As manifestations of definitive core-national interests and evolving aspirations, foreign policies are inherently dualistic constructs that involve elements of both strategic continuity and tactical dynamism. In addition to national interests and aspirations, foreign policy dynamics are governed by a country’s ideological underpinnings and outlook, and the overarching narrative of international politics. It is this interplay between continuity (in pursuing strategic national interests) and change (in the style and normative ideals of diplomacy) that constitutes the defining theme of India’s foreign policy towards China since 2014.

Any nuanced analysis of continuity or perceived departures in a country’s foreign policy template vis-à-vis another country needs to be foregrounded in a study of evolving strategic dynamics between the two nations. In the context of India-China relations, it can be persuasively argued that the strategic environment has continued to be defined by the same set of issues that existed prior to 2014.

While Indian foreign policy since 2014 has largely followed the established doctrine vis-à-vis the long-standing border dispute, new policy narratives have been fostered to deal with the  Belt and Road ‘grand-strategy’, skewed bilateral- trade economics, and China’s selective reading of terrorism. Further, there has been an enhanced effort to integrate India’s cultural ethos with its foreign policy outreach to counter China’s gradual penetration within India’s civilizational space through a state-funded and meticulously crafted strategy of embracing and appropriating Buddhism1.

To counter China’s growing footprint in South Asia and Indian Ocean Region, the country’s Foreign Policy has begun conferring an enhanced thrust upon geopolitics. This approach has been articulated through the idioms of ‘extended neighborhood’ and ‘Act East’, ‘neighborhood first’, and ‘Indo-Pacific’. Most Importantly, India has moved beyond the shibboleths of ‘non-alignment’ and has embraced the concept of ‘strategic and issue-based alignment’.2 While these formulations signify India’s larger strategic interests, their importance in India’s China policy cannot be over-emphasized.

In addition to the aforementioned issues, India-China dynamic is also governed by the PRC’s efforts to undermine India’s status as a global nuclear power under the pretext of its ‘all-weather friendship’ with Pakistan. The alliance with Pakistan and heavy investments in the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) have also fuelled Chinese ambitions to foresee a mediation role for itself in the Kashmir dispute. On both these issues, Indian foreign policy has followed strategic continuity that upholds India’s credentials as a responsible nuclear power, and reaffirms India’s traditional position on Kashmir being a bilateral issue.

While strategic contestation remains the overarching theme of India-China dynamic, the Doklam crisis of 2017 marked the watershed in this relationship. Not only did the 73-day-face-off demonstrated India’s firm position and resolve on the issue of territory and sovereignty, it made China recognize India as a strategic challenge almost for the first time3. Additionally, India’s robust stand at Doklam reaffirmed the country’s leading role in the South Asian geopolitics.4

India’s China Policy Since 2014: Breaks and Continuity with the Past

Beginning with the contentious issue of boundary demarcation between India and China, it is justified to assert that the 1988 paradigm continues to define the larger contours of India’s foreign policy approach towards the dispute. While the 1988 rapprochement between the two countries was noteworthy in many respects, it has tacitly relegated the boundary question as secondary in India-China dynamic5. The reluctance or inability on part of successive policy dispensations to establish a new modus vivendi to deal with this vexed issue has allowed the stalemate to linger on for several decades now.

Since 1988, India-China border dispute is largely managed by a framework that involves the   Agreement on the Maintenance of Peace along the Line of Actual Control in the India-China Border of 19936, the expert group talks, and the Special Representative (SR) Mechanism of 2003. While it is conventional wisdom to cite BPTA7 and its various avatars as ‘instruments of success’ in maintaining peace and tranquility along the India-China border, it is equally important to recognize that the SR mechanism has not yielded any tangible results even after 21 rounds of talks. However, it is important to recognize that since 2014, the mechanism has been approaching the boundary dispute with a more assertive vocabulary that emphasizes upon achieving ‘a fair, reasonable and mutually acceptable solution to the India-China boundary question at an early date’8. This constitutes a significant departure from the earlier formulations that committed the two countries to ‘discussions on a framework for a resolution of the Boundary Question’9.

In terms of political approach to the dispute, a new discourse was added to India’s foreign policy during Xi Jinping’s maiden visit to India in 2014 and Modi’s 2015 State visit to China. In a significant move, Prime Minister Modi raised the boundary issue at public forums as against keeping it confined as a recurrent topic in bilateral documents10. Ironically, this momentum and dynamism was not maintained during the Wuhan Summit – which in fact came under the backdrop of a border stand-off.

The very bedrock of the Wuhan summit was built on India’s sacrifice of the ‘Thank You India’ celebrations. This constituted a strategic retreat from the policy narrative that the country had initiated on Tibet in 2014 when SikyongLobsangSangey was invited to Prime Minister Modi’s oath-taking ceremony along with the Heads of all SAARC nations. If this invitation had signaled a new posturing by New Delhi, Wuhan provided the Chinese with a ‘new normal’ to deal with India. In the final analysis, while the summit achieved strategic compromise by India on Tibet, it did not secure any commitment from the Chinese side regarding India’s core national concerns.

It is important to note here that the joint statement issued at the end of the Wuhan summit included the formulation of ‘fair, reasonable and mutually acceptable settlement’ with regards to the boundary dispute11. The crucial missing link in this position is the emphasis upon ‘early settlement of the boundary question’ that was an integral component of the joint statements that were issued after the Modi-Xi State-level meetings in 2014 and 201512. In this context, the ‘strategic guidance’ issued to the officials at the end of the Summit largely constitutes yet another appendix to the CBMs (confidence building measures) regime that began with the 1993 Agreement. When read alongside the joint statement, the much hyped ‘strategic guidance’ appears to be a reiteration of the lexicon of ‘border management’ that has come to characterise the Border Question.

While it can be argued that the Wuhan Summit was directed towards restoring normalcy in India-China relations, it is equally pertinent to under-score that the summit came at a time when China was faced with an increasingly unfavorable domestic and international climate due to the trade war with the US and growing internal unrest (albeit muted) against the decisions taken during the 19th Party Congress. Though it is never advisable to undermine an adversary’s strength, times like these require countries to design foreign policy templates that offer a skillful combination of realpolitik and constructivist approaches and not commit themselves to a liberal positioning.

Notwithstanding the above discussed criticism, the Wuhan Meet can be justifiably credited for introducing the concept of ‘informal summits’ within the scope of India-China strategic dialogue. If institutionalized as an annual event, this mechanism of informal exchanges between the top leaderships of the two countries can go a long way in addressing the ‘political-will deficit’ that has kept the boundary issue in an imbroglio for several decades now.

With regards to ‘One China’, while India’s foreign policy continues to abide by the 2010 decision to not endorse this formulation, certain developments on this issue merit attention. In the middle of 2018, India’s national carrier, Air India was made to replace ‘Taiwan’ with ‘Chinese Taipei’ in the list of destinations on its website. While this move could have easily been projected as a business decision – if only for tactical reasons, the MEA decided to dub it as a reiteration of its official policy on Taiwan13. Though this turn of events does not exactly represent a departure from the 2010 policy, it certainly dilutes the strategic impact of this robust initiative. The fact that this development came in the post-Wuhan context makes it all the more crucial.

In yet another significant move on the ‘One China’ construct, India recognized Tibet as ‘Tibet Autonomous Region of People’s Republic of China’ in the 2014 joint statement and followed it up with the 2015 joint statement14. Needless to say, this move contradicted India’s consistent position since 2010 to not recognize Tibet as a part of China in any joint statements between the two countries. As against these initiatives, ‘One India’ policy has not found any mention in India’s recent dealings with the PRC.

Inarguably, the most successful demonstration of India’s foreign policy approach towards China has been on the issue of Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). BRI is not only China’s flagship foreign policy project, it bears Xi Jinping’s ‘personal signature’ in more ways than one. While the country has reiterated its unflinching position on India’s territorial integrity through its opposition to CPEC, India should be credited for shaping the emerging global narrative on connectivity and infrastructure finance by highlighting the predatory nature of China’s ‘debt trap diplomacy’.  In fact, India has not restricted itself to the criticism of BRI and has proposed an alternative in the form of ‘Asia-Africa Growth Corridor’.

Additionally, BRI has become China’s primary platform to advance its penetration within the South Asian landscape. In order to deal with increasing Chinese footprint in the country’s immediate periphery, India’s foreign policy re-invented the doctrine of ‘neighborhood first’. While the idea itself is not new, the concept was imbued with renewed strategic salience that involved reiteration of India’s cultural links with the South Asian nations and an enhanced thrust upon the issue of regional connectivity.

However, in spite of these initiatives, India still needs to address the perennial irritants in its relations with the South-Asian region. This policy vacuum has been utilized by China to acquire strategic space within this region.

Over the years, oppositional political discourse in all South Asian states (barring Bhutan) has expressed itself through an anti-India rhetoric. Moreover, alignment with China is employed as a tool in South Asian polities to demonstrate their strategic autonomy vis-à-vis India to their domestic audience. While this narrative has continued to define India’s regional  environment, India has not been able to create permanent constituencies in South Asian states that can safeguard its strategic interests across the entire political spectrum in these countries. Though this lack of strategic template has characterized all foreign policy establishments, the 2015 Nepal-blockade has proved to be the most negative articulation of India’s neighborhood policy in a long time. Even on the issue of connectivity, the progress has largely remained mixed. As a result, China’s increasing strategic thrust in the South Asian region continues to remain a challenge for India.

With regards to the Maritime Silk Road (MSR) component of the BRI, while continuity has been maintained in the policy of deepening strategic interests in the region, India’s stand on the Indo-Pacific construct remains in stark contrast to the much touted policy of ‘issue-based alignment’. While more negotiations regarding the scope and nature of the proposed architecture were due, India did not have to altogether reject the concept’s credentials of being a ‘strategy’15.

Furthermore, India crafted the novel approach of reimagining its strategic geography and extending it to Southeast Asia. In order to fully realize the scope of this ‘extended neighborhood’, a constructive effort was made to connect the South and Southeast Asian spaces through the idiom of Buddhism and physical connectivity. The evolution of ‘Look East’ into ‘Act East’ was integral to this strategic outlook. Another dimension of this policy is that it allows India greater strategic presence within the South China Sea.

Inclusion of cultural diplomacy within the dynamics of the ‘Act East’ construct has been one of the novel and most significant foreign policy conceptualizations by India in recent times. While this policy is important for varied reasons of diplomacy, it entails definitive strategic component with regards to China. By placing Buddhism on India’s diplomatic agenda, India has offered a potent counter to China’s consistent efforts at assuming the leadership of the global discourse on this philosophy.

In fact, Buddhism is one of the key pillars of China’s outreach to Nepal. Moreover, ownership of Buddhism narrative is indispensable to China’s hold over Tibet and its attempts to place pro-China spiritual leaders within the pantheon of Tibetan Buddhism.

Further, in pursuance of its policy of ‘strategic alignment’, India has forged closer ties with US, Japan and Vietnam. While these partnerships have evolved over the consistent work of several decades, it needs to be recognized that the last five years have imbued them with a new momentum and energy. Today, India’s relations with these countries have moved beyond the dynamics of bi-laterals and have acquired the status of ‘comprehensive strategic partnerships’16 that involve an ever increasing military dimension. As has been mentioned elsewhere in this article, while such developments need not be viewed entirely from the perspective of India-China binary, they nevertheless remain central to India’s foreign policy approach vis-à-vis China.

The issue of Trade Deficit continues to be a work in progress. While India has reportedly reduced the deficit by 10 percent recently, this largely remains an outcome of the US-China trade war. As such, India needs to continue with its efforts to secure more favorable and justified trade terms with China – both at the bilateral level as well as under the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) framework.

With regards to the domination of India’s smartphone sector by the likes of Huawei and ZTE, India urgently needs to revisit its policies. While an outright ban is neither advisable nor tangible, India should participate in the global narrative being led by the US regarding the strategic designs of these companies, and insist upon operational transparency by these Chinese giants.

Finally, it can be concluded that ‘dynamism’ and ‘assertive posturing’ constitute the two recurrent themes of India’s foreign policy approach towards China since 2014. In the last five years, the most articulate expressions of this policy narrative have been the Doklam issue and India’s position on the BRI. Additionally, India’s foreign policy template towards China is now governed by the ideal of ‘strategic and issue based alignment’. This newly crafted ideology and India’s thrust upon cultural diplomacy have allowed the country greater maneuverability space against China’s expansionist policies in India’s sphere of interests. With these elements, India’s new foreign policy constitutes a template for its leadership role in world politics.

(Ms. Shikha Aggarwal is a Senior Research Fellow at India Foundation. Views expressed are personal.)

References:

1     One of the primary initiatives by China in this regard is the ‘World Buddhist Forum’.

2     This conceptualization was introduced by Foreign Secretary Vijay Gokhale at the 2019 edition of the ‘Raisina Dialogue’.

3     This assertion is borne out of at least two articles that have been written by well-established Chinese commentators Yi Guoming and Li Yang. The Papers can be accessed at http://www.cwzg.cn/politics/201707/37313.html, and http://www.kunlunce.com/gcjy/zxzz1111111/2017-12-21/121772.html. Additionally, one of China’s foremost strategic experts, Prof. Shen Dingli has described Doklam incident as one of China’s five major foreign policy failures. This comment can be accessed at https://www.voanews.com/a/china-great-power-diplomacy/4038160.html

4     This assertion is rooted in the fact that Doklam is a disputed territory between Bhutan and China. India had stopped China’s incursion in Doklam under the spirit of ‘India-Bhutan Friendship Treaty’ of 2007. The treaty can be accessed at https://mea.gov.in/Images/pdf/india-bhutan-treaty-07.pdf

5     This assertion is borne out of the fact that while India-China relations in areas of political, cultural, economic and defense exchanges have deepened steadily, progress has been elusive in terms of actual demarcation the boundary between the two countries. The status report on India-China bilateral relations for the years 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017 can be accessed at:

       https://www.mea.gov.in/Portal/ForeignRelation/China_September_2014.pdf

       http://www.mea.gov.in/Portal/ForeignRelation/Indiachina_bilateral_relations.pdf

       https://www.mea.gov.in/Portal/ForeignRelation/China_07_12_2016.pdf

       https://www.mea.gov.in/Portal/ForeignRelation/China_October_2017.pdf

       The status report on bilateral relations for 2012 can be accessed at:

       https://mea.gov.in/Portal/ForeignRelation/China-January-2012.pdf

6 The agreement is available at: https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/CN%20IN_930907_Agreement%20on%20India-China%20Border%20Areas.pdf

7     The 1993 agreement is referred as the Border Peace and Tranquility Agreement (BPTA) is general discourse

8     The formulation appears in the official Press Releases of the SR mechanism. The press releases for the talks since 2014 can be accessed at: https://www.mea.gov.in/media-advisory.htm?60/Media_Advisory

9     The formulation appears in the official Press Releases of the SR mechanism. The press releases for the talks prior to 2014 can be accessed at: https://www.mea.gov.in/media-advisory.htm?60/Media_Advisory

10 The Prime Minister’s Press Statement during President Xi Jinping’s 2014 India visit can be accessed at https://www.mea.gov.in/Speeches-Statements.htm?dtl/24014/

11  The joint statement can be accessed at : https://www.mea.gov.in/press-releases.htm?dtl/29853/IndiaChina_Informal_Summit_at_Wuhan

12  The two joint statements can be accessed at : https://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/24022/Joint+Statement+between+the+Republic+of+India+and+the+Peoples+Republic+of+China+on +Building+a+Closer+Developmental+Partnership,  https://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/25240/Joint_Statement_between_the_India_and_China_during_Prime_Ministers_visit_toChina

13 The statement by the MEA spokesperson can be accessed at: https://www.mea.gov.in/media-briefings.htm?dtl/30035

14 ibid 9

15 India declared its official policy on the Indo-Pacific at the 2018 Shangri La Dialogue. The PM’s speech can be accessed at https://www.mea.gov.in/Speeches-Statements.htm?dtl/29943/Prime+Ministers+Keynote+ Address+at+Shangri+La+Dialogue+June+01+2018

16 India-Vietnam ties were elevated to ‘comprehensive strategic partnership’ in 2015.

       India – Japan relations were upgraded to ‘Global and Strategic Partnership’ in 2014.

    (This article is carried in the print edition of May-June 2019 issue of India Foundation Journal.)

 

Introduction:

The National Democratic Alliance government led by Prime Minister Narendra Modi has registered many successes in diverse areas since it assumed power in May, 2014. Possibly one of the most significant spheres is foreign policy. While India’s expanding relations with the United States and Japan as also its tensions with China and Pakistan have found extensive mention in popular media as well as in discussions by scholars, practitioners and think tanks, adequate space has not been devoted to India’s outreach to and momentous accomplishments in strengthening its partnerships to its West with Afghanistan, Central Asia and West Asia. Countries in these regions are extremely important for India not only for its security and stability but also for its energy security, trade, investment as well as the welfare of its 9-million strong diaspora in the region.

Central Asia:

India has several millennia old historical, cultural and civilisational links with Central Asia. Brisk trade of goods, ideas and thoughts took place from India (and China) to Central Asia and beyond over the Silk Road from 3rd century BCE to 15th century CE. Buddhism travelled to Afghanistan, Central Asia and Western China from India through the Silk Road. The region was part of Emperor Ashoka’s kingdom in 3rd century BCE. Alexander of Macedonia, Kushans, Babar, Mughals and Sufism are evidence of vigorous links between India and the region over the ages. India and the Central Asian Republics (CARs) enjoyed vibrant economic and cultural ties when the latter were a part of the Soviet Union in the 20th century.

Notwithstanding the strategic and economic significance of Central Asia, the region was not accorded adequate importance by India’s political leadership for much of the period since the countries gained independence in 1991. The then Prime Minister PV Narasimha Rao recognised the strategic importance of the region and visited Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan in 1993 and Turkmenistan and Kyrgyzstan in 1995. After 1995, for a period of 20 years till 2015, only 4 Prime Ministerial visits from India to the region took place viz, by Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee to Kazakhstan in 2002 (in continuation of his participation in the regional Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia) and Tajikistan in 2003, and by Dr Manmohan Singh to Uzbekistan in 2006 and to Kazakhstan in 2011 on way back from the BRICS Summit in China.

This evident neglect was corrected by Prime Minister Modi soon after assuming power. He took the initiative to visit all the five countries of the region in July, 2015, two of them (Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan) before going to Ufa in Russia for the BRICS/SCO Summit, and three of them (Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan and Tajikistan) on the way back. This provided a strong impetus to bilateral ties. Since then, PM Modi has travelled twice more to the region, once in 2016 to Tashkent, Uzbekistan and again in 2017 to Astana, Kazakhstan to participate in the annual Summits of member countries of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO). The Indian PM will travel again to the region to Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan in June, 2019 to attend the next SCO Summit. On the side-lines of all these Summits as also of the SCO Summit in Qingdao, China in June, 2018, PM Modi met leaders of the four Central Asian countries (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan) which are members of SCO.

The then President Almazbek Atambayev of Kyrgyzstan and President Emomali Rahmon of Tajikistan visited India in December, 2016. The new President of Uzbekistan ShavkatMirziyoyev who has launched several far-reaching and visionary initiatives in domestic, economic and foreign policies of his country visited India twice within a span of four months. His first visit was a bilateral State visit in Oct, 2018 and the second came in January, 2019 for the Vibrant Gujarat Summit. All these visits and interactions have led to a dynamic upsurge in bilateral interactions and cooperation in political, economic, defence and cultural spheres.

India became a full member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation in 2017. In addition to the lack of direct geographic contiguity and connectivity, one of the important causes for India’s failure to take full advantage of its historical and civilizational linkages with this region has been the inadequate interactions and meetings between the leaders of India and CARs. India’s membership of SCO has sought to address this lacuna in a substantial manner. It is well understood that in Central Asian countries, most decisions of significant importance and value, both political and economic, are taken by Presidents of the countries and not at a Ministerial level. The regular and frequent meetings at the highest political level can be expected to provide a fillip to India’s ties with these countries and the region in the coming years. In addition to meetings at the highest level, several meetings at Ministerial and official levels have also taken place. These have led to discussions on expanding understanding and cooperation in diverse areas.

Although India enjoyed direct access to the region over millennia through the current day Pakistan and Afghanistan, it is not able have a direct connect with Central Asia today because Pakistan does not permit people, goods and traffic to travel from India to this region using its territory. To circumvent this obstacle, India pro-actively focused on developing connectivity routes to Central Asia and Afghanistan via the Chabahar project and the International North South Transport Corridor (INSTC). Although these projects had been planned many years ago, they were taken in hand seriously only over the last 5 years. A trilateral Agreement was signed by PM Modi with Presidents of Iran and Afghanistan during his visit to Iran in May, 2016. Within 18 months, the first phase of renovation and upgradation of Chabahar port from 2.5 million tonnes to 8.5 million tonnes was completed and inaugurated by the Iranian President in December, 2017. Further work on expansion of Chabahar and connecting it by a rail link to Zahedan and then onwards to Malik/Zaranj on the Iran-Afghanistan border is under way. Uzbekistan has expressed interest in linking with this connectivity initiative by joining a railway link from Termez to Herat. India also acceded to the Ashgabat Agreement in February 2018. This will help in smooth and streamlined flow of goods between Central Asia and India. India joined the Convention on International Transport of Goods Under Cover of TIR Carnets (TIR Convention) in August, 2018, under which the first consignment arrived without any obstacles from Afghanistan via Chabahar in March, 2019. This will help India and Central Asia to enhance their economic cooperation.

India is an energy deficient country. This region is extremely well endowed with energy, mineral and natural resources. Both India and Central Asia are a perfect match for each other. The challenge is to transport the energy resources from these land-locked states to India. The region offers significant trade, investment and economic opportunities to Indian businesses. Indian private sector needs to take aggressive and determined measures in prospecting and exploiting economic potential in these countries through joint ventures, export of services, bidding for World Bank, ADB and other multilaterally funded infrastructure projects etc.

India has been importing uranium from Kazakhstan since the bilateral civilian nuclear deal was signed during visit of Kazkah President Nursultan Nazarbayev to India as Chief Guest at India’s Republic Day in January, 2009. Recently this Agreement was further extended to import another 3,000 tonnes of uranium ore by India. Kazakhstan has the world’s second largest reserves of uranium ore and is the world’s largest producer of this mineral. During the visit of Uzbek President to India in October last year, it was agreed to import 3,000 tonnes of uranium from Uzbekistan also.

Work on Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India gas pipeline has been speeded up over the last five years. Work in Turkmenistan on laying the pipeline appears to have been completed while that in Afghanistan commenced more than a year ago. The likely date for completion of the project is 2020 but could slip by a few months.

In a significant development, Kazakh troops were deployed in November, 2018 under Indian command as UN peacekeepers in Lebanon. It is for the first time in Indian history – whether in UN missions or otherwise – that an Indian Army unit has been broken down by replacing one of its own companies with a foreign company.

Central Asian Region has always constituted the extended neighbourhood of India. India’s outreach to this region since PM Modi assumed power has seen a significant upswing in political, strategic, economic, commercial, defence, counter-terrorism, cultural spheres and enhanced people-to-people contacts.

Afghanistan:

India and Afghanistan have a strong relationship based on cultural and civilizational links. The relationship is not limited to only the governments in New Delhi and Kabul but has its foundations in historical contacts and exchanges between the people. Transfer of power in New Delhi and Kabul in 2014 took place within a few months of each other. After a protracted political process, President Ashraf Ghani and CEO Abdullah Abdullah assumed power in September, 2014. The first visit by Abdullah Abdullah to India took place in March, 2015 followed soon thereafter by Ashraf Ghani in April, 2015, a full seven months after assuming the Presidency. Before coming to India, Ghani had already travelled to Pakistan, USA, Iran, China, Saudi Arabia and some other countries. Ghani’s decision soon after assuming power to suspend the request for supply of arms was initially viewed as a setback for Indo-Afghan strategic ties. Besides, his decision to visit China and Pakistan ahead of India was also viewed as a snub to Delhi.

Since his election Ghani tried to improve relations with Pakistan, which in turn could pave the way for peace talks with the Taliban. His first visit after becoming President was to Pakistan in November, 2014. However, after many terror attacks in Afghanistan from Pakistan, and failed Taliban peace talks, Ghani grew increasingly cold to Pakistan and called it the “center of the Taliban.”

Notwithstanding the late and uncertain start to bilateral ties after assumption of power by Ghani, relations have warmed and improved significantly over the last 4 years. Two long-pending projects viz the Parliament building and the Salma dam (Afghanistan-India Friendship dam) were completed at rapid speed and handed over to the Afghan authorities, the first in December, 2015 and the second in June, 2016. By getting these two prestigious and iconic projects completed expeditiously after coming to power, PM Modi sent out a strong message that India will meet its commitments and deliver on its promises on time. In August 2016, PM Modi also jointly inaugurated through video conferencing the restored Stor Palace in Kabul with President Ghani.

India-Afghanistan partnership has always been characterized by high level exchanges. Over the last four years, the frequency and regularity of such visits witnessed a sharp increase. Bilateral trade crossed the US $ 1 billion mark. The two sides successfully organised the India-Afghanistan trade and investment show in Mumbai in September, 2018 and strengthened connectivity, including through Chabahar port and Air-Freight Corridor. Under the New Development Partnership, both sides are implementing   116   High   Impact Community Development Projects in 34 provinces of Afghanistan. These important investments are in areas of education, health, agriculture, irrigation, drinking water, renewable energy, flood control, micro-hydropower, sports and administrative infrastructure. On-going programmes for education, capacity building, skills and human resource development of Afghanistan, one of the largest such programmes in the world, was extended for a further period of five years from 2017 to 2022. India offered 500 scholarships for children of martyrs of Afghan Security Forces and gifted four Mi-25 Attack helicopters to the Afghan Air Force. India agreed to implement some important new projects such as the ShahtootDamand drinking water project for Kabul that would also facilitate irrigation, water supply for Charikar City, road connectivity to Band-e-Amir in Bamyan Province that would promote tourism, low cost housing for returning Afghan refugees in Nangarhar Province to promote their resettlement, a gypsum board manufacturing plant in Kabul to promote value added local industry and for import substitution, and a polyclinic in Mazar-e-Sharif.

The inauguration of the Dedicated Air Cargo Corridor in June 2017 between Kabul-Delhi and Kandahar-Delhi has provided a fresh impetus to bilateral trade. In December 2017, Kabul-Mumbai Air Cargo Corridor was also inaugurated. The Air Corridor has ensured free movement of freight despite the barriers put in place due to the denial of transit by Pakistan. It has been decided to further strengthen the corridor and expand it to other cities in India. Several thousand tonnes of cargo has already been transported in the Air Corridor since its inauguration.

India has supported the people and Government of Afghanistan in their efforts to build a united, sovereign, democratic, peaceful, stable, prosperous and inclusive nation. India supports all efforts for peace and reconciliation in Afghanistan which are inclusive and Afghan-led, Afghan-owned and Afghan-controlled. India has advocated the need for a sustained and long-term commitment to Afghanistan by the international community. India has been opposed to involvement of Taliban in the peace process till it renounces violence and accepts the Constitution of Afghanistan. In recent months, for a variety of reasons, most of the international players active in the region have come around to the view that Taliban will need to be a part of the final resolution to the conflict in Afghanistan. Although this is against the stated position of both India and Afghanistan, both countries participated through presence of non-official representatives in the meeting organised by Russia in Moscow in November, 2018 in which for the first time Taliban representatives also participated. India is actively engaged with a number of countries on bilateral, regional and plurilateral basis as well as in different formats to find an acceptable solution to the ongoing conflict in Afghanistan. Although the coming months pose a formidable challenge, India has reiterated that it is committed to work with like-minded countries to arrive at a solution for a safe, secure, peaceful and prosperous Afghanistan.

West Asia:

India’s vigorous and dynamic relations with West Asian countries represent one of the brightest achievements of India’s foreign policy over the last five years. India today would be one of the very few, if not possibly the only country, which has excellent relations with all countries of the region. India enjoys strong relations with Saudi Arabia as it does with Israel. India has robust relations with United Arab Emirates as it has with Iran. With other countries in the region like Qatar, Syria, Bahrain, Oman, Egypt, Turkey etc India maintains warm ties.

This region is vitally important for India’s safety, stability, energy security and economic well-being. This region is home to about 9 million Indians who travelled to that region for better job opportunities in the wake of the oil boom in the 1970s.  70% of India’s imported oil needs and 90% of gas requirements come from West Asia. This dependence will only increase as the Indian economy continues to grow at 8 per cent or more. Indian diaspora in West Asia remits about 55% of the total inward remittances to the tune of about US$ 45 billion into the country. This inward flow of funds is extremely important for India to balance its current account deficit. Safety and security of the Indian people is extremely important for the Indian government. Hence stability in the region is of great interest to India. The region represents a significant market for Indian goods and also a source of large investments into India for India’s infrastructure and economic development.

Since the BJP-led government came to power in 2014, the Arab governments were somewhat wary that because of the well-known personal rapport between PM Modi and Israeli PM Netanyahu, India might adopt a pro-Israeli policy at the expense of traditional relations with them. Also, the Palestinian cause could suffer. These misgivings were soon dispelled. Starting with his first visit to the region to UAE in August, 2015, PM Modi travelled to Qatar and Saudi Arabia as well as to Iran over the next one year. Many leaders from the region also visited India. Crown Prince of UAE was the Chief Guest on India’s Republic Day in 2016. Far reaching collaboration in security, defence, counter-terrorism & intelligence were the major outcomes of these visits. Joint Statement with UAE was noteworthy as it prohibited Pakistan to use UAE territory for anti-India activities which had hitherto been the case. In addition, several accused Indian origin terrorists were extradited to India. Moreover, several billions of dollars of strategic investments in India have been agreed to by these countries.

Reaffirming importance of this region and particularly of UAE, PM Modi visited UAE the second time in 2018 after his visit to Palestine. Several MoUs were signed in railways, energy sector, financial services and manpower. But for the first time a MoU between an Indian consortium (OVL, BPRL & IOCL) and Abu Dhabi National Oil Company (ADNOC) was signed that allows the acquisition of 10% participating interest amounting to US$600 million in Abu Dhabi’s offshore Lower Zakum concession for 40 years.

The crowning pinnacle of India’s relations with UAE and the Islamic world in general came in early March, 2019 when India was invited as the Guest of Honour to the 46th Meeting of Foreign Ministers of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation. This was done in the face of threat from Pakistani Foreign Minister that he would boycott the Meeting if invitation to the Indian EAM was not withdrawn. The Foreign Minister of UAE refused to get blackmailed as a result of which Pakistan FM did not attend the meeting. Statement by UAE foreign minister that ‘’the friendly country of India’’ had been invited ‘’as guest of honour in view if its great global, political stature as well as its time-honoured and deeply rooted cultural and historical legacy, and its important Islamic component’’ clearly demonstrates the huge distance that India’s relations have travelled not only with UAE but with all countries in the region.

The first ever visit by an Indian Prime Minister to Israel was undertaken by PM Modi in April, 2017. This was followed by a week-long visit to India by Israeli PM Benjamin Netanyahu in January, 2018. Both these visits provided a huge impetus to bilateral ties. Soon after coming to power, PM Modi met his Israeli counterpart on the side-lines of the UN General Assembly meeting in New York in September, 2014. Israel has emerged as a major and reliable security, intelligence and counter-terrorism partner for India. In defence, it is the third largest supplier after Russia and USA. Reputed for its arid agricultural technologies, it has become a close partner in India’s food security initiative. S&T and Cyber Space as well as intelligence cooperation have become new frontiers of cooperation.

On the issue of Palestine, India has maintained its principled stand but has de-hyphenated the relationship from that with Israel. Before visiting Israel, PM Modi received President Mahmoud Abbas in India and assured him of India’s consistent political and economic support. India stuck to its ethical position by voting against the US move at UNGA to shift its Embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. Also, PM Modi became the first Indian Prime Minister to visit Palestine-Ramallah in February, 2018. In fact, the Palestinian leadership which has discarded US as an honest broker of peace hopes that India perhaps could play a more proactive role in the Middle East.

PM Modi went to Ramallah via Amman, Jordan where he had extensive discussions on counter terrorism, deradicalization and economic and security collaboration as well as on issue of Jerusalem and Palestine. King Abdullah II of Jordan who was on a visit to Pakistan and UAE, cut short his visit and returned earlier to meet PM Modi.

Within weeks, King Abdullah II paid a highly significant State visit to India, after a gap of 12 years when over a dozen agreements and MoUs were signed including on defence cooperation that has hitherto been elusive due to Jordan’s close relations with Pakistan. Jordan has emerged as a key collaborator in India’s food security initiative. Being rich in shale deposits, it could become a reliable partner in India’s energy security scenario.

Visit by Iranian President to India in February, 2018 was significant for the message it conveyed that India conducts its foreign policy independently and based on its national interests. In addition, notwithstanding the threat of US sanctions, India has continued to import significant quantities of oil from Iran to meet its energy needs, as also to develop Chabahar to promote connectivity to Afghanistan and Central Asia. During the visit of President Rouhani, nine MoUs across a wide spectrum were signed. One of the most important was to create a mechanism for Rupee-Rial trade through Asian Clearing mechanism that would overcome the risk of being hit by sanctions on import of oil from Iran.

PM Modi also paid a visit to Oman in February, 2018. Oman has maintained good relations with Iran and other GCC countries and can act as a reliable interlocutor in intra-regional affairs and conflicts. India and Oman relations have been very close and historic. Apart from deeper trade and economic engagement Oman has been a significant defence and anti-piracy partner for India. During the visit eight agreements were signed in military, health, tourism, judicial cooperation, and space sectors. India will be able to use the Duqm port for its military logistical requirements. This fits well in its SAGARMALA initiative and maritime security. This was further supplemented by the Agreement India signed with France during President Macron’s visit to India allowing India to use its naval bases and facilities in the region.

This proactive outreach has yielded significant results not only in the fields of security, counterterrorism, defense and de-radicalisation, but also in the area of trade and investment. Joint military and naval exercises were held with UAE for the first time. Defence, intelligence and counter-terrorism cooperation have started acquiring greater salience. UAE has agreed to raise its investments in India, including through the establishment of UAE-India Infrastructure Investment Fund, to reach a target of US$ 75 billion to support India’s plans for rapid expansion of next generation infrastructure, especially in railways, ports, roads, airports and industrial corridors and parks. UAE has also agreed to participate in the development of strategic petroleum reserves, upstream and downstream petroleum sectors, and collaboration in third countries.

During PM Modi’s visit in 2015, UAE agreed to allot land to build a Hindu temple in Abu Dhabi. This will further enrich cultural and people-to-people ties. The dynamism in India’s relations with West Asia can be ascertained from the fact that Saudi Arabia, UAE and Palestine have conferred their highest awards on PM Modi for his contribution to strengthening relations between them and India.

West Asia has been facing profound turbulence and instability. India on account of its enhanced credibility could be asked to play a greater role be it in the Middle East Peace Process and Palestine or Syria. India will however need to approach this issue with great care and circumspection. Over the last 5 years, India has followed a sophisticated policy of nurturing bilateral ties with all the countries in the region without getting entangled in their ideological or sectarian fault lines. This is the key reason for success of India’s foreign policy in the region.

Conclusion:

India has covered enormous distance over the last 5 years under PM Modi’s stewardship in rejuvenating bilateral and regional relations with West Asia, Central Asia and Afghanistan. India today stands on the threshold of providing a massive impetus to partnerships with these regions in the coming years.

(Shri Ashok Sajjanhar has worked for the Indian Foreign Service for over three decades. He was the ambassador of India to Kazakhstan, Sweden and Latvia, and has held several significant positions in Indian embassies in Washington DC, Brussels, Moscow, Geneva, Tehran, Dhaka and Bangkok.)

    (This article is carried in the print edition of May-June 2019 issue of India Foundation Journal.)

 

 

The general elections in India in 2014 coincided with the ambitious negotiation of a global agenda for sustainable development at the United Nations (UN). These negotiations converged the three aspects of sustainable development – economic, social and environmental. The outcome, adopted by world leaders in September 2015, was Agenda 2030 for Sustainable Development, with 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) at its core. This has been a major success for multilateral diplomacy.1

The principle of international cooperation is the core of multilateralism. As an “original” founder-member of the multilateral system created by the UN, India has major stakes in effective international cooperation. With over 40% of her Gross Domestic Product (GDP) being contributed by her international trade,2 India’s destiny is closely linked with sustaining international cooperation to catalyze her transformation into a major power. India’s ability to participate on an equal basis in the decisions of multilateral institutions is intrinsic to this endeavor.

Agenda 2030 has validated India’s view that the eradication of poverty is central to sustainable development.3 Home to almost 270 million people living under the poverty line,4 India has a strong interest in implementing Agenda 2030 on the basis of her nationally set priorities and transform herself. Globally agreed means of implementing Agenda 2030 include supportive financial flows, such as Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) for employment and infrastructure, as well as access to appropriate technologies and clean energy to accelerate development while protecting the environment.

In the run-up to the May 2014 general elections in India, several of these priorities assumed political prominence. The new government’s focus on prioritizing inclusive development, captured in the SabkaSaath, Sabka Vikas slogan, galvanized voters in India as well as interlocutors from many of India’s strategic partners.5

India’s clear road-map of national targets for development announced by the government between May 2014 and September 2015 served to significantly align India’s national development agenda with the goals formulated by the UN.SabkaSaath, Sabka Vikas became aligned with SDG 1, the over-reaching goal for poverty eradication. The National Food Security Mission aligned with SDG 2 for food security; Health Insurance schemes with SDG 3 for good health and well-being; the National Education Mission with SDG 4 for quality education; BetiBachaoBetiPadhao  with SDG 5 on gender equality; Swachh Bharat  with SDG 6 for sanitation and clean water; the target of 175 GW of renewable energy by 2022 with SDG 7 on clean energy; the MNREGA scheme and Skill India with SDG 8 on decent work for all; Make in India, Start Up India and Digital India with SDG 9 on industry, innovation and infrastructure; Jan DhanYojna with SDG 10 to reduce inequalities; the Smart Cities Mission with SDG 11 for sustainable cities and communities, India’s SAGAR policy announced in March 2015 with a focus on the Blue Economy with SDG 14 on oceans; and the Krishi Vikas and FasalBimaYojna with SDG 15 on agriculture and life on land.

Prime Minister Modi’s first official visit to the UN General Assembly (UNGA) on 27 September 2014 reiterated India’s commitment to multilateralism.  He said that “India is a country that constitutes one-sixth of humanity; a nation experiencing economic and social transformation on a scale rarely seen in history. Every nation’s world view is shaped by its civilization and philosophical tradition. India`s ancient wisdom sees the world as one family. It is reflected in a tradition of openness and diversity; co-existence and cooperation. This is why India speaks not just for itself, but also for the cause of justice, dignity, opportunity and prosperity around the world. It is also because of this timeless current of thought that India has an unwavering belief in multilateralism.”6

The 2014 UNGA address by the Prime Minister contained his proposal for the UN to declare an International Yoga Day. Emphasizing international cooperation to recognize the integral bond between humanity and the environment, the proposal captured the imagination of delegations in the UN General Assembly. As the Prime Minister explained, “For us in India, respect for nature is an integral part of spiritualism. We treat nature’s bounties as sacred. Yoga is an invaluable gift of our ancient tradition. Yoga embodies unity of mind and body; thought and action; restraint and fulfillment; harmony between man and nature; a holistic approach to health and well-being. It is not about exercise but to discover the sense of oneness with yourself, the world and the nature. By changing our lifestyle and creating consciousness, it can help us deal with climate change. Let us work towards adopting an International Yoga Day.”7

The implementation of this proposal was swift, demonstrating the commitment of member-states to making a living reality out of international cooperation. Within 75 days, 176 other countries joined India in co-sponsoring a UNGA resolution on 11 December 2014 to declare 21 June every year as the International Day of Yoga. This has become a record for such resolutions in the UNGA. When the International Yoga Day began to be implemented from 2015 onwards, its link with SDG 3 (global health) and SDG 12 (changing lifestyles for responsible consumption and production) of Agenda 2030 became explicit. As the Prime Minister had said in his address, “We can achieve the same level of development, prosperity and well-being without necessarily going down the path of reckless consumption.”8

At the Paris meeting of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCC) in November 2015, India took a major initiative to push environmental issues towards the path of meaningful international cooperation rather than polemical confrontation. Together with President Francois Hollande of France, Prime Minister Modi launched an International Solar Alliance (ISA). Speaking on the occasion, he said, “Our hope for a sustainable planet rests on a bold global initiative. It will mean advanced countries leaving enough carbon space for developing countries to grow. That is natural climate justice.  It also means a growth path with lighter carbon footprint. So, convergence between economy, ecology and energy should define our future.”9

In March 2018, barely 16 months after having proposed the ISA, Prime Minister Modi jointly inaugurated the ISA with visiting French President Emmanuel Macron in India. In October 2018, India hosted the first General Assembly of the ISA, which became the first inter-governmental organization associated with the UN to be headquartered in India since India’s independence in August 1947.10 Aligning India firmly with SDG 7 of Agenda 2030 on clean energy, the Prime Minister asserted that India was doing so with a new self-confidence of “Poverty to Power.”11

Such positive contributions to implementing the principle of international cooperation by India are today being increasingly challenged by major powers seeking to impose their domestic political and economic policies on the multilateral system.12 Unilateral measures, including attempts to enforce extra-territorial application of domestic laws, directly impacts on the capacity of countries like India to meet their national developmental targets under Agenda 2030. Polarization between the major powers has begun to create frictions within multilateral institutions established under the UN framework.13 These include the International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank and the World Trade Organization (WTO). The agreements in 2010 to reform decision-making within the IMF and World Bank to reflect global economic realities are yet to be implemented,14 mainly on account of the reluctance of western economies to cede their inherited privileges in decision-making in multilateral financial institutions.15

In the WTO, the United States is targeting the effective functioning of the international dispute settlement mechanism which it helped create in 1995, and which has adjudicated over 500 trade disputes between member-states so far. Attempts to revert to the pre-WTO bilateral approach to use punitive measures based on domestic laws to resolve trade disputes jeopardizes international cooperation based on the international rule of law.16

India’s ability to make multilateral institutions responsive to priorities of developing countries depends on India’s participation as an equal member in decision-making in all structures of multilateral governance. It is worth recalling that Agenda 2030, in which India participated actively, was adopted unanimously by the UN General Assembly, which takes decisions on the democratic principle of one-country one-vote.17 When adopting Agenda 2030, world leaders had unanimously stressed that “there can be no sustainable development without peace and no peace without sustainable development.”18

The mandate to ensure international peace and security is the “primary responsibility” of the UN Security Council according to the UN Charter.19 Unlike in the UN General Assembly, decision-making in the UN Security Council is determined by the veto power of the five self-selected permanent members (China, France, Russia, the UK and the USA).20

This is the context for India’s active leadership in the UN General Assembly since November 197921 to reform the UN Security Council by amending the UN Charter, including the veto provision in decision-making.

Since 2014, India has attempted to conclude this reform within a fixed time-frame. Prime Minister Modi exhorted fellow world leaders in 2014 to “reform the United Nations, including the Security Council, and make it more democratic and participative. Institutions that reflect the imperatives of 20th century would not be effective in the 21st. It would face the risk of irrelevance; and we will face the risk of continuing turbulence with no one capable of addressing it.”22 China is leading the push-back by permanent members against reforming the Security Council.

What are the issues concerning India on the agenda of the Security Council which need India’s participation on an equal basis in the Council’s decision-making process? Countering terrorism directed against India by Pakistan is a priority. Before the Security Council became active in seeking to counter terrorism through its resolutions,23 which are binding on all member-states of the UN under Article 25 of the UN Charter, India had taken the lead in using the UN General Assembly to compel member-states to prosecute or extradite terrorists wanted for committing terrorist attacks against India. Speaking at the UN General Assembly in 2014, Prime Minister Modi urged world leaders to “put aside our differences and mount a concerted international effort to combat terrorism and extremism. As a symbol of this effort, I urge you to adopt the Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism (CCIT).”24  The CCIT contains the legal obligation of “prosecute or extradite”. Pakistan has delayed consideration of the CCIT in the UN General Assembly’s Legal Committee (of which it was Vice-Chair in 2016-2017)25.

After the Pathankot terror attack of 2016, India’s request to the Security Council to list the leader of the Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) Masood Azhar on the Sanctions List26 has been repeatedly blocked by China, a veto-wielding permanent member. Earlier, following the 26 November 2008 terrorist attacks on Mumbai, carried out by the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT), the UN Security Council had placed the leaders of the LeT like Hafiz Saeed and Zaki-ur-Rehman Lakhvi on its Sanctions List on 10 December 2008.27 However, the Security Council has been unable to enforce its decision to imposing sanctions on Hafiz Saeed so far,28 due to lack of political will among its permanent members.

Related to this is the impact of terrorism on UN peacekeeping operations (PKOs). Out of the 71 UN PKOs mandated by the UN Security Council since 1948, India has participated in 49, contributing over 200,000 troops to date.29 Terrorism has already targeted PKOs like UNDOF30 in the Golan Heights and MINUSMA31 in Mali. The potential for an increase in terrorist attacks on other UN missions, including UNAMA in Afghanistan, has become greater due to the perception that the Security Council is ineffective in countering terrorism, including terrorist acts against the UN itself.

This aggravates the existing shortcomings in Security Council in the effective use of PKOs for conflict resolution. Currently, as many as 75,000 out of the total of about 100,000 UN peacekeeping troops are deployed by the Security Council to respond to just 4 conflicts in Africa,32 which continue to spiral out of control. Two reasons for this failure are lack of representation among the Council’s permanent members from Africa; and the absence of consultations by the Security Council with troop-contributing countries like India, which are not permanently represented in the Council. Under Article 44 of the UN Charter, India has the right to seek consultations with the Security Council on deployment of its troops contributed to PKOs. Prime Minister Modi had drawn attention to this issue, emphasizing that “the problems arise to a large extent because Troop Contributing Countries do not have a role in the decision-making process.”33

Despite deployment of PKOs, the Security Council has not been able to contain escalating crises across the continents, which extract a huge human and material cost. More than 68 million people are currently displaced by violent conflicts. Till 2018, over 3800 UN peacekeepers, including 169 Indian UN troops, have laid down their lives to uphold the UN Charter. At the Leaders’ Summit on Peacekeeping in New York in September 2015, Prime Minister Modi had underlined that “it would be most fitting if the proposed memorial wall to the fallen peacekeepers is created quickly. India stands ready to contribute, including financially, to this objective.”

Beyond measures to counter terrorism and the deployment of PKOs, other issues on the Council’s agenda impacting on India’s strategic interests include the situation in Yemen, which sits astride the main sea lane of communication through the Red Sea that carries the bulk of India’s international trade; the situation in Iran, which is an important source of energy for India, as well as a critical partner in India’s connectivity projects like the International North-South Transport Corridor through Bandar Abbas and the Chabahar Project; the situation in Afghanistan, especially regarding attempts to regularize the re-integration of the Taliban into Afghanistan’s political structures; and the looming confrontation between the major powers on securitizing cyber space and outer space, where India is an emerging power.

As India looks to contribute to strengthen the multilateral system, two areas emerge as priorities for her.

First, India must become an equal participant in Security Council decision-making to ensure that this multilateral structure is responsive to India’s core interests of ensuring peace and security for sustainable development. To amend the UN Charter and reform the UN Security Council, a UN General Assembly resolution needs to be adopted. China has asserted that such a resolution requires “comprehensive consensus”.34 China’s assertion flies in the face of the fact that the UN General Assembly decided unanimously in 1998 that any resolution for deciding on Security Council reform needs only a two-thirds majority,35 and not “comprehensive consensus.” India must take the lead to counter China’s blocking tactic in the UN General Assembly by tabling the text of a draft resolution on Security Council reform co-sponsored by at least 129 member-states (a two-thirds majority).

Second, India must take the initiative to restore the primacy of the principle of international cooperation, on which the current multilateral system was founded a century ago. In 1963, over half a century ago, the UN General Assembly36 had declared 1965, the 20th anniversary of the United Nations, as the “International Co-operation Year”.

Given India’s significant stakes in effective international cooperation for the transformation of India, an Indian initiative in the UN General Assembly to declare  the 75th anniversary year of the founding of the UN in 2020, as a Year of International Cooperation would galvanize the latent sentiment among the majority of UN member-states for restoring the inter-linkages between peace, security, human rights and sustainable development. In addition, such a contribution by India for making multilateralism relevant for the 21st century would create an important leadership framework for India when she assumes the Chair of the G-20 in 2022.

(Shri Asoke Kumar Mukerji retired after over 37 years in the Indian Foreign Service as Permanent Representative of India to the United Nations in December 2015. He led the team that implemented Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s proposal for the UN General Assembly to declare an International Yoga Day in 2014, in a record time of 75 days with 177 co-sponsoring countries. He led India’s negotiations on Agenda 2030 on Sustainable Development which was adopted by world leaders in September 2015. In July 2018, the University of East Anglia (UK) awarded him a Doctor of Civil Laws (honoris causa) degree for his contributions to diplomacy.)

 

References:

1     United Nations, “Transforming our world: The Agenda 2030 for Sustainable Development”, Preamble, 25 September 2015. Agenda 2030 was adopted at the UN Summit in New York attended by Prime Minister Narendra Modi. Accessed at https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/post2015/transformingourworld

2     World Integrated Trade Solution (WITS), The World Bank and UNCTAD, “India Trade Statistics”. Accessed at https://wits.worldbank.org/CountryProfile/en/IND

3     In 1972, at the first UN Conference on the Human Environment held in Stockholm, India’s statement “poverty is the biggest polluter” had drawn strong criticism from environmental activists, who saw it as an attempt by India and other developing countries to shirk their obligations to protect the environment in the pursuit of accelerated socio-economic development.

4     The World Bank, “India’s Poverty Profile” Snapshot 2012, May 27, 2016. Accessed at http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/infographic/2016/05/27/india-s-poverty-profile

5     U.S. Department of State, “Remarks at the Center for American Progress India:2020 Program”, Secretary of State John Kerry, 28 July 2014. Accessed at https://2009-2017.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2014/07/229870.htm

6     Narendra Modi, “Text of the PM’s Statement at the UN General Assembly”, 27 September 2014. Accessed at  https://www.narendramodi.in/text-of-the-pms-statement-at-the-united-nations-general-assembly-6660

7     Ibid.

8     Ibid.

9     Narendra Modi, “Let us turn to the Sun to power our future”, Launch of International Solar Alliance, Paris, 30 November 2015. Accessed at https://www.narendramodi.in/pm-modi-at-the-launch-of-international-solar-alliance-385253

10  Press Information Bureau, Government of India. “PM inaugurates first Assembly of International Solar Alliance”, 2 October 2018. Accessed at http://pib.nic.in/newsite/PrintRelease.aspx?relid=183908

11  Narendra Modi, “PM inaugurates first assembly of the International Solar Alliance”, 2 October 2018. Accessed at https://www.narendramodi.in/pm-modi-inaugurates-first-assembly-of-international-solar-alliance-541716

12  Both the “America First” policy of the United States and the “Belt and Road Initiative” (BRI) of China impact on multilateralism today, the former by weakening the rules-based system of multilateral structures and the latter by distorting multilateral structures to give primacy to China’s economic interests while suppressing multilateral political and human rights agendas. The UK’s “Brexit” referendum will impact on the stability of the multilateral system, especially if the UK’s international partners are expected to re-negotiate crucial political and economic agreements bilaterally with the UK and the EU.

13 The Bretton Woods Institutions, the IMF and World Bank, were established by the United Nations Monetary and Financial Conference held from 1-22 July 1944 in the United States. The United Nations-sponsored Conference on Trade and Employment held in Havana, Cuba from 21 November 1947 to 24 March 1948, aimed to create an International Trade Organization. The refusal of the United States to agree to the proposed Organization led to a provisional General Agreement for Tariffs and Trade liberalization known as the GATT between 1947-1994, which became the WTO on 1 January 1995. 

14 International Monetary Fund, “Statement by Hon. Arun Jaitley, Governor of the Bank and the Fund for India”, Governor’s Statement No. 26, 13 October 2017, paragraphs 7-8. Accessed at https://www.imf.org/external/am/2017/speeches/pr26e.pdf

15  Bretton Woods Project, “IMF Quota Reforms: the fight for democratic governance continues”, 6 December 2018. Accessed at https://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/2018/12/imf-quota-reforms-the-fight-for-democratic-governance-goes-on/  See also Statement by Hon. Arun Jaitley, Governor of the IMF and IBRD for India”, dated 7 October 2016, Fund-Bank Annual Meeting 2016. Available at https://www.imf.org/external/am/2016/speeches/pr18e.pdf

16  International Economic Law and Policy Blog, “How should WTO members respond to the Appellate Body Crisis” by Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, European University Institute, Florence. Accessed at https://worldtradelaw.typepad.com/ielpblog/2018/12/ulli-petersmann-on-how-should-wto-members-respond-to-the-wto-appellate-body-crisis.htmls

17 The UN Charter in Article 18 provides for one-country one-vote in UN General Assembly decision-making. See United Nations, UN Charter, Article 18.1. Accessed at https://www.un.org/en/charter-united-nations/

18  See note 2.

19  United Nations, UN Charter, Article 24.1. Accessed at https://www.un.org/en/charter-united-nations/

20  Ibid. Article 27.3.

21  “Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council”, UN Document No. A/34/246 dated 14 November 1979, submitted by Algeria, Argentina, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Guyana, India, Maldives, Nepal, Nigeria and Sri Lanka to the UN Secretary General. Available at

       http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/34/246

22 See note 1.

23 The UN Security Council began to use provisions of Article 41 of the UN Charter to impose economic sanctions like travel bans, assets freeze and arms embargo after adopting resolution 1267 to counter terrorist threats from the Taliban and Al Qaida in October 1999. Since then, the Council has adopted over 40 resolutions on countering terrorism, which have not been enforced evenly by the Council.

24 Ibid.

25  United Nations General Assembly, Sixth Committee, 71st Session. Accessed at  https://www.un.org/en/ga/sixth/71/bureau.shtml .

26 Ministry of External Affairs, India. “Designation of Masood Azhar under UNSCR 1267”, 2 April 2016. Accessed at  https://www.mea.gov.in/press-releases.htm?dtl/26589/Designation_of_Masood_ Azhar_under_UNSCR_1267

27  United Nations Security Council. “Hafiz Muhammad Saeed”. Accessed at https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/1267/aq_sanctions_list/summaries/individual/hafiz-muhammad-saeed

28 BBC News, “Pakistan’s $10 m bounty cleric Hafiz Saeed released”, 23 November 2017. Accessed at https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-42100276. Under Article 41 of the UN Charter, the Security Council has the right to take non-military measures like economic sanctions to enforce its decisions.

29  United Nations, “India: a long and deep tradition of contributing to UN peacekeeping”. Accessed at https://news.un.org/en/gallery/541602

30 In March 2013 and August 2014, terrorist groups operating in Syria captured Filipino and Fijian UN troops and held them hostage. The Security Council has not prosecuted these groups or member-states supporting their activities.

31  Between October 2013 and February 2019, as many as 191 UN troops had been killed by terrorists operating in Mali. The Security Council has not been able to prosecute any of these terrorists so far.

32  These four PKOs are MONUSCO in the Democratic Republic of Congo, UNMISS in South Sudan, MINUSCA in Central African Republic and MINUSMA in Mali.

33  Narendra Modi, “India’s commitment to UN peacekeeping remains strong and will grow”, Speech at the Summit on Peace Operations, 28 September 2015. Accessed at https://www.narendramodi.in/statement-by-prime-minister-at-the-summit-on-peace-operations—356824

34  XinhuaNet, “Chinese State Councilor meets co-chair of inter-governmental negotiations on UN Security Council reform”, 1 March 2019. Accessed at http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2019-03/01/c_137861341.htm

35  United Nations, “Affirmative votes from two-thirds of its members will be required for decisions on Security Council reform, Assembly decides”, Document GA/9511 dated 23 November 1998. Accessed at https://www.un.org/press/en/1998/19981123.ga9511.html

36  United Nations, UN General Assembly Resolution 1907 (XVIII), 21 November 1963. Accessed at https://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/1907%20(XVIII).

    (This article is carried in the print edition of May-June 2019 issue of India Foundation Journal.)

 

 

India’s Afghanistan and Pakistan policy is intertwined as a hyphenated Afghanistan-Pakistan (Af-Pak) policy. Its Pakistan policy is centred around the Kashmir issue and is focused on preventing and countering export of violence in the region by Pakistan. India’s Afghanistan policy is also centred around security concerns, wherein it is perceived that terrorist violence in Afghanistan can have a spill over impact on India, especially in J&K. It can thus be seen that India’s policy towards both Pakistan and Afghanistan is designed to contain and neutralise violence that is being exported from its Western neighbours. Fundamentally, it is a human security policy expressed within the ambit of India’s national security policy doctrine.

India’s military gets into the frame when Pakistan supported terrorists attack military personnel and installations within India.1 Pakistan calls such personnel operating from its soil as non-state actors, but that is mere rhetoric as Pakistan actively aids and abets groups such as the Jaish-e-Mohammed, Lashkar-e-Taiba, Hizbul Mujahidin and others to attack targets in India, in effect waging a proxy war on the country.

Indian newspapers frequently write on the Indian economy being attacked through fake Indian currency notes (FICN), which originates in Pakistan and is pumped into India via Nepal and Bangladesh. They also regularly cover the sporadic violation of the ceasefire agreement between the two countries by Pakistan, wherein villages near the LoC (Line of Control) as well as the Indian troops deployed on the LoC are subjected to machine-gun and mortar fire from Pakistani positions. Unfortunately, no Indian newspaper ever covers the blatant abuse of human rights by the Pakistani establishment in Pakistan occupied Jammu and Kashmir (POJ&K). This includes both the region of Gilgit-Baltistan as well as the region of Mirpur-Muzaffarabad, called Azad Kashmir by Pakistan. This silence by the Indian media on what is happening in POJ&K is hard to explain. India still treats Pakistan with kid gloves, despite the fact that terrorist groups that carried out major attacks in India such as the attack on India’s Parliament, the attack on the Akshardham Temple and the Mumbai attacks to mention but a few, were all supported by the Pakistan military. Evidently, Pakistan is waging a proxy war against India, in line with its doctrine of ‘bleeding India with a thousand cuts’.2 Pakistan is also in illegal occupation of Indian territory (POJ&K). Pakistan continues to suppress these people, and the human rights abuses inflicted on this hapless population knows no bounds. They continue to be denied their fundamental rights and have no recourse against the atrocities being inflicted on them by the state. There is thus a need for India to review its policy with respect to the Af-Pak region and view it in a more realistic framework, to enable the charting out of a fresh course which can bring peace to the region and which can have a beneficial impact on stability in South Asia and indeed on the world.

Until March 2019, Pakistan authorities were loathe to admit that they created ‘militants’. However, for the first time, such an admission came from no less a person than the Pakistani premier, Mr Imran Khan. Khan’s electoral rhetoric was venomously anti-India and it was due to his intransigence that both the Sindh and Punjab Assemblies of Pakistan passed resolutions regarding Kashmir against India. The admission from Khan was made in April 2019, while briefing a group of foreign journalists, wherein he stated that Pakistan created these ‘militants’ during the Cold War to fight the Soviet Forces in Afghanistan and that Pakistan is now ready to dismantle these assets. Khan also went on to state that both the Pakistan Army as well as its intelligence arm, the Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) are also of the same resolve.3

However, such statements make little sense and have even lesser sanctity. If, at any time in the future, the Pakistan military establishment wishes to withdraw the statement made by the Pakistani Prime Minister, then all that is required is that the Pakistani Assembly will pass a unanimous resolution disassociating itself from the statement made by Khan. There is thus no reason for India to feel elated at the statement given by Prime Minister Khan. By itself, it carries no weight and is worthless.

For some reason, many in India get carried away by such Pakistani theatrics. It must be remembered that a chance for peace was derailed by General Pervez Musharraf, when Pakistan attacked India on the Kargil heights. The Pakistani premiers attempt to remove Musharraf did not only not succeed, but resulted in a coup and the ouster of the elected Prime Minister himself! After the coup, Musharraf visited India and was accorded a red carpet welcome! It is only to be hoped that in future course of time, the likes of Hafiz Saeed, the head of the Lashkar-e-Taiba, are not accorded such VIP treatment! India thus needs to review its South Asia policy. As of now, the policy appears to be tactical, and has little strategic impact.

What exactly has changed since 2013 in Afghanistan and Pakistan? The period saw Nawaz Sharif being deposed from the office of the Prime Minister. It also saw the SAARC Summit becoming conditional to the drawdown of terrorism emanating from Pakistan. We have seen the flare up of tensions along the Durand Line with Afghan and Pakistani troops clashing across the Line. We also see the complete breakdown of the ceasefire agreement between India and Pakistan, with violations taking place almost on a daily basis. The period has also seen the emergence of ISIS in Afghanistan, which has been named the ‘Khorasan’ module, but which in effect is ISIS ‘Lahore’ module. There also appear to be Pakistani links to the 9/11 attacks in the US as also to the St. Petersburg metro blasts. In all, the security situation remains grim.

Pakistan-Afghanistan relations also exhibit similar indicators of unending conflict as existing in the India-Pakistan relationship, with all initiatives for peace coming to nought. It is unfortunate, that in the minds of the Pakistani establishment, Afghanistan is little more than a colony of Pakistan. The Pakistan government’s persistent meddling in the internal affairs of Afghanistan, with Prime Minister Khan seeking a change in government also adds to tension in the region. Another factor to be considered in this equation is the presence of three terrorist groups in Afghanistan: the Afghan Taliban, al-Qaida and the Islamic State. If Afghanistan has a truce with the Afghan Taliban, the latter is likely to be replaced by the ISIS. This game, if it can be called such, is unlikely to end, as it has too many players and too many conflicting interests.

The world apparently, has also not focused sufficiently on understanding, why a Sindhi student from Liaquat University of Medical and Health Sciences (LUMHS), in Jamshoro district, Sindh province, actually joined up with the Islamic State in Lahore. The student, NaureenLaghari, was arrested in Lahore, during a security operation. She was a brilliant student and never exhibited any extremist leanings, yet she chose to join the Islamic State and was planning, along with three other colleagues, to target Churches and Christian gatherings during the Easter festivities. It appears she was radicalised through the social media.4 It is apparent that the Islamic State has established roots in Afghanistan and Pakistan, as well as in other countries in South Asia. In April 2017, the US used a large yield bomb, the GBU-43/B Massive Ordnance Air Blast (MOAB), commonly known as “Mother of All Bombs” to destroy a network of tunnels and caves in Nangarhar province of Afghanistan, in which a large number of terrorists who were from the Islamic State were killed.5 According to Afghanistan Times, the cave complex also had some fighters who had earlier served in the Pakistan military as well as from groups such as the Lashkar-e-Taiba.

It is apparent that the Islamic State as well as other terrorist groups have a foothold in Afghanistan as well as in Pakistan. Both the countries also have indigenous movements which are fighting the state. Ultimately, what needs to be secured is human security for the entire South Asian region, but this can only come about if terrorism is eliminated from Pakistan and Afghanistan, which are the tectonic plates from which terrorism emanates. What therefore needs to be done to bring out this outcome?

The following requires consideration:

l  A return of all the fighters to their respective countries. This outcome is easier said than done, as fighters from Iraq, Syria, Yemen, Afghanistan, Indonesia, Philippines, Central Asia, Russia, China, Thailand, Africa, Europe and North America are  dispersed in various trouble spots across the world. On return, these fighters would need to be put through a process of de-radicalisation.

l  For the Muslim masses, the education system must now inculcate programmes, which can insulate the youth from embracing a radical culture.

l  There is a danger of the Pakistani nukes falling into the hands of radical groups. It may be worth considering if such assets could be shifted to Sindh, the only province so far in Pakistan that has not been completely radicalised. The government of Sindh too, needs to see that Punjabi influence, which has dominated life in the whole of Pakistan since 1947, is curtailed and there is greater space for regional aspirations. The Sindhi and Baloch Diaspora could also play a greater role in achieving such an outcome.

l  The international community, with India taking the lead, could look into the possibility of holding a referendum in Pakistan, in Sindh, Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, where the local people could vote to remain with the state of Pakistan. If the people desire to do so, then a state-building and state-making process along with the nation-making process in Pakistan should be kicked off. Based on the Lahore Resolution of 1940, Pakistan must transform itself into a confederation, or perhaps a union of Indus Republics.

For sustainable peace in the region, we could also look into the possibility of having an International Security Force intervention in Pakistan to eradicate terrorist elements, which have inflicted a reign of terror and insecurity, not only in Pakistan, but across the world.

For peace in south Asia, the initiative must be from within South Asia and not from outside the region. Prime Minister Modi has to some extent broken the mould when he spoke about the Rohingya issue and of the rights of the people of Balochistan. This change in the Indian approach must be pushed through with vigour by the Indian foreign policy.

(Mr. Zulfiqar Shah is a Sindh and Balochistan civil and political rights activist.)

References:

1   Some of the more dastardly attacks were the attacks on an Indian Air Force base in Pathankot in January 2016, attack on a brigade HQ in Uri in September 2016 and a suicide attack on a police convoy in Pulwama in February 2019.

2   Gates, Scott, Kaushik Roy (2016). Unconventional Warfare in South Asia: Shadow Warriors and Counterinsurgency. Routledge. pp. Chapter 4.

3   https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/09/world/asia/imran-khan-pakistan.html

4   https://tribune.com.pk/story/1386225/naureen-not-recruited-terrorists-university-lumhs-vc/

5   https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-39607213

(This article is carried in the print edition of May-June 2019 issue of India Foundation Journal.)

 

 

Pakistan’s endemic denials notwithstanding, the Pulwama carnage and its aftermath became a catalyst to cognizable shift in regional political scenario leaving its vibrations to reach other parts of the region under discussion. IAF’s Balakot blitzkrieg is a turning point in the three-decade-old Pakistan sponsored proxy war in Kashmir. Major world powers have begun to take a pragmatic view of India obliged to react to terrorist outrage in which the limits of her tolerance are subjected to a test. States have the prerogative of demonstrating their might in situations of self-defence.

The news of India’s airstrike on Azhar’sJaish stronghold was more stunning for China; it amounted to indirect rebuff to her for her sustained effort of taking Azhar under her protective wings against the Security Council’s resolve to designate him. It took the wind out of China’s sail. The first reaction which knowledgeable circles noted was Beijing’s subtle hint to Pakistan that she had to respond to the opinion of the world community. Ever since China vetoed the resolution for the fourth time and the big three decided to take the issue to an open debate, China was ill at ease and loath to be publicly exposed.

China’s antics of making the SC drop reference to Pulwama and Kashmir from the text of the resolution is to keep Pakistan in a state of false expectancy. Nonetheless, both know that after the resolution was passed the US, UK and France conceded in their individual statements that Pulwama proved the catalyst to the passing of a unanimous resolution. This is indirect recognition of India’s right to make bigger strikes on Pakistan-based terrorist installations if the need arises. India and the US are committed to taking joint action in a counter-terrorism bid.

Suspecting that Indo-Pak spat, if allowed to escalate, would gravely impact Afghan situation and the role of Pakistan and her army at Doha negotiations, the US seriously intervened to desist both India and Pakistan from crossing the red line.

The US achieved some success in its interventionist mission primarily because of a critical financial situation bedevilling Pakistan. American authorities bluntly told her that the US would not encourage IMF to sanction loans which Pakistan would pay to liquidate burgeoning Chinese debts.Pakistan’s economy at its nadir would not sustain a war with India for more than a day.

Not losing the sight of astute statesmanship, the Western powers very carefully maintained stoicism over two developments on Indo-Pak political chessboard. One was not to dig into or even randomly underplay India’s claim of having decimated the Balakot terrorist camp, and the second was to remain non-committal about IAF Mig shooting down an F-16 fighter craft of PAF. Though at one point of time India did raise the issue of Pakistan’s infringement of the conditions of sale of F-16s by the US to Pakistan but she mysteriously did not push the matter obviously because of American pressure to refrain from giving media hype to the vulnerability of her so-called impregnable F.16. The US did not like adverse impact on the marketing of her war machine.  The US and the western media somehow saw prudence in keeping the issue under wraps to the entire satisfaction of Pakistani GHQ. India, too, would not overplay Pak’s incredulous deniability. The world knew what Pakistan did not like it to know and forthwith release of Indian pilot was a face-saving rather than a goodwill gesture.

Somehow, the Indian media did not seriously debate the decision of the Modi government to give a green signal to Balakot airstrike. In the process, the recklessdomestic opposition front tried to play cheap vote bank politics and avoideddiscussing the situation from an exclusive nationalist perspective. It revealed its inherent weakness rather than an element of unbridled vengeance let loose during the election campaigning.

Modi government took ten days to frame the outlines of reacting to Pulwama carnage. The Balakot airstrike was less a tactical compulsion and more the unfolding of a decisive policy of meeting the challenge of terrorism emanating from our western neighbour. The PMO and the Defence Ministry both burnt the midnight oil in analyzing and anticipating the grave and perilous outcome of a proposed airstrike deep inside Pakistan. It meant war. India was prepared for an armed clash short of a nuclear strike. The Americans were kept informed and Beijing’s ownupdated intelligence input also spoke almost identically. Both were told that the time had come for cleaning the slate. In a grave situation like this, suspension of the ongoing election through a presidential decree would not be a surprise. That exigency, too, did not escape the notice of policy planners.This objective analysis is to be understood from repeated warnings by the Home Minister that India had to take all necessary steps to ensure her national sovereignty and territorial integrity.

When the news came next morning that PAF had tried to bombard our ammunition dumps and arsenals close to the border, the flash went from New Delhi.  It was a matter of hours not days. Not more than an hour was taken for emergent exchange of communication among Washington, Islamabad, UAE and New Delhi.

Heaving a sigh of relief, President Trump made a laconic remark pregnant with meaning.  He said that he was expecting good news from Islamabad. Imran Khan had to decide within minutes that Wing Commander Abhinandan, would be set free to go back to India that afternoon or the next day. The scare of a massive Indian missile attack on all airbases in Pakistan was so alarming as to force senior PAF officers to spend two or three nights in the bunkers and underground shelters. Pentagon czars would have laughed in their sleeves on hearing Prime Minister Imran Khan saying his decision to free the Indian pilot was an “expression of goodwill”.

De-escalation of tension is temporary because it is compulsive. Its stability is conditional upon Pakistan containing terrorism at home and playing a positive role in persuading Taliban for a peace deal in Afghanistan. For Pakistan, the priorities are (a) to mollify the US so that IMF loan could be obtained without loss of time, and (b) a face-saving mechanism that would help administration neither to antagonize nor fraternizing the terrorist organizations and their leaders.

At a recent news briefing, a senior US official told reporters that without getting involved in Pakistan’s internal politics, Washington expects her civil and military leaders to correct the situation. The official went on to say, “We support the fact that Prime Mister Imran Khan says right things and appears to be trying to make some changes within Pakistan, But only time will tell if he is successful in doing that.” Acknowledging that recently both civil and military leaders in Pakistan have taken steps to eliminate terrorism, the official said that Pakistan’s military was also supporting these changes. “So far, we do see support from the military to the direction that Prime Minister Khan seems to be going in,” he said.

The senior administration official noted that Pakistan was not only saying the right things, it had also taken some right steps. Elucidating what he meant by the right things, the official said that Prime Minister Khan was “very public about wanting stability in the region, pointing out how important that is for Pakistanis to prosper and to have economic development which is one of his core campaign promises”.

This statement of the American senior official gives the impression that Pakistan (meaning both civilian government and the GHQ) had found that they need to give a different direction to their state policy in the light of the ground situation. There is more of expectation than expediency in the statement of the American official, and hypnotizing that there is a mode of giving a new direction to her policy.What do we expect Pakistan to do? It has to dismantle the terror structure which is hydra-headed. The question is will that be a reality? This is not what we but what the world community and the peace-loving segments of Pakistani civil society will have to ask.  To put it crudely, will Pakistan army surrender to the diktat of the civilian government which it has been toppling whenever it desired to do so?

American officials believe that the Pakistan army is on board in regard to the dismantling of the terrorist structure. If that is the case, then it is the beginning of the end of Pak army’s long – tested superlative role in the framing of the foreign policy of that country.

In summing up this analysis, the note has to be taken of the 2-day visit of US Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, South and Central Asia, Alice G Wells to Pakistan on 29 April. This visit comprised two inter-connected components. The first component dealt with Afghan situation for which US Special Representative for Afghan Reconciliation Zalmay Khalilzad and his team held meetings with Pakistani officials with Wells in the chair. In the second component, Assistant Secretary Wells held extensive meetings with a wide variety of Pakistani official representatives that included top civil and military echelons with the Pakistan Army Chief Bajwa included among them. She also met with Pakistan think tank members and representatives of political parties. It is important to note that these wide-ranging talks and with a wide range of Pakistani officials (army in particular) indicate that the US wants to keep a close track on (a) What Pakistan would be doing in the context of finding a solution to Afghan crisis, and (b) what steps Pakistan will be taking to impose curbs on terrorist organizations operating from her soil against either Afghanistan or India in Kashmir. In her press conference, Secretary Wells made two very clear and unambiguous statements by way of response to the questions put to her by the media persons. She said (a) resumption of a peace dialogue between India and Pakistan depends on how far  Pakistan succeeds in imposing effective curbs on terrorism and denies terrorists all facilities for conducting operations against the neighbours, and (b) How far Pakistan plays a constructive and positive role in strengthening peace and normalcy in the South Asian region. Perhaps Ambassador Wells’ threadbare expression will not go down well with Pakistan, but then Pakistan has to re-assess the consequences of a frozen and fossilized policy in the South Asian region.

(Prof. K.N. Pandita is the former Director of the Centre of Central Asian Studies, Kashmir University, Srinagar. Views expressed are personal.)

 

“Friendship is a flowing river”, Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina Wajed quoted Mexican Nobel Laureate Octavio Paz in her Op-Ed article[i] in an Indian daily to describe India-Bangladesh relations. There is no doubt that Indo-Bangla friendship streams like a river, overcoming all the obstacles. Neighbours that share a porous land border of 4096.7 km, 54 rivers, culture, language and history, have always attempted to find a way to make things work. The two countries have genuine concerns for maintaining their fraternal relationship. With Awami League leader Hasina’s fourth term as the PM, Indo-Bangladesh bond remains strong and stable. Interesting enough, Awami League and BJP, the two incumbent parties, have a similarity in their party symbols. The boat of Awami and the lotus of BJP – both are aquatic.

Bangladesh has always been at the core of India’s neighbourhood policy. Dhaka’s foreign policy reflects the principles of Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). Dhaka is a beneficiary of Modi’s Act East policy – a revised, reviewed and renamed framework of Look East policy. In addition to South Asian Associationfor Regional Cooperation (SAARC), the regional clubs like Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC), Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Nepal Initiative (BBIN) and Bangladesh, China, India, Myanmar Forum for Regional Cooperation (BCIMforum) have presented additional opportunities to engage Dhaka and Delhi. Prime Minister Modi and Prime Minister Hasina Wajedvow to maintain the upward trajectory of Indo-Bangla ties.

High-level Visits and Transactions

The present India-Bangladesh relations are an outcome of highly transactional diplomacy. The two neighbours have inked several deals in recent years to strengthen bilateral relations.

Shirin Sharmin Chaudhury, the speaker of Bangladesh Parliament, attended Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s swearing-in ceremony on May 26, 2014. During his maiden visit to Bangladesh in June, 2015, PM Modi settled the forty-one-year-old boundary dispute. As per the Land Boundary Agreement 1974 and protocol of 2011, 51 erstwhile Bangladeshi enclaves in India and 111 erstwhile Indian enclaves in Bangladesh were physically transferred to the other country. India lost 10,000 acres of land in that land swap deal, but Narendra Modi won the hearts of thousands of Bangladeshis. In his hour-long address at Dhaka University, the Indian premier read out a few lines in Bengali and emphasized on Bangladesh’s successes on the social and economic fronts. Mamata Banerjee, Chief Minister of West Bengal, also joined the two leaders in Dhaka. The three leaders flagged off two Bangladesh-India bus services. Modi extended a fresh $2 billion Line of Credit (LoC) support for 15 projects to Bangladesh. Dhaka heaved a sigh of relief hearing the announcement of full disbursement of $200 million. The two South Asian supremos inked 22 agreements on different areas like cooperation in maritime safety, curbing human trafficking and fake Indian currency notes. Bangladesh made a few important announcements to appease India. Access to Chittagong and Mongla Ports made India happy. PM Hasina praised Modi for his charismatic role and Modi appreciated Sheikh Hasina for her farsightedness. The two premiers raised the global issues like climate change. PM Modi called on President Md. Abdul Hamid, former PM and opposition leader Khaleda Zia and many other dignitaries.

PM Hasina reciprocated Prime Minister Modi’s state visit. She has visited India five times since 2015. She got a warm reception – whenever she arrived in India. She attended the BRICS-BIMSTEC Goa summit in October 2016. A year later, Delhi hosted Prime Minister Hasina and extended an additional $4.5 billion third LoC support to Bangladesh in 2017, following China’s $24 billion LoC assistance. She came to West Bengal on a two-day official visit at Modi’s invitation in 2018. Hasina and Modi inaugurated the Bangladesh Bhavan, a Rs. 25 crore project of Bangladesh, at Shantiniketan in West Bengal. Chief Minister Mamata Banerjee had a tête-à-têtewith her. Kazi Nazrul University in West Bengal conferred an honorary D.Litt. degree on PM Hasina.

External Affairs minister Sushma Swaraj,her deputy VK Singh, Home Minister Rajnath Singh, Commerce minister Suresh Prabhu and other heavy weight leaders travelled to Bangladesh and announced many initiatives. President Md. Abdul Hamid,Abul Hassan Mahmood Ali, the then foreign minister of Bangladesh, visited India and made important announcements.

Trade

India surrounds Bangladesh on three sides plus there is a long maritime border. The two countries are connected through all modes of transport – land, air and waterways. The connectivity and transport facilities have propelled the growth of bilateral trade. Trade is the main driver of Dhaka’s foreign policy dynamics. The two burgeoning economies have fulfilled each other’s’ commercial requirements and ultimately become trade partners. The nation of 170 million is the largest regional trading partner of India. The trade between the two neighbours crossed $9.3 billion mark in 2017-18 financial year[ii]. Under the South Asian Free Trade Area (SAFTA) agreement, India allows duty and quota free entry to most of the Bangladeshi goods.

Bangladesh is the second largest garments exporter after China. India traditionally imports raw jute and jute products, apparels, hosiery products, knitwear, leather shoes, fruit juices, jams and pickles, fish from Bangladesh. In the last five years, trade between Bangladesh and India has soared. Informal and illegal cross-border trades remain unaccounted.  In spite of the security checkups, border patrolling and hi-tech surveillance of Border Security Force (BSF) and Border Guards Bangladesh (BGB), smugglers are expanding their empire.

The smuggling of fake Indian currency, cattle, gold, cough syrup and other goods has reduced in recent years – especially after Hasina and Modi’s arrival in power. Border-haats are set up in Tripura and Meghalaya to promote local businesses. The Economic Times reports, “The inflow of foreign direct investment (FDI) to the country has almost tripled during ruling Awami League’s nine years in office under Hasina.”[iii]

PM Hasina accompanied a business delegation, during her India visit in 2017. Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry (FICCI) and Federation of Bangladesh Chambers of Commerce and Industries (FBCCI), the two industrial ombudsmen of India and Bangladesh raised a six-point agenda to boost bilateral business ties as well as investment. They proposed to set up a Joint Task Force on Tariff and Non-Tariff Barriers and a Joint Task Force to promote business and investments in several sectors of Bangladesh. India-Bangladesh Chamber of Commerce and Industry was formed to boost the bilateral trade.

India’s newly implemented unified tax system GST has benefited the Bangladeshi entrepreneurs. Indian enterprises relish the taste of success in several business sectors in Bangladesh. Indian and Bangladeshi Inc inked a deal worth $9 billion to invest in Bangladesh. Reliance Power signed a deal worth $1billion with Bangladesh’s Ministry of power, energy and mineral Resources for the first phase of the 3000 MW power project at Meghnaghat in Bangladesh. Energy behemoth Adani Power signed an agreement worth $2 billion to supply 1600 MW of power from its Jharkhand plant to Bangladesh[iv]. Big Indian enterprises like Indian Oil Corporation, ONGC Videsh, Numaligarh Refinery Limited, Petronet LNG Ltd have significant presence in the oil and gas sector of Bangladesh.

 

Defence Diplomacy

Bangladesh is a success saga of defence. Mukti Bahini, with the help of Indian forces, heralded a new era in 1971. Bangladesh still expresses her gratitude to India for her liberation. During her 2017 India visit, PM Sheikh Hasina met with the families of seven Indian soldiers who died in the 1971 Liberation War. A cheque of Rs 5 lakh

Bangladesh and India, both are victims of terrorism. The two nations have not come out of the shock of deadly attacks on them. There are similarities between the attacks in Mumbai and Artisan bakery in Gulshan, Dhaka’s diplomatic enclave.

Modi and Hasina government have come forward to fight terrorism. The two leaders are hailed for remarkable success in strategic co-operation. The AwamiLeague government has been assisting India to crack down on northeastern militants. In recent years, India’s defence relation with Bangladesh is not competitive. The two defence forces co-operate and collaborate each other even though there are serious allegations against B[v]. During Awami League’s tenure, Bangladesh has shown a genuine concern for regional security. BGB (erstwhile BDR), Bangladesh Police, and Rapid Action Battalion (RAB) took several initiatives to curb terrorism, illegal trades and smuggling. BGB catches up with BSF, conduct flag meetings – whenever the situation demands. Policing the border is now easier through direct engagement of BGB and BSF.

India has provided expert training, technical and logistic support to Bangladesh defence forces. In a friendly gesture, Indian Air Force aircraft airlifted 25 Bangladesh Army officers and their spouses from Dhaka to New Delhi in 2018. A coordinated patrol (IN-BN CORPATby two naval forces was kicked off in last year. Indian forces reached Bangladesh with aids during severe natural disasters. Indian Navy’s rescue operation in 2017 after the cyclone Mora is the most recent example. Apart from BSF and BGB meetings, the forces of both the countries exchange communications and participate in tactical drills. Hosted alternately by the two countries, Exercise Sampriti is an important bilateral defence cooperation. The last edition of Sampriti was held in March 2019. The 36 East Bengal Battalion of Bangladesh and 9th Battalion of the Rajputana Rifles took part in the round held at Tangail, Bangladesh. The two countries have huge contributions in UN Peacekeeping operations.

Two agreements were signed in 2017 on co-operation in the peaceful use of nuclear energy and cooperation in the regulation of nuclear safety – during PM Hasina’s stay. Besides, an inter agency agreement was signed between the Global Centre for Nuclear Energy Partnership of India and Bangladesh Atomic Energy Commission. India’s Defence Services Staff College and Defence Services Command and Staff College of Bangladesh signed an MoU. An agreement was signed between the National Defence College of Bangladesh and India’s National Defence College. Prime Minister Modi extended a separate LoC support of $500 million to Bangladesh for purchasing defence hardware while Hasina was in India on a state visit in April, 2017.[vi]

Most recently, in March 2019, in a video-conference with PM Modi, Hasina condemned Pulwama terror attack and clearly stated about her government’s zero tolerance policy against terrorism. In the video-conference, she also asserted that Indo-Bangladesh relations have now become “a role model of good neighbourliness for the rest of the world.”

Diplomatic Outreach

The two nations have engineered give-and-take diplomacy. Dhaka’s “friendship to all, malice to none,” policy goes well with the South Block doctrine. Even though, BJP’s parliamentary victory was a matter of concern for the Islamic Republic, the two governments shook hands and became friends.

Modi government has taken a few remarkable initiatives to please Dhaka. A road in Delhi has been named after Bangabandhu. A Hindi edition of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman’s autobiography was released during Hasina’s state visit.[vii] A biopic of Bangabandhu, jointly produced by two countries, will be out by 2021. Several services have been started to tribute the Muktijoddhas such as five-year multiple entry visa for all Muktijoddhas and free of cost treatment for them.

India is literally empowering her partner Bangladesh. In addition to other aids under the ITEC programme, India is supplying 1.16 gigawatts of power to Bangladesh. The construction of India-Bangladesh Friendship Pipeline from Siliguri to Parbatipur is funded by India. India has contributed in road, water and railway construction, connectivity and other areas in Bangladesh. In the last seven years, Bangladesh has received three LoCs worth $8 billion from the Indian Government.

A Hindi chair was set-up in Dhaka University in January, 2017[viii]. ICCR is the bridge between two societies. India’s Yoga-diplomacy is drawing good responses from Bangladesh.More and more visas are being issued by both the governments. More patients from Bangladesh are now coming to Kolkata, Mumbai, Chennai, Delhi and Bangalore for treatment. While in Dhaka in 2018, Rajnath Singh and his Bangladeshi counterpart Asaduzzaman Khan Kama inaugurated world’s largest Visa Application Center.[ix] In Chennai, Bangladesh is opening her sixth diplomatic mission in India. The workers, toiling in India, hugely contribute to the economy of Bangladesh. Bangladesh receives almost half amount of its total remittances from her workers in India. Indian workers on the other side remit million rupees from Bangladesh.

Like their citizens, the two states have great affection for each other. Bangladesh boycotted the 19^th SAARC summit to protest Pakistan. Dhaka stood by India’s side in most of the cases – but the Sinophobia is irritating New Delhi. After Xi Jingping’s historic Bangladesh visit, Beijing has come closer to Dhaka. China is now a strategic partner and largest arm supplier of Bangladesh. Bangladesh is also the second largest destination for Chinese investment under the Belt and Road Initiative.

If the relation between the two governments deteriorates, the brotherhood of Islamic and separatist terror outfits will be stronger. Without Dhaka’s support, it will be very difficult for Delhi to defeat the insurgents and militants. On the other hand, Bangladesh is a den to ferocious species like Al-Qaeda,Jamaatul Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB), Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami Bangladesh (HUJI-B). The ISIS footprint in Bangladesh, terrifies all the South Asian states. After the Artisan attack, Pulwama terror attack and most recent carnage in Sri Lanka, South Asia should take the emerging security threats seriously.

India’s internal policy immensely affects Bangladesh. What happens in Bangladesh, impacts on her external relations. While the daughter of democracy at the helm of political affairs, critics say, the political plurality of Bangladesh is under threat. Religious minorities, freethinkers, activists and ahamadias are living in a dystopian democracy. Some Bangladeshis are relinquishing their nationalities and migrating to India and other countries.

On the other hand, New Delhi’s announcement of deporting infiltrators irked Dhaka. Teesta pact is not resolved yet as West Bengal Chief Minister vetoed. A dry and downstream Teesta affects nearly 21 million people in Bangladesh. There’s not adequate water in Teesta. If Bengal agrees to share Teesta water, people in West Bengal’s Teesta basin will suffer. While commenting on this PM Haisina said, “We sought water, but Didi (Banerjee) has given us electricity. However, we have got something.”

CM Banerjee has proposed of sharing water of Teesta’s cousin Torsa, Sankosh and Raidak. But it does not appear to be feasible. Dhaka has pulled off the proposal.A river can’t disobey the flow of politics. A river goes where the current takes her along. But in geo-politics, a set of interests leads a friendship. The two states have to ensure that their friendship continues to flow like a river.Politics not always stops at water’s edge!

(Ayanangsha Maitra is a freelance journalist, tweets @AyanangshaViews expressed are personal.)

[i] The Hindu, April 7, 2017 https://www.thehindu.com/opinion/lead/friendship-is-a-flowing-river/article17854490.ece

 

[ii] India proposes free trade agreement with Bangladesh, The Economic Times, Sep 26, 2018,

https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/economy/foreign-trade/india-proposes-free-trade-agreement-with-bangladesh/articleshow/65965232.cms

 

[iii] Bangladesh seeks wider investments from India, The Economic Times, September 26, 2018

https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/economy/foreign-trade/bangladesh-seeks-wider-investments-from-india/articleshow/65816460.cms?from=mdr

 

[iv] Bangladesh, India sign finance deal for Rampal plant, Dhaka Tribune, April 12, 2017

https://www.dhakatribune.com/business/2017/04/12/bangladesh-india-sign-finance-deal-rampal-plant/

 

[v] Why border killing has not stopped, Dhaka Tribune, Dec 27, 2017

https://www.dhakatribune.com/bangladesh/2017/12/27/border-killing-not-stopped

 

[vi] List of Agreements/MoUs exchanged during the State Visit of Prime Minister of Bangladesh to India (April 07-10, 2017)

 

https://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/28360/List_of_AgreementsMoUs_exchanged_during_the_State_Visit_of_PrimeMinister_of_Bangladesh_to_India_April_0710_2017

 

[vii] Bengali News Article, Daily ProthomAlo, April 8, 2017

https://www.prothomalo.com/bangladesh/article/1138351

 

[viii] Bengali News Article, Banglanews24, Jan 10, 2017

https://www.banglanews24.com/education/news/bd/546540.details