Keynote Address

It’s a privilege to share my thoughts at the 9th Indian Ocean Conference on collective stewardship for the Indian Ocean. Let me express my appreciation to the Government of the Republic of Mauritius, specifically to Prime Minister Dr Navinchandra Ramgoolam and to Foreign Minister Mr Dhananjay Ramful, to the organisers, India Foundation, and to Ram Madhav ji, who has been the driving force behind this conference for all these years.

We gather every year, at least we have for the last nine, to deliberate on the Indian Ocean, its achievements, prospects and challenges. And we do so again at a time when the turbulence in the world and in the Indian Ocean itself is at a high. This gives our conversations a particular value, and I am confident that you all share that belief. In this background, let me make five points that I hope you will reflect on during the Conference deliberations:

  • The first is an obvious one; I am stating the obvious, but it is nevertheless necessary today. And it is about the importance of the Ocean. This is not just a framework in which we all exist, but an ecosystem; it is the resources on which we depend, the connectivity on which we thrive, and indeed the culture we have built over the ages. It is so fundamental that when this is disrupted, numerous aspects of life are impacted. We are seeing it today. The Indian Ocean must plan for more stormy days while hoping for more sunny ones.
  • Over the last few decades, our focus has been on overcoming the artificial barriers of the colonial era. This meant deeper regional cooperation, stronger economic linkages, the rebuilding of connectivity, and the revival of traditions. Last year, we deliberated at some length on these very facets. The spirit of the monsoons must inspire us to keep working together. We must continue to advance this and not be distracted from our long-term goals. The world may be more fragmented, but we, the nations of the Indian Ocean, must seek to be more cohesive.
  • Global trends are a reality that cannot be ignored. The world is more competitive, fractured and inward-looking than in the past. The benefits of globalisation are today overshadowed by the temptations to leverage and weaponise. As a result, we are all in a quest for greater resilience and are seeking more trusted partners.
  • Chokepoints are now a great global anxiety. We naturally tend to think of them physically, as is the case in nearby regions. But let’s not forget that they have also been conceptualised in domains such as finance, technology, resources and even knowledge. Overcoming that control mindset is essential for the well-being of the international economy.
  • And not least, there is a call for deeper cooperation amongst the nations of the Indian Ocean. In many ways, it is a Global South Ocean. Whether it is food, fuel or fertiliser shortages, responding to natural disasters, or addressing the consequences of conflicts, the answer increasingly lies in collective resilience. We in India have articulated it through our MAHASAGAR outlook and our Neighbourhood First policy.

With those five points before you, let me emphasise today that we meet in a world marked by uncertainty and rapid change. The global order is undergoing a period of profound transition, shaped by shifting power balances, ongoing conflicts, economic fragmentation, and growing contestation. Nations increasingly prioritise security and resilience. Here is the paradox the world faces: interdependence is deepening, yet competition is intensifying. Navigating this is therefore becoming tougher.

In these turbulent times, the situation in West Asia merits particular attention. All of us are deeply concerned about the conflict and would like to see an early return to normalcy. We firmly oppose the targeting of civilians, infrastructure and commercial shipping. It is essential that navigation remains safe and unimpeded. Each of us has felt the economic impact of this conflict very deeply. When energy is scarce and expensive, it has far-reaching implications for society as a whole. When trade is constricted, the effects go beyond business to livelihoods across sectors. When fertilisers are harder to procure, the consequences for food security are obvious. These are the immediate challenges as we meet here at this conference. But there are underlying issues that we also need to address, because there is no guarantee that such scenarios will not recur.

So let me turn back to the Indian Ocean that we collectively inhabit. The Ocean’s vulnerability only further highlights its centrality. We have to recognise that the pressures on the Indian Ocean are only growing. The takeaway here is the urgency with which we seek solutions, and the importance of convincing the international community of that pressing requirement. It can no longer be business as usual.

We have been discussing non-traditional challenges in our maritime space at multiple conferences. But here is the truth we cannot avoid. There is a full-blown conflict that is today deeply affecting all nations of the Indian Ocean. Moreover, there are grey zone activities that span the spectrum between the traditional and the non-traditional. We all saw and felt the consequences when shipping in the Red Sea was disrupted over the last few years. So, the bottom line is that the spectrum of challenges has become wider and more seamless, and, unfortunately, more serious. Our stewardship cannot ignore this.

No single Indian Ocean state, however capable, can alone preserve and protect the maritime space. The complex challenges demand a shared commitment. One rooted in cooperation, transparency, and, above all, respect for international law. We must view the Indian Ocean as a global commons, where not only the benefits are shared but so too other responsibilities. Our efforts must be pursued through strong institutional networks. The Information Fusion Centre-Indian Ocean Region (IFC-IOR) enables real-time maritime information sharing, enhancing domain awareness and operational coordination among partner countries. Regional platforms such as the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA), the Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative (IPOI), BIMSTEC, Colombo Security Conclave, and the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS) all provide structured avenues for dialogue, cooperation, and capacity building.

India has consistently acted as a ‘First Responder’ in the Indian Ocean region. Whether in humanitarian crises or natural disasters, we have stepped forward with speed and reliability. Be it disaster relief operations in Sri Lanka, Madagascar, Mozambique or responding to oil spills off the coasts of Mauritius or Sri Lanka, we have been there for the region. A recent example is ‘Operation Sagarbandhu’ in Sri Lanka after the devastating Cyclone Ditwah last year. We not only undertook prompt and extensive HADR operations, but also committed a package worth USD 450 million for relief and reconstruction.

Equally important is our approach to development partnerships. India’s engagement is guided by the priorities of our partners, focused on sustainable outcomes. Let me cite some examples.

  • Here in Mauritius, in addition to iconic projects like the Metro Express, we are currently working on water supply, a police academy, a forensic laboratory and archives. Just earlier today, I had the honour of joining Prime Minister Ramgoolam to dedicate a Renal Transplant Unit and hand over 90 e-buses. The recent Special Economic Package, which we have finalised, contemplates 8 significant initiatives in health, transport and infrastructure.
  • In Seychelles, while partnering over the years in different domains, we have again just extended a Special Economic Package, the delivery of which Foreign Minister Barry Faure and I are working on.
  • In Sri Lanka, our projects span housing, health, education, cultural centres, connectivity infrastructure and livelihood enhancement.
  • In the Maldives, major ongoing projects include the flagship Greater Male Connectivity Project, several road and water sanitation projects, and airport development.
  • In Madagascar, India’s assistance in agriculture and energy is today underscored by the supply of rice in very large quantities.
  • Where partners such as Nepal, Bangladesh and Bhutan in South Asia are concerned, or Tanzania and Mozambique in Africa, our development partnerships are subjects in themselves. They encompass so many dimensions of the economy and society. And these projects have not just been transformational in themselves but have actually brought our countries and our region much closer.

Apart from this, capacity building and capability enhancement for our partners in the region are equally vital. Many countries in the region face difficulties in monitoring their vast EEZs. To support our partners, we have not only invested in dedicated training programmes but are also equipping their navies and coast guard. I also note that in Sri Lanka, we have recently set up and operationalised the Maritime Rescue and Coordination Centre. As we discuss collective stewardship, defence partnerships also come to mind. And ours in this region are rooted in cooperation, not in confrontation. Through joint exercises, whether AIKEYME, Dosti, or MILAN, we build interoperability and trust to combat threats collectively and create a safer, more prosperous Indian Ocean region.

All these efforts become meaningless without connectivity. Indeed, connectivity ties everything together. Whether it is the IMEC, the INSTC, or the IMTT, India is at the centre of these initiatives. Our approach to connectivity is clear. It must be transparent, consultative, respectful of sovereignty, and a genuine partnership.

Allow me also to share a thought on the Indian Ocean Rim Association, headquartered here in Mauritius. As the current Chair, India is committed to deepening sustainable development, capacity building and regional integration.

Among the platforms relevant to the Indian Ocean is also the Quad. India’s partners in the Quad – Australia, Japan and the United States – are all maritime nations. Our first collaboration actually started in the Indian Ocean in 2004. So let me just flag to your attention some of the Quad initiatives of relevance, including the Partnership for Maritime Domain Awareness, the Indo-Pacific Logistics Network, and the Partnership for Cable Connectivity and Resilience.

In this volatile era, the idea of collective stewardship calls for moving beyond narrow calculations and embracing the broader vision of shared responsibility. The Indian Ocean, with all its promise and challenges, offers us an opportunity to demonstrate what such cooperation can achieve. By working together, we can ensure a free, stable and prosperous Indian Ocean region. India remains fully committed to this endeavour.

Author Brief Bio: Dr S. Jaishankar is the External Affairs Minister, Government of India

 

Special Address – IOC 2026

As we set sail towards new horizons of maritime partnership, this year the war against Iran has prevented me from attending the conference in person. Since the deplorable initiation of this war on February the 28th, violence in the region has escalated. This has had a strong impact on our seas, through the disruption of transit through the Strait of Hormuz, the targeting of port infrastructure, and events such as the torpedo attack on an Iranian ship as it returned from a cooperative maritime event, the International Fleet Review in India. In the face of such instability, Oman believes that collective stewardship of our ocean offers the most promising route to peace and harmony. We hope that the ceasefire, which came into effect on Wednesday, will help to restore security, stability, and maritime freedom in the region.

Oman reiterates its commitment to working closely with its partners to uphold the law of the sea, promote constructive cooperation, and protect our ocean and the people on its shores. We must prevent the Indian Ocean from becoming a source of conflict, hostility, or zero-sum competition. For centuries, the Indian Ocean has connected our cultures, economies, and communities. Today, it carries a significant share of global trade and serves as a key channel for cooperation. Looking ahead, the Indian Ocean offers an opportunity to secure a sustainable future and elevate the prosperity of billions. We must continue to act together as stewards of this vision.

Collective stewardship requires us to reaffirm our adherence to international law, including freedom of navigation and state sovereignty, amid the growing fragmentation of the global order. Crucially, we must speak out in favour of justice when these laws are violated. Our approach must be guided by pragmatism, neutrality, and mutual respect. And it must have the future of our planet at its heart. In times of heightened violence, we often overlook the environmental impact on our oceans, including harmful contamination, explosives, and rising temperatures. This is yet another reminder that it is in our collective interest to denounce conflict.

We must also balance the potential of the blue economy with the preservation of our natural environment. The responsible use of marine resources is vital. We must engage with all stakeholders, listen openly to new ideas, and thereby map the most strategic path to sustainable development. The Indian Ocean has connected us for millennia, and it will continue to do so for many years to come. The Sovereign of Oman is grateful that, even in times of severe uncertainty, our partnership and our collective stewardship of the Indian Ocean endure. Thank you very much.

Author Brief Bio: Sayyid Badr bin Hamad bin Hamood Albusaidi is the Foreign Minister of Oman.

 

Curtain Raiser Address

It gives me immense pleasure to invite you to the 9th edition of the Indian Ocean Conference here in Mauritius. This conference is taking place under extraordinary circumstances. There is an ongoing conflict, with an uncertain diplomatic pause, in our neighbourhood at this moment.

The conflict is limited to just three countries, but its consequences are being felt by almost all countries in the world. The economy, trade and travel have been severely affected in our region and beyond. There are many important lessons that the current situation teaches us.

  • One, no conflicts are local. All conflicts will have regional and global consequences.
  • Two, we have entered the age of middle powers and multipolarity, rather than unipolar or bipolar superpower geopolitics.
  • Third, and most importantly, all future geopolitics will be regional.

We, the nations assembled here, belong to the Indian Ocean Region. It is the most dynamic region in the world today. The Indian Ocean Region has emerged in this century as the global power axis. 40 per cent of global bulk container traffic and 70 per cent of the world’s energy trade pass through this region. This region is home to 3 of the world’s top 5 economies. Incidentally, 3 of the 5 largest militaries are also based here.

We long prided ourselves on the peace and freedom that prevailed in our region. But sadly, today we realise that this tranquil region is turning into a volatile one. Where there is volatility, there is always room for big-power intervention and politics. There is a need to be aware of that danger.

The Indian Ocean Conference is a platform intended to catalyse regional cooperation for the peaceful management of the region. Through a series of annual foreign ministers’ conferences among the regional countries, we intend to strengthen the idea that the region’s present and future – political, economic, environmental, and security – must be managed primarily by the countries here, with support from the powers beyond where necessary. The big question is: Are we ready to shoulder the responsibility for building a peaceful, free and prosperous Indian Ocean?

Friends! We are extremely grateful to H.E. Navin Ramgoolam, the Hon’ble Prime Minister of Mauritius, and his able colleagues for hosting this conference in such a fabulous manner. The Hon’ble PM is an elder statesman and one of the most respected in the region, and his leadership is important for regional peace and stability.

H.E. Dr Jaishankar, India’s EAM, is a household name in the strategic and diplomatic world. He has been integral to this vision and initiative. We are ever grateful to him for his leadership and support.

H.E. Sayyid Badr bin Hamad al Busaidi, the foreign minister of Oman, who is playing a critical role at the moment in securing peace in West Asia and the Middle East, has also been integral to this initiative. His in-person presence is missed due to the understandable regional situation. But he is joining us virtually from Oman. We are thankful for his interest and involvement.

H.E. Vivian Balakrishnan, FM of Singapore, has also been an important leader of the initiative right from its first conference in 2016, which he hosted in Singapore. We miss him this year, but we are grateful for his support.

Last but not least, we wish to express our heartfelt appreciation to H.E. Dhananjay Ramful, the Foreign Minister of Mauritius, for the graceful conduct of the conference and for leading from the front.

Over the next two days, ministers and other senior leaders from more than 25 countries will address this conference, which is attended by more than 200 delegates from 33 countries. I welcome each of you to this most important calendar event of the year in our region. We are aware of the difficulties some of you faced in arranging travel and logistics. Some could not attend due to the prevailing situation in the region. We thank each of you for joining us at this conference despite these difficulties.

Author Brief Bio: Dr. Ram Madhav is the President of India Foundation

 

The 2026 Gulf War and the Fragility of Global Maritime Security

The regional war in the Persian Gulf involving Iran, Israel, and the US, which began on 28 February 2026, has caused extensive damage across Iran and to US assets in the Gulf. US military bases have been struck in almost all the Gulf countries, including Iraq, Jordan, and Türkiye. Israel has also been subjected to multiple missile and drone attacks from Iran and by Hezbollah in Lebanon.

A two-week ceasefire was announced on 8 April 2026, after which high-level talks were held between US and Iranian officials in Islamabad. The talks did not yield an outcome, but the US has now extended the truce indefinitely to allow ongoing peace negotiations. Future talks may or may not yield an outcome, but in the meantime, Iran has closed the Strait of Hormuz. To reopen it, the US has imposed a blockade around the Strait to prevent ships from entering or leaving Iranian ports. As approximately 80% of Iran’s oil exports and nearly 70% of its total non-oil trade pass through the Strait of Hormuz, the blockade will significantly disrupt the Iranian economy. The US hopes to break Iran’s stranglehold on the Strait through economic pressure.

At present, there appears to be no early end to the conflict. The blockade at a single chokepoint is already causing ripple effects across the world’s major economies. The price of Brent crude oil, which had been hovering between $65 and $70 per barrel before the war, has spiked to over $100 per barrel and could reach $150 if the war is not resolved early. Currently, India, China, South Korea, Japan, and many other countries that rely on energy flows through the Strait of Hormuz are affected. Even nations not directly affected have seen energy prices rise. This underscores the importance of maritime security across the global commons and at all chokepoints.

The security environment must be viewed in the context of India’s ambitious goal to become a developed nation by 2047. The stated goal is for India’s GDP to reach USD 30-35 trillion by then, up from USD 4.2 trillion today. In real terms, this means India must maintain an annual growth rate of about 10% over the next twenty years to reach this goal. Sustaining such growth depends on further developing India’s maritime economy. Today, nearly 95% of India’s trade by volume and around 70% by value passes through maritime routes, emphasising the sector’s significance to India’s economy and competitiveness. India’s interests, hence, lie in a free and open Indian Ocean. That is why Maritime India Vision 2030 identifies 10 pivotal themes to position India as a global maritime powerhouse.

The Maritime India Vision document emphasises the development of port infrastructure, efficient logistics networks, shipbuilding and repair, and the strengthening of policy and institutional frameworks to support all stakeholders as key initiatives for achieving this goal.[i] More importantly, a safe and secure maritime environment is essential to achieving that target.

Freedom of navigation is crucial for maritime trade, particularly in the Indian Ocean Region. Its strategic importance stems from the fact that major Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCs) pass through this area, which includes four critical chokepoints: the Strait of Hormuz, the Strait of Malacca, the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, and the Lombok Strait. Disruption at any of these locations can significantly affect global energy supplies and supply chains, as demonstrated by the current closure of the Strait of Hormuz.

Today, the Indian Ocean plays a central role in global commerce. Around 100,000 ships pass through this ocean annually, carrying a third of the world’s containerised cargo. The IOR also accounts for about 20 per cent of the world’s refining capacity, mainly in the Gulf region (notably Jubail in Saudi Arabia, Jamnagar in Gujarat, and Singapore). Furthermore, the ocean supports offshore oil and gas exploration and production activities along the coasts of India, Iran, Saudi Arabia, other GCC countries, and Western Australia, representing 40 per cent of global offshore output.[ii] In terms of energy resources, 42 per cent of global crude oil, products, and distillates move through the Indian Ocean. The IOR contains about 50 per cent of global oil reserves[iii] and about 44 per cent of global gas reserves.[iv] It is hence vital to secure the Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCs) and choke points to ensure the unhindered flow of maritime traffic.

Maritime threats to free and open navigation in the Indian Ocean arise from state conflict, piracy, terrorism, and illegal trafficking. The US-Israeli conflict with Iran has led to the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, resulting in about 10% of the world’s container traffic being rerouted. Even the Red Sea route faces pressure, with many carriers choosing the more expensive route around the Cape of Good Hope. Besides rising costs, there are serious challenges to the predictability of energy supplies, which could potentially have a disastrous impact on global economies. India would be particularly affected.

But there is yet another danger to maritime shipping. Wars are also fought in the electromagnetic spectrum, and that has impacted shipping in and around the war zone. A cursory glance at a map showing the location of commercial ships in the Strait of Hormuz shows different clusters of ships, some even over the land! This is because, as numerous ballistic missiles are fired by the belligerents, countermeasures such as GPS jamming are employed to interfere with missile guidance systems. This has adversely impacted the AIS (Automatic Identification System) signals for civilian ships, significantly increasing the risk of collisions. Ships use AIS to identify each other and also to avoid collisions. Tankers carrying hundreds of thousands of tonnes of oil cannot come to a sudden halt or turn quickly to avoid a collision. They take time to adjust their course, significantly increasing the risk of collisions among merchant ships operating in war zones.[v]

After years of decline, piracy saw a marked resurgence in 2025, which has continued to this day. Piracy imposes high costs on the global economy, estimated at between $7 billion and $12 billion in annual losses.[vi] Thanks to coordinated efforts by the governments of the rim countries, piracy concerns have been significantly reduced in Southeast Asia and the Horn of Africa, although they still occasionally resurface. Piracy activities typically involve hijacking tugboats and barges, as well as kidnapping crews for ransom. In response, the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP) was established in 2006, with an Information Sharing Centre (ISC) in Singapore. This was the first regional government-to-government agreement aimed at fostering cooperation to combat maritime security threats in Asia. Later, in 2017, Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines established the Trilateral Maritime Patrols to coordinate responses to kidnappings and robberies in the Sulu and Celebes Seas.

These initiatives have proven to be effective, and today most piracy incidents are limited to petty theft. Similarly, to tackle piracy concerns in the Horn of Africa, nineteen countries formed the Djibouti Code of Conduct—a cooperation agreement against piracy and armed robbery at sea—in 2008. In 2022, the International Maritime Organisation removed the Indian Ocean’s status as a high-risk area for piracy. Although piracy has decreased, the UN-led military response remains active today, and countries such as India and China have deployed troops to support the effort.[vii]

In March 2024, Indian naval commandos successfully rescued all 17 crew members of the Maltese-flagged bulk cargo vessel MV Ruen after a 40-hour operation, 2600 km from Indian shores. The operation, which lasted 40 hours, was led by INS Kolkata and supported by INS Subhadra, High Altitude Long Endurance drones, P-8I maritime patrol aircraft, and naval commandos. All 35 pirates were taken into custody.[viii] This action was significant in suppressing piracy in the Western Indian Ocean, but since then, suspected Somali pirate groups have shown the ability to operate far offshore using hijacked fishing vessels as motherships.

On 6 November 2025, pirates hijacked the Hellas Aphrodite, but the ship was rescued the following day by a Spanish warship, ESPS Victoria, under the European Union’s counter-piracy mission, ‘Operation Atalanta’. Central Somali communities are frustrated over perceived illegal fishing by foreign ships, which strips the Somali government of revenue and erodes the livelihoods of artisanal fishers. Pirate groups often claim they are ‘protecting’ their waters and making a living in an environment with limited fishing opportunities. Piracy concerns, therefore, become entangled with illegal fishing issues. There is also a growing relationship between al-Shabaab and Houthis, which adds to maritime insecurity.[ix] An interesting aspect of the Hellas Aphrodite attack was that the crew prevented a hijacking by taking shelter in the ‘citadel’. This is a secure location within a ship, self-contained with food, water, medical supplies, sanitation, and communication, designed to accommodate the entire crew and additional personnel for three to five days. This provides friendly naval forces with the time they need to arrive and carry out a rescue operation. Such best practises need to be followed by all merchant ships.

Beyond state conflict and piracy, the IOR faces challenges related to illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing, narcotics smuggling, and underwater security. IUU is a major concern. The plundering of regional stocks by large, well-equipped trawlers disrupts local economies and also serves as a front for human and drug trafficking.

Trafficking in drugs remains a major concern. The IOR is located between two regions known for drug trafficking—the Golden Crescent (Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan) to its west and the Golden Triangle (Myanmar, Laos, Thailand) to its east. This positioning makes the IOR a key hotspot for drug smuggling. Owing to the vast, largely unmonitored ocean, substantial quantities can be transported via small boats or dhows. These vessels can be transhipped at sea, making detection difficult. Nonetheless, in a remarkable operation, INS Tarkash, a frontline frigate of the Indian Navy, successfully intercepted and seized over 2500 kg of narcotics in the Western Indian Ocean on 31 March 2025.[x] However, such maritime drug routes continue to expand, prompting new initiatives like India’s IOS (Indian Ocean Ship) SAGAR 2.0. This unique operational engagement programme enables naval personnel from friendly foreign countries to train and sail together on board an Indian naval ship.

The deployment of advanced submarine technology and unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs) by major powers has elevated Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) to a top priority for regional navies. This also presents a threat to underwater cables in the IOR. The Houthis in Yemen have repeatedly threatened to cut or damage undersea cables in the Red Sea. Their persistent attacks on shipping have already made the Red Sea a high-risk area for vessels. The internet outage across West and South Asia in September 2025 was caused by the cutting of undersea cables in the Red Sea. Although this was later found to be due to accidental damage during commercial shipping, the challenge of safeguarding undersea cables remains.[xi]

India’s SAGAR (Security and Growth for All in the Region) vision document, announced by Prime Minister Modi on 12 March 2015, remains a strategic framework for securing the Indian Ocean as a free, open, peaceful, and navigable region. India has since emerged as a net security provider in the region, maintaining open sea lanes free from piracy and serving as a primary responder in most HADR (Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief) missions. India’s new MAHASAGAR (Maritime Heads for Active Security And Growth for All in the Region) initiative is an extension of SAGAR, shifting the focus from maritime security alone to economic and geopolitical concerns. But the immediate challenge India and the world face is to bring the ongoing Gulf war to a swift conclusion. That has to be the first step towards ensuring the safety and security of the Indian Ocean.

Author Brief Bio:  Maj. Gen. Dhruv C. Katoch is Editor, India Foundation Journal and Director, India Foundation.

 

References

[i] Government of India, Press Information Bureau (Delhi), Maritime India: From Vision 2030 to Amrit Kaal 2047,” October 26, 2025, https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2182563&reg=3&lang=2.

[ii] Talmiz Ahmad, “Indian Ocean Region by the Numbers: Vital Hub for Global Commerce, Strategic Chokepoints, Vast Oil Reserves,” Frontline, February 23, 2024, https://frontline.thehindu.com/world-affairs/indian-ocean-region-by-the-numbers-vital-hub-for-global-commerce-strategic-chokepoints-vast-oil-reserves/article67891133.ece.

[iii] Worldometer. Oil – World Oil Statistics. Accessed March 19, 2026, https://www.worldometers.info/oil/?utm_source=chatgpt.com

[iv] Worldometer, Natural Gas Reserves by Country,” accessed March 19, 2026, https://www.worldometers.info/gas/gas-reserves-by-country/.

[v] BBC News, GPS jamming: The invisible battle in the Middle East,” March 10, 2026, https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c3ewwlx9e1xo.

[vi] Jadranka Bendekovic and Dora Naletina, “Piracy Influence on the Shipowners and Insurance Companies,” ResearchGate, October 2013, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/324441187_Piracy_influence_on_the_shipowners_and_insurance_companies.

[vii] Darshana M. Baruah, Nitya Labh, and Jessica Greely, “Mapping the Indian Ocean Region,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, June 15, 2023, https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2023/06/mapping-the-indian-ocean-region.

[viii] News on Air, “Indian Navy Rescues 17 Crew Members of Hijacked Cargo Vessel MV Ruen; Captures 35 Pirates After 40-Hour Operation,” All India Radio, March 17, 2024, https://www.newsonair.gov.in/indian-navy-rescues-17-crew-members-of-hijacked-cargo-vessel-mv-ruen-captures-35-pirates-after-40-hour-operation/.

[ix] Denys Reva, “As Somali Pirates Make a Comeback, Collaboration Is Key,” ISS Today, Institute for Security Studies, March 21, 2024, https://issafrica.org/iss-today/as-somali-pirates-make-a-comeback-collaboration-is-key.

[x] Press Information Bureau, “The Indian Navy to Induct First MH-60R Seahawk Multi-Role Helicopter Squadron INAS 334 ‘Seahawks’ at INS Garuda, Kochi,” Ministry of Defence, March 3, 2024, https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2117629.

[xi] R. Vignesh, “Securing Critical Undersea Infrastructure: Challenges and Options,” MP-IDSA Issue Brief, October 7, 2025, https://www.idsa.in/issuebrief/securing-critical-undersea-infrastructure-rvignesh-151123.

 

International Conference on ‘India-Japan Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific: Enhancing Security and Stability’

The International Conference on India-Japan Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific: Enhancing Security and Stability, organised by India Foundation brought together eminent policymakers, diplomats, military leaders, and scholars to deliberate on one of the most critical strategic partnerships in the contemporary geopolitical landscape. The conference drew a diverse attendance of 160 delegates, representing the fields of academia, diplomacy, defence, policy research, and strategic affairs. The event also featured a stellar panel of 18 distinguished speakers. Held on 24 March 2026, the conference coincided with the 10th anniversary of Japan’s Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) vision, providing a timely platform to reinforce the Special Strategic and Global Partnership between India and Japan. Against the backdrop of evolving maritime challenges, regional flashpoints, and the imperative of upholding a rules-based international order, the day-long event underscored the shared commitment of both nations to peace, stability, and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific region.

The conference commenced at 10:00 AM with registration and tea/coffee, followed by the Inaugural Session from 10:30 to 11:30 AM. Dr Ram Madhav, President, India Foundation, chaired the session and delivered introductory remarks. He emphasised the need for India and Japan to deepen cooperation beyond existing frameworks such as the Quad, advocating for expanded engagement across the broader Indo-Pacific, including the Indian Ocean region. He called for an explicit extension of the FOIP concept to encompass a free and open Indian Ocean, urging both nations to leverage their democratic values and strategic convergence for regional stability.

The session featured addresses by high-level dignitaries. VAdm Krishna Swaminathan, PVSM, AVSM, VSM, Flag Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Western Naval Command, Indian Navy, delivered a compelling address highlighting the India-Japan partnership as a critical anchor for Indo-Pacific stability. He drew attention to the region’s role as a driver of global economic growth while underscoring risks from flashpoints in the Taiwan Strait and South China Sea, alongside China’s accelerated military modernisation and assertiveness. His remarks reinforced the importance of robust naval cooperation in safeguarding sea lanes and maintaining maritime security.

H.E. ONO Keiichi, Ambassador of Japan to India, delivered an insightful keynote address. He described the India-Japan relationship as entering a “New Golden Chapter” ahead of the 75th anniversary of diplomatic relations. The Ambassador reaffirmed Japan’s proactive policies under its leadership and its unwavering commitment to sovereignty, opposition to the use of force or coercion, and the building of resilient supply chains with trusted partners. He highlighted the strategic depth of bilateral ties and the shared vision of a free, open, and rules-based Indo-Pacific order.

Shri Sujit Ghosh, Joint Secretary (East Asia), Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, stressed the importance of translating resilience into actionable outcomes. He pointed to high-level defence exchanges between the armed forces of India and Japan as a defining feature of the enduring partnership, underscoring practical steps towards enhanced interoperability and strategic alignment.

The inaugural session set a robust tone for the day, blending strategic foresight with diplomatic pragmatism and establishing the conference’s central theme: the indispensable role of India-Japan cooperation in addressing contemporary security challenges.

Following a short break, Panel Discussion 1 on “Rule-Based International Order & Freedom of Navigation” commenced at 11:45 AM and continued until 13:00 PM. Chaired by VAdm Shekhar Sinha, PVSM, AVSM, NM & Bar, ADC (Retd.), Former Chief of Integrated Defence Staff and Former Commander-in-Chief, Western Naval Command, the panel included Amb Sanjay Kumar Verma, Former High Commissioner of India to Japan; Prof. C Raja Mohan, Distinguished Professor, Institute of American Studies, Jindal Global University, Delhi; and Commodore Sujit Samaddar, Visiting Fellow, RIS, and Former Principal Director Naval Plans, Indian Navy.

The discussion explored the foundational principles of maritime governance, with panellists examining legal and operational dimensions of freedom of navigation. Emphasis was placed on collaborative mechanisms to counter unilateral assertions and ensure unimpeded access to international waters, reflecting the growing convergence between Indian and Japanese maritime doctrines.

A lunch break from 13:00 to 14:00 PM provided an opportunity for networking among delegates, fostering informal exchanges on bilateral and multilateral initiatives.

Panel Discussion 2, held from 14:00 to 15:15 PM, focused on “Potential Flash Points in the Indo-Pacific.” Chaired by Shri Yaduveer Krishnadatta Chamaraja Wadiyar, Member of Parliament, Lok Sabha, the panel comprised Amb Preeti Saran, Former Secretary (East), Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India; Adm (Prof.) Jayanath Colombage, Former Chief of the Navy, Sri Lanka; and Ms Rami N Desai, Distinguished Fellow, India Foundation.

The session offered diverse perspectives on emerging hotspots, including maritime disputes, territorial assertions, and their implications for regional stability. Panellists analysed the interplay of great-power competition and local dynamics, with particular attention to the need for proactive diplomacy and enhanced situational awareness. The discussion highlighted how India-Japan collaboration could serve as a stabilising force amid these challenges.

A tea/coffee break from 15:15 to 15:30 PM allowed delegates to recharge before the final technical session.

Panel Discussion 3, from 15:30 to 16:45 PM, addressed “Role of International Institutions in Dispute Resolution.” Chaired by Capt Alok Bansal, Executive Vice-President, India Foundation, the panel featured Prof. Gudmundur Eiriksson, Former Judge, International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS), Iceland; Amb Ruchira Kamboj, Former Permanent Representative of India to the United Nations; and Prof. Hosoya Yuichi, Faculty of Law, Department of Political Science (Mita), KEIO University, Japan.

This session delved into the efficacy of multilateral institutions in managing disputes, with panellists evaluating legal frameworks, enforcement mechanisms, and the potential for India-Japan joint initiatives to strengthen institutional responses. The deliberations underscored the complementary roles of diplomacy, international law, and strategic partnerships in resolving conflicts peacefully.

The Valedictory Session from 17:00 to 17:30 PM provided a powerful conclusion to the conference. Chaired by Amb Jaideep Mazumdar, Former Secretary (East), Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, the session featured the Valedictory Address by Adm Dinesh K Tripathi, PVSM, AVSM, NM, Chief of the Naval Staff. Adm Tripathi delivered a profoundly insightful address emphasising the securing of sea lanes, the strengthening of bilateral naval ties, and the imperative of safeguarding the rules-based maritime order. His remarks encapsulated the conference’s key takeaways, offering a forward-looking vision for deeper India-Japan defence and maritime cooperation. The address served as a fitting culmination to a day of rigorous strategic deliberations.

The event concluded with a Hi-Tea, providing delegates an opportunity for continued engagement and reflection.

In summary, the conference successfully highlighted the strategic depth of India-Japan relations and their pivotal role in shaping a stable Indo-Pacific. Through high-level addresses, expert panels, and vibrant exchanges, participants reaffirmed the partnership’s potential to address shared challenges ranging from maritime security to institutional governance. As both nations mark significant milestones in their bilateral engagement, the deliberations at this conference are expected to inform policy directions and operational cooperation in the years ahead.

India Foundation’s initiative once again demonstrated its commitment to fostering informed discourse on India’s foreign and security policy priorities. The event not only reinforced existing synergies but also charted pathways for expanded collaboration, ensuring that the India-Japan partnership remains a cornerstone of regional peace and prosperity.

 

India’s Maritime Multilateralism in Visakhapatnam: IFR-MILAN-IONS 2026 Naval Trifecta

The Indian port city of Visakhapatnam served as the epicentre of global naval diplomacy for 10 days, from 15 to 25 February 2026. The Indian Navy held three major maritime events simultaneously in the city: the International Fleet Review (IFR) 2026[i], Exercise MILAN 2026 and the 9th Conclave of Chiefs of the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS) 2026. These events were attended by 74 countries, with 33 represented by their naval chiefs and heads of maritime security agencies[ii], creating a rare spectacle of international naval cooperation and professional camaraderie and demonstrating India’s growing maritime capabilities in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR).

The decision to hold all three events in Visakhapatnam was not based on logistics or convenience, but on a strategic choice to operationalise Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s vision of MAHASAGAR (Mutual and Holistic Advancement for Security and Growth Across Regions)[iii] and to demonstrate India’s intent to be a leading power in shaping the rules-based maritime order in the Indian Ocean.

The Strategic Context: China’s Expanding Indian Ocean Footprint

In the 21st century, China’s Indian Ocean strategy has evolved into a multi-layered approach to projecting power, and accordingly the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) has expanded its operational reach across the Indian Ocean. Although China officially has only one overseas military base, in Djibouti in 2017[iv], its actual strategic footprint in the region is far broader than this single facility. The growing number of dual-use ports, such as Gwadar (Pakistan), Hambantota (Sri Lanka) and Kyaukphyu (Myanmar), serve as potential logistical hubs that could support Chinese naval operations in the future. Chinese efforts to secure military access to ports in Tanzania and Mozambique on Africa’s east coast, if successful, would complement Djibouti and allow Beijing to influence events around the key maritime chokepoints in the northwestern Indian Ocean.[v]

The recent surge in Chinese research vessels in the IOR is equally concerning, with India tracking at least four dual-use Chinese research ships in the region by late 2025: Lan Hai 101, Lan Hai 201, Shi Yan 6 and Shen Hai Yi Hao.[vi] The Information Management and Analysis Centre (IMAC) and the Information Fusion Centre for the Indian Ocean Region (IFC-IOR)[vii] of India, based in Gurugram, have been tracking these developments closely, fully aware that a strong maritime domain awareness is the first line of strategic defence. In this context, China’s long-term Indian Ocean strategy, which combines political influence over littoral states, naval expansion, dual-use infrastructure and deep-sea data gathering, puts the Visakhapatnam naval trifecta in a stronger strategic position.[viii]

International Fleet Review (IFR) 2026: Projecting Capability

The International Fleet Review (IFR) 2026, which took place on 18 February 2026 with President Droupadi Murmu as the reviewing authority,[ix] was the ceremonial highlight of one of the largest maritime gatherings in the Indian Ocean Region. It was India’s third IFR, after Mumbai in 2001 and Visakhapatnam in 2016, but the scale and political messaging of the 2026 edition were qualitatively different. In 2001, the IFR was attended by 97 ships from 20 countries, whereas in 2016, it was attended by 95 ships from 50 countries. IFR 2026, in comparison, had 85 ships and participation from 74 countries, reflecting a major expansion in India’s diplomatic reach at sea.[x] The participation of so many countries signifies a major deepening of India’s international engagement in the maritime domain.

IFR 2026 was a clear demonstration of India’s convening power and the Indian Navy’s ability to assemble a large and diverse maritime coalition, not on the basis of hard alliances or coercion but on voluntary trust and shared interests. For smaller Indian Ocean littoral states such as Seychelles, Maldives and Sri Lanka, India’s ability to host such a massive and inclusive event stands in sharp contrast to China’s largely bilateral and often debt-heavy model of engagement. The turnout at IFR 2026 itself told a story, and the presence of navies from Australia, Japan, France, Russia, South Korea, along with some countries from ASEAN and the African continent, showed that India’s maritime partnerships are open and non-exclusionary, not locked into rigid ideological blocs. This demonstrates the diversity and flexibility of New Delhi’s naval relationships.

For Moscow, participation in IFR 2026, despite Western sanctions and relative diplomatic isolation, is proof of a strong India-Russia defence relationship. The presence of Russian and Western navies at IFR 2026 sent a clear message that India would not allow its multilateral maritime platforms to be held hostage to great-power rivalry or bloc politics. This is a clear signal that, under India’s leadership, the Indian Ocean will remain a common space governed by common rules rather than be carved up into rival spheres of influence. IFR 2026 is a concrete manifestation of India’s multi-alignment doctrine in the Indian Ocean, where India is engaging with multiple major powers without joining any single bloc while working to preserve a cooperative, rules-based maritime order in the IOR.

MILAN 2026: From Regional Exercise to Indo-Pacific Platform

MILAN is the Indian Navy’s flagship biennial multilateral exercise. Launched in 1995, it was initially a small, regional exercise under the Andaman and Nicobar Command, with just four participating navies from Indonesia, Singapore, Sri Lanka and Thailand. Thirty years later, in 2026, it has grown into one of the biggest multilateral naval exercises in the Indo-Pacific region. The 2026 edition, the 13th, was held in Visakhapatnam, with 74 participating countries, including Germany, the Philippines and the UAE as new entrants. This sheer scale and diversity of participants reflects what MILAN has come to represent. The exercise is also a clear physical manifestation of India’s strategic autonomy. New Delhi projects itself as a navy that can work with everyone and is adversarial to none, seeking to stitch together a collective, cooperative maritime security architecture across the Indo-Pacific, which is the exact opposite of China’s Indian Ocean strategy, because the Chinese PLAN approach relies on bilateral deals and strategic dependencies and tends to undermine such collective and cooperative frameworks.

The transition from SAGAR (Security and Growth for All in the Region), announced in 2015 by PM Modi, to MAHASAGAR (Mutual and Holistic Advancement for Security and Growth Across Regions), launched in 2025, is also evident at sea in MILAN’s ever-expanding agenda. While SAGAR was largely Indian Ocean-centric and security-focused, MAHASAGAR extends further outward from the Indian Ocean to the Indo-Pacific and brings in economic diplomacy, technological connectivity, environmental sustainability, and much deeper professional interoperability between partner navies.[xi] The participants in MILAN now cover the Indian Ocean Region, Southeast Asia, the Western Pacific, Africa, and Europe, which is a clear indication that MILAN has come a long way since its inception as a regional confidence-building exercise to become one of the major Indo-Pacific maritime platforms of our times.

Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS) 2026: Institutional Leadership in the Indian Ocean

The 9th Conclave of Chiefs of the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium, held in Visakhapatnam on 20 February 2026, had special institutional significance because India took over the IONS chairmanship from the Royal Thai Navy for the 2026-28 term. India has returned to the chairmanship after 16 years, following its first term as chair from 2008-10. The IONS, established by the Indian Navy in 2008, now has 25 member navies and 9 observers. The 2026 conclave was attended by naval chiefs and heads of maritime security agencies from 33 countries, underscoring the importance IONS has acquired as a regional maritime forum. The Philippines was also inducted as a new observer, expanding and strengthening the IONS’ cooperative framework.

As part of IONS 2026, India has outlined an action-oriented agenda for its chairmanship, including conducting the IONS Maritime Exercise (IMEX), continuing the deployment of the Indian Ocean Ship (IOS) SAGAR to IONS member states with multinational crews,[xii] and holding a series of structured maritime information-sharing workshops and dialogues to deepen operational interaction, professional exchanges, and capacity building across member navies. As the chair of the IONS, India has a chance to steer the forum towards maritime domain awareness, information sharing, and interoperability, as these are the areas where China has been seeking to create a unilateral advantage through the deployment of research vessels and by negotiating bilateral port agreements across the Indian Ocean. India’s IONS chairmanship is not just symbolic but a deliberate attempt to strengthen a collective and transparent information ecosystem in the Indian Ocean Region to counter the information asymmetries that Beijing’s approach seeks to introduce in the IOR.

India’s Response Architecture – MAHASAGAR

The MAHASAGAR vision builds on the earlier SAGAR doctrine and projects India as a global maritime power. IFR 2026, Exercise MILAN 2026, and IONS 2026 are manifestations of India’s maritime statecraft, projecting a coherent strategic posture. The Indian Navy is not merely managing the IOR security environment but also asserting custodianship over the maritime order, grounded in UNCLOS and freedom of navigation. India’s bid for custodianship of the Indian Ocean is not without substance, as it counters China’s revisionist agenda and expanding footprint in the region. Each of the three events represents a different aspect of this approach. IFR 2026 highlights India’s indigenisation in naval modernisation and its gradual shift towards a technology-driven area-denial posture in the IOR. MILAN 2026 builds interoperability and translates goodwill into collective security. IONS 2026 enables India to shape rules of engagement as chair, focusing on maritime domain awareness, information sharing and interoperability. Overall, India’s IOR approach differs from China’s bilateral, transactional and infrastructure-oriented engagement, as India provides multilateral, inclusive platforms based on voluntary participation, common doctrine and rules-based norms.

Visakhapatnam’s trifecta underscores India’s forward-looking posture and a new regional security framework based on cooperation. The Indian Navy’s status as a “preferred security partner” and “first responder” in the IOR provides littoral states in the IOR with a free-from-debt, free-from-political-baggage option for security support and capacity-building.[xiii] The spirit of MAHASAGAR aligns with the Indian vision of a free, open, inclusive Indo-Pacific region, one that is open to all in a common pursuit of progress, because it is not directed against anyone, is not exclusive or competitive, and does not aim to undermine the centrality of ASEAN or the existing open, transparent and inclusive regional architecture.

The Road Ahead

The three events in Visakhapatnam hold greater strategic significance because India has shown it can bring together all three dimensions of power in the Indian Ocean at the same time: hard power through an impressive display of fleet capabilities, soft power through large, inclusive multilateral exercises, and institutional leadership by setting the agenda on maritime norms and cooperation. By holding IFR, MILAN and IONS together in the same place at the same time, India sent a deliberate signal that its Indian Ocean strategy had gone beyond simply responding to China’s growing presence, and that New Delhi is now proactively seeking to set the rules, networks and security architecture of the region. As the Indian Ocean is emerging as the primary arena for major power competition, the Visakhapatnam trifecta of 2026 will probably be remembered as the moment when India signalled that it would not merely take part in the maritime contest, but would seek to define the conditions in which it would occur.

Author Brief Bio: Mr Siddharth Singh is a Senior Research Fellow at the India Foundation. He is also the Assistant Editor of the India Foundation Journal

References:

[i] IFR & MILAN 2026. (n.d.). IFR & MILAN 2026. https://www.ifrmilan26.com/

[ii] Global fraternity must join hands to tackle evolving maritime challenges, says Raksha Mantri as he inaugurates Exercise MILAN in Vizag. (n.d.). https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2230212®=3&lang=1

[iii] Desk, I. (2025, August 18). MAHASAGAR Initiative: India’s Global Maritime Outreach And Strategic Vision. IMPRI Impact and Policy Research Institute. https://www.impriindia.com/insights/policy-update/mahasagar-initiative/

[iv] Jazeera, A. (2017, August 1). China opens first overseas base in Djibouti. Al Jazeera. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/8/1/china-opens-first-overseas-base-in-djibouti

[v] Singh, A. K. (2025, August 6). Harbors of Power: How China’s African ports are shaping India’s ocean Strategy – Australian Institute of International Affairs. Australian Institute of International Affairs. https://www.internationalaffairs.org.au/australianoutlook/harbors-of-power-how-chinas-african-ports-are-shaping-indias-ocean-strategy/

[vi] WION Web Team. (2024, January 15). What are 4 Chinese ships doing in Indian Ocean and why their movements are being closely watched. WION News. https://www.wionews.com/photos/what-are-4-chinese-ships-doing-in-indian-ocean-and-why-their-movements-are-being-closely-watched-1764333408418/1764333408425

[vii] Information Fusion Centre – Indian Ocean Region. (n.d.). Home. https://ifcior.indiannavy.gov.in/home

[viii] Singh, Swaran. (2026, February 11). Milan 26: India’s maritime diplomacy comes of age. The Diplomat. https://thediplomat.com/2026/02/milan-26-indias-maritime-diplomacy-comes-of-age/

[ix] ADDRESS BY HON’BLE PRESIDENT OF INDIA SMT. DROUPADI MURMU ON INTERNATIONAL FLEET REVIEW – 2026 | President of India. (n.d.). https://www.presidentofindia.gov.in/speeches/address-honble-president-india-smt-droupadi-murmu-international-fleet-review-2026

[x] HON’BLE PRESIDENT OF INDIA REVIEWS THE INTERNATIONAL FLEET REVIEW 2026 OFF VISAKHAPATNAM. (n.d.). https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2229820®=3&lang=1

[xi] Bhatt, P. (2025, November 21). SAGAR to MAHASAGAR: India’s maritime security achievements and way forward. South Asian Voices. https://southasianvoices.org/sec-f-in-r-mahasagar-india-11-21-2025/

[xii] INDIA ASSUMES CHAIRMANSHIP OF THE INDIAN OCEAN NAVAL SYMPOSIUM. (n.d.). https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2231000®=3&lang=2

[xiii] NatStrat. (n.d.). The Indian Ocean and its littorals. https://www.natstrat.org/upload/specialedition/the-indian-ocean-and-its-littorals-natstrat.pdf

 

Make Samsara Great Again? Karma, Renunciation, and the Critique of Activism

Abstract

This article reconsiders the meaning of karma in classical Jain and Buddhist philosophy and its implications for ethics and politics. Against modern popular and activist appropriations that recast karma as a principle of justice, responsibility, and worldly repair, I argue that Buddhist and Jaina sources understood karma primarily as a contaminant: the binding force that traps beings in saṃsāra, the cycle of birth and death marked by suffering and delusion. The task was not to perfect karma but to exhaust, transcend, or dissolve it, a project inseparable from the renunciatory ideal.

Part One traces this negative valuation of karma in Jaina and Buddhist sources, from the Jain metaphysics of karmic matter to the Buddha’s definition of karma as intention, to Abhidharma theories of continuity, and to Nāgārjuna’s radical deconstruction of karmic causality as empty. In each case, karma emerges not as cosmic justice but as the very machinery of bondage, demanding renunciation as its practical corollary.

Part Two turns to the broader implications of this view. I develop the notion of renunciation as a form of ascetic resistance: an apolitics that resists the karmic economy itself, neither reforming nor fleeing the world but refusing its logic of action and accumulation. This perspective is then contrasted with modern activist reinterpretations, which recast karma as a resource for social justice, ecological responsibility, or political resistance. While powerful in their own right, these activists risk reinscribing the very economy of action that renunciation sought to overcome.

Finally, the article suggests that the renunciatory critique of karma retains philosophical force in the Anthropocene. In an age of ecological collapse and political exhaustion, the lesson of these traditions is not that we must “make saṃsāra great again,” but that some problems cannot be redeemed within the frameworks that generate them. Their rejection of the karmic economy discloses another mode of resistance—ascetic rather than activist, apolitical rather than political—in which life is revalued as the possibility of peace beyond accumulation, identity, and striving.

Introduction: The Paradox of Karma

The idea of karma has long fascinated both insiders and outsiders to Indian traditions. In contemporary popular discourse, however, it is often reduced to a natural moral law, a cosmic guarantee of reward for good and punishment for bad. This simplistic notion has been eagerly adopted, typically with slight variations, by activist movements of many stripes, in which spirituality and politics are said to merge.[1] In this spirit, Neo-Jain, neo-Buddhist, and neo-Hindu reformulations—largely developed outside Asia—along with eclectic “yogic” lifestyles shaped by New Age thought, Western esotericism, and harmonialism, [2] recast karma according to preferred political allegiances.

Today, activism—political, social, environmental, or spiritual—is increasingly framed as a moral imperative, even a heroic stance. To resist its logic is to risk appearing suspect. Its discourse permeates the arts, academia, the media, and even religion, celebrating the “active,” outspoken individual as the virtuous counterpart to the villainous capitalist “businessman.” This cultural valorisation of activism profoundly reshapes how karma is imagined, especially in the popular wellness and spirituality literature marketed to Western audiences.

A striking example is found in Tibetan Buddhism, in the Karmapa’s The Heart Is Noble,[3] a collection of talks and teachings for a general readership, that recasts karma as a thoroughly worldly principle of interdependence and responsibility. No longer a subtle, delusive mechanism of bondage, karma here functions as an ethical calculus of cause and effect, urging mindful consumption, compassionate action, and ecological engagement. In this well-intentioned reframing, karma is reified as worldly justice, a summons to reform society through collective good deeds.

This article argues that while such activist readings appeal to contemporary intuitions of justice, they profoundly distort how karma functioned in classical Indian philosophy. Far from serving as a mechanism of moral progress, karma was more often regarded as a contaminant, a binding force that tethers beings to saṃsāra, the cycle of birth and death marked by suffering, impermanence, and delusion. The task, therefore, was not to perfect karma but to transcend, exhaust, or cleanse it. In this sense, the doctrine of karma was traditionally inseparable from the ideal of renunciation.

Johannes Bronkhorst has traced the genealogy of this transformation.[4]

In the Vedic world, karman meant a ritual act. Its efficacy was technical and amoral: properly performed sacrifices maintained cosmic order (ṛta) and secured benefits. Intention was irrelevant; precision was everything. The Śramaṇa traditions (Jainism, Buddhism, Ājīvikas) decisively broke with this worldview. For the Jainas, karma became a moral-psychological substance binding the soul; for Buddhists, karma was redefined as intention itself (cetanā). In both cases, sacrificial causality was replaced by moral teleology. Suffering and rebirth were explained not by divine whim or ritual failure, but by one’s own actions and desires. This moralisation of karma was revolutionary. It universalised responsibility, rendering human beings the authors of their fate, and explained apparent injustice without recourse to divine judgement. Yet it also introduced a new problem: karma itself became the obstacle. Whereas sacrificial karma had been a means of sustaining cosmic order, moral karma became the very machinery of bondage.

This article seeks to explore this paradox—the negative valuation of karma. I argue that in both Jaina and Buddhist sources, karma is framed not as a moral guarantee but as a contaminant to be purged. This reframing underpinned the rise of the renunciatory ideal and gave birth to what may be called ascetic resistance: the apolitics of renunciation. By refusing the karmic economy that bound householders to the cycle of desire and accumulation, renouncers carved out an alternative ethos, neither political reform nor quietist withdrawal, but a principled rejection of the world.

The paper proceeds in two parts. Part One turns to the sources themselves, focusing on Jaina and especially Buddhist accounts. It traces the development from the Buddha’s redefinition of karma as intention, through Abhidharma attempts to secure karmic continuity, to Nāgārjuna’s radical deconstruction of karma as empty of intrinsic nature. In each case, karma emerges not as a principle of cosmic justice but as the very mechanism of bondage. Part Two then considers the broader implications of this view. It develops the idea of ascetic resistance as a form of counter-politics, contrasts the ancient rejection of karma with modern activist reuses of the term, and asks what these traditions might offer for thinking about life in the Anthropocene.

I suggest that the result is a liberating way of reading karma: not as a consoling law that explains suffering, but as a diagnostic of entanglement and a call to detachment. This attitude, I suggest, constitutes a political stance in its own right, a quiet yet uncompromising refusal that should not be drowned out by activist rhetoric.

1. Karma as Contaminant: Jaina and Buddhist Sources
1.1 Jainism: the Weight of Karma

Few traditions take the binding character of karma as seriously as the Jainas. In Umāsvāti’s Tattvārthasūtra, karma is described not merely as a causal law but as a quasi-material substance (dravya) that adheres to the soul. The text enumerates eight principal types of karmic matter—knowledge-obscuring, perception-obscuring, deluding, obstructive, lifespan-determining, body-making, status-determining, and feeling-producing—along with 148 subtypes (Tattvārthasūtra 8.1–9). These karmic particles infiltrate the soul through passions and activities, weigh it down, and obscure its innate luminosity.

The consequence is stark: every embodied existence is karmically compromised. Even apparently virtuous actions, insofar as they involve attachment, attract subtle karmic matter. For early Jains, the mere fact of living the life of a householder binds to hell.[5] This is why Jain ethics often appear severe. The task is not simply to perform good deeds but to minimise karmic influx (āsrava) altogether and to wear away past accumulations (nirjarā). Liberation (mokṣa) is possible only when the soul is utterly freed from karmic accretions, rising naturally upward, radiant and weightless, by its own purified nature.

This metaphysics of karma underpins the radical asceticism for which the Jain tradition is renowned. Practices such as fasting, celibacy, vigilance over speech, and even the careful avoidance of harming microscopic life are not merely moral disciplines but techniques of karmic prevention. The renouncer’s refusal of worldly entanglement is thus both ethical and ontological: each restraint is a shield against new karmic adhesions, each austerity a solvent that dissolves past residues.

In this vision, karma is pollution; renunciation is detoxification. However virtuous the household path, it cannot suffice, for every social bond and every act of possession implicates one in fresh karmic influx. Hence the Jain renouncer embodies a mode of ascetic resistance: not the reform of worldly life, but its abandonment as karmically compromised. This resistance is not political in the usual sense, for it does not seek to restructure society. It is apolitical in the precise sense that it resists the very economy of action that makes politics possible. By undoing the bonds of karma, the renouncer gestures towards a freedom that can never be secured within the karmic order, the ritualised social habitus.

1.2 Buddhism: Karma as Intention and Bondage

The Buddha redefined karma not as ritual action, as in the Vedic context, but as cetanā, intention. In the Aṅguttara Nikāya, he declares: “It is intention, monks, that I call deeds (karma); For after making a choice one acts by way of body, speech, and mind” (AN 6.63).[6] Intention is thus the generative force of moral life: the decision to act conditions speech and bodily conduct, setting in motion consequences that extend beyond the moment of action itself. This definition both interiorizes and universalises karma.

Yet this radical interiorization also deepens the problem. While intention is morally significant, it remains entangled in saṃsāra: every volition, even ethical volition, sustains the cycle of birth and death. In Vasubandhu’s Abhidharmakośabhāṣya, this is formulated with clarity. Vasubandhu distinguishes between actions performed with wisdom (prajñā) and those without. The former—acts undertaken in freedom from self-delusion—do not generate karmic residue; they are “non-producing” (akāraka) and leave no trace.[7] But actions done under ignorance, even if outwardly wholesome, give rise to new karmic seeds and reinforce the latent dispositions (saṃskāras) that project future rebirths.[8] Karma, then, is not primarily a law of cosmic justice but the machinery of bondage: it binds beings to saṃsāra through the inertia of volition itself. No activism, insofar as it presupposes a continuing self, can thus make saṃsāra “great again.” As the Saṁyutta Nikāya (12.66) warns,

Whatever ascetics and brahmins in the future will regard that in the world with a pleasant and agreeable nature as permanent, as happiness, as self, as healthy, as secure: they will nurture craving. In nurturing craving they will nurture acquisition. In nurturing acquisition they will nurture suffering. In nurturing suffering they will not be freed from birth, aging, and death; they will not be freed from sorrow, lamentation, pain, displeasure, and despair; they will not be freed from suffering, I say.[9]

In other words, even the most ethical volitions, if rooted in attachment to identity, permanence, or conventional value schemes, remain karmically entangling. As long as action is propelled by desire or self-delusion, it perpetuates the cycle of becoming. Only acts of renunciation—gestures that sacrifice continued existence rather than revindicating it—fail to generate new bonds. They alone interrupt the momentum of craving (tṛṣṇā), bringing the karmic economy to cessation.

1.2.1 The Abhidharma Problem of Continuity

Within Abhidharma scholasticism,[10] the definition of karma as intention sharpened a profound philosophical dilemma: if all phenomena are impermanent and momentary (kṣaṇika), how can an action performed at one time generate fruit in another, even in another life? This is not a peripheral puzzle but a test of coherence for the entire Buddhist project. If the causal link between action (karma) and fruit (phala) cannot be explained, then the moral law collapses into incoherence.

Several schools offered solutions. The Vaibhāṣikas (e.g. Sarvāstivādins) maintained that dharma-s exist in the past, present, and future; hence, an action, though past, continues to subsist until its fruit ripens. The Sautrāntikas instead posited the seed hypothesis: an act implants a karmic seed that persists as a causal series of traces (vāsanā) until conditions mature. The analogy, often rehearsed, is that of a mango seed: though the seed perishes, the causal continuum it began—sprout, sapling, tree—eventually yields fruit. So too does karma operate through a succession of momentary traces.[11] The Pudgalavādins and some Abhidharmikas advanced a different view: the action leaves behind an avipraṇāśa, an “unperishing” residue, like a debt recorded in writing. This karmic record persists until repaid by fruition, ensuring continuity across lifetimes.

Both strategies sought to navigate between the Scylla of annihilationism (if an act perishes utterly, its fruit would have no cause) and the Charybdis of eternalism (if the act endures unchanged, it becomes a permanent entity). Their common aim was to preserve moral order without conceding a self.

1.2.2 Nāgārjuna’s Deconstruction of Karma

Nāgārjuna, in the seventeenth chapter of the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā (MMK), subjects these scholastic hypotheses to ruthless critique. His strategy is not to deny causality on the conventional plane but to dismantle the assumption that karma and its fruits possess intrinsic nature (svabhāva).

If an action had intrinsic nature, he argues (17.22), it would be eternal and incapable of being “done,” since an eternal entity cannot undergo transformation. If, conversely, actions lacked intrinsic nature, then fruits could arise from non-actions, collapsing all distinctions between merit and fault (17.23–24). Furthermore, if the determinacy of an act rested in its essence, it would generate endless fruits, even after the first fruit has ripened (17.25). And since actions are rooted in defilements (kleśa), which themselves lack ultimate reality, the claim that actions are ultimately real is incoherent (17.26–27).[12]

The consequence is devastating: neither action, agent, fruit, nor enjoyer ultimately exists. They are like illusions conjured by a magician, a mirage shimmering in the desert, or a city of the gandharvas glimpsed in the sky (17.31–33). Their efficacy in the conventional domain is not denied, but their ultimate status is void. In the Madhyamaka vision, karma is not a cosmic law but a conventional construct that functions only within the domain of ignorance.

1.2.3 Philosophical Consequences: Karma as Emptiness

What does this mean for Buddhist soteriology? On the one hand, the refutation of intrinsic karma secures the coherence of emptiness (śūnyatā): if all dharmas lack svabhāva, then karma cannot be an exception. On the other hand, this undermines any attempt to treat karma as a metaphysical guarantor of justice. There is no cosmic storehouse of deeds, no metaphysical ledger of moral debts. There are only dependently arisen series of volitions and results, provisionally designated as “person,” “agent,” or “fruit.”

The Buddha’s own words are here radicalised :

He who does the deed and he who experiences the result are one and the same’: this is one extreme, brahmin. […]

He who does the deed is one, and he who experiences the result is another’: this is the second extreme. […]

Avoiding these two extremes, the Realised One teaches by the middle way: ‘Ignorance is a requirement for choices.[13]

Nāgārjuna reads this not as evidence of a subtle metaphysical relation but as a negation of both sameness and difference, a denial of ultimate identity altogether. Choice (saṅkhāra), the taking up of one course over another, grounded in expectations shaped by a constructed self, as the Saṃyutta Nikāya (12.66) suggests, belongs wholly to ignorance. For the deluded, choice appears as freedom, the power to decide and act. From the Buddhist standpoint, such choosing is bondage: it renews ignorance, craving, and aversion, and thus sustains saṃsāra. The equanimous one does not choose but abandons.

1.2.4 Practical Consequences: Karma and Renunciation

At the practical level, the Madhyamaka critique underwrites an ethos of renunciation. If karma is not a cosmic mechanism of justice but a circuit of bondage sustained by ignorance, then the task is not to amass merit or secure a more favourable rebirth, but to withdraw identification from the very process of karmic accumulation. Renunciation thus entails not merely abstaining from the unwholesome or cultivating the wholesome, but seeing through the very moral economy that binds both alike.

This is why Nāgārjuna insists that the true escape from karma is not through abandonment in the ordinary sense (simply ceasing certain actions), nor through death and rebirth, but through a radical transformation of vision: meditation and insight into emptiness. Once the practitioner perceives that actions, agents, and fruits are as insubstantial as dreams, the binding force of volition is broken. One may still act, but without clinging, without the delusive appropriation that converts choice into bondage. Here Nāgāṛjuna meets Vasubandhu.

In this way, Nāgārjuna’s philosophy sustains the soteriological orientation of renunciation at two levels:

  1. Philosophical: By showing that karmic causality is empty, he prevents it from becoming reified into a metaphysical principle that would entangle the practitioner in endless cycles of moral calculus.
  2. Practical: By urging disidentification from action and fruit, name and form (nāma-rūpa) he clears the way for the cultivation of detachment and serenity.
1.2.5 Summary

From the Buddha’s redefinition of karma as intention, through the Abhidharma’s theories of continuity, to Nāgārjuna’s dismantling of the notions of deed and fruit, a consistent theme emerges: karma is not a principle of justice but a mechanism of bondage. Its coherence depends on ignorance; its dissolution requires insight. To recognise karma as empty is to disidentify from the entire economy of action and result, a renunciation enacted both in thought and in practice.

Within this vision, the task is not to improve saṃsāra but to unmask its very logic. The idea of “making saṃsāra great again” — the impulse to redeem or save the world through further action — is incoherent, for saṃsāra is a process without foundation. It cannot be repaired precisely because it is unreal, a collective hallucination. One does not reform a mirage; one ceases to chase it.

The philosophical deconstruction of karma thus sets the ground for renunciation. If action is structurally incapable of yielding liberation, then persisting in cycles of good and bad deeds can only perpetuate bondage. Renunciation is thus not merely a stoic attitude but the most genuine form of Buddhist activism. It is a final act of cessation, a withdrawal from the karmic economy, spelling out the apolitics of liberation: the refusal to participate in ignorance.

Part Two: Ascetic Resistance: The Apolitics of Renunciation
Renunciation as Ascetic Resistance

The negative evaluation of karma in classical Indian traditions gave rise to the ideal of renunciation. As Romila Thapar emphasised, the renouncer was never merely a marginal figure but a paradoxical one, at once rejecting social order and embodying an alternative authority.

Far from being life-negating, the techniques adopted by ascetics and renouncers […] have, as axiomatic, the belief that life can be the means of discovering immortality and freedom. […] To the extent that the two societies were kept distinct, there was a tacit recognition of the futility of changing the larger society; that the renouncers had links with this society however, also indicates that there was an equally tacit recognition of osmosis as a process of social change.[14]

In this light, renunciation appears not as an evasion of responsibility but as its radical reconfiguration: a way of embodying transformation, of teaching through being.

The renouncer does not seek to reform society through political action but to step outside it altogether. The householder’s rituals, duties, and property bind one to karmic accumulation; the ascetic’s refusal dissolves those bonds. Caste rules are ignored, property relinquished along with sexuality and family obligations, food taboos broken, and identities dissolved. This is not activism—an effort to improve the world through righteous action—but what may be called ascetic resistance: the refusal of the very ritual and karmic economy that holds society together. The renunciate’s authority derives precisely from detachment, the apolitics of liberation.

Modern Activist Reuses of Karma

Against this backdrop, modern activist reinterpretations of karma appear as profound reversals. Jin Y. Park,[15] for example, reclaims karma as intentional action and agency, aligning it with Hannah Arendt’s notion of action as natality and José Medina’s “epistemic resistance.”[16] For Park, karma is not passive acceptance but a creative practice of resistance: meditation, ethical cultivation, and mindful living become political acts that resist ignorance and injustice. This resonates with strands of Engaged Buddhism,[17] as well as with Black American Buddhist voices such as Pamela Ayo Yetunde and Lama Rod Owens, who frame karma as a resource for mindful struggle against systemic racism and oppression.[18]

There is undeniable force in such readings. They resist fatalism, empower the marginalised, and show how Buddhist categories can inspire collective transformation. Yet from the vantage of classical renunciatory traditions, they risk reinscribing the very karmic logic they aim to overcome. By valorising agency, resistance, and creativity, they reaffirm the primacy of action—the very mechanism of bondage. For the renouncer, karma was never a resource to be mobilised but a contaminant to be exhausted, dissolved. Activist inversions, by contrast, cultivate the very disease they seek to cure, treating saṃsāra as a problem to be fixed through political means. In so doing, they collapse reality into the flat plane of conventional truth—a ritual game without cessation (as in the Frankfurt School, where critique has no final resting place)—in which the perspective of nirvāṇa has no purchase. The renunciatory critique is thereby neutralised: the cycle of misery is no longer to be broken, but managed—made equitable, bearable, even aestheticised.

Toward the Anthropocene: Learning from the Renouncer

This contrast is not only historical but urgently contemporary. In an age of climate collapse, political polarisation, and existential unrest, the constant imperative to “fix” the world risks reproducing the very logics of accumulation, identity, and competition that generated the crisis. Activism, however well-intentioned, can unwittingly mirror the structures it resists, deepening cycles of reaction and exhaustion—the logic of “us against them.” For within saṃsāra, every solution already carries the seed of a new problem.

Here, the renunciatory traditions offer a different resource: not a politics of resistance, but an apolitics of renunciation. They remind us that not every problem is solved by more action. Fundamental issues require stepping back from the very frameworks that perpetuate them. The method is not quietism but refusal: the recognition that the karmic economy, like the consumer economy, is not redeemable on its own terms. As the Acintita Sutta (AN 4.77) warns, the precise results of karma belong to the “inconceivable” (acinteyya), beyond the reach of speculation or calculation—much like questions about the ultimate nature of the world itself.

To paraphrase a contemporary slogan, the renunciatory traditions warn us: we cannot “make saṃsāra great again.” The cycle of karmic action is not a site of repair or redemption but of perpetual entanglement. What they offer instead is a transfigured resistance—ascetic rather than activist, apolitical rather than political—in which life is revalued not as accumulation or identity but as the possibility of peace in equanimity. In this sense, the renouncer speaks even to the Anthropocene[19]: not by attempting to mend a delusional system, but by disclosing another mode of living altogether, one freed from competitive striving, identitarian divisions, and moral self-assertion, where freedom is measured not by remaking the world in one’s image, but by relinquishing it, letting it be as it truly is (yathābhūtam).

Author Brief Bio: Dr. Karl-Stéphan Bouthillette obtained his PhD (2018) in Indian Philosophies from the Institute for Indology and Tibetology of the Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität, in Munich, Germany. He is now Assistant Professor at the Department of Philosophy (DoP) at MAHE. He published extensively on the early developments of Sanskrit philosophical doxography and now researches on the phenomena of list-making and taxonomy within the spiritual exercises of South-Asian gnostic yogas. In general, he is exploring the ancient South-Asian intellectual dimensions of spiritual life, especially in the scholastic and ascetic aspects of their expression. In brief, he has taken interest in what he describes as the ‘yoga of reason’, or the ‘path of knowledge’ (jnana-yoga) pursued by Gnostics belonging either to the Hindu, Buddhist, or Jain traditions.

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References:

[1] This tendency is by no means confined to Buddhism. Across the global marketplace of modern spirituality, one repeatedly finds the claim that spirituality and politics are not merely compatible but inseparable. Benjamin Riggs ( 2017), for instance, insists that “spirituality is not an other-worldly affair” but a principled orientation toward the world in which politics, far from being a distraction, becomes an integral field of practice. In a similar vein, AnaLouise Keating ( 2005, 242) defines “spiritual activism” as both an epistemology and an ethics grounded in interconnectedness, one that explicitly directs spiritual practice toward social transformation by challenging racism, sexism, homophobia, and systemic injustice. Such formulations exemplify the activist reframing of spirituality as a call to world-reform.

[2] See Baier, Maas, and Preisendanz 2018; Diamond-Lenow 2023; A. Foxen and Kuberry 2021; A.P. Foxen 2020; Godrej 2017; Goldberg 2016; Hauser 2013; Jordan 2020; Pacheo 2015; Shearer 2020; Sood 2020; Strube 2021

[3] Dorje 2013.

[4] Bronkhorst 2011, 2016, 2000.

[5] Johnson 1995, 25.

[6] Translation from Sujato 2018b. Insertions in parentheses are mine.

[7] Richard P. Hayes ( 1989, 10) explains: “an act that is motivated by wisdom can never be accompanied by a desire for continued existence, for wisdom is the very realization that nothing endures. In the absence of a desire for continued existence, the root cause for continued existence does not exist, and therefore an act that stems from a wise motivation does not have the consequence of continued existence.”

[8] According to Hayes ( 1989, 10): “An intention to act that is not associated with wisdom is bound to be associated with the belief in a continuing self. Such an unwise intention is bound to be accompanied by such conditioning characteristics as selfish desire or anger, and it becomes either an unprofitable intention, in case it is accompanied by a desire to bring harm to another, or a profitable intention, in case it is accompanied by a desire to bring benefit to another. Therefore, an unwise intention becomes profitable or unprofitable owing to its association with profitable or unprofitable conditioning characteristics.”

[9] Translation from Bodhi 2000, 605-606

[10] On Abhidharma, see e.g. Anālayo 2014; Bronkhorst 1985; Coghlan 2018; Cox 2004; Dhammajoti 2015; Frauwallner 1995.

[11] See the Milindapañha (Questions of King Milinda) 2.1.6, in the standard Pali Text Society edition translated by Rhys Davids ( 1890, 132).

[12] For translations of Nāgārjuna’s MMK, see e.g. Kalupahana 1991; Siderits and Katsura 2013.

[13] Aññatarabrāhmaṇasutta (A Certain Brahmin), in Saṁyuttanikāya 12.46, Sujato 2018a.

[14] Thapar 2000, 876.

[15] Park 2025.

[16] Arendt’s notion of action as “natality” (the capacity to begin anew through political action) and Medina’s idea of “epistemic resistance” (challenging injustice by disrupting dominant interpretive frameworks) both revalue action as creative and transformative. From the perspective of classical Jaina and Buddhist thought, however, this represents a reversal: karma is not resource but bondage, and liberation lies not in multiplying action but in renouncing the karmic economy altogether.

[17] For further discussion of Engaged Buddhism and Humanistic Buddhism, see, e.g., Duc 2025; Guruge 2002; Hanh 2008; Ives 1992; King 2009; Krause 2024; Queen 1999; Queen and King 1996; Laliberté 2024; Lintner 2009; Pittman 2001; Sivaraksa 1989; Stanley and Loy 2009; Subrahmanyan 2019; Sukala 2024; Yun 1994, 1995, 2000, 2003.

[18] For further discussion of Buddhism in relation to karma, systemic racism, and oppression, see, e.g., the following works: Giles and Yetunde 2020; Starlyte 2024; Owens 2020; Ward 2020; Yancy and McRae 2021.

[19] For further discussion of Buddhism, environmentalism, and the Anthropocene, see, e.g., Callicott 2017; Carvalho 2014; Chae 2022; Dorzhigushaeva and Kiplyuks 2020; Holohan 2022; Ives 2025; James 2004; Lim 2019; Loy 2019, 2015, 2008, 2003; Shiu 2023; Simonds 2025; Stanley, Loy, and Dorje 2009.
 

An Interview with H.E. Prof Anil Sooklal, High Commissioner of Republic of South Africa to India, on BRICS

Mr. Come Carpentier:

Excellency, given your long experience in both Indian and South African diplomacy, what do you consider the major achievement that India could aim to achieve during this year of its presidency?

H.E. Prof Anil Sooklal:

India, as a founding member of BRICS, has a very important mandate this year. This is the fourth time India has hosted the BRICS Summit. They did so for the first time in 2012, and I was very privileged to be part of that meeting. India’s present chairship of BRICS in 2026 is at a very challenging time in the global context, not only in terms of the global trade architecture, which has been hit by the tariff episode, but also in terms of global geopolitics and a very fractured world. The world is looking for leadership, and, in many senses, that leadership is coming from the Global South, and more specifically from the BRICS. This is the 20th anniversary of the BRICS’ first meeting at the level of foreign ministers on the margins of the UNGA in New York in 2006, as an informal group, and it has since evolved into a summit-level meeting. Today, I think BRICS is widely respected and recognised as perhaps the most powerful formation from the Global South, championing not only issues of the Global South, although that has been the primary focus when we came together as a BRICS family, but also issues of global concern across the whole spectrum, from geopolitical security and the economic and financial situation to sustainability and people-to-people cooperation. Given the paralysis we face on the global multilateral front, this will be a major focus of India’s chairship this year.

How do we preserve the multilateral architecture, a rules-based system grounded in international law and underpinned by the UN Charter and its purposes and principles? All of which have been marginalised and eroded by the very founders of this international system, which sought to establish a rules-based global order. Yet today, many describe us as living in a period of global disorder.

India has wisely chosen a theme that plays on the BRICS acronym: Building for Resilience, Innovation, Cooperation, and Sustainability. All these are critical issues that also show continuity in the focus we have had since the outset amongst BRICS countries. India will build on what we have achieved under past presidencies. Of course, BRICS, as you know, is based on three pillars of cooperation: political and security, economic and financial, and social and people-to-people. And under each of these themes, India has elaborated specifically what it will take forward.

But I think, as I have indicated, how do we preserve an international system underpinned by international law in an architecture that is in dire need of reform? We cannot continue with the current global multilateral architecture, as even Secretary-General Guterres has indicated that the United Nations Security Council is no longer fit for purpose. It is now more than 80 years old and has become obsolete and archaic. It needs serious reform. And just recently, one of the leaders from the Global North questioned how it is possible today that India, a country with the largest global population, the fourth-largest global economy, and a major player on the international scene, is not yet a member of the Security Council? And I think this is something that we have been calling for, the reform of the United Nations system, and especially the Security Council. And I think we have seen in the recent past that the Security Council is totally paralysed. Global peace and security, which is a mandate of the Security Council, is no longer being addressed. Countries are not respecting this. They are embarking on unilateral actions, including military, financial, and economic measures, without any respect for the very institutions we all came together to create after the Second World War. So, we have rendered these institutions almost obsolete. But more importantly, unfortunately, they are our institutions. We created them. And we are now responsible for rendering them, as you have indicated, obsolete and dysfunctional. And that’s a great pity. And this is some of the issues that India, as we expect, and as they have said, will address in a very focused way.

In this era of the weaponisation of tariffs and trade, there is an increased need for us, as countries of the global South, to deepen trade amongst ourselves. India has entered into a range of free trade agreements. Most recently, we witnessed the signing of the FTA with the European Union. President of the European Union, Ursula von der Leyen, referred to it as the mother of all free trade agreements. It brings together over 2 billion people, creating a massive market. More recently, we have seen even the USA agree a framework agreement with India, and they are also working on an FTA with our region, the South African Customs Union. So we are hopeful that during the course of this year, we will be able to finalise that agreement as well. I think this is the Global South showing leadership, and India is at the centre of that. Despite all of these threats to our economies, including high tariffs, closed markets, and a move towards an introverted trade space, we have not seen this as a deterrent. We have seen it as a major opportunity. And this is what BRICS has to address comprehensively.

As you have noticed, at the 2023 summit we tasked our finance ministers with exploring the creation of a common payment system and a payment platform for BRICS countries. We also indicated that we need to deepen trading in our own currencies. That’s happening at an extended level, well beyond BRICS. Prime Minister Modi was in Malaysia this weekend. They are going to adopt the UPI system. Many countries are doing so. China has created its own platform. India, Brazil, of course, us in South Africa, and Russia as well. Because we can’t be held hostage to payment systems and payment platforms, and to a global financial system dominated by a few. And then, in times of difficulty, to unilateral sanctions that freeze our funds.

Many are saying that BRICS is responsible for de-dollarisation. That’s not the case. BRICS doesn’t have de-dollarisation as an agenda item. What it does have, and has had as a very important agenda item, including this year, is how to deepen trading in our local currencies and how to deepen the creation of payment platforms so we don’t have to depend on Western-created systems. I think this is happening at an accelerated pace. We want greater autonomy and independence, and we want the space to make choices that are, first and foremost, in the best interest of our countries, our region, and the global South. This space has been dominated for too long by certain countries and certain multinational financial houses.

I was very pleased to see that India is now going to launch its own fleet of cargo ships, not just depend on the Global North for our trade. These are all very positive developments that will be taken forward under India’s presidency. But I think the New Development Bank is doing very well, and we need to deepen its imprint.

The new members who have joined need to be taken on board as full members, and we need to deepen the loan book with them as well, because the NDB has shown that it’s possible for us to create our own financial institutions and manage them positively. So, I think you’ll also see a focus on that front. Then, of course, the environment, green energy, and the energy portfolio are critical to BRICS cooperation. Issues of disaster risk resilience, which India has brought to the table, will receive increasing attention, and how we can cooperate on the environment will also be a focus.

I think that is also a very critical issue. I think BRICS has an important role to play. When we speak of energy, we always talk about the energy transition, but we’re not seeing it in reality. So I think we will focus on that. But also, I think India will play an important role in sharing experience in digital technologies. I mean, digital public infrastructure has transformed Indian society, and we are very keen to see how we can work with India to learn from India and also provide assistance in the technology space. India is hosting the AI summit next week. That’s a major global development. We need to ensure that countries of the global south, developing countries, are the beneficiaries of developments in the AI space, and that we are not marginalised.

Mr. Come Carpentier:

India has recently concluded an FTA with the European Union and has an interim agreement with the United States. Are you concerned that such FTAs with countries that do not belong to the BRICS could, in some way, hamper or at least confuse the overall direction that the BRICS has taken? For example, very clearly, the US under President Trump has certain requirements, including the purchase of a certain amount of goods and services from the United States, which, I believe, amounts to 500 billion in five years. And while tariffs have been lowered, higher tariffs can be reinstated at any time if the US believes that India is not abiding by its demands, for example, regarding energy purchases. Do you think that this could make BRICS coordination more difficult?

H.E. Prof Anil Sooklal:

One of the strengths of the BRICS member states is the bloc’s collective power. It not only strengthens the bloc but also each of us. You would have seen this in the case of India, where, despite the imposition of 50 per cent tariffs, there were threats of 100 per cent tariffs and of stopping the purchase of Russian oil. In South Africa, we faced 50 per cent tariffs, as did many others. So did Brazil. But none of the BRICS countries buckled under this pressure. I think the days are gone when one power can dictate how we conduct our domestic affairs, who we trade with, who we buy from, and who we interact with. You have seen the resilience of BRICS countries. This pressure tactic no longer works. All it has done is reinforce the cohesion of a bloc like BRICS, and it has prompted us to expedite the deepening of our interactions at all levels.

I am not concerned that, despite our signing free trade agreements with any party, they may renege on those provisions and impose new tariffs and provisions. I think we are past that period. And the size of the economy: you would have seen just last week, in statistics we received from the IMF, that in 2026, almost 50 per cent of global GDP growth is being generated from this region. China: almost 27 per cent; India: 17 per cent; and Indonesia: 3.8 per cent. Just these three countries generate almost 50 per cent of global GDP growth. USA 9.9 per cent. Put this in perspective. European Union, about 7.5 per cent. Now, the pendulum has shifted from the global north to the global south. And this is what is keeping the global economy buoyant in a very challenging time. It is countries like us from the global south, including BRICS countries, that are powering the global economy in very difficult circumstances. So, a country that is responsible for under 10 percent of global GDP growth can no longer call the shots and determine what’s in the best interest of all of us.

As I have said, the weightage has shifted dramatically, and BRICS is at the centre of that. So, I think BRICS is in a good position. But as I indicated at the outset, India has assumed the chair at a very challenging time. India will have to show leadership as chair of BRICS, and collectively we have to show leadership as BRICS. Now, if you look at recent summit declarations, when we speak of the global system, we already speak of a multipolar world. We don’t say we are coming into a multipolar world. If you look at past BRICS summit declarations, the past two or three, we already indicate that we are living in a multipolar world. And that’s a major statement.

Regarding the agreements being signed with countries from the global north, we also have an FTA with the EU. And we have FTAs with countries from both the north and the south. I think the unique identity of BRICS is that, even though we are a formation of the global south and champion issues of core concern to us, we have always been inclusive. It’s never been an exclusive entity. The G7 is over 50 years old, formed in 1975. But it’s a closed shop.

For a short period, they brought in Russia and then pushed it out, but it’s a closed shop. Interestingly, I think President Macron has given the best answer to this dynamic. Last month, at an annual meeting with all the French ambassadors in Paris, he made a very interesting statement. He said, “Look, this year France chairs the G7, and India chairs BRICS.” He said we must ensure that the G7 doesn’t become anti-BRICS and that the BRICS doesn’t become anti-G7. He added that we would like to work closely with India during its tenure as chair of BRICS.

Now, I think this is a very positive development. BRICS has already been examining how we cooperate with our partners globally, not just in the Global South, but also in the Global North. I think this is one of the unique opportunities India has under its chairship. Besides France, the Prime Minister of Finland has made very positive statements about India playing a bridging role between the North and the South. Chancellor Merz, when he was here, said the same thing. I think this is partly due to the fractures in the transatlantic alliance. Even partners from the Global North, particularly in Europe, are looking for trusted partners from the Global South with whom they can work. And India, South Africa and Brazil come to mind immediately. For those from the Global North who want to engage with the BRICS, I think we must be open to that.

South Africa’s experience has shown that dialogue fosters common understanding. But when we stop talking to each other, we misunderstand each other. And then we see all kinds of permutations, such as that BRICS is a bloc that’s anti-West. Or BRICS is a bloc that’s anti-G7. Or BRICS is about de-dollarisation. These are all false narratives. This is not what BRICS is about. BRICS wants to create a more inclusive, just world underpinned by international law, where we truly leave no one behind. And I think this is what this unique moment is: India’s opportunity to chair BRICS in a very fractured world, to create bridges between the North and the South.

Mr. Come Carpentier:

At one point, President Macron suggested that France would like to join the BRICS. There have been policy papers by scholars on the possibility of establishing a special relationship between the European Union and the BRICS. In this regard, I would like to draw your attention to two points. The first is the trade instruments. President Trump has expressed strong opposition to the BRICS unit and, by extension, to India’s proposal and the project to link the central bank digital currencies of all BRICS members and other countries. Such an alternative system will definitely undermine the role of SWIFT and the dollar. The US will not take this lying down, because much of its prosperity depends on its role as the world’s reserve currency and, essentially, on its control over the use of the dollar. The European Union has its own interest in the euro. How do you see the BRICS confronting this, given the many different agendas among those countries?

The second point pertains to artificial intelligence. In AI, as in other fields, China is now either catching up with the US or overtaking it, and its technology could be the driving force in the coming years. China would thus increase its economic preponderance within BRICS and globally. The US has proposed a G2, which China has officially rejected, saying it does not want to be a new club of two superpowers, leaving the rest behind. How do you see BRICS facing this? Also, how would you react to the naval exercise off the coast of South Africa involving Russia, Iran, China, and South Africa? This in itself seems to orient BRICS towards the use of military force to stop certain unacceptable abuses of power.

H.E. Prof Anil Sooklal:

I would say the BRICS is a balancing force at the moment. I also think it’s important to recognise that in this multi-layered global environment, we live in an age of what some scholars have described as multi-alignment. There’s no contradiction in this. India is a member of the Quad, BRICS, and SCO. And I think this is the reality. We are going through a phase where you’ll find alliances that weren’t there before. But every country also has to take into account its national interest as it forms relationships within the region and globally. And sometimes these may seem contradictory, but in the larger picture, they are not.

In 2023, when South Africa was the BRICS chair, I was asked how we manage the five very diverse countries and how we get along as BRICS countries. I said it’s far easier than in the G20, where BRICS, the G7, and even the monarchy are part of it. In the G20, we have governance systems you don’t agree with, and they’re so diverse, but we still get on and achieve positive outcomes from G20 summits. So, in BRICS, it does not matter what type of alliance we have amongst the five of us. Now, the initiative India is taking is part of what I have said about us having greater financial choices and independence. So linking digital currencies, as India has suggested, is a natural evolution of what we’re trying to do in the financial space, like deepening trade in local currencies and creating our own payment platforms. It is important to remember that, at one point, the US accounted for over 50% of global trade. Today, that figure has fallen dramatically, under 20%. Yet, some 50% of trade is conducted in one currency, a currency that dominates the global economic space, the country.

Secondly, see what is happening with the IMF reserve basket. You have to create space for other currencies. It can’t be dominated by a few, and you’re seeing that evolution, such as the return to gold as the preferred foreign holding. Also, if you look at history, where was the dollar before the end of World War II? At that time, the pound was the most dominant global currency, but its history now. With the emergence of other major economies, reliance on the US dollar will decline. At some point, China and India will become economies equal to, or maybe even bigger than, the USA’s. So, we cannot marginalise these countries and their financial systems. It’s a natural growth. We all still deal in dollars, but there has to be space for all of us to coexist. And this is what BRICS is speaking about. The coexistence within the political space, within the security space, within the economic space and the financial space. Trying to contain the rise of countries won’t work. It’s going to fail. So, I think we need to accommodate each other.

This is what BRICS is about. It’s about how we accommodate each other, coexist, and ensure that all of us benefit from the larger economic space, the larger global security space, and the global governance architecture, so that it can’t be one or two that determine what’s in our best interest. And I think you are seeing increasingly, as I have said, that countries and leaders from the Global North are recognising this. Secretary General Guterres, when he spoke at the BRICS Summit in Johannesburg in 2023, said the Global North must learn to live with the Global South and accommodate them as they rise. So I think that selfish and hegemonic mentality is something of the past. Clinging to it is not going to take us into the future.

Mr. Come Carpentier:

There are currently three African countries that are members of BRICS, and several others are waiting to join. Now, given that organisations should not expand too quickly because they may lose cohesiveness and even the ability to communicate effectively, do you think there could be an actual agreement between the African Union (AU) and the BRICS, as India included the AU in the G20? Should India use its year of chairship to make the AU a full member of BRICS?

H.E. Prof Anil Sooklal:

Well, on the three occasions that we chaired BRICS, 2013, 18 and 23, we invited all the regional economic communities, the presiding country presidents, plus the AU commission chairperson and the AU presidency to all these summits. So the precedent is there. They have been part of past summits, and I am sure India will also have an Africa focus.

India is also hosting the India-Africa Forum Summit at the end of May this year. So Africa has always been a focal point of India’s foreign engagement, and I am sure even this year you will have that continuity. South Africa and the other member states like Egypt and Ethiopia, would like to see greater engagement between BRICS and the African continent, and I think that’s also something that will happen.

Mr. Come Carpentier:

We all do hope so. It’s a fascinating conversation, and I wish to thank you very much for your very detailed and scholarly responses. In terms of currency, trade, and high technology, the leadership is coming to the BRICS grouping. Therefore, given India’s initiatives, China’s open-source technologies, and Russia’s development of alternatives, I think the time for BRICS has come. Thank you for capturing it so well. It’s a moment that BRICS must seize, and I think India will provide that leadership this year.

H.E. Prof Anil Sooklal:

Thank you for having me.

Brief Bios:

  • E. Prof Anil Sooklal is the High Commissioner of the Republic of South Africa to India. Additionally, he is the non-resident High Commissioner of South Africa to Bangladesh and Nepal.
  • Come Carpentier has been, since 2003, the convener of the International Editorial Board of World Affairs – The Journal of International Issues. He has travelled and lectured in more than fifty countries. in universities and institutions of Europe, the Americas and Asia. He has written and co-authored several books and more than 200 articles and essays on subjects related to philosophy of science, geopolitics, international relations and the history of civilisations in more than thirty journals, newspapers and magazines in France, India, Italy, the USA, Russia and Switzerland. He was associated for many years with the World Public Forum Dialogue of Civilisations as a member of the founding association and a regular guest and speaker on that platform. He is a member of the Advisory Sub-Committee of the Paris-Berlin-Moscou Committee and an advisor to the International League of Phoenician, Chananean and Punic Cities (Lebanon). He has been a consultant to various American and European high-tech corporations and was between 1992 and 1999 the Secretary of the Tissot Economic Foundation (Switzerland).

 

The BRICS Structure: Does it need a Unified Currency and a Mutual Defence Pact to establish a non-NATO/EU order

Introduction

The BRICS represents a confluence of interests and common purposes. One of the most profound statements on ‘problem solving’ comes from the famous scientist and brilliant mind, Albert Einstein, who said, “Any intelligent fool can complicate a simple problem; it takes courage to move in the other direction.” Let’s address the BRICS challenge to itself and the world around it from that perspective, and consider its impact and implications for NATO and the EU.

For nearly a century, the global order has been defined by two primary pillars of Western power: the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and the supremacy of the U.S. Dollar. Together, they represent the “Hard” and “Soft” power of the Global North—a military shield and a financial sword. For the BRICS nations (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa, and their recent expansions), the quest for a multipolar world is not merely an ideological preference; it is a survival strategy. It is within this context that a ‘confluence of interests and commonalities of purpose’ (COI & COP) is established among the BRICS nations and affiliated members.

The West must be credited with establishing a rules-based order and the massive institutional framework that the proverbial Third World or Global South was forced to accept and follow. The Western institutional framework almost compelled the Global South to look up to the Global North as an aspirational model dominating their socio-economic models of change and development!

To truly transfer power away from the West, BRICS must transition from a consultative forum to a structured institutional bloc. I believe that the synthesis of a NATO-style mutual defence pact and an alternative global payments and trade settlement mechanism, with or without a unified BRICS currency, is the only viable option to dismantle Western hegemony and establish a sovereign and unshackled Global South.

The Monetary dilemma: De-Dollarisation as Liberation

The most potent tools of Western influence are not the aircraft carrier but the SWIFT system and the almost unified Central Banking system! When the West can freeze hundreds of billions of dollars of sovereign nations’ assets and seize the assets of individuals and entities at will, if not at the drop of a hat, it signals to every BRICS nation that their wealth is held to ransom by the political compulsions of those ‘who established their rules-based order’, where everyone loses their freedoms and choices at the pleasure of those they do not agree with. Add to that the West’s complete dominance of the media, whether print or digital, to manage any narrative the way they want. Truth is thus always manipulated and managed by Western hegemony.

The U.S. Dollar serves as the world’s primary reserve currency, enabling the United States to run massive deficits funded by the rest of the world. For BRICS, this creates a “structural dependency.” When the Federal Reserve raises interest rates to fight American inflation, it inadvertently crushes the currencies and debt-servicing capabilities of the Global South. When the Fed reduces interest rates, it has a concomitant impact on dollar-dependent nations. Thus, either way, the Global South gets crushed, in addition to the perpetual threat and uncertainty of sanctions and asset seizures, even if a country may not be directly responsible for the actions of a particular country, individual, or entity.

The world of 2026 looks very different from what we inherited after the Second World War in 1945. The end of the Second World War also marked the beginning of the end of European occupation of virtually the entire Rest of the World (ROW) through the brutal mechanisms of imperialism and colonialism, driven by oppressive practices. Europeans, literally and figuratively, took charge of the entire ROW and shared it amongst themselves as their own harem! ROW became a subservient entity for enriching the colonialist empire. They brutally and systematically extracted all riches and natural resources from their colonies and made themselves a superpower, while subjugating their colonies to abject poverty, in the name of ‘God, Glory and Gold’!

As we all know, BRICS today is larger than the G7 across all economic indicators, including GDP, and in pure diplomatic gravitas, which has led to the need and argument for a formal alignment to create a new world order. This has moved from a radical anti-West idea to a political and economic necessity. For the West to feel threatened is a natural outcome. However, they must recognise that the BRICS want to establish the concept of ‘fair share’ across every aspect of governance, including political, economic, social and technological dimensions. BRICS nations are rich in critical mineral resources, and they must want to share the rewards equitably.

Reform of political and economic institutions is urgently needed today, given the utter failure of the post-Second World War institutional structures—the United Nations, the World Bank, the IMF, the WHO, etc. These institutions systematically pursued the Western agenda in the name of a ‘rules-based order’. The United Nations Security Council, with its veto powers, became a monopoly or oligarchy controlling the world’s global challenges—what better way to capture the entire ROW behind UNSC mandates they rarely agreed upon? Today, the most powerful political grouping is dominated by the EU/NATO, which totally ignores the real and actual needs of the ROW.

The Mechanics of a Unified BRICS Currency

Does BRICS really need its own currency, or should it create a bilateral currency mechanism for trade payments and money transfers as an alternative to SWIFT? A unified currency—let’s call it the R5+ (reflecting the Real, Ruble, Rupee, Renminbi, and Rand)—would provide several strategic advantages, keeping COI & COP in constant focus. A unified currency would indeed provide a viable alternative to the Euro and the USD!

  • Commodity Backing:Unlike the USD, which is a fiat currency backed by “faith and credit,” a BRICS currency could be backed by a basket of physical assets.  The BRICS control a massive share of the world’s oil, gold, and rare-earth minerals.
  • Sanction Insulation:A unified currency, operating on a proprietary blockchain or digital ledger (CBDC), would bypass Western-controlled clearing houses.
  • Trade Efficiency:By eliminating the need for the dollar, BRICS nations can reduce transaction costs, thereby stimulating intra-bloc trade, which currently accounts for a growing percentage of global GDP.
The Security Pillar: A NATO-Style Collective Defence

NATO is the only ‘war club’ in the world today. It’s white-only, members-only, by invitation-only, an exclusive club operating with almost the Musketeer philosophy of ‘one for all, all for one’ in case of war against ANY member country! They can do whatever they want – be it in the Falklands or Venezuela. But if any country goes to war with any NATO country, hell’s fury will be unleashed. Thus, for the BRICS, economic power without a military deterrent is fragile. The history of the 20th century is littered with nations that attempted to move away from the dollar, only to face “regime change” or external destabilisation. A BRICS mutual defence treaty—a “Southern Nations Atlantic Pacific Alliance” (SNAPA)—would change the mechanism and calculus of intervention. One can visualise a real global peace happening! Imagine if India and China commit to this arrangement. A whole new world of economic prosperity will be created by the world’s two largest economic giants.

Deterrence Against Hybrid Warfare

NATO’s Article 5 (an attack on one is an attack on all) provides a psychological and physical shield. A BRICS equivalent would prevent the “salami-slicing” tactics often used against developing nations. If an economic embargo or a proxy conflict were initiated against one member, the others would be treaty-bound to provide military or logistical support.

Brics will gain significant Technological and Intelligence Sovereignty

With Russia, China and India possessing formidable military capabilities, including market and manufacturing prowess, a formal defence alliance will provide significant:

  • Interoperability:Standardising defence hardware and communication protocols across the Global South.
  • Intelligence Sharing: Countering Western signals intelligence (SIGINT) with a unified Southern network.
  • Space and Cyber Defence:Pooling resources for satellite constellations and cybersecurity to ensure the West cannot “turn off the lights” during a diplomatic dispute.

Why a defence pact is required, and why a high-calibre trade and payment settlement mechanism is needed, must be understood in another context, given Western countries’ proclivity to ‘control, manage, manipulate and mobilise (C3M) the rest of the world from their prism alone’. The Global South must not forget the suffering caused by European colonialism and imperialism. In fact, the entire world is still suffering from the ‘flashpoints’ left behind by the colonialists and imperialists.

Therefore, the BRICS COI and COP will remain the cornerstones of a mutually beneficial relationship and its outcomes. The “Security-Monetary Nexus” is the secret to the West’s longevity, and it must be the blueprint for the East’s ascent.

If BRICS launches a currency but lacks a defence pact, the West can use military pressure or “colour revolutions” to flip individual members, breaking the currency union from within. Conversely, a military alliance without a shared currency mechanism remains dependent on Western finance to fund its operations. By doing both, BRICS creates a closed-loop system of power.

Overcoming Internal Friction

Critics argue that the rivalry between China and India, or the geographical distance between Brazil and Russia, makes such an alliance almost untenable. But this is the 21st century, in which the tectonic shift brought by technology has completely altered the framework of how we communicate with each other. Geopolitically speaking, nations are far more aware of the impact and implications of events around them. Thus, the establishment of the COI & COP will remain at the root of all perceived or real differences amongst BRICS members. Remember, the European Union and NATO were formed by nations that had spent centuries at war, including launching ‘world wars’ amongst them for territorial gains and advantages.

The unifying force for BRICS is the convergence of interests and common purposes, which must overcome differences arising from diverse cultures. The desire for sovereignty and disdain for Western “long-arm jurisdiction” provide a stronger glue than cultural homogeneity ever could. The alliance must consider adopting a “non-interference” clause, focusing strictly on external defence rather than internal governance.

To effectively manage the ‘internal frictions’ within BRICS, the founders must be very pragmatic about the admission of new members to the organisation. For example, admitting Turkey or Pakistan would increase the likelihood of internal sabotage within BRICS. After all, isn’t Turkey already in NATO for ages, and hasn’t Pakistan always been doing the ‘dirty job’ for the USA and Europe, as its Defence Minister has said? Would it not be suicidal for BRICS to have them in the organisation?

Conclusion: Will the West accept the BRICS as equals?  

The simple answer is NO. But given the geopolitical imperatives, Europe’s severe decline, and the US’s inability to continue printing dollars to wiggle out of its financial difficulties, the West will seek genuine collaboration as the way forward. The transition of power from the West to the Global South is not about creating a new “Empire” with its own imperial and colonial ambitions. It’s about restoring the world to a state of balance where RESPECT for each other’s territorial imperatives is the new rules-based order, Westphalian or not. A NATO-style BRICS alliance, moving away from the SWIFT payment and trade settlement mechanism (with or without a unified currency), would force a “Global Reset.” BRICS must defeat all NATO/EU ‘divide and rule’ tactics by always keeping the mantra of ‘Convergence of Interests & Commonality of Purposeas BRICS’s cultural binding glue. Otherwise, BRICS will provide many more editions and chapters of that book called ‘Confessions of the Economic Hit Man’! Even though Mr Trump has said that BRICS is the enemy of the dollar and America, he knows it’s not true. BRICS is looking for respect and a seat at the table to usher in a new rules-based order. EU/NATO must negotiate as equals rather than as a hegemony.

In this new era, the “South” ceases to be a playground for Northern interests and becomes the architect of its own destiny. The tools of the master—the treaty and the mint—must now be used to build a different kind of house. The recently concluded Munich Security Conference offered many glimpses of geopolitical games, but it was very clear that the EU is worried about its global decline in political power and economic capabilities. Only through greater cooperation and collaboration with other nations on equal footing can it extend its life cycle. Empires have disappeared in the past. It will happen again. “History is littered with the corpses of men and women who forgot the lessons of history!”

Author Brief Bio: Shri Vibhuti Jha is an international banker and a geopolitical media analyst.
 

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