Introduction

With the return of the Taliban to power in Afghanistan the entire geo-strategic environment in greater South Asia has taken a turn for the worse. The Taliban’s ascent to power poses reconfiguration of the strategic dynamics in the region. Contrary to the general perception, it is not the Taliban that would be the net contributor to the security volatility in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region. Currently there are close to a dozen radical Islamic non-state outfits operating in Afghanistan. However, the most powerful and dreaded of them happen to be the Islamic State of Khorasan (IS-K). The radical intervention of the IS-K, in the region’s geopolitical affairs, can be deeply problematic.

This essay has four key objectives. First, it argues why failures in governance leads to that political entity becoming an attractive haven for non-state actors such as terrorist outfits. It does so by introducing the theory of state failure to explain this phenomenon. While staying on that theme, it suggests, how a collapsed state, such as Afghanistan under the Taliban, lacking recognition (both internal and external) has become the preferred destination for many non-state actors with ambitions of undermining regional stability.

Second, while staying on the topic of non-state actors it examines the ideological and strategic characters of the Islamic State in general and IS-K in particular. Third, it suggests why the Taliban and the IS-K having their origins in the same religion and a shared radical outlook find themselves in the opposite sides of the ring. Fourth, the essay maps out the future security challenges emanating from the IS-K beyond Afghanistan.

In the conclusion, this essay proposes, that given this all-encompassing threat, the states in the region will do well by shifting their focus from the traditional inter-state conflict dynamics and devote their energy and resource to tackling the growing menace of IS-K.

State Collapse

Afghanistan, prior to the Taliban takeover on 15 August 2021, was a failed state. However, given the manner of their ascent to power, the country’s subsequent isolation from the international community precipitated the state failure leading to a state collapse.

According to realist international relations theory, viable states are characterised by high degrees of socio-political cohesion. They also possess the ability to respond to the citizens’ everyday needs on a continual basis. These attributes allow them to withstand all manners of security challenges. A weak, failing and collapsed state, by contrast, is one that not only lacks internal socio-political cohesion but are incapable of addressing the multi-dimensional security needs of its citizenry. These weak, failing or collapsed states, as Barry Buzan puts it, exist in a “condition of effective civil war which mirrors all the worst and none of the best features of viable states (Buzan, 1991: 100-101).

Weak, failing or a collapsed states are plagued by several security deficiencies. They face fundamental existential challenges emanating from ethnic, tribal, cultural, religious contestations leading to social fragmentation along those lines. Such internal divisive dynamics severely undermine the effective functioning of the state and in turn create security and strategic nightmares for that country and those adjacent to it.

States are the fundamental units of the international system and are responsible for maintaining both order and justice within their defined borders and behave as responsible members of the global community (Misra, 2004: 11). A collapsed state, by contrast is one which not only lacks legitimacy within but is also shunned by the international community. Lacking respectability at home and abroad, it soon fails to live up to its fundamental role of addressing the question of internal order and international personality.

Compared to a ‘viable state’ a ‘collapsed state’ is often at a disadvantage when it comes to defending itself from corrupt and destabilising forces or ideas (Misra, 2004: 9). Stripped bare of resources to maintain the process of governance and existing on the margins of international society as pariahs, owing to the lack of legal recognition, collapsed states are vulnerable to invidious external influences and intervention by non-state actors. Owing to this existential vacuum for the regime, many competing and contending non-state actors flock to the borders of this collapsed state to act out their own religious and political vision.

Collapsed states are a calamitous challenge for their citizenry and neighbours. Without a legally recognised government, the citizens in a collapsed state are more likely to come under the influence of radical non-state actors and their spurious ideologies. Since the authority of the central government is contested, many anti-state actors can take advantage of the prevailing chaos and enlist supporters to undermine the authority of the regime and freely export their own spurious ideologies.

For Robert I. Rotberg, an early proponent of the theory of state collapse, a collapsed state is characterised by “tense, deeply conflicted, dangerous, and contested bitterly by warring factions. In most failed states, government troops battle armed revolts led by one or more rivals. Occasionally, the official authorities in a failed state face two or more insurgencies, varieties of civil unrest, different degrees of communal discontent, and a plethora of dissent directed at the state and at groups within the state (Rotberg, 2003: 5). The prevalent atmosphere in Afghanistan under the Taliban easily fits the definition of a collapsed state as spelt out by Rotberg’s study.

The Taliban are painfully conscious of the fact that they have inherited a dysfunctional economy, a fearful citizenry, a civil society in flight, a near-total absence of foreign reserves, a hostile international system, and ambiguous external supporters and partners. To make matters worse, Afghanistan, under the previous government, was dependent on external aid to cover 75 percent of its budget. The Afghan economy is already in a free fall with a tumbling national currency and a deep financial crisis. Under the circumstances, Afghanistan fast slid into a state collapse whereby the regime failed to address both the human security as well as material security needs of its citizenry.

A violent cartographic vision

The elephant in the room, of course, is IS-K. Before we consign Afghanistan and the region to its vortex of violence, it would be worth asking what the nature and character of this outfit is. What does it stand for? What makes it different from another terror organisation such as the Taliban?

IS-K was set up in January 2015 at the height of IS’s power in Iraq and Syria, before its self-declared caliphate was defeated and dismantled by a US-led coalition (Gardner, 2021). In IS geopolitics, the physical space of occupied Syria and Iraq is the heartland of the end of the world of Islam. Its eastward flank constitutes the Islamic State of Khorasan / IS-K (Giustozzi, 2018). The Islamic State announced its expansion to the Khorasan region in 2015, which historically encompasses parts of modern-day Iran, Central Asia, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. The eastern territorial flanks dominated by the Muslims came to be known as the Khorasan province that necessitated taking over by IS faithful and soldiers. With that objective in mind, the IS had announced its expansion into the Khorasan region way back in 2015. Historically, the region encompassed parts of modern-day Iran, Central Asia, Afghanistan and Pakistan.

While the original Islamic State (IS) was decimated through the armed campaigns by the U.S. and a host of international actors in 2019, it managed to permeate its cartographic and strategic vision among those who subscribed to its ideology long before its demise. According to the geopolitical vision prior to its decimation, the landmass of Iraq and Syria constituted the heartland of Islam (Misra, 2015). Once displaced, plenty of ISIL fighters escaped to the chaotic landscape of Pakistan and Afghanistan, the eastern arm of their prophetic land. Once in this terrain, they have been responsible for internecine turf war with other established militant groups in the region – including the Taliban – and have unleashed their terror on both non-combatant and military targets. While the coalition forces have come under their attack in over hundreds of occasions, it is the civilian populace that have borne the brunt of their violence. IS-K has been responsible for killing innocent civilians, nurses, doctors, pregnant women and children.

In the latest of its attacks, it killed nearly two hundred people near Kabul airport which included 13 U.S. servicemen. Ever since, they have been on a killing spree across Afghanistan – mostly targeting minority Shia community members and other Taliban interests. Ousted from Syria and Iraq, the IS is in desperate search for a homeland. The crises in Afghanistan with a Muslim populace suits its core objective of using it as its base. Since the IS-K has to establish a safe haven for itself in areas of Afghanistan that the Taliban have been controlling for some time, and the Taliban have not agreed to share space with this emerging competitor, there have been these sporadic clashes between the two (Guistozzi, 2001).

The core differences

According to some analysts, the global Islamic State movement is also now depicting Afghanistan as the epicentre of its ideological struggle. The group’s main propaganda organs have trumpeted the successes of its Afghan affiliate, describing the anti-Taliban campaign in an official statement as a “new stage in the blessed jihad” (George,Warrick & DeYoung, 2021). It is worth mentioning, that the Taliban have fought with the IS(K) since its emergence in 2015. During the U.S. and NATO mission in Afghanistan both the groups fought against the external forces as well as against each other. IS-K and the Taliban have been locked in bloody battles with one another for some time.

In recent months, the Taliban has intercepted and killed several IS assassins across Afghanistan. But why this armed encounter between two radical Islamic militant outfits? One is, of course, perturbed by the fact that if both were fighting against the external occupation of Afghanistan, why were they not partners? Why do IS-K and the Taliban clash as militant organisations? To answer these questions, we need to examine the core ideological and political difference that exists between the two. As Frank Gardner, BBC’s long-term security correspondent argues, IS-K have major differences with the Taliban, accusing them of abandoning Jihad and the battlefield in favour of a negotiated peace settlement hammered out in “posh hotels” in Doha, Qatar. Similarly, IS-K considers Taliban militants “apostates,” making their killing lawful under their interpretation of Islamic law (Gardner, 2021).

In terms of its ideological and strategic rivalry, the IS-K hates the Taliban as much as the West (The Economist, 2021). According to a Deutsche Welle analysis, “an ideological gulf separates the two militant groups. While the IS belongs to the Salafist movement of Islam; the Taliban adhere to the Deobandi school (DW, 2021).

This is substantiated by several critics. According to a contemporary observer of IS, Afzal Ashraf.

While the Taliban seems content — at least for now — with an emirate for themselves within Afghanistan, the Islamic State group in Afghanistan and Pakistan strives to establish a caliphate throughout South and Central Asia and has also embraced the Islamic State’s call for a worldwide jihad against non-Muslims (Ashraf, DW, 2021).

With that objective in view, it has established parallel government structures and cells across Afghanistan. This strategy was revealed upon the Taliban’s killing of IS(K)’s shadow governor in the Nangarhar province in mid-October 2021. One might ask what objection the IS(K) should have when there is a fellow Islamic regime is in power in Afghanistan? IS-K views the Afghan Taliban both as its strategic rival in a saturated militant landscape, and as an ideological opponent (Jadoon, Mines & Sayed, 2021). Furthermore, IS-K smears the Taliban’s efforts to form an emirate based on national boundaries, which is directly opposed to the Islamic State’s vision of a global caliphate (Jadoon, Mines & Sayed, 2021).

Apart from the larger geopolitical objective of creating a larger Islamic umma across the Muslim world in the Middle East and South and Central Asia, IS also has its specific take on a rule-based Islamic legal governance. Its gripe with the Taliban stems from the fact that the latter is not interpreting and following an orthodox Sharia law. “For IS-K, the Taliban’s views are not strict enough. IS fighters have called the Taliban apostates and bad Muslims because of their willingness to negotiate a peace deal with the United States. By doing so, they betrayed the goals of the jihad, IS fighters said (DW, 2021).”

According to its original ideological precept, to rid the Islamic world of adversaries who do not follow “true” Islamic principles necessitates an epic military engagement. But to engage its foes in this grand war, IS needs to take the combat to them. It knows that attacking its foes on their own turf will force them to join its cause (Misra, 2015). This might explain the IS-K’s terror engagement with another terror outfit such as the Taliban. Furthermore, IS-K’s activism in the region is linked to the question of its very survival. After having been routed in Iraq and Syria, the group is in desperate need to find a host geography from where to operate. As Graeme Wood in his engaging essay on the Islamic State has very eloquently put it: “Caliphates cannot exist as underground movements, because territorial authority is a requirement: take away its command of territory, and all those oaths of allegiance are no longer binding” (Wood, 2015).

Given Af-Pak regions porous ethno-geographical borders and a relatively receptive audience, the group rightly believes the region offers the best striking chance to regroup, return to its activism and establish a new homeland for its ideology and governance. The IS-K’s moves in this regard is a strategic shift borne out of pure necessity. It rightly feels the Taliban and the Pakistani state cannot compete with it, either in terms of its specific brand of violence or building an oppositional consensus based on a specific borderless Islamic worldview. That being the objective, it is likely to up the ante.

In terms of strategic parity, there is a lot of difference between the Taliban and the IS-K. While the Taliban is in possession of a state, the IS-K remains stateless. Similarly, while the Taliban is playing to assume the identity of a legitimate government, the IS-K will forever remain a terrorist front. Added to that is the issue of military equivalence between the two.  “The Islamic State has far fewer fighters in Afghanistan than the Taliban — roughly 2,000 according to the latest United Nations estimate, compared to Taliban ranks estimated at more than 70,000 — but many fear it could grow if the Taliban fractures or if disaffected Taliban members seeking a return to the battlefield peel off to join other groups” (George,Warrick & DeYoung, 2021).

This inherent strategic imbalance, however, is unlikely to deter IS-K from undertaking larger and bolder terror objectives.  The group and its sleeper cells are also emboldened by the fact that they represent a strand within Afghanistan-Pakistan region who are receptive to a radical Islamic politics but do not necessarily identify with the Taliban’s core ideology.

Terrorists against a terrorist regime

The linkage between state collapse and terrorism is conclusively established by several different academic and policy studies (Zartman, 1995; Rotberg, 2003; Misra, 2004; Fukuyama, 2006). In fact, one of the key indicators of state collapse is the growth of criminal violence in the country under review (Rotberg, 2003: 5).

Afghanistan under the Taliban is experiencing prolonged encounters with non-state terrorists, growing threat of radicalisation, violent sectarianism and cross-border terrorist infiltration. Paradoxical as it may seem, there are nearly half-a-dozen non-state terrorist outfits operating in the country whose key intention is to undermine the authority of the ruling regime and undermine the stability in the region. Prominent of these outfits with the most likely lethal power is the Islamic State of Khorasan (henceforth IS-K). The group has claimed responsibility for a spate of attacks on the Taliban interests and Afghan civilians killing hundreds in the process.

After orchestrating a swift control of Afghanistan in mid-August 2021, the Taliban were quick to declare their victory over their U.S. and NATO detractors. What they did not count on was the dissent and opposition within. “After taking over Afghanistan last month, the Taliban claimed that security “has been assured” and that the county was taken out of the “quagmire of war”. But a series of attacks carried out by an affiliate of the ISIL/ ISIS, the Islamic State of Khorasan (IS-K) group in recent weeks has shattered the claims of security (Haris & Latifi, 2021).

The Islamic State “has positioned Afghanistan as a foremost priority — both in terms of media and military activity — since the withdrawal of the U.S. and the Taliban’s subsequent takeover” (George,Warrick & DeYoung, 2021). Sworn rivals of the Taliban, the IS-K pose the biggest threat to Afghanistan and regional peace.

In Afghanistan, the IS-K has emerged as “the most significant threat to the Taliban’s dominion as well as to public safety. So far, the Taliban has failed to contain the terrorists, who have staged numerous attacks (Raghavan, 2021).” Although the Taliban have expressed in the past their commitment to an Afghanistan where the country’s territory cannot be used by other non-state actors for their own ideological cause (Misra, 2021), given their tenuous hold over the country they are unlikely to be in a position to thwart the IS-K threat. The entire IS-K initiative is of extreme concern to the ruling regime in Kabul. Whether the new regime is going to be primarily Pashtun-led, a government of national unity, an inclusive political formation or an extremely conservative one, irrespective of the nature and character this new government, the challenges it is likely to face from the IS-K can be debilitating.

Should the IS-K cells and operatives decide to rupture the Taliban’s authority, the latter cannot maintain its sovereignty effectively. There are two reasons why the new regime will find it hard to address the challenges coming from these operatives. First, the members belonging to this outfit in the country are not necessarily Arabs – to whom IS ideology is originally attributed to. Most of IS-K members are indigenous Afghans who may be outwardly sympathetic to the Taliban but could be maintaining a hard-line position in private. They are not necessarily bought over by the current regimes ideological disposition and outlook on governance.

IS-K has the capacity to easily blend into the mainstream and attack the interests of the Afghan state with relative ease. It is this inability to distinguish and differentiate them from the rest which would prove extremely challenging to the regime – should it decide to weed them out at some point. If it does try to confront IS-K in the home territory, then, the regime stands being exposed to violent surprise attacks in every possible context and scenario. Pursuing a live and let live policy is not going to be of any help to the Taliban either. Turning a blind eye to their militancy stands capsizing the very effectiveness of the Taliban’s core ideology, governance and ultimately regime survival.

If events on the ground are anything to go by, it amply proves that Afghanistan will remain the playground of various radical Islamic outfits. That its future is going to be mired by bouts of sectarian violence is proved by the indiscriminate suicide bomb attacks by IS-K and perhaps many other radical outfits. These gory events demonstrate the fact that the regime is incapable of addressing these threats. Present day Afghanistan is a country rife with suicide bombings and empty of liveable opportunities. With al Qaeda sleeper cells operating throughout the country, the IS-K intermittent bombings, and the neighbouring Uighur radical Islamic incursion, in all likelihood Afghanistan will slide back into a terrorist safe haven fairly soon.

Proliferation of IS-K radicalism

The Af-Pak areas have been plagued by the perennial problem of lack of credible government presence. The area has lacked enough government both visible and invisible to enforce law. As the state has remained weak in the periphery and at times non-existent, it has remained in the grip of non-state violence.

IS-K is “a complex and fluid amalgam of extremist ideologies and actors. Its reach is spilling over from its traditional stronghold in Nangarhar and risks inflaming sectarian fissures as far afield as Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, China, and India” (Muggah & Rohozinski, 2021). What is, at the moment, a small but highly active offensive against the Taliban-led government, the IS-K dynamics of insurgent violence is likely to spread to the rest of Afghanistan and the region. Unlike the Taliban, which has its focus on Afghanistan, IS-K exhibits regional and millenarian ambitions such as uniting Muslims across South Asia, Central Asia and beyond (Muggah & Rohozinski, 2021). Given that Pakistan is imploding with the rise of several hard-line radical religio-political movements, it is a matter of time before the IS-K finds a favourable condition to spread its mayhem into the neighbouring areas.

The gravity of IS-K threat is well appreciated in the upper echelons of military circles in Pakistan. Despite Pakistan having a history of hobnobbing with various terrorist outfits, for the better part of its career as a newly independent country, there is reckoning among the military as well as political leadership in the country, that they can ill afford the rise of a violent militant outfit such as IS-K which seeks to undermine the very basis of nation-state. In its bid to stem the rising tide of IS-K, the government in Islamabad has undertaken several concrete steps. Principal among these is relaying “raw information as well as helping the Taliban to monitor phone and Internet communication to identify IS-K members and operational hubs” (George,Warrick & DeYoung, 2021).

Although neither a failing state like its immediate neighbour Pakistan, or a collapsed state like Afghanistan under the Taliban, India is nonetheless a vulnerable state when it comes to countering the influence and expansionism of IS-K.  India’s challenging internal religious make up and territorial insurgencies would prove a fertile ground for IS-K’s permeation. An ongoing Islamic insurgency in the restive union territory of Jammu and Kashmir can facilitate establishment of alliances between indigenous and external militants. New Delhi is intimately conscious of the likely impact of a violent IS-K uprising in Afghanistan. Already, security and intelligence agencies in India are bracing for armed attacks by the group in India’s troubled territory of Jammu and Kashmir (Sharma, 2021).

Added to that are the fears of IS-K inspired radicalisation in various pockets throughout India with known history of Islamic insurgency. Indian recruits have featured prominently in several recent IS terror undertakings. In the year 2020, while claiming responsibility for the Nangarhar jailbreak in eastern Afghanistan, the Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP)’s propaganda wing released photographs of 11 attackers, including three Indian recruits from the south-eastern province of Kerala (Basit & Sinan Siyech, 2020). This attack came in the back of 25 March 2020 attack on a Sikh Gurudwara in Kabul by the IS-K which killed some 25 innocent civilians. According to the IS press release, following the incidence, one of four-member team that was behind this attack was an Indian (Dixit, 2020). Mohammed Mushin aka Abu Khalid al-Hindi who was a member of this team came from Kerala’s Kasargod district who had earlier joined the Islamic State.

That the IS and its eastern wing IS-K, is serious about promoting large-scale religious violence in India is proven by the fact that since February 2020, it is bringing out a monthly propaganda magazine called Voice of Hind, with exclusive coverage of events in India. Despite this outreach, critics have repeatedly argued that IS finding a sympathetic audience in India will be marginal. According to this view, “at its peak, IS successfully recruited over 40,000 supporters and sympathisers using the internet and social media platforms from 120 countries around the world. Yet Indians did not amount to more than 200 according to the most liberal figures (Basit & Sinan Siyech, 2020).

True, while IS recruiting drive among Indian Muslims may have been a lacklustre affair in the past, it is unlikely to remain so in the future. Indian radical Islamist’s participation in any future IS-K undertaking is likely to grow and consolidate. This is due to three key factors. First, the previous IS Caliphate undertaking was geographically in a faraway part of the world. This had limited resonance on the Indian sympathisers to the cause. A full-blown IS-K insurgency in Af-Pak region would prompt a sizeable number of participants from India to engage in its ideological and militant cause.

Second, as Raffaello Pantucci, Britain’s Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) puts it, “India was the birthplace of the Deobandi movement, a sect that was a source of ideas for the Taliban, and the conflict in Kashmir has for years been a rallying cry for extremist groups” (Pantucci, 2020). Third, worryingly, Islamic State-Khorasan’s modest territorial footprint in Afghanistan and Pakistan is bolstered by a widening digital presence across Central and South Asia (Muggah, and Rohozinski, 2021). Simply put, despite having a robust governing structure, India is likely to fall prey to the IS-K terror cells owing to the above two reasons. Given various degrees of dissent among some Indian Muslims towards the state, the IS-K would reach out to this constituency, not only to stay relevant among a melee of various terror outfits operating in the region but also to rebuild its ranks.

Conclusion

The US and NATO troop withdrawal from the country has provided a “god-sent” opportunity to a whole host of violent jihadi groups whose primary objective is to ferment chaos and perpetuate anarchy. The battle between rival powers to gain strategic depth in the chaotic Afghanistan-Pakistan region is not a turf war between various state and non-state actors as many observers and analysts would like to point. It is a battle for the very political survival of many actors who have a stake in the larger geopolitical future in the region.

While the Taliban will be busy maintaining its control over the restive population of Afghanistan, there will be one or more key non-Taliban radical forces who would seek to undermine the security in the Af-Pak region and the greater South Asia. For the key actors in the region each will be driven by their own realpolitik concerns. Their respective conduct will be based more on practical rather than principled, moral, or even ideological considerations. Contrary to general strategic scripts, the Taliban has as much an interest in undermining the IS-K as other polities such as Pakistan and India. For the Taliban, reigning in the IS-K will be the very basis to its own political survival in the deeply divided fractious politics of Afghanistan.

It is bad news for everyone. The hardliner, the liberal the secular and the autocratic states are all going to face the heat when it comes to the rise and expansion of the IS-K. As for the regional actors, perhaps it is too early to send out torches and pitch forks to deal with the growing menace of IS-K. But it does not hurt to be prudent and follow a pragmatic policy of greater vigilance to address the likely security threat of this groups sympathisers and affiliates across the greater South Asian region.

Author Brief Bio : Prof Amalendu Misra, PhD, is a Professor of International Politics, Department of Politics, Philosophy & Religion at Lancaster University, United Kingdom. 

References

1. Ashraf, Afzal (2021) ‘Terror in Afghanistan: Who is Islamic State Khorasan?’ Deutsche Welle (DW), 26 August.
2. Basit, Abdul & Sinan Siyech, Mohammed (2020) ‘Islamic State’s India Dilemma: What does the Nangarhar jailbreak tell us about the terror group’s recruitment in India?’ The Diplomat, 26 August.
3. Buzan, Barry (1991) People, State, and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era, Hemel Hempstead: Harvester.
4. Dixit, Rekha (2020) ‘Who is Mohammed Muhsin, the Indian suspect in attack on Sikh gurudwara in Afghanistan?’, The Week, 30 March.
5. Ember, Carol R.& Ember, Melvin (1994) ‘War, Socialization & Interpersonal Violence’, Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol. 38, no. 4, pp. 620-646.
6. Fukuyama, Francis (2006) Nation-Building: Beyond Afghanistan and Iraq, Baltimore, MA: Johns Hopkins University Press.
7. Gardner, Frank (2021) ‘Afghanistan: Who are Islamic State Khorasan Province militants?’, BBC, 11 October.
8. George, Susannah, Warrick, Joby and DeYoung, Karen (2021) ‘Pakistan using informal intelligence channels to prop up Taliban fight against ISIS’, The Washington Post, 23 October.
9. Giustozzi, Antonio (2021) ‘Afghanistan: Who are IS-K and what was the motivation behind Kabul airport attack?’ The Scotsman, 27 August
10. Giustozzi, Antonio (2018) The Islamic State in Khorasan – Afghanistan, Pakistan and the New Central Asian Jihad, London: Hurst.
11. Haris, Mujtaba & Latifi, Ali M. (2021) ‘Taliban takes on ISKP, its most serious foe in Afghanistan’, Al Jazeera, 27 September.

12. Jadoon, Amira, Mindes, Andrew & Sayed, Abdul (2021) ‘The evolving Taliban-ISK rivalry’, The Interpreter, 07 September.
13. Kleinfield, Rachel (2018) A Savage Order: How the World’s Deadliest Countries Can Forge a Path to Security, New York: Pantheon.
14. Misra, Amalendu (2004) Afghanistan: The Labyrinth of Violence, Cambridge: Polity Press.
15. Misra, Amalendu (2015) ‘What does Islamic State actually want?’, The Conversation, 19 November.
16. Misra, Amalendu (2021) ‘Nation Building: Will the Taliban Succeed Where America Failed?’, The National Interest, 18 August.

17. Muggah, Robert & Rohozinski, Rafal (2021) ‘Islamic State-Khorasan’s Reach Extends Far Beyond Afghanistan’, Foreign Policy, 09 September.
18. Pantucci, Raffaello (2020) ‘Indians and Central Asians Are the New Face of the Islamic State’, Foreign Policy, 08 October.
19. Paliwal, Avinash (2021) India’s Afghan strategy as China steps up presence in Af-Pak region, The Times of India, 08 July. Raghavan, Sudarsan (2021) ‘Afghanistan’s war is over, but the Taliban faces a new hurdle: Enforcing the law — and protecting Afghans from ISIS’, The Washington Post, 19 October.
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24. Zartman, I William (1995) Collapsed States The Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.

Asia primarily has four regional security complexes, namely West Asia, Central Asia, East Asia and South Asia. Afghanistan occupies a location of geo-strategic importance as it lies on the periphery of all four, without merging into any of them. It is one of the few nations that remained neutral during the two world wars. Afghanistan has been more of an insulator, than a buffer, between these four complexes. Despite strong forces in its neighbourhood, it has retained its inherent characteristics of internal warlordism, cross-border terrorism and drugs trade.

The Taliban, which has now taken over Afghanistan, were earlier in power from 1996 till 2001. That rule was characterised by a harsh Islamic law, discrimination against women, providing patronage to terrorism and opium cultivation. Only three countries, Saudi Arabia, UAE and Pakistan accorded formal recognition to that government. Origins of the Taliban lie in the guerrilla training of young Pashtuns in the Pakistani seminaries in the cross-border Pashtun belt. A doctrinal mix of a more moderate ‘Pashtunwali’ and a fundamentalist Islam has resulted in an inconsistent ideology, this asymmetry being a source of a larger divide in the Taliban.

Though the Afghanistan political matrix has undergone great changes since 1973, Taliban has retained its significance therein, despite the loss of its founder leader Mullah Muhammad Omar and thousands of its cadres. Its ideology has been shaped by the regional security environment and the fact that Afghanistan is a land locked country, which makes befriending Pakistan and Iran a prerequisite for trade and survival.

Regional Dynamics

The neighbouring regions of Central Asia and West Asia, particularly West Asia, are torn by internal conflicts and intervention of major powers. They are global destabilisers. Geopolitical and security literature has termed these areas as shatterbelts^[i]. Afghanistan, lying between these two regions, itself is facing a combination of civil wars and interventionist actions of other countries, often leading to great power competition.

Rawalpindi has always exercised significant financial, diplomatic and operational control over the guerrilla activities of Taliban. The Director General of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI), a military outfit, was present at the initial government formation at Kabul in September 2021. Pakistan seeks a Taliban-controlled government in Kabul to secure its western borders and keep the Durand Line quandary under control. Pakistan’s rivalry with India has prompted the latter to consider Afghanistan as a form of operational strategic depth. Afghanistan has thus become a secondary theatre of this rivalry.

The Taliban leadership is well aware of these historically adversarial relations between its former mentor, Pakistan, and its beneficiary, India. This has given the Taliban leadership a chance to take advantage of both sides. Recent incidents in the narcotics trade can be viewed from this angle. Nonetheless, this opens a window of opportunity for India.

The Taliban Leadership

The Taliban leadership council is called the Rahbari Shura or the Quetta Shura. It decides on all political and military matters and operates a shadow government through nine commissions and three administrative organs, akin to the ministries of the Taliban government. Most of the Taliban leadership are from the Mujahideen and received their schooling in Afghanistan. Their ideology, thus, is more related to the Afghan tribal way of life.

When Pakistan created the Taliban in the 1990s, inductees were mostly Pashtuns from the madrassas in the Pakistani province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). Ideology of the new inductee Pashtuns was different from that of Afghanistan. The movement’s ideology has transformed over the past two decades from a ‘traditionalist’ Islam conforming to the concepts of Eastern Pashtun villages to one more characteristically conforming with the Arab world. Anand Gopal and Alex Strick van Linschoten, in their June 2017 paper “Ideology in the Afghan Taliban”, have made three important observations regarding dynamism of Taliban ideology^[ii].

• Firstly, though the Taliban’s ideology was rooted in the pre-1979 rural South Pashtun, and did get distorted during the civil war, it was never allowed to become an alien phenomenon, or a product of extremist Pakistani madrassas.
• Secondly, the original Taliban’s ideology has undergone a metamorphosis from Pashtunwali and is now closer to the Arab form of political Islam. The objectives and methodology have shifted in important ways.
• Thirdly, the Taliban’s actions never reflected an unreasoned imitation of an ideology. They have been the result of an internal logic, reflecting a pragmatic concern for statecraft.

Taliban’s Relations with Major Terrorist Groups

The current multi-layered leadership of Taliban is a mix of war veterans from the Mujahideen and guerrilla warfare trainees of the ISI from madrassas in Pakistan. Their occupational activities have brought them in contact with other terrorist groups. Some significant linkages are as under.

• Al-Qaeda. Taliban is a nationalist movement of Afghanistan, whereas al-Qaeda has acquired a global footprint. The latter is bound to the Taliban by a pledge of allegiance, “bay’ah,” which was first offered in the 1990s by Osama Bin Laden to Mullah Omar and which has been renewed several times since, though not always publicly acknowledged by the Taliban.^[iii] It is unlikely that the Taliban will sever their ties with the al-Qaeda, now that they hold power, despite the assurances given in the Doha Agreement in February 2020.
• Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). The (Afghanistan) Taliban received active support from TTP which is ideologically intertwined with groups like al-Qaeda. The TTP too has pledged “Bayah” to the Afghan Taliban, which is a matter of concern to Pakistan. The TTP aims to make Pakistan a Sharia compliant state and their attacks on the Pakistani forces have intensified after Kabul fell to the Taliban.^[iv]
• Islamic State. The Taliban has reportedly fought the self-proclaimed Islamic State, which is a rival of al-Qaeda and has an estimated 2,500 members in Afghanistan. Some districts in Afghanistan are reportedly under ISIS control.
• East Turkmenistan Islamic Movement (ETIM). ETIM is active in the Uighur insurgency in Xinjiang province of West China. It is said to receive training and other logistic support from Taliban.

The Taliban leadership would be under immense international diplomatic and economic pressures to terminate its narcotics trade and support to terrorist activities. Particularly in regard to the latter, external pressures separated from any domestic will, are likely to run into a blind alley. This has potential to lead to a non-optimal situation wherein aid in kind may be more readily available with a general reluctance amongst nations to transfer cash.

Foreign Policy

Afghanistan has always attracted big power attention due to its location at the confluence of multiple regional security complexes. This interest has been rekindled by the energy resources of Central and West Asia and China’s quest for a land access to the Indian Ocean. Pakistan’s influence on Taliban affairs, further complicated by the India-Pakistan rivalry, has drawn Afghanistan into a different security convolute. Taliban’s deciding to keep its released prisoners at Qatar, rather than Pakistan, appear to be a step to managing this conflict.

Taliban’s foreign policy formulation has been based on factors quite akin to those on which Afghan foreign policy has historically been devised. For successful governance of the nation, Taliban will need to address certain critical aspects in the financially bankrupt and war-ravaged nation.

• Afghanistan is a large supplier of dry fruits and has rich mineral deposits all across the country. There are currently more than 1,400 discovered mineral deposits of gems, copper, iron, ore, gold, and lithium in Afghanistan, estimated by US officials as being worth at least US $3 trillion.^[v] This potential can be optimally exploited by technical collaboration with more advanced nations, which in turn will improve its trade deficit too.
• Human resource development, such as higher education facilities and integrating women into the work force will be essential. Educating a nation is costly and has a long lead time. An intermediary measure would be to seek scholarships for higher education courses in friendly countries.
• Economic infrastructure, such as roads and dams, will help usher in prosperity in Afghanistan.
• A well-equipped and trained police force is essential for governance.

All these activities require finances that Afghanistan does not have. Any income from the narcotics trade will be closely monitored by the international community. When last in power, Taliban had tried to generate a renewable source of revenue by progressing a gas pipeline from Turkmenistan to Pakistan and India with the American Unocal Corporation. This did not take off due to political and security instability. Loans from multilateral financial institutions and aid from friendly nations could provide a solution. This underscores the need to establish and maintain good relations with other nations even if it runs contrary to its earlier core ideology.

India’s Concerns

India’s core strategic interests in Afghanistan lie in regional stability and development without external interference. A stable, democratic Afghanistan that is relatively modernist and inclusive would minimise external interference in the country, thereby avoiding geopolitical imbalances in the region. It would also open up the region for flow of energy resources from the oil and mineral-rich Central Asian Republics through pipelines, which would benefit India besides other stake holders. How that is to be achieved would remain a challenge for India, especially with the Taliban government.

A core interest for India would be an Afghanistan that does not become a haven for terrorist groups from across the world. The eradication of all terrorist activities emanating from the region is hence a priority for India, which includes state-sponsored terrorist nurseries and havens along either side of the Durand Line. In a May 2020 statement, the Taliban disassociated itself from the Kashmir insurgency^[vi]. That statement reversed the Taliban’s past ardent opposition to Indian presence in Kashmir by terming the Kashmir situation as a ‘domestic issue of other countries that the movement did not seek to interfere in’.^[vii] Whether the Taliban sticks to this commitment remains to be seen.

Pakistan’s quest for strategic depth in Afghanistan would not affect India strategically as Pakistan’s internal fault lines will deny it success. Pakistan’s commitment to the Sunni cause in Afghanistan has led to violence against its own Shia minority—a strategic error that is potentially of the same gravity as that which cost it East Pakistan, now Bangladesh.

India’s Aid Paradigm

Afghanistan needs sustained external aid to develop in its preferred areas. International aid is generally directed towards the donor nation attaining economic, political or security benefits; however, a pillar of New Delhi’s aid to Kabul has been development partnership. This aid is formulated primarily on basis of Kabul’s stated needs.

India, as the sixth largest donor to Afghanistan, has given over US $ 4 billion aid in the last two decades. It has built more than 2,500 miles of roads, which includes the 218-kilometer Zaranj-Delaram Road to the Afghanistan-Iran border for facilitating movement of goods and services to the Iranian port at Chabahar. This highway, completed in 2010, connects Iran with the Garland Highway, which links Kabul, Kandahar, Mazar-e-Sharif, Herat and Kunduz. It has built the Afghanistan-India Friendship Dam (AIFD), also called ‘Salma Dam’, in Herat District, hydropower plants, electricity transmission lines, hospitals, schools and the country’s new parliament building. Three major characteristics of Indian aid are that it is bereft of any strings attached, overheads are minimised by use of its existing structures and it is provided as per the end-use determined by Kabul.

Where India goes from here, after the Taliban takeover, will depend to a large extent on the type of government the Taliban runs. In February 2020, the Taliban’s political spokesman, Suhail Shaheen, told Turkey’s Anadolu News Agency that the Taliban has “no issue with any country”. Then on 26 August 2021, in an interview to the News Channel CNN-News 18, the same spokesperson candidly stated that the Taliban would be happy if India completed the ongoing projects and would welcome any new projects which were for the welfare of the people.^[viii] How this ultimately pans out is yet to be seen, but it would be prudent to keep in mind the fact that the Taliban government in power is not inclusive and is largely controlled by the Haqqani Network, which in turn is beholden to Pakistan. So further assistance by India will depend on how the situation in Afghanistan evolves.

India’s Afghan Policy and Future Options

New Delhi has consistently supported a strong, democratic and violence free Afghanistan due to the latter’s insulator status between the four regional security complexes of Asia. Afghanistan is party to dominant conflict in South Asia and has pronounced significance to peace and stability in the region. Its inclusion in SAARC in 2007 was promoted by India in order to expedite its strategic integration into the South Asian regional order. The current situation In Afghanistan provides India the opportunity at international power projection, as all major powers have a stake in the manner the Afghan situation pans out. The cost of engagement has to be seen in the context of the cost of non-engagement, so some form of outreach to the Taliban may be inevitable, though this does not mean formal recognition of the government. Indian would need to closely watch the growing congruence between the Taliban and Pakistan, as also the forays that China may make in Afghanistan to pursue its economic interests.

The Indian response will have to be based on how the situation evolves. Should Afghanistan slip into civil war, then Indian support to forces that desire an inclusive government and who bat for gender equality will perhaps be on the cards. Russia is already concerned with the growing threat of the spread of radicalism in Afghanistan, which would have negative spillover effects on the Central Asian Republics and thence to Russia’s Muslim population. Towards this end, a joint exercise of the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) called Rubezh-2021 was held in Kyrgyzstan in early September in which military personnel from Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia and Tajikistan took part. The exercise focused on the preparation and conduct of hostilities to destroy illegal armed groups that invade CSTO member state’s territory. Iran too is deeply concerned with the sectarian killings that have taken place through a spate of suicide attacks on Shia Mosques.^[ix] India could coordinate its efforts in such a scenario with Russia, Iran and the CAR’s.

India could also support a UN mandated intervention under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. But as this would be a peace keeping force and not a force for peace enforcement, its utility would be negligible. In any case, the Taliban will not accept outside forces on its land, making this option a virtual non-starter.

A more pragmatic and doable approach for India would be to support efforts at providing humanitarian assistance to the people of Afghanistan. Prime Minister Modi spoke of this in the G-20 meeting,^[x] calling for assistance based on UN Resolution 2593^[xi] of the 15-member Security Council, which demanded that Afghan territory not be used to threaten or attack any country, reiterated the importance of combating terrorism in Afghanistan and for providing unhindered access for the United Nations and its agencies to provide humanitarian assistance to Afghanistan. Here, the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) would have a central role in providing assistance and would give India a much needed say in assisting Afghanistan’s return to stability.

On the negative side, with the current dominant role being played by Pakistan in Afghanistan, Indian efforts to restore stability will be hindered by Pakistan. Would USA, Russia, China and Iran be able to dissuade Pakistan from playing a spoiler, would have to be seen, but should that happen, it could make a significant impact on restoring stability in Afghanistan. 

Author Brief Bio: Maj Gen Harkirat Singh is an Alumnus of Sherwood College, Nainital, National Defence Academy and National Defence College, New Delhi. A veteran of India’s strategic forces operations within the country and abroad, he has been a resource person for geo-strategy at national universities.

References:

^[i] A feature of the contemporary world geopolitical map, the “shatterbelt”, was especially prominent during the cold war. Shatterbelts are regions torn by internal conflicts whose fragmentation is increased by the intervention of external major powers in contention over the region. They are global destabilisers. Also see “Geopolitics of the World System”, Saul Bernard Cohen, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers Inc, Oxford, UK, 2003, p 5-42, pp 436.

^[ii]  Anand Gopal and Alex Strick van Linschoten, “Ideology in the Afghan Taliban”, Afghanistan Analysts Network, June 2017. Details at https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/201705-AGopal-ASvLinschoten-TB-Ideology.pdf . Viewed on 02 Aug 2020

^[iii] https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-58473574

^[iv] https://www.indiatoday.in/world/story/al-qaeda-taliban-pledge-pakistan-1851361-2021-09-10

^[v] https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/167207/Economic%20Growth%20opportunities%20in%20Afghanistan%20final.pdf

^[vi]   “Taliban Praises India for Resisting US Pressure on Afghanistan”, Press Trust of India, The Hindu, New Delhi, 17 June 2012.  Also see https://www.thehindu.com/news/international/taliban-praises-india-for-resisting-us-pressure-on-afghanistan/article3539512.ece

^[vii]   “Kashmir is India’s Internal Matter, says Taliban; Denies Plan to Target Delhi”, Shishir Gupta , Hindustan Times, New Delhi, 19 May 2020. Also see  https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/kashmir-is-india-s-internal-matter-says-taliban-denies-plan-to-target-delhi/story-sOgG3yPsMenP4nZDKRbygL.html.

^[viii] https://www.news18.com/news/world/exclusive-taliban-seek-foreign-aid-to-rebuild-nation-after-20-years-of-war-have-special-message-for-india-4126862.html

^[ix] https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-58925863

^[x] https://www.ndtv.com/india-news/united-global-response-needed-to-bring-desired-changes-in-afghanistan-pm-2573239

^[xi] https://www.un.org/press/en/2021/sc14620.doc.htm

It has now been over ten weeks since Kabul has fallen. This has been a tumultuous time for not just Afghanistan, but for the entire region. The takeover of Afghanistan by Taliban, which took the Biden administration by surprise due to the sheer pace of its execution, has set into motion a major geo political alignment. Afghanistan, often considered to be the graveyard of empires, may now become the epicentre of the power play between America and China. The present turmoil in Afghanistan, exacerbated by America’s messy withdrawal, presents a perfect opportunity for China to exploit the fault lines in the region and challenge the present world order.

The intense rivalry between the top two economies in the world, which first started with the trade war in 2018, has since intensified. The outbreak of coronavirus marked an inflection point in China’s relations with America and the world. It was during the pandemic that the full import of China’s wolf warrior diplomacy and its economic and foreign policy became apparent. After long speeches at Davos singing praises for multilateralism and assurances that China will not seek hegemony, the world had been taken in by Xi Jinping’s carefully crafted image of an economic super power that would not risk its trade ties for geo-political ambitions. This façade fell in 2020. For Beijing, its economic might was a means to an end. This included changing the present political world order and establishing its own system and values.

The desire to redraw world maps, which has not been restricted to just the Indo-Pacific, has led China to pursue an alternative global order, with its money power as its fulcrum. Thus, Xi Jinping forged partnerships with like-minded countries like Iran and Pakistan that share China’s deep dislike and distrust for the existing world order. These partnerships served two key objectives: to subvert the present system and undercut China’s principal rivals, which were America, India and Japan. Despite its smaller economic stature, India’s potential to be a balancing force against China in Asia, due to its demographics and rising economy, became a Chinese concern. To limit its ability to become a counter to it, China flanked New Delhi and redoubled its partnership with Pakistan. China also undercut America in its geo-strategic orbits by forming deep partnerships with countries like Iran and Russia; even as it enhanced the scope of its economic partnership with Israel.

For years, it was believed that China’s singular focus towards achieving the numero uno position in Asia would be via the maritime route, given its obsession with Taiwan and a growing desire to undo colonial subjugation under Japan, or its ‘century of humiliation’. It was assumed that China’s expansive maritime strategy, partly explaining the furious pace of ship-building since early 2010, was a precursor to sea-based hegemonic tendencies. To this effect, China built the artificial islands in the South China Sea, almost presenting a fait accompli to the United States. However, Beijing’s ambitions have not been limited to maritime expansion, but also extend to seeking expansion on land. To this effect, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has been actively working since 2016 to offset power equations, stretching from Pakistan till West Asia. In fact, much before Taliban’s Kabul takeover, the superpower-in-a-hurry had started laying the ground for its ambition to change status quo in the entire region. It was a message to both America and India to jettison their efforts to contain China’s expansive military strategy in Asia, which firmed up post the revival of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) in 2017.

Under Jinping, Beijing has been eyeing a central role in global power equations. To this effect, China has boosted its presence in a region historically considered to be America’s bastion, West Asia. Of the four Indo-Pacific democracies that formed the Quad, it was Washington and New Delhi that have been at the centre of China’s aggressive strategy for West Asia. As the final arbitrator in a region filled with inherent complexities and contradictions, America has traditionally played a pivotal role in deciding power equations. For India, the West Asian region is vital to secure its energy needs, which are heavily dependent on imports. China’s strategy to create a nexus of countries in the Middle East has rested on its ambition to challenge American power and create uncertainty for India’s oil needs. In the last one decade, China has made significant investments in the Middle East. On one end, it cultivated wide-ranging business interests with American allies like Saudi Arabia and Israel and on the other end, it redoubled efforts to deepen strategic ties with Iran.

Beijing’s Middle East roadmap had two primary facets – enhancing the scope of its partnership with Tehran and green signalling large BRI projects in Israel and Saudi Arabia, which form the backbone of the US security network in the region. This highlighted China’s hunger to target the Middle East as the next arena for its power struggle with America and the liberal world. Like Asia, where Beijing built deeper ties with Pakistan to make use of its strategic location, in the Middle East too, China used a similar template. In this region also, Beijing needed a network of allies to topple the existing world order. The end objective was creation of an alternative power axis from Pakistan to Afghanistan to Iran. In its Middle East gambit, both Russia and Turkey played an important role. In fact, Moscow was vital for Beijing to spread its influence since it hoped to piggy-ride the former’s historical connections and deep inroads across the region. So after challenging the status quo in Asia, the Middle East is now the next frontier where Beijing wants to establish itself as the new-age hegemon.

On one end was the USA-led first world order where Japan, India, France, the UK and other US allies played a key role. At the other end was a China-centric world order, sealed by the meeting of minds between two authoritarian leaders to exploit the existing fault lines in geo-politics, geo-economics and geo-technology. While the American-led system was geared towards preserving the status quo, China, along with Russia, Iran, Pakistan and Turkey, are all aligned to change the same.

The present flux in Afghanistan has further cemented China’s formation by creating a long corridor of nations that are averse to the US-dominated world order. Afghanistan, which has witnessed a shadow boxing match between two super powers in the past, is all set to witness another such geo-political contest. For almost a decade now, Beijing’s economic strength, military might and global clout have been geared for a larger objective. In fact, China’s primary goal has been to upend the world order as we knew it, one where liberal democracies with market-driven economies strive to uphold global rules. For Beijing, which became Asia’s largest economy in 2010 and the world’s second largest military spender in 2011, its economic muscle has always been a means to a larger end, which has been to create a Sino-centric world order.

A Sino-centric world order was envisaged as one where China’s primary challengers would be subverted and their prospects blunted. In Asia, this strategy resulted in Beijing firming up its partnership with Islamabad, New Delhi’s hostile neighbour to the West. China has always viewed India’s growing role in the continent’s geo-economics and geo-politics as a threat. The possibility of the latter emerging as a strategic pivot in the Indo-Pacific region and a counter-balancing force to Beijing’s aggression has spooked Communist leaders. To stymie the myriad possibilities a stronger India presented to the world in undercutting Beijing’s clout in the region, China has been pursuing an aggressive policy along its land borders. While it is now an indisputable fact that the economic trajectories of the two countries became starkly different since the early 2000s, India’s potential and ability to counter Chinese hegemony in Asia has become a growing concern for the latter. This led Beijing to solidify its economic and security cooperation with Islamabad, India’s arch rival. Of course, it helped that India was the common adversary for both China and Pakistan.

Through Islamabad, Beijing created a new geo-strategic equation, one that hurt not just India’s but also America’s security interests. To pursue its strategy to create a parallel network of allies, China made Pakistan one of the foundational pillars of its flagship investment program, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Islamabad’s failed governance systems further enabled China to use its territory and resources towards its core objective. As it tied Islamabad closely to its mega BRI project by pumping in vast amounts of money in risky projects, Beijing ensured greater alignment on strategic and security issues, one of which was to contain India. As part of this policy, the BRI passed through the territory of Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (PoK) that is India’s sovereign territory. The BRI’s infrastructure projects allowed China access to vast resources in the mineral-rich but restive regions of Gilgit-Baltistan in PoK and Balochistan. In fact, while launching the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) under the BRI in 2015, China was brazenly contemptuous of India’s concerns. The CPEC, thus, marked an important inflection point in India’s bilateral ties with China since it undermined the former’s role in its geo-strategic orbit.

Xi Jinping’s flagship global investment drive focused on Pakistan to serve China’s economic interests and strategic ambitions. In the last two years alone, China has invested US $65 billion in Pakistan, effectively providing an economic lifeline to its defunct economy. This ensured Islamabad has continued to remain afloat, and therefore, relevant to China’s larger strategic calculations to contain India. The corridor, which is a network of highway and power projects, is worth over US $80 billion after fresh contracts worth US $11 billion were signed in 2020.^[1] Out of this, Beijing’s actual investment in Pakistan was nearly US $50 billion.^[2]

For Pakistan, Chinese funds were a boon since it was faced with a collapsing economy and widespread political uncertainty. Over time, as it continued to green light more projects and piled up more loans, Islamabad entered the infamous club of eight most vulnerable countries due to its very high level of indebtedness. On the other hand, for Beijing, Islamabad’s growing indebtedness was an added advantage; it translated into higher economic and political leverage over the almost-failed state. Beijing’s modus operandi was clear – exploit Pakistan’s weak economy and strategic location to circumvent India and access vital infrastructure. So, China’s reasons for pouring billions of dollars into Pakistan went beyond just economic interests. It was to flank Asia’s third largest economy. And while it used Pakistan’s locational advantage and mineral wealth, in exchange China provided complete diplomatic immunity to its acts of terror.

For China, Pakistan serves three core interests, all of which have only been reinforced since America’s withdrawal from Afghanistan that has altered the geo political dynamics. For one, Pakistani deep state has tried to ensure India remains pre-occupied with a simmering Line of Control (LoC). China’s covert and overt support to Pakistan has signalled to New Delhi about the tactical disadvantages it faces as a result of the security partnership between its two hostile neighbours. Pakistan now offers tremendous utility in stretching Indian defence capabilities by forcing it to prepare for a ‘two-front’ war scenario. As ties with China deteriorate and with Pakistan continue to remain almost-hostile, India now needs to prepare for the possibility of greater collusion between its two neighbours. This means additional strain on New Delhi’s resources. Even if the possibility of a full-blown attack remains minimal, both Islamabad and its big daddy Beijing will continue to focus on low-key attacks, which are meant to be constant irritants. The present security climate is seeing some of those possibilities coming to light, with Pakistan starting another round of killings in Kashmir and China increasing its build up around the entire Himalayan range. Post Taliban’s takeover of Afghanistan, Pakistan’s deep state will exploit its terror links further, in a bid to create more instability. This will present the Indian security establishment with continued challenges to address terrorism-related threats, both in the border union territory of Jammu and Kashmir as well as across India.

Secondly, Pakistan is also vital for China’s plans and ambitions for the Indian Ocean Region (IOR). China started developing the Gwadar port in June 2016 to gain access to the northern part of the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf for its military and economic ambitions. Through Gwadar, China aimed to secure access for its oil imports, which presently go through the narrow Straits of Malacca and are susceptible to disruptions. The Gwadar port, located in the troubled region of Balochistan and just 120 kilometres from the Iranian border, made China a stakeholder in a maritime region which was traditionally considered to be New Delhi’s bastion. As Beijing has been working to blunt India’s strategic advantage in this vast maritime domain, it has hoped Gwadar would serve as an ideal launch pad to gain control over maritime waters spanning Central Asia and East Africa all the way till the Straits of Malacca and beyond. The port has enhanced China’s ability to dictate rules in the larger Indo-Pacific region. Together with Djibouti in Africa, Gwadar in Pakistan and Hambantota in Sri Lanka; China has sought to develop a string of strategically located ports for maritime dominance. To counter Gwadar, India was developing the Chabahar Port in Iran’s east, which was meant to side-step Pakistan. The project, which allowed India to take the land route to Afghanistan and Central Asia, is now unlikely to take off after Taliban formed the government.

Thirdly, Pakistan provided the perfect platform and opportunity for Beijing to engage with Afghanistan – a region where China has for long envisaged an enhanced role for itself, in tandem with its growing appetite for global dominance. While India has made several efforts to reach out to Kabul, including through a generous aid program to rebuild the war-torn country, it has always been disadvantaged by Pakistan’s access, geographical proximity and close ties with the Taliban. Since Islamabad has been integral to talks, negotiations and transition of power in Afghanistan, it has frustrated Indian efforts to create a counter-balance. After Taliban’s takeover, Indian predicament have become more pronounced, even as it has further bolstered Chinese ability to engage with Afghanistan.

By exploiting the present lawlessness in Afghanistan and Taliban’s deep linkages with Pakistan, China will seek to derive maximum economic, strategic and security benefits. Increased participation by Chinese companies to rebuild Afghanistan through the flagship BRI program will translate into direct transportation links and an economic corridor between China and Afghanistan. This, by default, will undercut both Indian interests and American influence. Besides strategic interests, Afghanistan is valuable since it is home to unexplored natural resources that China covets. Access to this mineral wealth will help China to secure its long-term growth prospects.

America may have left Afghanistan, but China hopes it will fill the leadership vacuum and use it to build its alternate formation of nations. US President Joe Biden wants to prioritise the Indo-Pacific region, but there is a good chance that this is exactly what Xi Jinping also wants the US to do. It is not an either/or choice for America, and the world. Instead, China’s influence needs to be responded, both on land and on sea; both in West Asia and in the Indo-Pacific.

China’s quest to dominate the world has deep security and geo-political ramifications for India. China’s rising influence must be contained, not just in the South China Sea, but also in the Indian Ocean Region, which is New Delhi’s bastion. For India, the post pandemic altered geo-political climate has been a wake-up call for the ramifications of ceding too much space in its own backyard. Far from building on its historic relations, New Delhi has witnessed several of its neighbours been charmed by Beijing’s cheque book. China has succeeded in limiting India’s influence in countries that have deep socio-cultural ties with it. New Delhi must reclaim its place in the region, both with its neighbours on land and with the IOR littorals.

The Asia Pacific is now termed as the Indo-Pacific due to the widespread recognition of the role India must play in it. But to actualise this and regain its dominance, New Delhi needs a multi-pronged strategy. India must step up the process of rebuilding its partnerships with the littorals and enhancing engagements with its island neighbours. New Delhi has deep historical and cultural ties with the Maldives, Mauritius, Seychelles and Sri Lanka; and has for long been their natural ally. This equity must be harnessed and traditional social links with these countries must be strengthened. After years of relentless efforts by Beijing to buy influence in the IOR, New Delhi will now have to adopt bold diplomacy to reclaim lost ground. A starting point can be the lessons from Beijing-backed ‘India Out’ campaign run by opposition parties.^[3] The campaign maligned India and succeeded due to India’s inability to counter such narratives early on. It deepened New Delhi’s trust deficit with Male. To gain more clout in Male’s politics, India must leverage its historical ties and engage more. Deeper defence and security ties could begin by training Maldivian defence personnel. Male’s distrust of Chinese funds after rising indebtedness can be India’s gateway to reconnect.

New Delhi’s biggest differentiator to China’s BRI-led diplomacy should be the willingness to engage with smaller countries as equal partners. India can position itself as a more ‘humane’ partner by providing solutions and aid/grant to all the island nations to address their biggest concern of ecological and environmental damage. India’s outreach coincides with the realisation by these small island nations about their geo-strategic importance, maritime value and enhanced role in the power play between India and China. To maximise their gains, the IOR littorals will even play India and China against each other as they jostle for more influence.

While China will entice them with more funds, India must step up its communication strategy to highlight the pitfalls of accepting them. New Delhi should offer attractive grants and assistance, which will be in stark contrast to China’s high interest loans. Till it becomes a US $5-6 trillion economy, New Delhi lacks the economic heft to match Beijing’s large loan book. To overcome this handicap, India must partner with Japan and the USA to provide more assistance to the IOR littorals. Tokyo has been the biggest provider of long-term infra loans in Asia, dwarfing the BRI. New Delhi must identify common areas to work with Japan in increasing development assistance to countries in IOR. India’s response to China’s debt trap model should be to create sustainable and economically viable infrastructure that boosts the local economy of recipient nations. New Delhi must communicate this message strongly to Mauritius, Seychelles, the Maldives, Sri Lanka, Comoros and Madagascar.

India’s decisive pivot for the IOR revolves around its roadmap for the strategically located Andaman and Nicobar (A&N) Islands. The northern-most point of the Andaman Islands is just 40 kilometres from Myanmar and the southern-most point of the Nicobar Islands is just 160 kilometres from Indonesia. India’s projection of power into the Western Pacific could begin from the A&N Islands which houses its first joint military command. Due to their geo-strategic location, the A&N Islands provide India an opportunity to become a key stakeholder in the IOR and SCS. At present, the A&N Islands are only geared towards reconnaissance; to boost capabilities and exploit the islands’ full potential, engagement and collaboration with other navies must be enhanced. This would be an important message for Beijing which has incorrectly assumed India to be a passive participant in the region.

So far, New Delhi had been reluctant to forge strategic partnerships with other large navies, lest it be construed as a display of intent to escalate maritime tension. But in the wake of Beijing’s regular military exercises with its partners, New Delhi’s military and foreign policy must change. Regular military drills with Pakistan, trilateral exercises with Iran and Russia in the Persian Gulf^[4] and elaborate military gaming exercises with South Africa and Russia off Cape Town^[5], all point towards the future direction of China’s strategy. It is to continue its efforts to encircle India. China had set its sights on the IOR in 2013, and India needs to now respond proactively. In fact, India should have started preparations for such an eventuality after December 2019 when a Chinese research vessel entered its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). Research vessels are primarily used in secret military data collection and collect information that impacts the movement and efficacy of submarines.

The A&N Islands’ strategic location allows India to utilise these as an advance post to alert about any enemy vessel and must be utilised better. Despite the A&N Islands’ proximity to the Straits of Malacca, New Delhi has held back from upgrading its presence due to fears that the move would be construed as blocking a crucial choke point. But it is precisely because of their strategic location that the A&N Islands can act as a stabilising factor against China’s maritime aggression. India can deepen its presence and capabilities in the A&N Islands by collaborating with France and the USA. France, which has the second largest EEZ in the world, operates a large facility in the IOR on the French Reunion Island. Indo-French military and security ties have been upgraded under PM Modi’s tenure and New Delhi must build on this by creating advanced capabilities in the A&N.

In any military strategy, not knowing the adversary’s larger ambition or game plan is the biggest surprise factor. In China’ case, though, there are no surprises; its over reach and ambition is clear. What remains unclear is the roadmap to address it.

Author Brief Bio: Gaurie Dwivedi is a Senior Journalist covering economy, policy and politics. She is also Visiting Fellow at USI.

References:

^[1] Muhammad Akbar Notezai, ‘CPEC 2.0: Full Speed Ahead’, 2020, https:// thediplomat.com/2020/09/cpec-2-0-full-speed-ahead/

^[2] American Enterprise Institute, China Global Investment Tracker, https:// www.aei.org/china-global-investment-tracker/

^[3] N Sathiya Moorthy, ORF, July 2021, https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/maldives-india-out-campaign-now-takes-a-personal-turn-with-local-political-implications/

^[4] N Bozorgmehr, H.Foy, Financial Times, December 2019, https://www.ft.com/content/3d5a4cf0-288f-11ea-9a4f-963f0ec7e134

^[5] Ankit Panda, The Diplomat, Nov 2019, https://thediplomat.com/2019/11/chinese-russian-south-african-navies-conduct-trilateral-naval-exercises/

Nepal is a Hindu majority state with religious, cultural, economic, matrimonial and linguistic relations with India. Thousands of Nepalese have married in India and vice versa which gives the bilateral ties a unique feature. Thousands of Nepalese are enrolled in the Indian Army and form part of the Gurkha Regiment. In addition, India and Nepal share an open border that is not only exceptional but has also facilitated Nepalese and Indian to live and work in each other’s countries. There is no other place in the Indian sub-continent that two sovereign nations enjoy an open border where visas and passports are not necessary. A whole generation of older Nepalese studied and struggled for the independence of India side by side with Indian freedom fighters. These leaders include former Prime Ministers Matrika Prasad Koirala, BP Koirala, Man Mohan Adhikari and Krishna Prasad Bhattarai. But all these unique features are now under stress.

With the flow of time, new generation of Nepalese opt for US, Australia and Europe for their higher studies, not necessarily Indian universities. The open border has been misused by notorious elements including terrorists and both India and Nepalese governments have realised the importance of regulating this border in order to stop organised crime, smuggling, human trafficking, arms trafficking and the growth of terrorism. The political change in Nepal in 2008 ended the Hindu monarchy and brought in secularism. This was done without a referendum. The elections to two Constituent Assemblies saw a period of great instability. Nepal has had 20 Prime Ministers in 20 years and 6 Constitutions in 5 decades. In all these major political changes, India has had a major role as a facilitator. However, the change of 2008 has introduced unprecedented challenges for Nepal as well as for India because of complexity of the polity and influence of extra-regional actors into what was previously an exclusive Indian domain. This paper shall discuss the historic dimension of Indo-Nepal relations in the religious and cultural spheres and discuss some of these challenges.

Post 1950 Nepal:

After India got independence, the Nepalese youth were also incited to end the 104 years of Rana oligarchy that had kept Nepal under the British security umbrella. King Tribhuvan took asylum in India as the anti-Rana movement became big inside Nepal. It was during the last days of the Rana regime that the 1950 Treaty of Peace and Friendship was signed between the two countries. This Treaty remains a bone of contention even till today. The Rana regime collapsed soon afterwards.

The Treaty has some unique features such as Nepalese citizens enjoying same rights as Indian citizens in India, including the right to hold jobs and buy property. However, the Left parties have continuously used this Treaty as an example of Indian hegemony in Nepal. Thus, we can see the period of 1950-1960 as a phase when Nepal saw the light of democracy but was unable to consolidate it. A rift erupted between Matrika Prasad Koirala and his half-brother BP Koirala. PM Nehru’s Nepal policy was also full of dubiousness. On the one hand, he supported democratic forces but on the other he was furious with the first democratically elected Prime Minister (BP Koirala) in 1960 for having established diplomatic relations with Israel and Pakistan. The royal takeover of 1960 took place when the Indian Army Chief was on an official visit to Nepal. While all senior leaders of the Nepali Congress and other parties were arrested, Queen Elizabeth visited Nepal in 1961, giving full political recognition to the royal takeover.  King Mahendra introduced a political system known as the party less Panchayat system, very much like the Indian Panchayati Raj. It survived for 30 years.

During this period, we can easily see that India’s Nepal policy was more low key and reluctant to take any major or hasty decision as its focus was diverted to managing other internal and external crisis. A secure Northern belt provided by the royal regime safeguarded India’s UP and Bihar states with external military action. The Sino-Indian border conflict of 1962 also enabled King Mahendra to expand his foreign policy ambitions to make Nepal more visible to the outside world. Nepal became active in UN, NAM and also in expanding its ties with the US and Europe. Nepal was elected twice to the UN Security Council (1968 and 1988). A number of high-level visits from India to Nepal are also testimony to the fact that relations was satisfactory. Only in 1988, the then Rajiv Gandhi government took some stringent measures that led to the deterioration of bilateral relations. Nepalese term this period as ‘Indian blockade’ when petroleum supplies and daily essentials were stopped. As a result of this, a whole new generation of Nepalese became anti-Indian.

The period 1990-2001 can be termed as a phase of political turbulence but with the constitutional monarchy as a bulwark of stability under popular King Birendra, Indo-Nepal ties did not suffer. Political parties raked up the issue of Kalapani border encroachment and Tanakpur power projects. King Birendra was the guest of honour at the Republic Day function in 1999. However, the political situation was again deteriorating with the onset of the Maoist insurgency in 1996. Initially, only the rural hinterlands were under the influence of the Maoist rebels but by 2004, the urban centres were also increasingly targeted. Due to the unfortunate cause of events of the royal massacre of 2001, stability in Nepal was again threatened. King Gyanendra took over direct power in 2005. India, this time again under the UPA government, brokered the 12-point understanding between the Maoists who had Interpol arrest notice and the political parties in 2005. This led the way to the people’s movement in April 2006.

But democracy in Nepal is still being consolidated. There seems to be a total lack of respect for each other’s vision, ideals and perceptions among the political parties. The main objective of democracy is to establish a strong link between the general people and society. It demonstrates that Nepalese democratic evolution has taken baby steps and has even fallen backwards if one is to see the recent events of weakening of main organs of the state viz. judiciary, legislature and the executive.

Mal-governance, nepotism, corruption and incompetence of Nepalese political party leaders gave many opportunities to the monarch and foreigners to intervene in the political system of Nepal. The Maoist insurgency was one of the most disturbing, unfortunate events in which 18 thousand innocents lost their lives and the nation is still suffering as it lags from economic and political recovery. The deadly earthquake of 2015 gave another blow to the ravaged economy of Nepal. Reconstruction of schools, colleges, private houses, UNESCO heritage sites is still going on at snails pace. India was the first responder to the earthquake. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi called by phone to the then PM Sushil Koirala who was on a foreign visit to inform about the earthquake in Nepal. The Constitution enacted soon afterwards, while sit was a progressive document in many respects, failed to be inclusive as the Madhesi grievances remained. The Constitution has envisioned a federal structure for the country. A new experiment for Nepal, it is hoped that the federal states will be able to address the challenges of their particular states in a better way than during a centralised polity run from Kathmandu. It ought to be remembered that 51 percent of Nepalese live in the Terai.

The economic growth has obviously been affected, and the growth rate lingers between 3-4% whereas the target is around 7.5%. Nepal still has agrarian economy which employs the majority of the workforce of the country. But the massive unemployment in the country has forced able, young Nepalese to go to the Gulf, Malaysia, Korea, Japan and other countries for employment. Although remittance that they send contributes about 28 percent of the total GDP, there is fear that even this source of foreign currency may plunge with the COVID-19 closures.

Post 2015 Nepal: A New Hope

Mr. K.P Oli and Mr. Pushpa Kamal Dahal of the CPN (UML) and CPN (Maoist) came together to form a United Communist Party, and the merger secured a near two-third majority in parliament. But a rift soon erupted between these two chairmen of the ruling party. The new dispensation also established party-to-party ties with the Chinese Communist Party. Prime Minister Oli had sufficient time and resources to resurrect the economy and give new hope to the people of Nepal suffering from years of despair and hopelessness. However, he raked up the nationalist sentiment by changing the political map of Nepal that was endorsed by a two-third majority of the Nepalese parliament. This was the time when Sino-Indian border clash was taking place at Galwan valley. Oli also said that Lord Ram was born in Nepal and gave a public jibe at the Indian national motto by saying ‘Simha Mewa Jayate’. Ultimately, after two failed attempts to dissolve the House, he was replaced by Sher Bahadur Deuba who became Prime Minister for the 5^th time.

People wanted to embrace a New Nepal in 2015, but the greed for power has brought the country to its knees. All the parties have deviated from the main purpose of a stable political system of nation-building. The leaders seemed to have forgotten that the main aim of their struggle for democracy was to create an environment where all citizens, overcoming differences of caste and creed, get equal opportunity and where all developmental needs are addressed. Instead, post-2008, they have politicised all vital organs of the state including the judiciary. According to the author Kamal Dev Bhattarai, “the country has been riding a wave of political chaos since Maoist rebels launched their war in 1996 – two decades of instability.”^[1]

In fact, the power struggle has toppled every single government since 1990. This has also scared away foreign investors, who are unsure of making investments amidst the political uncertainties. The industrialists have lost trust in the government due to the erratic changes not only among ministers but also officials. Political instability gives a negative impact on society increasing frustration among the people, which affects the nation as a whole. Political instability is a breeding ground for the unemployed youth to engage in political violence and armed conflicts. Inequality, inflation and the slow pace of GDP growth all are contributing factors to the instability. According to Deependra Chaulagain, ‘the infighting between the political parties has helped neither the ruling party nor the opposition’^[2]. Due to lack of governance, education, health services and the overall economy is suffering. Nepal is even hit harder by the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic. With the relaxation of prohibitory orders, the economic activities are gradually picking up among the income-generating sectors, but the government is still struggling to generate resources to fund the rehabilitation of COVID -19 affected sectors, especially the SMEs.

Because of lock-down in India due to the COVID-19 pandemic, thousands of poor Nepalese migrant labour working in Indian cities returned home in 2020. This caused a massive spread of the pandemic inside Nepal. But with the unemployment in the country and lack of health services including lack of oxygen, they started returning back to India soon afterwards taking advantage of the open border facility. This shows the dependency of the Nepalese economy on India. It also exposed the massive unemployment prevalent in rural Nepal, especially in the far-western region.

Labor migration itself has also put Nepal in the high-risk category of HIV-aids transmission, not to mention other societal costs. The country is suffering from skilled manpower as all are setting out for work outside. Nepal has been unfortunate to face the ill effects of climate change and natural disasters too. Due to global warming, the Himalayas are at huge risk because fast-melting glaciers in the high mountains pose a huge threat to life and property.  Author Sarah Karnot’s ‘disfunctionalism’ concept of the state has been recognised as the primary reason for the persistence of poverty and political instability.^[3] Nepal has managed to make progress in some areas, but achievements have not been even. Marginalised communities such as the Madhesis and Dalits need to be brought in the mainstream. There have been some positive strides but this is not enough. Economy has to be resurrected, tourism has to be given priority but for all this, political stability is a must.

Nepal: A Yam between Two Boulders:

Nearly three centuries ago, King Prithvi Narayan Shah had envisioned Nepal as a ‘yam between two boulders’. Nepal should have been able to benefit from being a low-income to prosperous country in between two Asian giants. Though Nepal is rich in natural resources, especially hydro-power, it fails to generate, utilise and exploit this power for sale to other countries in the immediate neighbourhood. This leads to over-dependence on foreign aid. Only recently, Indian help to build transmission lines has created synergy among the two countries and Nepal has been exporting power during the lean season. Nepal’s notorious ‘load shedding’ has also eased due to power import from India. India has been a big contributor in terms of humanitarian assistance during difficult times, like the devastating 2015 earthquake, as mentioned earlier. Modi government was also steadfast in supplying the COVISHIELD vaccines for Nepal in the midst of the covid-19 pandemic. Indian Ambassador to Nepal Vinay Mohan Kwatra also handed over medical supplies worth Rs. 18 crores in June 2021.^[4] This aid comprised ventilators, ambulances, PPEs and other equipment. India is one of the major investors in Nepal which helps in generating employment and opportunity for Nepalese people. Nepal’s major trade is conducted through the Kolkata port. India has helped provide assistance to build hospitals and educational institutions which help in exchanging students for achieving a degree.

India under PM Modi has given priority to facilitate improved connectivity and has allocated resources for building border roads and railways that will reduce poverty in Nepal. India is Nepal’s largest trade partner and provides essential transit. As Nepal is a landlocked country, it is very difficult for it to be self-sufficient, and not rely on its powerful neighbour. The two countries have undertaken various connectivity projects to enhance people-to-people linkages and achieve economic progress but the bordering states of UP, Bihar, West Bengal and Uttarakhand also need to be in the same page in terms of giving extra attention to the development of the border regions. In some areas, the Nepalese side is more developed than the Indian side. India is also trying to look out for various ways to develop the inland waterways within its framework of trade and transit to provide access to the sea for Nepal.

Of late, China has also given top priority to Nepal and this is quite visible after the success of the Maoist movement in 2008. Two communist parties have set-up party-to-party ties as their mutual ideology of Marxism and Maoism gives a common kinship. Flurry of high-level visits, awarding of major contracts and tenders such as the Bhairahawa International Airport and Pokhara International Airport to Chinese companies show that Sino-Nepal relations is getting a strong economic tinge. Second largest cluster of tourists to Nepal are Chinese and there is much anticipation inside Nepal of the early completion of the Golmud-Lhasa-Shigatse-Keyrung railway that will connect Nepal to China via the railways. Although Chinese economic footprint is growing all around South Asia, what makes Sino-Nepal relations in the modern era truly exceptional is the dominance of communist parties in Nepali polity. These communist parties were originally having fraternal ties with Indian communist parties. Although Nepal would like to reap benefits from the economic progress of both its neighbours and would want to distance itself from the bilateral problems between India and China, its manoeuvrability is limited in this regard. At times, Indian commentators fail to understand this phenomenon and criticise Nepal as playing the ‘China card’. Nepal’s relations with both India and China need to be seen in their own merit, the latter having become very active in terms of trade, investment, tourism and providing scholarships to students in the recent years. Instead of nitpicking on China’s economic forays inside Nepal, India has to sharpen its own traditional leverages which it has overlooked post 2006.

Conclusion

The political evolution of Nepal since the 50s, the dependence of the economy on Indian economy and the new factors adversely affecting the relationship has been highlighted above. Nepal and India share a unique, deep-rooted relationship of cooperation and close people-to-people cultural ties, but India needs to comprehensively review its Nepal policy from time to time. We not only share an open border for the free, unrestricted movement of our nationals but also have a very close bond through marriages popularly known as roti-beti ka Rishta. We share very similar ties in terms of the common religion – Hinduism and Buddhism. However, official India needs to revisit our common heritage and encourage religious and cultural bonds such as the Ram-Sita Vivah Mahotsav in Janakpur. The Sanatan culture, Sanskrit and revered temples such as the Char Dhams (Four Dhams) in India, Lord Pashupatinath and Muktinath in Nepal, yoga, Kumbh Mela, Shiva Ratri, etc. are embodiments of our common heritage. The ‘Bol Bam’ pilgrims are increasing year by year from India to Nepal. Stressing on physical connectivity is not enough. No other country can replace India inside Nepal if the common religious, cultural and linguistic aspects are stressed and given priority.

Author Brief Bio: Raksha Pandey is a Ph.D. Research Scholar in the Department of Humanities and Social Sciences at Tribhuvan University, Kathmandu, Nepal.

References:

^[1] Bhattarai, K.D. (2016). Nepal’s unending political instability. The Diplomat

^[2] Chaulagain, D. (2021). Political instability could affect recovery of the economy hit by the pandemic. The Kathmandu Post

^[3] Karnot, S. (2006). South Asian Journal of South Asian studies

^[4] See India Hands Over Medical Equipment Worth Over Rs 18 Crore to Nepal (news18.com)

Nitin Gokhale

Sri Lanka’s geographical position in the Indo Pacific is crucially located between two well established logistics hubs—Dubai and Singapore. What role can Sri Lanka play to bring in more trade and greater exchange of flow of goods in the region? Besides these two main hubs, do you foresee Sri Lanka to be a good logistics hub?

Ranil Wickremesinghe

Singapore is a good logistic hub, lying between the Indian Ocean and between the South China Sea and the Pacific Ocean. Dubai’s location on the eastern part of the Arabian Peninsula on the coast of the Persian Gulf, makes it an ideal major global transport hub for passengers and cargo. Sri Lanka has always been one of the trading centres of the Indian Ocean, even in earlier times when there was a highly developed trading system. Today, the Indian Ocean is the least integrated trading region in the world. So facilitating integration of trade in the region is one of the challenges for Sri Lanka. We also need to work on the proposition of being the gateway to India and onto the Bay of Bengal. The Bay of Bengal is developing rapidly and has become a region of great interest. We therefore, need to coordinate our shipping policies with that of India, Bangladesh and Myanmar.

We also have to see how we can go forward with some form of economic cooperation and trade integration. The Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) is aimed at strengthening regional cooperation but has not so far been able to bring about trade integration. This is an issue which we have to look into, especially as there are two big ongoing projects on the side of the Western Indian Ocean. One of these is the International North–South Transport Corridor (INSTC), a multi-mode network of ship, rail, and road route for moving freight between India, Iran, Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Russia, Central Asia and Europe. The other is the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, that is linking Central Asia to the Xinjiang province of China and also to the heart of Russia and onto Turkey.

There is also a lot of potential in East Africa. By 2050, the population in the region between Bangladesh and East Africa, will be equal to that of India, which will make this region bigger than the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) grouping. It is important that we start looking outside our national framework towards a cooperative set up. It would be appropriate to discuss a timeframe, which could perhaps be ten years, for trade integration to take place in specific sectors. We can move slower than the RCEP but nevertheless some move has to take place. Here, India can take the lead to be the engine of growth. This big region can then interact with RCEP and perhaps later, move on to interacting with the European Union (EU).

Nitin Gokhale

That is a good suggestion, but would require very good relations between India and Sri Lanka.Where do you see the relationship between India and Sri Lanka currently and what should be done to improve it?

Ranil Wickremesinghe

We have had ups and downs in our relationship. We had challenges when the LTTE came in, we have them now and we had them in 2014. But we also had very good relationships from about mid-1990s till about 2005—and we worked a lot of these out in 2015. The first issue—and let us be frank about it—was the Belt and Road Initiative of China. We had to accept the fact that we had two different views, but nevertheless, that does not preclude us from working together, because we had one issue on which we both agree—that Sri Lanka should not be a threat to India and India should not be a threat to Sri Lanka. Now, if we accept that, then we can resolve our differences on trade, economy, culture and on any other issue.

There is no gainsaying the fact that Sri Lanka and India need greater integration in trade. For that, we need to integrate our ports. We could link the Colombo and Trincomalee ports with the Indian system and we were working towards that end. We worked on Colombo harbour on the East terminal, on getting the oil tanks and aiming at the Bay of Bengal, which means that there were so many projects that we had jointly put together, and also with Japan, as India came in with Japan. We need to continue working towards that end.

I had always asked India to give us a terminal in return, which would have been very good at some stage as we had two LNG plants and the floating terminal. We also had the oil tanks issue which we should conclude quickly. From our side, we can explain the issue to the trade unions and see that their concerns are taken into account. Similarly, we were looking at development of the Mattala airport and the third section of the central expressway. At that time, the USA came in with a proposal from the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) and one part of it was to study the road from Kurunegala to Trincomalee, to look at the possibilities of having industrial estates.  Sri Lanka rejected that package which was worth over US $2 billion, which perhaps could have been beneficial for us. Such like issues need to be resolved in our quest towards further integration. India and Sri Lanka already have a Free Trade Agreement, the ISFTA, which was signed in December 1998. As a step forward, we can now look into the possibility of the five southern states of India, working together with Sri Lanka as one economic grouping.

We must remember that Indo-Sri Lanka relations are not merely dependent on government-to-government relations. It is a heritage relationship as we have a common origin, with strong bonds in Buddhism, Pali and Sanskrit. We have similar Rahu Kalaya (inauspicious timings). While the sacred Buddha shrine is in Bodh Gaya in India, we have the southernmost sacred Hindu Shrine in Koneswaram in Trincomalee. We listen to the melodious voice of Lata Mangeshwar and you listen to the Sri Lankan singer, Yohani. These are cultural bonds which unite us and we should further strengthen them.

Nitin Gokhale

While civilisational and cultural ties do bind us together, another factor that is binding India and Sri Lanka as also Maldives together, are the common maritime security mechanisms. What is your view about SAARC and BIMSTEC, the latter in reality being SAARC minus Pakistan? Do you think SAARC and BIMSTEC are good platforms to improve relations in the region?

Ranil Wickremesinghe

We need the trilateral agreement, and we also need SAARC and BIMSTEC. SAARC is the only organisation for South Asian. If we create a vacuum, then someone else will come and fill it. Both India and Pakistan were the founder members of SAARC, so, regardless of the difficulties in the relationship, we have to go along with the organisation. The problem in SAARC, as I foresee it, is with Afghanistan. If you are going to persecute people of other religions, or of different Muslim sects, and if people do not have freedom and are going to be shot on the streets, that is going to create a problem for us. With respect to Pakistan, while it does have a problem with some other countries, nevertheless, we should start moving at the official level and the ministerial level in an attempt to resolve all issues. BIMSTEC gives us a reach to the Bay of Bengal and maybe, at some later stage, to some maritime issues in the region. So, it is essential that we get this. At the moment, we have only the Trilateral Security Arrangement.

Nitin Gokhale

The elephant in the room is China. The shadow of China is very long and very thick in the region. How does Sri Lanka balance this and how does India make sure that China does not overwhelm its relations with its neighbours, especially Sri Lanka?

Ranil Wickremesinghe

Sri Lanka has had long ties with China, just as India has had, which go back to the times that Buddhism spread from India to China and Sri Lanka. We have also had trading relations with China since earlier times. Post-independence, it was Prime Minister Nehru himself who pushed forward the cause of China. Sri Lanka had a trade pact with China in 1952, when the latter agreed to export rice to Sri Lanka in exchange for rubber. Since then, our relationship has grown and we have become close to each other. That is one thing we both have to acknowledge. But we have not allowed the Chinese relationship in any way to impact on the Indian relationship. We have to accept the fact that we may have different views, but we also know that India has a specific role to play in the Indian Ocean. India is the largest country – politically, economically, militarily and population wise. We have accepted Security and Growth for All in the Region (SAGAR). Hence, if China comes in and they want to have an economic corridor, we can handle that without coming into any conflict with India. We have the Belt and Road Initiative on one side, with multiple economic projects. On the other hand, if we can have sub regional cooperation with the five Indian coastal states as well, that too should be all right. Our relations with India are not just country to country relations, but relations with people who have the same origins.

Nitin Gokhale Moving away from Indian Ocean and the bilateral relations, how do you see Sri Lanka responding to the increasing American footprints in the Indo-Pacific, the recent AUKUS agreement, and the traction QUAD has now got?

Ranil Wickremesinghe

In the beginning of the last century, America extended their manifest destiny out into the Pacific, with Hawaii and Philippines. Then, after World War II, USA consolidated firstly by bringing Hawaii and Alaska as two States in the American Union and secondly, through the San Francisco system, brought Japan in. Later, with the Nixon visit to Beijing, the ice between the two countries was broken. We have to remember that China’s economy was built up by America.

The Asia-Pacific construct gave way to the Indo-Pacific, in the context of the US-China rivalry, with the US reframing the arrangement by pushing it into the Indian Ocean. But when we look at the QUAD, we are still wondering what exactly it stands for. The idea originated from the then Japanese Prime Minister Abe’s speech at the Indian Parliament and received traction later with the speech of Indian Prime Minister Modi at Shangri La. Subsequently, President Trump gave his vision of the Indo-Pacific and now we see a reframing of the same. So there has to be some agreement on what exactly the QUAD is to be.

If you take the last QUAD summit meeting in Washington, it talks about an inclusive Indian Ocean, which is basically what the Japanese and the Indians have been pushing for. AUKUS is a military alliance and as a military, they talk of working with the partners. We are not enthused with any military alliance in Indian Ocean, so there is very lukewarm response in Asia for AUKUS. I am pressing hard for the freedom of navigation and undersea cables in the Indian Ocean. That will take 50 percent of the problem out, but I think AUKUS is going to be a problem. And I don’t know how India is going to manage it.

Nitin Gokhale: I think that’s where the convergence between India and Sri Lanka will come in. Thank You.

Brief Bios:

*Shri Ranil Wickremesinghe is the Former Prime Minister of Sri Lanka

*Shri Nitin Gokhale is the Founder of BharatShakti.in and Strat News Global

Policies are ethereal. No matter what the published doctrine or strategy might be, it is quite difficult to pinpoint a specific anchorage for a policy over a period of time – at a certain point in time. What we do get, however, is a general sense of being and a spatial sense of direction as to where we might be heading as a country, or as an institution or even for that matter, a society or an individual. Foreign Policy is almost at the heart of the art of statecraft. Its evolution is highly non-linear and – if we look back in history – it moves back and forth in time like a short-stepped tango danseuse. Foreign Policy, clearly written or shaded in grey, deals both with the vernacular and with the elite and everything that falls in between. As a researcher, the earliest foreign policy books known to me is the “Manusmrity” – or the Code of Manu from the Indian sub-continent stipulated to have been rooted in the timeframes of 12th to 10th century BCE. If you would look at the treatise, particularly at Chapter VII, on Raj Dharma, you will get an even older version of Kautilya’s Arthashastra. The chapter contains what ought to be a nation or a king’s policy ought to be, with regard to countries (or kingdoms) other than their own. A near parallel grew from what is China today in the form of Sun Tzu and his ‘Art of War’ in the 5th century BCE. These were like general principles which a sovereign ruler, in this case a king, would apply to the affairs of the state and to the conduct of relations with other sovereigns – which today – is variously termed as foreign policy. Let me proceed into the subject matter of this article with this spirit in its foundation.

Bangladesh @ 50

As I write this article, Bangladesh is celebrating its Golden Jubilee of Freedom and the Birth Centenary of its Father of the Nation, the Architect of its State, Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. Most auspiciously, we are also celebrating the anniversary of fifty-years of bilateral ties with our most trusted friend and our closest neighbour, India.

The story of Bangladesh is a saga of an epic proportion. The country had literally started with scorched earth. With three million dead and two hundred thousand raped (Jahan, 2013; Sharlach, 2000; Debnath, 2017), Bangladesh started with nothing but an indomitable resolve to survive the harsh winters of December 1971. Fifty years have passed since then and what some pundits once referred to as a ‘basket case with no hope of survival’ (Jahan, 1973) evolved into a “development miracle” (Barai, 2020) and a “land of opportunity” under the leadership of Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina (Khondker, 2017; Wajed, S, 2020), the able daughter of the assassinated Father of the Nation Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. Thanks to, first, strong agricultural sector production – both extension and distribution and marketing; second, the rapid expansion of RMG-led production and export; and third, impressive remittance that pulled the economy even when the global economy was facing recessions and meltdown, the growth engine of Bangladesh keeps roaring ahead. It is not only these three direct impetus, but also a cocktail of robust and manifest structural reforms – expanding and reconfiguring public sector investments into the formation of infrastructure assets; a freer and more transparent flow of remittances from a thriving expatriate community; diversification of exports – to higher-value brands and integration of essentially middleware design and software components, which have contributed to Bangladesh’s journey towards becoming a journey of a determined and charismatic leadership (Moni & Joy, 2020). The Economy of the country has been growing at a sustained rate of more than 6% per annum for the last four decades and had it not been stifled by the sudden onslaught of the COVID19 paradox, it would have been lifted to an 8% paradigm starting 2020. Even after nearly two years of COVID19-induced constrictions, Bangladesh’s economy grew an astonishing 5.2% in 2021 and our growth projections are close to 7% again in the year coming up ahead.

Bangladesh is often tagged, and consequently, anointed as a model of development by the international financial institutions including the World Bank and IMF – despite their erstwhile reservations and skepticism about the very survival and growth of the country (Sawada, Mahmud and Kitano, 2018). The astute foreign policy dimension of Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina not only complements but also acts as a primary vortex for international connectivity, fiscal stability and economic growth both for the country and for the region. As a secular,  sovereign and independent nation-state Bangladesh is formulating its foreign policy goals and objectives to advance its national interest based on the core dictum of Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, ‘Friendship to All, Malice towards None’ (Rahman, 1998).

Bangladesh has been slowly but steadily walking through various stages of its survival and growth as a Westphalian country in the geospatial, geo-strategic and geo-economic milieu of South Asia – bordering on the Indian Ocean and sitting on the tip of a thin land bridge to Southeast Asia and the theatre of the East. When we speak of the Foreign Policy imperatives for Bangladesh emanating from its economic realities, we must remember that Bangladesh had started with all the ingredients of a nation-state – except that its productive capabilities, assets, and revenues were either uncollateralized or impossibly immutable either to free-flowing cash or to high-powered foreign currency denominators. Securing and nurturing interest in the country came at a high personal cost and with a high degree of personal sacrifices. Indeed, the nation-building initiative of the country revolved around a mostly idealistic notion centred on Bangla as a language and Bengali as a dominant mode of cultural expressions – which survived not only two hundred years of British and Pakistani occupation but also nearly 21 years of successive autocratic regimes after the assassination of Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and defied many attempts on its intended national and institutional architecture.

Therefore, in retrospect, the foreign policy of Bangladesh evolved sparingly around our core constitutional principles – nationalism, socialism, democracy, and secularism – radiating from the spirit of the glorious war of liberation in 1971. Though Bangladesh had a few collaborators to the Pakistani regime installed as Ministers and even once as a Prime Minister by the Military autocracy (Mookherjee, 2015), it has somehow never forgotten that the constitution of Bangladesh dictates the state to formulate its foreign relations on the principles of respect for national sovereignty and equality, non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries, peaceful settlement of international disputes, and respect for international law – keeping the centrality of the united nations as an arbiter of the international order (The Constitution of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh, 2020). The famous dictum of the father of the nation, Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, “friendship to all, and malice towards none”- remains the bedrock of the foreign policy manual – in spite of and despite the many allurements and threats from both within and from outside the borders of the country. As a nation-state, Bangladesh is committed to making friendship with all countries of the world to fulfil its destiny and to build a prosperous future not only for its people but also for the common good of the citizens of the world. The core spirit of our Liberation War guides us in raising our voice to support the oppressed peoples throughout the world – and not only for the disenfranchised Rohingyas from the North of Rakhine of the Union of Myanmar – 1.1 million of whom we have sheltered for the last four years purely on humanitarian grounds.

A core element of any nation state is the economic wealth and capability of its administrative architecture marked by the prosperity of its citizenry. We in Bangladesh consider prosperity not as financial or economic in nature. Rather, economic prosperity is only a mere sub-set of the archetypes of human, societal and ecological well-being that define our existence as conscious and conscientious beings capable to produce and pursue grand visions. Prosperity, to us, is inclusive. Prosperity to us is the ability of the state system to enable the individual to live with a measure of pride and dignity and deploy his or her productive capacity to the fullest possible extent.  Access to nutrition, health, shelter, education, and an otherwise decent living is all part of the prosperity that we understand. This was and still remains the founding principle of Bangladesh and the guiding doctrine of the Government.

Therefore, our foreign policy priorities emanate from a very basic wish list of the Government for the welfare of its people. Our priorities arise from a deep-rooted wish for synchronising our efforts with our neighbours and partners in the geosphere that we share. True to the election manifesto of 2008, Bangladesh has already reached the financial strength of a stable lower middle-income country. We aspire to become a developed country by 2041 and we are working on the Delta Plan for 2100. Lest we forget, we have rooted out the evil of transboundary terror utilising Bangladesh soil at great peril to both the state and to the life of its charismatic leader, Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina.

Bangladesh as a country was conceived from the highest ideals imaginable by humans. Ideas of freedom, democracy, equality, justice and inclusivity. Amongst these, the idea of democracy was the driving force. Be it the Language Movement of 1952, or the 6-point Movement of 1966, or for that matter, even the initial struggles of the post-1970 elections till March, Bangladesh was roused by the Greatest Bengali of all times, Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman for the cause of democracy. The question of a human identity, free from the oppressive clutches of autocracy and autocratic dispensations, propelled the Bengali psyche to ultimately aspire for a land of their own so that they may live with pride and dignity.

Ever since its creation through the partition of India in 1947, the country named Pakistan was a geographical and cultural absurdity. Although the GDP of Bangladesh (the then East Pakistan) exceeded that of its West counterpart during the formative stages, the discriminating economic policies and direct transfer of resources by the central government eventually turned the East into a colony of the West (Papanek, 1967; Khan, 1970). Referring to these stark disparities, Awami League proposed the famous six-point program of regional autonomy and emerged as the last resort of hope for the Bengali people, and indeed, a beacon of hope for all nationalities suppressed by Islamabad regime. Awami League won the absolute majority in the 1970 general election—the first of its kind in the history of Pakistan—in spite of the elections being held under the military dictatorship. When the authoritarian government of Pakistan denied upholding the democratic will of the people, the Bengali people under the astute leadership of the Father of the Nation become uncompromising and determined to free the country. The Pakistan military’s staunch refusal to hand over power to a Bengali-led civilian government led to the genocide which started on 25 March 1971 under ‘Operation Searchlight’ and ultimately the events led to a nine-month-long war of independence.

Geopolitical Context of Bangladesh Foreign Policy

Bangladesh is located at the cusp of the vast Indian landscape and in particular of Bengal and the so-called seven sisters, i.e., the Northeastern Region, coasting on the frontiers of the Bay of Bengal funnel and touching the northwest tip of the troubled Myanmar territories (Yasmin, 2016). Its geo-spatial triangulations make it strategically important for invariably all major powers of the world. India’s propensity to reconnect the economic corridors through Bangladesh has helped Bangladesh craft its foreign policy in a propitious manner, where both countries stand to gain significantly from a mutually convenient policy direction towards each other (Mantoo, 2013). A major part of this grand initiative revolves around the rivers which formed the lifelines of the greater Indian civilisation and the transfusion of products and ideas across its many ethnicities and languages. The great opening at the south, the Bay of Bengal, is also not just another sea. It is a living and breathing ecosystem of life forms; economic priorities; commercial and diplomatic effort; individual, business, and corporate interests; evolutionary tendencies of societies, nations, countries, especially those with a Westminster style democracy and those with a more regimented set of governance structures—and how each tries to influence and entice the other; and above all, of Mother Nature, with all her furies and fiery beauties and a rising sea-level (Iyer, 2017) and rapidly worsening conditions in global warming (Elahi & Khan, 2015).

In other words, harmony, and lack thereof, amongst often conflicting priorities of economy, ecology, and security deeply influence the thought spheres which underwrite the Foreign Policy paradigms of both the country and the region. The lenses, layers, and spheres through which the Bay of Bengal could be seen are also many and multifarious. Bangladesh’s foreign relations vis-a-vis other countries take account of these natural geopolitical endowments. Coupled with Bangladesh’s own initiatives for regional stability and connectivity, such as the SAARC, BIMSTEC, and BBIN processes, where the Bay of Bengal holds a very prominent position, currently, Bangladesh also hosts two intersecting strategic constructs crossing their pathways across the cone of the Bay of Bengal and the landmass that is Bangladesh, i.e., the Indo-Pacific Strategy (IPS) and the Belt-and-Road Initiative (BRI).

Bangladesh is richly endowed with many layers of political economy and geo-demographic variables making it an extremely complex, dynamic and fluid cauldron of ideas, acts, movements and visualisations. Many sets of ideas are simultaneously playing out their lives on the population of the country. As such it is a magnificent milieu of levels and layers, fields and players, so far as statecraft is concerned.

At the time of the birth of Bangladesh, not only the subcontinent but also the entire world was deeply divided by the Cold War. Realising this stark reality, Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman manoeuvred his foreign policy to forge a bipartisan position in matters related to international politics, and create an amicable relationship with each party and even those who wished to stay away. Therefore, just after his return to the country in January 1972, when his favourite liberation forces (Mukti Bahini) were in a state of turmoil as a result of the after-shock of a guerrilla war, requested India to withdraw its troops immediately from Bangladesh, unlike any other newly born state anywhere in the world, ever. And India, as a true friend and partner, respecting the sovereignty of the new born country, took the timely measure to withdraw its troops. Indian withdrawal of troops also assisted Bangabandhu to get recognition of many countries, 126 very quickly.

Bangabandhu’s best bait was to appeal to reason and utilise the technologies of power to assert the legitimate aspirations of a sovereign and independent Bangladesh. Bangabandhu realised the nature of the evolution of power in the international domain and the sharp brakes which various coteries within the vestibules of the global power corridors exerted by means of control over the natural resources of the planet (Karim, 2020). Additionally, Bangabandhu understood the importance that Bangladesh ought to place on its rightful entry into the UN system and also into the Islamic Ummah.

As of 2021, Bangladesh is fast graduating into an economically solid and densely calibrated middle-income economy. As of 2021, our aim is to become a fully developed country by 2041. The Government of Bangladesh under the astute statesmanship of the Hon’ble Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina is working relentlessly for realising the Visions 2021, 2041 and 2100 in order to translate the dream of the Father of Nation Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman of a happy and prosperous “Sonar Bangla” into a reality. The Foreign Office is also playing a key role in fulfilling these dreams of the Government. Stabilising the economy and poverty alleviation remains our foremost priority. We intend to complement this objective with a greater depth in external trading and FDI – coupled with a greater inflow of foreign remittance. During next few years, we expect to increase (a) foreign investment and diversified investment portfolio, (b) expansion & diversification of our export basket, (c) providing quality service to our diaspora and also involving them in our nation building efforts (d) transfer of critical technologies, and (e) gainful employment of our professionals and workers abroad.

Bangladesh and its Immediate Region

Since independence, Bangladesh has been maintaining a delicate balance in its regional engagements amidst the destabilising power politics affecting the South, Central, and Southeast Asian regions. Rather than going to confrontations with the neighbouring countries, it has rather chosen to resolve the issues of disputes through dialogues, and international arbitration mechanisms.

For Bangladesh, South Asia remains at the core of its foreign policy priorities. The historic Land Boundary Agreement with India in 2015 has untangled the complex territorial rights set down since as early as in 1713. The four thousand plus kilometres of land border between Bangladesh and India are now possible zones of prosperity instead of conflict (Bhattacharya, 2017).  Delimitation of the maritime boundary with both India and Myanmar—a historic dispute over the resource-rich Bay of Bengal, Bangladesh was able to persuade both countries to the international system and hold everyone including itself to the rigours of international standards. Our maritime delimitation is a rare example of engaging both the multilateral and the bilateral systems to solve regional disputes (Ghani, 2020). Despite the constant provocations of Myanmar regarding the Rohingya issue, Bangladesh has always been committed to engaging international mechanisms for their safe, democratic and sustainable repatriation, justice, and accountability of Rohingya people. Acclimatising the UN mechanism to support the persecuted citizens of Myanmar and bringing Myanmar to the UN court system without going to direct confrontations is a success story of Bangladesh’s regional foreign policy (Julhash, 2020). Bangabandhu methodically went in stages and in a step-by-step manner so that no loophole could jeopardise the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the newborn country. In spite of severe constraints and challenges, creating the seeds of a sovereign national identity – complete with the full spectrum of a Westphalian state system was a singularly important phenomenon that Bangabandhu gave birth to.

If we take a closer look at the way our diplomatic manoeuvres have been construed, knowingly, and possibly as equally, subconsciously, the immediate neighbourhood has remained a core focus of the country’s tactical formulations in the foreign policy domain. We constantly monitor the civilisational linkages across South Asia. The more recent bonds of trust, honour and shared sacrifices between Bangladesh and India remains the crux of this ideation. We have engaged the South Asian and East Asian neighbours beyond the call of regular diplomatic overtures and have gone beyond to engage structurally so that we become interconnected to the rest of Asia in an organic way and then catapult our productive endowments to a height achievable only by synergistic configurations and not alone.

Bangladesh’s Ties with India

South Asia is a unique place to be! Amongst other things, it is marked with a shared culture, concentric to the Indic civilisation; a widely varied topography; a strong lineage of family and religious bonds (and its flipside / consequent harmony and/or discord); cross-breeding societies, yet bound existence; a huge mélange of geographic and climatic conditions; invasions, assimilations and colonial past; the continuous interplay of strategic powers and power players; well-defined and strong administrative structures; growing economies and communities trapped in low-level equilibriums; and involvement and pre-eminence of security concerns (and consequently, security agencies).

In such a configuration, Bangladesh and India share an extraordinary relationship, so as to say. It’s more congenital than architectural.  Sketched, as post-Westphalian republics, out of a stretch of land and waters, which sheltered a multitude of nations, peoples and belief-systems for centuries across, Bangladesh and India are not exclusive neighbours. Rather, Bangladesh-India relations are multifaceted and deeply inter-entrenched in a shared history, geographical contiguity, cultural commonality, and economic complementarity. The psychological bonds, which stem from the association of the two countries during the ‘Glorious War of Liberation – 1971’ remain a dominant factor in how peoples of the two countries see each other. While many inside India would not know, Bangladesh has always been supremely aware of the pivotal role that the Government and people of India, and especially of the Indian Armed Forces and of the supreme sacrifices made by its members, played in our War of Liberation. The shared struggle of 1971 has set the benchmark for bilateral cooperation in maintaining peace and stability and upholding the superior human values in our neighbourhood landscape.  Needless to say, the War of Liberation has set in motion a dynamic détente that defines the entire range of Confidence Building Measures [or CBM] between the two countries.

It is often said and categorically noted that India and Bangladesh are bound by history and heritage but it is seldom understood which history and whose heritage the countries or republics – which in themselves are rather recent phenomena in the stage of world politics – share. Again, it may not be very wise to claim that we fully understand the extent, range and depth of the vision which define this relationship over the years to come (Mamun, 2015). The situation is further complicated when we are dealing with the flux-vortex of complex socio-economic parameters marked by ironies. Both countries have a relatively young population, i.e., passing through an era of demographic dividends; both countries have pervasive and hardcore poverty; both countries suffer from rising income inequalities; both countries have slow permeation of literacy and knowledge; and parts of both countries have seen aggressive religious fundamentalism. At the same time, both countries also have strong community driven traditions of employment and inclusive prosperity. And interestingly, people of both countries have, by and large, an ambitious mindset – when national ambitions are not solely mired by putting the next meal on the table rather the aspiration levels have risen up to landing an explorer vehicle on Mars.

The intense and dynamic interlinks between the two countries in terms of trade and commerce is complemented by the fact that at least three major sweet-water river systems of the world, complete with their tributaries and branches, alluvial deltas and marshes, a full-fledged sea with a sizeable and resource-rich continental shelf, are shared by the two countries. One cannot but write with heartfelt passion when one writes about anything, which even remotely relates to the relationship between the two countries. Amongst the menaces which festered the relationship between the two countries, Land Boundary Agreement was a strange case to deal with. Complications had originally started with the Radcliffe award when on the stroke of a certain midnight in 1947, a caricatured border was produced by an Englishman who had never even visited the areas that he was entrusted to divide. Further complication had arisen with the differentiated implementation of the 1974 Treaty signed by the founder of the Independent Bangladesh Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and Prime Minister Indira Gandhi. It is hard to believe but remains nonetheless true, that of the 4,096 kilometres of border between Bangladesh and India, only 6.5 kilometres remained un-demarcated and it remained so in three separate pieces none of which is longer than 3 kilometres at a stretch and one involved nothing other than a river which has shifted course many years before! The question of exchange of enclaves (111 Indian enclaves in Bangladesh with an area of 17,158.13 acres; 51 Bangladeshi enclaves in Indian territory with an area of 7,110.02 acres) and territories in adverse possession (there was 3,506.01 acres of Bangladesh territory under the adverse possession of India and 3,024.16 acres Indian territory under adverse possession of Bangladesh) also plagued the relationship between the two countries till now due only to procedural delays.

Even when technical committees headed by Envoys Plenipotentiary had signed and exchanged close to twelve hundred strip-maps, and the cabinets had approved in effect the Mujib-Indira Treaty of 1974, the issue remained pending for a lack of consensus at the Parliament. De facto issues constrained by de jure concerns. It is interesting to see how once a perfectly placid land could turn into a hotbed of division with the introduction of a foreign concept. The sub-human levels of existence that inhabitants of the enclaves and adversely possessed lands lived in was not only a problem, rather it was a shame for the two countries so long as they remained unresolved. Bangladesh had ratified this supremely important treaty in the early seventies. The ratification by the Indian Legislature effectively removed one of the last vestiges of a foreign Raj and its vicious measures to divide the Indian subcontinent. The nature of this peculiar beast – called Enclaves, Adversely Possessed Lands and Undemarcated Boundaries had literally been humanitarian and law-enforcement issues of epic proportion. The lack of a de jure agreement represented a serious impediment to the People-to-People connect of both the countries, and led to an Achilles’ Heel which undermined the security apparatus and processes of both Bangladesh and India. Although each successive Government in India worked hard to get the Constitutional Amendment Bill passed, it is Prime Minister Modi who could be credited the most for bringing all parties together into a breath-taking consensus.

An area that created headlines in each other’s countries for well over three decades was the concern for security and especially the rise of autonomous non-state and sub-state actors. In last twelve years since Awami League came to power in Bangladesh, considerable momentum has been whipped up in both countries to drive out sub-state actors infringing on the sovereignty and territorial integrity of each other. Most notable amongst these are Bangladesh Government’s steps to mobilise actions against the Northeast insurgents like ULFA et al. Actions taken in spite of the limited force capabilities of the law enforcement agencies of the country are symptomatic of the commitment of the government to bolster Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) taken on its part to dispel the confusion and aspersions for distrust in each other.

Since Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina came to power twelve years ago, her Government has been trying to piece together a coordinated strategy to put the relationship between the two countries on the right track, and essentially, on an incrementally upward growth trajectory. Very much within the scope of this collaboration, be it at the bilateral or at the sub-regional or at the regional level, the intention was to make collective endeavours for ensuring ecologically sustainable economic progress for the region as a whole.

Bangladesh in South Asian Region: A Model for Symbiotic Existence

For countries to exist in peace with themselves, with their constituent peoples, and with their neighbours across borders, we must ensure for each:

• First, equitable market access commensurate to the merit of comparative economic advantage (negating the infant industry argument) in the other;
• Second, a rapid expansion of the environmentally sustainable regional export basket in both goods and services – contributing to the reconstruction of the ancient value-chains (essentially supplementing its gamut with free movement of cargo and seasonal workforces);
• Third, quick transfer and assimilation of critical technologies;
• Fourth, broader employment of both professionals and workers in regional economies based purely on the principle of ‘dead-weight burden’ reduction;
• Fifth, commencement of regional power, energy and communication grids, and
• Sixth, embedding the youth, the media, the civil society and the social media, in the discourses related to policy formulation.

The various factors enabling, calling for and dictating cooperation between the two countries are geographic proximity, common language, similar demographics and consumption pattern, common development needs and experience, and common inherited industrial infrastructure to name a few. In terms of economics, these are very high positive simulators in the Gravity Model, which would bring any two countries and their economies extremely close together – as if they were almost one yet each maintained its sovereign priorities (Mamun, 2015).

The geopolitical or rather geostrategic interests, that are a natural result of the location of Bangladesh and India in South Asia, cannot be undermined. If we trace our recorded history back to the 7th century, when Hiuen Tsang travelled through India, we would notice that the erstwhile Bengal and particularly East Bengal—which is now Bangladesh—had always been one of the most critical gateways to the vast economic and even political inner core of the Indian sub continent.  Sketchier glimpses from Mahabharata or for that matter Megasthenes’ Indica might only complement this fact from an even more ancient past.

At the level of pure physical and tactical security of the societies though, which inhabit today’s South Asia, it is quite obvious that both India and Bangladesh share a vision of a peaceful immediate neighbourhood, and that decision-makers on both sides understand the important role being jointly played by the two countries. National security, regime stability, and territorial integrity define the baseline understanding of both Bangladesh and Indian policy-makers. From a purely operational viewpoint, Bangladesh understands the depth and breadth of security that India’s friendly postures ensure and at the same time, India appreciates the value of the unprecedented security measures taken by the Government of Sheikh Hasina at a very high personal cost and commitment to free the Bangladesh landmass from anti-India elements. This has only added to the unmatched breakthroughs in the development of the Northeast and stability across the entire Eastern theatre. After all, insurgency and terrorism are common enemies to both countries. Bangladesh has allowed the transport of heavy equipment for power generation and other industrial usage in the Northeast ending decades of disconnect between the Indian mainland and the northeast. Work is now going on to facilitate greater connectivity between and across points in India and Bangladesh.

As the world’s attention zooms in on Asia and her Oceans, the two countries have successfully resolved the maritime boundary delimitation issue. It would be prudent to note that the Indian Ocean Rim region has three declared nuclear powers. Successful arbitration between India and Bangladesh for the resolution of the maritime boundary delimitation has become an issue for discussion, deliberation and introspection in far away countries.  We must find ways to harness the strength of the Blue Economy for the benefits of our two peoples.

Over the last couple of years, Bangladesh and India have put in place several ‘Capstone Documents’ and set in motion ‘Key Processes’ which will define the Government-to-Government relationship in the years to come. Starting with the visionary Joint Communiqué of 2010, the Framework Agreement of 2011, and the institution of the Joint Consultative Committee (JCC) at the level of Foreign Ministers have ensured that our two countries embark on an irretrievably irrevocable process of shared and mutual prosperity and unparalleled confidence in each other. The Ministries of Home and Foreign Affairs now meet regularly. The Border Security Instruments are now in realtime sync with each other starting with the Directors-General down to Company Commanders. The District Commissioners at the bordering Districts now meet to resolve the issues, which create tensions and hindrances in our bilateral cooperation at the state level. All these measures attest to only one thing, that leadership at the helm believe in looking ahead, that they believe in looking beyond the rear-view mirror, that they believe in creating the charts and the maps ahead, and that they don’t want to go back in a time warp. Case in point – the Joint Statement of March, 2021. AI is now a core collaboration area.

With at least three nuclear powered neighbouring nations operating in the same geo-maritime spheres, it is needless to say that solving the equation to a win-win solution requires Bangladesh and India to work out close proximity anomalies.

It is said that visions grow out of facts of the past, appreciation of the present, and ideas for the future. We have vividly seen the past and are experiencing the present. Visionary thinkers from both sides are speaking of a couple of new areas to begin working on. These include, amongst others:

• First, managing Peaceful and prosperous International Borders and Security,
• Second, water Security and joint management of river basins.
• Third, energy Security and cross-border generation and trade in power,
• Fourth, connectivity and Integrated Multimodal Communication, with special emphasis on utilising inland waterways,
• Fifth, sub-regional and regional development and utilisation of mega-architectures such as regional and continental highways, rail networks, sea ports and coastal shipping,
• Sixth, investment, production, manufacturing and service sector complementarity,
• Seventh, education and health sector development and elimination of diseases, malnutrition, illiteracy and ignorance,
• Eighth, designing sustainable and forward-looking mechanisms in joint finance and marketing of both innovative and high-end value-added products and services, and
• Ninth, development of leadership across South Asia to institute measurable social and economic changes.

Dialogues at both the Track 1, Track 2 and Track 1.5 are critical to the realisation of these formulations. The India-Bangladesh Friendship Dialogue (where the India Foundation is also a major partner) which took a vertical life since 2015 is a glaring example of the Track 1.5 innovation between the two countries.

Also, endorsements are coming at private levels at the helm to take the idea of reconnecting the ancient value-based chains and networks of production, trade, commerce and communication into its pristine natural configurations. Since days have changed and times have passed, a host of value-added services and production possibilities have been added to the paradigm of our interconnectedness. Telecommunications, power, energy, university and skill-building centres, hospitals and hospitality services have been added to the regional and sub-regional architecture of cooperation.

Bangladesh and the Indian Northeast are located at the “Fulcrum Advantage Point” of such a configuration to emerge. It is imperative that we do not only make the policies and rules for our two countries, but that we effectively implement all those to boost both South Asian trade and trade with the Southeast Asian nations.

Bangladesh-India: Way forward for our shared prosperity

In the interest of sustainable cooperation, it is important to take effective steps to resolve pending issues like sharing of common river waters and bringing down border killing to zero as such incidents vitiates public minds. The policymakers should also expedite signing of the treaty for sharing of the waters of the Teesta, the river  so vital for northern Bangladesh’s irrigation as it still remains a long-pending issue.

As India and Bangladesh are celebrating the 50th anniversary of their diplomatic relations, the two countries, bonded by nature, history and culture, should be bold enough to go for new areas of cooperation and connectivity, as it is the key apparatus to change the fate of the region. And that connectivity should not be in terms of land, road, and waterways alone, it must be of culture and  people-to-people connections as well.  The two countries’ political leaders must look beyond the borders, and forge a progressive partnership for a peaceful, prosperous, and progressive region.

As of now, benefits of trade and economic cooperation remain far below their potential. Trade between the two countries, a major part of which takes place through land ports, face formidable challenges. Cost of trading remains very high, mostly associated with lack of appropriate trade facilitation as well as logistical difficulties and the consequent high lead time that discourages traders. Indeed, some studies show that for some products, trade costs for Bangladesh are higher than those associated with trading with Europe and North America. In spite of the fact that India imports about US$ 450.0 billion worth of products annually from the global market, Bangladesh’s exports to India have tended to hover around only US$ 1.0 billion. Direct B-to-B connections between productive networks and value chains remain sketchy.

It is against this backdrop that the ongoing efforts and policy shifts are important from the perspective of triggering substantive changes in going forward. The recent efforts to deepen bilateral cooperation have been underpinned by initiatives in many areas including promoting trade in goods, services and energy; establishing multi-modal connectivity; infrastructure building; initiatives to stimulate cross-border investment; and cooperation in areas of technology and capacity-building in various sectors. A large number of projects are being implemented in Bangladesh at present, with many being financed by the three lines of credit (LOC) offered by India worth US$ 8 billion. Energy import from India; India’s involvement in building Bangladesh’s nuclear power plant; the grant provided for the Padma bridge; building special economic zones for Indian investors in Bangladesh; the signing of the coastal shipping agreement; allowing transit facilities to Nepal and Bhutan through India to use Bangladesh’s Mongla, Chattogram and Payra ports; the signing of the Bangladesh-Bhutan-India-Nepal (BBIN) Motor Vehicle Agreement and other initiatives could usher in a sea of change in the way that trade, business, and other areas of connectivity operate at the moment. Bangladesh perceives these to be opportunities that could be leveraged to transform its comparative advantages to competitive advantages, enabling it to address the challenges of development and the dual graduation. We want to connect our river, rails, roads, aviation and shipping networks to an optimised format with India so that people-to-people and business-to-business connectivities remain unhindered and can bring the best to the fore.

I would not dare dictate the natural evolution of the relationship between our two countries. But I believe that this is time we devise a grand dream which our two great peoples could share and partake. I expect from all of us to put together a vision document which would define the core economic focus as long as the interaction between the two countries are concerned, rights and responsibilities of both the social and the economic actors, which draw the social and the economic paradigms between the two countries. Through innovative initiatives, the friendship between the two nations could be learnt as lessons by the rest of the world, and to replicate the ideas regionally and sub-regionally, in different domains – economic, social, cultural, political and environmental and so on.

This requires imaginative ideas, courageous leaders and strong and learning institutions, capable of converting these visions into reality. What if we toyed with the idea of the “Great Trans-Asian Rail-Road-River Network” to connect to the Seas in the South? May be, such are the visions of connectivity and infrastructural development, landscaping and ultimately, “mindscaping” the entire region.

Indo-Bangladesh friendship initiatives should be viewed in the larger context of re-inventing the meaning of ‘development’, from a non-western, non-universal stand-point, of defining change and need with respect to our specific histories, experiences, economies and culture, and not as a by-product of western subordination, underdevelopment and colonialism.  If we can plan intelligently, the instances of India-Bangladesh friendship would be quoted as an exemplar of ‘bilateralism and beyond’, of how a sub-regional formation locks us to each other in an unbreakable embrace for our region to prosper and for our people to find both liberty and grandeur.

People of Indian subcontinent have gone through similar history and they were invaded by the Persians, the Huns, the Moguls, the Arabs and the British. They withstood the massacres of Nadir Shah or Chengis Khan, yet they maintained their dignity of life and respect towards all faiths, ethnicity, colour, and background. No wonder Prime Minister of India Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru was overwhelmed with it and coined the word that Indian strength and beauty is in “Unity in Diversity.”

If we look towards next 50 years of South Asia, its strength should come from a tolerant society of multi-culturalism multi-ethnicity, multi-religions and multi-races.

In spite of efforts, millions of people in many parts of the world are being uprooted from their homes and traditional jobs due to violence, wars and terror. Many are becoming victims of ignorance and spread of venom of hatred. Forcibly displaced people of Myanmar known as Rohingya are such victims. Therefore, to establish a peaceful world across nations, it is time to inculcate a mindset of tolerance, a mindset of respect towards others irrespective of ethnicity, colour, race and religion. Bangladesh proposed such a resolution in the UN known as “Culture of Peace” and it was adopted with consensus. Let this South Asian leadership prove to the rest of the world that they truly can realise “Culture of Peace” in the subcontinent for a secure, peaceful and stable South Asia.

The ambitions for South Asia is as grand and as deep as human imagination can be. We do not need to be beholden to the prejudices and to the dogma which defined our colonial past. Rather, we ought to consider constructing a layered milieu of actors and processes which would serve the region in a more meaningful way than ever before. Across the boundaries of the nation state, we ought to consider rejuvenating the civilisational linkages which defined our characteristic traits as humans and as nations.

Ambitious as may be, over next 50 years, I would wish to have sustainable peace and stability in South Asia. Our youth must be freed from the confines of the prejudiced mind so that they can realise the visions of the enlightened soul. South Asia must show the world that it practices a ‘Culture of Peace’ and it is a region of tolerance and respect for others irrespective of ethnicity, colour, race and religion. True to the meaning of Dharma – the path of righteousness. Only by accepting the richness of our texture as a civilisation can we truly harness the potential of the individual. Ultimately, if the human individual is at peace and is in comfort for life and dignity then we have succeeded as nations and as states.

Author Brief Bio: Dr. A. K. Abdul Momen is the Foreign Minister of Bangladesh

Bibliography

1. Bhattacharya, D., 2017. COMPARATIVE IMPACT OF EXECUTION OF LAND BOUNDARY AGREEMENT, 2015 BETWEEN INDIA AND BANGLADESH ON THE STATUS OF ERSTWHILE ENCLAVES’PEOPLE. Journal of South Asian Studies, 5(2), pp.77-87.
2. Debnath, A., 2017. The Bangladesh genocide: The plight of women 1. Plight and fate of women during and following genocide, pp.47-66.
3. Elahi, F., 2015. . A Study on the Effects of Global Warming in Bangladesh. International Journal of Environmental Monitoring and Analysis. Vol. 3, No. 3, 2015, pp. 118-122.
4. Ghani, M., 2020. A ‘Great Win’ For Bangladesh. [online] The Daily Star. Available at: <https://www.thedailystar.net/news-detail-227828> [Accessed 26 December 2020].
5. IYER, G., 2017. Common Responses to Maritime Security Threats in the Bay of Bengal. New Delhi, Nov.
6. Jahan, R., 2013. Genocide in Bangladesh. edited by Samuel Totten & William S. Parsons, Centuries of Genocide: Essays and Eyewitness Accounts, pp.249-278.
7. Jahan, R., 1973. Bangladesh in 1972: Nation Building in a New State. Asian Survey. 13, No. 2, pp. 199-210 (12 pages)
8. Julhash, A., 2020. Rohingya Case: International Court Begins Gathering Evidence. [online] Thediplomat.com. Available at: <https://thediplomat.com/2020/02/rohingya-case-international-court-begins-gathering-evidence/> [Accessed 29 September 2021].
9. Karim, T., 2020. Bangabandhu: The Architect Of Bangladesh’s Foreign Policy. [online] The Daily Star. Available at: <https://www.thedailystar.net/in-focus/news/bangabandhu-the-architect-bangladeshs-foreign-policy-1956905> [Accessed 29 September 2021].
10. Khan A.R., 1970, “A New Look at Disparity,” Forum.
11. Khondker, H.H., 2017. Sheikh Hasina of Bangladesh: Politics, personality and policies. In Women presidents and prime ministers in post-transition democracies (pp. 221-237). Palgrave Macmillan, London.
13. Mamun, S M. 2015. Irreversible, Irrevocable Successes in India-Bangladesh Relations. Policy Wonks. Accessed from: https://www.academia.edu/35844289/Irreversible_Irrevocable_Successes_in_India_Bangladesh_Relations
14. Mantoo, S.A., 2013. India and the Strategic importance of Bangladesh. An Analysis of Intelligence Support to Security Operations in Nigeria: A Review of Some Joint Task Force Operations, p.48.
15. Mookherjee, N., 2015. The spectral wound: Sexual violence, public memories, and the Bangladesh war of 1971. Duke University Press.
16. Moni, D. and Joy, S.W., The Success Premier Sheikh Hasina.
17. Papanek, G.,1967 Pakistan’s Development, Harvard, 1967
18. Rahman, T.S., 1998. FOREIGN POLICY OF BANGLADESH. Bangladesh at 25: an analytical discourse on development, p.217.
19. Sharlach, L., 2000. Rape as genocide: Bangladesh, the former Yugoslavia, and Rwanda. New Political Science, 22(1), pp.89-102.
20. Sawada, Y., Mahmud, M. and Kitano, N., 2018. Economic And Social Development Of Bangladesh.
21. Wajed, S., Sheikh Hasina.
22. Yasmin, L., 2016. Bangladesh and the great powers. In Routledge Handbook of Contemporary Bangladesh (pp. 389-401). Routledge.

Introduction

Freedom of speech and expression is an essential facet of democracy. Freedom of association is, likewise, a form of freedom of expression, recognised by Article 20 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights^[1] and Article 22 of the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights.^[2]This right is also expressly recognised by the Indian Constitution read with appropriate constraints.^[3]

Organisations/associations can however be either licit or illicit. There is no dispute as far as membership of a licit organisations is concerned. Even anti-governmental organisations which are non-violent in nature are inherently crucial for democracies. However, membership of an unlawful association is a matter of legal and political dispute. Terrorist organisations, by their very nature are “harder to deter” when compared with other organisations,^[4] which consequently bespeaks the need for appropriate legislation to curb their spread. That was the reason why anti-terrorism legislations such as the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987 [hereinafter “TADA”],^[5] the Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2002 [hereinafter “POTA”],^[6] or the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 [hereinafter “UAPA”],^[7] were introduced.

Membership in a terrorist group has been considered penal because violent acts are not the only tactic of terrorist organisations.^[8] Many such organisations now have two wings. While one wing engages in illegal activities, the other participates in social and political activities to increase its reach and support base, thus blurring the line between lawful and unlawful purposes. This raises the question: Can members of banned organisations, who engage in social and political activities of banned organisations, be charged with a criminal offence?

Three Judgements

Three Supreme Court judgments delivered in 2011, ruled that mere passive membership of an organisation cannot be criminalised except in cases wherein the member intends to contribute to the organisation’s unlawful intent. These were:

• State of Kerala Raneef [hereinafter “Raneef”]^[9]
• Arup Bhuyan v. State of Assam [hereinafter “Arup Bhuyan”]^[10]
• Indra Das v. State of Assam [hereinafter “Indra Das”]^[11]

All three judgments were delivered by the division bench of Markandey Katju and Gyan Sudha Mishra, JJ.

The Raneef Judgement. Dr. Raneef, head of the medical team of Popular Front of India, an organisation engaged in unlawful activities was prosecuted under the Indian Penal Code, 1860 [hereinafter “IPC”]; the Explosive Substances Act, 1908; and UAPA. The bench examined the question “whether all members of an organisation can be automatically held to be guilty, once an organisation is declared unlawful,” and ruled that mere passive membership of a banned organisation cannot be criminalised. Markandey Katju, J., relied on the precedents of the Supreme Court of United States of America like Scales v. United States and Elfbrandt v. Russell. Unless the accused actively participates in the functioning of the organisation with the intention to further the illegal aims of organisation, making mere membership as punishable will amount to “guilt by association” which has no place in the USA as well as in India.

The Arup Bhuyan Judgement. Here, the accused was convicted under TADA which made membership of a banned organisation criminal.^[12] The bench made a reference to the constitution bench judgment of Kedar Nath Singh^[13] and held that “mere membership of a banned organisation will not incriminate a person unless he resorts to violence or incites people to violence or does an act intended to create disorder or disturbance of public peace by resorting to violence.”^[14] The court also cited the decision of Clarence Brandenburg v. State of Ohio which held that “a group formed to teach or advocate the doctrines of criminal syndicalism” is not per se illegal. The court thus concluded that it will become unlawful only if it provokes to imminent lawless action.^[15] The court also stated that the judicial pronouncements of the USA “apply to India too, as our fundamental rights are similar to the Bill of Rights in the U.S. Constitution”.

The Indra Das Judgement. In this case, Katju J. discussed the idea of active and passive membership in a very detailed manner. The substantial part of the judgment is as follows:

“In Arup Bhuyan case we have stated that mere membership of a banned organisation cannot incriminate a person unless he is proved to have resorted to acts of violence or incited people to imminent violence, or does an act intended to create disorder or disturbance of public peace by resort to imminent violence. In the present case, even assuming that the appellant was a member of ULFA which is a banned organisation, there is no evidence to show that he did acts of the nature above mentioned. Thus, even if he was a member of ULFA it has not been proved that he was an active member and not merely passive member.”

Katju J. further took backing of many cases decided by the Supreme Court of USA in 1960s,^[16]wherein it was observed that a seditious law ought to interfere only if there is an “imminent danger” to the country and held:

“Section 3(5) of TADA or Section 10 of the UAPA, 1967 which on their plain language make mere membership of a banned organisation criminal have to be read down and we have to depart from the literal rule of interpretation in such cases, otherwise these provisions will become unconstitutional as violative of Articles 19 and 21 of the Constitution…Hence, mere membership of a banned organisation will not make a person a criminal unless he resorts to violence or incites people to violence or creates public disorder by violence or incitement to violence.”

Issues Raised by the Three Judgements

All the three cases were decided by the same bench in the same year (2011) and their findings are also similar, with some variations. Though the cases concern the constitutionality of a central enactment, no notice was issued to the Union of India, which should have been made a necessary party, to enable the Court to take note of each aspect of the controversy while deciding validity of laws that directly impact national security and sovereignty. A review petition has been filed against the decision of the division bench in Arup Bhuyan case which is pending before a higher bench.

The power of judicial review must be exercised in an even more cautious manner when the court is developing a law and expanding a jurisprudence. In light of the above the following issues need serious investigation:

1. Whether, by reading down the provision of a law enacted by parliament without even hearing the Union of India is violation of basic principle of “fair hearing”.
2. Whether the distinction made by the division bench in active and passive membership of an unlawful organisation holds good in law.
3. Whether the concept of free speech in USA is same as that in India. Did the division bench take note of various higher bench judgments regarding applicability of the precedents of the USA in India?
4. While deciding all three cases, the Supreme Court relied on many U.S. Supreme Court decisions but did not discuss Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project^[17] decided by the U.S. Supreme Court in 2010, which is on “material support to foreign terrorist organisation”. Whether this judgment is relevant in Indian context.
5. Whether the judgments by division bench in three cases operate per incuriam.
6. Why did the court not consider the drastic changes in security situation in the world and in India before relying on precedents from the 1960s?

Distinction between Active and Passive Membership: Is it in Conformity with Law

An unlawful assembly is defined in Section 141 of IPC as an assembly of five or more people with a common intent to disrupt peace, while Section 149 of IPC requires presence of a commonality of object coupled with physical presence at the site to be considered penal. This section states:“If an offence is committed by any member of an unlawful assembly in prosecution of the common object of that assembly, or such as the members of that assembly knew to be likely to be committed in prosecution of that object, every person who, at the time of the committing of that offence, is a member of the same assembly, is guilty of that offence.”

In addition, Section 34 of IPC provides for constructive liability in cases wherein the offenders have a common intention to act together. It is essential for the application of this provision that each and every member acts in harmony with each other and there is presence of an element of active participation from all. A collective reading of these provisions suggests that for holding multiple persons liable constructively, a sense of active involvement is needed, either in the form of active participation or in the form of physical presence. The strong opposition that jurists have raised against legislative innovations that allow criminal indictment or prohibit public employment of people found to have been members of organisations whose goals are considered subversive or to have associated with persons with such purposes, demonstrates the traditional importance that jurists have placed on the idea that guilt is personal.^[18]

TADA, UAPA and POTA were however enacted to cover those situations which could not be tackled by the already existing set of provisions in the IPC. Parliament enacted these laws, precisely to deal with offences relating to terrorism and social disruptions, wherein the elements of active participation or physical indulgence would play no role in determination of culpability. These laws, thus, ought to be interpreted in a strict sense unless a manifestly absurd interpretation emanates out of it.

These laws were enacted as statutes of strict liability where absence of presence of mens rea would have little role to play. Thus, the imputation of requirement of active membership is a direct attempt to infuse the requirement of mens rea or knowledge on the part of the accused while being a member of the organisation and this consequence is in direct conflict with the above-stated purpose. For this, reliance can be assigned on judgment of the Apex court in State of Maharashtra v. Mayer Hans George,^[19] which stated…“The nature of mens rea, that will be implied in a statute creating an offence depends upon the object of the Act and the provisions thereof.”

The crucial factor which acts as the dividing line between unlawful assemblies and proscribed organisations is that the latter requires formal constitution of an organisation with various stated and unstated objectives. The members complement each other through their acts and omissions to further the common objectives of the organisation. Such organisations become proscribed when their stated objectives exceed the permissible limits of law and it requires an express declaration by the appropriate authority to declare it as proscribed. In unlawful assembly, no complementary conduct is required, only commonality of object is enough. It is hence evident that the division bench judgment has embarked upon the application of purposive interpretation of the statute, thereby, exceeding the scope of interpretation attributed to a court of justice.

Free Speech: Misplaced Comparison between India and the US

The Court in all the three judgments has relied heavily on the cases related to free speech decided by the Supreme Court of USA. Katju J., has stated that the Fundamental Rights in Indian Constitution are same as Bill of Rights in USA. There are however, fundamental differences between the two, on at least three counts.

Firstly, free speech under First Amendment in USA has no reasonable restrictions by means of a law whereas in India, freedom of speech and expression is subject to reasonable restrictions.^[20] The term ‘reasonable restriction’ was introduced into the Constitution, to allow the courts to keep a check on any legislation providing for arbitrary restrictions. The interest of national security was one of the justifiable grounds considered for restricting free speech in the Constituent Assembly debates, but this point appears to have been erroneously overlooked by the division bench, which has given free speech preference over national security concerns.

Secondly, in India, these set of rights are available only to citizens unlike in the USA where, it is available to both citizens as well as non-citizens. Thirdly, in India, article 19 can be suspended during emergency unlike in USA where there is no such provision.^[21]

While the principles of law as laid down by the Supreme Court of USA can be imported in India, it is unwise to import every doctrine as the circumstances and societal structure in the USA and India are different. In the Babulal Parate v. State of Maharashtra,^[22] case [hereinafter “Babulal”], the Supreme Court stated:

“It seems to us, however, that the American doctrine cannot be imported under our Constitution because the fundamental rights guaranteed under Article 19(1) of the Constitution are not absolute rights but, as pointed out in State of Madras v. V.G. Row [1952 SCR 597] are subject to the restrictions placed in the subsequent clauses of Article 19. There is nothing in the American Constitution corresponding to clauses (2) to (6) of Article 19 of our Constitution.”

The division bench comprising of Katju J., was bound by observations made in Babulal and other judgments delivered by larger benches which had similar observations.^[23] It has thus erroneously overlooked all these considerations and precedents of Constitution Bench while relying on decisions of the Supreme Court of USA.

On the contrary, a judgement of the Supreme Court of the USA, which should have been considered is the “Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project” [hereinafter “Holder”], which is in conflict with the various judgments cited by the division bench to interpret the issues related to free speech in India. Here, on the issue whether the provisions of Material Support Law are in contravention of free speech guaranteed by First Amendment of the Constitution of the USA, the Court observed that material support meant to “promote peaceable, lawful conduct,” but not to further terrorism and that the government’s interest in combating terrorism is an urgent objective of the highest order. As terrorist groups systematically conceal their activities behind charitable, social and political fronts, such contributions and support further their terrorism.^[24]

In the present-day Indian context, there is a need to have stringent laws in place which can prove effective in curbing terrorist activities and ward off any impending dangers. The judgments delivered by the division bench in Arup Bhuyan, Raneef and Indira Das cases respectively have heavily relied on jurisprudence laid down by the US Supreme Court during the 1960s, wherein free speech was given precedence over other concerns. The Holder judgement delivered in 2010, however, evaluated according to the prevailing circumstances.

National security is of paramount importance and in case free speech acts as an aid to any terrorist activities – violent or non-violent, it is liable to be restricted. Terrorist organisations often peddle their agenda in the garb of social organisations and pose a threat to life and property. The law has to be such as is able to ward off any such threat and also penalise persons involved. For this, the law needs to adapt to the need of the hour.

Per Incuriam Judgements

The law of precedent, as followed in India, entails that the prior judgments passed by larger composition of the court ought to be accepted as settled law by subsequent courts unless expressly assailed by a larger bench on proper reference.^[25] The issues of law involved in the three judgments have been subject matter of consideration before the court previously in the case of Kartar Singh v.State of Punjab.^[26] While speaking on the constitutional validity of TADA, a five-judge constitution bench embarked upon the deduction of the object of this legislation and observed as follows:^[27]

“…the meaningful purpose and object of the legislation, the gravity of terrorism unleashed by the terrorists and disruptionist endangering not only the sovereignty and integrity of the country but also the normal life of the citizens, and the reluctance of even the victims as well as the public in coming forward, at the risk of their life, to give evidence — hold that the impugned section cannot be said to be suffering from any vice of unconstitutionality. In fact, if the exigencies of certain situations warrant such a legislation then it is constitutionally permissible as ruled in a number of decisions of this Court, provided none of the fundamental rights under Chapter III of the Constitution is infringed.”(Emphasis supplied)

The above observation makes it clear that the act of bifurcation of membership and division of liability on the basis of active or passive membership renders the very object as negated. It is thus apparent that TADA covers two categories of persons: One, those persons involved in terrorist and disruptive activities and two, those persons associated with terrorist and disruptive activities. The former category squarely covers active members and the latter category covers passive members. A necessary corollary of this observation is that the statute aims to target both active and passive members.

After upholding the constitutional validity of TADA in Kartar Singh, the Supreme Court in PUCL v. Union of India,^[28] [hereinafter “PUCL”] declared that the provisions of POTA are constitutionally valid. In the light of these clear observations, the interpretation adopted by the division bench that the purposive interpretation is required to save the membership provision from being declared unconstitutional is in utter contrast with the settled law pertaining to this question. Therefore, the authors are of the view that the judgments are per incuriam.

Conclusion

India, and indeed the world, is under serious challenge from terrorist organisations. With respect to counter terrorism legislation such as TADA and POTA, the Apex Court has often interpreted these enactments to achieve a balance between civil liberties of the accused, human rights of the victims and the compelling interest of the state.^[29]

The three judgements delivered by the Supreme Court in 2011 have however placed individual liberty over the security concerns of the state. Here, the Supreme Court read down provisions of central enactments passed through the Parliament of India without giving a chance of hearing to the Union of India, even though the enactments in question were Central Acts. In the judgements delivered in all the three cases, equated the membership of a criminal organisation with that of a terrorist organisation. Such an interpretation defeats the very purpose for which laws such as TADA, UAPA and POTA were enacted. While drawing upon precedents from the USA, the Three Judgements took into account the judgements delivered in the US in 1960s, when no terrorism threat was faced by the US, but overlooked the US judgements of a later date, when terrorism was a threat and in which the judgements gave precedence to national security, as in cases from Schneck v. United States^[30] to Holder.

While the decision of Arup Bhuyan is under review, it is in the interest of national security, that all members of a banned terrorist organisation, who engage in terror activities or who engage in social and political activities of banned organisations, must be charged with a criminal offence. The burden of proof must rest on those who have been so charged.

Author Brief Bios:

*Bhanu Partap Singh Sambyal is an LL.M. (Constitutional Law) from the Indian Law Institute, New Delhi.

*Vijay K. Tyagi is an Academic Tutor and TRIP Fellow at O.P. Jindal Global University, Sonipat and an ex-LAMP Fellow at PRS Legislative Research.

The authors are thankful to Prof. (Dr.) Anurag Deep, Professor, Indian Law Institute, New Delhi for his inputs and guidance.

References:

^[1] G.A. Res. 217A (III) (Dec. 10, 1948).

^[2] G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI) (Dec. 16, 1966).

^[3] India Const. art. 19(1)(c) and art. 19(4)

^[4] Liat Levanon, Criminal Prohibitions on Membership in Terrorist Organizations, 15(2) New York Criminal Law Review 233 (2012).

^[5] Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1987, No. 28 of 1987, § 3(5) [hereinafter “TADA”].

^[6] Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2002, No. 15 of 2002, § 3 [hereinafter POTA].

^[7] Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967, No. 37 of 1967, § 10; § 20; § 38 [hereinafter “UAPA”].

^[8] Walter Laquer, Postmodern Terrorism: New Rules for an Old Game, Foreign Affairs, Sept./Oct. 1996, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/1996-09-01/postmodern-terrorism-new-rules-old-game.

^[9] State of Kerala v. Raneef, (2011) 1 SCC 784 (India) (Division Bench decision).

^[10] Arup Bhuyan v. State of Assam, (2011) 3 SCC 377 (India) (Division Bench decision) [hereinafter “Arup Bhuyan”].

^[11] Indra Das v. State of Assam, (2011) 3 SCC 380 (India) (Division Bench decision).

^[12] TADA, supra note 5, § 3(5) – Any person who is a member of a terrorists gang or a terrorist organization, which is involved in terrorist acts, shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than five years but which may extend to imprisonment for life and shall also be liable to fine.

^[13] Kedar Nath Singh v. State of Bihar, AIR 1962 SC 955 (Constitution Bench decision).

^[14] Arup Bhuyan, supra note 10, ¶ 9.

^[15] Arup Bhuyan, supra note 10, ¶ 9.

^[16] Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Board, 67 U.S. 1 (1961), Keyishan v. Board of Regents of the University the State of New York, 385 U.S. 589, 606 (1967), Abraham v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919).

^[17] Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1 (2010) [hereinafter “Holder”].

^[18] John Lord O’Brian, Loyalty Tests and Guilt by Association, 61 Harvard Law Review 592 (1948).

^[19] State of Maharashtra v. Mayer Hans George, AIR 1965 SC 722, ¶ 18 (India) (Full Bench decision).

^[20] India Const. art. 19(1)(a) and art. 19(2)

^[21] India Const. art. 352; art. 358.

^[22] Babulal Parate v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1961 SC 884 (India) (Constitutional Bench decision).

^[23] S. Rangarajan v. P. Jagjivan Ram, 1989 SCR (2) 204 (India) (Full Bench decision) [“… The decisions bearing on the First Amendment are, therefore, not useful to us except the broad principles and the purpose of the guarantee.”].

^[24] Holder, supra note 17, at 25.

^[25] India Const. art. 141 – Law declared by Supreme Court to be binding on all courts.

^[26] Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab, (1994) 3 SCC 569 (India) (Constitutional Bench decision) [hereinafter “Kartar Singh”].

^[27] Id., ¶ 253.

^[28] Peoples’ Union for Civil Liberties v. Union of India, (2004) 9 SCC 580 (India) (Division Bench decision).

^[29] Anurag Deep et al., Human Rights: Contemporary Issues, 394-412 (V.K. Ahuja ed. 2019).

^[30] Schneck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919).

Atmanirbhar Bharat is a buzzword which has caught the imagination off not just the entrepreneurial class in India but perhaps of every segment of society. To that extent, the governments approach towards self reliance has made a distinct impact and has appealed to one and all, but it must galvanise all stakeholders on the ground—that is, the industry, the policy makers and the bureaucracy, all of whom need to work in unison. And most importantly, the Indian consumer, whose pride in “Make in India” needs to be rekindled and be channelled towards encouraging the industry—much like how Germany, followed by Japan and later Korea and China, did. What is required now is to create an environment of collaboration rather than confrontation, to convert the re-industrialisation of India to a concrete goal.

The Indian MSME (Micro, Small, and Medium Enterprises) sector contributes to about 30 percent of the Indian economy and over 40 percent of the labour force. Numbering over 63 million enterprises, of which 99.5 percent fall in the micro and small category, it stands second in the world only to China.^[1] This is thus an important sector requiring specific focus, especially in the manufacturing space, which by itself constitutes about a third of all enterprises. The Government recognises the need for the manufacturing industries to scale up and hence is creating incentives to bolster it. If we wish to achieve an USD 5 trillion economy in the next few years, the manufacturing sector will have to be upscaled, for which our policies should provide appropriate incentives.

Unfortunately, despite the fast pace of economic reforms that have taken place over the last six years, India is still saddled with a humungous quantity of restrictive laws which shackle economic growth. A whole host of regulatory mechanisms are akin to a millstone around the neck of the entrepreneur, which drags the industry down. Certain reforms, like the implementation of the Goods and Services Tax (GST), have come as a blessing, as in one stroke, the industry was freed from the yoke of the provision of laws such as excise, sales tax, octroi, Local Body Tax (LBT) etc., which were hindering every decision and transaction of business. But much more needs to be done, especially in terms of policy interventions. A study of the copper industry makes an interesting case for greater policy interventions to achieve the Atmanirbharta goals.

Case Study: Copper Industry

India has a copper demand of about 1 mtpa, of which 25% comes from scrap, mainly through the unorganised industry with weak/inadequate environmental and quality standards. Of the balance 0.75 mtpa demand, indigenous copper ore production serves about 5% of this requirement (owned by the PSU, Hindustan Copper) and the remainder has to be imported. Capacities available with both Hindalco and Vedanta are adequate to serve India’s entire demand for smelting & refining of copper. However, we need policy reforms to ensure India remains competitive in this field. This sadly is lacking.

India has FTAs with only a few countries from where the ore comes at 0% duty and the remainder comes from countries where duty levied is 2.5% (for copper, with a price of USD 8000-10,000/MT, the margin for a processor is only ~4% – rest is made by the mine/ore supplier). Roughly, India imports more than half of its ore in concentrate form at 0% duty and the balance by paying 2.5% duty

As India moves to e-vehicles, increased electrification, urbanisation and renewables, the demand for copper is expected to rise to 2 mtpa by 2030. Imports for additional copper ore will be from countries where we pay 2.5% duty, which means that about three quarters of India’s copper ore requirements will be sourced from countries where we need to pay duty. At the same time, India has FTAs with Japan, ASEAN and some other countries, and imports refined copper products from them at 0 % duty. Both Japan and ASEAN however, import copper ore mostly from FTA countries where duty is 0 %. In addition, almost 70% of India’s imports of refined copper, is now from FTA countries where duty is 0%.

This makes the Indian smelting and refining industry for copper uncompetitive with imported refined copper. As a result, Indian manufacturers using refined copper find it cheaper to import the product. This differential in pricing structures is a disincentives to the Indian corporate to invest upstream in smelting/refining capacity in India. To build these capabilities and attain self reliance upstream for this critical metal, Indian policy makers need to look ahead and make policies which incentivise the growth of indigenous capability. Without policy boosts, we will be unable to achieve the Prime Minister’s vision of an Atmanirbhar Bharat.

Case Study: Enabling Manufacturing- The Mittelstand Experience

The ‘Mittelstand’ commonly refers to small and medium-sized enterprises in German-speaking countries, especially in Germany, Austria and Switzerland. These firms are usually defined as enterprises with annual revenues of up to 50 million Euro and a maximum of 500 employees. It would be instructive to see how they achieved world leadership in their expertise areas. Post-World War II, the political leadership, bureaucracy, academia, and entrepreneurs were united by a common purpose of gaining leadership in technology and manufacturing—and that created the miracle. Japan and China followed suit as did developing nations like Korea and Taiwan. Two points stand out in the growth stories of these countries; one, manufacturing was enabled, not shackled; and two, growth was fuelled by the rapid scaling of the small industries into medium ones.^[2] In contrast, in India, there was an antipathy to the development of and creation of wealth. This had much to do with the mindsets of the ruling establishment, both at the political and administrative level, which viewed wealth creation as an undesirable element in society, and so imposed regulations that controlled the growth of the manufacturing sector. This thwarted the efforts of our entrepreneurs, whose energies were diverted towards fighting the system, rather than in creating productive value. The government departments were in opposition to, rather than in support of, the Indian entrepreneur, which kept India down for the first half century or so after independence. A socialist mindset glorified poverty and looked at wealth with disdain. The political and bureaucratic class prospered at the expense of the common Indian who remained steeped in poverty. Private enterprise and initiative were all but killed, but crony capitalism grew by leaps and bound.

Since 2014, there has been a concerted effort to change things around, but a lot remains to be done, especially in terms of sensitising the bureaucracy and changing mindsets from exercising control and thwarting growth, to becoming facilitators for the India growth story. India still has a long way to go in this regard.

The Advantage of Scaling

The Mittelstand experience showed the advantage of scaling. Today, the larger corporates in India provide employment to millions of people across the country. The Tata Group and L&T, employ between them, over one million people. Add to this the employment provided by Infosys, Mahindra and Mahindra, Reliance Industries, Wipro, HCL, the Aditya Birla group and a host of private banks, and we come to realise the tremendous contribution of the larger corporate houses to the India growth story.^[3] Yet, we continue to rave and rant at these powerhouses of development, rather than seeking to create an environment where the number of large corporate houses can double in a decade. We need a mindset change where the private sector is respected, instead of the other way around. This is where the jobs come from. This is what will create wealth for India. Moreover, the MSME’s too must be encouraged to grow. Scale is a virtue which must be cultivated, not an evil which is to be exorcised. Today, many of the MSMEs which started about 20 years ago, operate more as one-man enterprises, and their business model is floundering.^[4] Imagine, if just a million of these enterprises had been enabled and encouraged to upscale to 50-500 employees, based on the Mittelstand model! This would have put India on the world map as a leading industrialised nation, eliminated poverty and unemployment and also reduced many of the social problems that India faces today.

Conclusion

India’s future does not lie in socialist policies which makes beggars out of Indians. We need empowering policies which create wealth and jobs, and which enable each and every Indian to stand on her or his own feet and not depend on handouts for sustenance. That is the India which will be truly Atmanirbhar. And that India can be created through a National Consciousness, to work together for a common cause.

Author Brief Bio:

Maj Gen Dhruv C Katoch is Editor, India Foundation Journal and Director, India Foundation.

References:

^[1] https://www.livemint.com/news/india/msmes-the-growth-engines-of-the-indian-economy-11597923225239.html

^[2] Samir Kaji, The Future of the Indian MSME and the Manufacturing Sector, India Foundation Journal, Vol II, Issue No 2, March April 2021, available at https://indiafoundation.in/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/March-April-2021-India-Foundation-Journal-1.pdf

^[3] Employment stats are available at https://www.statista.com/topics/6583/employment-in-india/#topicHeader__wrapper

^[4] Samir Kaji, Note 2.

Context

The future of work is unfolding fast. With rapid automation, digitalisation, and re-skilling, organisations are facing an unforeseen workforce challenge. The shelf-life of most skills today has halved, and they are predicted to be rapidly changing in the years to come. The existing organisation structures are no longer optimised to support the changes brought in by the fast-changing skills eco-system. The demographic profile of talent has also been undergoing fundamental changes—with an increasing preference for flexibility and empowerment in their work.

To this heady mix, the complexities of the pandemic were added in 2020. Business continuity was severely challenged which has led to a broad-based stress on jobs and employment. New ways of working like remote and agile were proven to work successfully, leading to more widespread and rapid adoption, while many existing practices around talent attraction, management, and retention are being questioned. All of these changes have super-charged workforce management and engagement into one of the key C-suite priorities today.

The ‘right talent in the right place and at the right time’ was always one of the key mantras to business success. Now, the definition of each of these three parameters has been extended in ways organisations had never thought of before. People are thinking differently about work, and we need to ready ourselves to a ‘brave, new world’.

Future Workforces

The signs had been around for a while – the digital enhancements in different industries, an increasing skills gap in talent globally, rising market volatility, and unique employee demographics. The 2020 pandemic only pushed these triggers and accelerated the need for a future-ready workforce.

According to the World Economic Forum Future of Jobs Study 2020, “85 million jobs may be displaced by a shift in the division of labour between humans and machines” by 2025.¹

A closer look at the nature of skills being replaced reveals that higher-order human attributes like emotional intelligence, influence, empathy, and creativity stand irreplaceable even in the jobs of the future. Furthermore, even the best technology can be harnessed only when the employee using it is skilled enough. The future workforce is turning digital, distributed, and diverse. It is rapidly embracing the changes needed and discarding the old to make room for the new.

Having entered this new normal, it is clear that skills are the new yardstick to measure organisational success against. Organisations can no longer prepare for the workforce of the future using methods of the past. To analyse this in detail, we delineate each aspect of the future workforce and identify its changing trajectory from a skill-based lens in terms of three integrated dimensions: ‘who’ forms the right talent, ‘where’ they work, and ‘why’ they contribute to organisational success.

1. Who:

The right talent is fast becoming available in a variety of forms and shapes – full-time and part-time workers, permanent employees and consultants/freelancers, on-site and fully remote staff, white-collar or blue/ grey collar gig workers, and retirees and independent contractors. This entire ecosystem of new types of workers arising because of digital enablement together form ‘digital employees’. While many of them may possess higher-order digital skills than their non-digital counterparts, it is not just the technology that sets them apart. It is what they can do with that technology and how they can deploy their skills – digital and more – beyond the traditional realm of work.

The changing composition of the workforce also creates increased possibilities and meets critical business challenges at the same time. A recruiter now only needs to focus on whether the talent being interviewed has the right skills needed to deliver the project – irrespective of his/ her preferences in terms of work arrangements, location, or time-zone. In fact, while overall full-time hiring had slowed down in India and globally during 2020, jobs were lost and unemployment averaged at 10%², the parallel digital employment and gig economy grew to absorb a large chunk of this workforce.

Flexing It, an India-based platform for white collar freelancers saw a 20+% growth in flexible talent positions posted in FY20-21 as compared to the previous financial year indicating an increasing demand for non-traditional work structures and a focus on skill.

2. Where:

2020 was also the year of remote work, forcing several organisations to embrace extended work-from-home (WFH) overnight. However, it is now clear that a hybrid approach to ‘where’ employees would like to work is the future. Several leading organisations like Novartis, Slack, and Twitter have announced a permanent option for employees to work from home.³ Many others have opted for a hybrid model, and the latest arrangement to join this trend is ‘work-from-anywhere’ (WFA).

Made possible due to greater confidence in work-from-home productivity during the pandemic-induced lockdown, as well as increased digitalisation of organisations and processes around data security, WFA breaks all barriers when it comes to talent attraction and management. When hiring for in-demand or niche skills, a recruiter no longer needs to be restricted to the local talent market or the full-time talent pool. This trend helps take employability and high-quality jobs to talent outside the metros and into Tier 2/3 cities which was a challenge earlier.

3. Why:

The future workforce has a third dimension that is fast changing – and this is the ‘why’. Professionals entering the workforce today are driven by different and unique motivations. Young professionals are thinking about their careers more sustainably. Enjoying time with family or pursuing their interests, seeking flexi-working options, and participating in meaningful projects are important for them. Millennials and Gen Z workers also embrace organisations that give back to society and follow ethical practices. They want to be able to trust their employer “to treat them fairly in terms of pay, development, and conditions and in return are expected to reflect the culture of the company in their approach and behaviour.”⁴ Likewise, they expect greater empowerment in their work. Virtual working during the pandemic has also encouraged managers to move away from micro-management to outcome-linked performance management. Once again, digital tools like collaboration software, project management platforms, and productivity tools support this welcome trend.

Digitalisation has enabled organisations to look at talent pools cutting across geographies, age, and other traditional barriers. The workforce strategy of the new normal is driven by the CEOs and the business, with a conscious understanding that the right skills can take their business to its goals and help navigate the volatility better. Many talent decisions are now driven from the top – be it diversity and inclusion agendas, employee assistance, and wellness programs, to people analytics. In the next section, we take a closer look at some of the key drivers that are shaping this emerging picture of future workforces.

Drivers of the Changing Workplace

Having seen the workforce of the future from the lens of the new normal and how it is changing, it is important to understand what drivers have influenced and accelerated these changes. We talk about a few of these below:

1. Technology

In a PwC survey of 10,029 members of the general population based in China, Germany, India, the UK, and the US, a third of people worldwide expressed worry about losing their jobs to automation and AI.⁵ However, while Digitisation, Virtual and Augmented Reality, and Robotics are indeed an immediate reality, we find that these technologies are creating newer jobs too. There is an urgent need to re-skill and constantly re-invent ourselves as well as our processes to ensure that more and more employees transition smoothly into sustainable job opportunities.

2. COVID-19 Pandemic

The unprecedented conditions invoked due to the COVID-19 pandemic have accelerated several work trends that were already in the pipeline. According to the World Economic Forum Future of Jobs Survey 2020, the top business response to COVID-19 was acceleration of the digitalisation of work processes.⁶ Acceleration of automation of work tasks and implementation of up-skilling/ re-skilling programmes were other key responses that have influenced the workforce of the future to be more agile.

3. Democratisation of work

The gig economy was already a key workforce trend with a large part of the population opting for it. The unexpected job market outcomes of 2020 drove a significant number of skilled and semi-skilled workers into the open market, who began exploring the benefits of the gig economy. This was further provided impetus by two significant trends:

• Firstly, we see a vastly increased acceptance by organisations to deconstruct roles into skills and hire talent in the form of an independent consultant or freelancer. This was particularly true for highly paid white-collar gig roles. A recent survey by Flexing It reveals a definite increase in the quality and quantity of roles available in the professional gig economy in India. In the next 5 years, 35%+ organisations expect to have a workforce comprising >15% flexible talent and 90% of the projects that freelancers worked on were of strategic priority.⁷
• Secondly, the emergence and scaling-up of effective on-demand talent platforms, that have democratised access to skills and effectively bridged the gap between the employer and the talent. These technology-driven platforms have effectively galvanised demand across white-collar, grey-collar, and blue-collar sectors.

According to the global study by Payoneer, India saw a massive 46% increase in new freelancers between Q1 to Q2, 2020, while emerging as the second-fastest growing economy for freelancers (160% y-o-y revenue growth) last year.⁸ However, this positive trend comes with its share of watch outs and opportunities to strengthen the gig and digital eco-system. We will discuss these in the next section.

4. Changing demographic of the workforce

As discussed in the previous section, the changing mindset of the newer workforce is a key changing force in shaping the new economy. The demographics, career preferences, and courage to make sustainable choices that are displayed by the Millennials and Gen Z workers means that organisations need to adapt themselves to suit the career aspirations of this new type of talent.⁹

These drivers have created a fertile ground for the workplace of the future to emerge from. However, the challenges that had prevented these changes from taking shape over so many years, are still prevalent, especially in an economy like India’s. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) forum anticipates that given a very young working population, “the annual demand for new jobs in India is estimated at 12-15 million…with a shortage of between 4-7 million jobs each year.”¹⁰ While on the one hand companies finds it difficult to fill their vacancies with capable talent, on the other hand, multiple candidates are looking for suitable opportunities.

The skilling challenge is accentuated by a scarcity of effective technology and tools to bridge the gap between the job seeker, especially beyond the metros, and the job. Added to this the gender disparity of the job market. Women are paid 19% lower¹¹ than their male counterparts for the same job, and the COVID-19 pandemic has only made it worse with the job losses higher amongst women professionals.

In South Asian economies like India, another roadblock that prevents the future-of-work changes from reaching the last mile is the lack of job formalisation. More than 80% of the South Asian workforce “is engaged directly in the informal economy and many more work as informal workers in the formal economy.”¹² This prevents an equitable reach of any changes taking place in the order of work. Put together, we have a greater challenge at hand.

These and multiple other challenges have prevented the Indian economy from fully leveraging the new digital workforce. “In order to take full advantage of the employment potential of the digital economy, it is essential to improve and secure digital infrastructure to enable equal access to digital technologies and reduce the digital divide.”¹³

In the next section therefore, we look ahead at some of the actions we can take to overcome these challenges.

Enabling Change: How can India leverage the future workforce?

Jack Welch once famously quoted – “change before you have to”. The time is upon us when multiple drivers are pushing businesses from all directions to embrace change and adapt into a more agile, future-ready eco-system. However, to enable that this change is sustainable and effective, it needs to be looked at from a holistic perspective.

We analyse it from seven different lenses and what it implies for each of these stakeholders:

1. Corporates

• Large organisations today are in a strategic position from where they can drive the thinking around skills needed in the futureand the right mix of Traditional and Digital Employees to deliver these. We will still need human employees in a fully automated world – whether to use a technology or develop new ones. Organisations need to be able to map their digital strategy such that they are able to identify the skills needed in the future, constantly update this thinking, and ensure the workforce is getting the support needed to build these skills. These aspects are critical for an organisation alongside using the latest technology.
• Another area where corporates can play a catalytic role is investing in technology that enables remote and digital workto take place seamlessly and democratically. Adopting technology and digitalisation for the sake of it, leads to short-term and unbalanced results. The pandemic accelerated the digital transformation and forced several organisations to adopt remote work technologies. However, the uneven reach of these reactive measures has impacted workplace productivity as well as inclusivity of different workforce categories. For example, a contract employee working on financial analysis would struggle to safely access confidential data while working from home if her/ his organisation previously relied on on-site data security measures alone. Proactively analysing which technological solution is critical and relevant to the business and industry is, therefore, a key imperative.
• As we prepare for the future of workforce, the responsibilities of corporates extend beyond just their workplace and industry. They can contribute towards more effective up-skilling of talent entering the workforce. This can be achieved through structured partnerships with academia and skill development initiativesto ensure greater fitment of talent with future jobs and support increased employability in society as a whole. Currently, many corporates look at skill building from a CSR (Corporate Social Responsibility) lens. However, there is a significant business case for corporates in developing meaningful partnerships with higher education institutes. Niche and new-age skills like Big Data, Virtual and Augmented Reality, Quantum Computing, Meta Materials are still in nascent stages. By sharing practical know-how, supporting lab development, and partnering in curriculum design as well as faculty development, corporates that utilise these pioneering technologies can build student interest and capability in parallel and build a talent pipeline for themselves at the same time.

2. Human Resources professionals and community

HR’s role is undergoing the biggest revolution in decades and the traits that will hold HR in good stead are bringing the outside in and a keen sense of business. The HR community can do this by developing new frames of thinking about core HR processes like Learning, Performance Management, Compensation – for new segments of the workforce. HR today needs to be open to new ways of working and managing a different type of talent – from full-time to part-time, from permanent to gig workers, and even expert advisors. Some of the key imperatives where HR can add immense value in years to come are:

• How they access non-traditional talent in time to meet business demands?
• How do they define fair pay for different workgroups?
• How to ensure people practices meet a hygiene standard across all talent categories?
• How is talent engaged and aligned to the larger organisational vision across boundaries of generation, age, and geographies?

Fortunately, digitalisation of HR processes has helped a great extent in making this new thinking a reality. Digital transformation is not about technology, it is about what people can do with that technology. For example, advanced HR management systems today can not only help HR and line managers plot what skills are available in the organisation but also identify which talent can be moved or quickly developed to occupy upcoming critical roles. Tools to fairly peg compensation of skills are now available for all segments of talent like full-time, contractual, and specialist advisors. Similarly, learning and development professionals believe that online learning portals have put self-development at the centre of employee engagement.

Considering that a “one size fits all” approach is no longer viable, HR also must learn to listen to people, their needs, and motivations in a more segmented manner. Defining a holistic Employee Value Proposition (EVP) that delivers an enriching experience to all segments of the workforce is the next important role for HR to play as we get future-ready. Every existing and potential employee should resonate with the EVP that HR creates. For example, some organisations have now adapted their Code of Conduct and employee policies to allow for employees to pick up part-time paid gigs in their free time, so that they can follow their passion like music or teaching. These forward-looking HR functions have identified the need for greater flexibility if they have to position themselves as employers of choice in this new world order.

Another role for HR professionals to play as we move rapidly into a new era of digital and distributed work is creating an inclusive culture that supports all groups of talent to perform, wherever they are. All people practices like hiring, learning, and development, performance management, succession planning, compensation, and talent management must accordingly adjust to enable a diverse workforce to operate in tandem with each other, together with achieving the larger vision of the organisation. As per research, diversity and inclusion brings greater innovation and superior business results. According to the 2020 McKinsey research, “Companies whose leaders welcome diverse talents and include multiple perspectives are likely to emerge from the crisis stronger.”¹⁴ Inclusion of these varied ideas means HR must build a safe environment for everyone to express their thoughts and bring their whole selves to work.

3. Higher Education Institutes

Higher education institutes are the primary source of our intellectual capital. As the new normal hits, the students entering the workforce from our institutions, preparing them for the new ways of working becomes crucial. The half-life of skills is only 2 – 5.5 years¹⁵ and so by the time a student graduates and enters a workplace, some of the skills she/ he studied at university will become obsolete! The focus of these institutes therefore should be on enabling students to prepare for a different future of work & how they can navigate it. Thankfully, digitalisation has also democratised the learning and re-skilling landscape. Mass Open Online Courses (MOOCs) platforms like Coursera, EdX, and others have enabled learners across the globe to access best-in-class education from the comfort of their homes and at a fraction of the cost of a traditional university degree.

At the same time, a meaningful partnership between higher education institutes and corporates will lead to a win-win understanding of which skills are required for the corporates and developing the talent from the institutes. Structuring programs for corporates on how their leaders and HR can better manage blended and hybrid workforces is also a critical input that academia can provide.

Workers of all categories across India are finding that jobs increasingly require new and adapting digital skills and competencies. However, skill development is still catching up, creating barriers to gainful employment. Higher education institutes can address these challenges by designing out-of-the-box solutions like innovative apprenticeship-based skilling models. These could include fully digital programs in conjunction with industry, which help define how this could scale and map the skills of the future, ensuring higher employability of youth.

4. Workforce partners & staffing agencies

Some of the largest private sector employers in India are staffing agencies like Quess, Teamlease amongst others. These organisations provide talent on contract to their clients and have a critical role to play in solving for India’s employment challenge. Workforce management and staffing agencies need to go beyond traditional manpower solutions and think about how they offer longevity in careers and skill building for the professionals they staff. They can also explore synergies with flexible talent portals to offer more opportunities for the community. Innovations like these in the industry can help advance the future readiness of the larger talent ecosystem.

Additionally, workforce service providers can consider designing equitable yet unique solutions for specific groups of talent. This can help create an optimised workforce.

5. Government and Policymakers

As the future of work evolves and businesses go through a VUCA (Volatile, Uncertain, Complex, and Ambiguous) environment, the world will not be simple for workers either who must constantly struggle with job mobility and re-skilling to ensure their relevance in the ever-changing talent market. In a society like India, less than half the active working population have the digital skills required today.¹⁶ Even fewer will have awareness of re-skilling parameters and platforms, let alone the ability to pay for it themselves. As a result, the continued state support to encourage skill development and mobility through allocation of funds and/or offering financial incentives to corporates investing in skilling their workforce for the future will be a huge impetus.

There is also a need for government bodies and policymakers to develop guidelines in consultation with industry around the employment of non-traditional workforce like baseline benefits (insurance, medical, retirals), overtime, minimum pay, leave working conditions, etc. Governments across the work are “responding to the dynamic changes in the nature of employment. An example of recent policy intervention is the Freelancer isn’t Free Act in the United States.”¹⁷ This enhances protections for freelance workers, including the right to receive a written contract, the right to be paid timely and in full, and the right to be free from retaliation. “Another example is the European Commission’s Late Payments Directive of 2011.”¹⁸ India has also taken positive steps in this direction, through the three draft labour codes intended to benefit platform-based gig workers¹⁹. When enforced, it will provide the right to the Central Government and State Governments to notify schemes for such workers related to life and disability cover, health and maternity, provident fund, employment injury benefit, housing etc. Such legislation can go a long way in providing the necessary support structures and an equitable work environment for them to perform optimally.

Policymakers can further structural support and incentives for WorkTech platforms and other workforce partners which enable the digital employment ecosystem. Such platforms are helping bridge the gap that has traditionally prevented transparency between organisations and gig and remote talent – whether white collar or blue/ grey collar. Policy measures aimed at incentivising such platforms will democratise access to the digital workforce to a variety of opportunities.

6. WorkTech and Gig Platforms

The Gig and Digital Employment economy is a rapidly growing and yet relatively new career choice for professionals in India. One of the biggest priorities for WorkTech platforms is to invest in enabling trust in this new model of employment and enhancing adoption. Strengthening the process of verification of candidates, a clear delivery process, and transparent compensation structures can help boost the Digital Employment ecosystem.

As independent workers, gig talent depends on their own initiative to build their skills and keep abreast with technical advances in their domain. WorkTech platforms are strategically placed to create optimised up-skilling initiatives for the gig workforce. By investing in the skilling and financial health of their community members, WorkTech platforms can contribute to ensuring a sustainable career for them.

Finally, WorkTech platforms can also play a significant role in this new normal by creating targeted support models for women professionals to enable them to get back to work. “Female job loss rates due to COVID-19 are about 1.8 times higher than male job loss rates globally”²⁰ The pressures of working from home and managing childcare or virtual schooling fall greater on women.

However, with the increased digitalisation of the workforce and acceptance of remote working, this inequality can be reversed if more women are absorbed into the gig and remote talent framework. WorkTech platforms have a significant role to play here by increasing the diversity of gig projects and creating a larger pool of women talent. Their role in democratising access to suitable projects will remove barriers faced by women today and can help increase India’s Labour Force Participation Rate (LFPR) for women.

7. Industry bodies

Associations and think tanks like CII, Assocham, and India Foundation have helped navigate the socio-economic thinking around key workforce trends over the years by asking the right questions to corporates, leaders, policymakers, and other stakeholders. Their continued efforts in this direction can enable broader change by sharing best practices and toolkits with the extended corporate community. By generating high-quality research and thought leadership on the future of the workforce, they can create the necessary awareness and pave the way for discussion and subsequent changes.

Industry forums can also play a unique role by facilitating partnerships between members to deliver solutions for Digital and Gig Employees. For example, Insurance companies can support the new gig sector by custom designing solutions with the support of flexible talent platforms. Such cross-pollination in a start-up culture like India can open up opportunities for new intermediaries/ ancillary services like “private insurance cover, training services, licensing help, credit providers and business support.”²¹

Other critical areas where industry forums can make a difference is enabling suitable corporate-academia or corporate-government partnerships towards skill-building and policy definition. They can decisively lead the thinking on core enabling mechanisms in partnership with members as we steer through the pandemic to take proactive measures towards skilling, job creation, and digitalisation. These measures will require sustained public-private collaboration at scale, which can be led by industry bodies.  

Conclusion

Today we stand at a defining moment in history. Amidst an unprecedented pandemic and an array of opportunities in new digital skills, we have the opportunity to look at the future from a new lens – one of change and renewal. As we look ahead, there is hope yet a need for caution. Our choices and decisions today will impact an entire generation, their livelihoods, and outlook. Herein lies the possibility to make a difference to tomorrow.

Fortunately, we have the right tools and the right mindset as a country. The Industrial Revolution 4.0 has led us to this exciting era where we can leverage humans and machines alongside. We have the ability to up-skill and re-skill our people in the latest technology, manage the best people practices, partner meaningfully with each other and create a society that uplifts every worker and supports their constant renewal in this ever-changing economy. Looking in the right direction, we can lead the narrative on the digital-ready future workforce.

Authors Brief Bio: Ms. Chandrika Pasricha is the Founder and CEO of Flexing It, India’s largest Tech-driven platform enabling the Professional Gig Economy and Ms. Vidhi Kumar is a Senior Consultant in Human Resources Management.

References :

1. https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2020/10/top-10-work-skills-of-tomorrow-how-long-it-takes-to-learn-them/
2. https://unemploymentinindia.cmie.com/
3. https://www.forbes.com/sites/kristinstoller/2021/01/31/never-want-to-go-back-to-the-office-heres-where-you-should-work/?sh=41a4eb5a6712
4. https://www.pwc.com/gx/en/services/people-organisation/workforce-of-the-future/workforce-of-the-future-the-competing-forces-shaping-2030-pwc.pdf
5. Ibid
6. Future of Jobs Survey 2020, World Economic Forum (http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_Future_of_Jobs_2020.pdf)
7. https://www.flexingit.com/think-factory-report/crafting-a-strong-freelancer-proposition-are-organizations-ready/13/
8. Payoneer study on Freelancing in 2020: An Abundance of Opportunities (https://explore.payoneer.com/en/report/2020-gig-economy-index/)
9. https://www.hbs.edu/managing-the-future-of-work/Documents/Building_The_On-Demand_Workforce.pdf
10. https://www.oecd-forum.org/posts/29977-india-inclusive-growth-and-the-employment-challenge
11. https://www.livemint.com/money/personal-finance/what-is-gender-pay-gap-and-why-is-it-so-wide-in-india-11575356633900.html
12. https://www.oecd-forum.org/posts/29977-india-inclusive-growth-and-the-employment-challenge
13. https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/—asia/—ro-bangkok/—sro-new_delhi/documents/publication/wcms_344607.pdf
14. How Diversity & Inclusion Matter | McKinsey
15. https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/global/Documents/HumanCapital/dttl-hc-english-opentalenteconomy.pdf
16. Future of Jobs Survey 2020, World Economic Forum

http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_Future_of_Jobs_2020.pdf

17. https://www.flexingit.com/think-factory-report/flexing-it-presents-some-key-trends-on-how-the-freelance-economy-has-been-shaping-in-india/4/
18. Ibid
19. https://www.mckinsey.com/featured-insights/future-of-work/covid-19-and-gender-equality-countering-the-regressive-effects
20. (i) The Occupational Safety, Health and Working Conditions Code, 2020, (ii) The Code on Wages, 2019 (“Wage Code”), and (iii) The Social Security Code, 2020 (“SS Code”) (collectively referred to as (“Labour Codes”))
21. https://www.flexingit.com/think-factory-report/flexing-it-presents-some-key-trends-on-how-the-freelance-economy-has-been-shaping-in-india/4/by 2025

Introduction

From technology flows wealth. Technology can thus play a major role in accelerating the Indian economy, but would require focus on attaining leadership in various niche technological fields. India is currently laying emphasis on technologies such as Artificial Intelligence (AI), Internet of Things (IoT), Additive Manufacturing, Drones, etc. This paper, however, looks at certain specific technologies on which India’s focus is either inadequate or absent. Emphasis needs to be laid on these areas too, else India will be left behind, once again, in the technological race.

India’s wealth, till about two centuries ago, was mostly acquired by selling technology driven products to the rest of the world such as cutting edge wootz steel (used for weapon making and making of the famous Damascus steel), high purity zinc, very large ships et al. It is also worth noting that 50% of entire Netherland’s textiles and 80% of its silk came from Bengal in the 17^th century. Both textiles and silk are products of technology. India also had great capability in ship building, which literally was driving British shipwrights to starvation. To save its ship building industry, the British resorted to legislation to throttle and kill the Indian shipbuilding industry.

As per the archives of the British parliament, a petition of several ship-builders of Great Yarmouth was presented to the British parliament in February 5, 1813. The petition begged that letting India-built ships to compete with British ships “will render precarious the means of maintaining his Majesty’s navy, and especially of fitting out with dispatch, his Majesty’s fleets on pressing emergencies, and will thereby undermine that great bulwark of our independence and greatness as a nation.” Consequently, the first legislative act of 1813 prohibited ships below 350 tonnes from plying between the Indian colonies and the United Kingdom. That took away 40 per cent of Bengal and Surat built ships out of the lucrative India-England trade. The second Act in 1814 denied Indian-built ships to be registered as British, to trade with the United States and the European continent. This was the “atmanirbhar” steps taken by the British in the 19th century, to protect themselves from the onslaught of the superior Indian ships.

This one piece of technology, ship-building, clearly demonstrates the role of advanced technologies in the export basket of India, till about 18^th century. It also underlines how technologically backward nations such as Britain, were able to claw into global technological leadership through a general policy of using a combination of regulations, standards and incentives to protect the domestic uncompetitive, technology-driven industries and to acquire technological competitive advantage. The above example amply demonstrates the role of government in ensuring that its domestic economy gains technological edge. Similar principles have been followed by all the advanced economies, including the USA, Japan, South Korea and China, among other nations of the world.

India has continuously missed “catching the bus” when it comes to industrial technologies. We either betted on too long-term a technology, or remained bystanders to new industrial technologies coming up, and then tried to play catch-up for the next few decades. Even when Indian industry was there at the right time, such as automobiles or television, we almost succeeded in throttling our domestic industry through poor policies, leading to near-death experiences. In other cases, such as the development of the Electric Vehicle (EV) industry and the associated battery industry, while the rest of the key economies globally unleashed a series of government policies towards the end of the first decade of this century, India simply watched. And now, we are playing catch-up in the EV industry, while being heavily dependent on economies such as China for key components and batteries.

What India needs is a dedicated institutionalised approach to acquiring technology. This paper focuses on a set of technologies that are economically critical for India, and on which more policy focus is required than what is being given currently. These technologies are in the cusp of disrupting existing industries and can potentially contribute to more than 5% of the USD 5 trillion economy that India wants to achieve in the near future.

Supersonic Transport Aircrafts

Supersonic passenger aircrafts are the next generation of passenger aircrafts, which will transform aviation. India can ill-afford to sit idle while others take the lead. Since the start of large-scale commercial aviation, the world has been pretty much stuck at commercial flights cruising at mach 0.8 speed. Crossing the sound barrier is a significant technological leap, given the myriad engineering challenges like managing turbulence, change in wing angles and the sonic boom. Due to the sonic boom impact on residential buildings and the nuisance value of the sound produced, the first successful commercial supersonic aircraft, the Concorde, was mandated to fly transatlantic, and was prohibited to have supersonic speeds while flying over land. Sadly, the Concordes were retired after flying for a little over 25 years. They were ultimately marred by a devastating accident, which contributed towards reduced profitability. The last flight took place in 2003, and the remaining Concordes were moth-balled and left at museums, as the operating costs exceeded the earnings.

However, there is a renewed interest now, globally, for supersonic flights, primarily due to time savings. Supersonic flight can cut down the travel time from say London to New York from 6.5 hours to a mere 3.5 hours. One could potentially, fly out in the morning from London to New York, finish work and come back to London before the day ends. Similarly, a Delhi-New York flight can be completed in 8 hours instead of the current 15.5 hours. And with further development of higher speed supersonic flights, these times can be further reduced. Such possibilities have led to a scramble for the development of the next generation of supersonic aircrafts, which are less noisy, more fuel efficient and faster than anything that we have seen earlier. These aircraft can redefine the airlines industry as we know it today.

Among the new crop of startups that have ventured into design, development and manufacturing of supersonic passenger aircrafts, is Boom Supersonic. They are building supersonic aircrafts where the sonic boom will not be noticeable, and their vision is to provide supersonic flights at USD 100 per seat, to anywhere in the world. It is an incredible vision. They are also the front-runners to being adopted by many airlines, including United Airlines, which plans to roll out supersonic routes using the USD 200 m Boom Overture Supersonic aircrafts, by as early as 2029.

Boom Supersonic is joined by startups that are focusing on smaller supersonic business jets, catering to the personal jets/ chartered jet market. Exosonic, again an American startup for supersonic transport aircraft, hopes to receive certification for its supersonic aircraft by 2029. Exosonic has also received a contract from the US Airforce to build the Air Force One for the President of the United States. Hermeus is another American startup which is building what is called a hypersonic aircraft, that can fly at five times the speed of sound. This is indeed the future. It will be having a range of 4,600 miles. It too has received funding from the US Air Force and it too is building an aircraft for Air Force One fleet.

The West Asian economies too, in a bid to diversify away from an oil-based economy, have jumped into the supersonic aircraft fray, with Mubadala, the Emirati sovereign investment fund, joining hands with Russia, to build a new supersonic transport aircraft from scratch. The Russians obviously come with a treasure trove of experience, having built the world’s first supersonic transport aircraft, the Tupulev Tu-144, that flew till 1999. More recently, they have been flying the supersonic Tupulev Tu-160. However, to be successful in the commercial market, the aircrafts need to make economic sense, and so Russia and Mubadala of UAE are going together for a brand new aircraft, built from scratch.

We also have Spike Aerospace, founded by Indian origin American, Vik Kachoria. It has an interesting design as it has no windows, and yet passengers can see everything outside, through a panoramic internal display that is connected to cameras outside. In fact, we also have Tech Mahindra contributing to this project by leveraging its prowess in engineering, optimisation and composites. Some others such as Aerian Supersonic, who have been working on smaller supersonic business jets, but had to suddenly shut shop as funding dried out. These are the vagaries of working on the cutting edge.

India, unfortunately, does not yet have a noticeable transport aircraft manufacturing industry, leave alone a supersonic transport aircraft. Being left behind in almost a trillion-dollar industry, will not do any good to India’s ambitions of becoming a USD 5 trillion economy and more in the near future. More importantly, India will be left out of a very critical technology that will also have strategic applications. Imagine having low sonic boom hypersonic bombers, which may be hard to detect on radars. India cannot afford to be a passive bystander to the fast-developing world of supersonic aviation. We need to act now to get on to this bus.

Artificial Meat and Artificial Agricultural Produce

Artificial meat refers to cultured meat, produced by in vitro cell cultures of animal cells. It is a form of cellular agriculture. It basically takes a single cell of an animal, and reproduces the same in the lab to make large chunks of uniform meat. Cultured meat and its technologies are critical for a world getting deeply impacted by climate change.

The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) of the United Nations, in its latest report, highlights the devastating impact climate change will have on the world, which can only be halted if we cut back on greenhouse gas emissions. As livestock, raised for meat consumption, contributes to over 14% of all greenhouse gas emissions, the production of artificial meat will help in fighting the impact of climate change.

By December of 2020, we already had the first restaurant selling cultured meat. This was the “1880” restaurant in Singapore, where cultured meat manufactured by the US firm Eat Just was sold. The first hamburger patty grown directly from cells happened even earlier in 2013, when professor Mark Post at Maastricht University pioneered a proof-of-concept for cultured meat by creating the cultured meat hamburger patty. Since then, other cultured meat prototypes have gained media attention.

Cultured meat is still not a “stabilised” technology. Numerous challenges remain in growing artificial meat at a commercial scale, that completely looks and tastes like real meat and can be produced at a lower cost and with a lower environmental footprint compared to current livestock-based meat production. It also requires fetal bovine serum that involves killing of a pregnant cattle. Although such issues are also getting technologically resolved to produce meat where no animal has to be killed, there are other issues such as being able to grow fat and muscle cells together, just like in real meat. There are also regulatory and ethical challenges. However, cultured meat will have very significant impact on our lives and our food industry at this current juncture when we have extremely inefficient manner of livestock-based meat production that is responsible for significant deforestation and for greenhouse gas emissions. The current livestock-based meat production is both cruel and unsustainable. The world needs to move to slaughter-free meat, which will also help in preserving our environment. India too, can least afford to ignore this technology.

It is interesting to note that the technology used for manufacturing cultured meat can also be used to manufacture fruits and vegetables and cereals and pulses. All agricultural produces can be manufactured in the same manner, thus reducing pressure on land and reversing deforestation. This is critical from an environmental perspective. Also, we would not need to spend enormous amounts on supply-chain and trucking costs in transporting food from rural areas to urban areas as the food can be manufactured in urban factories, thus further reducing greenhouse gas emissions. Such technology also has space applications. Astronauts would not need to carry large amounts of food to space, as they would be able to manufacture them in small petri dishes.

The implications of cultured meat are enormous. Many start-ups and government funded laboratories in US, Europe, Argentina, Australia and Israel are jumping into the fray, and one would not be surprised if China too, also has its own entities doing research and development in this area. However, India with over 16% of the global population, seems to be starkly missing in this race, again letting the bus pass by. We therefore need to look into not only cultured meat but also cultured agri produces.

Quantum Computing

India has already signalled its intent to develop capabilities in quantum computing—a field of computing which leverages the collective properties of quantum states to perform computation. This is based on a branch of physics called Quantum mechanics, where a particle can be in multiple states at the same time, and it explains the aspects of nature at small (atomic and subatomic) scales, for which classical mechanics is insufficient.

Quantum computing is a critical technology because Quantum computers are believed to be able to solve certain computational problems, many times faster than classical computers. Quantum computing is now expected to become mainstream in the next few years as the field shifts toward real-world use in pharmaceutical, data security and other applications.

In the Union Budget announced in February 2020, a sum of Rs 8,000 crore has been allocated for setting up a National Mission on Quantum Technologies & Applications (NM-QTA). It is one of the technologies that India can ill-afford to miss. Indian initiatives must quickly lead to achieving Quantum Supremacy. The term Quantum Supremacy does not describe hegemony but stands for the theoretical case where quantum computers are believed to be able to quickly solve certain problems that no classical computer can solve in any feasible amount of time.

As of now, quantum computing still has a long way to go and a number of technical challenges remain in building a large-scale quantum computer. Sourcing parts for quantum computers is also challenging. Many quantum computers, like the ones made by IBM and Google require Helium-3, which industrially can be made only through nuclear reactions. Also, the special superconducting cables are made only by a Japanese company, Coax Co, thus creating severe vendor dependency and perhaps vendor lock-in.

In October 2019, a Sycamore processor (a Google quantum processor) created in conjunction with Google AI Quantum was reported to have achieved quantum supremacy, with calculations more than 3,000,000 times as fast as those of Summit, an IBM supercomputer that is currently one of the fastest supercomputers in the world. By December 2020, even Chinese universities were reportedly having success in quantum computing. But that still does not imply that it will lead to a multi-billion dollar industry and lead to new jobs getting created, as in the case of supersonic transport aircraft and artificial meat. So why should India spend its scarce resources in quantum computing?

The answer lies in the extremely profound impact on the world that quantum computing will have in the manner we live and interact and do business and banking and communication. It would make all current banking encryption useless, the day it achieves demonstrable quantum supremacy. It would entail reworking of our cybersecurity systems and frameworks. It would have a deep impact on the cybersecurity of not just banks but of entire nations. Nations that do not possess quantum computing technology, will become extremely vulnerable. India cannot be caught in such a situation.

The economic upsides of quantum computing are also very significant. India already has small pockets of expertise, that are developing algorithms for quantum computing. And as India gets around to spend the Rs 8,000 crore of its budgeted money, it must have clear achievable goals so that the money is not frittered away without any outcomes. Also, to be clear, as I have written many times before, technology is not a patent created or bought, neither is it a set of techniques written down in a book. It is a team of humans who are actually working on the technology and improving on it on a daily basis. And hence, a significant amount from that Rs 8,000 crore needs to be spent to create the human resources that can absorb and develop quantum computing. That is why the Japanese have a yardstick of spending 10 dollars on technology assimilation for every dollar of technology procured. India too, needs to change its mechanisms for technology acquisition.

This brings us back to the issue of an institutional structure required for technology acquisition—an empowered body having a national perspective. Otherwise, our efforts will be splintered into multiple bodies and groups, which may even work at cross-purposes, to the detriment of the nation. Only then can we achieve supremacy in quantum computing and other technologies.

Robotics

Robotics is an exploding market, with new players jumping in. India has a nucleus of a very successful robotics private sector, albeit still in early stages. We need to focus on growing this industry to be able to serve unique Indian requirements as well as for exports.

Today, robots are playing an increasingly critical role in lives of people, be it in

manufacturing, or in the services sector as receptionists, nurses, firefighters or as soldiers. Robotics has now reached a level where a combination of technologies will make the robotics industry explode in the near future. We have artificial intelligence combining with speech technologies, sensors and all-pervasive connectivity, leading to more powerful and more useful robots getting created. In the not-too-distant future, we will also have autonomous vehicle.

Robotics is thus another “big bus” that we are poised to miss, if we do not act now. While the country does have numerous startups and deep skills in robotics, it is not enough to be able to get any significant slice of the global robotics market. Moreover, India needs robots for its own unique usage, such as replacing dangerous manual scavenging with robots, or tackling terrorism. For that matter, even though India is a young nation with perhaps the largest population of people below 24, we are also home to one of the largest populations of the old, who would need support through robotics. Robotics can also play a key role in providing quality education and also in other fields such as healthcare, agriculture, mining etc.

Globally, the robotics market size, valued at USD103.95 billion in 2019, is projected to grow to USD 209 billion by 2025. This is a conservative estimate. With the maturing of the enabling technologies and greater adoption of robotics in emerging economies, the size of the robotics market is set to explode. In fact, in October 2017, Saudi Arabia even granted citizenship to a robot named Sophia, making it the first robot citizen of the world.

With new-age players like Tesla, GreyOrange (an Indian company) etc. entering the global robotics market to join the earlier entrants like ABB, Hitachi and Mitsubishi, the market will further democratise and expand. From an Indian policy perspective, robotics has figured in Indian Economic Survey 2017-18 as a priority area, but it has drawn limited attention in terms of policy or plan. In parallel, the developments in private sector and few research institutions in India has been laudable. In the paper, “Robotics in India”, published in the Journals of India, several impediments had been identified for development of robotics in India. These include lack of a robotics hardware ecosystem resulting in imports of most of the components for robotics. In addition, regulatory issues on dual-use certifications is leading to challenges in certifications. The high import duties (in some cases), and bottlenecks in customs as part of the permission driven environments, is also playing a deadening hand.

India also has many financial disincentives built in. Any company which imports robots into India, currently pays about 26.85% tax (7.5 basic customs duty plus 18% GST). This is a serious impediment to mass adoption of robots, which is compounded by limited availability of critical human resources. According to the FICCI-TSMG Advanced Manufacturing Survey 2016, lack of quality human resources with necessary skills and expertise to work with advanced manufacturing technologies, negatively impacts the ability to undertake cutting edge R&D in India. There is also a significant mindset shift required in order to grow the industry. In spite of the Government’s focus on robotics lately, the notion that robots will destroy jobs, severely hampers an enthusiastic adoption of the technology and the growth of the market. Fortunately, India has a strong IT base, that can provide the fuel to propel the robotics industry. India must therefore, leverage its advantages to be able to be a net exporter of robots in the near future and quickly harness policy and regulatory tools to achieve global leadership in robotics.

Central Bank Digital Currency

The movement towards Central Bank Digital Currency has potential to transform flow of money. However, myriad issues need to be solved before such an instrument can be brought in. There has been a raging debate on cryptocurrencies since the creation of the Bitcoin. A cryptocurrency is a secure digital store of value and hence is a possible alternative to currencies. However, there are multiple issues with cryptocurrencies that need to be resolved, before they can truly emerge as an alternative to currency.

The legal status of cryptocurrency, in most places, is that of a commodity. Just as one is free to buy or sell commodities like gold, silver, pulses, grains etc, one is free to buy and sell digital stores of value, that is cryptocurrencies, as long as it is not harmful. This is where some of the issues with cryptocurrency come up. They seem to have aspects that are harmful to the financial sector.

In a recent case, a Chinese national was caught money-laundering using the crypto exchange WazirX. He had bought cryptos (short for cryptocurrency) on the WazirX exchange and converted them into dollars on the Binance exchange, outside of India, which enabled him to siphon money out of India (WazirX and Binance shared the same digital store of value). These are the challenges of using cryptocurrency from a monetary management perspective. Any economic offender fugitive can simply convert money earned from illegal operations into a crypto, put it on a pen drive, and fly out with that money. Unfortunately, this is what makes cryptos popular. Essentially, there is anonymity attached to crypto, and hence its use is preferred for doing illegal transactions. Governments and law enforcement agencies are trying to plug these loopholes in the cryptos, and make them workable currencies.

The legal-comic part of the WazirX case is that the Directors cannot be charged for complicity in foreign exchange violation. The legal position is that cryptocurrencies are considered as a commodity and not as a currency in India. Hence, as no currencies are involved, no foreign exchange violation has taken place! This comic angle actually demonstrates that cryptos cannot be glibly treated as commodities either, as they are far more powerful. One can transport the equivalent of 10 tonnes of gold in a small 10 gram pen drive, by using crypto, and no customs in the world can catch it.

However, even if these issues of money-laundering and funding of terrorism are addressed, there is still the issue of central banks, such as the Reserve Bank of India (RBI), losing an important monetary tool, wherein the Central Bank could “print money” and increase the money supply at times such as the current times where the government has funds pressures due to the Covid-19 pandemic. A non-sovereign crypto, that is a crypto that is not under the control of any government, takes away the power to exercise these important monetary tools, as extra cryptos cannot be released. Those who support early adoption of cryptos, in fact see this as a positive feature, since it prevents an irresponsible central bank and an irresponsible government from printing excess money which would have an inflationary impact and would be tantamount to “stealing” money from people’s pockets. However, in certain circumstances, such as the current post-pandemic economic situation where demand has dimmed and the vulnerable sections of the society need cash in hand, it is important to print money and provide such support, so that the economy survives. A crypto prevents such a step from being taken, thereby threatening the entire economy.

Can we take the best of the cryptocurrency, mitigate its risks and create something more robust, wherein people can actually use the cryptocurrency and increase efficiency in the economy? This is where the concept of Central Bank Digital Currency or CBDC comes in. CBDC is a concept wherein the central bank issues a cryptocurrency that can possibly be pegged to a fiat currency, or managed in a different manner, but under the control and monitoring of the Central Bank, so that issues of KYC (Know Your Customer), AML (Anti Money Laundering), CFT (Combating Financing of Terrorism) and monetary policy issues could be addressed, especially for large value transactions. However, by taking away anonymity in CBDC, one also takes away some of the attractiveness of the crypto. But then it is anonymity that is the bane of crypto from a law enforcement perspective, that a CBDC will solve.

However, a CBDC by itself is not a panacea for crypto adoption. A CBDC still poses issues that need to be resolved. So, if India adopts a CBDC—let’s just call it ‘IndiaCoin’ for now—the first to get impacted would be the banks. Large transactions would no longer be needed to be routed through banks or the hordes of neo-banking startups. So, the banks would have to reinvent themselves to stay relevant, as a considerable part of their business will get hit. In fact, the US Federal Reserve Bank and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology’s Digital Currency Initiative will soon be publishing the first stage of their work to determine whether a Fed virtual currency would work on a practical level. This would also be seen as a response to China’s CBDC as well as a response to the plethora of cryptocurrencies that are all over the place.

Replacing the multitude of cryptocurrencies with a single CBDC resembles the step the federal government of US took in the 19th century, when it stopped the circulation of various currencies issued by a plethora of banks in the US, and replaced them with a single currency, the US Dollar, issued by the Federal Reserve Bank.

An ‘IndiaCoin’ CBDC would help in many national initiatives such as DBT (Direct Benefit Transfer), wherein support to the vulnerable can be transferred directly to them, without the need of a banking intermediary, thereby increasing the efficiency. Businesses and civic society can issue payments directly to each other, without the need to go through banks, and save enormous costs. But it also comes with the fear that during any crisis, people can quickly withdraw large amounts of money from banks, into a simple small pen drive, and that can lead to a run on the banks and thus lead to a banking crisis and failure of the financial systems. Also, it is not really clear if an ‘IndiaCoin’ would be cheaper than paper currency, since the cost of running the cryptos is supposed to be very high, depending on what algorithm is used.

However, many of these issues are solvable. And once solved, an ‘IndiaCoin’ would bring in tremendous benefits to the economy, with payments being pushed into the background as they would get linked to smart-contracts, smart vehicles, smart roads and so on, where automatic triggers would lead to flow of payments. It is a welcome move that Indian institutions and the government are discussing such a possibility, and are treading carefully forward rather than rushing in.

Accelerating Atmanirbhar

We need a policy to accelerate self-reliance in India, similar to what the British adopted in the 18^th century, to protect its fledgling industries from competition. The policy should enable an environment whereby the required goods and services can be created from within the country, rather than getting them from other economies. However, it is neither to be confused with the erstwhile “License Raj” that hollowed out India, nor with the “Great Leap Forward” of China, that took its economy back by a whopping -25%. Atmanirbhar, therefore, can be looked at as a campaign to create robust world-class industries in India, that would make India competitive globally in a range of goods and services.

The campaign is based on the five pillars of economy, infrastructure, systems, demography and demand and is fuelled by packages that provide support to MSME’s, the poor including farmers, agriculture and new horizons of growth and finally, government reforms, to act as enablers.

What is holding back accelerated adoption of Atmanirbhar? Specifically, for the government market, we continue to see procurement frameworks skewed against local suppliers, despite the push by the Prime Minister’s Office. In almost every government department (Both Centre and the States), there are numerous cases where foreign suppliers are favoured over Indian suppliers. This bias is brought about by tweaking the procurement requirements/ tender documents by putting in criteria that is impossible for Indian players to meet such as the Indian player needs to be in business in the given industry for over 25 years. Or, the participating supplier must have provided the goods or services to at least two governments outside of India. Such pre-qualification criteria are abundant in government procurement documents and appear to favour foreign suppliers.

It is important to identify the steps needed to provide a level playing field to domestic players and to ensure that such superfluous criteria are not brought into government procurement. There are a lot of steps that can be taken through policy measures, once the problem is recognised. To begin with, there needs to be an appellate authority with requisite teeth, where tenders or procurement norms that are discriminatory to Indian players and which do not provide any apparent benefit to the government or the public, can be brought up for seeking redressal. This would make it easier for smaller players and startups to demand a level playing field through a set-out process. Such an appellate body can possibly be in the lines of the National Human Rights Commission, with adequate suo moto powers, to immediately rectify any violation of a level playing field for domestic players.

However, a Atmanirbhar Commission will not be sufficient to make India Atmanirbhar. More needs to be done and one can borrow from the policies adopted by the Defence Procurement Procedure 2016 (DPP 2016), which progressively follows the DPP 2013. DPP 2016 was updated to a more progressive DPP 2020, in order to aggressively promote increasing indigenous manufacturing and reducing timelines for the procurement of defence equipment. It is important to reduce the timelines for procurement, not just from the government perspective, but also from the perspective of domestic players, who have limited ability to pursue government deals that have a long sales cycle, going into multiple years, if not a decade. The long procurement cycle itself is a big deterrent to domestic players, as they do not have alternate markets to depend on, and are extremely dependent on being successful in the Indian market, before being accepted in any other market.

The key features of DPP 2016 that needs to be adopted to accelerate the Atmanirbhar campaign, is the concept of Make II. The ‘Make’ procedure for indigenous design, development and manufacture of defence equipment/ weapon systems, was simplified in 2016 and promulgated in DPP-2016. A new sub-category ‘Make-II (Industry Funded)’ was introduced under this procedure with primary focus upon development of equipment/system/platform or their upgrades or their subsystems/sub-assembly/assemblies/components with focus on import substitution. In this subcategory, no Government funding is envisaged for prototype development purposes but has assurance of orders on successful development and trials of the prototype. This is the key policy measure that needs to be adopted for government procurement of civilian goods and services. It reduces the risks of domestic players in developing cutting edge goods and services.

Under the defence Make II procedure, successful development would result in acquisition, from successful Development Agency/Agencies, through the ‘Buy Indian–IDDM (Indigenously Designed, Developed and Manufactured)’ category with a minimum of 40% domestic content, through open commercial bids. Cases where innovative solutions have been offered are to be accepted, even if there is only a single individual or firm involved. If we can have a similar program for civilian procurement, it would eliminate much of the “creative” procurement norms that infest government procurement, and tilts the process in favour of foreign suppliers.

At the end of the day, the other side of the coin of Atmanirbhar is access to domestic market. Domestic players cannot invest into products and services without access to domestic markets, especially the government market that makes up roughly 20% of all procurements in the economy. With handicaps such as higher cost of capital and infrastructure that throttles production and logistics, domestic players already have the pitch queered against them. Adopting Atmanirbhar policies that nudge the state governments to procure from domestic players and provide level playing fields to them, would surely accelerate the Atmanirbhar campaign. Such a policy must include an appellate authority for seeking redressal related to unfair procurement norms and a procurement policy that mimics the Make II policy of the DPP 2016.

Conclusion

New technologies are emerging on the horizon which will significantly disrupt existing industries. This provides a good opportunity for India to enter into these industries on the back of the new disrupting technologies to lay the foundation of India’s future economy. Will India continue to be a technology importer or will India be the leader of technology-based exports, as India was till the 18^th century, will depend on whether we are able to take the appropriate steps now.

To gain dominance in the given technologies, India must have an institutional framework to doggedly pursue technology acquisition through all means possible. Such a framework is in addition to the Atmanirbhar campaign that India already has. Only then can India surge ahead in dominance of key technologies in a short period of time.

Author Brief Bio:

Dr Jaijit Bhattacharya is a noted expert in technology policies and technology-led societal transformation. A recipient of the prestigious APJ Abdul Kalam Award for innovation in Governance, he is currently President of Centre for Digital Economy Policy Research. He is also CEO of Zerone Microsystems Pvt Ltd, a deep-tech startup in the fintech sector.

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