India has been seen as fastest emerging economy of the world. This has been possible due to strengthening of internal economic system necessary for overall growth as well as transformation in the foreign policy especially towards economic ties with many countries. India has also been seen by the world as a believer of multilateral relations instead of unilateral favourism.  India does not agree to uni-polar or bi-polar world order. It believes in mutual growth by means of cooperation in all fields with as many countries as possible given that the understanding is mutual.

Towards this, India has always been part of multilateral forums which are growth oriented. Being the key player in the South Asian as well as the Indian Ocean Region, India has been engaging many Asian and littoral countries on regular basis. It realised importance of the East Asian countries in 1990 and started active dialogue process with Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN). The then Look East policy has been transformed into Act East Policy and is the foundation of India-ASEAN relationship. Putting the Indian perspective for the IOR, of mutual growth in a secured environment as a priority, India also has shared vision SAGAR (Security And Growth for All in the Region) with all its oceanic neighbours. ASEAN is very important for India for competing in world economy especially against China. India aspires to grab 5% of global trade by 2020 and for that, friendship with ASEAN can prove to be an effective measure. China has been ahead of India in trading with SE Asian countries for more than a decade because of lack of connectivity and institutional linkages between India and these countries.

India has also been paying great attention to its neighbours under the ‘neighbourhood first’ policy. Out of the 10 ASEAN countries, Myanmar is the only one which shares its borders with 4 states of India and hence attains great importance as a bridge to ASEAN-India future relationship. Myanmar’s membership of ASEAN, BIMSTEC and Mekong Ganga Cooperation has introduced a regional/sub-regional dimension to bilateral relations and imparts an added significance to Myanmar in the context of India’s “Act East” policy.

Myanmar : An Old and Important Neighbour

India shares a long land border of over 1600 kms with Myanmar as well as a maritime boundary in the Bay of Bengal. Four north-eastern states – Arunachal Pradesh, Nagaland, Manipur and Mizoram – have a boundary with Myanmar. Both countries share a heritage of religious, linguistic and ethnic ties. India and Myanmar share close cultural ties and a sense of deep kinship, given India’s Buddhist heritage. Building on this shared heritage, India is undertaking some key initiatives in the restoration of the Ananda Temple in Bagan and the repair and conservation of a large number of damaged pagodas. Work on restoring and renovating two historic temples in Bodh Gaya built by Myanmar rulers King Mindon and King Baygyidaw have also been completed.

The origin of the Indian community in Myanmar is traced to the mid-19th century with the advent of British rule in Lower Burma in 1852. Yangon and Mandalay had a dominating presence of Indians in civil services, education, trade and commerce during British rule. There are varying estimates of 1.5-2.0 million people of Indian origin living and working in various parts of Myanmar. A large number of the Indian community (nearly 150,000) live in Bago (Zeyawaddy and Kuayktaga) and Tanintharyi Region and Mon State, primarily engaged in farming.

Present Relations with Myanmar

Trade Cooperation :  India is the fifth largest trading partner of Myanmar – its fifth largest destination for exports and sixth largest source of imports. Agriculture sector dominates the trade, particularly supply of beans and pulses to India ($809 million in 2016-17) and timber ($156 million). India’s exports to Myanmar include sugar ($424 million in 2016-17 & $67 million in 2017-18), pharmaceuticals ($178 million in 2017- 18), etc. A bilateral Trade Agreement was signed in 1970. Bilateral trade has been growing steadily and reached US $2.18 billion (2016-17) but declined to $1.6 billion in 2017-18, mainly due to imposition of quantitative restrictions by India on import of beans and pulses. India is presently the eleventh largest investor in Myanmar with an approved investment of US $743.642 million by 26 Indian enterprises. Most of India’s investments have been in the oil & gas sector.

Defence Cooperation : Defence cooperation between the two countries continues to strengthen. Exchanges of high-level visits, enhanced training cooperation, capacity building and support in provision of specific equipment and technologies have led to a more wholesome relationship and better understanding of mutual security concerns. Present Chief of Indian Army and Chief of Air Staff have visited Myanmar in 2017 and 2018 respectively and we hosted senior officers of Myanmar defence forces in reciprocation. Myanmar Army has displayed enhanced understanding of India’s security concerns and initiated measures to address them.

Disaster Relief : India has responded promptly and effectively in rendering assistance following natural calamities in Myanmar – during Cyclone Mora (2017), Komen (2015), earthquake in Shan State (2010), Cyclone Nargis in 2008 and the outbreak of influenza virus in Yangon in July-August 2017. Indian defence forces have actively participated in these HADR missions.

Development Cooperation : India has extended development assistance to Myanmar on generous terms and our assistance portfolio is now over $1.75 billion. The bulk of the assistance is grant-funded. The projects include the Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Transport Project (KMMTTP); the Trilateral Highway Project, which is an East-West corridor connecting our Northeast with Myanmar and Thailand; the Rhi-Tiddim road; assistance for border area development in Chin State and the Naga Self-Administered Zone by financing bridges, roads, schools and small health centres; assistance in setting up institutions for higher learning and research, namely Myanmar Institute of Information Technology, Advanced Centre for Agricultural Research and Education, Myanmar-India Centre for Enhancement of IT Skills, India-Myanmar Industrial Training Centres; capacity assistance in public health by supporting upgradation of Yangon Children’s Hospital and Sittwe General Hospital and the construction of a 200-bed women’s hospital at Monywa; the Rakhine State Development Programme; restoration and conservation of Ananda Temple in Bagan and the repair and conservation of 92 earthquake damaged pagodas; reconstruction of Yamethin Women Police Training Centre, etc.

Ongoing Projects

According to a statement issued by the Indian Embassy in Myanmar, “the landmark Land Border Crossing Agreement between India and Myanmar, signed on May 11, 2018, has been brought into effect with the simultaneous opening of international entry-exit checkpoints at the Tamu-Moreh and the Rihkhawdar-Zowkhawtar border between Myanmar and India.”

The idea is to have better connectivity by all means. It is in the interest of both the countries as Myanmar also is not a supporter of BRI and the infrastructure cooperation between India and Myanmar can counter Chinese debt oriented run-over. The tri lateral highway between India, Myanmar and Thailand is likely to be completed by next year. Similarly India-funded Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Transport Project (KMMTTP) will allow for sea-access for the landlocked North-eastern states of India via the Kaladan River in Myanmar. As far as air connectivity goes there are hardly any flights flying to Yangon directly from Indian cities. There is only one weekly Air India flight from Kolkata to Yangon and twice in a week from Delhi via Gaya. Most other flight services such as Thai Airways reach Yangon via Bangkok. On the other hand, the flight services from Myanmar to other East and Southeast Asian countries like Singapore, Malaysia, Taiwan, Japan and Bangkok are much more frequent and larger in number.1 Airlines from ASEAN countries carry twice the size of international passengers from and to India, compared to the passengers carried by all Indian airlines together.2

Connectivity of main land to NE states of India has been improving gradually and easy trans-border commute including by means of air, will further give an impetus to overall development of EAST.

Suggestions

Air Connectivity : Unlike earlier days, the NE states are better connected with major Indian cities nowadays. However it still has scope of getting better. Other than road connectivity, the air connectivity to major cities of NE can be improved. The Indian aviation sector is growing and is bound to prosper in future. Investment in NE aviation sector will not only connect local people better but also will offer faster and convenient passage to travelers from eastern neighbours, either for tourism or meeting business partners/relatives across borders. Given the terrain characteristics and short distances involved, small scale airlines having ATR aircraft with seating capacity varying from 50 to 100 shall be encouraged for operations within the local air space including Myanmar or maybe Bhutan, Nepal and Bangladesh also. For example there is a flight from Bhutan to Dhaka via Guwahati already.

The airline operators from Myanmar can be given permissions to land in small airports of NE states. The IAF can regulate the prohibited air space of NE states depending on timing of inbound and outgoing flights from Myanmar and same can be tied up for Indian operators. The entry and exit points can be fixed for ease of traffic management.

Bus Services : Other than having better trade opportunities at two border opening points (mentioned earlier), we can also improve bus services to connect local villagers or commuters for deepening the cultural bond. Assisting Myanmar authorities in improving road conditions to reduce travel time to selected cities like Mandalay (region of Ananda temple), Yangon etc will also boost tourism across borders. For example with better roads and widened bridges, the present travel time of 11 hours from Moreh (Manipur) to Mandalay can be reduced to about five hours.

Port Connectivity :  Work on the Kaladan project began after the governments of India and Myanmar entered into a framework agreement in 2008. The project aims to provide an alternate outlet to the landlocked North East which is heavily dependent on the narrow ‘Chicken’s Neck’ at Siliguri. Originally, the project was scheduled to be completed by 2014, but is expected to be operational only by 2019-2020 as all components of the project, including Sittwe port and power, river dredging, Paletwa jetty, have been completed, except the under construction Zorinpui-Paletwa road. However there is a need of actively pursuing the timely construction and starting the port to port service as soon as possible as we have seen that this delay is directly causing dent in India’s ambition to boost trade and economy in East Asian countries.

Medical Tourism : More high standard hospitals should be constructed in NE region so that it not only benefits Indian citizens staying in far flung areas of the region but it can boost medical tourism from neighbouring countries. Delhi and Mumbai hospitals are generally full with patients for West Asian countries. Similarly, for East Asian countries, NE cities can be preferable destination.

Educational Tourism : Many students from Myanmar are studying in China because of the proximity and China has made few concessions in students’ visa rules for Myanmar. But if we see number of Chinese students across the globe (mainly US, UK and Australia), we can understand that it is not China’s education system but soft power policy that is drawing students from SE Asian countries. India has much affordable and well reputed educational institutes, not only in metropolitan cities but important cities of NE India as well. Imphal in Manipur has good Regional Institute of Medical Sciences (RIMS), In Assam, Guwahati has Indian Institute of Technology (IIT) and Dibrugarh also has reputed technical colleges, Shillong in Meghalaya has North East Hill University (NEHU) and Indian Institute of Management (IIM) and then there are good National Institutes of Technology (NITs) in many states. We should boost educational tourism in order to attract students from Myanmar and other SE Asian countries in order to have a positive image of India in young minds of these countries and ensure a long lasting relationship in years to come.

Defence Interaction: In Dec 2018, delegation of military personnel from both countries exchanged visits as CBM. The Indian Air Force facilitated the travel of the Myanmar’s military officials in IL-76 aircraft, some of whom were accompanied by their spouses. It was a goodwill gesture and same if continued can further strengthen defence cooperation. Families of government officials can also enjoy touring if LTC facility is provided. Joint exercises between defence forces while paying attention on HADR drills also will have close ties established. The Myanmar air force has fleet of mix of Russian and Chinese aircraft. They should be invited for joint exercise in India as goodwill gesture to increase interoperability. These joint exercises will benefit both the counties in long run. The border areas are infected with rebel groups’ activities which are hampering timely completion of connectivity projects as well as economic growth of the region. These groups are funded and supported by other countries for thwarting the bi-lateral ties between India and Myanmar. Joint operations against such groups should be conducted as active defence cooperation.

Conclusion

Myanmar’s opening-up in recent years has made the country an arena of competition among established and new players. The democratisation, along with economic reforms, has unleashed new opportunities for India, which is determined to make up for lost time. With a creative blend of diplomacy and culture, the India-Myanmar relations can only scale new heights in days to come. We need to ACT EAST using SAGAR vision to have credible and reliable relation with this strategically important neighbour which is also a key link between India and ASEAN partnership.

(Wg Cdr Vikas Kalyani is a Senior Research Fellow at India Foundation. The views expressed are personal.)

 

References:

1     https://www.orfonline.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/IndiaMyanmar.pdf – India-Myanmar connectivity : Possibilities and challenges

2     http://ris.org.in/sites/default/files/Final_Air_Connetivity_Report-web.pdf

 

(This article is carried in the print edition of July-August 2019 issue of India Foundation Journal.)

As manifestations of definitive core-national interests and evolving aspirations, foreign policies are inherently dualistic constructs that involve elements of both strategic continuity and tactical dynamism. In addition to national interests and aspirations, foreign policy dynamics are governed by a country’s ideological underpinnings and outlook, and the overarching narrative of international politics. It is this interplay between continuity (in pursuing strategic national interests) and change (in the style and normative ideals of diplomacy) that constitutes the defining theme of India’s foreign policy towards China since 2014.

Any nuanced analysis of continuity or perceived departures in a country’s foreign policy template vis-à-vis another country needs to be foregrounded in a study of evolving strategic dynamics between the two nations. In the context of India-China relations, it can be persuasively argued that the strategic environment has continued to be defined by the same set of issues that existed prior to 2014.

While Indian foreign policy since 2014 has largely followed the established doctrine vis-à-vis the long-standing border dispute, new policy narratives have been fostered to deal with the  Belt and Road ‘grand-strategy’, skewed bilateral- trade economics, and China’s selective reading of terrorism. Further, there has been an enhanced effort to integrate India’s cultural ethos with its foreign policy outreach to counter China’s gradual penetration within India’s civilizational space through a state-funded and meticulously crafted strategy of embracing and appropriating Buddhism1.

To counter China’s growing footprint in South Asia and Indian Ocean Region, the country’s Foreign Policy has begun conferring an enhanced thrust upon geopolitics. This approach has been articulated through the idioms of ‘extended neighborhood’ and ‘Act East’, ‘neighborhood first’, and ‘Indo-Pacific’. Most Importantly, India has moved beyond the shibboleths of ‘non-alignment’ and has embraced the concept of ‘strategic and issue-based alignment’.2 While these formulations signify India’s larger strategic interests, their importance in India’s China policy cannot be over-emphasized.

In addition to the aforementioned issues, India-China dynamic is also governed by the PRC’s efforts to undermine India’s status as a global nuclear power under the pretext of its ‘all-weather friendship’ with Pakistan. The alliance with Pakistan and heavy investments in the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) have also fuelled Chinese ambitions to foresee a mediation role for itself in the Kashmir dispute. On both these issues, Indian foreign policy has followed strategic continuity that upholds India’s credentials as a responsible nuclear power, and reaffirms India’s traditional position on Kashmir being a bilateral issue.

While strategic contestation remains the overarching theme of India-China dynamic, the Doklam crisis of 2017 marked the watershed in this relationship. Not only did the 73-day-face-off demonstrated India’s firm position and resolve on the issue of territory and sovereignty, it made China recognize India as a strategic challenge almost for the first time3. Additionally, India’s robust stand at Doklam reaffirmed the country’s leading role in the South Asian geopolitics.4

India’s China Policy Since 2014: Breaks and Continuity with the Past

Beginning with the contentious issue of boundary demarcation between India and China, it is justified to assert that the 1988 paradigm continues to define the larger contours of India’s foreign policy approach towards the dispute. While the 1988 rapprochement between the two countries was noteworthy in many respects, it has tacitly relegated the boundary question as secondary in India-China dynamic5. The reluctance or inability on part of successive policy dispensations to establish a new modus vivendi to deal with this vexed issue has allowed the stalemate to linger on for several decades now.

Since 1988, India-China border dispute is largely managed by a framework that involves the   Agreement on the Maintenance of Peace along the Line of Actual Control in the India-China Border of 19936, the expert group talks, and the Special Representative (SR) Mechanism of 2003. While it is conventional wisdom to cite BPTA7 and its various avatars as ‘instruments of success’ in maintaining peace and tranquility along the India-China border, it is equally important to recognize that the SR mechanism has not yielded any tangible results even after 21 rounds of talks. However, it is important to recognize that since 2014, the mechanism has been approaching the boundary dispute with a more assertive vocabulary that emphasizes upon achieving ‘a fair, reasonable and mutually acceptable solution to the India-China boundary question at an early date’8. This constitutes a significant departure from the earlier formulations that committed the two countries to ‘discussions on a framework for a resolution of the Boundary Question’9.

In terms of political approach to the dispute, a new discourse was added to India’s foreign policy during Xi Jinping’s maiden visit to India in 2014 and Modi’s 2015 State visit to China. In a significant move, Prime Minister Modi raised the boundary issue at public forums as against keeping it confined as a recurrent topic in bilateral documents10. Ironically, this momentum and dynamism was not maintained during the Wuhan Summit – which in fact came under the backdrop of a border stand-off.

The very bedrock of the Wuhan summit was built on India’s sacrifice of the ‘Thank You India’ celebrations. This constituted a strategic retreat from the policy narrative that the country had initiated on Tibet in 2014 when SikyongLobsangSangey was invited to Prime Minister Modi’s oath-taking ceremony along with the Heads of all SAARC nations. If this invitation had signaled a new posturing by New Delhi, Wuhan provided the Chinese with a ‘new normal’ to deal with India. In the final analysis, while the summit achieved strategic compromise by India on Tibet, it did not secure any commitment from the Chinese side regarding India’s core national concerns.

It is important to note here that the joint statement issued at the end of the Wuhan summit included the formulation of ‘fair, reasonable and mutually acceptable settlement’ with regards to the boundary dispute11. The crucial missing link in this position is the emphasis upon ‘early settlement of the boundary question’ that was an integral component of the joint statements that were issued after the Modi-Xi State-level meetings in 2014 and 201512. In this context, the ‘strategic guidance’ issued to the officials at the end of the Summit largely constitutes yet another appendix to the CBMs (confidence building measures) regime that began with the 1993 Agreement. When read alongside the joint statement, the much hyped ‘strategic guidance’ appears to be a reiteration of the lexicon of ‘border management’ that has come to characterise the Border Question.

While it can be argued that the Wuhan Summit was directed towards restoring normalcy in India-China relations, it is equally pertinent to under-score that the summit came at a time when China was faced with an increasingly unfavorable domestic and international climate due to the trade war with the US and growing internal unrest (albeit muted) against the decisions taken during the 19th Party Congress. Though it is never advisable to undermine an adversary’s strength, times like these require countries to design foreign policy templates that offer a skillful combination of realpolitik and constructivist approaches and not commit themselves to a liberal positioning.

Notwithstanding the above discussed criticism, the Wuhan Meet can be justifiably credited for introducing the concept of ‘informal summits’ within the scope of India-China strategic dialogue. If institutionalized as an annual event, this mechanism of informal exchanges between the top leaderships of the two countries can go a long way in addressing the ‘political-will deficit’ that has kept the boundary issue in an imbroglio for several decades now.

With regards to ‘One China’, while India’s foreign policy continues to abide by the 2010 decision to not endorse this formulation, certain developments on this issue merit attention. In the middle of 2018, India’s national carrier, Air India was made to replace ‘Taiwan’ with ‘Chinese Taipei’ in the list of destinations on its website. While this move could have easily been projected as a business decision – if only for tactical reasons, the MEA decided to dub it as a reiteration of its official policy on Taiwan13. Though this turn of events does not exactly represent a departure from the 2010 policy, it certainly dilutes the strategic impact of this robust initiative. The fact that this development came in the post-Wuhan context makes it all the more crucial.

In yet another significant move on the ‘One China’ construct, India recognized Tibet as ‘Tibet Autonomous Region of People’s Republic of China’ in the 2014 joint statement and followed it up with the 2015 joint statement14. Needless to say, this move contradicted India’s consistent position since 2010 to not recognize Tibet as a part of China in any joint statements between the two countries. As against these initiatives, ‘One India’ policy has not found any mention in India’s recent dealings with the PRC.

Inarguably, the most successful demonstration of India’s foreign policy approach towards China has been on the issue of Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). BRI is not only China’s flagship foreign policy project, it bears Xi Jinping’s ‘personal signature’ in more ways than one. While the country has reiterated its unflinching position on India’s territorial integrity through its opposition to CPEC, India should be credited for shaping the emerging global narrative on connectivity and infrastructure finance by highlighting the predatory nature of China’s ‘debt trap diplomacy’.  In fact, India has not restricted itself to the criticism of BRI and has proposed an alternative in the form of ‘Asia-Africa Growth Corridor’.

Additionally, BRI has become China’s primary platform to advance its penetration within the South Asian landscape. In order to deal with increasing Chinese footprint in the country’s immediate periphery, India’s foreign policy re-invented the doctrine of ‘neighborhood first’. While the idea itself is not new, the concept was imbued with renewed strategic salience that involved reiteration of India’s cultural links with the South Asian nations and an enhanced thrust upon the issue of regional connectivity.

However, in spite of these initiatives, India still needs to address the perennial irritants in its relations with the South-Asian region. This policy vacuum has been utilized by China to acquire strategic space within this region.

Over the years, oppositional political discourse in all South Asian states (barring Bhutan) has expressed itself through an anti-India rhetoric. Moreover, alignment with China is employed as a tool in South Asian polities to demonstrate their strategic autonomy vis-à-vis India to their domestic audience. While this narrative has continued to define India’s regional  environment, India has not been able to create permanent constituencies in South Asian states that can safeguard its strategic interests across the entire political spectrum in these countries. Though this lack of strategic template has characterized all foreign policy establishments, the 2015 Nepal-blockade has proved to be the most negative articulation of India’s neighborhood policy in a long time. Even on the issue of connectivity, the progress has largely remained mixed. As a result, China’s increasing strategic thrust in the South Asian region continues to remain a challenge for India.

With regards to the Maritime Silk Road (MSR) component of the BRI, while continuity has been maintained in the policy of deepening strategic interests in the region, India’s stand on the Indo-Pacific construct remains in stark contrast to the much touted policy of ‘issue-based alignment’. While more negotiations regarding the scope and nature of the proposed architecture were due, India did not have to altogether reject the concept’s credentials of being a ‘strategy’15.

Furthermore, India crafted the novel approach of reimagining its strategic geography and extending it to Southeast Asia. In order to fully realize the scope of this ‘extended neighborhood’, a constructive effort was made to connect the South and Southeast Asian spaces through the idiom of Buddhism and physical connectivity. The evolution of ‘Look East’ into ‘Act East’ was integral to this strategic outlook. Another dimension of this policy is that it allows India greater strategic presence within the South China Sea.

Inclusion of cultural diplomacy within the dynamics of the ‘Act East’ construct has been one of the novel and most significant foreign policy conceptualizations by India in recent times. While this policy is important for varied reasons of diplomacy, it entails definitive strategic component with regards to China. By placing Buddhism on India’s diplomatic agenda, India has offered a potent counter to China’s consistent efforts at assuming the leadership of the global discourse on this philosophy.

In fact, Buddhism is one of the key pillars of China’s outreach to Nepal. Moreover, ownership of Buddhism narrative is indispensable to China’s hold over Tibet and its attempts to place pro-China spiritual leaders within the pantheon of Tibetan Buddhism.

Further, in pursuance of its policy of ‘strategic alignment’, India has forged closer ties with US, Japan and Vietnam. While these partnerships have evolved over the consistent work of several decades, it needs to be recognized that the last five years have imbued them with a new momentum and energy. Today, India’s relations with these countries have moved beyond the dynamics of bi-laterals and have acquired the status of ‘comprehensive strategic partnerships’16 that involve an ever increasing military dimension. As has been mentioned elsewhere in this article, while such developments need not be viewed entirely from the perspective of India-China binary, they nevertheless remain central to India’s foreign policy approach vis-à-vis China.

The issue of Trade Deficit continues to be a work in progress. While India has reportedly reduced the deficit by 10 percent recently, this largely remains an outcome of the US-China trade war. As such, India needs to continue with its efforts to secure more favorable and justified trade terms with China – both at the bilateral level as well as under the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) framework.

With regards to the domination of India’s smartphone sector by the likes of Huawei and ZTE, India urgently needs to revisit its policies. While an outright ban is neither advisable nor tangible, India should participate in the global narrative being led by the US regarding the strategic designs of these companies, and insist upon operational transparency by these Chinese giants.

Finally, it can be concluded that ‘dynamism’ and ‘assertive posturing’ constitute the two recurrent themes of India’s foreign policy approach towards China since 2014. In the last five years, the most articulate expressions of this policy narrative have been the Doklam issue and India’s position on the BRI. Additionally, India’s foreign policy template towards China is now governed by the ideal of ‘strategic and issue based alignment’. This newly crafted ideology and India’s thrust upon cultural diplomacy have allowed the country greater maneuverability space against China’s expansionist policies in India’s sphere of interests. With these elements, India’s new foreign policy constitutes a template for its leadership role in world politics.

(Ms. Shikha Aggarwal is a Senior Research Fellow at India Foundation. Views expressed are personal.)

References:

1     One of the primary initiatives by China in this regard is the ‘World Buddhist Forum’.

2     This conceptualization was introduced by Foreign Secretary Vijay Gokhale at the 2019 edition of the ‘Raisina Dialogue’.

3     This assertion is borne out of at least two articles that have been written by well-established Chinese commentators Yi Guoming and Li Yang. The Papers can be accessed at http://www.cwzg.cn/politics/201707/37313.html, and http://www.kunlunce.com/gcjy/zxzz1111111/2017-12-21/121772.html. Additionally, one of China’s foremost strategic experts, Prof. Shen Dingli has described Doklam incident as one of China’s five major foreign policy failures. This comment can be accessed at https://www.voanews.com/a/china-great-power-diplomacy/4038160.html

4     This assertion is rooted in the fact that Doklam is a disputed territory between Bhutan and China. India had stopped China’s incursion in Doklam under the spirit of ‘India-Bhutan Friendship Treaty’ of 2007. The treaty can be accessed at https://mea.gov.in/Images/pdf/india-bhutan-treaty-07.pdf

5     This assertion is borne out of the fact that while India-China relations in areas of political, cultural, economic and defense exchanges have deepened steadily, progress has been elusive in terms of actual demarcation the boundary between the two countries. The status report on India-China bilateral relations for the years 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017 can be accessed at:

       https://www.mea.gov.in/Portal/ForeignRelation/China_September_2014.pdf

       http://www.mea.gov.in/Portal/ForeignRelation/Indiachina_bilateral_relations.pdf

       https://www.mea.gov.in/Portal/ForeignRelation/China_07_12_2016.pdf

       https://www.mea.gov.in/Portal/ForeignRelation/China_October_2017.pdf

       The status report on bilateral relations for 2012 can be accessed at:

       https://mea.gov.in/Portal/ForeignRelation/China-January-2012.pdf

6 The agreement is available at: https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/CN%20IN_930907_Agreement%20on%20India-China%20Border%20Areas.pdf

7     The 1993 agreement is referred as the Border Peace and Tranquility Agreement (BPTA) is general discourse

8     The formulation appears in the official Press Releases of the SR mechanism. The press releases for the talks since 2014 can be accessed at: https://www.mea.gov.in/media-advisory.htm?60/Media_Advisory

9     The formulation appears in the official Press Releases of the SR mechanism. The press releases for the talks prior to 2014 can be accessed at: https://www.mea.gov.in/media-advisory.htm?60/Media_Advisory

10 The Prime Minister’s Press Statement during President Xi Jinping’s 2014 India visit can be accessed at https://www.mea.gov.in/Speeches-Statements.htm?dtl/24014/

11  The joint statement can be accessed at : https://www.mea.gov.in/press-releases.htm?dtl/29853/IndiaChina_Informal_Summit_at_Wuhan

12  The two joint statements can be accessed at : https://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/24022/Joint+Statement+between+the+Republic+of+India+and+the+Peoples+Republic+of+China+on +Building+a+Closer+Developmental+Partnership,  https://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/25240/Joint_Statement_between_the_India_and_China_during_Prime_Ministers_visit_toChina

13 The statement by the MEA spokesperson can be accessed at: https://www.mea.gov.in/media-briefings.htm?dtl/30035

14 ibid 9

15 India declared its official policy on the Indo-Pacific at the 2018 Shangri La Dialogue. The PM’s speech can be accessed at https://www.mea.gov.in/Speeches-Statements.htm?dtl/29943/Prime+Ministers+Keynote+ Address+at+Shangri+La+Dialogue+June+01+2018

16 India-Vietnam ties were elevated to ‘comprehensive strategic partnership’ in 2015.

       India – Japan relations were upgraded to ‘Global and Strategic Partnership’ in 2014.

    (This article is carried in the print edition of May-June 2019 issue of India Foundation Journal.)

 

Introduction:

The National Democratic Alliance government led by Prime Minister Narendra Modi has registered many successes in diverse areas since it assumed power in May, 2014. Possibly one of the most significant spheres is foreign policy. While India’s expanding relations with the United States and Japan as also its tensions with China and Pakistan have found extensive mention in popular media as well as in discussions by scholars, practitioners and think tanks, adequate space has not been devoted to India’s outreach to and momentous accomplishments in strengthening its partnerships to its West with Afghanistan, Central Asia and West Asia. Countries in these regions are extremely important for India not only for its security and stability but also for its energy security, trade, investment as well as the welfare of its 9-million strong diaspora in the region.

Central Asia:

India has several millennia old historical, cultural and civilisational links with Central Asia. Brisk trade of goods, ideas and thoughts took place from India (and China) to Central Asia and beyond over the Silk Road from 3rd century BCE to 15th century CE. Buddhism travelled to Afghanistan, Central Asia and Western China from India through the Silk Road. The region was part of Emperor Ashoka’s kingdom in 3rd century BCE. Alexander of Macedonia, Kushans, Babar, Mughals and Sufism are evidence of vigorous links between India and the region over the ages. India and the Central Asian Republics (CARs) enjoyed vibrant economic and cultural ties when the latter were a part of the Soviet Union in the 20th century.

Notwithstanding the strategic and economic significance of Central Asia, the region was not accorded adequate importance by India’s political leadership for much of the period since the countries gained independence in 1991. The then Prime Minister PV Narasimha Rao recognised the strategic importance of the region and visited Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan in 1993 and Turkmenistan and Kyrgyzstan in 1995. After 1995, for a period of 20 years till 2015, only 4 Prime Ministerial visits from India to the region took place viz, by Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee to Kazakhstan in 2002 (in continuation of his participation in the regional Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia) and Tajikistan in 2003, and by Dr Manmohan Singh to Uzbekistan in 2006 and to Kazakhstan in 2011 on way back from the BRICS Summit in China.

This evident neglect was corrected by Prime Minister Modi soon after assuming power. He took the initiative to visit all the five countries of the region in July, 2015, two of them (Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan) before going to Ufa in Russia for the BRICS/SCO Summit, and three of them (Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan and Tajikistan) on the way back. This provided a strong impetus to bilateral ties. Since then, PM Modi has travelled twice more to the region, once in 2016 to Tashkent, Uzbekistan and again in 2017 to Astana, Kazakhstan to participate in the annual Summits of member countries of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO). The Indian PM will travel again to the region to Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan in June, 2019 to attend the next SCO Summit. On the side-lines of all these Summits as also of the SCO Summit in Qingdao, China in June, 2018, PM Modi met leaders of the four Central Asian countries (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan) which are members of SCO.

The then President Almazbek Atambayev of Kyrgyzstan and President Emomali Rahmon of Tajikistan visited India in December, 2016. The new President of Uzbekistan ShavkatMirziyoyev who has launched several far-reaching and visionary initiatives in domestic, economic and foreign policies of his country visited India twice within a span of four months. His first visit was a bilateral State visit in Oct, 2018 and the second came in January, 2019 for the Vibrant Gujarat Summit. All these visits and interactions have led to a dynamic upsurge in bilateral interactions and cooperation in political, economic, defence and cultural spheres.

India became a full member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation in 2017. In addition to the lack of direct geographic contiguity and connectivity, one of the important causes for India’s failure to take full advantage of its historical and civilizational linkages with this region has been the inadequate interactions and meetings between the leaders of India and CARs. India’s membership of SCO has sought to address this lacuna in a substantial manner. It is well understood that in Central Asian countries, most decisions of significant importance and value, both political and economic, are taken by Presidents of the countries and not at a Ministerial level. The regular and frequent meetings at the highest political level can be expected to provide a fillip to India’s ties with these countries and the region in the coming years. In addition to meetings at the highest level, several meetings at Ministerial and official levels have also taken place. These have led to discussions on expanding understanding and cooperation in diverse areas.

Although India enjoyed direct access to the region over millennia through the current day Pakistan and Afghanistan, it is not able have a direct connect with Central Asia today because Pakistan does not permit people, goods and traffic to travel from India to this region using its territory. To circumvent this obstacle, India pro-actively focused on developing connectivity routes to Central Asia and Afghanistan via the Chabahar project and the International North South Transport Corridor (INSTC). Although these projects had been planned many years ago, they were taken in hand seriously only over the last 5 years. A trilateral Agreement was signed by PM Modi with Presidents of Iran and Afghanistan during his visit to Iran in May, 2016. Within 18 months, the first phase of renovation and upgradation of Chabahar port from 2.5 million tonnes to 8.5 million tonnes was completed and inaugurated by the Iranian President in December, 2017. Further work on expansion of Chabahar and connecting it by a rail link to Zahedan and then onwards to Malik/Zaranj on the Iran-Afghanistan border is under way. Uzbekistan has expressed interest in linking with this connectivity initiative by joining a railway link from Termez to Herat. India also acceded to the Ashgabat Agreement in February 2018. This will help in smooth and streamlined flow of goods between Central Asia and India. India joined the Convention on International Transport of Goods Under Cover of TIR Carnets (TIR Convention) in August, 2018, under which the first consignment arrived without any obstacles from Afghanistan via Chabahar in March, 2019. This will help India and Central Asia to enhance their economic cooperation.

India is an energy deficient country. This region is extremely well endowed with energy, mineral and natural resources. Both India and Central Asia are a perfect match for each other. The challenge is to transport the energy resources from these land-locked states to India. The region offers significant trade, investment and economic opportunities to Indian businesses. Indian private sector needs to take aggressive and determined measures in prospecting and exploiting economic potential in these countries through joint ventures, export of services, bidding for World Bank, ADB and other multilaterally funded infrastructure projects etc.

India has been importing uranium from Kazakhstan since the bilateral civilian nuclear deal was signed during visit of Kazkah President Nursultan Nazarbayev to India as Chief Guest at India’s Republic Day in January, 2009. Recently this Agreement was further extended to import another 3,000 tonnes of uranium ore by India. Kazakhstan has the world’s second largest reserves of uranium ore and is the world’s largest producer of this mineral. During the visit of Uzbek President to India in October last year, it was agreed to import 3,000 tonnes of uranium from Uzbekistan also.

Work on Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India gas pipeline has been speeded up over the last five years. Work in Turkmenistan on laying the pipeline appears to have been completed while that in Afghanistan commenced more than a year ago. The likely date for completion of the project is 2020 but could slip by a few months.

In a significant development, Kazakh troops were deployed in November, 2018 under Indian command as UN peacekeepers in Lebanon. It is for the first time in Indian history – whether in UN missions or otherwise – that an Indian Army unit has been broken down by replacing one of its own companies with a foreign company.

Central Asian Region has always constituted the extended neighbourhood of India. India’s outreach to this region since PM Modi assumed power has seen a significant upswing in political, strategic, economic, commercial, defence, counter-terrorism, cultural spheres and enhanced people-to-people contacts.

Afghanistan:

India and Afghanistan have a strong relationship based on cultural and civilizational links. The relationship is not limited to only the governments in New Delhi and Kabul but has its foundations in historical contacts and exchanges between the people. Transfer of power in New Delhi and Kabul in 2014 took place within a few months of each other. After a protracted political process, President Ashraf Ghani and CEO Abdullah Abdullah assumed power in September, 2014. The first visit by Abdullah Abdullah to India took place in March, 2015 followed soon thereafter by Ashraf Ghani in April, 2015, a full seven months after assuming the Presidency. Before coming to India, Ghani had already travelled to Pakistan, USA, Iran, China, Saudi Arabia and some other countries. Ghani’s decision soon after assuming power to suspend the request for supply of arms was initially viewed as a setback for Indo-Afghan strategic ties. Besides, his decision to visit China and Pakistan ahead of India was also viewed as a snub to Delhi.

Since his election Ghani tried to improve relations with Pakistan, which in turn could pave the way for peace talks with the Taliban. His first visit after becoming President was to Pakistan in November, 2014. However, after many terror attacks in Afghanistan from Pakistan, and failed Taliban peace talks, Ghani grew increasingly cold to Pakistan and called it the “center of the Taliban.”

Notwithstanding the late and uncertain start to bilateral ties after assumption of power by Ghani, relations have warmed and improved significantly over the last 4 years. Two long-pending projects viz the Parliament building and the Salma dam (Afghanistan-India Friendship dam) were completed at rapid speed and handed over to the Afghan authorities, the first in December, 2015 and the second in June, 2016. By getting these two prestigious and iconic projects completed expeditiously after coming to power, PM Modi sent out a strong message that India will meet its commitments and deliver on its promises on time. In August 2016, PM Modi also jointly inaugurated through video conferencing the restored Stor Palace in Kabul with President Ghani.

India-Afghanistan partnership has always been characterized by high level exchanges. Over the last four years, the frequency and regularity of such visits witnessed a sharp increase. Bilateral trade crossed the US $ 1 billion mark. The two sides successfully organised the India-Afghanistan trade and investment show in Mumbai in September, 2018 and strengthened connectivity, including through Chabahar port and Air-Freight Corridor. Under the New Development Partnership, both sides are implementing   116   High   Impact Community Development Projects in 34 provinces of Afghanistan. These important investments are in areas of education, health, agriculture, irrigation, drinking water, renewable energy, flood control, micro-hydropower, sports and administrative infrastructure. On-going programmes for education, capacity building, skills and human resource development of Afghanistan, one of the largest such programmes in the world, was extended for a further period of five years from 2017 to 2022. India offered 500 scholarships for children of martyrs of Afghan Security Forces and gifted four Mi-25 Attack helicopters to the Afghan Air Force. India agreed to implement some important new projects such as the ShahtootDamand drinking water project for Kabul that would also facilitate irrigation, water supply for Charikar City, road connectivity to Band-e-Amir in Bamyan Province that would promote tourism, low cost housing for returning Afghan refugees in Nangarhar Province to promote their resettlement, a gypsum board manufacturing plant in Kabul to promote value added local industry and for import substitution, and a polyclinic in Mazar-e-Sharif.

The inauguration of the Dedicated Air Cargo Corridor in June 2017 between Kabul-Delhi and Kandahar-Delhi has provided a fresh impetus to bilateral trade. In December 2017, Kabul-Mumbai Air Cargo Corridor was also inaugurated. The Air Corridor has ensured free movement of freight despite the barriers put in place due to the denial of transit by Pakistan. It has been decided to further strengthen the corridor and expand it to other cities in India. Several thousand tonnes of cargo has already been transported in the Air Corridor since its inauguration.

India has supported the people and Government of Afghanistan in their efforts to build a united, sovereign, democratic, peaceful, stable, prosperous and inclusive nation. India supports all efforts for peace and reconciliation in Afghanistan which are inclusive and Afghan-led, Afghan-owned and Afghan-controlled. India has advocated the need for a sustained and long-term commitment to Afghanistan by the international community. India has been opposed to involvement of Taliban in the peace process till it renounces violence and accepts the Constitution of Afghanistan. In recent months, for a variety of reasons, most of the international players active in the region have come around to the view that Taliban will need to be a part of the final resolution to the conflict in Afghanistan. Although this is against the stated position of both India and Afghanistan, both countries participated through presence of non-official representatives in the meeting organised by Russia in Moscow in November, 2018 in which for the first time Taliban representatives also participated. India is actively engaged with a number of countries on bilateral, regional and plurilateral basis as well as in different formats to find an acceptable solution to the ongoing conflict in Afghanistan. Although the coming months pose a formidable challenge, India has reiterated that it is committed to work with like-minded countries to arrive at a solution for a safe, secure, peaceful and prosperous Afghanistan.

West Asia:

India’s vigorous and dynamic relations with West Asian countries represent one of the brightest achievements of India’s foreign policy over the last five years. India today would be one of the very few, if not possibly the only country, which has excellent relations with all countries of the region. India enjoys strong relations with Saudi Arabia as it does with Israel. India has robust relations with United Arab Emirates as it has with Iran. With other countries in the region like Qatar, Syria, Bahrain, Oman, Egypt, Turkey etc India maintains warm ties.

This region is vitally important for India’s safety, stability, energy security and economic well-being. This region is home to about 9 million Indians who travelled to that region for better job opportunities in the wake of the oil boom in the 1970s.  70% of India’s imported oil needs and 90% of gas requirements come from West Asia. This dependence will only increase as the Indian economy continues to grow at 8 per cent or more. Indian diaspora in West Asia remits about 55% of the total inward remittances to the tune of about US$ 45 billion into the country. This inward flow of funds is extremely important for India to balance its current account deficit. Safety and security of the Indian people is extremely important for the Indian government. Hence stability in the region is of great interest to India. The region represents a significant market for Indian goods and also a source of large investments into India for India’s infrastructure and economic development.

Since the BJP-led government came to power in 2014, the Arab governments were somewhat wary that because of the well-known personal rapport between PM Modi and Israeli PM Netanyahu, India might adopt a pro-Israeli policy at the expense of traditional relations with them. Also, the Palestinian cause could suffer. These misgivings were soon dispelled. Starting with his first visit to the region to UAE in August, 2015, PM Modi travelled to Qatar and Saudi Arabia as well as to Iran over the next one year. Many leaders from the region also visited India. Crown Prince of UAE was the Chief Guest on India’s Republic Day in 2016. Far reaching collaboration in security, defence, counter-terrorism & intelligence were the major outcomes of these visits. Joint Statement with UAE was noteworthy as it prohibited Pakistan to use UAE territory for anti-India activities which had hitherto been the case. In addition, several accused Indian origin terrorists were extradited to India. Moreover, several billions of dollars of strategic investments in India have been agreed to by these countries.

Reaffirming importance of this region and particularly of UAE, PM Modi visited UAE the second time in 2018 after his visit to Palestine. Several MoUs were signed in railways, energy sector, financial services and manpower. But for the first time a MoU between an Indian consortium (OVL, BPRL & IOCL) and Abu Dhabi National Oil Company (ADNOC) was signed that allows the acquisition of 10% participating interest amounting to US$600 million in Abu Dhabi’s offshore Lower Zakum concession for 40 years.

The crowning pinnacle of India’s relations with UAE and the Islamic world in general came in early March, 2019 when India was invited as the Guest of Honour to the 46th Meeting of Foreign Ministers of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation. This was done in the face of threat from Pakistani Foreign Minister that he would boycott the Meeting if invitation to the Indian EAM was not withdrawn. The Foreign Minister of UAE refused to get blackmailed as a result of which Pakistan FM did not attend the meeting. Statement by UAE foreign minister that ‘’the friendly country of India’’ had been invited ‘’as guest of honour in view if its great global, political stature as well as its time-honoured and deeply rooted cultural and historical legacy, and its important Islamic component’’ clearly demonstrates the huge distance that India’s relations have travelled not only with UAE but with all countries in the region.

The first ever visit by an Indian Prime Minister to Israel was undertaken by PM Modi in April, 2017. This was followed by a week-long visit to India by Israeli PM Benjamin Netanyahu in January, 2018. Both these visits provided a huge impetus to bilateral ties. Soon after coming to power, PM Modi met his Israeli counterpart on the side-lines of the UN General Assembly meeting in New York in September, 2014. Israel has emerged as a major and reliable security, intelligence and counter-terrorism partner for India. In defence, it is the third largest supplier after Russia and USA. Reputed for its arid agricultural technologies, it has become a close partner in India’s food security initiative. S&T and Cyber Space as well as intelligence cooperation have become new frontiers of cooperation.

On the issue of Palestine, India has maintained its principled stand but has de-hyphenated the relationship from that with Israel. Before visiting Israel, PM Modi received President Mahmoud Abbas in India and assured him of India’s consistent political and economic support. India stuck to its ethical position by voting against the US move at UNGA to shift its Embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. Also, PM Modi became the first Indian Prime Minister to visit Palestine-Ramallah in February, 2018. In fact, the Palestinian leadership which has discarded US as an honest broker of peace hopes that India perhaps could play a more proactive role in the Middle East.

PM Modi went to Ramallah via Amman, Jordan where he had extensive discussions on counter terrorism, deradicalization and economic and security collaboration as well as on issue of Jerusalem and Palestine. King Abdullah II of Jordan who was on a visit to Pakistan and UAE, cut short his visit and returned earlier to meet PM Modi.

Within weeks, King Abdullah II paid a highly significant State visit to India, after a gap of 12 years when over a dozen agreements and MoUs were signed including on defence cooperation that has hitherto been elusive due to Jordan’s close relations with Pakistan. Jordan has emerged as a key collaborator in India’s food security initiative. Being rich in shale deposits, it could become a reliable partner in India’s energy security scenario.

Visit by Iranian President to India in February, 2018 was significant for the message it conveyed that India conducts its foreign policy independently and based on its national interests. In addition, notwithstanding the threat of US sanctions, India has continued to import significant quantities of oil from Iran to meet its energy needs, as also to develop Chabahar to promote connectivity to Afghanistan and Central Asia. During the visit of President Rouhani, nine MoUs across a wide spectrum were signed. One of the most important was to create a mechanism for Rupee-Rial trade through Asian Clearing mechanism that would overcome the risk of being hit by sanctions on import of oil from Iran.

PM Modi also paid a visit to Oman in February, 2018. Oman has maintained good relations with Iran and other GCC countries and can act as a reliable interlocutor in intra-regional affairs and conflicts. India and Oman relations have been very close and historic. Apart from deeper trade and economic engagement Oman has been a significant defence and anti-piracy partner for India. During the visit eight agreements were signed in military, health, tourism, judicial cooperation, and space sectors. India will be able to use the Duqm port for its military logistical requirements. This fits well in its SAGARMALA initiative and maritime security. This was further supplemented by the Agreement India signed with France during President Macron’s visit to India allowing India to use its naval bases and facilities in the region.

This proactive outreach has yielded significant results not only in the fields of security, counterterrorism, defense and de-radicalisation, but also in the area of trade and investment. Joint military and naval exercises were held with UAE for the first time. Defence, intelligence and counter-terrorism cooperation have started acquiring greater salience. UAE has agreed to raise its investments in India, including through the establishment of UAE-India Infrastructure Investment Fund, to reach a target of US$ 75 billion to support India’s plans for rapid expansion of next generation infrastructure, especially in railways, ports, roads, airports and industrial corridors and parks. UAE has also agreed to participate in the development of strategic petroleum reserves, upstream and downstream petroleum sectors, and collaboration in third countries.

During PM Modi’s visit in 2015, UAE agreed to allot land to build a Hindu temple in Abu Dhabi. This will further enrich cultural and people-to-people ties. The dynamism in India’s relations with West Asia can be ascertained from the fact that Saudi Arabia, UAE and Palestine have conferred their highest awards on PM Modi for his contribution to strengthening relations between them and India.

West Asia has been facing profound turbulence and instability. India on account of its enhanced credibility could be asked to play a greater role be it in the Middle East Peace Process and Palestine or Syria. India will however need to approach this issue with great care and circumspection. Over the last 5 years, India has followed a sophisticated policy of nurturing bilateral ties with all the countries in the region without getting entangled in their ideological or sectarian fault lines. This is the key reason for success of India’s foreign policy in the region.

Conclusion:

India has covered enormous distance over the last 5 years under PM Modi’s stewardship in rejuvenating bilateral and regional relations with West Asia, Central Asia and Afghanistan. India today stands on the threshold of providing a massive impetus to partnerships with these regions in the coming years.

(Shri Ashok Sajjanhar has worked for the Indian Foreign Service for over three decades. He was the ambassador of India to Kazakhstan, Sweden and Latvia, and has held several significant positions in Indian embassies in Washington DC, Brussels, Moscow, Geneva, Tehran, Dhaka and Bangkok.)

    (This article is carried in the print edition of May-June 2019 issue of India Foundation Journal.)

 

 

The general elections in India in 2014 coincided with the ambitious negotiation of a global agenda for sustainable development at the United Nations (UN). These negotiations converged the three aspects of sustainable development – economic, social and environmental. The outcome, adopted by world leaders in September 2015, was Agenda 2030 for Sustainable Development, with 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) at its core. This has been a major success for multilateral diplomacy.1

The principle of international cooperation is the core of multilateralism. As an “original” founder-member of the multilateral system created by the UN, India has major stakes in effective international cooperation. With over 40% of her Gross Domestic Product (GDP) being contributed by her international trade,2 India’s destiny is closely linked with sustaining international cooperation to catalyze her transformation into a major power. India’s ability to participate on an equal basis in the decisions of multilateral institutions is intrinsic to this endeavor.

Agenda 2030 has validated India’s view that the eradication of poverty is central to sustainable development.3 Home to almost 270 million people living under the poverty line,4 India has a strong interest in implementing Agenda 2030 on the basis of her nationally set priorities and transform herself. Globally agreed means of implementing Agenda 2030 include supportive financial flows, such as Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) for employment and infrastructure, as well as access to appropriate technologies and clean energy to accelerate development while protecting the environment.

In the run-up to the May 2014 general elections in India, several of these priorities assumed political prominence. The new government’s focus on prioritizing inclusive development, captured in the SabkaSaath, Sabka Vikas slogan, galvanized voters in India as well as interlocutors from many of India’s strategic partners.5

India’s clear road-map of national targets for development announced by the government between May 2014 and September 2015 served to significantly align India’s national development agenda with the goals formulated by the UN.SabkaSaath, Sabka Vikas became aligned with SDG 1, the over-reaching goal for poverty eradication. The National Food Security Mission aligned with SDG 2 for food security; Health Insurance schemes with SDG 3 for good health and well-being; the National Education Mission with SDG 4 for quality education; BetiBachaoBetiPadhao  with SDG 5 on gender equality; Swachh Bharat  with SDG 6 for sanitation and clean water; the target of 175 GW of renewable energy by 2022 with SDG 7 on clean energy; the MNREGA scheme and Skill India with SDG 8 on decent work for all; Make in India, Start Up India and Digital India with SDG 9 on industry, innovation and infrastructure; Jan DhanYojna with SDG 10 to reduce inequalities; the Smart Cities Mission with SDG 11 for sustainable cities and communities, India’s SAGAR policy announced in March 2015 with a focus on the Blue Economy with SDG 14 on oceans; and the Krishi Vikas and FasalBimaYojna with SDG 15 on agriculture and life on land.

Prime Minister Modi’s first official visit to the UN General Assembly (UNGA) on 27 September 2014 reiterated India’s commitment to multilateralism.  He said that “India is a country that constitutes one-sixth of humanity; a nation experiencing economic and social transformation on a scale rarely seen in history. Every nation’s world view is shaped by its civilization and philosophical tradition. India`s ancient wisdom sees the world as one family. It is reflected in a tradition of openness and diversity; co-existence and cooperation. This is why India speaks not just for itself, but also for the cause of justice, dignity, opportunity and prosperity around the world. It is also because of this timeless current of thought that India has an unwavering belief in multilateralism.”6

The 2014 UNGA address by the Prime Minister contained his proposal for the UN to declare an International Yoga Day. Emphasizing international cooperation to recognize the integral bond between humanity and the environment, the proposal captured the imagination of delegations in the UN General Assembly. As the Prime Minister explained, “For us in India, respect for nature is an integral part of spiritualism. We treat nature’s bounties as sacred. Yoga is an invaluable gift of our ancient tradition. Yoga embodies unity of mind and body; thought and action; restraint and fulfillment; harmony between man and nature; a holistic approach to health and well-being. It is not about exercise but to discover the sense of oneness with yourself, the world and the nature. By changing our lifestyle and creating consciousness, it can help us deal with climate change. Let us work towards adopting an International Yoga Day.”7

The implementation of this proposal was swift, demonstrating the commitment of member-states to making a living reality out of international cooperation. Within 75 days, 176 other countries joined India in co-sponsoring a UNGA resolution on 11 December 2014 to declare 21 June every year as the International Day of Yoga. This has become a record for such resolutions in the UNGA. When the International Yoga Day began to be implemented from 2015 onwards, its link with SDG 3 (global health) and SDG 12 (changing lifestyles for responsible consumption and production) of Agenda 2030 became explicit. As the Prime Minister had said in his address, “We can achieve the same level of development, prosperity and well-being without necessarily going down the path of reckless consumption.”8

At the Paris meeting of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCC) in November 2015, India took a major initiative to push environmental issues towards the path of meaningful international cooperation rather than polemical confrontation. Together with President Francois Hollande of France, Prime Minister Modi launched an International Solar Alliance (ISA). Speaking on the occasion, he said, “Our hope for a sustainable planet rests on a bold global initiative. It will mean advanced countries leaving enough carbon space for developing countries to grow. That is natural climate justice.  It also means a growth path with lighter carbon footprint. So, convergence between economy, ecology and energy should define our future.”9

In March 2018, barely 16 months after having proposed the ISA, Prime Minister Modi jointly inaugurated the ISA with visiting French President Emmanuel Macron in India. In October 2018, India hosted the first General Assembly of the ISA, which became the first inter-governmental organization associated with the UN to be headquartered in India since India’s independence in August 1947.10 Aligning India firmly with SDG 7 of Agenda 2030 on clean energy, the Prime Minister asserted that India was doing so with a new self-confidence of “Poverty to Power.”11

Such positive contributions to implementing the principle of international cooperation by India are today being increasingly challenged by major powers seeking to impose their domestic political and economic policies on the multilateral system.12 Unilateral measures, including attempts to enforce extra-territorial application of domestic laws, directly impacts on the capacity of countries like India to meet their national developmental targets under Agenda 2030. Polarization between the major powers has begun to create frictions within multilateral institutions established under the UN framework.13 These include the International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank and the World Trade Organization (WTO). The agreements in 2010 to reform decision-making within the IMF and World Bank to reflect global economic realities are yet to be implemented,14 mainly on account of the reluctance of western economies to cede their inherited privileges in decision-making in multilateral financial institutions.15

In the WTO, the United States is targeting the effective functioning of the international dispute settlement mechanism which it helped create in 1995, and which has adjudicated over 500 trade disputes between member-states so far. Attempts to revert to the pre-WTO bilateral approach to use punitive measures based on domestic laws to resolve trade disputes jeopardizes international cooperation based on the international rule of law.16

India’s ability to make multilateral institutions responsive to priorities of developing countries depends on India’s participation as an equal member in decision-making in all structures of multilateral governance. It is worth recalling that Agenda 2030, in which India participated actively, was adopted unanimously by the UN General Assembly, which takes decisions on the democratic principle of one-country one-vote.17 When adopting Agenda 2030, world leaders had unanimously stressed that “there can be no sustainable development without peace and no peace without sustainable development.”18

The mandate to ensure international peace and security is the “primary responsibility” of the UN Security Council according to the UN Charter.19 Unlike in the UN General Assembly, decision-making in the UN Security Council is determined by the veto power of the five self-selected permanent members (China, France, Russia, the UK and the USA).20

This is the context for India’s active leadership in the UN General Assembly since November 197921 to reform the UN Security Council by amending the UN Charter, including the veto provision in decision-making.

Since 2014, India has attempted to conclude this reform within a fixed time-frame. Prime Minister Modi exhorted fellow world leaders in 2014 to “reform the United Nations, including the Security Council, and make it more democratic and participative. Institutions that reflect the imperatives of 20th century would not be effective in the 21st. It would face the risk of irrelevance; and we will face the risk of continuing turbulence with no one capable of addressing it.”22 China is leading the push-back by permanent members against reforming the Security Council.

What are the issues concerning India on the agenda of the Security Council which need India’s participation on an equal basis in the Council’s decision-making process? Countering terrorism directed against India by Pakistan is a priority. Before the Security Council became active in seeking to counter terrorism through its resolutions,23 which are binding on all member-states of the UN under Article 25 of the UN Charter, India had taken the lead in using the UN General Assembly to compel member-states to prosecute or extradite terrorists wanted for committing terrorist attacks against India. Speaking at the UN General Assembly in 2014, Prime Minister Modi urged world leaders to “put aside our differences and mount a concerted international effort to combat terrorism and extremism. As a symbol of this effort, I urge you to adopt the Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism (CCIT).”24  The CCIT contains the legal obligation of “prosecute or extradite”. Pakistan has delayed consideration of the CCIT in the UN General Assembly’s Legal Committee (of which it was Vice-Chair in 2016-2017)25.

After the Pathankot terror attack of 2016, India’s request to the Security Council to list the leader of the Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) Masood Azhar on the Sanctions List26 has been repeatedly blocked by China, a veto-wielding permanent member. Earlier, following the 26 November 2008 terrorist attacks on Mumbai, carried out by the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT), the UN Security Council had placed the leaders of the LeT like Hafiz Saeed and Zaki-ur-Rehman Lakhvi on its Sanctions List on 10 December 2008.27 However, the Security Council has been unable to enforce its decision to imposing sanctions on Hafiz Saeed so far,28 due to lack of political will among its permanent members.

Related to this is the impact of terrorism on UN peacekeeping operations (PKOs). Out of the 71 UN PKOs mandated by the UN Security Council since 1948, India has participated in 49, contributing over 200,000 troops to date.29 Terrorism has already targeted PKOs like UNDOF30 in the Golan Heights and MINUSMA31 in Mali. The potential for an increase in terrorist attacks on other UN missions, including UNAMA in Afghanistan, has become greater due to the perception that the Security Council is ineffective in countering terrorism, including terrorist acts against the UN itself.

This aggravates the existing shortcomings in Security Council in the effective use of PKOs for conflict resolution. Currently, as many as 75,000 out of the total of about 100,000 UN peacekeeping troops are deployed by the Security Council to respond to just 4 conflicts in Africa,32 which continue to spiral out of control. Two reasons for this failure are lack of representation among the Council’s permanent members from Africa; and the absence of consultations by the Security Council with troop-contributing countries like India, which are not permanently represented in the Council. Under Article 44 of the UN Charter, India has the right to seek consultations with the Security Council on deployment of its troops contributed to PKOs. Prime Minister Modi had drawn attention to this issue, emphasizing that “the problems arise to a large extent because Troop Contributing Countries do not have a role in the decision-making process.”33

Despite deployment of PKOs, the Security Council has not been able to contain escalating crises across the continents, which extract a huge human and material cost. More than 68 million people are currently displaced by violent conflicts. Till 2018, over 3800 UN peacekeepers, including 169 Indian UN troops, have laid down their lives to uphold the UN Charter. At the Leaders’ Summit on Peacekeeping in New York in September 2015, Prime Minister Modi had underlined that “it would be most fitting if the proposed memorial wall to the fallen peacekeepers is created quickly. India stands ready to contribute, including financially, to this objective.”

Beyond measures to counter terrorism and the deployment of PKOs, other issues on the Council’s agenda impacting on India’s strategic interests include the situation in Yemen, which sits astride the main sea lane of communication through the Red Sea that carries the bulk of India’s international trade; the situation in Iran, which is an important source of energy for India, as well as a critical partner in India’s connectivity projects like the International North-South Transport Corridor through Bandar Abbas and the Chabahar Project; the situation in Afghanistan, especially regarding attempts to regularize the re-integration of the Taliban into Afghanistan’s political structures; and the looming confrontation between the major powers on securitizing cyber space and outer space, where India is an emerging power.

As India looks to contribute to strengthen the multilateral system, two areas emerge as priorities for her.

First, India must become an equal participant in Security Council decision-making to ensure that this multilateral structure is responsive to India’s core interests of ensuring peace and security for sustainable development. To amend the UN Charter and reform the UN Security Council, a UN General Assembly resolution needs to be adopted. China has asserted that such a resolution requires “comprehensive consensus”.34 China’s assertion flies in the face of the fact that the UN General Assembly decided unanimously in 1998 that any resolution for deciding on Security Council reform needs only a two-thirds majority,35 and not “comprehensive consensus.” India must take the lead to counter China’s blocking tactic in the UN General Assembly by tabling the text of a draft resolution on Security Council reform co-sponsored by at least 129 member-states (a two-thirds majority).

Second, India must take the initiative to restore the primacy of the principle of international cooperation, on which the current multilateral system was founded a century ago. In 1963, over half a century ago, the UN General Assembly36 had declared 1965, the 20th anniversary of the United Nations, as the “International Co-operation Year”.

Given India’s significant stakes in effective international cooperation for the transformation of India, an Indian initiative in the UN General Assembly to declare  the 75th anniversary year of the founding of the UN in 2020, as a Year of International Cooperation would galvanize the latent sentiment among the majority of UN member-states for restoring the inter-linkages between peace, security, human rights and sustainable development. In addition, such a contribution by India for making multilateralism relevant for the 21st century would create an important leadership framework for India when she assumes the Chair of the G-20 in 2022.

(Shri Asoke Kumar Mukerji retired after over 37 years in the Indian Foreign Service as Permanent Representative of India to the United Nations in December 2015. He led the team that implemented Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s proposal for the UN General Assembly to declare an International Yoga Day in 2014, in a record time of 75 days with 177 co-sponsoring countries. He led India’s negotiations on Agenda 2030 on Sustainable Development which was adopted by world leaders in September 2015. In July 2018, the University of East Anglia (UK) awarded him a Doctor of Civil Laws (honoris causa) degree for his contributions to diplomacy.)

 

References:

1     United Nations, “Transforming our world: The Agenda 2030 for Sustainable Development”, Preamble, 25 September 2015. Agenda 2030 was adopted at the UN Summit in New York attended by Prime Minister Narendra Modi. Accessed at https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/post2015/transformingourworld

2     World Integrated Trade Solution (WITS), The World Bank and UNCTAD, “India Trade Statistics”. Accessed at https://wits.worldbank.org/CountryProfile/en/IND

3     In 1972, at the first UN Conference on the Human Environment held in Stockholm, India’s statement “poverty is the biggest polluter” had drawn strong criticism from environmental activists, who saw it as an attempt by India and other developing countries to shirk their obligations to protect the environment in the pursuit of accelerated socio-economic development.

4     The World Bank, “India’s Poverty Profile” Snapshot 2012, May 27, 2016. Accessed at http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/infographic/2016/05/27/india-s-poverty-profile

5     U.S. Department of State, “Remarks at the Center for American Progress India:2020 Program”, Secretary of State John Kerry, 28 July 2014. Accessed at https://2009-2017.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2014/07/229870.htm

6     Narendra Modi, “Text of the PM’s Statement at the UN General Assembly”, 27 September 2014. Accessed at  https://www.narendramodi.in/text-of-the-pms-statement-at-the-united-nations-general-assembly-6660

7     Ibid.

8     Ibid.

9     Narendra Modi, “Let us turn to the Sun to power our future”, Launch of International Solar Alliance, Paris, 30 November 2015. Accessed at https://www.narendramodi.in/pm-modi-at-the-launch-of-international-solar-alliance-385253

10  Press Information Bureau, Government of India. “PM inaugurates first Assembly of International Solar Alliance”, 2 October 2018. Accessed at http://pib.nic.in/newsite/PrintRelease.aspx?relid=183908

11  Narendra Modi, “PM inaugurates first assembly of the International Solar Alliance”, 2 October 2018. Accessed at https://www.narendramodi.in/pm-modi-inaugurates-first-assembly-of-international-solar-alliance-541716

12  Both the “America First” policy of the United States and the “Belt and Road Initiative” (BRI) of China impact on multilateralism today, the former by weakening the rules-based system of multilateral structures and the latter by distorting multilateral structures to give primacy to China’s economic interests while suppressing multilateral political and human rights agendas. The UK’s “Brexit” referendum will impact on the stability of the multilateral system, especially if the UK’s international partners are expected to re-negotiate crucial political and economic agreements bilaterally with the UK and the EU.

13 The Bretton Woods Institutions, the IMF and World Bank, were established by the United Nations Monetary and Financial Conference held from 1-22 July 1944 in the United States. The United Nations-sponsored Conference on Trade and Employment held in Havana, Cuba from 21 November 1947 to 24 March 1948, aimed to create an International Trade Organization. The refusal of the United States to agree to the proposed Organization led to a provisional General Agreement for Tariffs and Trade liberalization known as the GATT between 1947-1994, which became the WTO on 1 January 1995. 

14 International Monetary Fund, “Statement by Hon. Arun Jaitley, Governor of the Bank and the Fund for India”, Governor’s Statement No. 26, 13 October 2017, paragraphs 7-8. Accessed at https://www.imf.org/external/am/2017/speeches/pr26e.pdf

15  Bretton Woods Project, “IMF Quota Reforms: the fight for democratic governance continues”, 6 December 2018. Accessed at https://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/2018/12/imf-quota-reforms-the-fight-for-democratic-governance-goes-on/  See also Statement by Hon. Arun Jaitley, Governor of the IMF and IBRD for India”, dated 7 October 2016, Fund-Bank Annual Meeting 2016. Available at https://www.imf.org/external/am/2016/speeches/pr18e.pdf

16  International Economic Law and Policy Blog, “How should WTO members respond to the Appellate Body Crisis” by Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, European University Institute, Florence. Accessed at https://worldtradelaw.typepad.com/ielpblog/2018/12/ulli-petersmann-on-how-should-wto-members-respond-to-the-wto-appellate-body-crisis.htmls

17 The UN Charter in Article 18 provides for one-country one-vote in UN General Assembly decision-making. See United Nations, UN Charter, Article 18.1. Accessed at https://www.un.org/en/charter-united-nations/

18  See note 2.

19  United Nations, UN Charter, Article 24.1. Accessed at https://www.un.org/en/charter-united-nations/

20  Ibid. Article 27.3.

21  “Question of Equitable Representation on and Increase in the Membership of the Security Council”, UN Document No. A/34/246 dated 14 November 1979, submitted by Algeria, Argentina, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Guyana, India, Maldives, Nepal, Nigeria and Sri Lanka to the UN Secretary General. Available at

       http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/34/246

22 See note 1.

23 The UN Security Council began to use provisions of Article 41 of the UN Charter to impose economic sanctions like travel bans, assets freeze and arms embargo after adopting resolution 1267 to counter terrorist threats from the Taliban and Al Qaida in October 1999. Since then, the Council has adopted over 40 resolutions on countering terrorism, which have not been enforced evenly by the Council.

24 Ibid.

25  United Nations General Assembly, Sixth Committee, 71st Session. Accessed at  https://www.un.org/en/ga/sixth/71/bureau.shtml .

26 Ministry of External Affairs, India. “Designation of Masood Azhar under UNSCR 1267”, 2 April 2016. Accessed at  https://www.mea.gov.in/press-releases.htm?dtl/26589/Designation_of_Masood_ Azhar_under_UNSCR_1267

27  United Nations Security Council. “Hafiz Muhammad Saeed”. Accessed at https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/1267/aq_sanctions_list/summaries/individual/hafiz-muhammad-saeed

28 BBC News, “Pakistan’s $10 m bounty cleric Hafiz Saeed released”, 23 November 2017. Accessed at https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-42100276. Under Article 41 of the UN Charter, the Security Council has the right to take non-military measures like economic sanctions to enforce its decisions.

29  United Nations, “India: a long and deep tradition of contributing to UN peacekeeping”. Accessed at https://news.un.org/en/gallery/541602

30 In March 2013 and August 2014, terrorist groups operating in Syria captured Filipino and Fijian UN troops and held them hostage. The Security Council has not prosecuted these groups or member-states supporting their activities.

31  Between October 2013 and February 2019, as many as 191 UN troops had been killed by terrorists operating in Mali. The Security Council has not been able to prosecute any of these terrorists so far.

32  These four PKOs are MONUSCO in the Democratic Republic of Congo, UNMISS in South Sudan, MINUSCA in Central African Republic and MINUSMA in Mali.

33  Narendra Modi, “India’s commitment to UN peacekeeping remains strong and will grow”, Speech at the Summit on Peace Operations, 28 September 2015. Accessed at https://www.narendramodi.in/statement-by-prime-minister-at-the-summit-on-peace-operations—356824

34  XinhuaNet, “Chinese State Councilor meets co-chair of inter-governmental negotiations on UN Security Council reform”, 1 March 2019. Accessed at http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2019-03/01/c_137861341.htm

35  United Nations, “Affirmative votes from two-thirds of its members will be required for decisions on Security Council reform, Assembly decides”, Document GA/9511 dated 23 November 1998. Accessed at https://www.un.org/press/en/1998/19981123.ga9511.html

36  United Nations, UN General Assembly Resolution 1907 (XVIII), 21 November 1963. Accessed at https://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/1907%20(XVIII).

    (This article is carried in the print edition of May-June 2019 issue of India Foundation Journal.)