Sri Lanka hosted the second edition of Indian Ocean Conference in Colombo in 2017. It
is excited to be on board with this initiative and the third edition and its theme of “building regional architectures”. The long-term objective of this initiative is to ensure oceanic good governance. The aim is to ensure the management of the world’s oceans and their resources in ways that keep our oceans healthy, productive, safe, secure and resilient, whilst strengthening connectivity and economic activity. In this context, the importance of building regional architectures to ensure oceanic good governance in the Indian Ocean region gains greater salience.

The end of the Cold War witnessed a shift in global attention to the IOR in strategic and political terms. The Indian Ocean region has become the hub of intense global activity over the last few decades underpinned by the growth of the Asian economies. The sea lanes in the Indian Ocean are considered among the most strategically important in the world with over 80% seaborne trade in oil transiting through Indian Ocean choke points. The most important trade routes of the world pass through this region. In particular we are witnessing the rise of maritime Asia due to the Strategic importance of the Indian Ocean.

Some important issues require collective reflection. Enhanced economic cooperation in the Indian Ocean region including amongst the diverse littoral economies in South Asia, South East Asia and Africa is essential for greater integration of the region. All economic indicators of the region have more than doubled during the past two decades. The region’s economic upturn is being driven by several factors including the revival of historic maritime links fueled by global value chain trade centered on East Asia, the rise of BRICs economies as growth poles in the world economy, increased investment in port infra- structure, consolidation in the shipping sector towards larger and more efficient ships, falling barriers to trade and investment, the growth of the middle class, and the winds of change in the sphere of technology.

With the right policies and with the correct perspective on oceanic ‘good governance’, the economies in the region are well placed to capitalise further on these changes and prosper. This should happen at global, regional and national levels which would facilitate economic convergence and prosperity in the Indian Ocean Region.

The Indian Ocean brings together peoples of three continents and constitutes a third of the world’s ocean space. The diversity and vastness of the Indian Ocean presents opportunities and challenges that the littoral states need to factor in so as to ensure peace and security of the region. These opportunities and challenges are multifaceted and require a regional architecture that addresses multiple issues both at a sub-regional level and at a wider Indian Ocean level.  We need to consider a multi-layered approach that promotes and protects the core values of ocean governance and addresses key issues impacting our ocean in an effective manner.

Freedom of navigation in the Indian Ocean has to be strengthened because it is vital to world and regional trade and critical to global energy security. We strongly believe that the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) is the foundation for a stable rules-based regime at sea. Also, we note with concern the extent of sea blindness of coastal states.  We, as a coastal state and an island, have limited visibility of our maritime surface picture. We rely extensively on transponder information such as AIS and VMS to map maritime activity around us, but the reality is that most dark vessels operate without activating transponder data. There is a need to develop maritime domain awareness (MDA technology) not only for our own national security interests but also for better regional cooperation to detect illicit activity at sea.

Many experts here on maritime affairs will acknowledge that jurisdictional limitations on the high seas offer criminal networks a safe haven for illicit trafficking activity. The Indian Ocean has become the largest route for trafficking Afghan heroin from the Makran coast to East Africa and South Asia. Sri Lanka hosted Home Ministers from Indian Ocean states including Shri Hansraj GangaramAhir, Ministers of State for Home Affairs in India, where it is resolved to establish the Southern Route Partnership (SRP) in October 2016. The Ministers agreed with the Colombo Declaration and pledged to develop a regional mechanism to counter drug trafficking in the Indian Ocean. The SRP with the support of the United Nations Office on Drug and Crime has become the primary mechanism to coordinate counter narcotics operations in the Indian Ocean region.

The SRP by itself would not do. Criminal activities transcend national maritime boundaries and impact on all coastal states. It is imperative that we improve the maritime law enforcement capacity of Indian Ocean states to counter all forms of maritime crime and ensure the long arm of the law can dispense “blue justice” across the Indian Ocean. Similarly, there are shared obligations for maritime search and rescue, and requirements for humanitarian assistance and disaster relief across the Indian Ocean. The case of Malaysian Airlines MH370 allegedly disappearing over the Indian Ocean is a wake-up call to all Indian Ocean states on the urgent need to review search and rescue capabilities over the Indian Ocean. Many small states have very large search and rescue areas of responsibility. We need to have a more integrated approach for search and rescue cooperation.

All Indian Ocean states need to commit more aggressively to achieving UN Sustainable Development Goal 14 – “Life below water”. The marine environment impacted by climate change, pollution, and oceanic resource exploitation needs to be monitored and safeguarded; it is indispensable to global environmental security and regional food security. We need to take a more serious approach to illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing, towards which Indian Ocean states have taken a lackluster approach driven by political imperatives. We as many other coastal states are facing the impacts of waste dumping in the Indian Ocean.

Regional Cooperation can make possible, stronger transport and trade connectivity not only through coordinated physical investments but also harmonisation of policies, rules, and procedures. Ultimately, an integrated Indian Ocean Region (IOR) market can emerge with economies of the scale necessary to compete in international markets.

The issues around the Indian Ocean are complex and require concerted efforts by littoral states to address the issues and take advantage of the opportunities that the ocean presents. At present there are multiple Indian Ocean organisations and forums, however in terms of achieving effective regional cooperation there is still a long way to go. Therefore, what is the most suitable regional architecture that will focus on key issues and also provide the necessary perspective of sub-regional dynamics that drives a coherent overall policy on ocean governance?

We may need to consider a multi-layered approach both in terms of division of thematic responsibilities and in terms of sub-regional interests, within an overarching Indian Ocean framework of shared values and principles. There is no perfect fit, on what regional architecture works best for such a vast ocean space. There are issues that can be addressed as a wider Indian Ocean community, and there are issues that can be dealt with more meaningfully at a thematic level or sub-regional level. It is about taking forward all these strands of activity within an architecture based on shared values and principles founded upon the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea.

It is high time for the littoral states, to be the masters of their own fate and the captains of their own ship. There should be increased coordination, participation and engagement by littoral states in determining how affairs are run in the Indian Ocean. Meaningful regional cooperation can help the 2030 Sustainable Development Goals. A single-minded focus on national strategies and actions has diverted attention from critical regional actions needed to promote energy, food, and water security-related SDGs; strengthen environmental sustainability, address climate change; and prevent natural disasters. Perhaps most importantly, regional cooperation can help build enough economic stakes in the region that promote peace and prosperity and substantially diminish the threat of aggression and war.

We must also be alert to competing global interest that can impact on the Indian Ocean. Recently, as the ice caps melt in the North Pole, a Maersk’s container vessel operated for the first time in an Arctic Route this summer from Murmansk in Russia (Near Norway) to Bering Strait near Alaska. If we are to achieve the full potential of the Indian Ocean it is imperative that we as Indian Ocean states maintain the comparative advantage in a shared approach.

Sri Lanka has a clear vision of what the country wants to be in the world today. It is repositioning itself to optimize its relationship with its neighbors and other partners, to leverage its geostrategic position and make it a hub of the Indian Ocean. To fully realise this potential, Sri Lanka is engaging in initiatives with regional players who have major economic stakes in the Indian Ocean. It is also pushing to further integrate with the world by undertaking reforms to facilitate trade and encourage productive foreign investments. Sri Lanka’s strategy is to leverage investments to boost its industries such as tourism, expand its manufacturing base, and safeguard its main exports: such as garments and tea.  Accordingly, the Indian Ocean region plays a critical role in driving the global economy, and it will play an even more important role in the future.

The Indian Ocean is central to deciding our common global future.  The shared nature of the Indian Ocean needs to be recognised and it is in our common interest to care, protect and develop this shared space for mutual benefit.  Maintaining peace and security in the Indian Ocean is a prerequisite for the development and growth of the region. It is the collective responsibility of the countries in this region and beyond to ensure that the Indian Ocean is better managed, safe, productive and resilient – through ‘Oceanic good governance’.

(This article is a summary of the remarks made by Mr. SagalaRatnayaka,
Chief of Staff to the Prime Minister and Minister of Youth Affairs, Project Management and Southern Development, SriLanka, on 28th August, 2018 at the 3rd Indian Ocean Conference,
at Hanoi, Vietnam organised by India Foundation.)

(This article is carried in the print edition of January-February 2019 issue of India Foundation Journal.)

In 2017, the Indian Ocean Conference’s theme was “Peace, Progress, and Prosperity.” In 2018, it is “Building Regional Architectures.” This change in themes mirrors the need of the hour – we must transition from identifying the future we want, to actively building that future, together.

In July 2018, Secretary Pompeo, in his address at the Indo-Pacific Business Forum, made clear that the United States is committed to supporting its words with actions and with resources. Some have accused US of talking about a free and open Indo-Pacific as it is withdrawing from Asia. Secretary Pompeo was clear. US is not withdrawing from Asia. US has never contemplated withdrawing from Asia. America’s own security and prosperity is intricately tied to this region. The Secretary outlined the U.S. commitment to ensuring a free and open Indo-Pacific that must, and will, include a thriving Indian Ocean region of economic growth, with a strong commitment to collective security and global norms that allow for an equal and equitable playing field and encourage prosperity for all.

The United States’ vision for the Indian Ocean region, and US roadmap for how it, together with its partners, can achieve that vision may be summarised in three broad points. First, US will expand economic engagement, with particular attention to addressing the region’s infrastructure needs and encouraging regional interconnectivity. Second, US will continue to broaden and deepen its security cooperation to address the geopolitical, transnational, and environmental threats that could derail progress in the Indian Ocean region. Third, US reaffirms its commitment to free and open air and sea-lanes, a rules-based global order, and a region where a level playing field gives every nation and every citizen the opportunity to prosper.

Economic Engagement

The Indian Ocean region is one of the most dynamic in the world. Nearly half the world’s 90,000 commercial vessels and two-thirds of the global oil shipments travel through its sea lanes, and protecting open and unhindered commerce is vital not only for the United States, but for each and every country in this region. The Indo-Pacific boasts some of the fastest growing economies on earth and is home to half of the globe’s population. The United States government and private sector have all along played critical roles in supporting this remarkable growth story. And US will continue to do so.

The United States is committed to the economic well-being of the region, which for us means focusing on private sector-led investments in sectors essential to the economic future of the Indo-Pacific. As Secretary Pompeo made clear, government spending alone can never address the Indo-Pacific’s needs, and is not the path forward for the Indian Ocean region. Only the private sector can provide the estimated $26 trillion needed by 2030 for infrastructure investment in Asia. We are proud of the important contributions of the U.S. private sector to growth and prosperity in the region. Annually, the United States conducts $1.4 trillion in two-way trade with the Indo-Pacific region, and over the past decade, Indo-Pacific foreign direct investment by American companies has doubled to about $940 billion last year from $444 billion in 2007.

Today, U.S. companies rank as the largest source of foreign investment in Bangladesh, with more than $3.3 billion invested to date. Chevron Bangladesh is the country’s largest producer of natural gas (over 55 percent) and GE, with 30 gas turbines and 1,500 gas engines installed, is helping generate a third of Bangladesh’s power capacity. SpaceX, one of the United States’ most innovative firms, recently helped launch Bangladesh’s first indigenous communications satellite. In India, GE is proceeding with its $2.5 billion investment in a factory that will produce 960 diesel-electric engines to help modernise the country’s rail system.

Yet, as we look to continue to unleash the potential of our private sectors to contribute to growth and development, the United States government is itself also committed to investing in the region through transparent and sustainable initiatives. Examples of these investments range from the $18 million in current loan support for micro, small, and medium-sized enterprises in Sri Lanka provided by the U.S. Overseas Private Investment Corporation; to training in innovative best practices provided to representatives from South Asia’s major ports including Colombo, Chittagong, Mumbai, and Pondicherry. It also includes the largest single grant to Nepal – a $500 million Compact from the Millennium Challenge Corporation signed in September 2017. This Compact, which will help to expand Nepal’s road network and electricity transmission infr-astructure, includes a $130 million of investment from the government of Nepal, bringing the total value of the investment to $630 million. In India, the U.S. Trade and Development Agency has supported the phenomenal growth of the civil aviation sector through a public-private partnership among U.S. and Indian civil aviation agencies and over 30 aviation companies, to promote aviation safety, security, standards harmonisation, and airspace liberalisation.

Yet, too many companies remain wary of investing in this dynamic region. An essential part of Indo-Pacific diplomacy of US will involve working with its partners in the region to prioritise transparency, accountability, and responsible financing that will unlock trillions in private capital into their economies, and into productive enterprises that bring jobs and prosperity to their peoples.

Security

As we pursue our economic growth goals, we cannot take our eyes off the threats we all face together. Natural disasters, piracy and crime, and other threats to the region are ever present. We must act together, meet these threats to our collective prosperity. For this reason, the United States is expanding its security engagement and cooperation across the Indo-Pacific, and particularly the Indian Ocean region. Its U.S. INDOPACOM, with more than 380,000 military and civilian personnel, 200 ships, and nearly 2,500 aircraft are engaged in strengthening relationships across a geography that comprises seven of the world’s ten largest militaries, nine of the world’s ten largest ports, and some of the world’s busiest and most critical sea lanes. But we do not seek to control, dominate, or coerce. Rather, to quote Secretary Pompeo, “where America goes, we seek partnership, not dominion.”

US security relationship with India, a Major Defense Partner, is a key example of this cooperation, and the 2+2 dialogue in New Delhi showcases this vital partnership. India holds more military exercises with the United States than with any other partner. In June 2018, we held our 22nd US-India-Japan Malabar naval exercise that continues to enhance our ability to protect the maritime commons together. On 2nd August 2018, we concluded our biennial RIMPAC exercises, the world’s largest international maritime exercise, with India and, for the first time, Sri Lanka and Vietnam participating. We hope that one day in the not too distant future other navies of the region can also participate in exercises and coordinate maritime activities to build a collective regional capacity.

This year also saw the USS NIMITZ carrier strike group visit Sri Lanka in the largest port call by any foreign military since World War II, the transfer of a U.S. Coast Guard cutter to the Sri Lankan Navy, as well as the announcement of a $39 million plus-up of Foreign Military Financing to help develop maritime security, peacekeeping, and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief capacity. Along with commitments of $40 million for Bangladesh and $17 million for Nepal, the Bay of Bengal Initiative will improve our ability to cooperate with regional partners to share shipping information and build maritime domain awareness capacity to enhance regional maritime security and support humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. And these are just a few of the many ways in which the United States is joining with its partners to meet those threats to our collective prosperity.

Governance and Architecture

The lack of architecture and underpinning structures that can help the Indian Ocean region chart a prosperous future was discussed at the previous Indian Ocean Conferences. Challenges to free navigation and consensus-based dispute resolution threaten to undermine the international rules and norms that have allowed for unprecedented global prosperity. In Southeast Asia, ASEAN is central to addressing these issues, and we hope that similar structures will take on a similar role in the Indian Ocean region. Through flexible regional groupings of like-minded partners, we seek to develop best practices and standards that will encourage sustainable and transparent development that can help countries avoid cycles of debt and weakened sovereignty. We are particularly hopeful that our trilateral mechanism with India and Japan can begin to assume some of these foundational roles in the Indian-Ocean region. This year we were glad to host an infrastructure-working group in Washington for our Indian and Japanese development experts that began to address the issues of development finance and transparency practices for the Indian Ocean region. We also look forward to continued momentum in our quadrilateral cooperation with India, Japan and Australia that will contribute to maritime security and domain awareness across the Indian Ocean region.

We are urging our partners across the Indian Ocean region to reaffirm their commitment to a world of global rules and norms. Together, we must make clear our determination to create an Indian Ocean region that respects international law as reflected in the law of the sea convention, that ensures a framework for transparency and the peaceful resolution of disputes, and that supports economic, political, and social linkages with South and East Asia. The United States has never been more committed to ensuring a free and open Indian Ocean region as part of a larger Indo-Pacific, and it welcomes the opportunity to work with all of its partners to create an Indo-Pacific region in which each nation is, to echo President Trump, “strong, prosperous, and self-reliant.”

(This article is a summary of the remarks made by Ms. Alice G. Wells, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs, USA on 28th August, 2018 at the 3rd Indian Ocean Conference at Hanoi, Vietnam organised by India Foundation.)

(This article is carried in the print edition of January-February 2019 issue of India Foundation Journal.)

The importance of Indian Ocean Conference has only been growing. Asia-Pacific region is now being combined with the Indian Ocean region for free trading nation like Korea in the Indo-Pacific as it is emblematic of economic prosperity. Our vital interests lie in the in the Indo-Pacific because it is an indispensable conduit for Korea’s exports and energy imports: 85 percent of its energy supply comes from the Middle East across the Indian Ocean. The Indian Ocean is Korea’s key trade route and therefore safeguarding the peace and the stability of the region, especially the freedom of navigation and flight is critically important for Korea.

Recently the international policy community has been paying greater attention to how to build the regional architectures that ensure people to people exchange, mutual prosperity and peace in the Pacific region. A number of new ideas and creative initiatives have been proposed and some of them have already been put into practices. There have been Japan’s free and open Indo-Pacific strategies, India’s act east policy and Indonesia’s fusion of the Indo Pacific.

The term Indo Pacific has become the universal currency when U.S. president Donald Trump unveiled his vision for a free and open Indo-Pacific in November 2017 in Vietnam. US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo added the details to this strategy by announcing America’s Indo-Pacific economic vision in July 2018. China has also put forward its belt and the road initiative as a means to enhance the regional connectivity. An essential tenet to these common initiatives was based on how to bolster regional connectivity. Korea welcomes and is open to these various initiatives and ready to join forces to enhance the digital and physical connectivity in the region. In the process of building regional architectures, we need to consider a list of the following three principles.

1) Any kind of initiative for building regional architectures in the Indo-Pacific should be based on open regionalism. Korea supports an open, transparent and inclusive regional architecture. We are all players, living in harmony for peace and prosperity while respecting each other and abiding by international laws.

2) Any emerging regional architecture should promote multilateral norms and institutions. It is imperative that trade be open, disputes be resolved peacefully and the potential of a mutually beneficial cooperation be fully realized under the auspices of multilateral norms and institutions.

3) Future regional architecture should be built upon the existing institutional resources. The multilateral mix in the institutions such as ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting Plus (ADMM+) and the East Asia Summit should be fully utilized. In particular East Asia Summit whose membership includes 18 nations in the Indo-Pacific can be a solid platform on which we can further build upon.

Korea fully supports the critical role that ASEAN has been playing in promoting regional cooperation. ASEAN centrality is an important institutional asset in the future regional architecture building process.

The Korean government’s ‘New Southern Policy’ also aims to create an open, transparent and inclusive Indo-Pacific by strengthening its partnership with the countries in the region. As a matter of fact, Korea’s diplomatic vision so far has been mostly confined to Northeast Asia due to geopolitical, economic as well as historical reasons. The new southern policy will provide Korea a new framework through which it can reach out to its partners and the friends in ASEAN and the Indian Ocean region.

During his visit to India and the ASEAN countries, South Korean President Moon Jae-in announced the vision to significantly bolster partnerships on three Ps, namely – People, Peace and Prosperity, and to work towards fostering a future oriented relationship. In particular, Korea aspires to be a reliable partner in working together to bring about the practical and mutually beneficial cooperation. For instance, President Moon during his visit to India in July 2018, with Prime Minister Modi announced to establish the India-Korea Center for Research and Innovation cooperation and the India Korea future strategic group to jointly develop the information and communication technology and advanced manufacturing technology.

Singapore-Korea launched a new cooperative partnership in the area of a digital technology that would contribute to advancing the ASEAN smarter citizen network. Korea also pledged to triple its cooperation fund by 2020 and expand on technology transfer and the job training programs for small and medium enterprises in ASEAN countries. In Northeast Asia, the task of building a lasting and a stable regional security architecture still remains an unaccomplished task. In September 2005, in the context of the six party talks we once spelled out a shared vision for establishing a multilateral security arrangement in Northeast Asia. However, with the nuclear talks impacts afterwards, the idea has never come to fruition. Only recently, we found a silver lining on the horizon as the prospects for the completed denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula looks brighter than ever before. What makes it unique this time is the fact that the top leaders are prompting the denuclearization process. Decisions are made at the top and then delegated to the working level for implementation. This is an unprecedented procedure and I believe it makes it success more probable than ever.

In its party central committee meeting in April 2018, North Korea officially terminated its policy of  parallel development of a nuclear buildup and economic growth and announced a new strategic line that focuses on economic development. In order for North Korea to develop its economy, international sanctions must be lifted, which in turn can only be achieved when it takes  substantial denuclearization measures. At issue now is a declaration to end the Korean War that settled into an uneasy truce in 1953. End of a war declaration can simply be a political and symbolic measure pending the ultimate establishment of a permanent peace regime on the peninsula. Nevertheless, it can have its own merits. It would help ease the tensions on the peninsula and provide North Korea with a room to envision a new political imagination that would charter a totally different future path for North Korea.

It is entirely possible that this new political imagination would lead  North Korea to the imperatives of economic development, the mitigation of sanctions and the denuclearization, thereby creating a positive cycle that interlocks path towards economic prosperity and lasting peace on the Korean Peninsula. It is absolutely necessary that the end of a war declaration should be adopted in tandem with Pyongyang to take concrete measures to halt its nuclear weapons program.

A Korean peninsula without a nuclear threat is a sure way to normalise North Korea’s relations with South Korea, the United States and Japan. In this respect, denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula is the key to building a lasting regional security architecture in Northeast Asia. The Indian Ocean Conference is providing a valuable opportunity for all of us to share insights into creating open, transparent and inclusive regional architectures in the Indo-Pacific.

(This article is a summary of the speech delivered by Mr. Cho Byung Jae, Chancellor,
Korea National Diplomatic Academy, South Korea on 28th August, 2018 at the
3rd Indian Ocean Conference, at Hanoi, Vietnam organised by India Foundation.)

(This article is carried in the print edition of January-February 2019 issue of India Foundation Journal.)

The theme of the Indian Ocean Conference – 2018, “Building Regional Architectures”, builds on the SAGAR discourse, which is underpinned by the common objective of “Security and Growth for all in the Region,” as the Honorable Minister of External Affairs of India, Sushma Swaraj noted. Many of the difficulties facing maritime security are apparently land-based. And their resolution requires an inclusive approach, which promotes cooperation and partnership between littoral and landlocked countries to address their shared problems. It goes without saying that maritime security, on which much global economic growth depends, is interconnected with events in landlocked countries. Afghanistan is a prime example: over the past forty years, geopolitical tensions have imposed destructive conflicts on what is one of the most naturally endowed countries at the heart of rising Asia. In the absence of peace in Afghanistan, instead of sustainable development that secures the future of its youthful population, poverty permeates its society. And this provides an enabling environment for such maritime security challenges as terrorism, drug trafficking, arms smuggling and human trafficking among others.

Over the past 17 years, Afghanistan has been a victim of external aggression in the form of terrorism. As a proxy of a coastal state, the Taliban has daily killed and maimed innocent Afghans, while destroying the infrastructure that should help connect and integrate Afghanistan with our surrounding resourceful regions in the North and South for increased trade, business and investment. The Taliban insurgency has enabled several terrorist networks with global and regional reach to operate out of Afghanistan. At the same time, this imposed insecurity has enabled a permissive environment for mass drug cultivation and production in Afghanistan, which now provides more than 90 percent of regional and global demand for drugs. In turn, revenues from the drug trade finance terrorism and fuel dysfunctional corruption that undermines governance and rule of law, which together destabilize drug producing and transit countries alike. Because of the interconnectedness of these imposed security challenges, Afghanistan is facing a complex humanitarian crisis with diminishing human security. Hence, this makes our country a major source of refugees and asylum seekers, who are often ferried by human smugglers to Europe, Australia and elsewhere. As we see, what is imposed on and happens in countries like Afghanistan directly affects maritime security.

This dangerous situation necessitates that littoral and landlocked states no longer pause but join hands, pool their resources, and share intelligence to pursue and implement a common counter terrorism strategy — one that doesn’t make any distinction between terrorist networks. Alongside this effort, they must work together to free their nations of abject poverty, knowing that a lack of human security allows terrorists, extremists, and state-sponsors of terrorism to recruit among the jobless, destitute youth to radicalize, brainwash and exploit them in conflicts of their choice. Indeed, the best way to fight poverty that feeds terrorism is to foster political and security confidence-building through regional economic cooperation. The latter can serve as an important enabler in deepening connectivity, enhancing competitiveness and productivity, lowering transaction costs, and expanding markets in any region.

How can this be done? In fact, Afghanistan has already put forth a number of strategic solutions for adoption and implementation by our coastal and landlocked neighbors; these include:

• The Heart of Asia–Istanbul Process (HOA-IP);
• The Regional Economic Cooperation Conference on Afghanistan (RECCA);
• The Kabul Process for Peace and Security Cooperation;
• The Joint Counter-Terrorism and Counter-Narcotics Strategy;
• The Afghanistan-Pakistan Action Plan for Peace and Solidarity (APAPPS).

We have worked hard to establish these Afghan-led processes to help secure regional cooperation for Afghanistan’s stabilisation and sustainable development. It goes without saying that a stable Afghanistan at the heart of rising Asia will help ensure stability and prosperity throughout our surrounding regions. That is why it is in the best short- and long-term interests of coastal and non-coastal countries to participate in and to double and triple their efforts to achieve the shared goals of these regional security and development cooperation mechanisms. Of course, every tangible step these countries take toward using these processes will help minimize their (and other countries’) vulnerability to terrorism and its state sponsors. That is why time is of the essence and they must reaffirm their often-pledged commitments to the implementation of the projects, programs, and policies, proposed under these mechanisms of regional cooperation.

In November 2017, the 7th Regional Economic Cooperation Conference on Afghanistan (RECCA) took place in Ashgabat, Turkmenistan. The conference focused on “Deepening Connectivity and Expanding Trade through Investment Infrastructure and Improving Synergy.” RECCA remains a major opportunity for Afghanistan’s littoral and landlocked neighbors to take stock of the progress made so far, and, besides working together to address the challenges and bottlenecks, they should move on to commit the financing and investment needed with respect to priority projects in the key areas of energy, transport networks, trade and transit facilitation, communications, and business-to-business and labor support.

To name a few, the full, unimpeded implemen-tation of the Chabahar Port, which involves Afghanistan, India, and Iran, deserves mention, as it will further enhance connectivity through Afghanistan and facilitate our integration with the regional and global markets. As work continues in this and other connectivity land and sea projects, we have launched air-corridors for trade, exporting Afghan products to markets near and far in the region.

Moreover, in December 2017, the 7th Ministerial Conference of HOA-IP, with its political, security, and economic confidence-building measures implementation mechanism, took place in Baku, Azerbaijan. Afghanistan aims at deepening synergies and complementarities among the interconnected projects of RECCA and HOA-IP, maximizing their impact on sustainable development not only in Afghanistan but also throughout its surrounding regions. This should encourage the country-participants to assess their shared security and development needs and to bolster their engagement with Afghanistan accordingly, in order to initiate the implementation of the proposed projects with win-win benefits.

Because sustainable development is impossible without durable stability, in 2017, Afghanistan re-launched the Kabul Process for Peace and Security in Afghanistan. Through this Afghan-owned and Afghan-led process, a results-oriented peace strategy has been laid out, the key purpose of which is to engage in unconditional, direct talks with the Taliban. Afghanistan’s peace strategy aims to separate reconcilable Taliban insurgents from transnational terrorist networks. But to succeed in this endeavor, Afghanistan relies on honest and tangible regional cooperation, foremost on the closure of the sanctuaries and other forms of support, which the Taliban enjoys in the region.

In parallel to peace strategy, Afghanistan is pursuing a joint counter-terrorism and counter narcotics strategy. The two strategies mutually reinforce one another, as Afghanistan’s counter-terrorism and counter-narcotics efforts not only contribute to similar efforts at the regional and global levels but also advance Afghan peace efforts by increasing the number of reconcilable Taliban, who otherwise would refuse to discontinue violence. In addition, Afghanistan has striven to engage with Pakistan on a state-to-state basis to secure the country’s cooperation both in fighting terrorism with no distinction and in persuading the Taliban leadership to participate in the intra-Afghan peace process for a political negotiated settlement. In this regard, the inaugural meeting of the Afghanistan-Pakistan Action Plan for Peace and Solidarity (APAPPS) took place in Kabul in late July 2018, as the APAPPS five working groups discussed issues of counter-terrorism, intelligence-sharing, peace efforts, trade and investment, and refugees. For our part, the Afghan side firmly committed to working with relevant Pakistani institutional stakeholders to implement the key goals of the five working groups, in line with the core principles of the APAPPS agreed between Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Considering these major opportunities for regional security and development cooperation, Afghanistan welcomed and strongly supports the South Asia strategy of the United States. The Strategy has followed a conditions-based approach to helping stabilize Afghanistan, and its key objective is to help close terrorist safe sanctuaries in Pakistan. Success in this necessary endeavorshould help reduce violence across Afghanistan, compelling the Taliban to opt for peace, an outcome desired by every Afghan. That is why we strongly believe that the full execution of the U.S. strategy, in partnership with coastal and littoral states that share Afghanistan’s security and development interests, will not only help stabilize our country but also ensure security as a precondition for sustainable development across our surrounding regions in the Asian continent.

(This article is a summary of the remarks made by Mr. M. Ashraf Haidari, the Director-General of Policy & Strategy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Afghanistan, on 28th August, 2018 at the
3rd Indian Ocean Conference, at Hanoi, Vietnam organised by India Foundation.)

(This article is carried in the print edition of January-February 2019 issue of India Foundation Journal.)

Author:  Aatish Taseer

Publisher: Fourth Estate India,
2018, pp 256

Price: Rs.599/-

Book Review by:Aaditya Tiwari

To know where you are is also to know who you are’ is a continuous theme of the book ‘The Twice Born’ by AatishTaseer. I was attracted to the book ‘The Twice Born’ to seek personal answers. Being born with a Brahmin surname all I had was certain traditions which were devoid of any meaning. The education I pursued had no reference to who we were and what our history was. The history books prescribed in the school curriculum were my first source to know about Brahmins and their portrayal as ‘evil’ was incongruent with my lived experience. It was with desire to know more about myself that I approached the book and as I finished reading it, I had more questions than answers.

‘The Twice Born’ is an account of Aatish’s personal journey to discover his cultural roots. He who is born and brought up in India feels more at ease with the Western world than in India. Aatish attempts to understand his culture by learning Sanskrit. He visits Varanasi, leaves and then returns to stay there. He is attracted to the vast literature and history that Sanskrit has to offer. He maps the evolution and preservation of India’s culture by tracing the lives of a few Brahmins who have studied and pursued Sanskrit all their lives.

The book carves out the lives of these Brahmins beautifully. Certain discussions that Aatish has on modernity, culture, traditions and history are simply profound. They open up many avenues to think, to counter and sometimes just to re-read to absorb. One which really stuck with me was the interaction between Aatish and one of the Brahmins – Shivam. Shivam in his own way shows the difference between modernity and spirituality. He says, ‘either we throw ourselves into this modernity or we go back to what we were. What is intolerable is this limbo, this middle condition, for in the end the truth is only that. (pointing to the cremation ghats).’

At one point, Aatish writes that ‘no country is more dependent on visitors for historical information about itself than India…What India knew about herself was too speculative and abstract, too mystical, for outsiders to apprehend, and what visitors said about India could make Indians feel the visitors were talking about a country Indians did not recognize.’ He talks of the Dharma of the place, ‘The past in India is inseparable from the world of belief. Once faith was removed, Indians did not know what to make of their past. As with the dharma of the place, what mattered was not antiquity or beauty, but sanctity’.

AatishTaseer spoke at India Foundation’s India Ideas Conclave in 2016 on the idea of dissent. He said his is a cultural dissent. Aatish remarked that the colonisation British did in India was nothing as compared to the colonization India made of herself. Post-independence, India pursued the aims of colonizers with a dedication that probably would have surprised even Macaulay and the Indian elite continued to be culturally and linguistically deluded.

Aatish witnessed a sort of cultural resurgence in the 2014 Lok Sabha campaign. He was in Varanasi at the time working on his book and delved into the political expression and significance of the 2014 mandate. He sees this mandate from the same prism that he saw India’s culture and gets judgemental about what was being done and what has been achieved. He witnessed that people were filled with a sense of pride but they had not found a way to use the immense cultural wealth in a modern way. Aatish says that ‘the second birth’ that had to occur had not occurred.

AatishTaseer has written a wonderful book that pushes us to think deeper. He chronicles Varanasi in a very innovative manner and gives a new perspective. Twice he writes in the book, ‘those in whom tradition was most intact were often the least able to speak of it.’ Through this book Aatish helps us understand the concept of ‘BeejaRakshan’ and tells why it is important to understand and preserve our roots.

(Aaditya Tiwari is a Fellow at India Foundation.)

(This Book Review is carried in the print edition of January-February 2019 issue of India Foundation Journal.)

Author: Vikram Sood
Publisher: Penguin Viking, 2018, pp 304
Price: Rs.599/-
Book Review by:Abhishek Pratap Singh

The Unending Game: A Former R&AW Chief’s Insights into Espionage’ is an enduring account of India’s intelligence framework citing global spy operations and a meticulous contribution to scholarship. As the author himself notes, there is a certain ‘prevalent perception’ about the world of intelligence, given the world of fiction built around the subject, and to uncomplicate the same, the present book by former Research and Analysis Wing Chief, Vikram Sood, forms an intelligent, detailed and insightful account about the functioning and operation of intelligence system in India. As the title suggests, it basically builds on the functioning of the intelligence system in the past and its key significance in contemporary times, also identifying the challenges involved with it as we look towards its role for future. Interestingly, it also notes the role of ‘sharpened intelligence’ as a major component with India stressing out for its new role in international affairs and changing geo-politics around.

The book also covers the memoirs of India’s intelligence operations by the author and goes in detail about the collection of information systems, related facts and its further interpretation with a bit of sensation. The book includes eleven chapters that go through three different but interrelated themes such as statecraft, inside intelligence network and the future ahead.

In the very first part of the book, Sood has eloquently discussed and explained the importance of intelligence by identifying it as ‘foremost duties of any government.’ The author also goes on to discuss in detail the functioning and work of a spy in a more realistic manner, identifying major qualities of the job and challenges involved with intelligence in the age of communication revolution that requires expertise in language and with the issue, also noting the new and widening ambit of security and its meaning.

While noting the vulnerabilities of cyber technology, the author identifies the significance of covert operations given India’s relations with China and Pakistan, reflecting his simmering concerns with India’s two uneasy neighbours. By taking inferences from the memoirs of George Tenet, the CIA Director at the time of 9/11, the author reiterates the cost attached with the ignorance of intelligence and limitations of ‘could have been’ school of thought in part one, also later pointing to the thinness of US intelligence in covering the threat of Islamic terror.

The author puts the grey shade of intelligence by quoting General Dwight Eisenhower who referred to it as ‘a distasteful but vital necessity’. While discussing about the intelligence system in Pakistan, primarily led by ISI, in the chapter on “The Asian Paying Fields”, he notes its key role in ‘managing two frontiers’ and being the significant ‘parallel powerful army’ within their political system. He underlines the ideological and structural difference between both the countries, given their differential intelligence configuration and operations.

While discussing about the CIA-KGB battles, Sood outlines how the KGB was able to outsmart western intelligence services, but has to face setbacks when Soviet leaders ignored the importance of intelligence.  Much to the dismay of many, the chapter titled “State of Surveillance”, points to the short moment of glory by making intelligence public and the cost attached with it.

The chapter titled ‘Intelligence Smoke and Mirrors’ takes us to the darkness of espionage world, giving insights into the formation of ‘secret societies’ given ‘paramount fear’ amongst rich elite and the birth of intelligence privatisation, at the full display in Cold War years. The reading here well captures the grey shade of intelligence in order to protect business interest of few.

If Kargil was a case of intelligence failure for India, the author details the reports by IB and RAW between May 1998 to April 1999 warning the same but to the lesser notice by the then army. The preference for strategic alliances over cultural links goes well with the realist framework, and remains a dominant practice in post cold war era politics, which is well argued in the book.

On the subject of ‘intelligence reforms,’ the book attaches greater significance to the role and command over advanced technology and innovative functioning with the application of same, keeping in mind our objectives, ability of adversaries and friends. Intelligence reforms must well be formulated “having determined our goals and obstacles”, keeping in mind non-conventional challenges to the state. One has to design newer methods of defence and offence both in the age of technology war, given overflow of information and sharing, given effective networking amongst terrorist organisations. Noting the shift in the age of information, the author attaches greater significance to the role of human intelligence (HUMINT) and expert training in terms of analysts, operators, handlers and master spies, also emplacing the importance of intuition born out of sustained experience.

The book culminates with the future challenges involved in the domain of national security and intelligence, and lists out some key intelligence reforms that India must look upon to make the job efficient, competent, professional and above all relevant in the present global order that is marred by turbulence and uncertainty. The book emphasises the importance of avoiding a ‘revolving door’ culture in the Indian intelligence network at the cost of service professionalism and integrity.

From the beginning to the end, the book takes it readers through a range of issues involving intelligence system starting from training to espionage, private intelligence to cold war fears, geopolitics to post war fault lines, secret societies to overt measures, conventional intelligence to cyber espionage, oil crisis to water threats, and from reform to challenges involved with intelligence in the age of technology and innovation.

The book forms a useful addition to the books on the subject and would be greatly useful to all those who would like to have insights into the functioning of intelligence agencies.

(Mr. Abhishek Pratap Singh holds PhD in East Asian Studies (Chinese) from
Jawaharlal Nehru University (JNU), New Delhi and teaches at University of Delhi.)

(This Book Review is carried in the print edition of January-February 2019 issue of India Foundation Journal.)

While Great Power aspirations are a function of perceived national interests and cumulative increase in national power determinants, they are executed on the chessboard of foreign policy. With ‘national rejuvenation’ as the guiding theme, China unequivocally declared its global ambitions at the 19th Party Congress. In order to transform the country into “a global leader of composite national strength and international influence” by 2050, China has begun conferring an increasing thrust upon its foreign policy dynamics. This has been manifested through the establishment of new institutional frameworks,enhanced budgetary allocations, and the creation of a dedicated leadership pantheon. The underlining feature of this emerging narrative follow the leitmotif of present political culture in China- tightening control of the Party with Xi Jinping at the helm of affairs.

At the National People’s Congress (NPC) held in March 2018, the Central Leading Small Group on Foreign Affairs(FALSG) was upgraded to the Central Foreign Affairs Commission. The Commission is headed by Xi Jinping himself and has been mandated to lead China’s diplomatic efforts. This clearly marks the enhanced centralization of foreign policy as the FALSG operated under the supervision of the Office of the State Councilor.

During the first meeting of the Commission held in May, Xi called for enhancing the centralized and unified leadership of the Party over foreign affairs. Significantly, the Central Leading Group for Safeguarding Maritime Rights and Interestshas been abolished and its work placedunder the newly established Commission. As Xi Jinping is also the head of the Central Military Commission (CMC), these developments allow the Party ultimate sway over China’s South China Sea and Indian Ocean strategy and its policies on territorial disputes. The emerging dynamicsappear to effectively undercut military’s authority with regard to these contentious issues.

The Commission consists ofPremier Li Ke Keqiang in the position of the deputy head, Politburo member Yang Jiechi as the director of the general office and Vice President Wang Qishan as a member. It is important to note that Foreign Minister and State Councilor, Wang Yi has not been reported either as a member of the Commission or an attendee to the first meeting. As Wang is regarded a foreign policy ‘hawk’ within the strategic echelons, his absence from the Commission needs to be studied with much scrutiny. For India, Wang’s absence from the Commission should be of particular concern as he is China’s Special Representative on border talks between the two countries. Significantly, there is no representation from the military on the Commission by far.

The list of attendees to the first meeting included Politburo Standing Committee (PSC) members Wang Huning and Han Zheng. These two men are important as Wang Huning is regarded the theoretical architect of ‘China Dream’ concept which, among other things, has become the template for China’s soft power diplomacy.In fact, he is the first party theoretician to be elevated to the PSC since Cultural Revolution. Han Zheng is the top official responsible for Hong Kong which has emerged as a domestic and diplomatic test case for China since ‘Occupy Central’. The presence of these officials along with YangJiechi–a career diplomat–on theCommissionrepresents a leadership line with domain expertise within China’s foreign policy landscape.

Another key development that signaled the emerging centrality of foreign policy within Chinese politics was the ‘Central Conference on Work Relating to Foreign Affairs’ which was convened in June this year. This was the second such meeting summoned by Xi Jinping following one in 2014. In contrast, Xi’s predecessors Hu Jintao and Jiang Zeming had only held one such meeting during their respective tenures.

At the meeting, ‘Xi Jinping’s Thought on Diplomacy’ was adopted as the guiding principle on foreign policy. Though largely a reiteration of China’s foreign policy outlook and goals under Xi’s presidency, the guiding thought emphasizes two fundamental ideas- absolute control of the Party over foreign affairs and advancement of major country diplomacy. Among other things, ‘majorcountry diplomacy’ highlights the role of head-of-state diplomacythereby furthering the President’s role in foreign policy planning and execution.

In addition to tightening central control, China is employing huge monetary resources to pursue its foreign policy goals. At the NPC, China announced a 15 percent increase in its foreign affairs expenditure from the last such budget presented in 2012. This figure assumes further strategic salience when compared with the increase in defense budget which stood at 8.1 percent.

The economic dynamics of China’s foreign policy approach has been further streamlined with the creation of China International Development Cooperation Agency (CIDCA). The Agency consolidates the roles that till now remained divided between the commerce and foreign affairs ministries. This will provide a concerted push to the Belt and Road Initiative and other international investments representing China’s strategic objectives.As foreign aid is a key instrument of diplomacy, the Agency can be expected to undertake propaganda initiatives to quell the widespread criticism of China’s foreign aid programmes.

While increasing emphasis upon foreign policy dovetails with China’s ambition to become the leader of the international system, the stress upon Party’s absolute controlsignals internal challenges to Xi Jinping’s authority. Of late, China is witnessing growing domestic criticism of Xi’s socio-economic policies and speculations remain rife over a civil-military disconnect in the country. Such developments hold the potential to compromise Xi’s policy agenda.This dichotomy needs to be fully grasped by the strategic community.

(Ms. Shikha Aggarwal is a Senior Research Fellow at India Foundation. She holds over five years of research experience in the field of International Relations and Area Studies. Previously, she has been associated with premier Indian think tanks such as the Centre for Air Power Studies, National Maritime Foundation and Vivekananda International Foundation.)