Islam in Xinjiang (East Turkestan) and even Catholicism in China remains a significant priority for Beijing. Attempting to actively guide religions to adapt to a “socialist society with Chinese characteristics”— is obviously indicative that the CCP dogma must be considered to be supreme over and above all religions.

Following our Swadharma (inherent nature) — based on Dharma which connotes social responsibility, moral law or ethical values based on truth — we need to move swiftly towards performing our Yugadharma (the Dharma in each epoch). So, Dharma has to be followed with Karma.

During our freedom struggle, a large number of youth sacrificed their life while seeking to break the bondage of our motherland. That was considered their rightful Dharma. But theirs were acts of individual heroism. When Netaji Subhas Chandra Bose galvanized individual forces into a formidable army — the Indian National Army, he performed a greater Dharma — due to which the British left India. Those who vowed to remain subjects of a British Dominion by adhering to non-violence and by enforcing pacifism to curb popular upsurge, had been selfishly adhering to personal gain, vested interests — detrimental to national emancipation. That was clearly Adharma. Śrī Krishna initially professed of attaining Dharma through peace. But when peace failed to achieve the goal, he advocated for war. And war is himsā (violence), not ahimsā (non-violence). We got freedom because of the armed struggle by the INA under the command of Subhas Bose. The achievement of Netaji for the country came through his performance of Yugadharma. That is why the British had identified Netaji as their sole enemy, and considered the advocates of non-violence as inconsequential. Hence, adhering to non-violence was not the ultimate Dharma of the era for achieving national emancipation. In this light, non-violence amounted to escapism and treachery that was practically translated into collaborationism. The dichotomy between Dharma and Adharma was quite obvious.

The conflict between Dharma and Adharma keeps permeating our human existence in every epoch. The discourse of Dharma and Adharma takes the centrestage in our great epic Mahābhārata.  Śrī Krishna’s sermons at the Kurukshetra battlefield can be depicted as a reflection of the dialectics and the sufferings in human life in which we exist amidst the constant tussle between Dharma and Adharma. We might continue professing वसुधैव कुटुम्बकम् (The world is but one family), and also यत्र विश्वम् भवत्येक नीड़म् (Where the world is but one abode). This has been our Swadharma. But now is the time to refashion our existence in the new era, in the new world order by adhering to Yugadharma. This world order is the one where the Chinese deceit and expansionism, and the American arrogance, mindlessness and hypocrisy have created perilous effects on the entire world. India must seize the time to embolden her gross national strength index through revitalizing the economy by means of enormous political will. That would amount to our fulfilling of Yugadharma. This Dharma would certainly require a paradigm shift so as to make India truly self-reliant, striving wholeheartedly to create grassroots wealth so that we could become a strong nation in all respect.

Author Brief Bio: Prof. Priyadarsi Mukherji, Ph.D. is Professor in Chinese & Sinological Studies, Centre for Chinese & South-East Asian Studies, School of Language, Literature & Culture Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi.

References:

[i]  Asha Kaul & Vishal Gupta, Demystifying Leadership: Unveiling the Mahabharata Code, Bloomsbury, 2021.

[ii]  Pradeep Kumar Gautam, Understanding Dharma and Artha in Statecraft through Kautilya’s Arthashastra, IDSA Monograph Series, No.53, July 2016.

[iii] https://gnews.org/zh-hans/931089/  [Translated by the author from the original Chinese text]

[iv] Ibid.

The Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC) was initially formed as a sub-regional grouping for economic cooperation with a view to promoting free trade, cross-border investment, tourism and technical cooperation amongst the member countries. Established on 06 June 1997, in Bangkok, Thailand, it was given the acronym BIST-EC, the name being derived from its four founding members (Bangladesh, India, Sri Lanka and Thailand), with the last two letters denoting Economic Cooperation. On 22 December of the same year, Myanmar was added to the grouping which was thereafter renamed BIMST-EC. Two more countries, Nepal and Bhutan became members in February 2004, and in the first summit meeting held on 31 July of that year, the grouping was renamed as BIMSTEC – Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation.

This year, as BIMSTEC commemorates the silver jubilee of its founding, is an opportune time to analyse what the organisation has achieved so far and more importantly, the road ahead which it needs to charter. In this issue, Mr Shamsher M Chowdhury, BB, the former foreign secretary of Bangladesh gives an account of how the organisation evolved and about its future prospects. He writes of the formal adoption of the BIMSTEC Charter on 30 March 2022, during the Fifth Summit held virtually in Colombo, and posits that the shared commitment of member countries to make BIMSTEC “a dynamic, effective and result-oriented regional organisation for promoting a peaceful, prosperous and sustainable Bay of Bengal region” is a goal that can be achieved through greater cooperation and deeper integration.

Shri Rajiv Bhatia, in his article on Incorporating the Blue Economy into BIMSTEC Agenda, expands on the term ‘Blue Economy,’ which represents the totality of water-related activities and resources—lakes, rivers, bays, coastal regions, seas and oceans—which need sustainable development to meet the growing needs of an expanding world population. He comes out with viable policy suggestions for promoting the Blue Economy and for Trade and Investment, with a view to transforming BIMSTEC into an effective instrument of regional integration.

Madhumita Kothari, in her very focussed and analytical article, discusses the leadership role that India can play in making BIMSTEC a bridge for Regional Connectivity, Prosperity & Security, highlighting in the process, the importance of the Bay. In yet another very focussed article, Shri Anil Trigunayat gives his views on how ‘Brand BIMSTEC’ can be built and concludes with a series of recommendations which could be relevant to achieve that aim. The issue of Climate Change is discussed by Shri Damodar Pujari, with a focus on the role that BIMSTEC can play as a group in tackling this challenge. In yet another innovative article, Shri Ankit Shah spreads the ambit further, delving into how BIMSTEC can integrate with ASEAN and the wider Indo-Pacific region. Finally, in the concluding article focussed on BIMSTEC, Commodore Anil Jai Singh posits on building a resilient Maritime Security Architecture.

A promising future beckons the countries around the Bay of Bengal. It is up to the leadership of all the countries and seize the moment, in the interest of their people and of the region as a whole.

Author Breif Bio:  Maj Gen Dhruv C. Katoch is Director, India Foundation and Editor, India Foundation Journal.

As BIMSTEC enters two and a half decades of its existence, it is time to take stock of BIMSTEC’s achievements and chart the organisation’s future course and direction. In order to make a realistic assessment of BIMSTEC’s standing in the region, it is relevant to assess how other regional/sub-regional organisations are conducting their business to promote cooperation in the South and South East Asia region.

ASEAN has developed extensive legal and institutional framework to carry out its broad mandate covering political, economic, security and socio-cultural issues. However, the once strong regional forum is showing strains at the seams. SASEC (South Asian Subregional Economic Cooperation) with its skeleton structure and limited mandate, has been able to complete 46 development projects worth over US$ 9 billion with the ADB assistance since 2001. SAARC, with all its initial promise, has continued to struggle, primarily due to political issues between some key members.

In a competitive environment of various forms of regional cooperation initiatives in this vital and strategically important region, an effective, visible and result-oriented BIMSTEC offers an opportunity for a rule and institution-based cooperation. BIMSTEC needs to expedite developing legal framework of cooperation in core areas like trade, investment, connectivity and education. Establishing a sound financing mechanism for project-based cooperation is of paramount importance. Strengthening of the Secretariat with necessary skills and financial resources is another area that requires the attention of the Member States. In this context, the decision of the government of India to donate US$ 1 million for the BIMSTEC Secretariat is a most welcome and timely move. The adoption and signing of the BIMSTEC Charter at the 5^th BIMSTEC Summit in Colombo on 30 March 2022, will create the necessary legal frame work for strengthening multi-sectoral cooperation and the organisation’s relevance within the organisation, and hopefully even beyond.

For BIMSTEC to move forward effectively, it is important to be guided by the consideration that sustained and steady progress should take precedence over form as one cannot afford to lose the momentum that is being generated. It is a fact that BIMSTEC is receiving attention as an important building block of the emerging Indo-Pacific region and it can play a much greater role in shaping the future socio-economic architecture of this region.

A Result Oriented BIMSTEC

According to the Bangkok Declaration of 6 June 1997, BIMSTEC was created with the desire “to establish a firm foundation for common action to promote sub-regional cooperation in the areas of trade, investment, technological exchange and other interrelated areas in a spirit of equality and partnership and thereby contribute towards peace, progress and prosperity in their common region”. Beginning with a sub-regional initiative with four Member States, BIMSTEC has become a promising regional organisation comprising seven countries of the Bay of Bengal region: Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Myanmar, Nepal, Sri Lanka, and Thailand.

BIMSTEC leaders are now pledge bound to work collectively towards making the organisation stronger, more effective, and result oriented.

One of the founding principles of BIMSTEC is to “constitute an additionality, to not be a substitute for bilateral, regional or multilateral cooperation involving the Member States.” During the last 25 years, five summit meetings have been held. In addition, there was the BIMSTEC Leaders’ Retreat in Goa, India, on 16 October 2016. This was a creative and thoughtful initiative. The Annual Ministerial Meeting held at the level of external affairs/foreign ministers of member states is the body responsible for coordinating and providing overall policy guidance on all BIMSTEC matters. The Ministerial Meeting had been held regularly. Sadly, the Covid pandemic did act as a major impediment to holding the meetings in person.

Senior Officials’ Meeting (SOM) is the most important layer of BIMSTEC’s existing institutional mechanism. This body undertakes the preparatory work for the Ministerial Meeting and follows up its decisions between the sessions of the Ministerial Meeting. In practice though, different mechanisms have evolved over a period of time which is unique to each sector. Trade and investment sector has a full-blown institutional structure with Trade and Economic Ministers’ Meeting, Senior Trade and Economic Officials Meeting, Trade Negotiating Committee (TNC) and a host of working groups under TNC are engaged in various areas of FTA negotiations. In some important sectors like transport and communication, counter-terrorism and trans-nationalcrime (CTTC) and agriculture, functions are conducted by working groups/expert groups without the existence of Ministerial or Senior Officials Meetings. Although deliberation on counter-terrorism and trans-nationalcrime (CTTC) has been upgraded to the level of nationalsecurity chiefs with effect from 2017, most member states do not appear to have a nationalsecurity chief in the real sense of the term. Furthermore, issues like CTTC, illicit drug trafficking, human trafficking etc. fall under the jurisdiction of Home Ministry of most member states.

The Bangkok Declaration also stipulated that BIMSTEC maintain close and beneficial cooperation with existing international and regional organisations with similar aims and purposes. Other than limited cooperation with ADB for conducting study in the transport sector and for the secretariat infrastructure, no serious attempt in this regard has been made. Common dialogue forum amongst BIMSTEC and various other regional, multilateral organisations/funding institutions could push the cause of BIMSTEC and give it much needed and greater visibility. The increasing global attention towards the emerging Indo-Pacific community is expected to present before BIMSTEC an opportunity to attract external funding for the region’s common infrastructure development.

Status of BIMSTEC Centres/Institutions

During the last 25 years, BIMSTEC has taken initiatives to establish a number of centres and institutions, the most important one being the establishment of a permanent secretariat in Dhaka. The others include the BIMSTEC Energy Centre (BEC), the BIMSTEC Weather and Climate Centre, BIMSTEC Cultural Industry Observatory (BCIO), BIMSTEC Technology Transfer Facility (TTF), BIMSTEC Tourism Information Centre, BIMSTEC Tourism Fund, BIMSTEC Centre for Poverty Alleviation. Operations of these centres/institutions have been hampered by lack of appropriate financing mechanism.

SAARC’s experience shows that the creation of centres and institutions alone do not necessarily help enhanced and effective regional cooperation. Some of the centres created by SAARC have become ineffective or are non-performing.  Even the experience of ASEAN has been mixed as far as the creation and running of centres is concerned. In the case of BIMSTEC, a more cautious approach is advisable because a proliferation of centres/institutions may lead to additional financial burden for member states, constitute expansion of the secretariat in various forms and locations, and give rise to problem of coordination of BIMSTEC activities.  One solution could be that the existing centre(s) located in the lead country of a sector can be declared as BIMSTEC Centre whose coordination and administration will remain with the nodal ministry while a part or whole of the service produced by the Centre will be dedicated to the benefit of all member states of BIMSTEC. This will spare the organisation from creating new administrative structures and funding arrangements.

Enhancing Visibility of BIMSTEC

The last two and a half decades has shown that BIMSTEC’s visibility remains relatively low, both within the region and more so, beyond. The Goa Leaders’ Retreat of 2016 was a high-profile event that brought BIMSTEC to the attention of the international community. Sustained political commitment on the part of member states and some immediate achievements that can bring visible benefit to the peoples of this region will contribute meaningfully in changing the picture. The establishment of BIMSTEC Network of Policy Think Tanks (BNPTT) is a welcome initiative to reach out to scholars and opinion builders. A forum for the media of the member countries could play a major role in assuring greater awareness among the population. Establishment of BIMSTEC Parliamentarians’ Forum, establishment of BIMSTEC Network of Universities, facilitated movement of businessmen and tourists, introduction of BIMSTEC scholarships by public/private universities, special visa arrangements for travel within BIMSTEC countries, holding of BIMSTEC cultural festivals could be some effective means to enhance the visibility and relevance of BIMSTEC among the citizens of the member states.  The Covid pandemic has highlighted the crucial importance of enhanced cooperation on the health sector, both in the preventive and curative regime, as much on the research domain. Enhanced cooperation and collaboration in this sector could bring tangible benefits.

Recommendations

In order to make BIMSTEC stronger, more effective and result-oriented, the following recommendations could be considered:

Recommendations on developing legal framework of cooperation

1. Redouble efforts to complete the initial phase of laying down legal framework to carry out cooperation in core areas like trade, investment, connectivity, security and energy.
2. Declaration or other non-binding form of documents may be resorted to when member states are not ready to enter into formal agreement on a specific subject.

Recommendations on project-based cooperation

1. Identify and implement development projects in such areas as agriculture, fisheries, technology, public health, tourism, climate change, blue economy etc.
2. Encourage pluri-lateral project implementation arrangements with the provision that those member states that did not initially join such arrangement, may do so at a later stage.
3. Develop guidelines for financing project-based cooperation

Recommendations to rationalise institutional mechanism

1. As the pivot of BIMSTEC institutional mechanism, SOM may hold special meetings, as and when necessary, in addition to the existing two meetings per annum.
2. Harmonise, to the extent possible, all sectoral institutional mechanism, and hold sectoral meetings regularly and at the designated level.
3. Upgrade Counter-terrorism and Trans-National Crime (CTTC) sector mechanism to the level of Home Ministers.
4. Empower National Focal Points to effectively coordinate BIMSTEC matters at the national level.
5. Review the role and function of Lead Country

Recommendations on rationalisation of sectors of cooperation

1. Reduce the number of sectors by merging interrelated sectors where appropriate.
2. Merge Environment and Disaster Management and Climate Change as one sector.
3. Merge Agriculture and Fisheries as one sector with emphasis on food security.
4. Include Human Resource Development as a stand-alone sector of cooperation

Recommendations on financing of BIMSTEC activities

1. Develop guidelines for financing studies/projects with BIMSTEC’s own resources.
2. Develop guideline for funding project-based cooperation with external funding.
3. Introduce program budget for BIMSTEC with Member States’ own resources.
4. Authorize the Secretary General to explore extra-budgetary resources from external sources and private sector in line with approved guidelines

Recommendations on establishment of BIMSTEC Centres/institutions

1. Keep the number of centres/institutions limited so as not to create additional financial burden for member states.
2. Wherever appropriate, existing centre(s) in the Lead Country may be declared as parallel BIMSTEC Centre, with the nodal ministry doing necessary coordination without creating new administrative and financing mechanism.
3. Hold the next meeting of BIMSTEC Joint Working Group, as soon as possible, to develop guidelines for the operational structure and financing of BIMSTEC Centres

Recommendations on enhancing visibility of BIMSTEC

1. Establish BIMSTEC Parliamentarians’ Forum.
2. Establish BIMSTEC Network of Universities.
3. Introduce BIMSTEC business visa scheme.
4. Introduce BIMSTEC scholarships by various universities.
5. Introduce BIMSTEC visa mechanism.
6. Establish a BIMSTEC media forum.
7. Hold BIMSTEC cultural festival regularly.
8. Strengthen BIMSTEC Secretariat.

As the BIMSTEC process enters the second half of its third decade, concrete and visible progress on various sectors of cooperation must be made to uphold the organisation’s credibility and relevance. With the support of the Member States, it is reasonable to expect the following to be achieved in the short and long term future:

• Continue work of Trade Negotiating Committee (TNC) with greater urgency to ensure progress on FTA negotiations.
• Continue the work of the JWG to make progress on guidelines for BIMSTEC centres/institutions.
• Conclude Agreement on Cooperation and Mutual Assistance in Customs Matters.
• Conclude BIMSTEC Coastal Shipping Agreement.
• Conclude MOU on BIMSTEC Grid Interconnection.
• Focus on effective execution of the Technology Transfer Facility(TTF).
• Make progress on BIMSTEC Motor Vehicle Agreement.
• Make progress on Trade Facilitation Agreement.
• Make progress on Agreement on Trade in Goods.
• Make progress on Agreement on Trade in Services.
• Monitor the effective implementation of the BIMSTEC Convention on Cooperation in Combating International Terrorism, Transnational Organised Crime and Illicit Drug Trafficking.
• Focus on effective implementation of the recently signed BIMSTEC Convention on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal matters.
• Hold meetings of two newly created sub-groups under Counter Terrorism and Transnational Crime sector.
• Ensure visible progress of the BIMSTEC Master Plan on Transport Connectivity.
• Initiate BIMSTEC Grid Interconnection Master Plan Study.
• Establish a forum for Parliamentarians as part of generating people-to-people contact.
• Finalise Terms of Reference for BIMSTEC Network of Policy Think Tanks.
• Create an Eminent Persons’ Group (EPG).
• Resume discussion on BIMSTEC Business Visa Scheme and BIMSTEC Travel Card.
• Initiate discussion on communications connectivity (e.g., broadband connectivity) as a sub-sector of Transport and Communications sector.
• Put in place formalised structure for Blue Economy as a sector/sub-sector with identification of Lead Country/Chair Country, Terms of Reference, relevant project identification and financing etc.
• Continue meetings of BIMSTEC National Security Chiefs.
• Hold BIMSTEC Cultural festival on a regular basis in the member states.

Challenges and Conclusion

The recently concluded 5^th BIMSTEC Summit meeting held in Colombo after a Covid enforced two-year delay and conducted virtually, was a significant step forward. The theme of the Summit gathering was “Towards a Resilient Region, Prosperous Economies, Healthy People”.

The key takeaways from the summit meeting included the signing of three important agreements, viz, the BIMSTEC Convention on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters, the BIMSTEC Memorandum of Understanding on Mutual Cooperation in the field of Diplomatic Training and the Memorandum of Association on Establishment of BIMSTEC Technology Transfer facility. The Summit also witnessed the Adoption and signing of the BIMSTEC Charter. This particular instrument would facilitate putting in place a set of rules, a framework and long-term goals for the organisation. This will help streamlining the operations of BIMSTEC and at the same time allow the organisation to enhance its potential.

The ‘Master Plan for Transport Connectivity’ was also adopted at the Summit. This lays out a guidance framework for connectivity-related activities in the region in the years ahead.

There can be no denying that setting up legal frame works and related institutions gives BIMSTEC necessary structures. The challenge that remains for the member countries is reaching the goals and dividends from BIMSTEC to the population in the region. There is a perceptible sense of scepticism among the current generation about the full usefulness of institutionalised regional collaborative bodies in delivering tangible benefits. The stagnation of SAARC and a not so cohesive ASEAN has served to reinforce such suspicions. Many see larger benefits being derived from deliverable bilateral, or sub-regional, arrangements. The ever-growing Bangladesh-India multimodal connectivity arrangements, for example, serves as a strong case in point. The same can be said about the emerging power and energy grid connectivity between Bangladesh, India, Nepal and Bhutan. It must, however, be noted that BIMSTEC does not intend to be an alternative to bilateral arrangements, instead it can complement such arrangements

For BIMSTEC, the challenge is heightened by the fact that it is a trans-regional organisation when one looks at the land mass and the demographic composition it covers. Its major geographical cementing element is the massive water body, the Bay of Bengal, arguably the largest Bay on planet earth. Hence the importance of leveraging the blue economy potential the Bay offers in promoting business linkages, focussing on trade and investment. Geo-politically, this maritime linkage has the potential to place BIMSTEC, as a body, and the member countries individually, in the much larger and strategically important Indo-Pacific and the Asia-Pacific theatre. This is all the more significant in an emerging multi-polar Asia and a shifting global order where ostensive national and strategic goals are being often pursued in a military form and with an equally military intensity.

However, at the end of the day, one wants to see and feel the tangible economic benefits and commercial opportunities that BIMSTEC can bring home. This is best achieved in an atmosphere of cohesion, compromise and concession. Ensuring such an atmosphere and achieving this triple goal poses the biggest challenge for BIMSTEC. It is, nonetheless, a work in progress and with the right political commitment, this should be achievable.

Building Brand BIMSTEC is also a major challenge, especially when one has to navigate through the growing marshes of scepticism, as mentioned earlier. It must be remembered that BIMSTEC is NOT a factory manufactured product whose brand value could be built through flashy commercials on the television screens. It is much more of an abstract form which needs to take a concrete shape. In building Brand BIMSTEC, three areas can play a major, and perhaps a decisive role. These are namely, multimodal connectivity leading to movement of people, goods and services throughout the region, educational linkages and sustained civil society and media interactions.

While connectivity is getting the needed focus, it is in the area of systematic and institutionalised educational linkages and civil society and media interactions that has to take a sustained form. A more specific approach in the field of educational linkages can be achieved by instituting something like a BIMSTEC Scholarship programme. Under this scheme, each member country will offer six graduate or post-graduate scholarships every year to aspirants from the other member countries. The fields of study can be varied but the procedures and the educational standards has to be uniform. Over a period of time, recipients of such scholarship programme can emerge as the best Brand Ambassadors for BIMSTEC. Investment in this field will not be wasted exercise.

In the prevailing situation, activities of civil societies have seen a significant growth, as has the outreach and role of the media. Sustained interactions between and among them within the BIMSTEC members will contribute immensely to building Brand BIMSTEC. Civil society groups and the media usually are not confined by forms; they can create their own. This enables them to enhance their scope and mode of work in a more flexible manner and without interference. In the end, they can contribute in a major way to promoting BIMSTEC in the region. Much, of course, will depend on how much freedom they are allowed to carry on their desired tasks. Needless to say, within BIMSTEC, civil society and media freedom is not granted in a uniform manner. Nevertheless, even if it remains limited to a majority of the member countries, the message of BIMSTEC can be spread to a larger section of the population in the region. Creating a BIMSTEC Network of Policy Think Tanks (BNPTT) can be a good starting point but the exercise need not be limited to its scope.

The Goa retreat of BIMSTEC leaders in October 2016 was a shining example that in a changed world, gatherings of leaders in an air of informality can be highly productive. This is worth replicating. As stated earlier in this essay, BIMSTEC is a continuous work in progress, but it is a promising undertaking. The task now is to remain focussed and look at the larger canvass that the Asia-Pacific region offers in a fast-changing world. It is perhaps also time to consider widening BIMSTEC’s membership to include the Maldives, and even Malaysia and Indonesia. This will further resonate the calls for a focus on the potential of blue economy.

Author Brief Bio: Shamsher M. Chowdhury, Bir Bikram, graduated as a Regular Commissioned Army officer in 1969. He took active part in the Bangladesh War of Liberation in 1971. For his bravery in the battlefield the Government of Bangladesh conferred on him the gallantry award Bir Bikram. In December 1974, the service of Shamsher M Chowdhury, BB was transferred to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as a career Foreign Service Officer. Mr. Chowdhury served as the High Commissioner of Bangladesh to Sri Lanka, Ambassador to the Federal Republic of Germany, Vietnam and the United States of America.He was Foreign Secretary of Bangladesh from 2001 to 2005.

Introduction

The Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC) took nearly 25 years from its inception in June 1997 to equip itself with a charter that defines its long-term vision and priorities for cooperation among its seven member-states. These are India, Bangladesh, Nepal, Bhutan, Sri Lanka, Myanmar and Thailand. The grouping completed this task admirably on 30 March 2022 when the charter was formally adopted at the fifth summit, held virtually in Colombo. The charter expresses the shared commitment of member countries to make BIMSTEC “a dynamic, effective and result-oriented regional organisation for promoting a peaceful, prosperous and sustainable Bay of Bengal region”,^[1] a goal to be achieved through greater cooperation and “deeper integration.”^[2]

The three noteworthy features of this carefully crafted formulation are: BIMSTEC is now a regional organisation, not a sub-regional one as often mentioned earlier; it is oriented towards and identified with the Bay of Bengal region; and clearly the achievement of its purposes will require more regional cooperation and integration than what exists at present.

This essay, composed for a compendium to underline the achievements and prospects of BIMSTEC during its 25^th anniversary year, argues that the vital regional grouping needs to ensure continuity with past efforts to strengthen economic cooperation and also be innovative to realise its potential in newer areas such as the Blue Economy. Only then will BIMSTEC be viewed as an institution developing in consonance with the ethos and temper of the 21^st century. The linkage between these two facets demands speedy progress in securing a comprehensive Free Trade Agreement (FTA), work on which began over two decades ago, as well as fulfilling expectations built up since 2016, regarding maritime security and sustainable cooperation based on maritime resources.

It is, therefore, necessary to trace the trajectory of dialogue and policy development concerning the Blue Economy; examine the present state of play regarding the finalisation of arrangements to expand and deepen economic cooperation; explain the pivotal importance of multidimensional connectivity for both facets; and make recommendations for the consideration of policymakers. The overarching objective is to stress that BIMSTEC has the potential to transform itself into an effective tool of regional cooperation by the end of the current decade if it strives hard enough and is driven by strong political will.

BIMSTEC and the Blue Economy

Meaning, trajectory

The Blue Economy, a relatively new concept that transcends the ‘Ocean economy,’ represents the totality of water-related activities and resources—lakes, rivers, bays, coastal regions, seas and oceans—which need sustainable development to meet the growing needs of an expanding world population. When the planet’s population increases from 7.8 billion in 2020 to 9.9 billion by 2050, land-based resources will not be enough. The dependence on oceanic resources will increase for food, medicines, energy and other requirements. It is imperative to protect the oceans and their biodiversity with immediate effect and utilise their vast assets sustainably. Some oceanic areas have already become the locus of several inter-state disputes and the source of insecurity of diverse kinds.

The Blue Economy, therefore, should be viewed in terms of three interlinked pillars—security, sustainability, and productivity. Their optimal development demands a synthesis of knowledge and cooperation with navies and coast guards, with diplomats, officials and legal experts, and with scientists, researchers, business leaders and entrepreneurs.

At the UN Conference on Sustainable Development held in 2012, special attention was paid to creating a global institutional framework for sustainable development through the ‘Green Economy.’ The Small Island Developing States (SIDS), in this context, requested a focus to be placed on their special interests, insisting on the incorporation of provisions for better adaptation mechanisms for coastal and sea resource-based countries. This brought into salience the ‘Green Economy in a Blue World’ or the Blue Economy itself. SDG 14^[3] became the bedrock of guidelines that would determine global policy on this subject.

Thus began a growing consciousness about the Blue Economy and the shaping of public policy and discourse in the member countries of BIMSTEC, even before it seeped into the lexicon of BIMSTEC, the organisation. India led the way through Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s famous speech in 2015 propounding the concept of ‘SAGAR’ (Security and Growth for All in the Region).^[4] The five constituent elements of ‘SAGAR’ offer a blueprint for collective action and coordination in the broader Indian Ocean region.^[5]  Bangladesh emerged as an ardent advocate of the Blue Economy, given its pivotal position in the Bay of Bengal and the dependence of its economy on the fisheries sector. It hosted an international workshop on the Blue Economy in Dhaka in September 2014, the precursor of a series of national and international level deliberations in subsequent years. Sri Lanka, with its unique position on the maritime transportation map of the Indian Ocean, has been active in thinking about and planning appropriate cooperation measures from fisheries to marine tourism, from sea transportation to ocean energy. Thailand has been a leader in its own right, playing a significant role within the ASEAN family and beyond to realise the opportunities of this ecosystem.

From Goa to Kathmandu

It was no surprise that when the historic Retreat of BIMSTEC Leaders was convened by India in Goa in October 2016, the Blue Economy found prominent mention in the outcome document:

We recognise the enormous potential that the development of the blue economy holds for our region, and agree to explore ways to deepen our cooperation in areas such as aquaculture (both inland and coastal), hydrography, seabed mineral exploration, coastal shipping, eco-tourism and renewable ocean energy to promote holistic and sustainable development of our region.^[6]

The document stressed the importance of cooperation for the sustainable development of fisheries for food security, as “the Bay of Bengal region is home to over thirty percent of the world’s fishermen.”^[7] The leaders agreed to derive benefits from the mountain regions for sustainable development. Obviously, rivers form the bridge between the mountains and oceans, and between the mountain economy and the Blue Economy.

The fourth summit in Kathmandu in August 2018 projected BIMSTEC as a regional organisation that was geared to advance “Towards a Peaceful, Prosperous and Sustainable Bay of Bengal.” Its outcome document contained clear-cut formulations on mountain economy and fisheries-related cooperation. But its two paragraphs on the Blue Economy in the section named ‘Sectoral Review’ were truly significant and forward-looking. Therein, the leaders acknowledged the hosting of the International Blue Economy Conference by Bangladesh in 2017. They agreed to:

Emphasise the importance of blue economy and agree to cooperate in this sector for the sustainable development in the region and decide to establish an Inter-governmental Expert Group to develop an action plan on blue economy, keeping in mind the special needs and circumstances of the landlocked Member States.^[8]

The subsequent fifth summit in Colombo simply reiterated the instruction to the ministers, officials and the Secretariat to ensure “prompt implementation” of its directives, including on the Blue Economy.^[9]

Between the Goa Retreat and the Colombo Summit, much has been activated in the Blue Economy, regionally and internationally. India’s focus has been on Sagarmala, the flagship mega programme for the expansion and modernisation of ports and port-related-infrastructure; crafting of a policy framework through a draft policy on the Blue Economy^[10] and a series of diplomatic initiatives to promote cooperation with diverse entities ranging from the IORA, ASEAN, and the Quad to Norway, the EU and France. Encompassing the overarching Indo-Pacific model, New Delhi released its Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative (IPOI), mentioned in Prime Minister Modi’s speech at the East Asia summit in November 2019.^[11] Through its seven holistic pillars, it covers various aspects of the Blue Economy and maritime security. The pillars and their leads identified so far, are: i) maritime security (India), ii) maritime ecology (Australia), iii) maritime resources (France and Indonesia), iv) capacity building and resource sharing (lead country pending), v) disaster risk reduction and management (India), vi) science, technology and academic cooperation (lead pending), and vii) trade, connectivity and maritime transport (Japan).”^[12]

Despite some members of BIMSTEC thinking seriously about the Blue Economy, the grouping has done little so far to promote regional cooperation in any tangible manner. But now that it has set in motion its plan for institutional reform, it can move forward in newer areas.

Trade and Investment

In contrast to the Blue Economy as a new domain, trade and investment represent a traditional area of regional cooperation on which BIMSTEC has worked since its inception in 1997. The signing of the framework agreement in 2004 raised hopes of an early breakthrough in concluding a viable, comprehensive FTA, but it did not follow. Nearly two decades of negotiations have made only modest progress. Of the seven constituent agreements of the FTA, just two are ready: the agreement on dispute settlement procedures and mechanism, and the protocol to amend the framework agreement. Negotiations for five agreements remain inconclusive so far. These are agreements on trade in goods; cooperation and mutual assistance in customs matters; trade in services; investment; and trade facilitation.^[13]

Whether the reiteration of the Leaders’ directives at the Colombo summit will motivate the officials to expedite matters, remains debatable, if not doubtful. This is because much has changed in the BIMSTEC region in the past two decades. Pratim Ranjan Bose, an analyst, explains that the record of negotiations does not build confidence. The region’s experience with SAFTA, the widespread perception that FTAs lose jobs at home, the unwillingness of Bangladesh and Sri Lanka to open their economies to Indian competition, and India’s lack of enthusiasm to further open up its market to Thailand, have been among the factors holding up the FTA negotiations.^[14] In addition, the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement, to which Thailand and Myanmar are signatories but India is not, has complicated matters. Finally, there is a growing realisation in the region that in the absence of extensive infrastructure connectivity, trade and investment flows cannot really grow.

In view of the above, BIMSTEC has no choice but to take a hard, realistic look at the current state of play regarding FTA negotiations as well as step up efforts to expand the multidimensional connectivity that links member states seamlessly through developed road, rail, air, shipping, digital and energy networks. This, say researchers NilanjanBanit and Aparna Sharma, will raise intra-BIMSTEC trade, stuck at 7% of total trade to an impressive macro figure.^[15]

Policy Suggestions

Advocates of BIMSTEC believe that it has a promising future. “The Bay of Bengal,” says an academic, “is evolving as the centre of the Indo-Pacific region again.”^[16] A serious endeavour is essential to translate intentions and declarations into action, as recommended below:

Blue Economy

• Speedy action to establish an Inter-governmental Expert Group for an action plan on the Blue Economy. It should be multi-disciplinary, factoring in all relevant developments in recent years as also the special needs of all member states and present a plan for concrete results.
• A full-fledged presentation on IPOI should be made before a representative gathering of officials from various ministries of the BIMSTEC countries. The goal should be to optimally associate BIMSTEC with this ambitious initiative.
• Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Thailand and Myanmar should be invited to make detailed presentations on their national plans, achievements and best practices relating to the Blue Economy before a representative gathering of officials in the BIMSTEC governments.
• The Bay of Bengal waters wash the shores of three countries that are not members of BIMSTEC: Maldives, Malaysia and Indonesia. It is necessary to involve them in BIMSTEC’s endeavours to develop various dimensions of the Blue Economy, especially fisheries, marine tourism, coastal shipping ecosystems, and maritime security.
• A regional mechanism should be created for practical cooperation among BIMSTEC members in the research and management of “maritime trade, shipping, aquaculture and tourism” as well as to strengthen the fisheries sector and protect it against pollution, minimizing the impact of climate change.^[17]
• A vision document, encompassing all facets of cooperation in the Blue Economy for the next 25 years, should be prepared. An applicable template is the ‘India-France Roadmap on the Blue Economy and Ocean Governance.’^[18]

Trade and Investment

• Decide whether BIMSTEC’s business community needs a comprehensive FTA or not. An apex industry chamber in India, FICCI, undertook a perception survey and reported in January 2018 that businesses favoured an early conclusion of the FTA.^[19]A repeat of this exercise throughout the region is necessary and will be fruitful
• Progress on connectivity has been held up in the absence of relevant legal instruments. Their finalization should be a priority.
• Implementation of the Master Plan for Transport Connectivity should be thought through properly, with periodic reviews at the ministerial level.
• Existing mechanisms like the Business Forum and the Economic Forum should be activated for optimal results in strengthening trade and investment linkages.

Conclusion

There is no dearth of ideas on how to transform BIMSTEC into an effective instrument of regional integration. What is now needed is active supervision by the political leadership of measures taken and progress achieved; the full commitment of bureaucracies; the engagement of business and industry; and a sustained and visible watch by an informed citizenry.

The combined endeavour should be to make BIMSTEC a model platform for cooperation in the Bay of Bengal region before the current decade ends. This needs collective political will.^[20]

Author Brief Bio: Rajiv Bhatia is Distinguished Fellow, Gateway House and former Ambassador to Myanmar. He headed the BSM division in the Ministry of External Affairs, which handled India’s relations with Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Myanmar and Maldives. As Chair of FICCI’s Task Force on Blue Economy and Chair of FICCI’s Core Group of Experts on BIMSTEC, he supervised and contributed to the crafting of three Knowledge Papers published in April 2017, January 2018 and December 2019.

References

^[1] BIMSTEC Charter. https://drive.google.com/file/d/1imTXMnsLg3ostI-kN8E5L6CeRyMWrGhh/view

^[2] Ibid.

^[3] Conserve and sustainably use the oceans, seas and marine resources for sustainable development. https://sdgs.un.org/goals/goal14

^[4] ‘Text of the PM’s remarks on the Commissioning of Coast Ship Barracuda’, PMINDIA. https://www.pmindia.gov.in/en/news_updates/text-of-the-pms-remarks-on-the-commissioning-of-coast-ship-barracuda/

^[5] For details, see Rajiv Bhatia, India–Africa Relations: Changing Horizons, Oxon & New York, Routledge, 2022. P. 118

^[6] ‘BIMSTEC Leaders’ Retreat Outcome Document and 16-Point Agenda of Action, Goa, India, 16 October 2016’, BIMSTEC.https://bimstec.org/?page_id=3812

^[7] Ibid.

^[8] ‘Fourth BIMSTEC Summit Declaration, Kathmandu, Nepal, 30-31 August 2018’. https://bimstec.org/?page_id=3812

^[9] ‘Fifth BIMSTEC Summit Declaration, Colombo, Sri Lanka, 30 March 2022’. https://bimstec.org/?page_id=3812

^[10] ‘India’s Blue Economy: A Draft Policy Framework’, Economic Advisory Council to The Prime Minister Government of India, New Delhi, September 2020. P. 12. https://incois.gov.in/documents/Blue_Economy_policy.pdf

^[11] ‘Prime Minister’s Speech at the East Asia Summit, 04 November 2019’. Ministry of External Affairs, 4 November 2019. https://www.mea.gov.in/Speeches-Statements.htm?dtl/32171/Prime_Ministers_Speech_at_the_East_Asia_Summit_04_November_2019

^[12] Keynote Address by Ms. Riva Ganguly Das, Secretary (East), Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India at the National Consultations on Indo- Pacific Oceans Initiative (IPOI), 3 September 2021. https://www.icwa.in/show_content.php?lang=1&level=1&ls_id=6877&lid=4682

^[13] ‘Trade, Investment and Development’, BIMSTEC. https://bimstec.org/?page_id=6124

^[14]Pratim Ranjan Bose, ‘The Relevance of BIMSTEC FTA in View of New Realities’, in Sreeradha Datta (ed) BIMSTEC: The Journey and The Way Ahead, New Delhi, Pentagon Press LLP, 2021. Pp. 227–250

^[15]NilanjanBanik and Aparna Sharma, ‘Trade Potentiality in BIMSTEC’, Briefing Paper, CUTS, No. 1/2015. https://cuts-citee.org/pdf/Briefing_Paper15-Trade_Potentiality_in_BIMSTEC.pdf

^[16] Rajeev Ranjan Chaturvedy, ‘Bridging the bay in quest of a stronger BIMSTEC’, The Hindu, 30 March 2022.

^[17]VenuRajamony, ‘A subregional grouping that must get back on course’, The Hindu, 29 March 2022.

^[18] ‘India-France Roadmap on The Blue Economy and Ocean Governance’, Ministry of External Affairs, 20 February 2022. https://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/34882/INDIAFRANCE_ROADMAP_ON_THE_BLUE_ECONOMY_AND_OCEAN_GOVERNANCE

^[19] FICCI Core Group, ‘Reinvigorating BIMSTEC: An Industry Vision for the Next Decade’, Knowledge Paper, New Delhi, FICCI, January 2018.

^[20]Probal K. Ghosh, ‘BIMSTEC: a Potential Arena of Maritime Convergences and Capacity Building’, in Sreeradha Datta (ed) BIMSTEC: The Journey and The Way Ahead, New Delhi, Pentagon Press LLP, 2021. P. 317.

Introduction

In the light of the decision of the Fourth BIMSTEC Summit of 2018, building on the 1997 Bangkok Declaration, defining a long-term vision and priorities for cooperation, clearly delineating roles, and responsibilities of different layers of institutional structure and decision-making processes, the BIMSTEC Charter, the Legal and Institutional Framework for BIMSTEC, is adopted at Colombo on the occasion of the Fifth BIMSTEC Summit, on 30 March 2022. It is now time for India to progress on manifesting its principle of Security & Growth for All in the Region (SAGAR), establishing Prime Minister Modi’s vision as a Bridge of Connectivity, Prosperity & Security. Through this, India can prove to the world the power of its people and the inherent capabilities in its eminent leadership to create a new world order.

Prime Minister Modi’s Address at the 5^th BIMSTEC Summit

The Prime Minister stated that BIMSTEC completing 25 years is a major milestone. In sync with his leadership values, he desired to make BIMSTEC more active and give greater priority to regional security. He expressed happiness at the BIMSTEC Charter being adopted, which was an important step towards creating an institutional architecture. He reiterated the Secretary General’s suggestion towards constituting an Eminent Persons Group to prepare a vision document and also agreed to increase the capacity of the Secretariat further, suggesting that the Secretary General may prepare a road map for the achievement of this goal. With this in view, he stated that India will provide financial assistance of USD one million to increase the operational budget of the Secretariat. He spoke of enhancing mutual trade between nations in the region and stated that it was necessary to make speedy progress on the proposal of BIMSTEC Free Trade Agreement adopting international norms in the field of Trade Facilitation. He further emphasised the need to enhance exchanges between the entrepreneurs and startups of the BIMSTEC countries.

Adopting BIMSTEC’s Master Plan for Transport Connectivity, Shri Narendra Modi said that the mainstay of better integration, better trade, and better people-to-people relations is better connectivity. Simultaneously, one has to move forward on the already ongoing initiatives in the field of connectivity like Coastal Shipping Eco-system in the Bay of Bengal, and implement the electricity grid interconnectivity. He laid emphasis on the development of the BIMSTEC Center for Weather and Climate for cooperation on disaster management, especially on disaster risk reduction, stating that India is ready to contribute USD 3 million to restart the work of this centre. Achieving Sustainable Development Goals related to quality education is an important part of the national policies of BIMSTEC countries. Towards that end he proposed to promote joint research on Marine Sciences. As the agriculture sector is the core economy of all BIMSTEC countries, he proposed to create regional value chains of value-added agricultural products.

Laying stress on security, Shri Narendra Modi said it was fundamental to ensure the prosperity and development of the region. Towards that end, he called for increased cooperation between the BIMSTEC law enforcement agencies.He also expressed satisfaction at the Convention to Combat Terrorism having become active since last year and on BIMSTEC member countries having signed the Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty on Criminal Matters. He recapitulated that at the 4th Summit in Kathmandu, it was decided to strengthen the regional legal framework against terrorism, trans-national crime, and non-traditional threats and said that now, emphasis must be laid on the development of a legal framework for increasing road connectivity and coastal shipping. Prime Minister Modi concluded his remarks with an expression of heartfelt concern about the BIMSTEC member countries facing the challenges of health and economic security and called for solidarity and cooperation as the need of the hour. He reinforced his vision of making Bay of Bengal, a bridge of connectivity, a bridge of Prosperity, and a bridge of Security.India’s External Affairs Minister, ShriS. Jaishankar, who had spoken a day earlier, had stated that for the BIMSTEC member countries, achieving SDG 14 targets and ensuring a ‘good order at sea’ in keeping with international maritime law, particularly UNCLOS is a priority. He suggested that a practical way to proceed is to have discussions using existing dialogue mechanisms, even while putting in place a plan of action in the maritime domain which is consistent with the national priorities. He contemplated on the fact that the science of oceans is not easy, stating that India is keen to develop platforms and initiatives that can enhance collaboration between the scientist and experts in the maritime domain. With respect to BIMSTEC, Shri S. Jaishankar stated that India will bring to bear all relevant policies and approaches; one, as Neighbourhood First, give it the utmost priority; two, in consonance with the SAGAR outlook, realise its full maritime potential; and three, as a first responder, be it on HADR situations, Covid or economic recovery, be there at critical times for all.

The Essence of the BIMSTEC Charter

The peoples of the Member States of the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC), represented by the Heads of State or Government of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh, Kingdom of Bhutan, the Republic of India, the Republic of the Union of Myanmar, Nepal, the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka, and the Kingdom of Thailand have reaffirmed their firm commitment to the principles and purposes of BIMSTEC as enshrined in the 1997 Bangkok Declaration through the Preamble of this Charter.

The Memorandum of Association (MOA) on the Establishment of the BIMSTEC Permanent Secretariat, done at Nay Pyi Taw, Myanmar on 04 March 2014 has been recognised in this Charter. The Headquarters Agreement between the Government of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh and the Secretariat of the BIMSTEC done at Dhaka, Bangladesh on 01 November 2015 also stands recognised in the Preamble of this Charter.

It is an accepted underlying principle that the geographical contiguity, abundant natural and human resources, historical linkages and rich cultural heritage present great potential for promoting deeper cooperation in identified core areas in the region; It is acknowledged that enhanced inter-linkages and inter-dependence within the economies and societies in the BIMSTEC Member States provide greater opportunity to advance regional cooperation and recognise the special needs and circumstances of the least developed and landlocked developing countries in the region, providing meaningful support to their development process. There is the need towards a strong commitment to making BIMSTEC a dynamic, effective, and result-oriented regional organisation for promoting a peaceful, prosperous, and sustainable Bay of Bengal Region through collective efforts, meaningful cooperation, and deeper integration. It is important to stress the need for a fair, just, equitable and transparent international order and reaffirm the faith in the multilateralism with the United Nations at the Centre and the rule-based international trading system. India can make commendable contribution manifesting its ‘Neighbourhood First Policy’ and effective leadership in the region.

Parties to dispute may request the Chairman of BIMSTEC, to provide good offices, conciliation and mediation to settle any dispute arising out of the interpretation or implementation of the Charter. Member States shall endeavour to resolve peacefully all disputes in a timely manner through dialogue, consultation and negotiation.

Recalling the decision of the Fourth BIMSTEC Summit of 2018 to begin the process of drafting the Charter for the organisation, building on the 1997 Bangkok Declaration, defining a long-term vision and priorities for cooperation, clearly delineating roles and responsibilities of different layers of institutional structure and decision-making processes the legal and  institutional framework for BIMSTEC was established through its Charter; And to this end, the Heads of State or Government of BIMSTEC Member States, assembled in Colombo on the occasion of the Fifth BIMSTEC Summit,  and have agreed to this Charter on 30March 2022.

The Member States of BIMSTEC shall have equal rights and obligations under this Charter. They shall take all measures they deem necessary, including enactment of appropriate domestic legislations to effectively implement provisions of this Charter and to comply with all obligations of membership.

The Purpose of the BIMSTEC

It is the purpose of the BIMSTEC:

1. to create an enabling environment for rapid economic development through identification and implementation of specific cooperation projects in the already agreed areas of cooperation and such other areas that may be agreed upon by the Member States which may be subject to periodic review.
2. To accelerate the economic growth and social progress in the Bay of Bengal region through joint endeavours in a spirit of equality and partnership.
3. To promote active collaboration and mutual assistance on matters of common interest in the economic, social, technical, and scientific fields.
4. To provide assistance to each other in the form of training and research facilities in the educational, professional and technical spheres.
5. To cooperate more effectively in joint efforts that are supportive of and complementary to national development plans of the Member States which result in tangible benefits to the people in raising their living standards, including through generating employment and improving transportation and communication infrastructure.
6. To cooperate in projects that can be dealt with most productively on a regional basis among the BIMSTEC Member States and that make best use of available synergies.
7. To maintain peace and stability in the Bay of Bengal region through close collaboration in combating international terrorism, transnational organized crimes as well as natural disasters, climate change and communicable diseases.
8. To maintain close and beneficial cooperation with existing international and regional organizations with similar aims and purposes.
9. To endeavour to eradicate poverty from the Bay of Bengal region.
10. To establish multidimensional connectivity, promote synergy among connectivity frameworks in the region, as a key enabler to economic integration for shared prosperity.
11. To promote trade and investment as a major contributing factor for fostering economic and social development in the region.

BIMSTEC had initially focused on six sectors in 1997 to include trade, technology, energy, transport, tourism, and fisheries and expanded in 2008 to incorporate agriculture, public health, poverty alleviation, counterterrorism, environment, culture, people-to-people contact, and climate change.Subsequently, following steps to rationalise and reorganise sectors and sub-sectors, cooperation was reorganised in 2021 under the following sectors and sub-sectors led by the respective Member States:

• Bangladesh: Trade, Investment and Development
• Bhutan : Environment & Climate Change
• India: Security; Sub-sectors: Counter-Terrorism and Transnational Crime,   Disaster Management, Energy
• Myanmar : Agriculture and Food Security ; Sub-sectors : Agriculture, Fisheries & Livestock
• Nepal: People-to-People Contact, Sub-sectors: Culture, Tourism, People-to-People Contact  (forums of think tanks, media etc.)
• Sri Lanka : Science, Technology & Innovation, Sub-sectors :  Technology, Health, Human Resource Development
• Thailand: Connectivity

Certain Important Issues in BIMSTEC

The Bay of Bengal (Bay) is in the northeastern part of the Indian Ocean. It is bound by land on three sides; on the west and northwest by India on the north by Bangladesh, and on the east by Myanmar and the Andaman &Nicobar Islands of India. Its southern limit is a line between Sri Lanka and the northwestern-most point of Sumatra (Indonesia). Important ports on the Bay include Paradip, Kolkata, Haldia, Chennai, Visakhapatnam, Kakinada, Pondicherry, Dhamra, Gopalpur in India and Chittagong, Mongla, Payra Ports in Bangladesh.

There are impending problems in the Bay and the effective role that BIMSTEC should play in the governance of the Bay to improve upon the commercial viability of the Bay Economic Zone, minimise criminal activities and support the development of a sustainable Blue Economy in the region. BIMSTEC is also a desirable platform for India to manifest its foreign policy in the form of ‘Act East’ &‘Neighbourhood First’, Security & Growth for all In the Region (SAGAR) and Sagarmala. A regional legal cooperation to put into effect the regional aspirations of unity in diversity therefore should be a priority.

Since its inception in 1997, BIMSTEC had a slow pace of development for various reasons including political, economic, social, and cultural. The region, though united historically with a rich cultural heritage, but post decolonisation got impregnated with crimes like insurgency, terrorism, narcotics smuggling, trafficking, illegal immigration which prompted the member states to consider internal and border security issues on priority. The development plan got ignored in the process. The oceans were put on the back-burner. Except for addressing security issues, development of the blue economy of the Bay of Bengal never received the required thrust.

The maritime delimitation issue between India and Bangladesh and between Bangladesh and Myanmar having being resolved, the maritime zones presently are clearly marked in the Bay of Bengal in terms of jurisdiction. This also has defined the Areas beyond national jurisdiction (ABNJ) which should now prompt the member states of BIMSTEC to have laws and a regulatory mechanism to jointly and severally govern the Bay.

BIMSTEC leaders emphasised the importance of blue economy and agreed to cooperate in this sector for sustainable development of the region. They decided to establish an Inter-governmental Expert Group to develop an action plan on blue economy, keeping in mind the special needs and circumstances of the landlocked member states. The BIMSTEC leaders noted with satisfaction the hosting of International Blue Economy Conference in Bangladesh in 2017 with the participation of government representatives from BIMSTEC member states.

BIMSTEC not only connects South and South-East Asia, but also the ecologies of the Great Himalayas and the Bay of Bengal. With shared values, histories, ways of life, and destinies that are interlinked, BIMSTEC represents a common space for peace and sustainable development.

Though the Bay has been an intrinsic part of the economy of the BIMSTEC nations, Ocean governance has been a low priority issue for the member states. Whether it is rights of sovereignty in the territorial waters or sovereign rights in the EEZ or for that matter governance of ABNJ, the laws are very limited and hardly harmonised with the prevalent international legal regime. Most of these member states have outdated colonial laws still governing the waters of the region. The absence of laws has created enormous opportunities for the criminal elements to vitiate the peace and legal order in the waters, resulting in deeply entrenched negative mercantile practices dominated by unlawful influences.

The most affected industry is fishing in the region characterised by over exploitation of available catch. The Bay of Bengal has 475 different species of fish and 36 species of shrimps. In the 2017-18 fiscal year, 6.5 lakh ton of fish was produced from the Bay which is more than seven percent of the world’s catch. The major cross border issues that are affecting the fishing industry in the Bay amongst others include a declining trend in the overall availability of fish; changes in species composition of catches; the high proportion of half-grown fish in the catch; and changes in marine biodiversity, especially through loss of vulnerable and endangered species. Fishing overlaps national jurisdictions. This has been a sticky problem between India and Bangladesh and a slightly more serious issue between India and Sri Lanka. Countries are experiencing difficulties in implementing fisheries management, especially the ecosystem approach to fisheries.

The Bay of Bengal countries contribute significantly to the global problem of loss of vulnerable and endangered species and there is lack of implementation of suitable policies at State level. There is open access to fishing grounds. The governments of these surrounding countries emphasise on increasing fish catches because of high consumer demand for fish. There is inappropriate government subsidies provided to fisherfolk. Further, increasing fishing effort, especially from trawlers and purse seiners including for seed and fishmeal for aquaculture, ineffective fisheries management, illegal and destructive fishing further add to the woes of the fishing industry of the region. The number of fishing harbours and fish landing centres are proportionately much less. There are hardly any cold storage facilities for the fishing industry which leads to huge wastage of the catch. Most of the fisher families in the eastern coast of India live below the poverty line resulting in a very unsystematic functioning of the fishing industry in the region. This is where BIMSTEC needs to take the lead in effective governance for a sustainable development of the fishing industry as an integral part of the blue economy. Legal cooperation among member states to deliberate on resolving these issues is an absolute necessity.

The Bay of Bengal is an area of high biodiversity with many endangered and vulnerable species. The major cross border issues relating to habitats pertain to the loss and degradation of mangroves, coral reefs and the loss of and damage, to sea grasses. Climate change impacts are shared by all BIMSTEC member states. Other issues of concern within the Bay economy pertain to food security needs of the coastal poor, lack of coastal development plans, increasing trade in products from coastal habitats, coastal development and industrialisation, ineffective marine protected areas and lack of enforcement, upstream development that affects water-flow, intensive upstream agricultural practices, and increasing ad-hoc tourism. If these issues are not defined and managed systematically with a correct policy and a regulatory mechanism, they will start eating into the economy rather than resulting in development.

Pollution of the Bay is a very serious issue. Discharge of untreated/partially treated sewage, sewage and organic discharges from the Ganges-Brahmaputra-Meghna River, Sewage-borne pathogens and organic load, solid waste/marine litter, increasing nutrient inputs, oil pollution, persistent organic pollutants (POPs) and persistent toxic substances (PTSs), sedimentation, and heavy metals are destroying the ecology of the Bay. Plastics and derelict fishing gear can be transported long distances across oceans. Differences between countries with regard to regulation and enforcement of shipping discharges may drive discharges across the oceans. Tar balls are transported long distances. POPs/PTSs and mercury, including organo-mercury, undergo long-range transportation. Sedimentation and most heavy metal contamination tend to pollute locally. Increasing coastal population density and urbanisation, higher consumption, resulting in more waste generated per person, insufficient funds allocated to waste management, migration of industry and proliferation of small industries are related issues of serious magnitude that require impact assessment and regulation.

Seabed mining and exploitation of poly-metallic nodules are expected to resume in the near future. India, in accordance with its contract with the International Seabed Authority (ISA) is conducting exploration on the seabed in the central Indian Ocean basin. However, it is to be noted that poly-metallic nodules are also available on the seafloor in the areas of national jurisdiction of the BIMSTEC coastal countries. In the absence of regional technology to the BIMSTEC nations except for India, the BIMSTEC will have to specially look at this domain of exploitation of future resources on the seabed and draft a policy of possibility of coordination with the ISA in terms of technology transfer, protection of the marine environment, marine scientific research and related issues.

Besides commercial issues there are criminal activities that are persisting across the Bay. Terrorism, smuggling of drugs, human trafficking, smuggling of contraband items are a very common feature across the Bay. IUU (Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated) fishing in the EEZ of other member states has been a cause of tension between member states of the BIMSTEC.

The Fifth Summit and Way Forward

Problems in the Bay are both historical and as a result of recent global developments. Therefore, it has become all the more important for the BIMSTEC to draft a policy of legal cooperation amongst the member states for better governance of the Bay so that a sustainable Blue Economy can develop and increase the GDP of member states manifold.

BIMSTEC needs to effectively cooperate with the United Nations and other regional organisations to implement its goals and achieve necessary targets. The corporatization of the fishing industry in the region is very important so that the quality of the industry, the life of the fisherfolk and infrastructure with good cold storage facilities can be improved manifold. It is important for the private sector to get involved and more harbours and fish landing centres need to be constructed with immediate effect.

Marine tourism, which could add manifold to the revenue of the BIMSTEC countries, must be picked up with public-private participation. Single regional visas or inter country recognition of passports without visas should work for easy movement of people. Beach tourism and cruise tourism need to be developed amongst the member states. There are beautiful beaches and tourism sites in the entire region which requires to be promoted amongst the people in the region as well as the globe at large.

The unity in diversity which is a special attribute of the BIMSTEC nations can fully fructify only when there is peace and security in the region. Thus, BIMSTEC is expected to play a vital role in governance of the Bay and India has to assume a leadership role to give effect to its ‘Neighbourhood First’ and ‘Act East Policy’ and absorb the development shock of the ingress of Belt and Road Initiative of China by a stronger and more evolved BIMSTEC with an improved governance of the Bay Economic Zone coupled with an established legal and regulatory framework in all aspects of economic development with a strong compliance guidelines to ensure enforcements.

Author Brief Bio:Dr. Madhumita Kothari is a legal academician teaching at various universities, writing research papers in the domain of her expertise and a Keynote Speaker at various national & international conferences. An award-winning Senior Legal Professional educated in the UK, Germany & India, she is presently, partner in HSA Advocates. She has 25 years of proven track record in the commercial sector across the areas of international commercial arbitration, dispute resolution, compliance and regulatory, international joint ventures, risk assessment & management, brand management, corporate communications, and cross-border transactions in Law of the Sea, shipping laws, energy, power, infrastructure, aviation, environment, artificial intelligence, mining, packaging, retail & education.

REFERENCES:

1. https://www.mea.gov.in/Speeches-Statements.htm?dtl/35090/English_Translation_of_Remarks_by_Prime_Minister_Shri_Narendra_Modi_at_the_5th_BIMSTEC_Summit
2. https://www.mea.gov.in/Speeches-Statements.htm?dtl/35088/Statement+by+External+Affairs+Minister+Dr+S+Jaishankar+at+the+BIMSTEC+Ministerial+Meeting
3. https://bimstec.org/
4. http://www.theindependentbd.com/post/164415
5. Indian Ministry of External Affairs, “Prime Minister’s Message on 20th Anniversary of Establishment of BIMSTEC,” June 6, 2017, http://www.mea.gov.in/Speeches-Statements.htm?dtl/28514/Prime_Ministers_message_on_20th_anniversary_of_establishment_of_BIMSTEC
6. http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/infographic/2017/06/06/blue-economy
7. http://thecommonwealth.org/blue-economy
8. https://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/blog/2018/blue-economy-sustainable-ocean-economic-paradigm.html
9. https://www.iucn.org/theme/marine-and-polar/our-work/international-ocean-governance
10. https://thediplomat.com/2018/11/can-bimstec-finally-become-relevant/
11. https://thediplomat.com/2018/08/making-sense-of-indias-revived-interests-in-bimstec/
12. https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/what-is-bimstec-and-why-is-it-important-for-india/story-SPT8asnufTPmW1kxG5PLaP.html
13. https://www.daily-sun.com/post/332913/Bimstec-leaders-to-cooperate-on-blue-economy-for-sustainable-development
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18. https://pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=1544617

Established in 1997, the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC), an inter-regional group, aimed to promote free trade, cross-border investment, tourism and technical cooperation^[1]. The organisation gradually expanded its mission and now, more than two decades after its founding, BIMSTEC has a legal and institutional framework, the BIMSTEC Charter^[2].

But the challenges of this century require speedier steps. One issue that needs urgent action from the BIMSTEC countries is climate change. The 5^th BIMSTEC Summit Declaration of 30 March 2022 was progressive on most fronts, yet had limited mention of how to counter the effects of climate change. This is ironic, considering that all the BIMSTEC countries are vulnerable to the threats posed by climate change.

BIMSTEC contains 22% of the world’s population on 3% of its geographical area, who contribute about 4% of global GDP^[3]. South Asia has the world’s highest risk of climate-induced floods, sea level rise and droughts, according to the U.N.’s most recent climate change report^[4]. The IPCC report of 2022^[5] also predicts significant water scarcity in countries along the Ganges and Indus rivers, and severe food shortages.

How this block tackles climate change will have implications for itself and for regions beyond its borders. A BIMSTEC Joint Working Group set up in 2021 has been tasked to prepare an Action Plan on Climate Change, a small but welcome step in the right direction. This article will evaluate climate vulnerabilities across the region, progress on cooperation and suggest ways to strengthen collaborative action.

Status Of Action on Climate Change:

Global climate change discussions focus on two broad areas: mitigation and adaptation^[6]. Mitigation aims to reduce the severity of climate change at the root-cause, greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. Reducing emissions or removing carbon from the atmosphere is crucial if the world is to meet the Paris Agreement^[7]’s ambitious goal of limiting average global temperature rise to 2⁰ C while working to further limit it to 1.5⁰ C. Emission reduction requires a transition to green energy sources. Nullifying or sequestering carbon in forests or oceans also lowers emissions.

With 2.5 billion tonnes of annual CO₂ emissions, India tops the chart in BIMSTEC, followed by Thailand (257 million tonnes) and Bangladesh (92 million tonnes)^[8]. Thailand and Bhutan lead the group in per capita emissions, with 3.9 tonnes and 2.5 tonnes, respectively. Their per capita emissions are higher than India’s largely because they are more sparsely populated: India has 464 people per sq. km, Thailand and Bhutan have 137 and 20 people per sq. km.^[9]. However, compared to the global average per capita emissions of 4.5 tonnes, BIMSTEC emissions are lower.

Complying with limiting the global average temperature rise to 2⁰ C or below is expected to cost South Asia 1.3% to 2.5% of GDP annually starting in 2050. That could increase to 6% of GDP annually if emission cuts are not undertaken at all^[10]. Therefore, there is an urgent need to take strong action on climate change. Country specific conditions across BIMSTEC are given below.

Bhutan, BIMSTEC’s lead country for Environment and Climate Change, is the only carbon neutral country in the world^[11]. Bhutan’s forest cover removes more CO₂ from the atmosphere than the country emits. However, climate change threatens vital elements of Bhutan’s growth: agriculture, hydro power, and forestry. Outburst floods from glacial lakes induced by climate change threaten the subsistence farming on which 80% of its population depends^[12].  Climate change also creates soil loss, thereby degrading arable land in the long term. Flooding is expected to increase and cost as much as 4% of Bhutan’s GDP by 2030 in reduced livelihoods, destruction of agricultural land and economic output^[13].

Nepal’s condition is no different. With Bhutan, it is expected to suffer higher than global average temperature rises by 2080. Increased floods, heat waves and glacial lake outbursts pose threats to Nepal’s economy as well^[14]. As agriculture is responsible for over 80% of emissions in Nepal, balancing emissions reductions with food security will be a challenge. Nepal’s policies are compatible with limiting the global temperature rise to 1.5⁰ C^[15]. Turning to renewable energy sources for transportation and other uses will help to reduce the GHG footprint. Nepal plans to mandate all light vehicles be electric by 2031. However, policy hurdles need to be addressed: Nepal needs to lower import duties, incentivise domestic manufacturing, and optimise EV production costs.

Bangladesh’s geographical position makes it highly vulnerable to climate change. The world’s largest delta, most of its land is below sea level and is vulnerable to devastating floods, sea level rise and other extreme weather events^[16]. Here too, agriculture is the biggest GHG emitter, followed by heat and electricity generation. and diversifying its energy sources is essential: to do so Bangladesh needs support from neighbouring countries. Shared hydroelectric power, offshore wind farms and an interconnected grid across BIMSTEC would be some of the ways its neighbours may contribute to reducing Bangladesh’s GHG emissions. The country needs about $5 billion per year until 2030 to mitigate and adapt to climate change^[17], leaving it with a finance gap of USD 1.7 billion a year, a huge shortfall. The developed world will determine whether this finance gap is met. Sustainable waste management is an area where the country can reduce GHG emissions. With rapid urbanisation and limited land availability for waste disposal, this problem will be exacerbated and the need for a solution is becoming more urgent.

Although the projected average temperature rise over Sri Lanka is estimated to be slightly lower than the global average, the number of days over 35⁰ C due to climate change will increase from 20 to 100 a year by the turn of this century^[18]. This will have implications for agricultural productivity (especially rice), energy consumption and nutritional security. Flash floods and cyclones are expected to increase. Fossil fuels are the biggest contributors to Sri Lanka’s GHG emissions. Its policymakers should develop sustainable alternatives to expensive overseas fuel, especially given Sri Lanka’s ongoing economic crisis.

In India, more than 80% of the population is vulnerable to the impact of climate change^[19]. Extreme weather events, cyclones, floods, heat weaves and droughts are poised to dent the country’s GDP by 12% annually by the turn of this century^[20]. Other socio-economic impact ranges from migration of communities affected by climate change to the loss of life and property. India’s renewable energy plans need to be fully met if it is to significantly reduce its overall GHG emissions. India has pledged to go carbon neutral by 2070 and needs USD 10 trillion to do so^[21]. Mobilisation of international climate finance will be essential for the country to meet its goal. Ground water depletion is another challenge as it is a major source of irrigation. Climate change will increase the ground water draw, further complicating projected water and food crises^[22].

Increased temperatures, extreme rainfall (over 100 mm/day of precipitation) and changes to rainfall patterns threaten agricultural productivity and food security in Thailand^[23]. Although the country has pledged to go carbon neutral by 2065, ambiguity surrounds its plans to achieve that feat. Details regarding the mechanisms and policy instruments to be adopted need to be spelled out before Thailand’s plan can be judged. Nevertheless, the intention to go carbon neutral exists!

Similarly, Myanmar faces hydro-meteorological threats, while most of its emissions arise from land use changes. Closer attention needs to be given to the alarming rate of loss of forest cover that is releasing trapped CO₂ in the atmosphere. Between 2002-2020, Myanmar lost 4 million hectares of forest land, resulting in 2.4 Gt of GHG emissions^[24]. Conversion of forest lands to other land uses needs to be strategically managed and alternatives to large-scale deforestation need to be developed.

Interstate Rivers and Biodiversity

The BIMSTEC bloc has been steadily enhancing its cooperation in the areas of inland waterway (river) transportation and shared hydroelectricity. However, BIMSTEC countries have yet to sign water-sharing agreements for several rivers. Barring Sri Lanka (due to its geographical location), all BIMSTEC countries share riverine resources. India, Bhutan, and Bangladesh share the watershed of the Ganges, Brahmaputra, and Meghna. Myanmar and Thailand share important rivers with the Salween forming a natural barrier between them.

Rivers are important to the livelihoods of fishing communities and contribute to the region’s food security. However, the majority of river-sharing arrangements amongst these countries have yet to be formalised or even formally discussed. India and Nepal haven’t signed any agreements since the Mahankali water-sharing agreement of 1985.  India and Bangladesh have yet to reach a Teesta water sharing treaty. Use of the Salween continues to be a contentious issue between Thailand and Myanmar.

Although river-sharing may appear to be a bilateral issue, ambiguity on water allocation may lead a country to take unilateral decisions, resulting in regional conflicts. With climate change-induced droughts and ground water depletion, countries need to find more water for their populations.  This will create competing claims over river water. To prevent erosion of trust and camaraderie, it is in the interest of BIMSTEC to proactively deal with emerging threats.

This region is rich in biodiversity: BIMSTEC countries are home to four of the world’s major biodiversity hotspots.: the Western Ghats and Sri-Lanka, Indo-Burma, the Himalayas and Sunderland.  A hotspot must satisfy two important criteria^[25]

1. Host at least 1,500 species of vascular plants that are not found anywhere else on the planet (endemic species.)
2. Contain 30% or less of its original vegetation, meaning it is threatened by human activity.

People benefit from hotspots. They provide water, livelihoods to indigenous communities, timber and non-timber forest products, and are significant for building resilience against climate vulnerabilities. Climate change and pressure from people have put these hotspots at risk. Illegal wildlife trade, poaching, loss of vegetation and biodiversity are some of the key threats. Remedying these requires collective action by member countries across borders.

Figure 2. Biodiversity hotspots of BIMSTEC. Source: https://www.tropicalconservationfund.org/biodiversityhotspots.html

Recommendations

Climate change is a shared problem that all countries face and the BIMSTEC countries are no exception. BIMSTEC must urgently work to reduce climate vulnerabilities, mitigate emissions and adapt to changing climate, to contribute to sustainable development in the region. The following is recommended:

Advocate forClimate Finance Flows from the Developed World: Climate finance is vital to enable BIMSTEC countries to deal with the crisis. Climate finance needs have been assessed for India^[26] and Bangladesh^[27] but to advocate effectively for ways to meet climate finance requirements BIMSTEC needs to determine the total amount of climate finance required by each country, as well as for sub-regional requirements. While country-driven approaches for the delivery of climate finance are useful, a regional assessment will enable the block to demand financial resources from the developed world. Countries working together under regional or contextual groups can better influence global discussions to secure their interests.

A Shared Framework on Climate Change Response: A framework needs to be developed that provides guidance to collectively deal with crises from climate-induced events. This will help preparations and the humanitarian response before, during and after an extreme weather event.

Financial Resource Pool: Within BIMSTEC a financial resource pool for a range of responses to climate change must be developed. A line of credit or other practical mechanism can be developed to support activities such as renewable energy promotion, sustainable technology acquisition, afforestation, climate smart agriculture, disaster risk reduction and more. Coupled with the framework on climate change, this financial resource pool will ensure resources are available when a country needs them, rather than forcing governments to solicit financial support after a calamity has struck.

Achieving Net-Zero Through Regional Collaboration: As BIMSTEC economies grow, their GHG and environmental footprint will also increase. Although most have plans to become ‘net-zero,’ they will need to obtain climate finance, technological support and capacity building to be successful. The international commitments on mobilization of climate finance agreed at Paris ($100 billion replenishable annually) have not yet been fully met or disbursed. The global response to the war in Ukraine might create competing claims on financial resources from the developed world. It is important for countries like India, with its extant ability and know how, to produce climate resilient technology and build capacity to support its regional neighbours.

Weather Forecasting Capacities: Improvements can be made to regional weather forecasting and emergency response capacities.  India pledging to reactivate the BIMSTEC Centre for Weather and Climate will boost the region’s weather forecast capabilities^[28].  Two multi-agency Disaster Management Exercises have been carried out that will strengthen shared emergency responses. India may take a lead in developing and launching a dedicated satellite for the BIMSTEC region to further augment regional weather monitoring capacity.

One Sun, One World, One Grid: While the renewable energy gap closes, the region’s energy supply needs to be secure. BIMSTEC’s equatorial and tropical countries have sunshine most of the year; their geography allows them to harness solar energy for extensive periods of time. Expansion of the green energy grid One Sun, One World, One Grid (OSOWOG) in the region can provide renewable energy and energy security. BIMSTEC’s Grid Interconnection Coordination Committee plans to develop a green grid as well as the policy framework for trade, exchange of electricity and a tariff mechanism^[29], India can take the lead in supporting the development of a BIMSTEC green grid that can become a sub-set of the South-East Asian OSOWOG. India already has plans to connect Sri Lanka with an interconnected grid and is working with its Southeast Asian neighbours on OSOWOG^[30]. Harnessing offshore wind energy over the Bay of Bengal and distributing it through the grid is a good way to increase the share of renewables in the energy basket.

Biodiversity And Natural Resource Conservation:  The area is teeming with biodiversity and is home to many indigenous species of flora and fauna. Given the geographical contiguity of the block’s countries, a shared conservation initiative is a natural group effort, with joint initiatives essential to safeguard natural resources, prevent illegal trade and hunting of endangered animals. India’s success in participatory conservation methods such as Joint Forest Management, can provide a template for the region. Participatory collaboration can be force-multipliers for wildlife surveillance, community-driven conservation and to secure livelihoods of communities that depend on biodiversity. A shared mechanism, such as a group of environment ministers, can oversee conservation efforts across BIMSTEC.

Formalizing Water-Sharing Agreements: Although BIMSTEC focuses on the Bay of Bengal, the rivers traversing the region are crucial for freshwater supply to the bay, the livelihood of communities and economic activities. The bloc must engage with member countries to settle water-sharing agreements on trans-boundary rivers. River-sharing agreements between India and Bangladesh for the Teesta, and between Thailand, Myanmar and China for the Salween must be concluded.  Parties need to abide by agreements in existing river settlements as trust between countries is indispensable for the success of BIMSTEC. Given that climate change will exacerbate the regional water crisis, it is vital for BIMSTEC to incorporate the terms ‘river’ and/ or ‘water’ in its charter and to develop a cooperation initiative on water.

Conclusion

BIMSTEC is an important initiative for collective action on the region’s most challenging issues. Climate change cannot be ignored.  Its impact needs to be carefully evaluated, vulnerabilities must be identified, and collective action plans developed to reduce dangers. The lead country on Environment and Climate Change, Bhutan, must act urgently and guide the working group in preparation for a road map for BIMSTEC. This bloc must focus on being ‘atmanirbhar’ to combat climate change as the threats it faces are unique. Solutions are available in the region. If BIMSTEC countries take on climate action together, they will strengthen the group and act as a replicable model for regional cooperation.

Author Brief Bio: Damodar Pujari is Fellow, Climate Change, Gateway House, Mumbai

References:

^[1] Bangkok Declaration Document, Government of Nepal: to promote free trade within the region, increase cross-border investment and tourism and to promote technical cooperation

^[2]https://drive.google.com/file/d/1imTXMnsLg3ostI-kN8E5L6CeRyMWrGhh/view

^[3]https://databank.worldbank.org/source/world-development-indicators

^[4]https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar6/wg2/downloads/outreach/IPCC_AR6_WGII_FactSheet_Asia.pdf

^[5]https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar6/wg2/downloads/outreach/IPCC_AR6_WGII_FactSheet_Asia.pdf

^[6]https://www.eea.europa.eu/help/faq/what-is-the-difference-between#:~:text=In%20essence%2C%20adaptation%20can%20be,(GHG)%20into%20the%20atmosphere.

^[7]https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/english_paris_agreement.pdf

^[8]https://ourworldindata.org/co2/country/bhutan?country=BTN~BGD~MMR~THA~NPL~LKA~IND

^[9] Our world in data and Global Carbon Project: https://ourworldindata.org/co2/country/bhutan?country=BTN~BGD~MMR~THA~NPL~LKA~IND

^[10] Assessing the costs of climate change and adaptation in South Asia. Mandaluyong City, Philippines: Asian Development Bank, 2014.: https://www.preventionweb.net/files/38999_assessingcostsclimatechangeandadapt.pdf

^[11] Hindustan Times report: https://www.indiatimes.com/explainers/news/negative-emission-of-carbon-552521.html#:~:text=Bhutan%20do%20it%3F-,The%20Kingdom%20of%20Bhutan%20is%20the%20only%20country%20in%20the,eventually%20creates%20a%20carbon%20sink.

^[12] Royal Government of Bhutan (RGB] (2006). National Adaptation Programme of Action. Retrieved from http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/napa/btn01.pdf

^[13] Bhutan’s Climate Risk Profile by Asian Development Bank: https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/publication/722636/climate-risk-country-profile-bhutan.pdf

^[14] Nepal’s Climate Risk Profile by ADB: https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/publication/677231/climate-risk-country-profile-nepal.pdf

^[15]https://climateactiontracker.org/countries/nepal/

^[16] Bangladesh’s Climate and Disaster Risk Atlas by ADB: https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/publication/760781/bangladesh-climate-disaster-risk-atlas-volume2-cover-pgxxiv.pdf

^[17]https://www.opml.co.uk/blog/combat-climate-change-bangladesh-example-to-follow

^[18] Sri Lanka’s Climate Risk Profile by ADB: https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/publication/653586/climate-risk-country-profile-sri-lanka.pdf

^[19] Climate Change Vulnerability Index of India, CEEW: https://www.ceew.in/publications/mapping-climate-change-vulnerability-index-of-india-a-district-level-assessment

^[20]  The costs of climate change in India by Overseas Development Institute: https://odi.org/en/publications/the-costs-of-climate-change-in-india-a-review-of-the-climate-related-risks-facing-india-and-their-economic-and-social-costs/

^[21] World Economic Forum: https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2022/01/green-finance-bolster-india-transition-net-zero/#:~:text=The%20goal%2C%20according%20to%20the,%2C%20industrial%2C%20and%20transport%20sectors.

^[22]https://edition.cnn.com/2021/02/24/asia/india-groundwater-study-intl-hnk-scn/index.html

^[23] Thailand climate vulnerability profile: https://www.iucn.org/sites/dev/files/content/documents/thailand_country_profile_june2014_press.pdf

^[24]https://tinyurl.com/2p8dpnzv

^[25] Conservation Priorities: https://www.conservation.org/priorities/biodiversity-hotspots#:~:text=To%20qualify%20as%20a%20biodiversity,in%20other%20words%2C%20is%20irreplaceable.

^[26]https://www.theclimategroup.org/our-work/news/financing-climate-action-india-priorities-and-reflections-cop26-indian-states

^[27]https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/Climate_en_com.pdf

^[28]https://www.business-standard.com/article/economy-policy/india-to-lead-security-pillar-of-bimstec-pm-pitches-for-regional-security-122033001342_1.html

^[29] BIMSTEC Event Update: https://bimstec.org/?event=bimstec-grid-interconnection-coordination-committee-deliberates-on-how-to-undertake-the-bimstec-grid-interconnection-master-plan-study-bgimps

^[30] Financial Express: https://www.ris.org.in/bimstec/bookspdf/FE-29-05-2020-One%20Sun%20One%20World%20One_Grid.pdf