Reviewed by Devrath JhunJhunwala

The ‘rise’ of China has emerged as a major theme of inquiry within academic and policy-making echelons across the world. Every aspect of Chinese politics, economics and society has seen rapid changes as China seeks to position itself as the ‘hegemon’ of the world order. ‘China ascendant: Its rise and implications’ is yet another addition to the voluminous literature on the subject. Through a series of essays focusing on various aspects of China’s growth and its effects, the editor, Harsh V. Pant, through a series of skilfully arranged book chapters, presents a coherent picture of a rising China and its implications for India and the rest of the world. The book is rich in the fluid use of statistical data and political analysis and seeks to juxtapose China’s rise in relation to India, and in doing so, suggests policy options for dealing with China.

China’s penetration, diplomatically and economically, within the Indo-Pacific region is viewed as compromising Indian strategic objectives. Essays in the book portray Chinese growth as a challenge to India’s foreign policy objectives and look into response options in terms of Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s ‘Act East’ policy. It presents an unbiased factual study of the hard power asymmetry between India and China through key economic and military indicators, which bring out the fact that India still has a long way to go to match Chinese capabilities. To come to par with China on the economic and military front, would require huge financial outlays for many years, and a peaceful investment climate. In his book chapter titled ‘Can India counter emerging Chinese capabilities like stealth aircraft?’ Pushan Das bluntly states that Indian capabilities are limited. The chapters on Space Militarisation and Cyber Security once again emphasise the need for India to step up efforts in Research and Development (R&D), if India is ever to catch up with China on this score.

Beyond hard power projection, the book analyses Chinese involvement across the world, especially in South Asia. China’s growing relationships with countries such as Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Afghanistan, traditional allies of India, are seen as solely for the benefit of China and describe economic dependency issues that could prove to weaken such nations. A key facet of this is Chinese presence in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR), which India has strategic interests in. China’s economic investments, military presence and diplomatic relations with nations in the IOR has raised concerns of Chinese intentions with respect to India, with the likelihood of China attempting a strategic encirclement of India. The IOR has been elaborated on as a key determinant of Chinese foreign policy goals with respect to India. With billions of dollars’ worth of goods and, more importantly, energy flowing through the IOR, both China and India see great strategic value in maintaining close ties with nations such as Sri Lanka, Maldives and Myanmar. India is unable to match Chinese economic inducements to these countries, but there is no reason why India should do so. There are other aspects which determine foreign policy which are India’s strengths such as soft power and a strong cultural connect, which India needs to exploit in its relations in the IOR.

The book devotes two chapters on Chinese naval power. ‘Sea Drones: Implications of the great underwater wall of China’ by Sylvia Mishra and ‘China’s naval power and prestige’ by Tuneer Mukherjee put forward the key instruments of such regional power projections. Both essays stress on growing technological development in both stealth and long-range weapon systems, especially with UUV’s (Unmanned Underwater Vehicle) with the Chinese navy. The need for a strict international code governing such modern naval technology is seen as a way to prevent Chinese challenges to national sovereignty of regional nations.

Building on South Asian affairs, a country that has been naturally focused on in the book is Pakistan, where China has found an opportunity to carry out a multitude of foreign policy objectives successfully. These include access to the Arabian Sea, a market for Chinese goods and a method to direct Indian attention away from wider regional issues. The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) is stressed as a massive undertaking that greatly enhances Chinese power in the region with little gross benefit to Pakistan. CPEC remains a concern for India as is the larger strategic partnership between China and Pakistan, the former using the latter as an instrument to keep India confined to the backwaters of South Asia and not emerge as a global power. The China-Pakistan axis also leads to the possibility of India being engaged in a two front war, and the same is discussed in detail in another book chapter by Abhijnan Raj titled “The sobering arithmetic of a two-front war”. The book thus places great emphasis on Chinese involvement in South Asia in an Indian context, viewing it as a potential threat for India and a growing imbalance in the status quo of the region. Diplomatic and strategic responses, notably ASEAN and BIMSTEC, are mentioned as possible counterweights.

Outside the South Asian region, China’s engagement with countries across the globe is viewed as an attempt by China to overturn the Western dominated world order. A Chinese policy deliberated upon is the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), a key action by the Xi Jinping regime. The initiative, while stressing trade and investment, is seen as a Chinese tool for global engagement and relevance. Debt traps, strategic dependence and disregard for international law is often mentioned when criticising this policy. China’s involvement in South Asia, Africa, South America and even the Arctic through massive unmatched investments and trade relations demonstrates the wide reach of China as well as its desire to establish a China-centric world. China hopes to back such engagement with economic superiority, through its strengthening Yuan and a ‘digital silk road’ of supportive infrastructure. The book also delves into China’s abysmal record on human rights and respect for the law. The Uighur problem in the Xinjiang province of China as well as domestic repression is viewed as a clear cut example of China’s indifference towards international law, which makes a future China based world order not something that would be welcomed.

China’s economic growth and its success in bringing millions out of poverty is certainly a success story. While this has been achieved through the government’s protectionist regulations, and while China’s authoritarian capitalism is criticised for its inefficiencies and inequalities, it cannot be denied that the country has achieved great success in improving the lives of its citizens, for which it must be lauded. The growth in China is termed as “selective liberalisation” where pro-market policies are only implemented in sectors imperative to growth. This helped China gain both employment and productivity, leading to a compound growth of 13% between 1989 and 2017. The book also lays focus on climate change, a field that is now increasingly relevant in areas of politics, economics and society world-wide. China’s environmental protection laws are hailed as a great first step, for their strict enforcement and their reduction of smog in urban centres. Such ‘lessons’ are painted as vital for Indian society, one that suffers greatly from high levels of pollution. In addition to that, essays such as ‘China’s innovation boom: Lessons for India’ by Meghna Bal seeks to emulate Chinese success in India, nevertheless stressing the inability of India to match the central planning that China gained from. As a critique to Chinese planning, another book chapter titled ‘The mystery of China’s shrinking cities’ by Sayli Udas-Mankikar berates China’s cruel population redistribution policies in its megacities. Forced evictions, relocations and demolitions are portrayed as inhumane, leading to an aged population without economic opportunities and more expensive living conditions for those remaining. Economic analysis in the book, therefore, both cheers and criticises the China economic model, painting it as unstable in the long-run but one that India should seek to implement with appropriate modifications.

Harsh V. Pant as the Editor has done an exemplary job in putting together a series of articles in a coherent manner, which brings out with distinct clarity the role that China is likely to play in the world, while highlighting India’s response options. There will be both competition and cooperation in the India-China relationship and how India negotiates the challenges ahead, with respect to both its security and economic concerns will have to be watched. The book offers valuable insight into certain aspects of China’s politics, military and economic advancement and diplomatic outreach across the world, which makes it a valuable addition to those wishing to delve into the subject.

Kashmir is all that Pakistan talks about these days. On 14 August, the day on which Great Britain created Pakistan in 1947, Imran Khan was in Muzaffarabad instigating Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (POK)“nationalists,” (the long-time adversaries of Pakistan), that India had snatched away Kashmir from them. He purported to convey through them a message to POK expatriates in the UK who responded by making a massive protest demonstration in front of the Indian Mission in London. The London police made a mock show of preventive measures.

Armed insurgency and ‘azadi’ (freedom) slogan were actually initiated by POK’s UK-based diaspora in the early 1980s on the behest of ISI. These criminals had kidnapped and murdered Ravindra Mhatre, the Indian Counsellor in Birmingham in 1982. In 1993, when JKLF had spread its fangs in the Valley, the PoK-based activists, under the leadership of Amanullah Khan, led a march to force entry into Kashmir Valley by violating the LoC. Apprehensive of JKLF carrying the day, and that Kashmiris would rally round freedom and not for accession to Pakistan, The Pakistan military stopped the JKLF marchers at Chakoti, a small village in POK near the LoC. Violence erupted and the Pakistan army opened fire on them in which 27 persons are reported to have been killed or seriously wounded. Since then, PoK “Kashmir nationalists” and Pakistan authorities have been locked in a seesaw relationship. But now, PoK expatriates have forgotten that bloodshed as well as the untold oppression unleashed by Pakistan on freedom fighters, intellectuals, ideologues, writers and media persons of PoK. Many of them were banished who sought asylum in western countries.

The Pakistani premier, MrImran Khan, made frantic telephone calls to President Trump raising alarm on India bringing certain constitutional and administrative reforms in Kashmir. Pakistan’s foreign minister made a jaunt to Beijing to secure China’s support at the Security Council where Pakistan lodged a complaint and called for an emergency meeting, which, however, did not materialise. Only a closed-door clueless meeting was held. Turkey’s President TayyipErdogan promised steadfast support without condemning India and the Malaysian Prime Minister, Tun Mahathir made only a lukewarm expression of concern. OIC second rung representatives passed the usual farcical resolution that finally goes to the dust bin and UAE as well as SAARC countries called it India’s internal affair.

Yes, China gave limited support, though she concentrated more on Ladakh and her border security concerns. But the world knows that China has no principled foreign policy. However, the Tiananmen Square carnage, trampling of the rights of Tibetans and suppression of Sunni Uighur Muslims of Xinjiang cannot be washed away that soon. Pakistan usually misleads the people in believing that Muslim countries support its Kashmir stand. But how the Muslim states reacted in the present case proves that what binds modern societies into the strings of a partnership are economic interests. China’s annual trade with India amounts to USD 95 billion compared to USD 13 billion with Pakistan. Turkey’s trade with India stands at USD 8.6 billion against USD 1 billion with Pakistan. Malaysia-India trade at USD 14 billion is 14 times more than the USD 1 billion of goods and services which Malaysia exchanges with Pakistan.^[1]

On Pakistan creation day, Imran Khan chanted only India and Modi in his Muzaffarabad outburst. He could not get rid of the genie. At the UN, at its embassies and missions abroad, the talk is only about Kashmir. Pakistan foreign office shot SOS to perceived patrons and dubious international organisations shedding crocodile’s tears on India’s masterstroke in Kashmir and begging for intervention. People in Pakistan have gone hysterical about the bolt from the blue. But the reality is that Imran Khan and his foreign minister have demonstrated feigned hysterics only to lure the Pak Army into thinking that its hand-picked civilian government is doing all it can to carry forward its agenda. Some observers even say that Imran Khan’s decision of taking the COAS and the ISI boss along with him to Washington was taken because he had apprehensions of a military coup in his absence. The arrest and detention of some of the terrorist leaders including Hafiz Saeed, no doubt an eyewash, did not go well with the army.

Pakistan has downgraded diplomatic relations with India, stopped bilateral trade which is ridiculously insignificant and cancelled the Samjhauta and Thar Express. Frustration speaks loudly. It shows how Modi has gravely incapacitated Pakistan. All that remains of seven-decade-old Kashmir dispute is to fulfil the 1994 unanimous resolution of the Indian Parliament of taking back the area of the original State of Jammu and Kashmir under Pakistan’s illegal occupation since 1947. Pakistan must come forward and talk about its withdrawal from POK (Mirpur Muzaffarabad and GilgitBaltistan), and also persuade China not only to return the Aksai Chin area of original J&K State but also return to India the part of Shaksgam Valley that Pakistan ceded to China in 1963.

The state raised by Maharaja Gulab Singh in 1846 has finally integrated into the Indian Union. The Indian nation must pay tribute to that Dogra ruler, a great army commander and a visionary statesman. J&K’s communally oriented Constitution of 1956, and the entire separatist edifice is razed to the ground. The falsely constructed superficial notion of identity stands eroded, and only one identity—that of an Indian—remains valid henceforth.  Forget about its reversal of constitutional reform measures,attack on any part of the Union Territory means war, and the Defence Minister cleared all doubts about India’s determination to recover its territory now under illegal occupation of the neighbouring countries. In the context of how and when to take back, POK, India must, among other things, take into account the fierce opposition in POK to Pakistani domination. It is the moral duty of India to come to their rescue. Many political dissenting parties in PoK and G-B are willing to be the part of Indian Union. India must consolidate her position there and liberate the people of those areas from the shackles of Pak slavery.

As far as Pakistan’s accusation of India violating the defunct UNSC resolutions on Kashmir is concerned, we may remind Pakistan that she has repeatedly altered the status of the parts of Kashmir it controls, weakening its current protestations. In April 1949, Pakistan took over Gilgit-Baltistan (then called the ‘Northern Areas’) through an agreement with the government of Azad Kashmir and the political party, All Jammu and Kashmir Muslim Conference. No accredited representative from GB was party to this clandestine agreement.^[2]

Recently, former Pakistani diplomat Husain Haqqani, who currently is the Director for South and Central Asia at Hudson Institute, wrote in one of his articles how in 1969 a Northern Areas Advisory Council (NAAC) was created in the region, followed by the Northern Areas Legislative Council (NALC) in 1994. Pakistan’s Ministry of Kashmir Affairs and Northern Areas retained all law-making powers until the 2009 Gilgit-Baltistan Empowerment and Self-Governance Order, which created an elected legislature and the office of the chief minister. According to him, Pakistan’s stance that the status of the princely state of Jammu and Kashmir was yet to be settled also did not come in the way of the 1963 Pakistan-China boundary agreement that resulted in China ceding some territory to Pakistan and Pakistan recognising Chinese sovereignty over hundreds of square kilometres of land in Northern Kashmir and Ladakh. He posits that in this scenario the Kashmiri separatist leadership now has three choices: it could take the matter to the Indian Supreme Court and argue that the decision violates Indian constitutional principles. This option has been exhausted with the Supreme Court declining to meddle in the administrative matters. Secondly, it could mobilise protests that could turn the Kashmir Valley into a South Asian West Bank, along with the misery that might bring for the Kashmiri people.^[3]

In doing so, Pakistan cannot afford to ignore the Damocles sword hanging on her neck in the shape of UN’s Financial Action Task Force (FATF) warning of blacklisting Islamabad. The way India has taken preventive measures clearly indicates that New Delhi will not allow a theocratic region on the territory of the Indian Union.  If massive protests ensue and India puts them down with a heavy hand, one can expect denunciation of human rights violations from detractors of India. It can be argued that in today’s world, human rights violations have, regrettably, lost their salience as instigators of international pressure. In the case of Kashmir insurgency, no power has an iota of doubt that it is a jihadi terrorist movement aimed at breaking the Union. India’s show of the might of the state cannot be challenged by China with Tiananmen Square massacre hanging around her neck like an albatross.

Finally, it could try and see how to extract maximum advantage from the new order. This is the only right option for the dissidents in Kashmir and it depends on their vision how best they can put it into practice. In conclusion, a heavy responsibility devolves on Indian policy makers in the background of the fundamental reason of scrapping Article 370 and doing away with State’s special status. It is the responsibility of development, of growth of infrastructure, of providing employment and other reforms. India has no time to waste in executing these weighty tasks, for which huge private as well as public investments would be required.

(*The writer is the former Director of the Centre of Central Asian Studies, Kashmir University)

^[1]Haqqani, Husain. “Pakistan Needs to Stop Thinking of Kashmir as an Unfinished Business of Partition.” By Husain Haqqani, www.hudson.org/research/15233-pakistan-needs-to-stop-thinking-of-kashmir-as-an-unfinished-business-of-partition.

^[2] Ibid.

^[3] Ibid.

Ministry of Power has just announced Ujjwal Discom Assurance Yojana (UDAY) 2.0 is under making. Like its predecessor, it is once again aimed at turning around operational & financial performance of distribution utilities in India. In film industry sequels to a hit movie is a common phenomenon, however their success again is depended on the script. It is early to say whether UDAY-I is a blockbuster or not (in terms of achieving its objective) but now UDAY II is on the floors. In this blog, I argue rather than providing ambitious targets in terms of tariff hike, in next five years Govt should focus on increasing quality & reliability of power. Once customers are accustomed to good quality power supply, they may not hesitate in paying actual tariffs

UDAY-I was launched by the Ministry of Power, Govt. of India on November 20, 2015, amidst much fanfare and hope that it will do what no other scheme could achieve i.e. bring about operational and financial turnaround in the State-owned Distribution Companies (DISCOMs). It was a tripartite agreement between the Central Govt. of India, State Govt. and State DISCOM whereby the respective state governments would take over 75% of the debt of the DISCOM’s in lieu of certain achievements to be made by the utilities. The two important achievements to be made by the end of FY 2018-19 were, a) reduction inAggregate Technical & Commercial loss (AT&C)to 15% and
b) reduction in gap between Average cost of supply (ACS) and Aggregate Revenue Required (ARR) to zero.

Table 1: ARR-ACS Gap for the FY 2018-19 (INR/Unit)

Source: UDAY portal (www.uday.gov.in)

[1] States like AP, Bihar & Rajasthan have signed MoU for each of their DISCOMs
[2] Negative indicates recovery from tariff would be more than the cost incurred

The above table shows data for ten states from UDAY portal (www.uday.gov.in). Only three states out of ten have managed to ensure that the gap between ACS and ARR is zero. In fact, in these three states gap is negative indicating DISCOMs revenue are higher than the cost. However, one should keep in mind that the number in ‘Actual’ column for FY 2018-19 indicate tariff determined based on certain projections (like sales and power purchase cost etc.) andfinals results would only be found out while truing-up (reconciliation) exercise for FY 2018-19 is taken up (should be done while determining tariff for FY 2020-21).
Seven out of ten states not meeting their target of reducing ACS-ARR gap should not be surprising considering tariff hike is still a political matter in India.As a thumb rule no tariff increase takes place in the states in the year of elections, for example, even though Madhya Pradesh and Chhattisgarh agreed to undertake tariff increase of 3% and 5% respectively in FY 2018-19, no increase happened in Madhya Pradesh and tariff was reduced by 3% in Chhattisgarhin the same year as elections were due.
Credit must be given to UDAY for trying to solve legacy problems through mixture of competitive federalism and state support (75% of DISCOM debts were taken over by respective State Govts.), however going forward it must also be pragmatic about politics around power tariff. Setting targets like reduction of AT&C losses to 15% in next five years is unwarranted asstates like Madhya Pradesh and Jharkhand have AT&C losses higher than 30%. Reducing it by half would require a massive capital investment (along with regular expenses such as O&M, employees etc,), which in turn would require tariff increase to a quantum which would not be politically feasible. On the other hand, not allowing such tariff increase would again create unmanageable liabilities in the commercial book of DISCOMs thereby maintaining the vicious cycle which it is trying to break from.
The popular Sharp magazine in one of its articles (dated 27 May, 2015) had given three rules for making movie sequels. First rule is ‘Don’t take your time’, second rule is ‘The same, only different’ and the third rule is ‘Dare to dream’. In all probability UDAY 2.0 would fulfil first and second rule, the challenge would be to fulfil the third rule. Can our policymakers dare to think of something which would ensure that in medium to long term, DISCOMs actually undergo financial and operational turn around?
One of the daring risks to take could be to follow what companies like Amazon or Flipkart do i.e. charge consumers less than what is required but at the same time provide high quality service so that when in near future prices are hiked consumers may not think twice in paying as they are satisfied with the services. This may not be the apt example in totality because these companies face competition pressures whereas the DISCOMs don’t since they are owned by the state governments. However, an analogy can be drawn from this i.e.keeping in mind that tariff increase beyond a certain limit is not politically feasible, UDAY 2.0 can focus towards increasing power reliability and quality and limit tariff increase to say 3-5% (so that consumers do not acquire the habit of not having tariff increase). Once consumers have enough confidence on government service delivery, they may not mind paying the ‘just tariff’. For example, residential consumers in Mumbai pay one of the highest tariffs in the country. Though there is a discontent post increase, yet they pay because power reliability and quality in Mumbai is the best in the country and consumers don’t face power cuts or have to buy power inverters. Further, improved service delivery would also bring efficiency ensuring reasonable tariff increase (Rajasthan DISCOMs in their FY 2018-19 tariff petition did not propose tariff increase and sought to increase revenue through cutting losses).
This is just one of the many ideas UDAY 2.0 can dare to dream of. The challenge is can they dare to dream of? Numerous bailout packages have been issued to DISCOMs in the past and UDAY 2.0 certainly won’t be the last. It is time to be pragmatic and understand there would be UDAY 3.0 or 4.0, however, it is important that each sequel builds onto the other hoping it is no more than a trilogy or a quartet.

*  Shashwat Kumar is a Predoctoral Fellow, Marie S. Curie European Training Network, H2020, Global India. He is based out of Institut Barcelona d’Estudis Internacionals, Barcelona (Spain)

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July 31, 2019, will be remembered as the day when the democratic fabric of India was upheld and reaffirmed. After receiving the President of India’s assent, the Muslim women community were afforded protection from the incivility and regressive nature of talaq-e-biddat, also known as ‘instant triple talaq’ under the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Marriage) Act of 2019.

What is talaq-e-biddat? It is a type of divorce practiced under the Hanafi Sunni school of jurisprudence, where the husband can divorce his wife by communicating ‘talaq’ three times in one sitting. On completion of this communication, the marital tie is broken instantly and irrevocably. With the utterance of those words, the woman loses all her rights to the household and is rendered homeless. The absurdity and inherent inequality of practicing instant talaq is hidden from no one. The government is rightly being credited for not only addressing a topic as sensitive as personal laws for the Muslim community, but also for ensuring an effective redressal to a regressive practise. Unfortunately, the issue has taken a political hue, with some clerics seeing the passage of the Act not as a social issue and a fight for gender equality but as undue interference in the religious affairs of the Muslims. The hypocrisy of certain lawmakers also stood out. Mehbooba Mufti, a Muslim woman politician and the leader of a regional political party based in Kashmir, directed her party members to stage a walk out in the Upper House (RajyaSabha) when voting on the Bill took place. She later tweeted “…abstention is essentially a no vote.” Instead of registering dissent against the proposed bill in the parliament by voting against it, Mehbooba Mufti’s People’s Democratic Party (PDP) adopted the political gimmick of staging a walk out. This was political duplicity and subterfuge of an exceptionally high order, even for a regional party not known for political propriety.

Before India’s Parliament enacted the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Marriage) Act of 2019, pronouncing ‘talaq’ thrice in one sitting had the effect of immediate annulment of the marriage. This was in stark contrast to the practice of ‘talaq-ul-sunnat’ which requires pronouncing ‘talaq’ three times over a three month period. The three-month period of ‘iddat’ would commence after ‘talaq’ was pronounced for the first time. The marriage stood annulled only if ‘talaq’ was pronounced for the third time at the end of the said ‘iddat’ period. The rationale behind giving three months ‘iddat’ period was to safeguard the woman by providing a cushion against decisions taken on impulse, while also providing time for negotiation or reconciliation. An additional reason was to ensure that the woman is not pregnant as pregnancy could directly or indirectly affect the decision of divorce, issue of maintenance or custody. Instant triple talaq, on the other hand, instantly leaves the wife and in most cases the children, in a miserable and helpless situation.

Recent years have witnessed the growing popularity of social media as a means of communication. This became a bane to the victims of instant triple talaq as the husbands started resorting to means such as Messenger, WhatsApp, fax, email etc to seek divorce by sending ‘talaq’ thrice by message to the wife. It is regrettable that Muslim clerics not only validated the divorce given under instant triple talaq, but went on to validate even the ones given via text messages. In one incident, a Muslim woman along with her young children were thrown out of their residence by her husband in Tamil Nadu. When the wife protested, the husband simply uttered ‘talaq’ three times, and the hapless woman, along with her children were rendered homeless with limited recourse to justice. In another such incident, a Muslim woman was divorced through instant triple talaq to make way for a younger bride who could pay more dowry. Incidents like these not only reflect on the regressive nature of this obnoxious practice, but also denies to Muslim women, the rights guaranteed to all citizens in the Constitution of India.

There is no gainsaying the fact that under the Constitution of India, personal laws, i.e.laws dealing with marriage, inheritance, etc are entitled to certain latitude in practice. However, the same document as reflective of the collective will of the people and spirit of the nation becomes the guardian of equality. On August 22, 2017, Supreme Court in the Shayara Bano judgment declared the practice of instant triple talaq as violative of the Constitutional spirit and the fundamental right of equality under Article 14. Both the parties to the case agreed that the practice of ‘talaq-e-biddat’ is “bad in theology, but good in law.” When a phenomenon is governed by personal laws in consonance with religious doctrines, it is absurd to argue in favour of its validity when the very same religious doctrines consider it ‘bad’. When the believers of the same faith consider an otherwise socially repulsive practice as a sin, in broader framework continuing it is nothing short of violating both, constitutional and societal morality. The court while extensively examining the instant and irrevocable nature of talaq-e-biddat held that the arbitrariness of the practice where a Muslim man can “capriciously and whimsically” break a marital tie without “any attempt at reconciliation”, is violating right to equality and thus, is invalid in the eyes of the law.

The inhumane version of instant triple talaq has already been outlawed either directly or indirectly in many Islamic countries. In Algeria, Iraq, Libya, Kuwait, Morocco, Sudan, Tunisia, UAE and Yemen, where the official religion is Islam, there are effective laws in place wherein divorce under ‘talaq-e-biddat’ is invalid. Even secular states with majority sunni population such as Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria have express provisions for protecting Muslim woman from the incivility of instant triple talaq. In Southeast Asia, Indonesia, a country with six official religions including Islam, expressly mentions that divorce will be declared final only by the court. Malaysia, with Islam as its official religion, has written laws regulating the divorce under Islamic Family Law Act 1984. The said Act does not recognise instant triple talaq. The law in Philippines, while acknowledging the importance of reconciliation during the ‘iddat’ period, outlawed practice of instant triple talaq. Theocratic states of Bangladesh and Pakistan with Islam as the official religion have written laws detailing the procedure to be followed for a valid divorce.

It must be noted that the practice of ‘talaq-e-biddat’ despite being declared as unconstitutional by the Supreme Court of India in August 2017, continued unabated across the country. There was no deterrence attached to the unconstitutionality of the practice, which gave the Muslim male the leeway to continue with the practice with impunity. In order to protect Muslim women in India from this Damocles sword of harassment and summary abandonment, and to ensure deterrence against resorting to the practice of instant triple talaq, The Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Marriage) Act of 2019, made the practice a criminal offence. Use of ‘talaq-e-biddat’ would now attract imprisonment which could extend to three years, a fine which would be decided by the court or both.

This move of providing a strong safeguard to victimised Muslim women, has raised the hackles of some in the Muslim clergy as also of some law makers, who are against the criminalisation of the practice. Some have viewed this legislation to protect Muslim women as anti-Islam and an assault on their religious practises, as guaranteed in Article 25 of the Constitution. This reasoning has been struck down by the Supreme Court of India, which had declared the practice of talaq-e-biddat or triple talaq as illegal, and held it to be not an essential religious practice.

A major inhumane fallout of the regressive practice of triple talaq is the resort to Nikah Halala which a divorced Muslim woman has to follow for reconciliation. Nikah Halala is a regressive custom which again discriminates against the female. If a divorced woman is to be reconciled with her former husband, she has to go through Nikah Halala. This means that she has to first marry another man and consummate the marriage with him. There is a waiting period up to the woman’s menses, after which the second husband gives a divorce, enabling her to marry her first husband. Victims of triple talaq have often been forced to undergo Nikah Halala, when they have been divorced by their husband in a moment of rage and later, the husband realising his error, wants her back. This has also become a tool for exploiting Muslim women, besides ridiculing her status as of being of little consequence. This was another reason why deterrence had to be built into the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Marriage) Act of 2019.

An instance reported in July 2018 revealed the horrific reality behind this practice. A woman was divorced multiple times and forced to consummate her marriage in the name of Nikah Halala with multiple men including her father-in-law and brother-in-law. On protesting against this nauseating behaviour, she was threatened not only to be declared as an outcast, but also threatened with her life. It is rumoured that Meena Kumari, the famous Bollywood actress of 1950s was also a victim of instant triple talaq and had to undergo Nikah Halala with the husband’s best friend. When asked about the incident, it is claimed that she said, “If in the name of religion, I have to handover my body to another man, then is there a difference between me and a sex worker?”. In the absence of any recorded evidence, it is possible that this event never took place. On the other hand, it is possible that it did, but considering the state of society in those times, it was kept under wraps. But regardless of the veracity or otherwise of the incident, such cruelty is not an uncommon occurrence and is reflective of the plight of Muslim women in India. That is why it becomes essential to see such practices as criminal offences and not just social evils. It ensures that a man respects the individuality of his wife and does not consider her to be an object that can be ridiculed or toyed around with as per his whims and fancies. It is important for men to realise that mere payment of a fine will not undo the agony a woman has to go through when she is left abandoned after a “manifestly arbitrary” pronunciation of ‘talaq’.

Talaq-ul-sunnat, as opposed to talaq-e-biddat gives the aggrieved Muslim woman time and space for reconciliation and negotiating the terms of divorce, including the maintenance. However, the instant and irrevocable nature of talaq-e-biddat immediately renders the Muslim woman helpless. In the backdrop of this reality, the criminalisation of instant triple talaq, while respecting the integrity of a woman, empowers her by providing the time and space to negotiate the terms on which to end the marriage. It is this criminalisation that fulfils the sociological goal of protecting and empowering the Muslim women community. Further, the law balances the rights of both, the aggrieved and the aggressor. Where the Muslim husband has the right to avail bail from a magistrate, the law also makes sure that the Muslim woman herself can file a complaint as can anybody related to her by blood or marriage. The law also ensures that upon the request of the aggrieved woman to a magistrate, the legal proceedings will be stopped and the dispute will be settled outside the set legal framework. The law has reiterated the right of the Muslim woman to seek subsistence allowance and custody of her children.

A similar rationale has been followed for criminalising another deplorable practice – that of dowry harassment. Over the years, thousands of women have been exploited, tortured and harassed on the pretext of dowry. In many reported cases the wife was tortured to death. It was the criminalisation of the act that deterred men and induced a behavioural change. It is nobody’s case that a legal framework facilitated a complete end to the practice of dowry harassment, but it did assist in vastly reducing the number of cases. Similarly, the triple talaq law, while creating a deterrence amongst Muslim men, will provide a legal recourse to safeguard the rights and dignity of Muslim women. A mere critique that law can be misused holds no ground when it is serving such a noble purpose.

Another critique that a jailed man will not be able to support and provide for the wife is nothing short of an absurdity. It is the irrational and unsupportive behaviour of the husband which has landed him in jail. Further, it is the responsibility of the courts to put in place a practical scheme for providing support to the Muslim woman when the husband is in jail. This is a responsibility that courts have been fulfilling since their inception not only in cases concerning rights of divorced woman, but every case involving right of the aggrieved party to receive compensation.

The exact number of triple talaq victims might not be available in the official records, but according to one of the petitioners in the Shayara Bano case, Bhartiya Muslim Mahila Andolan (BMMA), the number of reported cases is going down. Further, in an interview with a leading newspaper, the BMMA said that there has been a behavioural change where more men are now approaching the organisation for marriage counselling, where otherwise they could have resorted to the easier route of ‘triple talaq’. The Mumbai chapter of BMMA alone had received 31 complaints of oral triple talaq in 2016. After making it a criminal offence, the number of complaints went down to 6 in 2017 and 2 in 2018.

The law may be challenged for judicial scrutiny on the grounds of criminalisation. However, it is this deterrence created from imprisonment that has given hope and confidence to the Muslim women. A practice “bad in theology, but good in law” has been declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court of the country. The impetus is now on Parliament as the representative of the collective conscience of the people, to motivate behavioural change in compliance with the legal provision while making sure the infrastructure to facilitate the said change is in place. The Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Marriage) Act of 2019 is the manifestation of this infrastructure and conscience.

In Shayara Bano judgment, Supreme Court acknowledged that “…90 percent of the Sunni Muslims in India, belong to the Hanafi school, and that they have been adopting ‘talaq-e-biddat’ as a valid form of divorce, is also not a matter of dispute”. In a country where presumably 90 percent from a sub-community of Muslims constituting nearly 14 crore of the total population believe in the validity of instant triple talaq and regard it as an available option, it is but democratic to protect women from it, while also ensuring effective deterrence against such an abhorrent practice. The evils of patriarchy have always determined the contours of personal laws in India. However, over the decades, these evils have been reformed and codification has played an important role in this regard. It is important to consider that when the uncivil and barbaric nature of Muslim criminal law has been acknowledged and made inapplicable, the community itself should step up and reform the regressive nature of personal laws under Shariat. It is not to argue that the journey to empower Muslim women stops at criminalising instant triple talaq. There are many creases to be ironed out, but a strong policy action like this must not be downplayed. In the twenty-first century, it is unacceptable that a Muslim woman’s constitutional right to equality be held ransom to antediluvian and patriarchal personal laws. An inherently patriarchal practice cannot and should not be sustained in a world progressing towards gender equality.

References

(i) ShayaraBano vs. Union of India & Others (2017) 9 SCC 1, para 15.
(ii) @MehboobaMufti, 9:10 PM, Jul 30, 2019, available at https://twitter.com/MehboobaMufti/status/1156228065510318081?s=20
(iii) Supra note i, para 127.
(iv) Ibid, para 57.
(v) Ibid, para 28.
(vi) QaziFaraz Ahmad, July 16, 2018, “Woman Forced to Sleep With Father-in-law Under NikahHalala, Faces Death Threats for Speaking Out”, News18, available at https://www.news18.com/news/india/woman-forced-to-sleep-with-father-in-law-under-nikah-halala-faces-death-threats-for-speaking-out-1813621.html.
(vii) “Flashback: Did you know that MeenaKumari was also a victim of ‘triple talaq’?”, DNA India, Aug 22, 2017, available at https://www.dnaindia.com/bollywood/report-flashback-did-you-know-that-meena-kumari-was-also-a-victim-of-triple-talaq-2538427.
(viii) Zeeshan Shaikh, “’After ordinance, there has been a drop in number of women reporting triple talaq’: NoorjehanSafiaNiaz, co-founder of the Bhartiya Muslim MahilaAndolan, speaks to The Indian Express about the efficacy of the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Marriage) Bill, 2019 and the organisation’s fight to bring in a comprehensive law on Muslim marriage”, The Indian Express, June 17, 2019, available at https://indianexpress.com/article/india/triple-talaq-ordinance-supreme-ocurt-bhartiya-muslim-mahila-andolan-5783641/.
(ix) Supra note i, para 144.

On 26 July 2019, the Indian nation, but more particularly the great Indian Army will commemorate the 20^thanniversary of “Operation Vijay”, the code name of Kargil operations with the theme ‘Remember, Rejoice and Renew.’ Troops from three battalions will undertake expeditions to the peaks where their units had fought under impossible conditions (15000 to 18000 feet high peaks) to drive out Pakistani intruders. “We ‘remember’ our fallen heroes by revisiting their sacrifices which instils pride and respect. We ‘rejoice’ by celebrating the victory in Kargil and we ‘renew’ our resolve to safeguard the honour of the tricolour, an Army official said on the theme of this year’s celebration.

Pakistan’s Kargil adventure codenamed “Operation Badr” was planned in good time which included the construction of logistical supply routes. On more than one occasion, the army had given past Pakistani leaders (Zia ul Haq and Benazir Bhutto) similar proposals for infiltration in the Kargil region in the 1980s and 1990s, says General (Rtd) V.P Malik, the then Indian army chief.  However, the plans had been shelved for fear of drawing the nation into all-out war. Some analysts believe that the blueprint of attack was reactivated when Pervez Musharraf was appointed aschief of army staff in October 1998.

In a disclosure Nawaz Sharif, the then Prime Minister of Pakistan stated that he was unaware of the preparation of the intrusion, and it was an urgent phone call from Atal Bihari Vajpayee, his counterpart in India, that informed him about the situation. Responding to this, Musharraf asserted that the Prime Minister had been briefed on the Kargil operation 15 days ahead of Vajpayee’s journey to Lahore on February 20. Sharif had attributed the plan to Musharraf and “just two or three of his cronies”, a view shared by some Pakistani writers who have stated that only four generals, including Musharraf, knew of the plan.

In early May 1999, the Pakistan Army moved to occupy the Kargil posts, numbering around 130, and thus control the area and the highway linking Ladakh with the rest of the country.  It deployed the elite Special Services Group as well as four to seven battalions of the Northern Light Infantry (a paramilitary regiment not part of the regular Pakistani army at that time) backed by the jihadists from PoK and Punjab and Afghan mercenaries. Covertly or overtly, they set up bases on the vantage points of the Indian-controlled region.

Pakistan had opened heavy artillery fire across the Line of Control to provide cover for the infiltrators. A shepherd from Garkhon village, Tashi Namgyal, had first spotted the intruders at Jubar ridgeline in Batalik on May 3, 1999, and alerted the Army. He, along with two of his friends, had gone looking for a lost yak. While peering through his binoculars, he saw six Pakistani soldiers dressed in black Pathani outfits

Our army brought in about 250 artillery guns to clear the infiltrators in the posts that were in the line of sight. The Bofors field howitzer played a vital role and the IAF used laser-guided bombs to destroy well-entrenched positions of the Pakistani forces. It is estimated that in the war, nearly 700 intruders were killed by air action alone.

The Indian Navy also readied itself for an attempted blockade of Pakistani ports primarily Karachi port. Later on, Prime Minister of Pakistan Nawaz Sharif disclosed that Pakistan was left with just six days of fuel to sustain itself if a full-fledged war had broken out. As Pakistan found itself entwined in a tricky position, the army had covertly planned a nuclear strike on India. The US President, Bill Clinton issued a stern warning to Nawaz Sharif. Two months into the conflict, an estimated 75%–80% of the intruded area and nearly all high ground was back under Indian control.

Following the Washington Accord on July 4, where Sharif agreed to withdraw the Pakistani troops, most of the fighting came to a gradual halt. In spite of this, some of the militants still holed up did not wish to retreat, and the United Jihad Council (an umbrella for all extremist groups) rejected Pakistan’s plan for a climb-down, instead deciding to fight on. Following this, the Indian army launched its final attacks in the last week of July; as soon as the last of these Jihadists in the Drass subsector had been cleared, the fighting ceased on July 26. The day has since been marked as Kargil Vijay Diwas (Victory Day) in India. By the end of the war, India had resumed control of all territory south and east of the Line of Control, as was established in July 1972 as per the Shimla Accord.

The unparalleled bravery and fighting spirit exhibited by the Indian soldiers and officers can be gathered from the contents of the following paragraph from a PTI reportage; “ A treacherous ridgeline in the Batalik sector, Khalubar saw a major battle with 1/11 Gorkha Rifles leading the fight. Lt Manoj Kumar Pandey led the final assault and was awarded the country’s highest gallantry award Param Vir Chakra. The terrain of Batalik-Yaldor-Chorbatla sector is the most rugged after the Siachen Glacier, with heights ranging from 15,000 feet to 19,000 feet. The temperatures in winter range from minus 10-15 degrees Celsius on a sunny day to minus 35-40 degrees Celsius at night. Even in summer, the night temperatures hover around minus 5-10 degrees Celsius. In the heights of Kargil, The signs of the battles may have long obliterated, but the locals still vividly recall the Indian Army’s bravery. “We are proud of our Army which fought a deadly short war in these rugged, remote and inhospitable sectors and reclaimed all our posts,” a resident of Garkhon village in Batalik sector, TseringDolkar, told PTI”

Pakistan’s perspective

Pakistan’s first perspective of its Kargil misadventure in which a large number of her troops especially those of the Northern Light Infantry were killed besides many irregulars, isthat while there is broad consensus that Kargil-like operations are not viable in the current international environment, violence in various forms remains a legitimate—if not the only—means to achieve Pakistan’s political objectives in Kashmir.  Pakistan understands it paid heavily for its adventurism and the international community did not support the use of overt force to alter the status quo. Thus Islamabad has concluded that the use of Pakistani troops in Kargil invited political failure, and consequently, its incentive to repeat such an operation is verymeager.

The second perspective is that in the calculus of Pakistani Generals, their Kargil strategy of total secrecy of this conspiracy has succeeded in keeping the Pakistani state and the nation both in complete darkness about the ground reality of Kargil war. Pakistanis believe and so do their Kashmiri henchmen that Kargil war was part of Pakistan-sponsored so-called freedom movement in Kashmir.

The third perspective isthat Kargil-like operations are disavowed, but violence remains a legitimate tool to achieve political objectives. Given these constraints, Pakistan believes that one of its few remaining successful strategies is to “calibrate” the heat of the insurgency in Kashmir and possibly pressure India through the expansion of violence in other portions of India’s territory. Security managers and analysts widely concur that Pakistan will continue to support the insurgency in Kashmir, and some have suggested it could extend such operations to other parts of India. Incidentally, notice has to be taken of the recent statement of an ISIS operative that they have established twocentres of operation, one in South Kashmir and the other in Pakistan. A few days before the Ansar Ghazavatul Hind commander Zakir Musa was gunned down in South Kashmir he had said in a statement that they were fighting neither for the “Azadi” of Kashmir nor for Pakistan but for the Islamic Caliphate for which Kashmir was central.

The third and the most dangerous take of Pakistan from Kargil war is that ultimately not able to face India in a conventional war, Pakistan must not turn down the option of using the WMD. She has developed tactical local delivery of the dirty bomb. As we have seen in this paper, at one point of time in the Kargil war, Pakistan was thinking of using the WMD. US President Bill Clinton summoned andwarned the Pakistani Prime Minister.

While we are remembering and paying homage to our martyred soldiers on the Kargil Divas and are fondly acknowledging the sacrifices of our armed forces, we also need to remind our leaders and policy planners what take Pakistan has taken from the Kargil war and how the enemy is changing strategy of befriending inimical elements within our people for their nefarious designs. Kargil success should not make us complacent nor should we underestimate the known and unknown the Jaichands in our society.

(Prof. K.N. Pandita is the former Director of the Centre of Central Asian Studies, Kashmir University, Srinagar. Views expressed are personal.)

Kargil is a small town located along the Suru River, a tributary of the Indus, in the Ladakh region. Historically, it served the purpose of transit and trading point between Skardu, Leh and Zanskar valley. Approximately 200 kilometres from Srinagar and situated on the Srinagar-Leh National Highway, the region is sparsely populated with diverse ethnic and religious groups. Isolated valleys, separated by some of the world’s highest mountains in the Himalayas, offer very tough living conditions.

Historical Context of Kargil War

Historically, Kashmir region has seen little peace as invaders have come in hordes, for plunder, loot and rape. Over time, large scale conversions have also taken place, which has changed the demography of the region. The partition of India and the subsequent accession of the state of J&K left behind its own legacy for the future generations to cope.

When partition took place, Pakistan laid claim to the princely states of Junagadh, Hyderabad and Jammu and Kashmir. As Pakistan bordered J&K, it tried to wrest the state by force, sending in hordes of armed invaders duly supported by elements of the Pakistan army. For India, it was the first bitter taste of things to come and the future did not bode well. Fearing rout of its people, Maharaja Hari Singh of Kashmir signed the “Instrument of Accession” with India, which enabled the Government of India to send in the Indian Army to restore the situation. The first unit of the Army was flown in to Srinagar airfield on 27 October 1947. The troops quickly moved out and made contact with the raiders who were on the outskirts of Srinagar. From then onwards, the raiders were steadily pushed back from the Kashmir valley.

The war however was far from over, with regions in Gilgit, Gurais, Skardu and Kargil still remaining under Pakistani control. Leh too was threatened and needed to be defended. Once again, the Indian Army played a stellar role. Leh airfield was captured by Indian troops by a small column sent under Major Prithi Chand. Under the command of Brigadier K.L. Atal, Lieutenant Colonel Rajinder Singh Sparrow deployed tanks on Zoji La Pass to open the Srinagar-Leh National Highway, a feat never attempted before by anyone in the world1. The problem of weak bridges was circumvented by removing the parts like turrets of the tanks and moving them on mules. By November 1948 the entire area was liberated. Since the matter was referred to the United Nations (UN), it established a Commission—United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan (UNCIP). On 21 April 1948, another resolution was passed to secure withdrawal of all Pakistanis and tribesmen from Jammu and Kashmir and the Government of India was requested to reduce its forces to the minimum strength, after which the circumstances for holding a plebiscite should be put into effect on the issue of accession to either India or Pakistan. In August 1948 a further resolution was adopted by UNCIP along similar lines.

There were three main clauses of the UN Resolution; the first was to accept and implement the ceasefire, the second was the withdrawal of all Pakistani troops and raiders from the entire State of Jammu and Kashmir and finally, both the countries were to reaffirm that the future of the State shall be determined in accordance with the will of the people. The Indian position on the issue remains clear – that the Instrument of Accession on 26 October 1947 gave the right to control the defence, communications and external affairs of the state to India and that the Pakistani aggression violated legal norms and ground realities.

The ceasefire came into effect from 1 January 1949, and was monitored by UN Military Observer Group India Pakistan (UNMOGIP). Approximately one-third of the J&K state remained with Pakistan, effectively dividing the state of J&K. Despite the UN Resolution, Pakistani troops and raiders continued to remain in occupied areas at many places. In the meantime, on 2 March 1948, Sheikh Abdullah was installed as Prime Minister and Maharaja was obliged to relinquish control of the state. First round of elections in Kashmir were held in 1951.

An understanding of the First J&K war is necessary because it highlighted the use by Pakistan of irregular troops, intermingled with regular forces for achieving military objectives. Pakistan’s penchant for using irregulars or nonmilitary means to attempt annexing Kashmir from India has continued since then. Terrorism from across the border and fomenting trouble in Kashmir are part of the same design. Operation TOPAC, Operation GIBRALTAR and GRANDSLAM were launched by Pakistan to annex Kashmir which involved riding on the back of militants or terrorists. The fourth round at Kargil in 1999 was yet another attempt in the same series and was a manifestation of continuing India-Pakistan hostilities over Kashmir.

Destabilisation of Kashmir in one form or the other has continued ever since the days of UN Resolution. India has been willing to resolve differences and towards this objective, the then Prime Minister of India, Shri Atal Behari Vajpayee, took the initiative and visited Pakistan from 20-21 February 1999, on the inaugural run of the Delhi-Lahore bus service in response to an invitation by the then Prime Minister of Pakistan, Muhammad Nawaz Sharif.2 Cordial discussions were held on the entire range of bilateral relations, regional cooperation within SAARC, and issues of international concern. Pakistan and India signed a Memorandum of Understanding on 21st February 1999, identifying measures aimed at promoting an environment of peace and security between the two countries and the two Prime Ministers signed the Lahore Declaration embodying their shared vision of peace and stability between the two countries and of progress and prosperity for their peoples.3

But, the peace seemed to be elusive and despite the overtures by the Indian Prime Minister, Pakistan continued with its old game. The bus from Lahore had not yet reached Delhi when the Pakistani Army, once again, began pushing in regular forces, disguised as militants, into the Kargil heights, catching the Indian establishment by surprise. This was to be a costly failure for India.

 Surprise and Detection of Intrusion

From a purely military point of view and taking into consideration the peculiar characteristics of the area, rugged, treacherous terrain and inhospitable climate, the area was divided into two separate parts based on the enemy threat and infiltration, namely the high threat and low threat areas. It was felt that any enemy movement into this area would be along the existing roads and tracks. Consequently, Indian deployment was based on this perception with strength varying according to the threat. The heavy snow accumulation along ridge lines made any movement impossible and hence the troops were deployed along various nalas and rivers to check infiltration during summers. Enemy intrusion to occupy heights and sustaining it during the harsh winters was considered impracticable and as such, the peaks were not patrolled. The planners of the operation in Pakistan took full advantage of this fact.

Pakistan’s Strategic Calculations

Intrusion in Kargil was a result of miscalculations of the Pakistani military elites who felt that the successful management of insurgency in Kashmir by the Indian Army was diluting their Kashmir cause. According to Sumit Ganguly4, an expert on India Pakistan relations, the planners were emboldened by Pakistan’s nuclear acquisition and resultant assumed annulment of Indian conventional superiority. Under the nuclear umbrella, Pakistani military decided to risk the intrusion in Kargil.

Kargil was chosen as it presented the opportunity to dominate the National Highway from Srinagar to Leh, a lifeline to Ladakh region which if denied would isolate Ladakh from Kashmir. If this was successfully implemented, holding Siachen would have become untenable. But, it was not to be; Pakistani military elites miscalculated the might of the Indian Army and the will of the people.

Pakistani diplomats denied any intrusion and presence of their army by the simple expedient of calling the infiltrators as militants who were not under their control. Dr. Shireen Mazari, from Islamabad Institute for Strategic Studies and others from Pakistan, gave several arguments during Kargil Conference held at Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California in 2002. The Indian side was led by Gen. V.P. Malik and the author too was in the Indian side. Participants from Pakistan argued that Kargil was the continuation of the five-decade old India-Pakistan dispute over Kashmir. According to them, a small number of senior officials in the Pakistan army planned the Kargil operation as a reaction to the Indian army’s forward military policy, which culminated in occupation of the Siachen Glacier in 1984. They contended that Pakistan’s military planners worked on the premise that occupation of un-held areas in Kargil would enable them to choke Indian defences in Leh and Siachen. Hence, it was the Siachen dispute that eventually spilled over into a new territorial dimension in 1999 – Pakistan army’s intended control over the Kargil heights.5

Pakistan further tried to mislead the world and the lies made progressively were proved wrong in time:

l   Initially Pakistan maintained that “Militants had infiltrated in Kargil and it was not a military intrusion.” Capture of Prisoners of War and the military equipment and personal diaries indicated Northern Light Infantry troops were dressed as Mujahideen who occupied the peaks. Pakistan denied Northern Light Infantry was part of regular army.

l   Subsequent lie was, “Kargil intrusion was an initiative taken by local military commanders who adventured to occupy a few places close to the LoC but found unheld peaks resulting into inching forward unopposed till they found themselves looking down at the National Highway around Kargil.”  In her recent publication Naseem Zehra maintains that, “Operation KP (Koh Paima), planned as a smooth, unhindered military operation in IHK, had turned into a Pakistan-India mountain battle of attrition. The die had been cast. Op Kargil had turned into the Battle of Kargil.”6

Kargil War

Kargil had been comparably peaceful with little or no incidents worth reporting taking place for long periods. Winter also meant vacating inaccessible posts for the season. Intelligence inputs did indicate some heightened activities across the LoC in this region but it did not raise any alarms and surprise and deception used by Pakistan was successful in taking advantage of it. Patrols in Batalik sector did notice some movement in the area when a shepherd corroborated having seen presence of foreign troops in Banju in the month of May 1999. Quick reaction teams and patrols were rushed to several places confirming the worst of the doubts.

Indian military commanders read the inputs and realised the gravity of the situation. Although the troops were rushed from within the available resources, it was not enough. The number of peaks that were occupied in Batalik, Yaldor, Kargil and Mashkoh was large. Conventional military wisdom is to apply 3:1 ratio of troops for attacking enemy in the plains but in the mountains and especially high altitudes, the ratio can go as high as 9:1.  It would take time to mobilise fighting echelons to arrive. Need for acclimatisation for few days compounded the situation. Attacks had to be launched soon to prevent the enemy firming up on the peaks. For a well coordinated attack, ground troops needed the support of the artillery and the Air Force.

Dynamics of War, Diplomacy and Indian Restraint

Strategy to deal with the situation presented a dynamic that needed swift and firm action but demanded restraint to be exercised. The movement of artillery across Zoji La would take time. Air effort could be provided immediately but the decision to use the Air Force against the militants and crossing of the LoC or violation of the Pakistan air space could only be taken with deliberations by the Centre as the situation could escalate and a localised battle could turn into a full-fledged war. A war between two nuclear-armed neighbours was a source of concern for the international community. Diplomacy thereafter went into overdrive. ‘Firm and swift response but with restraint’ became the mantra to deal with the situation.

Indian Air Force began participating in the operations from the end of May 1999. The intruders shot down an Indian helicopter in Dras area on 28 May and thereafter the IAF decided to launch airstrikes to degrade the well entrenched enemy on the peaks. During the operations, India lost two MiG 27 air crafts to hostile fire. One of the pilots, Flight Lieutenant K. Nachiketa was taken prisoner of war and the other, Squadron Leader Ajay Ahuja, unfortunately, did not survive.

The young soldiers of the Infantry displayed exemplary valour and grit and rose up once again to show their true mettle. The first breakthrough came at Tololing in Dras sector and thereafter, there was no looking back.7 An Israeli media man in Kargil commented that it was only the Indian Infantry who could breach the strong defences at such high altitudes under freezing conditions8. Pakistanis were first driven out of Dras, then Batalik, Yaldor, Chorbat La and Mashkoh. By the first week of July 1999, it was clear to Pakistan that a rout of their forces was complete if they continued to hold on to their positions.

Prime Minister of Pakistan, Nawaz Sharif flew to the United States on 4 July 1999 to seek US intervention and halt of Indian operations, but Indian diplomacy too was in an overdrive. None of the countries condemned India’s response; instead they tacitly approved it. Pakistan stood isolated and beaten very badly. Upon ceasefire Pakistani troops were allowed to withdraw. Pakistan violated ‘DGMO’s Understanding’ several times during their withdrawal. Operation Vijay in Kargil finally terminated on 26 July 1999.

Aftermath of the Kargil War

Loss of face in Kargil resulted in turmoil in Pakistan and a military coup awaited Nawaz Sharif on his return. General Pervez Musharraf took charge as the President of Pakistan. Pakistan Army was yet again exposed. Pakistan as a country had lost but the army in Pakistan had won in their designs to own a nation. The history of Pakistan would indicate that the prosperity of its people dips each time military rulers have usurped power and this time it was no exception. Pakistan’s economy has nosedived to such an extent that today, Pakistan is out with a begging bowl to survive. It is not difficult to conclude that the current realty is a direct outcome of military rule in Pakistan for long periods of time. Pakistani military officers have become the landlords of large tracts of land and the military has taken control of large corporations. Even though Kargil was a decisive diplomatic and military defeat of Pakistan, it has still not abandoned harbouring, mentoring and pushing terrorists across the LoC into Kashmir.

Strategic Reckoning

On the Indian side, the victory was euphoric but loss of lives and casualties was tragic. Indian Army had restored the pride of the country and Indian diplomacy had very successfully secured the international opinion in favour of the country. Introspection however was needed regarding the failure of intelligence that cost the nation gravely. The Government of India appointed a Kargil Review Committee (KRC) a few days after the Kargil war was over. The Report brought out grave deficiencies in India’s security management system, particularly in the areas of Intelligence and Border and Defence Management. Following the KRC Report, Prime Minister of India constituted a Group of Ministers (GoM) to go into the Report and formulate specific proposals for implementation.9

Based on the recommendations of the GoM, several issues pertaining to the national security, such as setting up of Integrated Defence Staff, efforts to integrate the intelligence agencies and having a full time National Security Advisor have been made or addressed. The progress on the organisational changes with respect to appointment of a Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) to provide single point military advice to the Government, to improve the jointness and resolve inter-service doctrinal, planning, policy and operational issues however remain.10 The pace of modernisation of defence forces has been slow and deficiencies in the inventories must be made up and the process is to be expedited. Kargil war threw up many security challenges but none of them could stand in front of the competence, courage and determination of the armed forces; will of the government, and the support of the nation.

(An Infantry Officer, Col Satish Tyagi (Retd) was commissioned in the RAJPUT Regiment and has taken part in the IPKF in Sri Lanka and in Operation Vijay in Kargil. He had authored “The Fourth Estate: A Force Multiplier for the Indian Army” post Kargil besides contributing several articles and his next book “Kargil: As It Happened; Eye Witness Accounts of the War” is due for release shortly.)

References:

1     Tyagi Satish, “Kargil: As It Happened-Eyewitness Accounts of the War”, USI of India: Speaking Tiger

2     https://mea.gov.in/in-focus-article.htm?18997/Lahore+Declaration+February+1999, Accessed on 23 May 2019.

3     https://mea.gov.in/in-focus-article.htm?18997/Lahore+Declaration+February+1999,  Accessed on 23 May 2019.

4     Interaction of author with Sumit Ganguly during the conference on “Asymmetric Conflict in South Asia: The Cause and Consequences of the 1999 Limited War in Kargil” at NPS, Monterey, CA, May 29 – June 1, 2002.

5     Author’s notes during the conference on “Asymmetric Conflict in South Asia: The Cause and Consequences of the 1999 Limited War in Kargil” at NPS, Monterey, CA, May 29 – June 1, 2002.

6     Naseem Zehra, “From Kargil to the Coup; the Events that Shook Pakistan”, www.bookmaza.com, PDF version circulated on Social Media .

7     Tyagi, SC, “Kargil As It Happened: Eyewitness Accounts of the War”, USI of India publication, Speaking Tiger.

8     Israeli media person interacted with the author in Batalik sector.

9     GoM Report on National Security.

10  “Defence planning remains tardy…inventories of the armed forces are deficient in many items even now”, Times of India, June 5, 2019

(This article is carried in the print edition of July-August 2019 issue of India Foundation Journal.)

The Indian army faced its moment of truth in Kargil in 1998. It was caught totally unprepared when large scale intrusions by the Pakistani elements were detected in May 1998. Decade long counter-terrorism operations had shifted the focus of the army away from its primary task of defending the country against external aggression. Kargil War found the army ill-equipped for conventional war in high altitude areas with extreme climatic conditions. For such a challenge, it was neither psychologically oriented nor possessed the necessary wherewithal. Shortages of essential arms, equipment and ammunition were alarming. The country still remembers the statement made by the then Army Chief, Gen VP Malik on 23 June, “We will fight with whatever we have.”1 It was an admission of grave vulnerability as every single item was in short supply. With a single sentence, he exposed the abysmal state of indigenous defence production and the gross incompetency of the procurement regime.

The government was rightly concerned. Soon after the war, it constituted a committee of ‘Group of Ministers on National Security’. In its report, submitted to the Prime Minister on 26 February 2001, the committee suggested the creation of a separate and dedicated institutional structure to undertake the complete gamut of procurement functions to inject a higher degree of professionalism and reduce delays.2 Consequent to the acceptance of the report, a new acquisition set-up was created in the Ministry of Defence (MoD) in October 2001.3 Broad guidelines for the formulation of a new defence procurement procedure were also issued. Need to achieve self-reliance was duly emphasised. The said procedure has been undergoing periodic revisions.4

The question that begs answer is whether the measures initiated after the Kargil War have borne fruits. Has the state of indigenous defence industry improved? To what extent has India achieved self-reliance in defence production, thereby reducing its dependence on imports? Is the modernisation of the Indian armed forces taking place as per the plans? This article attempts to examine all the facets of the above posers.

Indian Defence Industry: a Saga of Criminal Neglect

Defence industry comprises of all industrial undertakings engaged in the production of hardware and services for use by the defence forces.5 Founding of Gun and Shell Factory at Cossipore in 1801 is generally considered to mark the establishment of the Indian defence industry. India had 16 ordnance factories producing low-tech items at the time of the Independence. Additional factories came up in due course and India has 39 of them now.6 In 1954, Bharat Electronics Ltd was established as the first Defence Public Sector Undertaking (DPSU).  Currently, there are nine DPSUs under MoD, including four shipyards.7

The Industrial Policy Resolution of 1956 divided industry into three parts:-

• Schedule A: Basic industries which are the preserve of the state, including defence and heavy engineering.
• Schedule B: Industries in which private industry was allowed to operate.
• Schedule C: All other industries.8

As defence was put under Schedule ‘A’, it became an exclusive reserve of the public sector. After a long gap of 35 years, manufacture of components, assemblies and sub-assemblies was thrown open to the private sector in 1991. It took MoD another 11 years to allow the private sector to participate in defence production. A policy directive was issued in January 2002 allowing 100 percent private equity with 26 percent Foreign Direct Investment (FDI).9 Subsequently, the Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion issued detailed guidelines for the issuance of licence for the production of arms and ammunition.10

The Department of Defence Production (DDP) was set up in 1962, in the aftermath of the Chinese aggression to create a self-reliant and self-sufficient indigenous defence production base.11 It deals with matters pertaining to defence production, indigenisation of imported stores, equipment and spares.12 Its functioning suffers from acute conflict of interests. It controls all DPSUs and the ordnance factories. All ploys are tried to ensure regular flow of orders to the public sector units. The private sector is kept at bay through cleverly introduced provisions of nominating public sector units for major contracts. Thus, the nation remains deprived of the technological prowess acquired by the private sector and its enormous potential remains untapped. Most knowledgeable observers consider DDP to be primarily responsible for the current pitiable state of the indigenous defence industry and regard it as the biggest impediment in India’s quest for self-reliance.13

The government is fully aware of the fact that the goal of self-reliance will remain a pipe dream unless full potential of the private sector is harnessed. A number of well-intentioned policy initiative have been taken towards that end during the last two decades. Yet, the ground situation has not changed. Even today, all major orders are grabbed by the public sector and the private sector continues to be a peripheral participant with the production of some low-tech items and indigenisation of components.

In 2004, the government constituted a committee under Mr Vijay Kelkar to, inter alia,  examine and recommend modalities of integration of the user, MoD and the Indian industry (both private and public) in the acquisition process and defence production.14 The committee made many innovative recommendations, to include establishment of a professional acquisition agency (like the DGA of France) and nomination of select private sector industry leaders as ‘Raksha Udyog Ratnas’ (RURs), to be treated at par with DPSU for all defence acquisition purposes, including receipt of technology for undertaking licensed production. Selection for RUR was duly carried out in 2006.15 As the government could not overcome the resistance put up by the public sector, it decided to abort the scheme.

Another noteworthy recommendation of the Kelkar Committee related to the projects entailing indigenous development under ‘Make’ procedure. It was duly incorporated in the Defence Procurement Procedure (DPP) of 2006.16 DRDO was to concentrate only on projects requiring sophisticated technology of strategic, complex and security sensitive nature. Responsibility for developing ‘High Technology Complex Systems’ was assigned to the Acquisition Wing.17 To start with, two major projects, i.e. Futuristic Infantry Combat Vehicle (FICV) and Tactical Communication System were initiated for indigenous development. Both were to get government funding support to the extent of 80 percent. The balance 20 percent was to be contributed by the PAs. Production agencies were duly shortlisted after much uncertainty. However, both the projects have made little headway and remain embroiled in bureaucratic impediments and doubts about ownership of the intellectual property rights.18

Launch of ‘Make in India’ Mission

Mission ‘Make in India’ was formally launched on 25 September 2014. It aims at persuading indigenous and foreign companies to invest in manufacturing in India by making it an irresistible destination, both for capital and technological investments. To start with, 25 sectors of economy have been identified and defence manufacturing is one of them.19 With a view to align and delineate DPP towards the achievement of the objectives of ‘Make in India’, an expert committee under Dhirendra Singh was constituted by MoD in May 2015.20

In an innovative suggestion, the committee suggested that a conceptual ladder be evolved to correspond to progressive development of competence level in the defence industry, from the very basic level of repair and maintenance to the level of acquiring ability to design, develop, manufacture and test systems. Different stages in the ladder were to be correlated with various categories in the capital procurement. The committee also recommended higher indigenous content across all defence purchases.21

The committee was of the view that the objectives of ‘Make in India’ could never be achieved without integrating the private sector. For that, two types of well-defined partnership models — depending upon the strategic needs, quality criticality and cost competitiveness — were advocated. In the case of platforms of strategic importance, ‘Strategic Partnership’ model was suggested to create capacity in the private sector on a long-term basis; over and above the capacity and infrastructure that exists in the public sector. The committee identified six segments for the purpose.22

Consequent to the receipt of the recommendations of the expert committee, DPP-2016 was promulgated with effect from 01 April 2016.23 The procedure has adopted a three- pronged approach to support ‘Make in India’ initiative – institutionalisation, streamlining and simplification of the procedure to promote indigenous design, development and manufacturing of defence equipment, platforms, systems and sub-systems; refinement of the ‘Make’ procedure to ensure increased participation of the Indian industry; and enhancement of the role of MSMEs.24

Creation of a new category called ‘Buy (Indian-IDDM)’ with overriding preference over all other modes of procurement is certainly the most radical change. It refers to the procurement of products from an Indian vendor meeting one of the two conditions — products that have been indigenously designed, developed and manufactured with a minimum of 40 percent Indigenous Content (IC) on cost basis of the total contract value; or, products having 60 percent IC on cost basis of the total contract value, which may not have been designed and developed indigenously.25

‘Buy (Indian)’ category comes at the second place. It refers to the procurement of products from an Indian vendor, having a minimum of 40 percent IC on cost basis of the total contract value. Next in the priority is ‘Buy & Make (Indian)’ category. It implies initial procurement of limited quantity in fully formed state from an Indian vendor engaged in a tie-up with a foreign OEM, followed by indigenous production in a phased manner through technology transfer. ‘Buy & Make’ category refers to an initial procurement of equipment in fully formed state from a foreign vendor, in quantities as considered necessary, followed by indigenous production with transfer of critical technologies.26

More importantly, DPP-2016 has streamlined the ‘Make’ procedure that aims at developing long-term indigenous defence capabilities. The revised‘Make’ procedure seeks to address the multiple objectives of self-reliance; wider participation of Indian industry; impetus for MSME sector; sound implementation; transparent execution and timely induction of equipment. Successful development under this scheme would result in acquisition with indigenous design and development. There are two sub-categories of ‘Make’ route. Projects under ‘Make-I’ will involve government funding of 90 percent. Usually, these projects will involve a development period of not less than three years. Projects under ‘Make-II’ will involve prototype development of equipment or their upgrades, or their sub-systems with a focus on import substitution, for which no government funding will be provided for prototype development purposes. With a view to provide impetus to MSMEs, DPP-2016 directs that preference be given to them for ‘Make-1’ and ‘Make-2’ projects costing less than Rs 10 crore and Rs 3 crore respectively for prototype development.27

A Reality Check

The government has been earnestly trying to make mission ‘Make in India’ a success. A number of far-reaching decisions have been taken to encourage indigenous production. FDI norms have been liberalised. Validity of industrial license has been increased from 3 to 15 years with a provision for further extension. Offset threshold has been raised to Rs 2,000 crore, thereby freeing a large number of contracts from the encumbrances of offset obligations.28

Most significantly, to kick-start ‘Make in India’ mission, MoD has announced that 23 fresh projects will be taken up under ‘Make-I’ and ‘Make-II’ sub-categories. In a complete departure from the past practices, MoD has also indicated the likely quantity requirements and the time lines. It will certainly help industries to take well-informed investment decisions. The range of products is highly varied; and includes thirteen projects for the army, six for the navy and four for the air force.29 It is a path-breaking initiative and provides a unique opportunity to all companies to enter the sector and establish their credibility. If this initiative proves successful, MoD will be encouraged to widen the scope further by adding more complex projects.

MoD’s initiatives have generated visible euphoria. Both the public and the private sectors are excited about the business prospects. The defence public sector has already recorded 20 percent growth, increasing its turnover from around Rs 43,000 crore to Rs 51,000 crore.30 OFB has earned acclaim for developing Howitzer Dhanush from the Bofors drawings. An initial order for 114 guns has been placed, providing a big boost to the indigenous capabilities. First consignment of six guns was handed over to the army in April 2019.31 OFB has also been tasked to manufacture AK 203 rifles, the latest version in Kalashnikov series with Russian collaboration at Amethi.32 Other defence undertakings are equally keyed up. Things are looking up for them as well: HAL is going to manufacture Kamov (Ka-226T) helicopters with complete technology transfer.33

As regards the private sector, all major players are eagerly gearing up for the anticipated business opportunities. L&T has already procured Rs 4,500 crore order for 100 pieces of K9 Vajra-T 155mm/52 calibre tracked self- propelled (SP) Howitzers, developed in partnership with Korea’s Samsung.34 L&T is also going to manufacture Lakshya-1 (pilotless target aircraft) and develop Laksha-2 with DRDO. It is also eyeing refit and upgradation of Russian Kilo class submarines at its shipyard at Kattupalli.

Tata Group has 14 group companies in the defence sector. Tata Motors have bagged a repeat order to supply 619 6×6 High Mobility Vehicles, in addition to the earlier order for 1,239 vehicles.35 It has also tied up with Bharat Forge and General Dynamics to develop FICV. Whereas modernisation of infrastructure of 67 air fields is already being undertaken by Tata Strategic Division, Tata Sons is joining hands with Airbus Industries to manufacture medium transport aircraft.36

Reliance Defence Limited has 11 subsidiaries in niche defence segments.37 Mahindra Defence Systems is collaborating with BAE Systems of the US for the manufacture of a total of 120 M-777 Ultra Light Howitzers.38 Furthermore, an agreement to produce medium and heavy lift helicopters is being finalised with Airbus. Bharat Forge is fast emerging as a serious player in the defence sector. It is partnering many Indian and foreign companies to develop and manufacture guns and fighting vehicles. In addition, it is planning to build AD systems with SAAB. There are numerous other companies like the Dynamatic Technologies, TVS Logistics and MKU that are participating aggressively in defence production.39

The government has demonstrated its earnestness and determination to make mission ‘Make in India’ a success. A total of 34 joint ventures have been approved for manufacturing defence equipment and 50 companies with industrial licenses have commenced production.40 Most of the proposals that were being processed for procurement from abroad have been aborted. They are being reinitiated for manufacture in India.

The Way Forward

Geographically, India is located in the centre of a highly volatile environment and knows that it has to be militarily strong to safeguard its national interests. It is also aware of the fact that no nation can feel secure without self-reliance in defence production. Therefore, neglect of the Indian defence industry is inexcusable. Radical measures must be initiated to set the things right.

To start with, the government must show sincerity in integrating the private sector. Public sector companies possess huge infrastructure; experience in systems integration with imported technology; trained engineering and manufacturing manpower; and access to defence research facilities. On the other hand, private sector companies excel in management, marketing and financial skills; are innovative and market driven; and have experience in component and sub-assembly manufacture. A well-blended fusion of both will result in synergising their respective strengths through economies of scale and prove mutually beneficial.41 See Illustration.

Private Sector – Management, marketing & financial skills – Innovative & market driven – Access to civilian technologies – Experience incomponent & sub-assembly manufacture

Categorise areas for optimum exploitation of competencies

Evolve long term strategy to harness strengths of public and private sectors, optimise utilisation of all national assets, avoid wasteful duplication and create globally competitive defence industrial base with economies of scale

Public Sector Reserve Fields in which initial investment is prohibitive & public sector has adequate infrastructure.Duplication by private sector will be wasteful.

Private Sector Reserve Fields in which private sector has excelled, e.g. software development, AI, robotics & simulators. Public sector should exit these fields.

Competitive Areas Fields in which development of multiple competing technologies is desired, e.g. electronics, optics, automation & hydraulics. Both public & private sectors should be permitted to compete on equal  footing.

Collaborative Areas Fields which facilitate synergy of competencies of public & private sectors, e.g. systems integration, upgradation of in-service equipment & special purpose vehicles. Both should be equal partners with mutual respect.

Identify Strengths

Public Sector – Huge infrastructure – Experience in systems integration with imported technology  – Trained engineering & manufacturing manpower – Access to DRDO facilities

Illustration: Harnessing Potential of Public and Private Sectors

 The above categorisation should be dynamic in nature and reviewed periodically. Maximum items should be in the open competitive list, especially those being imported.

Even in areas earmarked for public and private sectors, a relationship of associate functioning can be profitably established.

There is a need for an effective institution- alised interface between the MoD, the services and the private sector for regular interaction at the policy making level. Presently, the government is unaware of the capabilities and potential of different private sector companies. On the other hand, many private sector companies have the capability to manufacture the whole range of defence requirements but do not know whom to approach to ascertain details.42

Indigenous production should be given purchase and price preference, thereby providing incentive to foreign companies to collaborate with Indian companies for production in India.43 Any nation that covets FDI in defence has to tailor its policies to position itself as the most irresistible destination. Foreign investors are not enthused by India’s FDI policy.  They consider it to be highly dissuasive and irrational – a foreign investor is expected to invest his resources and technology in a venture where he has no significant control while the venture is bound by strict capacity/product constraints, has no purchase guarantee, no open access to other markets (including exports) and where preference may be accorded to the local public sector.44 It is time India revisits the policy to assuage the apprehensions of the investors.

In addition, the government should pay heed to five critical recommendations of the Dhirendra Singh Committee – corporatisation of the management structure of the Ordnance Factory Board; merger of shipyards under MoD into one corporate entity (retaining the yard facilities in their present geographical locations but working under one single management); expeditious implementation of the strategic partnership scheme; and creation of an independent agency to oversee the complete gamut of activities related to defence industry and procurements.

Defence business is a painstaking affair and results will be visible only after a long gestation period. In the interim, the government must remain wary of unscrupulous elements and not let the well-intentioned ‘Make in India’ mission degenerate into an ‘Assemble in India’ sham.45 That shall be highly detrimental to national interests.

(Major General Mrinal Suman, AVSM, VSM, PhD, (Retd.) commanded an Engineer Regiment on the
Siachen glacier and was the Task Force Commander for designing and sinking shafts for Pokhran II.
He is a prolific writer and has published over 500 articles. He is considered India’s foremost
expert in India’s defence procurement procedure and offsets.)

 References:

1. “They did have India by the throat” by Pravin Sawhney, The Pioneer, 02 July 2015

2     “Report of the Group of Ministers on National Security”, at https://www.vifindia.org/sites/…/GoM%20Report%20on%20National%20Security.pdf

3     Indian Defence Procurement Procedure – 2016, available at  https://mod.gov.in/sites/default/files/Update060519_0.pdf

4     ibid.

5     http://www.indiandefencereview.com/spotlights/private-sector-in-defence-production/

6     History of Indian Ordnance Factories, available at http://ofbindia.gov.in/index.php?wh=history&lang=en

7     Defence Public Sector Undertakings, available at https://ddpmod.gov.in/defence-public-sector-undertakings

8     Industrial Policy of 1956, available at  http://www.economicsdiscussion.net/articles/industrial-policy-of-1956-8-main-features-of-1956-policy/2225

9     Major General Mrinal Suman, ‘Private Sector in Defence Production: a Reality Check’, Indian Defence Review, vol 22 , issue 3 (Jul-Sep 2007).   

10 ibid.

11 http://www.indiandefencereview.com/spotlights/private-sector-in-defence-production/

12  Department of Defence Production, available at https://ddpmod.gov.in/about-ministry

13 Major General Mrinal Suman, ‘Department of Defence Production and Conflict of Interest’, Force, vol 22, issue 1(Mar 2012).

14  Major General Mrinal Suman, ‘The Kelkar Committee Report and Raksha Udyog Ratnas’, Indian Defence Review, vol 22 , issue 3 (Jul-Sep 2007)

15  ibid.

16  Defence Procurement Procedure – 2006, available at https://mod.gov.in/sites/default/files/dpp2006.pdf

17  Mrinal Suman, ‘Make (High-tech)’ Procedure: A Convoluted Initiative’, SP Year Book 2009-10, vol 39.

18  Major General Mrinal Suman, ‘Make in India’ Mission and the Current Dispensation: Disappointment is Inevitable’, Force, Vol  , issue (Dec 2014).

19 http://forceindia.net/guest-column/money-over-matter/rethink-and-reorganise/

20 ibid.

21 Ibid.

22 Laxman K Behera, ‘Strategic Partnerships: A Critical Overview of the Aatre Task Force Report’, IDSA Comment, April 26, 2016.

23  Indian Defence Procurement Procedure – 2016, available at https://mod.gov.in/defence-procurement-procedure

24 Ibid.

25 Ibid.

26 Ibid.

27 Ibid.

28  Major General Mrinal Suman, ‘Appraising Cost-Effectiveness of Offsets’ , FORCE, vol 8, issue 4(2010).

29  Manu Pubby, ‘Defence ministry lists out 23 projects for private industry’, Economic Times of India, May 02,  2016

30  Suman, Reality Check, op cit.

31  Franz-Stefan Gady, ‘India’s Army Receives First Six of 114 Long-Range Dhanush Howitzers’, The Diplomat, April 11, 2019.

32 Rahul Bedi, India, ‘Russia inaugurate manufacturing plant for AK-203 assault rifle’, Janes’s 360, March 05, 2019 

33  Manu Pubby,  ‘India and Russia to jointly manufacture Kamov 226 helicopter under ‘Make In India’’, Economic Times of India, July 14, 2018

34  News 18, ‘PM Modi Inaugurates L&T’s 1st Self-propelling Howitzer Gun-making Facility’, available at https://www.news18.com/news/india/pm-narendra-modi-inaugurates-larsen-and-toubros-k9-vajra-gun-making-facility-2007781.html

35  Tata Motors Press Release, ‘Tata Motors bags additional order for 619 nos. of 6 X 6 High Mobility Vehicles, from Indian Army’, available at https://www.tatamotors.com/press/tata-motors-bags-additional-order-for-619-nos-of-6-x-6-high-mobility-vehicles-from-indian-army/

36  Neelam Mathews, ‘MAFI Phase II will take off, IAF insists’, Jane’s Airport 360, September 18, 201

37  Suman, Reality Check, op cit.

38  Smriti Jain, ‘Indian Army to get first ‘Make in India’ M777 Howitzer gun by year-end; it’s a big boost!’, Financial Express, Mar 26, 2019

39  Suman, Reality Check, op cit.

40  Suman, Reality Check, op cit.

41  Suman, Private Sector, op cit.

42  Suman, Private Sector, op cit.

43  Mrinal Suman, ‘Development of the Indian Defence Industry’, SPs Year Book 2013-14, vol 

44  Mrinal Suman, ‘FDI in Defence: Time to Revisit the Policy’, FORCE, May 2015

45  Mrinal Suman, ‘Make in India’ and Defence Production: a Reality Check’, FORCE, vol   , issue  (Jun 2016)

 

(This article is carried in the print edition of July-August 2019 issue of India Foundation Journal.)

Year 1999 C.E. was a unique year in more ways than one. Y2K syndrome had gripped the world with fear and anxiety and every organisation, big or small, was busy downloading and/or taking printouts of entire data base because no one was sure as to what will happen after 23:59:59 on 31st December 1999. Whether the computers will seamlessly switch over to year 2000 C.E. or revert to 1900 C.E. was creating a scare across the globe. Thankfully, the computer software allowed seamless switch over to year 2000 C.E.

For India too, the year 1999 was an extremely significant one, besides the Y2K anxiety and fear. In April 1999, the NDA government led by Shri Atal Bihari Vajpayee, which had come to power in 1998, failed to win a no-trust vote by a single vote, after its coalition partner, the AIADMK withdrew support. The BJP led National Democratic Alliance (NDA), secured 269 votes while the opposition got 270. The opposition under the leadership of Congress’ Sonia Gandhi also failed to come up with the numbers, forcing the dissolution of the House and the holding of fresh elections. Shri Vajpayee remained the “caretaker” Prime Minister until the elections were held. And it was during this period that Pakistan ‘nearly’ succeeded in severing Ladakh region from India by positioning her well-armed soldiers all along Kargil Heights, leading to the Kargil War.

So much has been written about the Kargil War that any further mention would be counterproductive, both from operational as well as record of events point of view. The K. Subhrahmanyam Committee report is the most comprehensive and authoritative information document on this issue.1 However, the most ‘substantive issue’ must be mentioned even at the cost of repetition and that is “Kargil took place because of monumental failure of intelligence agencies” over a period of at least two years preceding Kargil Operations, which commenced on 23May 1999. This paper, will look into certain aspects of the Kargil War, but will focus on the fundamental question whether India is today, two decades later, better placed to face such a contingency.

Army personnel gave an outstanding and exemplary account of bravery and determination while operating in the most inhospitable terrain against an adversary, which had the advantage of position/ location by being at higher ground and vantage point. No army in the world has ever fought a battle at these heights and in such difficult terrain. Kargil War was won not because of superior weapons; it was won due to sheer dint of hard work, exemplary bravery and determination by Indian Army personnel on the ground and Air Warriors in the air.  Indian Military was ill-equipped to fight in this terrain – a sad reflection of profligacy in planning for such contingencies by the military planners. Certain fundamental issue that merits attention, with respect to the employment of Air Power, are discussed in the succeeding paragraphs.

Target Location: Unlike plains, where even a camouflaged target can be easily acquired, target in the hills, specially bunkers etc present a vastly different picture. Natural camouflage is inherent nature of a target in the hills. Spotting a bunker opening is well-nigh impossible even from 2 km. Target dimensions are small which further add to the complexity of detection. Target location information, therefore, has to be absolutely precise, may be with an error of no more than few meters. Meandering valleys and high hill features on either side of the direction of attack create severe limitation in spotting and tracking the target before weapon delivery.

Target Illumination: One of the most effective ways of successful hit on the target is illumination by laser (ground/air based) and/or by smoke indicators by ground forces. Smoke indicators, however, do not provide pin point accuracy for guidance. Laser illumination is the most precise method of target illumination.

Factors Affecting Target Identification: Problems created due to natural camouflage, angle of the sun at the time of attack, shadow of adjoining hill on the target, presence of ‘significant cloud’ at or near point of weapon launch, deception by enemy by painting ‘doors/windows outline’ near actual target creates enormous problems for the pilot in spotting, tracking and finally delivering weapon on the target.

Target Destruction/Neutralisation: Only a ‘Direct Hit’ can result in target destruction/neutralisation. There are two reasons. Firstly, in hilly terrain such as in Kargil region, a miss by ten meters will almost certainly mean an unsuccessful weapon delivery. Secondly, the blast effect damage is not as much as in case of target in plains. Error margin, therefore, is almost negligible.

Reconnaissance: Conventional photo reconnaissance even from ultra-low level may not provide accurate information, which would be sufficient for targeting. Visual reconnaissance from vantage point around the hill feature and/or specific heliborne mission for reconnaissance is the only option. However, it must be categorically stated that heliborne reconnaissance will have to take into account enormous threat from man portable Surface to Air Missiles (SAM) and hand held weapons. In fact, infrared (IR) reconnaissance by night might produce better results and may be more helpful in pin-pointing bunker location. Power supply in all bunkers is invariably dependent on small portable generators. Even a one kilo-watt portable generator emits significant heat signature, which can be picked up by the IR pod of reconnaissance aircraft. Superimposing the heat signature thus obtained on IR film on the area map will clearly indicate the location of heat source, the bunker. Humint (human intelligence), however, remains the most important source of actual target location.

Let us now examine the means to engage targets in the hilly terrain such as Kargil.

Fighter Aircraft: A fighter/bomber carrying conventional rockets/bombs has extremely little chance of successfully engaging a target in hills such as a bunker and/or gun position. A successful hit, if at all, is more by stroke of luck than precise aiming. A free fall weapon and/or unguided rockets can, at best create noise due to exploding bombs and falling rocks. Only a precision guided munition (PGM) such as a laser guided bomb can meet the desired objectives. Laser guided bombs will hit the target only and only if these are launched at precise range from a target which is being continuously illuminated until the bomb strikes. ‘Litening Targeting Pod’ acquired during the Kargil operations enabled the Mirage-2000 aircraft to not only assist in weapon launch at precise range but also helped in illuminating the target until the point of impact. Lasing of the target can also be accomplished from ground (if the target is visible from ground) and/or helicopter equipped with suitable lasing equipment.

Attack Helicopter/Armed Helicopter: Even an attack/armed helicopter will find it difficult to engage a bunker/gun position embedded in hills with conventional (unguided) weapons.

Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicles (UCAVs): Targets in Kargil type terrain can be best attacked and neutralised by UCAVs. USAF experience in Afghanistan clearly highlights the need for such platforms. We have, however, not kept pace in terms of weapons acquisition on terrain specific case. India’s indigenous effort ‘Rustom’ is still under development, with the Rustom 2 undergoing various trials.2 The Rustom 2 is a Medium Altitude Long Endurance (MALE) unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV), and is slated to replace/supplement the Heron’s currently in service with India’s Armed Forces. It is designed for surveillance and reconnaissance. India is however unlikely to have an armed UCAV of Indian origin before 2030 C.E.

Weapons required to engage targets in hills have to be different from those used in plains. Guidance from launch to impact is an essential and integral part of a successful strike. Irrespective of the ‘tonnage’ of the bomb viz 500 kg or 1,000 kg, it is imperative to understand that if the point of impact is even 10-20 meters above/below and/or left/right of the intended target, it just might cause no damage to the bunker. While we are yet to think of and acquire more modern weapons viz ‘Advanced Precision Kill Weapon Systems (APKWS), which are essentially laser guided rockets launched in salvo. This provides for better dispersion, thus exponentially increasing the chances of a successful engagement of target. Global Positioning System (GPS) guided weapons of varying weights have their own limitation. Suffice to mention that an error of merely ‘one minute’ in GPS coordinate will result in the weapon impacting about 20 meters from the target, if the bomb was launched 60 km from the target. Weapons like Crystal Maze and SPICE-2000 bombs are reasonably accurate and can achieve single digit CEP provided target coordinates are accurate to the last digit. Targets located in such terrain can be engaged by strike fighters and/or attack helicopters during day only. Target engagement at night even under flare illumination is nearly impossible.

Threat to Strike Aircraft and Attack/Armed Helicopters

SAM Threat: Shoulder launched  SAMs pose the most potent and important threat to strike fighter/helicopters. Due to light weight nature of SAM equipment comprising of launch tube with mounted tracking device and at least two missiles weighing less than 15 kg, the composite weapon system can be carried by a single soldier even in hilly terrain to the top of the hill features in surrounding area. Shoulder launched SAMs have a kill range from about 800 meter (near boundary) to about 6.5 km (far boundary) and can operate autonomously. An input about the impending attack from friendly radar station is a bonus. A typical SAM battery compliment comprises of six independent teams of two soldiers each, who act as ‘look out,’ ‘load carriers’ and ‘launch control’. In order to provide overlap for kill at near boundary, they are normally located about 500 meters from each other. Thus, a battery can provide unbroken cover at near boundary for nearly 3 km on either side of the target. Nearly ‘Fixed Direction’ of attack due to valley orientation makes their job of spotting and engaging a hostile aircraft fairly simple. Identifying and neutralising such teams is nearly impossible because they do not radiate on any frequency. A strike aircraft, therefore, has to remain outside the ‘kill’ envelope of shoulder launched SAM at the time of weapon delivery with sufficient margin to pull away after the launch.

Light Weight Anti Aircraft Guns: If the adversary can place even few Anti Aircraft guns on the watershed facing the probable approach direction of strike fighter and/or attack helicopter, it can cause severe attrition as well as induce errors in tracking causing weapons to miss the target.

Weapons and Platforms Required

To achieve operational success, it is mandatory to have the following combination of weapons/platforms and capability:

1. PGMs, UCAVs, Targeting Pods, Advanced Precision Kill Weapon Systems viz Laser Guided Rockets and Target Illumination Capability from Ground/Air
2. Heliborne Attack Capability: It must be remembered that helicopters are vulnerable due to proximity from target, low speed, advance warning of approach, limited manoeuvrability in narrow valleys, load carrying capacity and restrictions on hover.
3. Reconnaissance Capability and Ability to Identify Targets: Problem areas in target identification are due to natural camouflage, sun angle at the time of attack, adjoining hill shadow, vegetation, presence of ‘significant cloud’ at the time of delivery, deception by the enemy by painting ‘doors’, ‘windows’ on nearby rocks. Problems in target location are due to meandering valleys, proximity of high hill features on either side of direction of attack and smoke screen at the time of attack. Severe limitations lie in predictable direction of attack, sun angle at the time of attack and threats that exist from shoulder launched SAMs, high rate of fire of Gattling guns and small arms fire in the cone of attack.

Development in other parts of the World

The U.S. government has developed a specially designed, secret missile for pinpoint airstrikes that kills terrorist leaders with no explosion, drastically reducing damage and minimising the chances of civilian casualties. Both the Central Intelligence Agency and the Pentagon have used the weapon while closely guarding its existence. A modified version of the well-known Hellfire missile, the weapon carries an inert warhead. Instead of exploding, it is designed to plunge more than 100 pounds of metal through the hardened shelters, tops of  armoured cars and buildings to kill its target without harming individuals and property close by.  R9X is also called ‘Flying Ginsu’.3

The US Navy together with Raytheon successfully test fired another round of Excalibur N5 munitions.4 N5 is a 5-inch or 127mm artillery projectile. Excalibur impacts at a radial miss distance of less than two meters from the target. The precision-guided projectile has been fired more than 1,400 times in combat.

Recommendations

Acquisition of ‘Terrain Specific’ weapons and weapon platforms

Prevailing concept of weapon acquisition is based on ‘generalities’. Even in post Kargil era, we have not moved forward in a cohesive and constructive manner towards acquisition of platform and weapon combination that would be ideally suited to successfully engage targets in high altitude or hilly terrain. For now, we will have to make do with litening pods, crystal maze and SPICE-2000 bombs because this is the best we have. Concentrated artillery bombardment is no solution to neutralise the targets embedded in steep gradient hills. A hit by an artillery shell is more by chance than aim. To put it simply, as on date we are not adequately equipped to engage a well entrenched adversary positioned in embedded and well camouflaged bunker.

 The Future

Twenty years have gone by since Kargil. A digital appreciation of existing capability from the air in form of strike fighters and attack helicopters does not project a rosy picture notwithstanding recent acquisition of Apache Helicopter from USA and Heron UAV from Israel. While the CEP details of air launched BRAHMOS are not known, it is unlikely to be less than 10 meters at its maximum launch range of around 250 km. In any case we have not achieved operational mating of BRAHMOS with Su 30 MKI. Currently we are at trial stage.

As on date we are not operationally equipped to engage miniature targets viz bunkers, gun position etc in ‘Kargil’ type terrain. Bravery of our ‘Brave Hearts’ is the only weapon in our store. ‘We will fight with whatever we have’ – a syndrome and malaise that afflicts the top military leadership, will get us nowhere. Second time around, we may not be as lucky.

(GpCapt TP Srivastava has served for over three decades with the IAF, flying the MiG-21 and MiG29fighters. He has authored a book titled “Profligate Governance: Implications for National Security” dealing with national and international affairs, specific military affairs, geo-strategic scenario etc.He writes extensively on defence and security related issues.)

 References:

I   The report is available at https://www.scribd.com/doc/152396717/Kargil-Review-Committee-Report-1999

1  https://www.airforce-technology.com/projects/rustom-ii-male-unmanned-aerial-vehicle-uav/

2  https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/we-need-talk-about-flying-ginsu-ultimate-missile-56812

3  https://www.naval-technology.com/news/raytheon-test-fires-sea-based-excalibur-n5-munition/

 (This article is carried in the print edition of July-August 2019 issue of India Foundation Journal.)