Abstract

Strategic competition and war are reshaping the routes linking the Indian Ocean to the Mediterranean. The Indo-Mediterranean is best understood as the space formed by the movement of goods, energy and data, and by the security arrangements that sustain them. It is more than a commercial corridor. Its viability depends on infrastructure, political alignment and the ability to keep connections open during crises.

Israel is the only viable candidate to serve as the western anchor of India’s Indo-Mediterranean strategy. No other node combines access to the Gulf-Levant route, an Indian-operated port asset, and a mature security and technological relationship with India. Haifa alone, however, cannot fulfil this role. Greece, Cyprus and Italy provide the anchor with European reach and redundancy; they do not replace it. The attacks of 7 October 2023, the Gaza war, disruption in the Red Sea and the wider West Asian crisis culminating in March 2026 exposed how politically and operationally fragile the proposed corridor remains.

The crises did not render IMEC irrelevant. They clarified what the project would need to survive: alternative routes, protected infrastructure, regulatory coordination and practical cooperation among regional partners. Israel can anchor the western segment only as a secure node within a wider Eastern Mediterranean network, not as a single point through which every flow must pass.

Keywords: Indo-Mediterranean; IMEC; India; Israel; Eastern Mediterranean; strategic connectivity

The Indo-Mediterranean as a strategic space

The Memorandum of Understanding announced at the New Delhi G20 summit in September 2023 described the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) in functional terms. An eastern corridor would connect India with the Gulf; a northern corridor would link the Gulf to Europe via maritime routes, railways, roads, and associated energy and digital infrastructure.¹ The map, however, advanced a broader proposition. It brought together regions usually treated as separate theatres: the Indian Ocean, the Arabian Peninsula, the Levant, and the Mediterranean. IMEC thus provided a material basis for thinking about an Indo-Mediterranean space.

This article argues that Israel is the only viable western anchor for India’s Indo-Mediterranean strategy because it uniquely combines geographic access to the Gulf-Levant segment with an established security and technological partnership capable of safeguarding the corridor’s critical infrastructure. Greece, Cyprus and Italy extend this anchor into Europe; they do not constitute alternatives to it.

The Indo-Mediterranean is neither a settled region nor simply the Indo-Pacific extended westward. It is a form of connectivity-based competitive regionalism: trade, capital, energy and data flow through infrastructure that is itself subject to political competition. Recent studies place IMEC at the intersection of India, the Gulf, the Abraham Accords and European initiatives. Banerjee and Singh treat it as collaborative infrastructure linking North-South and South-South trade with transport, digital and energy systems.² The 2026 ISPI report likewise reads the corridor through the lens of diversification and supply-chain resilience.³

The Gulf states’ ongoing ties with China prevent the Indo-Mediterranean from becoming an exclusively Western bloc. Chinese firms already operate infrastructure that could be part of IMEC, while India continues to pursue the International North-South Transport Corridor through Iran and Eurasia. IMEC adds a route to India’s multi-alignment strategy rather than replacing its other options.

A western anchor must do five things. It must link the Gulf-Levant land segment to Mediterranean routes, transfer goods, energy and data across multiple infrastructure types, and connect the Levant to more than one European gateway. It must also support India’s capacity to coordinate partners on standards, investment and security, and keep flows moving or restore them quickly after disruption. These are practical tests of geographic centrality, multimodal capacity, network reach, coordination and resilience. A node that concentrates traffic without providing alternatives is a chokepoint. A port without cross-border political access is an endpoint.

IMEC is more likely to supplement the Suez Canal than replace it. It can provide selective redundancy for time-sensitive, high-value trade while supporting energy and digital links.4 Banerjee and Singh’s simulations also reject simplistic claims of universal gain: network expansion distributes opportunities more widely, but economic and emissions objectives create policy trade-offs, especially for Asian members.

The analysis draws on the September 2023 government announcement, policy reports published between 2024 and March 2026, and assessments of conflicts along the route. It asks why Israel is the only viable Western anchor and what conditions must be met for it to fulfil that role. It defines the anchor as an assessable strategic function rather than a geographic metaphor. For India, this approach links resilient connectivity and secure supply chains directly to the national interest.

India’s capacity to coordinate partners under regional pressure

IMEC was announced at a moment of optimism about regional integration. The Abraham Accords had created formal ties between Israel and several Arab states; I2U2 brought India, Israel, the United Arab Emirates and the United States into a practical minilateral framework; and Washington was attempting to advance Saudi-Israeli normalisation. India’s relations with both Israel and the Gulf had deepened without forcing New Delhi to choose between them. IMEC appeared to translate those diplomatic changes into infrastructure.

The attacks of 7 October 2023 and the war that followed broke the political sequence on which the proposed northern corridor tacitly relied. The original memorandum did not list Israel or Jordan among its signatories, even though the projected railway had to cross both countries to reach the Mediterranean. After October 2023, cooperation with Israel became far more difficult for Arab governments to justify publicly. Saudi-Israeli normalisation stalled, while fighting in Gaza, clashes on Israel’s northern front and Houthi attacks on commercial shipping widened the conflict’s geographical reach.⁵

The Red Sea crisis offered a paradoxical lesson. It complicated investment, raised insurance and transport costs, and showed that infrastructure could be targeted for political purposes. Yet it also strengthened the case for alternative connections. A corridor designed solely to reduce costs under normal conditions would be difficult to justify against established maritime shipping. A corridor that provides additional options during disruption has a different strategic rationale. This distinction explains why the language surrounding IMEC shifted from efficiency to resilience and redundancy.

The escalation of the West Asian crisis in March 2026 sharpened that logic. US-Israeli strikes on Iran and Iranian retaliation threatened energy infrastructure and shipping around the Gulf, while the Strait of Hormuz again became a focal point of global risk.⁶ For India, the exposure was immediate: energy imports, trade, investment and the welfare of Indian citizens across the Gulf all depended on regional stability. The crisis also exposed an important limit to corridor thinking. A route that links several chokepoints is not resilient merely because it is new. Resilience requires spare capacity, alternative ports, interoperable procedures and institutions able to respond when a segment fails.

India’s exposure can be measured. An estimated 40–50 per cent of its crude-oil imports pass through the Strait of Hormuz. In 2024–25, Saudi Arabia and the UAE supplied about 22 per cent of India’s crude-oil imports and 54 per cent of its liquefied petroleum gas imports, while the UAE alone supplied roughly 13 per cent of its liquefied natural gas imports.⁷ More than nine million Indian citizens live in the Gulf, and their remittances account for an estimated 38 per cent of the total remittances received by India. A regional crisis would therefore affect not only energy prices but also household incomes in states such as Kerala, Uttar Pradesh and Bihar.⁸

India already has several ways to shape this environment. Its market creates demand and lends commercial weight to new connections. Indian firms can also secure positions at selected nodes, as the Adani investment in Haifa demonstrates. New Delhi’s distinctive advantage, however, lies in combining security and technology cooperation with diplomacy. Its trust with Israel, relations with the Gulf, participation in I2U2, engagement with Greece, and cooperation with the United States and Europe allow it to connect partnerships that no single regional institution presently governs. Used together, these relationships could give India a steadier strategic presence in a region where its economic exposure has long been greater than its political influence.9

India’s capacity to coordinate partners is limited. New Delhi can modernise its own ports and support investment abroad, but it cannot build the missing Saudi-Jordanian-Israeli links by itself, compel Saudi-Israeli normalisation, or set European customs and rail standards. It also lacks the financial weight of the Gulf states and the infrastructure portfolio China has accumulated across the region. Its citizens and energy imports remain exposed to crises around Hormuz and the Red Sea. India must also preserve the Iran-centred INSTC to protect the strategic autonomy and flexibility at the heart of its multi-alignment. It can sponsor, invest and coordinate, but it cannot command the corridor.

Indian influence diminishes as the route moves west of the Gulf. An anchor would not give New Delhi control over that space, but it would provide a partner able to organise the transition from the Arabian Peninsula to European markets and to protect the infrastructure on which that transition depends. Israel is the only viable candidate. No alternative combines access to the Gulf-Levant segment, an Indian-operated port asset, established defence and technology cooperation with India, and the capacity to secure physical and digital infrastructure.

Geographic centrality, multimodal capacity and security provision

Geography gives Israel its initial claim to the role. Goods moving by rail from Saudi Arabia and Jordan would reach the Mediterranean through Israel, most plausibly at Haifa. The railway from Haifa to Beit She’an already exists. What is missing is the short, politically difficult connection to the Jordanian network. Haifa matters because it is where an overland Gulf-Levant route could return to sea and divide among several European ports.

The physical gap is limited but strategically significant. The operational Haifa–Beit She’an railway is approximately 60 kilometres long. An additional 15 kilometres would be required to connect Beit She’an to the Sheikh Hussein crossing and the Jordanian network. Haifa’s annual cargo capacity has been estimated at roughly 30 million tonnes, while its pre-war container capacity was reported at about 1.5 million TEU. The tonnage and TEU figures measure different forms of throughput and should be assessed separately when judging whether the port can absorb additional IMEC traffic.¹⁰

Indian investment turns this geographic connection into a bilateral one. By acquiring a controlling interest in the older Haifa port, the Adani Group placed an Indian operator at the prospective western end of a corridor shaped in part by Indian strategy.¹¹ The acquisition preceded IMEC and should not be recast as an IMEC project. Its importance lies in giving India a commercial presence in a location where it already has a diplomatic interest. It also sits alongside Chinese involvement in the newer Haifa Bay terminal and in Piraeus. IMEC’s Mediterranean segment will not be insulated from Chinese infrastructure. India’s more realistic aim is to avoid dependence on any single operator.

The deeper foundation is the India-Israel security and technology relationship. Years of cooperation have built trust in sectors where states do not readily share access. For IMEC, the relevant question is not which weapons system India buys from Israel. It is whether the relationship can protect ports, digital networks and maritime traffic through cyber defence, intelligence exchange, maritime-domain awareness and continuity planning. Israeli policy studies argue that this experience could improve the corridor’s reliability.¹² The claim needs qualification: exposure to missile attack does not make a state a secure logistics hub. Israel’s value lies in its ability to recover quickly and keep essential systems operating under pressure.

The security requirement also alters the meaning of bilateral cooperation. Corridor security is a collective-action problem: protecting a port does not secure its railway, and hardening a cable landing station does not prevent interruption elsewhere. India and Israel would therefore need to move beyond a supplier-client model towards joint standards and risk assessment with Jordan, Gulf partners and European operators. Shared threat assessments, port-recovery exercises, cyber-incident reporting and links among maritime fusion centres can begin below the level of a formal alliance. Israel meets the resilience criterion only if these arrangements lower risk across the route rather than merely strengthen Israeli assets.

Digital infrastructure also requires route-wide protection. Submarine cables carry the bulk of intercontinental data, and damage to cables in the Red Sea after the Rubymar was struck in February 2024 showed how an attack on shipping could interrupt data flows between Asia and Europe.¹³ Israel’s land bridge and the Blue-Raman cable system offer geographic diversification, but they also create new landing stations and terrestrial segments that require protection. A resilient network needs alternative landing points and repair capacity, not a single cable presented as an escape from Suez.

Blue-Raman is designed to connect India with Europe via Saudi Arabia, Israel and Italy, adding a digital layer to the corridor’s ports and railways. Its strategic value also reflects competition over data routes. The China-linked PEACE cable, which connects Pakistan with Djibouti, Egypt and France, has a reported capacity of 192 Tbps. Blue-Raman should therefore be assessed not only as commercial infrastructure but also as part of India’s effort to diversify secure data connections to Europe.¹⁴

Energy links add another layer. The Eastern Mediterranean already hosts overlapping projects involving Israeli and Cypriot gas, Egyptian liquefaction capacity, and a proposed electricity connection linking Israel, Cyprus, Greece and continental Europe. The Great Sea Interconnector has faced financial and political obstacles, but it illustrates what an Indo-Mediterranean architecture would look like: the Levant connected to the European system via Cyprus and Greece.¹⁵ Green hydrogen remains a longer-term prospect. Electricity, gas and renewable-energy cooperation offer more immediate foundations.

Israel meets more of the anchor criteria than any alternative. Haifa provides geographic centrality; the port, railway, cable and energy projects offer multimodal capacity; and the India-Israel relationship provides the required security and technological foundation. Network reach still depends on improved relations and functioning links with Jordan, while the full overland corridor requires progress towards Saudi-Israeli normalisation. Cyprus, Greece and Italy provide onward reach and redundancy, but none can secure or replace the Gulf-Levant segment. For India, Israel is therefore the indispensable partner for protecting the western end of its secure supply chains.

Network reach: the Eastern Mediterranean

Haifa does not, by itself, connect India to Europe. Cargo must then move to ports capable of handling transhipment and distributing goods to European rail and road networks. Greece and Italy are therefore part of the strategic argument, not decorative additions to it.

Greece is close to the Levant and has strengthened political relations with both India and Israel. Its accession to the Three Seas Initiative in 2023 also offers a potential link between Eastern Mediterranean ports and Central and Eastern Europe.¹⁶ Yet COSCO’s control of Piraeus makes it difficult to present IMEC as a clean alternative to the BRI. Piraeus still matters. Its ownership shows that competition with China will occur within shared infrastructure networks, not only between rival corridors.

At the European end, Italy adds depth and choice. ISPI’s comparison of Piraeus, Marseille-Fos, Genoa and Trieste shows that no port meets every requirement. Trieste offers rail access to Central Europe and a free-port regime; Genoa provides scale and links to northern Italy; Marseille offers another western outlet.¹⁷ Using several ports would reduce congestion and political dependence while allowing cargo to follow its destination and type. It would also address the concern that IMEC merely replaces one chokepoint with another.

Cyprus matters for a different reason. It is not a major rail gateway, but it links the energy and security systems of Israel and Greece. Electricity interconnection, gas development and maritime cooperation give the island a role that exceeds its market size. Israel, Cyprus and Greece can form the bridge; Italy can connect it to the European interior.

India has already moved towards this broader geometry. Its engagement with Greece has expanded, and Indian strategy increasingly treats the Mediterranean as the western extension of its maritime interests rather than a distant European periphery. Italy’s formal participation in the IMEC memorandum and its renewed promotion of Trieste reinforce this trend. The western anchor should thus be understood as a distributed system: Israel is its central Levantine node, while Greece, Cyprus and Italy provide that node with reach and redundancy.

The network also needs practical governance. IMEC’s signatories should establish a small coordinating mechanism for transport, digital systems, energy and infrastructure protection, including Israel, Jordan and other indispensable non-signatories in technical bodies. Border-crossing times, rail capacity, port dwell time, cable-repair arrangements, insurance premiums and interoperable customs procedures would provide measurable benchmarks of performance. For India, these arrangements would turn diplomatic access into resilient connectivity with European markets.

Resilience and political limits

The hardest problem is political. Israel cannot establish a complete overland corridor without Saudi cooperation, and Saudi-Israeli normalisation remains absent. Das’s warning that the corridor places India within an unstable and asymmetric framework of normalisation is therefore well founded. The Gaza war raised the domestic cost of visible cooperation with Israel across the Arab world, while the March 2026 crisis exposed ports, railways and energy routes to direct attack. Treating normalisation as inevitable would turn a strategic preference into an analytical assumption.

Political legitimacy is not a secondary issue to be resolved after construction. A corridor marketed as a framework for regional prosperity will remain fragile if its gains accrue mainly to distant markets and large infrastructure firms. Jordan bears the costs of transit, border management and new construction; Palestinian exclusion would make the project easier to attack as an attempt to bypass the conflict rather than to change regional conditions. This does not mean that IMEC can deliver a peace agreement. It means that planners should identify concrete local benefits, including logistics employment, industrial zones, energy access and improved Palestinian trade capacity. Functional inclusion would not eliminate opposition, but it would make cooperation less dependent on elite diplomacy alone.

Phased implementation offers a more credible path than either waiting for comprehensive Saudi-Israeli normalisation or ignoring the political obstacle. Partners can improve port, border, digital and energy connections, which have independent value, develop technical standards among willing states, and preserve the option to join the full rail corridor when diplomatic conditions permit. Normalisation would enable the complete route, but it cannot replace planning.

IMEC still lacks binding commitments on financing, governance and construction. Rail links remain incomplete, border procedures are slow, and customs systems are not integrated. Private investors require predictable volumes, risk guarantees, transparent regulation, and evidence that multimodal transfers can compete on time and cost. Analysts have therefore called for private-sector participation, competition among ports and operators, and two-way trade rather than a conveyor belt serving only India-to-Europe traffic.¹⁸

China’s position in Gulf infrastructure, Haifa Bay and Piraeus makes exclusion expensive and perhaps impossible. The Gulf states are unlikely to abandon BRI relationships for an underfunded alternative. India’s national interest lies in competitive diversification, not rigid alignment: it should prevent any single state, company or route from controlling the system while preserving its own multi-alignment.

India must also safeguard its interests in Iran and the International North-South Transport Corridor. Disengaging from Iran would weaken the strategic autonomy that makes New Delhi a valuable partner. At the same time, Iranian capabilities and allied armed groups can threaten the maritime and physical infrastructure on which IMEC depends. India must manage this competition without assuming that economic interdependence will resolve security conflicts.

Israel can fulfil the anchoring role only if it reduces risk rather than concentrates it. That requires four practical shifts: completing and modernising links to Jordan; embedding Haifa in a multi-port Mediterranean network; protecting physical, digital and energy infrastructure through shared protocols; and creating benefits for transit states and neighbouring populations. These steps would advance India’s national interest by combining strategic autonomy with resilient connectivity and more secure supply chains. Without them, “anchor” will remain a metaphor.

Conclusion

Israel is the only viable western anchor, combining the necessary geography and infrastructure with a security and technological relationship that can support India’s westward strategy. Greece, Cyprus and Italy are essential to the network’s European reach, but they extend the anchor rather than replace it. Even so, Israel cannot fulfil this role fully without improved relations and operational connectivity with Jordan, as well as progress towards Saudi-Israeli normalisation.

India can advance this architecture by combining security-technology cooperation with diplomatic coordination, thereby translating extensive economic interests into a more visible regional presence. It cannot impose normalisation, finance every missing link, or control the regulatory systems through which the corridor must pass. The strategy therefore depends on a division of functions: India supplies investment, technology cooperation and diplomatic coordination; Israel anchors and secures the Gulf-Levant transition; Eastern Mediterranean partners provide European reach and redundancy.

Author Brief Bio: Dr. Lauren Dagan Amoss is a researcher specialising in India’s foreign and security policy, with a regional focus on the Indo-Pacific. She is a Senior Fellow at the Begin-Sadat Centre for Strategic Studies (BESA) and a lecturer at Bar-Ilan University. Her doctoral research examined India’s policy toward the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, analysing the evolution of New Delhi’s diplomatic positioning from independence through the contemporary period. Her current research interests include strategic realignment in the Indo-Pacific, India’s security doctrine, and India–Israel relations. Dr. Dagan Amos is a member of the Deborah Forum, which promotes women’s leadership in Israel’s foreign and defence policy community.”

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Abstract

The growing attention to the Indo-Mediterranean reflects more than the emergence of a new economic corridor linking the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean Sea. Rather, it signals a broader transformation in the spatial organisation of international politics. This article argues that the Indo-Mediterranean should be understood as an emerging geopolitical macro-space, shaped by the ongoing transition from a predominantly Atlantic-centred international system to an increasingly polycentric global order.

Moving beyond approaches that interpret the India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) primarily as an infrastructure or connectivity initiative, the article develops a broader geopolitical framework in which maritime routes, logistics, digital networks, energy infrastructure, and political partnerships become instruments through which new configurations of power are territorialised.

The analysis examines how India, the Gulf region, the Eastern Mediterranean, Southern Europe, and East Africa are increasingly forming an interconnected macro-space characterised by multiple centres of political, economic, technological, and maritime power. By proposing the Indo-Mediterranean as a geopolitical macro-space, the study contributes to the theoretical debate on the relationship between power, space, and the transformation of the international order.

Keywords: Indo-Mediterranean, Geopolitical Macro-Space, Polycentric Order, Connectivity, IMEC, Geopolitics

Introduction

The emergence of the Indo-Mediterranean as a strategic concept reflects a profound transformation in the contemporary international system. Rather than a simple expansion of an existing geographical framework or the addition of a new economic corridor, the Indo-Mediterranean embodies a broader reconfiguration of political, economic, technological, and maritime interactions, driven by the ongoing redistribution of global power.

The growing prominence of the Indo-Mediterranean should be understood within the broader context of the transition from a predominantly Atlantic-centred international system towards an increasingly polycentric order. This transition is reshaping the spatial organisation of global politics, generating new patterns of connectivity that integrate maritime routes, logistics, digital infrastructure, energy networks, production chains, and strategic partnerships into broader geopolitical configurations.

From this perspective, the India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) is neither the origin nor the sole expression of the Indo-Mediterranean. Rather, it is one of the most visible manifestations of a deeper historical process through which a new geopolitical macro-space is taking shape. Building on this premise, this article proposes interpreting the Indo-Mediterranean as an emerging geopolitical macro-space. It argues that understanding this evolving configuration requires moving beyond conventional regional approaches and analysing the reciprocal relationship between power, connectivity, and the production of geopolitical space within the emerging polycentric international order.

The Transformation of International Order and the Emergence of New Geopolitical Macro-Spaces

The emergence of the Indo-Mediterranean cannot be understood as an isolated regional development or as the outcome of a single infrastructure initiative. Rather, it reflects a broader transformation of the international system, in which the redistribution of power is progressively reshaping the spatial organisation of global politics and the very architecture of international order. As international orders evolve, so too do the geopolitical configurations through which power is projected, connectivity is organised, and strategic interaction is structured.

Historical experience shows that geopolitical spaces are neither permanent nor solely determined by physical geography. Their strategic relevance varies with the prevailing configuration of political authority, economic interdependence, technological development, and military capabilities. The Mediterranean, for example, was the principal centre of political and commercial interaction in classical antiquity; the Atlantic acquired global centrality with the rise of European maritime expansion and the consolidation of the modern international system; similarly, the Indo-Pacific has emerged over the past two decades as the predominant strategic framework for understanding the redistribution of economic dynamism and maritime power towards Asia.

These examples suggest that geopolitical spaces are best understood as historically contingent political constructions, an understanding consistent with broader debates that have challenged purely territorial conceptions of international politics and emphasised the spatial dimension of political authority. International orders do not merely operate within geographical space; they actively produce their own strategic spatiality. Each historical configuration of international order generates a corresponding spatial organisation through which political authority, economic interaction, technological innovation, and strategic connectivity become territorially embedded. In this sense, geopolitical macro-spaces are not the passive settings of international politics but one of its principal historical products.

The current transition towards an increasingly polycentric international order is generating precisely such a transformation. The relative diffusion of economic capabilities, technological innovation, demographic dynamism, and political influence beyond the traditional Atlantic core has produced multiple centres of strategic initiative. Within this evolving context, connectivity assumes significance that extends well beyond the construction of physical infrastructure. Maritime routes, ports, logistics platforms, digital networks, energy corridors, submarine cables, financial mechanisms, and technological standards become essential instruments through which political actors organise space and project influence. Connectivity therefore constitutes one of the principal mechanisms through which contemporary geopolitical macro-spaces are progressively formed.

The Indo-Mediterranean should be understood within this broader analytical framework. Its emergence does not stem solely from the implementation of the India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor or from the growing importance of maritime trade between South Asia and Europe. Rather, it reflects the progressive integration of multiple strategic subsystems—including the Indian Ocean, the Arabian Peninsula, the Gulf, the Red Sea, the Eastern Mediterranean, and Southern Europe—into an increasingly coherent geopolitical configuration.

This perspective builds on the classical geopolitical insight that political power and geographical space are inextricably linked. However, whereas traditional geopolitical theories primarily focused on strategic regions, continental balances, and the distribution of power among states, the contemporary transformation of the international order calls for analytical categories capable of explaining the emergence of new macro-spatial configurations shaped by connectivity, technological infrastructure, transregional interactions, and multiple centres of political authority. The notion of macro-space inevitably recalls Carl Schmitt’s concept of the Großraum; unlike Schmitt’s construction, which presupposed a hegemonic power ordering the space around it, the macro-space discussed here is defined precisely by the absence of a single ordering centre.^[1]

The concept of the geopolitical macro-space proposed in this article is intended as a contribution to this renewed theoretical agenda, extending contemporary geopolitical reflection on the organisation of strategic spatiality^[2] by providing an analytical framework for understanding how international orders reorganise space amid polycentric transformation.

From Connectivity to Geopolitical Macro-Space: The Making of the Indo-Mediterranean

The growing relevance of the Indo-Mediterranean cannot be explained solely by the proliferation of infrastructure projects or the expansion of commercial exchanges between South Asia, the Gulf, and Europe. Rather, it reflects the progressive convergence of multiple geopolitical dynamics that are reshaping the strategic architecture of a vast transregional area stretching from the Indian Ocean to the Mediterranean Sea.

Connectivity is a principal manifestation of this transformation, but it should not be confused with its underlying cause. Ports, maritime corridors, railways, energy pipelines, digital infrastructure, and logistics networks are not merely instruments that facilitate trade; they also help reorganise political influence, strategic interdependence, and regional hierarchies. In other words, infrastructure does not simply connect existing geopolitical spaces; it actively participates in constructing new ones.

At this point, a conceptual distinction is necessary. Connectivity refers to the material and immaterial networks that facilitate the circulation of goods, capital, information, energy, technologies, and people. In recent years, connectivity has become a central analytical concept for understanding the reorganisation of global interactions. By contrast, geopolitical integration denotes the political process by which such networks become embedded in stable patterns of strategic interaction, institutional cooperation, and long-term political alignment. Connectivity creates networks; geopolitical integration creates geopolitical macro-spaces. Infrastructure alone does not generate geopolitical space. A geopolitical macro-space emerges only when connectivity is transformed into a durable framework of political, economic, technological, and strategic relationships.

This distinction is analytically significant. Conventional approaches often treat connectivity as an essentially economic phenomenon, emphasising efficiency, trade facilitation, and market integration. While these dimensions remain important, they only partially explain the strategic significance of contemporary transregional corridors. The Indo-Mediterranean exemplifies this multidimensional process. Its emergence stems from growing interaction among several strategic subsystems that have historically been studied separately: the Indian Ocean, the Arabian Peninsula, the Gulf, the Red Sea, the Eastern Mediterranean, and Southern Europe. Increasing maritime exchanges, energy interdependence, digital connectivity, financial cooperation, technological partnerships, and security dialogues have progressively eroded the analytical boundaries separating these regions, giving rise to a more integrated strategic environment.

Within this framework, the India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC), formally launched via a Memorandum of Understanding signed on the margins of the G20 New Delhi Summit in September 2023, should be understood as an expression of a broader geopolitical transformation rather than its primary cause. The corridor institutionalises and accelerates trends already reshaping the region, including India’s westward strategic projection, the Gulf monarchies’ growing geopolitical role, the renewed strategic importance of the Eastern Mediterranean, and European actors’ search for diversified economic and logistical partnerships.

The Indo-Mediterranean thus constitutes an emerging geopolitical macro-space, the coherence of which stems from the interplay of maritime geography, infrastructure development, political cooperation, technological integration, and the evolving distribution of power across Eurasia and its surrounding maritime domains.

The Indo-Mediterranean as a Polycentric Geopolitical Configuration

The emergence of the Indo-Mediterranean illustrates one of the most significant spatial consequences of the ongoing transformation of the international order. Unlike traditional geopolitical regions, whose coherence often rested on geographical proximity or institutional integration, the Indo-Mediterranean is being shaped by the interaction of multiple centres of power, whose relationships are increasingly defined by strategic complementarity rather than hierarchical dependence.

The distinction between multipolarity and polycentrism is particularly relevant in this context. Multipolarity primarily concerns the distribution of power among sovereign states and therefore remains conceptually rooted in the Westphalian understanding of international politics. It describes a system of several major state powers whose interactions determine the overall balance of power.

Polycentrism, by contrast, offers a broader analytical framework. While states remain the principal actors, the international order is increasingly shaped by the interaction of multiple centres of political, economic, technological, financial, normative, and infrastructural power across different scales. These centres include not only states but also regional organisations, transnational infrastructure networks, financial hubs, technological ecosystems, maritime corridors, and other strategic actors capable of influencing the organisation of international space.^[3]

Accordingly, multipolarity concerns the distribution of capabilities, whereas polycentrism concerns the organisation of the international order and the production of geopolitical space. This evolving configuration spans a vast maritime and continental continuum linking the Indian Ocean, the Arabian Peninsula, the Gulf, the Red Sea, the Eastern Mediterranean, and Southern Europe. Its coherence derives not from a single political authority or security architecture, but from the growing convergence of economic interests, technological cooperation, infrastructure development, maritime security, and diplomatic engagement among its principal actors.

Within this macro-space, India occupies an increasingly prominent position. Its sustained economic growth, demographic weight, technological capabilities, expanding naval presence, and proactive diplomatic initiatives have progressively transformed the country into one of the principal centres of the emerging polycentric order. India’s strategic engagement with the Gulf monarchies, partnerships with Mediterranean countries, and growing participation in transregional connectivity projects demonstrate an increasingly westward geopolitical orientation that complements its established role in the Indo-Pacific.

The Gulf region has undergone a profound strategic transformation. No longer viewed primarily as an energy-exporting periphery, the Gulf monarchies have become active geopolitical actors, investing in logistics, finance, advanced technologies, renewable energy, artificial intelligence, and maritime infrastructure. Their sovereign wealth funds, global investment strategies, and expanding diplomatic networks have significantly enhanced their capacity to shape the geopolitical evolution of the wider Indo-Mediterranean.

The Eastern Mediterranean and Southern Europe occupy a strategic position within this evolving configuration. Rather than marking the western terminus of Asian connectivity, they increasingly serve as active interfaces linking European markets, North African economies, West Asian energy systems, and maritime routes connecting the Mediterranean with the Indian Ocean. The growing Indian presence in Mediterranean port infrastructure—exemplified by Adani Ports’ acquisition of a controlling stake in the port of Haifa in early 2023—illustrates this evolving role. Their significance therefore derives not merely from geography but from their capacity to facilitate multidirectional political, economic, and technological exchanges.

East Africa also acquires renewed geopolitical importance within this framework. Ports, maritime infrastructure, digital connectivity, and expanding commercial relations increasingly integrate the eastern coast of Africa into Indo-Mediterranean dynamics. As maritime trade and investment intensify, East Africa is increasingly becoming an indispensable component of this broader macro-spatial configuration. These dynamics are already evident: Gulf logistics operators have invested extensively in ports along the Horn of Africa and the East African seaboard; India has framed its engagement with the western Indian Ocean through its SAGAR and, more recently, MAHASAGAR maritime visions; and the India–Italy Joint Declaration of May 2026 explicitly envisages trilateral development projects in Africa, combining India’s digital public infrastructure with Italy’s Mattei Plan.^[4] Far from being on the periphery of the emerging configuration, East Africa is one of the arenas where the polycentric character of the Indo-Mediterranean will be tested.

The consolidation of this macro-space is, however, contingent rather than inevitable. The attacks on commercial shipping in the Red Sea since late 2023, which forced a substantial share of Europe–Asia trade to reroute around the Cape of Good Hope, have exposed the vulnerability of the maritime backbone underpinning Indo-Mediterranean connectivity. The stalling of normalisation processes in West Asia following the war in Gaza has likewise slowed the political alignments that IMEC presupposes. Competing connectivity frameworks—most notably China’s Belt and Road Initiative and the European Union’s Global Gateway—alongside persistent intra-regional rivalries further complicate the emergence of a coherent strategic configuration.^[5]

External great powers may equally shape its consolidation: the United States remains a central security actor in the Gulf and may seek to embed the new connectivity schemes within existing US-centred security architectures, while Russia promotes the International North–South Transport Corridor as an alternative Eurasian axis and maintains close relations with the Gulf monarchies, notably through energy coordination. These constraints do not invalidate the macro-spatial dynamics analysed here, but they underscore that geopolitical macro-spaces are political constructions whose consolidation depends on sustained agency, not on geographical destiny.

The Indo-Mediterranean should therefore not be interpreted as a geopolitical space dominated by a single hegemonic actor. Its defining characteristic is the coexistence of multiple centres of decision-making, each with distinct political priorities, economic capabilities, and strategic interests. Cooperation and competition coexist within a framework of selective interdependence that reflects the broader logic of an increasingly polycentric international order.

This emerging macro-space differs from both traditional regional systems and classical geopolitical spheres of influence. It is neither an alliance nor a homogeneous geopolitical bloc. Rather, it constitutes a flexible strategic configuration in which multiple actors simultaneously contribute to the production of geopolitical space while preserving significant degrees of political autonomy. These characteristics make the Indo-Mediterranean one of the clearest contemporary manifestations of the transition towards a polycentric world order.

Italy as a Mediterranean Strategic Interface

The emergence of the Indo-Mediterranean macro-space also invites a reconsideration of the geopolitical role of Southern Europe, particularly Italy. Traditional interpretations have often portrayed Italy as Europe’s southern frontier or as a logistical gateway between the Mediterranean and continental markets. Such perspectives, however, underestimate the broader strategic implications of the ongoing reconfiguration of the international order. Within an emerging polycentric system, Italy’s geopolitical significance derives less from its position within Europe than from its location at the intersection of multiple strategic spaces. Situated at the centre of the Mediterranean, Italy occupies a privileged position, linking the European continent with North Africa, the Balkans, the Eastern Mediterranean, the Middle East, and, via the Suez Canal and the Red Sea, the wider Indo-Mediterranean maritime system.

In this context, the notion of a strategic interface proves analytically useful. A strategic interface is more than a geographical crossroads or a logistical gateway: it designates a geopolitical space where different macro-spatial configurations intersect and interact, generating durable political, economic, technological, and security relationships. Strategic interfaces facilitate the articulation of geopolitical macro-spaces without dissolving their respective centres of decision-making. They are therefore essential to a polycentric international order, enabling differentiated forms of cooperation while preserving the autonomy of the actors involved.

This centrality is not merely geographical. It depends on the country’s capacity to participate actively in the political, economic, technological, and infrastructural networks that increasingly structure the Indo-Mediterranean macro-space. Ports, logistics platforms, digital infrastructure, energy interconnections, industrial cooperation, scientific partnerships, and maritime security all contribute to redefining Italy’s strategic role within this evolving geopolitical configuration. Relations between Italy and India take on particular significance in this context. Italy is today India’s fourth-largest trading partner within the European Union, with bilateral trade of around €14 billion in 2025.^[6]

Over the past decade, bilateral cooperation has broadened beyond traditional commercial exchanges to encompass defence, maritime security, advanced manufacturing, space technologies, digital innovation, renewable energy, and higher education. The elevation of bilateral relations to a Strategic Partnership in 2023 and the adoption of the India–Italy Joint Strategic Action Plan 2025–2029 have provided this convergence with an explicit institutional framework.^[7]

In May 2026, the relationship was elevated to a Special Strategic Partnership: the Joint Declaration adopted in Rome sets a bilateral trade target of €20 billion by 2029, reaffirms both governments’ commitment to IMEC—encouraging its first ministerial meeting to take concrete steps to advance the initiative in 2026—and envisages interconnected port networks through a dedicated maritime transport agreement. Significantly, the joint article signed by the two Prime Ministers for the occasion explicitly referred to the emergence of the Indo-Mediterranean as an interconnected space linking the Indian Ocean to Europe.^[8] These developments reflect broader structural changes in the international system, as medium and major powers increasingly diversify their strategic partnerships beyond traditional alliance frameworks.

The Indo-Mediterranean consequently offers Italy the opportunity to develop a more autonomous and multidimensional geopolitical projection. Rather than acting exclusively within an Atlantic or European framework, Italy may increasingly contribute to consolidating a wider strategic space linking Europe with the Indian Ocean through mutually beneficial partnerships based on economic complementarity, technological cooperation, maritime security, and political dialogue.

For India, Italy is more than a European trading partner. It is one of the principal Mediterranean gateways through which relations with Southern Europe, North Africa, and the wider Mediterranean basin can be strengthened. The growing convergence of Italian and Indian strategic interests therefore illustrates how the Indo-Mediterranean is progressively fostering new patterns of cooperation that transcend conventional regional boundaries.

From this perspective, Italy should not be seen as the western endpoint of Indo-Mediterranean connectivity. Rather, it is one of the political and strategic interfaces through which the emerging macro-space acquires coherence and functional integration. Its future relevance will depend less on geographical determinism than on its capacity to formulate a long-term geopolitical strategy consistent with the evolving polycentric order.

Conclusion

The concept of the Indo-Mediterranean reflects far more than the emergence of a new geographical label or the implementation of a major infrastructure initiative. It represents one of the most significant spatial manifestations of the ongoing transformation of the international system. This article has argued that the Indo-Mediterranean should be understood as an emerging geopolitical macro-space rather than merely a corridor of connectivity linking India, the Middle East, and Europe.

The India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor is undoubtedly one of the most visible expressions of this transformation. Nevertheless, it should be understood as part of a broader historical process rather than as its origin. The Indo-Mediterranean represents neither the replacement of existing geopolitical regions nor the establishment of a new hegemonic sphere of influence. Rather, it exemplifies the emergence of a polycentric spatial order in which multiple autonomous centres interact through differentiated forms of cooperation, competition, and strategic interdependence.

The concept of the Indo-Mediterranean as a geopolitical macro-space is intended not merely as a regional category but as a contribution to a broader theoretical understanding of the evolving relationship among power, space, and international order in the twenty-first century.

Author Brief Bio: Tiberio Graziani is the Chairman of Vision & Global Trend -International Institute for Global Analyses. He currently teaches at the International Doctoral School in “Law and Social Change: The Challenges of Transnational Regulation” at Roma Tre University. He is the Editor-in-Chief of Geopolitica which is a Journal of Geopolitics and Related Matters. He is a Member of several scientific committees of academic journals, including World Affairs (India), GeoPolitica (Romania), Sicurezza e Giustizia (Italy). He is also a Member of the: Advisory Board for the Political Science Area of Link Campus University; Advisory Committee of the Degree Program in “Diplomatic, International and Global Security Studies”, University of Salerno.

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Endnotes

^[1] Carl Schmitt, “The Großraum Order of International Law with a Ban on Intervention for Spatially Foreign Powers: A Contribution to the Concept of Reich in International Law (1939–1941),” in Writings on War, ed. and trans. Timothy Nunan (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2011), 75–124.

^[2] Saul Bernard Cohen, Geopolitics: The Geography of International Relations, 2nd ed. (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2009).

^[3] For a cognate account of the emerging order as a “multiplex world,” see Amitav Acharya, The End of American World Order (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2014). Whereas Acharya’s multiplex describes the coexistence of multiple actors, layers, and regional orders, polycentrism as employed here is a spatial category: it concerns the way an emerging international order produces and organizes geopolitical space.

^[4] “India–Italy Joint Declaration,” Rome, May 20, 2026, which envisages trilateral initiatives with African partners in fields including digital public infrastructure, agriculture, health, education, artificial intelligence, connectivity, and renewable energy, in connection with India’s development partnerships in Africa and Italy’s Mattei Plan.

^[5] On the EU–India partnership and the Global Gateway as a connectivity axis alternative to the Belt and Road Initiative, see Michele Pigliucci, “Unione Europea e India: un partenariato strategico alla sfida delle tensioni globali,” in India: A Eurasian Power, ed. Alberto Cossu and Tiberio Graziani (Callive Edizioni, 2026), 167–178.

^[6] Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, “India–Italy Bilateral Relations,” country brief, 2026.

^[7] Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, “India–Italy Joint Strategic Action Plan 2025–2029,” Joint Statement, November 2024.

^[8] “India–Italy Joint Declaration,” adopted on the occasion of the elevation of the bilateral relationship to a Special Strategic Partnership, Rome, May 20, 2026. See also Narendra Modi and Giorgia Meloni, “Italy and India: A Strategic Partnership for the Indo-Mediterranean,” joint op-ed published on the occasion of the visit, May 20, 2026.

Introduction

On 20 May 2026, in a joint op-ed titled A Strategic Partnership for the Indo-Mediterranean, published across various Italian and Indian media outlets, the Indian and Italian leaders, Narendra Modi and Giorgia Meloni, welcomed “the emergence of the Indo-Mediterranean.”^[1] This raises two issues. Firstly, the paradigm shifts that have brought India and Italy to a common adoption of an Indo-Mediterranean strategic framework. Secondly, the nature of their Indo-Mediterranean partnership.

In 2021, Vas Shenoy spoke of “the seeds… for the creation and development of a new, expanded Indo-Mediterranean” in the context of Modi’s discussions with Mario Draghi, the Italian Prime Minister, during which the two leaders announced a Strategic Partnership on Energy Transition and a Statement of Intent on Textiles Cooperation.^[2] These “seeds” have since flowered with the advent of the Meloni administration in late 2022, when Italian and Indian strategic convergence over the Indo-Mediterranean directly informs their burgeoning defence and economic partnership. It also reflects their strong mutual support for economic and digital corridors across the Indo-Mediterranean.

Paradigm Shifts

Strategic paradigms often overlap and shift. The 1980s arrival of the “Asia-Pacific” was a Pacific Rim initiative launched by Australia, Japan and the US, which led to the creation of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) in 1989. China joined in 1991, but India was excluded. The 2010s arrival of the “Indo-Pacific” marked a westward shift, bringing the Indian Ocean into the geographical frame and India into the political one. As a term, the “Indo-Mediterranean” has entered strategic discourse in recent years, as noted in 2021 by the previously cited Vas Shenoy.

Geographically, the Indo-Mediterranean represents a further westward shift from the Indo-Pacific. Literally, the Indo-Mediterranean could be understood as spanning the whole Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean from Singapore to Gibraltar. In practice, it has been seen as running from the Eastern Mediterranean to the Arabian Sea, from Italy to the west coast of India, as “strategic space in the making.”^[3] As Ambassador Gurjit Singh put it, India and Italy are “partners in peninsularity”.^[4] Their peninsular locations, Italy’s extending into the Mediterranean and India’s into the Indian Ocean, enable their mutual projection and thereby their mutual encounter. Geopolitically, their strategic neighbourhoods have expanded and now overlap across the Indo-Mediterranean. India has moved westwards across the Red Sea and the Mediterranean towards Italy, while Italy has moved eastwards across the Red Sea and the Arabian Sea towards India. Italy’s Ambassador to India, Antonio Bartoli, has commented that “there is a common space that we could call Indo-Mediterranean, that is the link between two vital basins for our respective nations”.^[5]

India: Extending Westwards beyond the Arabian Sea

India’s adoption of the term Indo-Mediterranean reflects its strategic push westwards. During the 1990s, India’s existing “immediate neighbourhood” focus within South Asia was overlaid with an “extended neighbourhood” outreach, initially eastwards towards South-East Asia.^[6]

The Look West policy announced in 2003 was economics-oriented towards the Gulf. Modi’s Act West reformulation has embraced security cooperation in the Gulf and a wider application elsewhere in the Middle East.^[7] This Middle East outreach took India to the shores of the Mediterranean, where close defence ties with Israel, established in the 2000s, have accelerated under Modi, the first Indian Prime Minister to visit Israel in 2017. In 2023, India’s Adani Group acquired a 70% stake in Israel’s Haifa port, a designated Mediterranean anchor for IMEC, the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor. Modi’s visit in November 2025 brought an MoU on Defence Cooperation.

India’s naval projection has been “westward-bound” this century.^[8] Indian naval thinking has consequently shifted. The 2015 Indian Maritime Security Strategy (IMSS) expanded India’s area of “primary interest” (identified as the Indian Ocean in the 2007 IMSS) to include the Red Sea (a “secondary” interest in the 2007 IMSS), while the Mediterranean (absent from the 2007 IMSS) was added as an area of “secondary” strategic interest.^[9] This was accompanied by a maritime posture (like Italy’s) to safeguard choke points and strategic conduits in the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea, an extended naval theatre of operations first seen with anti-piracy deployments commencing in 2008 and strengthened in 2023, in the wake of Houthi disruption, with Operation Sankalp “safeguarding India’s maritime interests.”^[10]

India has extended its “extended neighbourhood” into the Mediterranean. India’s Minister for External Affairs, Subrahmanyam Jaishankar, emphasised in 2022, “I want to drive home the point that where the Mediterranean is concerned, it is a region of growing interest to us…. in the last few years…. there has been very visible intensification of those ties.”^[11] Geoeconomics is also on display. At the India Mediterranean Business Conclave, Jaishankar argued that “Mediterranean ports and maritime routes have long facilitated East-West trade”, that “our task is to make history work positively in the contemporary era”, and that, consequently, “we want to deepen our engagement with the Mediterranean region.”^[12] Moving across the Eastern Mediterranean, India has developed close security ties with Cyprus and Greece, which were consolidated during Modi’s 2025 visits, with an Indo-Mediterranean rationale, tacitly, to counter close defence ties between Turkey and Pakistan. Last, but certainly not least, India has developed close ties with Italy following Meloni’s visit to India in 2023.

Italy: Extending Eastwards Beyond the Mediterranean

The Mediterranean is Italy’s starting point and immediate neighbourhood, giving rise to the old Roman view of the Mediterranean as Mare Nostrum, “Our Sea.” The Roman Empire not only controlled the Mediterranean but also held power in the upper Red Sea, at times pushing down to Yemen and the gates of the Indian Ocean. From that Red Sea position, a flourishing trade with India was established. The colonial period saw Italian colonies spread across the Eastern Mediterranean (Albania, Libya, Dodecanese), the Red Sea (Eritrea), and the Indian Ocean (Somalia). In the 1990s, the concept of a “Wider/Extended Mediterranean” (Mediterraneo allargato) arose in Italian naval circles, accompanied by a maritime posture (like India’s) to safeguard choke points and strategic conduits: in the Persian Gulf in the early 1990s, since 2008 in the Gulf of Aden with the Atalanta operation, and since 2024 in the Red Sea with the Aspides.

Meloni extended the Meditterraneo allargato concept in her Press Statement with Modi in March 2023, “when we talk about the wider Mediterranean, we must consider that it extends all the way here”, i.e. over the Arabian Sea to India.^[13] India’s ambassador, Vani Rao, reciprocated, “We welcome Italy’s wider Mediterranean strategy… in which India is a key player.”^[14] Meloni’s Italy has taken an active role beyond the Mediterranean, with high-level visits and links established with Eritrea, Saudi Arabia, Djibouti and the Gulf countries, as shown when Meloni attended the Gulf Cooperation Council Summit in 2026 as a privileged invitee. Most significantly, Italy has deepened its cooperation with India, in an accelerating and explicit Indo-Mediterranean partnership.

An Indo-Mediterranean Partnership.

In this “Indo-Mediterranean era”, Italy’s and India’s policies have shifted from parallel “resonance” to strategic “convergence”.^[15] Jaishankar’s strategic logic is simple: “it makes eminent sense to connect what Italy is doing in the Mediterranean with what India is doing in the Arabian Sea for mutual benefit.”^[16] As Italy increasingly operates in the Indian Ocean, it cannot ignore India; and as India increasingly operates in the Mediterranean, it cannot ignore Italy. Italy plays a “growing role in India’s maritime and defence calculus”, and vice versa.^[17]

Under Modi and Meloni’s leadership, India-Italy cooperation has surged across trade, defence and emerging technologies, amid mutual talk of their “Indo-Mediterranean strategic axis.”^[18] A Strategic Partnership was announced during Meloni’s visit to India in 2023. The following year, the joint Italy-India Strategic Action Plan 2025-2029 opened with Indian and Italian affirmations of “awareness of the unparalleled potential” of their Strategic Partnership.^[19] This Strategic Partnership was formally elevated to a Special Strategic Partnership, marking a “new era” announced during Modi’s 2026 visit to Italy.^[20] Modi captured the personal warmth between the two leaders by presenting Meloni with a bag of ‘Melody’ toffees from the Indian firm Parle upon his arrival in Rome; Meloni video-posted it on X under the nickname “Team Melodi”, making it an instant viral meme! Their evident camaraderie underpinned their equally strategic deals.^[21]

Jaishankar emphasises maritime strategic logic; “India, as part of its Indo-Mediterranean… our maritime interests… bring the two countries closer.”^[22] Maritime cooperation has been evident since 2023, with India’s Navy exercising with the Italian Navy in the Mediterranean and Italy’s Navy exercising with India’s Navy in the Arabian Sea. The joint carrier-to-carrier exercises between India’s INS Vikramaditya and Italy’s ITS Cavour in October 2024, off the west coast of India, were a particularly potent and substantive moment of bilateral maritime cooperation and seapower projection. Both navies participated in the Bright Star Exercise 2025, held off Alexandria, involving other Indo-Mediterranean actors. In 2026, both countries agreed to establish a Maritime Security Dialogue focused on their shared Indo-Mediterranean space.

Defence cooperation has deepened, reflecting their Defence Cooperation Agreement signed in 2023. This represents a determined effort to move beyond the AugustaWestland helicopter issue, the order cancelled by India in 2014 following a bribery scandal involving the Italian company Augusta. Fincantieri secured contracts in December 2025 to fit heavyweight torpedoes to India’s Scorpene submarines, which “fits into a broader Indo-Mediterranean security strategy.”^[23] Leonardo (which had taken over Agusta) and Adani agreed in February 2026 to collaborate on the production, maintenance and phased indigenisation of advanced AW169M and AW109 TrekkerM helicopters for the Indian military. In April 2026, the Indian and Italian Defence Ministers signed the Military Cooperation Plan 2026-2027.^[24] A Defence Industrial Roadmap was announced during Modi’s visit to Rome in May 2026, along with a Joint Declaration of Intent on Strengthening the Bilateral Defence Industrial Cooperation.

Italian and Indian politicians emphasise similar themes. Italy’s President, Sergio Mattarella, in his official greetings to his Indian counterpart, President Droupadi Murmu, on India’s Republic Day in January 2026, stressed their “converging interests, beginning with the protection of a rules-based international order, the peaceful pursuit of security and stability along the Indo-Mediterranean arc.”^[25] In a similar vein, Jaishankar argued in May 2025, at the National Day Reception for Italy, that “in and across the Indo-Mediterranean, as peninsular nations, India and Italy share maritime interests and a commitment to ensuring freedom of navigation and shipping.”^[26]

Likewise, Italy’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Antonio Tajani, argued, “We share the same concerns as natural maritime powers. In the whole Indo-Mediterranean region, we both promote the principles of freedom of navigation.”^[27] At the India Maritime Week in November 2025, Italy’s Deputy Minister of Infrastructure, Edoardo Rixi, argued that “India and Italy share a common vision of the sea…. we are natural partners in the broader Indo-Mediterranean region…. we shape new geopolitics of the seas.”^[28] Their geopolitics of the sea is a Mahanian focus on seapower and chokepoint security across the Indo-Mediterranean. Geo-economics is also on the cards. Modi explained in his Press Statement in May 2026, in Rome, “as maritime powers, close cooperation between India and Italy in the field of connectivity is only natural;” to be applied across the Indo-Mediterranean through economic and digital corridors.^[29]

Indian and Italian diplomats have embraced Indo-Mediterranean terms of reference for their strategic partnership. Bartoli, Italy’s Ambassador to India since July 2024, argued that “we are both peninsulas projected into the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean. These seas are increasingly interconnected and part of a single Indo-Mediterranean space.”^[30] Vani Rao, India’s Ambassador to Italy since April 2024, likewise considered that “the Indo-Mediterranean… represent one vast maritime and geographical space in which we share common strategic interests” with Italy.^[31] Bartoli argued that, on the geopolitical front, “Italy and India share common interests, but also joint challenges in the Indo-Mediterranean Sea [which] require our joint efforts to ensure a free, open, and prosperous Indo-Mediterranean” (FOPIM?).^[32] This is a deliberate echo of the Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) formulation used further east, with a common challenge to China present in both the FOIP Indo-Pacific and FOPIM Indo-Mediterranean formulations.^[33]

Both Bartoli and Rao attended the Track 1.5 Indo-Mediterranean Initiative, announced at the India Forum 2024 in Rome, which was co-chaired by Vas Shenoy, appointed as the Indian Chamber of Commerce Representative in Italy in November 2023, and Senator Giulio Terzi di Sant’Agata, President of the India-Italy Parliamentary Friendship Group.^[34]  Shenoy and Sant’Agata agreed that the India-Italy partnership serves as “champions for the Indo-Mediterranean.”^[35] Both Bartoli and Rao attended the workshop Indo-Mediterranean: Italy and India, a Special Relationship, held in November 2024 by Rome’s Med-Or Foundation and New Delhi’s Strategic and Defense Research, “with a particular focus on maritime security and the Italian and Indian naval cooperation, the IMEC corridor project.”^[36]

Economic Corridors

The India-Italy partnership makes geo-economic sense, given their self-perceived role as the two main pillars or anchors of the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC), which runs from Mumbai to Trieste. This underpinned their Memorandum of Understanding on cooperation in ports, logistics and infrastructure, signed during Modi’s visit to Italy in May 2026.

History from the past informs the present, as Tajani notes that “Italy and India have been for ages two natural terminals in the common Indo-Mediterranean area, tied by an intense exchange of trade.”^[37] More specifically, the Ambassador to India, Antonio Bartoli, noted that “Rome and India were already trading two thousand years ago… the future Indo-Mediterranean corridor IMEC, for goods and data, is a modern re-edition of an ancient route.”^[38] As Italy’s Special Envoy for IMEC, Antonio Talò explained, IMEC was “a vision directly connected to the concept of the Indo-Mediterranean: a geopolitical reading based on seas and connections” linking India and the Mediterranean.^[39]

Deliberately invoking the earlier Roman-period trade system, Italy labels IMEC la via del cotone, “The Cotton Road/Route.” As Jaishankar noted in November 2023, “what, Senator, you call the Cotton Road, which in many ways is like a revival return of history…. we are very happy to see Italy there.”^[40] This Cotton Road invocation also ties into the Cotton Route 3-year project, which focuses on older links and was funded in 2015 by India’s Ministry of External Affairs. This was undertaken as a “counter” to China’s Maritime Silk Road (MSR) initiative announced in 2013, which also invoked historical flows along the old Silk Route from China to the Roman Empire.^[41] New Delhi and Rome’s immediate and strong support for IMEC has been dubbed a “Cotton Route alliance between Italy and India to counterbalance China.”^[42]

IMEC was launched in September 2023 at the G-20 summit in New Delhi. Two corridors were proposed. The first was a relatively simple eastern maritime corridor from Mumbai to the Gulf (UAE). The second was a more complex northern corridor through the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan, to the Israeli port of Haifa, from which maritime routes to Italy (Taranto and Trieste) and France (Marseilles) extend. To serve the overland route from the Gulf to the Mediterranean, a railway transit network was proposed to supplement established road routes.

Both Italy and India are strong supporters of IMEC.^[43] Modi explained that IMEC “is going to become the basis of world trade for hundreds of years to come, and history will always remember that this corridor was initiated on Indian soil.”^[44] Similarly, at the 2024 Rome Mediterranean Dialogue, Meloni noted, “Italy played a key role in launching this initiative within the G-20 and it intends to remain at the forefront.”^[45] IMEC serves as a counterweight to China’s Maritime Silk Road (MSR), which also crosses the Indian Ocean into the Mediterranean. India has boycotted the MSR, while Meloni’s government quickly withdrew from it on taking power in 2022.

Digital Corridors

Digital infrastructure is another area for Italy-India cooperation, exemplified by the Europe-Africa-India Digital Corridor linking Italy (Genoa) to India (Mumbai). Tajani noted that “connectivity is becoming an increasingly strategic dimension of our cooperation. A significant example is the Blue & Raman submarine cable project.”^[46] Italy’s telecommunications giant Sparkle is installing undersea cables across the Mediterranean to Haifa as part of the BlueMed wing, with a Raman wing envisaged extending down the Red Sea from Aqaba and across the Arabian Sea to Mumbai, where Sparkle signed a “strategic” partnership agreement with the Indian company Airtel in September 2024.^[47] Reflecting its importance to Italian digital strategy, the Meloni government took a controlling 70% share in Sparkle in April 2026. The Blue-Raman scheme is counterpoised by China’s Pakistan and East Africa Connecting Europe (PEACE) initiative; planned from Gwadar in Pakistan across to Djibouti, up the Red Sea to Egypt and then the Mediterranean. This is part of China’s Digital Silk Route (DSR) initiative, which concerns both India and Italy.

Conclusion: Looking Forward

The India-Italy strategic partnership looks set to deepen further across the Indo-Mediterranean. With India and Italy less sure of US support under Donald Trump, and with their common concerns over China remaining evident, the strategic logic for the India-Italy partnership, mutual support, is all the more relevant. India may be the bigger partner, but both benefit.

Defence technology transfers should increase under the Defence Industry Roadmap agreed in 2026. Fincantieri’s Landing Platform Dock expertise offers another area for collaboration with India, enabling greater Indian maritime reach across the Indian Ocean. Similarly, military exercises should increase, given India and Italy’s growing deployments into each other’s strategic backyards. Their 2023 Defence Cooperation Agreement awaits further, but eminently achievable, development into a Logistics Support Agreement, similar to those that India and Italy both enjoy with Japan.

Trade is likely to increase under the EU-India Free Trade Agreement, signed in January 2026, with the Modi-Meloni summit in May 2026 setting a bilateral trade target rising from €14 billion in 2025 to €20 billion by 2029. With regard to IMEC and the Digital Corridor, the Mediterranean (Italy’s sphere) and Arabian Sea (India’s sphere) wings of both projects are well established. However, first the Gaza conflict in late 2023 and then the Gulf War disruption of the Strait of Hormuz during 2026 have complicated the construction of IMEC’s Land Rail Corridor running across the Arabian Peninsula to exit at Haifa, as well as the Digital Corridor’s Aqaba-Haifa link. This is compounded by Houthi disruption of the Red Sea, first in sympathy with Hamas/Gaza in 2023 and then in sympathy with Iran in 2026. Middle East volatility makes completion of these linking land-bridges all the more important, but all the more hostage to fortune outside Italy and India’s control.

Author Brief Bio: Dr David Scott is a member of the Centre for International Maritime Security (CIMSEC) and is a prolific writer on India, the Indian Ocean, the Indo-Pacific and Indo-Mediterranean maritime geopolitics.

Endnotes:

^[1] Narendra Modi and Giorgia Meloni, “Italy and India. A Strategic Partnership for the Indo-Mediterannean,” May 20, 2026, https://www.narendramodi.in/italy-and-india-a-strategic-partnership-for-the-indo-mediterranean-20th-may-twenty-twenty-six-605524. Also Emanuele Rossi, “Indo-Mediterranean Doctrine enters the Strategic Mainstream,” Decode39, May 20, 2026, https://decode39.com/14874/indo-mediterranean-doctrine-enters-the-strategic-mainstream/.

^[2] Vas Shenoy, “Exploring Draghi’s Italy and its Relation with India,” Decode39, December 30, 2021, https://decode39.com/2580/draghi-italy-india-vas-shenoy/.

^[3] David Scott, “The ‘Indo-Mediterranean’: Strategic Space in the Making,” Journal of Territorial and Maritime Studies 13, no. 2 (2026): 86-105.

^[4] Gurjit Singh, “India and Italy: Partners in Peninsularity,” Gateway House, March 16, 2023, https://www.gatewayhouse.in/india-and-italy-consolidate-partnership/.

^[5] Antonio Bartoli, “Interview” (Italy Backs India’s Defence Ambitions!), WION, July 13, 2026, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vNXxFW5PPu8.

^[6] Scott, “India’s ‘Extended Neighborhood’ Concept: Power Projection for a Rising Power.” India Review 8, no. 2 (2009): 107-143.

^[7] Samuel Rajiv, “Modi’s ‘Act West’ Policy in Motion,” Syama Prasad Mookerjee Research Foundation, March 15, 2017, https://spmrf.org/modis-act-west-policy-motion/.

^[8] Yuval Zur, Tamir Magal and Nadav Kedem, “The Growing Power of the Indian Navy: Westward Bound,” Military and Strategic Affairs 4, no. 2 (2012): 101-116.

^[9] Ensuring Secure Seas: Indian Maritime Security Strategy (New Delhi: Integrated Headquarters, Ministry of Defence (Navy), 2015): 32.

^[10] Ministry of Defence, “Indian Navy’s Ongoing Maritime Security Operations (‘Op Sankalp’), March 23, 2024, https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleaseIframePage.aspx?PRID=2016201. Also Arushi Anthal, “Securing Strategic Conduits: India’s Maritime Posture in Middle East’s Geopolitical Theatre,” in India-Middle East Relations in a Changing Global Order, ed. Anu Sharma (Singapore: Springer-Verlag, 2026), 109-131.

^[11] Subrahmanyam Jaishankar, “Address by External Affairs Minister, Dr. S. Jaishankar at the Business Event in Cyprus,” December 30, 2022, https://www.mea.gov.in/speeches-statements?dtl/36072.

^[12] Jaishankar, “Keynote Address by EAM, Dr. S. Jaishankar at the CII India Mediterranean Business Conclave,” September 6, 2024. https://www.mea.gov.in/speeches-statements?dtl/38267/.

^[13] Meloni, “President Meloni’s Press Statement with Prime Minister Modi,” March 2, 2023, https://www.governo.it/en/articolo/president-meloni-s-press-statement-prime-minister-modi/21964.

^[14] Vani Rao, “Interview” (“India’s Amb. Rao Explains why IMEC is a Strategic Bridge between Europe, Asia, and Africa), Decode39, October 20, 2025, https://decode39.com/12107/indias-amb-rao-explains-why-imec-is-a-strategic-bridge-between-europe-asia-and-africa/.

^[15] Maheep Singh, “India and Italy in the Indo-Mediterranean Era: From Resonance to Convergence,” European Times, May 31, 2026, https://europeantimes.org/india-and-italy-in-the-indo-mediterranean-era-from-resonance-to-convergence/.

^[16] Jaishankar, “EAM’s Remarks at the India-Italy Business, Science and Technology Forum,” April 11, 2025, https://www.mea.gov.in/Speeches-Statements.htm?dtl/39412/.

^[17] Prem Mahadevan, “Italy’s Growing Role in India’s Maritime and Defence Calculus,” Bharat Shakti, May 22, 2026, https://bharatshakti.in/italys-growing-role-in-indias-maritime-and-defence-calculus/.

^[18] Shenoy, “Modi and Meloni’s Indo-Mediterranean Axis,” CNKY, May 12, 2026,

https://cnky.in/modi-and-melonis-indo-mediterranean-axis/; Decode39, “Italy and India:

Forging a Strategic Axis in the Indo-Mediterranean,” Decode39, November 8, 2024, https://decode39.com/9684/italy-and-india-forging-a-strategic-axis-in-the-indo-mediterranean.

^[19] Italy-India Joint Strategic Action Plan 2025-2029, November 18, 2024, https://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents?dtl/38541/ItalyIndia_Joint_Strategic_Action_Plan_20252029.

^[20] Peeush Srivastava, “India-Italy Strategic Partnership Enters a New Era of Global Cooperation,” Economic Diplomacy, May 21, 2026, https://www.economicdiplomacy.in/post/india-italy-strategic-partnership-enters-a-new-era-of-global-cooperation.

^[21] TOI News Desk, “From ‘Melodi’ Camaraderie to Strategic Deals,” Times of India, May 21, 2026, https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/from-melodi-camaraderie-to-strategic-deals-key-takeaways-from-pm-modis-italy-visit/articleshow/131239209.cms.

^[22] Jaishankar, “Remarks by External Affairs Minister Dr. S. Jaishankar at the inauguration of the New Premises of Embassy of India in Rome,” November 24, 2024.

^[23] Decode39, “Italy-India Naval Defence Ties Deepen with Major Fincantieri Contract,” Decode39, December 31, 2025, https://decode39.com/12980/italy-india-naval-defence-ties-deepen-with-major-fincantieri-contract/.

^[24] Shenoy, “Italian Defence Minister Crosetto’s Bilateral Visit Strengthens the Indo-Mediterranean,” Economic Times, May 1, 2026, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/italian-defence-minister-crosettos-bilateral-visit-strengthens-the-indo-mediterranean/articleshow/130682099.cms.

^[25] Sergio Mattarella, “Letter” to Droupadi Murmu,” January 26, 2026,  https://x.com/ians_india/status/2016090804440400084/photo/1.

^[26] Jaishankar, “EAM’s Remarks at the National Day Reception of Italy,” May 28, 2025,

https://www.mea.gov.in/speeches-statements?dtl/39572/.

^[27] Antonio Tajani, “Interview” (India-Italy Ties Enter “Special Strategic Partnership” Phase During PM Modi’s Rome Visit), May 20, 2026, https://www.esteri.it/en/sala_stampa/archivionotizie/interviste/2026/05/i-rapporti-tra-india-e-italia-entrano-nella-fase-di-partnership-strategica-speciale-durante-la-visita-a-roma-del-primo-ministro-modi-caratterizzata-dallimec-e-dallaccordo-di-lib/.

^[28] Edoardo Rixi “Interview” (Edoardo Rixi on Italy-India Maritime Cooperation, IMEC Strategy and the Future of Global Sea Routes), Economic Times, November 15, 2025, https://government.economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/governance/italys-maritime-strategy-enhancing-india-italy-cooperation-and-global-sea-route-security/125328856.

^[29] Modi, “Press Statement by the PM during the Joint Press Statement with the PM of Italy,” May 20, 2026, https://www.pmindia.gov.in/en/news_updates/press-statement-by-the-pm-during-the-joint-press-statement-with-the-pm-of-italy/.

^[30] Sangeeta Saxena, “Italy Sees India as a Strategic Priority: Ambassador Antonio Bartoli at Kalam & Kavach 3.0,” Aviation & Defence Universe, May 16, 2026, https://www.aviation-defence-universe.com/italy-sees-india-as-a-strategic-priority-ambassador-antonio-bartoli-at-kalam-kavach-3-0/.

^[31] Rao, “Interview” (Anche l’Italia trarra vantaggio dalla partnership Usa-India. Parla l’ambasciatrice Rao), Formiche, February 17, 2025, https://formiche.net/2025/02/partnership-usa-india-ambasciatrice-rao-italia/.

^[32] Bartoli, “Why Italy Matters to India.” The Hindu, October 4, 2024, https://www.thehindu.com/opinion/op-ed/why-italy-matters-to-india/article68714657.ece.

^[33] Bartoli, “Why Italy Matters to India.” The Hindu, October 4, 2024, https://www.thehindu.com/opinion/op-ed/why-italy-matters-to-india/article68714657.ece.

^[34] Sibal, “India and Italy Strengthen Ties with Indo-Mediterranean Initiative, WION, June 18, 2024, https://www.wionews.com/world/india-and-italy-strengthen-ties-with-indo-mediterranean-initiative-732626.

^[35] Giulio Sant’Agata and Vas Shenoy, “The India-Italy Partnership as Champions for the Global South and the Indo-Mediterranean,” The Economic Times, August 2, 2025. https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/india/the-india-italy-partnership-as-champions-for-the-global-south-and-the-indo-mediterranean/articleshow/1230550.

^[36] “Indo-Mediterranean. Italy and India, a Special Relationship. The Workshop by Med-Or and CSDR,” Med-Or Foundation, November 6, 2024, https://www.med-or.org/en/news/indo-mediterranean-italy-and-india-a-special-relationship-il-workshop-di-med-or-e-csdr.

^[37] Tajani, “Interview” (Italy Intends to Grow Trade with India by €6 bn), December 11, 2025, https://www.esteri.it/en/sala_stampa/archivionotizie/interventi/2025/12/tajani-litalia-vuole-aumentare-gli-scambi-con-lindia-di-6-miliardi-hindustan-times/.

^[38] Bartoli, “Speech” (Republic Day), June 2, 2025. https://www.ansa.it/english/news/news_from_embassies/2025/06/09/amb.-bartoli-multiplying-italy-india-business-opportunities_72f890c2-9cc5-4b8b-9588-5f3d6cefec9c.html.

^[39] Federico di Bisceglie, “IMEC and Security. Ambassador Talò Reads the New Italy-India Strategic Route,” Decode39, May 21, 2026, https://decode39.com/14928/.

^[40] Jaishankar, “Remarks by EAM, Dr. S. Jaishankar at the Joint Session of the Senates External Affairs and Defence Commission in Rome,” November 3, 2023, https://www.mea.gov.in/speeches-statements?dtl/37234.

^[41] Joydeep Thakur, “India Aims to Revive ‘Cotton Route’ to Counter Chinese Silk Route,” Hindustan Times, March 26, 2015, 4.

^[42] Container News, “Cotton Route Alliance between Italy and India to Counterbalance China’s Dominance,” Container News, December 19, 2024, https://container-news.com/cotton-route-alliance-between-italy-and-india-to-counterbalance-chinas-dominance/.

^[43] Abhishek Agarwal, “India and Italy: Bridging Continents through IMEC,” Centre for Social and Economic Progress, April 24, 2026, https://csep.org/blog/india-and-italy-bridging-continents-through-imec/.

^[44] Modi, “PM’s Address in the 105^th Episode of ‘Mann Ki Baat,” September 24, 2023, https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleaseIframePage.aspx?PRID=1960066&reg=48&lang=Modi.

^[45] Meloni, “President Meloni’s Speech at Rome MED Dialogues 2024,” November 27, 2024, https://www.governo.it/it/node/27243.

^[46] Tajani, “Interview” (India-Italy Ties Enter “Special Strategic Partnership” Phase During PM Modi’s Rome Visit,” May 20, 2026, https://www.esteri.it/en/sala_stampa/archivionotizie/interviste/2026/05/i-rapporti-tra-india-e-italia-entrano-nella-fase-di-partnership-strategica-speciale-durante-la-visita-a-roma-del-primo-ministro-modi-caratterizzata-dallimec-e-dallaccordo-di-lib/.

^[47] “Airtel and Sparkle Sign Strategic Agreement for Enhanced Undersea Cable Capacity Between India and Italy,” Digital Terminal, September 13, 2024, https://digitalterminal.in/telecom/airtel-and-sparkle-sign-strategic-agreement-for-enhanced-undersea-cable-capacity-between-india-and-italy

Introduction

The India-Vietnam Enhanced Comprehensive Strategic Partnership (ECSP), upgraded in May 2026, is grounded in shared geopolitical concerns and economic complementarities. The upgrade significantly deepens cooperation across defence, supply chain diversification, critical minerals, and financial and digital connectivity. It also aligns India’s “Act East Policy” and “Developed India @2047” with Vietnam’s “Vision of a developed country by 2045”.

Against this backdrop, the Paper argues that to understand why these two middle powers are deepening their alliances, it is important to study the geopolitical alignments, defence convergences, and economic complementarities between India and Vietnam. Given the changing power dynamics in the Indo-Pacific, the Paper also argues how Vietnam fits into this broader geopolitical balance.

To analyse the argument, the Paper draws on major international relations theories, including ‘Neorealism’, ‘Liberal Institutionalism’ and ‘Constructivism’, and reflects on why and how India and Vietnam are deepening their ties. It also examines the evolution of India-Vietnam relations and the recent upgrade to ECSP. Geopolitical balancing by both countries amid the shift in power in the Indo-Pacific is also highlighted. The Paper further explores key drivers of growth in sectors such as manufacturing, supply chains, critical minerals, human resource mobility and EV manufacturing. Finally, the Paper focuses on the immense potential of tourism and people-to-people exchanges to foster a comprehensive political and economic relationship between the two countries.

Theoretical Framework

Analysing the India-Vietnam Enhanced Comprehensive Strategic Partnership (ECSP), which encompasses robust India-Vietnam relations and critical supply-chain frameworks, requires a multidimensional approach. The Paper uses an international relations theoretical framework to analyse this partnership. The evolution of these multifaceted relations can be evaluated through the lenses of three core international theories: Neorealism, Liberal Institutionalism and Constructivism.

Neorealism highlights the anarchic nature of the international system, in which states seek to maximise security by balancing against rising threats. The primary factors shaping states’ behaviour are the distribution of power and the need to balance against potential hegemonies. From a Neorealist perspective, the India-Vietnam partnership exemplifies external balancing, particularly in response to China’s territorial claims in the South China Sea and its growing assertiveness in the Indo-Pacific. Both countries are prioritising independent foreign policies while strengthening their defence capabilities. Vietnam seeks to enhance its strategic presence by diversifying its diplomatic options through partnerships with a rising Asian power, such as India. By contrast, India uses its deepening defence and maritime ties with Vietnam as a geostrategic lever to project power in response to the rise of an assertive China and the shifting balance of power in the Indo-Pacific.

Liberal Institutionalism holds that even in an anarchic system, absolute gains can be achieved by strengthening institutional engagement. According to this view, states cooperate out of mutual self-interest, facilitated by international regimes, institutions, and economic interdependence. The liberal institutional perspective views ECSP through the lens of institutional networks and economic interdependence. Both nations are concerned not only with security balancing but also with institutional integration and economic partnerships. Bilateral agreements to raise the trade target to USD 25 billion by 2030, digital payment linkages between their central banks, and cooperation on critical rare-earth minerals have highlighted their joint efforts to build resilient supply chains. Institutional collaborations through the Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative (IPOI) emphasise a shared security architecture, ‘freedom of navigation’, and a ‘rules-based order’ in the South China Sea. These frameworks reduce transaction costs and build long-term trust, making both economies mutually resilient to external threats.

Constructivism emphasises the role of shared ideas, norms, identities, and socialisation in shaping state behaviour. It holds that national interests are not fixed by material power alone but are socially constructed through interaction. According to Constructivism, shared history, civilisational linkages, and anti-colonial solidarity construct a powerful narrative of mutual trust and partnership. India’s ‘Act East’ policy and Vietnam’s integration into the IPOI provide the ideological and normative backbone of their alignment. Both nations share a post-colonial identity as rapidly growing, aspirational societies with complementary national visions – India’s ‘Viksit Bharat 2047’ and Vietnam’s ‘2045 Development Vision’. Their shared commitment to strategic autonomy and to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) provides a strong normative foundation for cooperation. Taken together, these factors turn a strategic and security pact, amid fluctuating geopolitical pressures, into a socially constructed partnership.

Evolution of India-Vietnam Relations

The historical connections between India and Vietnam have enriched our ancient literature and mythology. Originating in the 2^nd century BCE, these linkages through trade and commerce can be traced back to the establishment of the Champa Kingdom, which flourished in what is now central and southern Vietnam. As a pivotal maritime centre, it has fundamentally shaped the region’s geopolitical landscape in ancient times. Historically, it has played a significant role in shaping the culture, commerce and connectivity between India and Vietnam^[1]. It has served as a vital bridge for the transmission of Indian social, political and cultural traditions to Southeast Asia and for forging lasting links with the Indian subcontinent.

These centuries-old ties continue to shape contemporary bilateral relations, forming a civilisational foundation for the strategic partnership between India and Vietnam today. The Hindu Kingdom of Champa and Indian Buddhist philosophy and religion also blended seamlessly with Vietnam’s indigenous belief system. India also provided “crucial moral and political support to Vietnam during its national liberation struggle against France and the United States”.^[2]

The foundation of the friendship was laid by India’s first Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, and Vietnam’s President Ho Chi Minh. As a visionary leader, Ho Chi Minh fought American troops with an unyielding spirit and became a household name in Kolkata, India, through the slogan “Mera Naam Tera Naam, Vietnam–Vietnam” (“My name and your name are the same as Vietnam”), which proclaimed solidarity with the people of Vietnam in their fight against American imperialism^[3].

The bilateral ties were upgraded to ‘Strategic Partnership’ in 2007 and to ‘Comprehensive Strategic Partnership’ (CSP) in 2016^[4]. A decade of this CSP (2016-26) and 54 years of diplomatic ties (1972-2026) have resulted in the elevation of ties to the‘Enhanced Comprehensive Strategic Partnership’ (ECSP) in 2026.

India and Vietnam have been reported as among the fastest-growing economies in the world. Both countries have achieved sustained economic growth and trade diversification over the past three decades. Vietnam’s ‘Doi Moi’ reforms of the late 1980s and India’s ‘New Economic Policy’ of 1991, both focused on liberalisation, privatisation and globalisation, mark parallel growth trajectories for both countries. Together, the two countries have pursued market-led, export-oriented growth strategies and sought to deepen their integration into regional and global value chains. Given their political histories of reform and complementarities, they have emerged as globally integrated, dynamic economies in the region.

In foreign policy and diplomacy, both India and Vietnam have recast their strategies since the late twentieth century. Economic reforms have led to diversification and greater multilateral engagement in Vietnam. India’s diplomacy in the post-Cold War era has evolved from classical non-alignment to multi-alignment, emphasising strategic autonomy within a rules-based order. Both countries have converged on a strategic outlook of multipolarity and diversified partnerships in a complex, interdependent world.

As two growing economies of the Global South, India and Vietnam have emphasised the importance of addressing shared challenges related to international law and of ensuring the voices and rights of developing countries. Leaders of both countries have also agreed to work closely on regional and international platforms to ‘promote peace, stability, and development’.

During his recent visit, President To Lam called India a “centre of growth and innovation in the world” and discussed linking the “strategic visions and development strategies of both countries to better address the turmoil in the situation of the world today”^[5]. As both countries move towards the goal of becoming‘developed countries’ – Vietnam by 2045 and India by 2047 – they share a vision for growth and mutual prosperity. It is fitting to quote Prime Minister Modi’s words, “Together, we will walk, grow, and win”, which reflect the foundational vision for collective development^[6].

Towards Enhanced Comprehensive Strategic Partnership

India and Vietnam officially elevated their bilateral relations to an ‘Enhanced Comprehensive Strategic Partnership’ (ECSP) during the State visit of the Vietnamese President, H. E. To Lam to India^[7]. The upgrade marks the 10^th anniversary of the ‘Comprehensive Strategic Partnership’ signed in 2016, deepening their bilateral cooperation. Both countries have institutionalised a multifaceted partnership in the region, anchored in defence and security cooperation, economic and green transformation, and strategic and regional alignment.

For India, Vietnam is an important factor in its ‘Act-East Policy’ and a significant partner in the ‘Vision MAHASAGAR’. As part of ECSP, Vietnam has announced its intention to join India’s ‘Indo-Pacific Ocean Initiative’ (IPOI). This integration of Vietnam into IPOI will be a strategic milestone for expanding India’s footprint in the regional architecture and enabling Vietnam to pursue geopolitical balancing.

Altogether, India and Vietnam concluded thirteen agreements during the May 2026 visit to India by the President of Vietnam, H. E. To Lam. The agreements cover a wide range of issues, including defence and maritime security; culture and tourism; critical minerals and digital technology; health and pharmaceuticals; trade, commerce and investment; and urban management and development partnership^[8].

Both nations aim to reach USD 25 billion in bilateral trade by 2030, with two-way trade currently at around USD 16 billion^[9]. While traditional items still dominate the trade basket between India and Vietnam, investments in new technology sectors, including the digital economy, technology and innovation, critical minerals, renewable and green energy, semiconductors, pharmaceuticals, healthcare, space technology, cybersecurity, the blue economy and marine technology, are increasingly significant drivers of bilateral trade growth between India and Vietnam.

Enhanced engagement in both “traditional and emerging areas of defence cooperation and defence systems procurement” between India and Vietnam has been the primary focus of the joint statement issued by the two leaders^[10]. Collaboration in “oceanography, including areas such as ocean observing platforms, data management, ocean prediction and services, capacity building and maritime scientific research” has also been emphasised^[11].

Digital technologies and critical emerging technologies have also been key themes in the joint statement between the two countries. It focuses on “facilitating greater collaboration and partnership in critical and emerging technology areas such as Digital Public Infrastructure, 6G, Artificial Intelligence, space and nuclear technology, marine sciences, biotechnology, pharmaceuticals, advanced materials and critical minerals. Cooperation will focus on practical initiatives such as joint research, R&D centres, and product development as mutually beneficial.”^[12] Under this initiative, “the Reserve Bank of India and State Bank of Vietnam” have agreed to promote financial innovation and digital payments. They have decided to link their respective platforms via QR codes for retail payments to facilitate tourism and business on both sides.

India and Vietnam are deepening bilateral healthcare ties to modernise medical infrastructure. The cooperative framework between the two countries covers digital health transformation, the integration of Artificial Intelligence into medicine, and expanded research into traditional medicine. Both countries have signed a tourism cooperation memorandum and agreed to “promote sustainable two-way tourism, including cultural and heritage, medical and wellness tourism”.^[13] They have also committed to strengthening air connectivity and logistics cooperation by expanding direct flights.

To establish institutional linkages and a formal framework enabling India and Vietnam’s largest megacities to collaborate, “a memorandum for the establishment of friendship and cooperation between the Brihanmumbai Municipal Corporation (BMC) in Mumbai and the Ho Chi Minh City People’s Committee in Vietnam has been signed.”^[14] As a key pillar of bilateral cooperation and the deepening of people-to-people ties, the joint statement focuses on “greater student, faculty and research exchanges between universities and think tanks of the two countries”. The two countries have also signed a memorandum on “documentation, conservation, digitisation and online dissemination of Cham manuscripts of Indian origin currently preserved in Vietnam”.

India-Vietnam Strategic Balancing

India and Vietnam have officially elevated their bilateral ties to an ‘Enhanced Comprehensive Strategic Partnership’ (ECSP). A core element of this upgraded framework is geostrategic balancing against China’s growing assertiveness in the South China Sea. This aligns with the combination of Vietnam’s maritime frontline position and India’s ‘Act East policy’ and broader Indo-Pacific ambitions.

Vietnam shares a sensitive land border with China and faces complex maritime disputes. It balances these pressures by cultivating deep defence and political ties with major powers. In this endeavour, India is a crucial partner for Vietnam in maintaining its strategic autonomy. For India, a strong Vietnam is a friendly partner in the Indo-Pacific, preventing unilateral domination in Southeast Asia and securing vital sea lanes of communication through which a significant share of India’s global trade flows.

Both nations advocate a ‘free, open, and rules-based’ Indo-Pacific, with strict adherence to the ‘United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea’ (UNCLOS) and to freedom of navigation. Vietnam has joined India’s ‘Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative’ (IPOI). This alignment reflects strategic convergence and enables close cooperation with India’s regional maritime architecture without directly forming a formal anti-China alliance.

Defence remains the cornerstone of the partnership between India and Vietnam. The two nations have established a new 2+2 Strategic Defence Dialogue and are focusing on naval interoperability, port calls, defence equipment procurement, capacity building and technology co-production. Both countries are working to enhance defence procurement. This includes advanced negotiations for Indian military exports to Vietnam, such as the BrahMos supersonic cruise missile, which Vietnam seeks to strengthen its coastal defence posture in the South China Sea.

Amid reports that Vietnam is finalising a BrahMos deal with India, a significant shift is underway in the region’s geopolitics. Although Vietnam maintains strong economic relations with China, it has increasingly sought to diversify its defence and strategic partnerships with India. Vietnam’s defence preparedness reflects China’s growing monopoly and hegemonic designs in the South China Sea and its maritime expansion, leading to a changing balance of power in the region. Furthermore, by expanding its BrahMos deal in Southeast Asia (Vietnam being the third country after the Philippines and Indonesia), India is increasing its influence and emerging as a ‘net security provider’, countering China’s hegemony in the region.

Key Economic Drivers and Sector Goals

India and Vietnam are accelerating economic integration under their ‘Enhanced Comprehensive Strategic Partnership’, aiming to “expand the bilateral trade target to USD 25 billion by 2030”. Beyond defence, the two nations aim to build resilient supply chains, enhance bilateral investment, and strengthen cooperation in the digital economy.

Manufacturing & Supply Chains: India and Vietnam are rapidly integrating their manufacturing and supply chains to form a powerful regional “China-Plus-One” alternative. The two manufacturing ecosystems are highly complementary rather than competitive. India, supported by large government programmes such as the Production Linked Incentive (PLI) Scheme, is attracting significant global investment in electronics, pharmaceuticals, and automotive manufacturing. Vietnam is actively diversifying its manufacturing sources and increasing imports of industrial inputs (such as iron, steel, and auto parts) from India to support its export needs. India also hopes to benefit from Vietnam’s highly efficient export processing zones to boost its own “Make in India” initiatives. Both nations are positioning themselves as complementary hubs for American and European businesses restructuring their global supply chains away from China.

Rare Earth and Critical Minerals: India and Vietnam are focusing on rare earths and critical minerals to secure supply chains and reduce reliance on monopolistic markets. This partnership combines Vietnam’s vast rare earth reserves with India’s surging demand and expanding processing capabilities. “Through new initiatives in critical minerals, rare earths, and energy cooperation, we will ensure the economic security and supply chain resilience of both sides.”^[15]

The Government of Vietnam has identified “the mining industry, including the rare earth minerals sector, as a priority for development, and has introduced measures to attract foreign investment, such as tax incentives, streamlined procedures for obtaining mining licences, and the establishment of industrial zones dedicated to mining and processing.” The strategic partnership between India and Vietnam on rare-earth elements makes Vietnam a crucial partner for India’s growing industrial and green technology needs. Rare-earth elements are also crucial for achieving “self-reliance and long-term security of the country, as the manufacturing of products across industries such as defence, aerospace, electronics, electrical equipment, including renewable energy, is highly dependent on the rare earth elements.”^[16]

Healthcare & Pharmaceuticals: The India-Vietnam healthcare and pharmaceutical partnership is rapidly expanding, driven by India’s position as a global supplier of generic medicines and Vietnam’s growing domestic pharma market. In light of this, Vietnam aims to increase its reliance on Indian companies for cost-effective medicines and drug procurement for its public hospitals. This reflects Vietnam’s commitment to move away from its historical reliance on a single source of supply, cementing India as its most trusted and cost-effective partner for pharmaceuticals and medical equipment. They are also collaborating on traditional medicine, digital healthcare transformation, and AI applications in the health sector.

Human Resource Mobility: India and Vietnam are rapidly deepening their bilateral relationship, with a major focus on human resource mobility and capacity building. As part of the ECSP, both countries view workforce development and human resource mobility as crucial to securing supply chains, driving economic growth, and achieving strategic autonomy in the region. India is one of the largest global exporters of healthcare professionals, including doctors and nurses, as well as highly skilled corporate employees, IT specialists, and technical advisors. Both countries have prioritised knowledge sharing and the integration of startup ecosystems by building corporate networks. In the evolving technology landscape, India’s experienced IT professionals are migrating to and partnering with Vietnam, as the country develops its digital economy and semiconductor industries. We find Indian expatriates frequently working in Vietnam as managers, tech experts, and executives in sectors such as manufacturing, renewable energy, and software.

India’s Consumer Market & The EV Boom: India’s rapidly growing consumer market is highly attractive to Vietnamese companies, particularly in the electric vehicle (EV) sector. Vietnamese EV giant VinFast views India’s market as a major priority, given the local appetite for sustainable and affordable mobility. VinFast is investing USD 500 million to build a large, integrated EV manufacturing plant in Thoothukudi, Tamil Nadu. The facility, which can scale to 150,000 vehicles annually, will allow VinFast to leverage the government’s EV manufacturing ecosystem. It has been reported that “VinFast also plans to establish a nationwide dealer network to build the brand with the commitment of good cars, good prices and excellent after-sales services.”^[17] It is also launching a “green and eco-friendly” taxi service in the Delhi-NCR region and expanding its operations to Bengaluru and Hyderabad by the end of 2026^[18].

Strengthening People-to-People Exchanges

Cultural and people-to-people ties provide the foundation on which the political and economic partnership thrives. In this regard, India and Vietnam have focused on tourism as a vital pillar of economic growth and cultural integration. The ECSP has focused on cultural, medical and wellness tourism, which will further sustainable tourism opportunities between the two countries.

The flourishing tourism sector has also acted as a catalyst for trade. Low-cost airlines such as Vietjet and IndiGo have rapidly expanded their networks, directly boosting air travel and accelerating investments in hospitality by Indian and Vietnamese conglomerates. Beyond holiday getaways, Vietnam has also emerged as a major hub for meetings, exhibitions and Indian destination weddings. This has led to an influx of Indian tourists, fostering social and cultural familiarity and adaptation. The hospitality sector in Vietnam, including hotels and local tour operators, has adapted by training staff in Indian cultural preferences and opening authentic Indian restaurants, thereby attempting to bridge the cultural gap.

Social media platforms and their feeds have amplified travellers’ wish lists for destinations such as beaches in Da Nang and Phu Quoc, heritage cities like Hoi An and Hue, and the urban landscapes of Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City. This has shifted Indians’ perception of Vietnam from a historically war-torn country to a vibrant, culturally rich, and affordable luxury destination, an alternative to expensive European holiday destinations.

Given the deep civilisational linkages between India and Vietnam, the two countries have agreed to collaborate on digitising ancient Cham manuscripts and to promote research into their shared civilisational and Buddhist heritage. Committed to deepening academic ties and institutional research, both countries have agreed to enhance educational cooperation and academic exchanges between their institutions. This expansion of people-to-people exchanges has been a major pillar of political cooperation between the two countries, leading to growing trust and a strong public mandate for enhanced diplomatic alignment.

Conclusion

The India-Vietnam ‘Enhanced Comprehensive Strategic Partnership’ is forward-looking. It is a highly ambitious framework rooted in civilisational ties and shared geopolitical interests. Bilateral relations are underpinned by mutual interdependence in a rapidly shifting geopolitical order. Both countries firmly support a ‘free, open and rules-based’ Indo-Pacific. They share security interests to counterbalance regional security concerns and oppose any coercion by any hegemonic power.

Vietnam remains a vital anchor of India’s Act East policy. The partnership has been strengthened by Vietnam’s accession to the IPOI, which aligns with Vietnam’s regional perspective. Under ECSP, the institutionalisation of the 2+2 Defence Dialogue further reinforces the commitment to a ‘rules-based’ security architecture in the region. On the economic front, both countries have set a high bilateral trade target of USD 25 billion by 2030. They are also diversifying supply chains and strengthening digital ecosystems through strategic MOUs covering critical minerals, digital connectivity, urban governance, and fintech. Overall, this partnership serves as a model for Indo-Pacific stability, underpinned by mutual trust and confidence, ensuring economic resilience and security in the maritime domain.

To conclude, it is worth quoting from Prime Minister Modi’s speech, which draws on Lord Buddha’s teaching, “If you light a lamp for someone else, it also illuminates your own path.” Reinforcing this principle, he adds, “By supporting each other’s visions and goals, we will collectively realise our aspirations to become developed nations.”

Author Brief Bio: Prof. Sonu Trivedi is a Distinguished Fellow at the India Foundation. She is also a Professor of Political Science at Zakir Husain Delhi College, University of Delhi.

REFERENCES

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^[3] Trivedi, Sonu. (2025) Legacy of President Ho Chi Minh and India-Vietnam Relations. Vietnam Journal of Asian–African Studies. Volume 1, Issue 1, pp. 25-36.

^[4] Embassy of India, Hanoi (2025). Bilateral Relations, URL: https://www.indembassyhanoi.gov.in/page/bilateral-relations/

^[5] Hindustan Times (2026, May 6). India, Vietnam elevate ties, conclude 13 agreements across sectors. URL: https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/india-vietnam-elevate-ties-conclude-13-agreements-across-sectors-101778089308070.html

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^[12] Ministry of External Affairs, India. (2026).

^[13] Ministry of External Affairs, India. (2026).

^[14] Ministry of External Affairs, India. (2026).

^[15] Narendra Modi. (2026, May 6). English Translation of Prime Minister’s Press Statement during the Joint Press Statement with the General Secretary of the Communist Party of Vietnam and the President of Vietnam. URL: https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2258346&reg=3&lang=2

^[16] EXIM Bank (2020). India Securing Rare Earth Elements. Working Paper No. 97. URL: https://www.eximbankindia.in/sites/default/files/2025-07/132file.pdf

^[17] Vinfast (2024). Vietnam’s VinFast breaks ground for ₹4,000 crore EV factory in Tamil Nadu. URL: https://vinfastauto.in/en/press-release/vietnams-vinfast-breaks-ground-for-rs4000-crore-ev-factory-in-tamil-nadu

^[18] The Telegraph (2026, May 22). Vietnam’s big electric car bet on India with plans for thousands of cabs. URL: https://www.telegraphindia.com/business/vietnams-big-electric-car-bet-on-india-with-plans-for-thousands-of-cabs/cid/2161794#goog_rewarded