Immediately after the Kargil conflict ended in July 1999, a Kargil Review Committee, chaired by the renowned strategic affairs analyst K. Subrahmanyam, was instituted and subsequently, a Group of Ministers (GoM) was set up thereafter. Both these reports highlighted the weaknesses in the lack of coordination between the R&AW, the IB and the military intelligence just prior to the war, and their inability to share information due to lack of inter-agency coordination. Further, R&AW’s human intelligence gathering techniques were found to be weak. Later, a review of the entire national security system by a credible body of experts was recommended and a full time National Security Adviser (NSA) was instituted.

The GoM Report

The GoM report was mandated to comment on broadly four major areas of national security i.e. Intelligence, Internal Security, Border Management and Management of Defence.  Further, as a part of its mandate, these recommendations were forwarded for implementation to the concerned Ministries/Secretariat i.e. the National Security Council Secretariat (NSCS) for Intelligence, Ministry of Home Affairs for Internal Security and Border Management and the Ministry of Defence for Management of Defence.

Vulnerabilities of Northeast India 

Northeast India is the easternmost region of India and comprises eight states: Arunachal Pradesh, Assam, Manipur, Meghalaya, Mizoram, Nagaland, Sikkim, and Tripura. The Siliguri Corridor in West Bengal, with a width of 21 to 40 kilometres (or 13 to 25 miles), connects the North Eastern Region with the rest of India. The region shares an international border of 5,182 kilometres, with the neighbouring countries, 1,395 kilometres, with Tibet Autonomous Region, China in the north, 1,643 kilometres, with Myanmar in the east, 1,596 kilometres with Bangladesh in the south-west, 97 kilometres with Nepal in the west and 455 kilometres with Bhutan in the north-west. It comprises an area measuring 262,230 square kilometres, almost eight percent of that of India. The total population of Northeast India is approximately 46 million with 68 percent of that living in Assam alone. Assam also has a higher population density of 397 persons per km² than the national average of 382 persons per km². The literacy rates in the states of the North eastern region, except those in Arunachal Pradesh and Assam, are higher than the national average of 74 percent. As per 2011 census, Meghalaya recorded the highest population growth of 27.8 percent among all the states of the region, higher than the national average at 17.64 percent; while Nagaland recorded the lowest in the entire country with a negative 0.5 percent. It has over 220 ethnic groups and equal number of dialects. The hill-states in the region like Arunachal Pradesh, Meghalaya, Mizoram, and Nagaland are predominantly inhabited by tribal people with a degree of diversity even within the tribal groups. The region’s population results from ancient and continuous flows of migrations from Tibet, Indo-Gangetic region, the Himalayas, present Bangladesh, and Myanmar. What distinguishes these states from the rest of country is the sensitive geopolitical location with the existence of diverse ethnic groups with different historical backgrounds. The Northeast as a whole is not a single entity with a common political destiny; rather it comprises eight states. The Tribal communities in Northeast India are living on the fringe of three great political communities, India, China and Burma. Historically, some of them played roles of buffer communities, and others the roles of bridge communities between these three great political communities.

The NE region of India is of immense geo-political importance to the Indian sub-continent due to its terrain, location and peculiar demographic dynamics, and is one of the most challenging regions to govern. However, its 40 million population accounts for only 3.1% of the Indian population. Post-independence, the history of this region has been marred by bloodshed, tribal feuds and under-development. Protracted deployment and operations by the army and the Assam Rifles have been instrumental in the abatement of the levels of violence and restoring the security situation to ensure that civil governance elements can function. At present, a delicate, uneasy peace prevails in the region. Having realised the futility of violence, several insurgent groups have resorted to Suspension of Operations (SoO) or ceasefire, thus paving the way for negotiations and hopefully, a resolution of problems.

Indo-Myanmar Linkages

India-Myanmar relations are rooted in shared historical, ethnic, cultural and religious ties. India shares a 1643 km-long border with Myanmar in the four North-Eastern states of Arunachal Pradesh, Nagaland, Manipur and Mizoram with Myanmar’s Sagaing Region and Chin State. The Singrouphos and the Tai groups such as the Ahoms, Khamtis, Phakes, Aitons, Turungs and the Khamyangs moved to North East India from the Shan state of Yunnan and Myanmar. In the same way Nagas, Kukis, Mizos, and the Lushais entered North East India from Burma. The people collectively known as Chins by the Burmese live along the border of North East India and Myanmar. Similarly, there are still a good number of Naga tribes inhabiting western Myanmar adjacent to the Indian state of Nagaland. All these people still maintain their language, traditions, arts, crafts, lifestyle as well as traditional religious practices. The interests are protected by the Indo-Burma treaty of 1951 on Border Affairs which allows free movement of the local ethnic tribals on both sides for the purpose of carrying on local trade and social visits within 16 km either side of the international border.

Being a neighbour, Myanmar played a significant role in the spread of Indian culture, trade, commerce, philosophy, customs, religious practices and belief systems through land to South East Asian Countries. As the land of Lord Buddha, India is a country of pilgrimage for the people of Myanmar(89% population in Myanmar follow Buddhism). A large population of Indian origin (estimated about 2.9 million) live in Myanmar. North Eastern States of India and Myanmar had strong people-to-people contacts since ancient times and therefore had a lot of ethnic and cultural linkages. Saigang Region bordering with Nagaland and Manipur has Bamar, Chin, Shan and Naga population practicing Buddhism and Christianity.

Security challenges along the India-Myanmar border

Indian and Myanmar insurgents often cross the international border and establish camps in the vast jungles and largely ungoverned areas of Myanmar. Since the inception of insurgency in the Northeast in the 1950s, Naga, Mizo, Meitei, and Assamese insurgents have been crossing over into Myanmar to set up bases, especially in the Chin state and Sagaing Region, where they rest, recoup, train, plan and launch future offensives, and take shelter when pursued by the Indian security forces. There are today approximately 55 such camps that have been established by the existing insurgent groups. Earlier tacit approval of the Myanmar army and fraternal ties with the population across almost guaranteed their safety. This coupled with other insurgent groups combining to facilitate the establishment of these safe havens was indeed alarming.  In fact, this shelter and support that the Indian insurgent groups received from across the border was one of the most important factors which helped them in sustaining their insurgency.

Further, theseinsurgent groups procured arms from the existing black markets of Southeast Asia as well as from Myanmar-based insurgent groups such as the United Wa State Army (UWSA). While the bulk of the weapons from Thailand and Cambodia were smuggled through the sea route, some of them are also smuggled overland through the India-Myanmar border with the help of Chin and Arakanese insurgents. Weapons produced in China are also routed across the Myanmar border at Ruili and then trucked via Lashio, Mandalay and Monywa to enter the Indian border through Phek, Chandel, Churachandpur and Champai.

Narcotics and the ‘Golden Triangle’ Proximity to the ‘Golden Triangle’ makes the India-Myanmar border vulnerable to trafficking of heroin and amphetamine-type stimulants (ATS) produced in Myanmar. These narcotics are trafficked into India through the states of Mizoram, Manipur, and Nagaland from Bhamo, Lashio and Mandalay. The most important trafficking route is the one which enters Moreh in Manipur through Tamu and travels thence to Imphal and Kohima via National Highway-39.  Reverse trafficking of precursor chemicals such as ephedrine and pseudo-ephedrine as well as codeine-based medicinal preparations from India to Myanmar takes place through the same route. While the bigger insurgent groups are not directly involved in drug trafficking to generate funds, they do so indirectly by demanding protection money from drug mafia for allowing safe passage to the drug consignments through their area.

The 1967 boundary agreement

The susceptibility of the India-Myanmar border to these threats and challenges stems from a number of factors. First, even though the international boundary between the two countries had been formally delimited and demarcated (except the northern tri-junction where India-Myanmar and China meet, pending the final resolution of the India-China boundary dispute) following the boundary agreement on March 10, 1967, the boundary has not crystallised on the ground as lines separating two sovereign countries. This is because like most of the boundaries that India shares with its neighbours, the India-Myanmar boundary is also superimposed on the socio-cultural landscape of the borderland, dividing several tribes and forcing them to reside as citizens of different countries. These tribes, however, refuse to accept the artificial line and continue to maintain strong cross-border ethnic linkages. Such linkages are often exploited by the insurgents to find shelter across the border among their own kinsmen who are sympathetic towards their ‘cause’.

Genesis of Insurgency

North East India has been in turmoil since independence. The oldest insurgency dates back to 1947 with the Nagas raising the issue of self rule and sovereignty. Since then, myriad insurgent movements have sprung up in most parts of the constituent states of the Region. Due to several common and specific abetting factors, violence mushroomed in different areas and during varied time periods.

The reasons for  insurgency  differs from state to state. Several factors like common ethnic stock, similar historical background and comparable geo-politics are responsible for abetting insurgency in the region. In addition, certain other factors specific to states, regions or tribes also acted as abetting factors for insurgency in the NE.

Assam: The roots of insurgency in Assam began with the protests/ agitations of the All Assam Students Union (AASU) against illegal influx of Bangladeshi immigrants. A break-away faction of the AASU formed the ULFA in 1979 with an objective of creating a ‘sovereign socialist Assam’.

With signing of the Assam Accord in 1985, the AASU ended its agitation and constituted the Asom Gana Parishad (AGP). This regional political party participated in elections and subsequently formed the government. However, ULFA continued with its struggle, with sovereignty as the prime motive. Apart from ULFA and Bodo insurgents, the Dimasa groups of North Cachar Hills (now Dima Hasao District) had been claiming ‘Dimaraji’, a Dimasa state based on historical records and presence of Dimasas in majority.

These demands were in direct clash with the interests of Nagas who claimed the overlapping areas as parts of ‘Greater Nagaland/ Nagalim’. The Dimasa insurgency was brought under control with the signing of Memorandum of Settlement (MoS) in 2012 with consequent formation of North Cachar Hill Autonomous Council (NCHAC). However, splinter Dimasa groups continue to venture out and carry out acts of kidnapping and extortion.

Manipur:  The roots of insurgency in the State date back to 1964 with the creation of United National Liberation Front (UNLF).The discontentment was for the alleged forced merger of Manipur and delay in conferring Statehood.Subsequently, groups like People’s Revolutionary Party of Kangleipak (PREPAK) in 1977, People’s Liberation Army (PLA) in 1978, Kangleipak Communist Party in 1980 and Kanglei Yawol Kanna Lup (KYKL) in 1994 emerged in Manipur. All insurgent groups propagated the idea of an independent Manipur with minor variation in ideologies.

In the Hill districts, contiguity with Nagaland and inhabitation by Naga Tribes enabled spillover of Naga insurgents into the State. NSCN (IM) has laid claim over these hill districts in the scheme of ‘Nagalim’ or Greater Nagaland. Kuki-Naga clashes in the Hill districts of Manipur in early nineties instigated the creation of several Kuki groups in the State. The groups which were initially formed to resist oppression by Nagas subsequently started demand for a separate ‘Kukiland’ state encompassing the Kuki-inhabited areas of Manipur, Assam, Mizoram and even parts of Myanmar. However, most of these groups are now under SoO with GOI.

Islamist groups like the People’s United Liberation Front (PULF) have also been founded to protect the interests of the ‘Pangal Muslims’. Links with other insurgent groups of the NE and camps in Myanmar have been corroborated. The insurgents have been broadly divided into Valley Based Insurgent Groups (VBIGs) and others comprising the Nagas, Kukis, Muslims and those representing minor tribes.

Nagaland: Nagaland is home to the oldest insurgency in the North East. The idea of a sovereign nation was conceived by the Nagas even before the independence of India. Nagaland attained Statehood in 1963 and today comprises 18 districts divided on the basis of Tribal affinities.

The Naga struggle for sovereignty commenced with the formation of Naga National Congress (NNC) in 1946. The entry of the Indian army in 1953 to prevent armed rebellion resulted in the party forming an armed wing called the Naga Federal Army (NFA). An underground government called Naga Federal Government (NFG) was also formed.

The first major effort towards peace was the signing of the Shillong Accord in 1975. However, the peace accord led to rebellion within the NNC which led to the creation of the NSCN in 1980. Difference of ideologies between the top leaders of the NSCN led to the splinter in the group in 1988 resulting in the formation of NSCN(IM) and NSCN(K). Both groups pursued the objective of creating a sovereign Nagalim encompassing areas of the present Nagaland state, Naga inhabited areas of Assam, Manipur, Arunachal Pradesh and Myanmar. NSCN (K) further split in 2011 to form a splinter group called NSCN (Khole-Khitovi (KK) which further split into NSCN (Khitovi-Neokpao or NSCN(KN)). In the same year, a split by the Zeliangs in NSCN (IM) resulted in formation of Zeliangrong United Front (ZUF).

In 1997, NSCN (IM) entered into a Ceasefire with the Government of India followed by NSCN (K) in 2001. On formation, NSCN (KK) also signed a Ceasefire with the government. In 2012, NSCN (K) further entered into a Ceasefire agreement with the Government of Myanmar. This agreement granted autonomy to NSCN (K) in the districts of Lahe, Leshi and Nanyun in Sagaing province of Myanmar. In 2015, NSCN (K) unilaterally abrogated the Ceasefire agreement. This decision of the group led to another split and resulted in the formation of NSCN (Reformation). NSCN (K) further went on to join hands with ULFA (I), NDFB (S) and KYKL to form the United National Liberation Front of Western SE Asia (UNLFW). In 2018, the NSCN (K) further split after the death of its founder Khaplang and now a smaller portion consisting mainly of Indian origin Nagas under the leadership of Khango Konyak left the group and have entered into a Cease Fire with the GOI as NSCN (Kango) and have joined the peace talks as a part of the NNPGs (Naga National Political Groups).

Situation Post Kargil GoM Report

Narcotics-Arms Nexus: The narcotics trade and the smuggling of arms and explosives are intimately linked and adversely influence the security and the social fabric of the affected region. India is located between two drug producing areas of the Golden Crescent in the West and the Golden Triangle in the East, which has resulted in drug trafficking through the country as well. The drug mafia has been improving its network and escalating its level of activities. Many of the existing insurgent groups are receiving weapons mainly from across the borders with the assistance of organised smuggling groups. Most of the arms are being smuggled via Bangladesh and Myanmar.  These continue with a lesser degree despite a number of measures being taken by the security forces and the Ministry of Home Affairs.

Fake Currency and Money Laundering:  Along with narcotics and illicit weapons trade, generation of black money and money laundering, there is a progressive blurring of lines between legal, financial and business operations and criminal activities; these create ample space for collusion between organised criminal and legitimate enterprises. A large amount of fake Indian currency continues to be smuggled into this region. This reduced to an extent during de-monetisation but has re-started to almost the previous levels.  Laundering of proceeds continues to sustain a large variety of criminal activities, including kidnapping and blackmail. Co-operation and collusion between organised crime and insurgent  elements continues.  Given the law and order as well as insurgency situation in the North east  the narcotics trafficking, arms smuggling, fake currency and money laundering rackets, provide a boost to the already fragile adverse situation. The prevention of money laundering is essential for safeguarding internal security.  The MHA and the Ministry of Finance have taken substantial action and provided  additional allocation for strengthening the resources of Directorate of Revenue Intelligence (DRI), the Enforcement Directorate (ED), Narcotics Control Bureau (NCB), Central Bureau Narcotics (CBN) and Foreigners Division (MHA) in the North East especially in the vulnerable areas of the NE, like Manipur, Mizoram, Arunachal and Nagaland. These arms of the state need further strengthening.

Illegal Migration: The law and order problems of the North East were aggravated by large scale unchecked migration from Bangladesh. Post 1971 illegal migration from Bangladesh into various States of the North East is estimated to be of the order of approximately more than 12 million people. This has generated a host of destabilising political, social, economic, ethnic and communal tensions. Politically, the Bangladeshi migrants are in a position to influence the results of the elections in a large number of constituencies in the North East (about 32% of the constituencies in Assam).  Economically, increased pressure on land, resulting in depletion of forest wealth, undercutting of wages of unskilled jobs, forcible occupation of Government land by the migrants and a host of other such issues, generate a ripple effect in the entire North East creating social and ethnic frictions which finally lead to violence. Illegal migration has decreased to a substantial level mainly due to untiring efforts of the security forces both the Assam Rifles and the BSF, the completion of the fence along the Indo- Bangladesh border and the forward movement of the Assam Rifles to the Indo- Myanmar International Border. Also with the recent measures being carried out due to the implementation of the NRC and the likelihood of the passage of the Citizenship Amendment Bill in the parliament, further reduction in illegal immigration is expected.

The Free Movement Regime

The India-Myanmar border has a unique arrangement in place called the Free Movement Regime (FMR). The FMR permits the tribes residing along the border to travel 16-km across the boundary without visa restrictions. While the FMR has helped the tribes continue maintain their age old ties, it has also become a cause of concern for the security establishment as its provisions are exploited by the Indian insurgents to cross over to Myanmar unrestricted and establish safe havens.  Today a 16 km free movement regime MOU has been promulgated post the acceptance by Myanmar Government. However, in this situation, due to the existence of only two border control points at Moreh and Zorawathor in Mizoram available along the 1635 kms long border and the lack of effective border control mainly due to an extremely difficult jungle terrain, lack of effective policing on the Myanmar side and the existence of insurgent camps in Myanmar, illegal trade activities in a variety of contraband items flourish along the Indo-Myanmar border. In order to check these practices, the several measures as under were recommended by the GoM to be adopted, these are as given below:-

(a)  Trade should be regulated only through one gate. This less the trade between the residents of the Free Move Regime (16 km belt) is in the process of being enforced.  Now, an Integrated Check Post (ICP) at Moreh located on NH-39 on the India-Myanmar border in the Tengnoupal district at about 110 km. from Imphal, the State capital of Manipur has started functioning w.e.f. 31 March 2018. Tamu is the corresponding town in Myanmar opposite to Moreh. And in addition, the Asian Highway (AH-1), a part of the India-Myanmar-Thailand Trilateral Highway is being developed that will connect Moreh to Mae Sot in Thailand, via Mandalay and Yangon in Myanmar. Later, this road will be further linked to Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam. Moreh will also be an entry/exit point for ASEAN and would thus be instrumental in facilitating India’s trade with ASEAN region

(b)  Border Fencing on a 10 km stretch along the Manipur-Myanmar border at Moreh was started in 2011 mainly to check free movement of insurgents and illicit trade. However this was abandoned after fencing an area of only 1.6 km on either side of the Land port at Moreh, due to public pressure of the locals living on both sides of the International Border.

(c)  Free movement regime should be restricted to tribals moving with head loads, comprising authorised local produce. An MOU was prepared and shared with the Myanmar Government in 2017-18. This is in the process of being implemented on ground.

(d)  Establish additional trading points in Tirap and Changlang District of Arunachal Pradesh, Nagaland, Manipur and Mizoram. Border trade with Myanmar is expected to not only lead to economic upliftment but also wean away the populace from insurgency. Other than Moreh and Zorawather, no other established trading points exist.

(e)  Further, a construction of a road running roughly parallel to the Indo-Myanmar border along its entire length was considered. At present this project has not been implemented but needs to be expedited.

Assam Rifles

The Assam Rifles needed to be conferred with powers under the Customs act and Criminal Procedure Code (Cr.PC), as in the case of the BSF.  This is in the process of being completed and will bring about a change in the ability of the Assam Rifles to effectively manage the Indo- Myanmar border. To that end, 16 additional AR units were raised mainly for the difficult task of Border management between 2005- 09 and are in the process of moving to the international border.

The GoM had further recommended that “In order that for the Assam Rifles play its role effectively, it should be placed under the complete control of the MHA. The DG, Assam Rifles should be selected and appointed by the MHA and report to it directly. This issue however needs a rethink and is not recommended especially since at present the Assam Rifles enjoys seamless interface with the Army in an extremely difficult task of both managing a live and difficult Indo-Myanmar international border as well as deal with an ongoing difficult insurgency in many parts along the international border.  Further, it would be prudent to take a historical perspective of AR to understand the full potential of its utilisation. Assam Rifles traces its beginning to 1835 when it was raised as Cachar Levy.  Its current strength is 46 battalions. 80 per cent of its officers are from the Army, while the balance 20 per cent are promotes from the ranks.

To their credit, AR battalions have participated in the 1962 Sino-Indian operations  and even the Indian Peace Keeping Operations in Sri Lanka. In 1966, when the MNF uprising overran the state, it was only the AR battalion at Aizwal that held its ground providing a foothold for launching  operations to beat back the insurgents. It also allowed the use of IAF resources from within the state.

During the 1971 Bangladesh War, AR relieved regular army units in the northeast for employment in erstwhile East Pakistan. A few AR battalions were deployed in Sri Lanka during Operation Pawan in 1987. AR units were deployed in J&K during the initial stages of the insurgency. During Operation Vijay in 1999, AR battalions manned the Line of Actual Control with army formations moving out to the western theatre. Then there is the question of ethos, tradition and practices followed by the Assam Rifles. Since 80 per cent of AR officers are from the army, the organisation has developed military ethos in sync with the Indian Army. It is these intangibles like ethos of a battalion, morale and ethics that have decisive influence on the operational efficiency of a force. The best of equipment and training cannot bring about the culture of sacrifice for achieving victory in battle.

What would placing Assam Rifles under the MHA achieve? Making the AR a pure police force will dilute its operational efficiency. It takes years to build a battalion and hardly any time for the force’s combat capability to slide without the strong leadership and environment that is required to sustain the state of morale.

As is also evident from the history of employment of the force, it has been utilised in difficult war situations  to take on priority tasks in the depth and also hold lesser threatened sectors where the army units and formations had been relieved. The threat from China to our North eastern Borders has not reduced. Infact, over the years it has only enhanced. Such arrangements require very agile units that have the grit and determination as well as training to undertake such frontline tasks.

The over 1635 km of Indo-Myanmar border that the AR guards is difficult mountainous  cum jungle terrain. It has no fence, nor will a fence prove to be of much use in such areas. Across the border are camps of Indian insurgent groups. The insurgents are well trained, armed and experienced. To guard such a difficult border, there is a need to have a para-military-force that is steeped in the military culture and operates shoulder to shoulder with the army. The army officers who lead these battalions provide them the kind of leadership required to be effective in the terrain and environment that the AR operates.

Improved Security Situation-2019

RecentlyfromFebruary 2019 onwards,  the Tatmadaw (Myanmar Army) conducted a series of counter insurgency operations against the camps of the Indian insurgents groups based at the Naga self-administered zone in Sagaing region of Myanmar and were able to  destroy a number of these camps, seized arms and ammunition, and arrested several cadres of the National Socialist Council of Nagaland – Khaplang (NSCN-K) and Meitei insurgent groups. The Tatmadaw has also asked all non-Myanmar insurgents to leave the country and warned the NSCN (K) against giving shelter to any Indian insurgent groups in their headquarters at Ta Ga. If this continues, the security situation will greatly improve along the Indo Myanmar Border.

Border Area Development Programmes (BADP)

Border Guarding Forces should also be given the responsibility of assisting the state in its  Border Area Development Programmes (BADP) especially since they are deployed in areas where no other arm of the government exists. People living on India’s international borders, particularly on land borders, face myriad problems, like difficult terrain, harsh living conditions and lack of access to public amenities.  Frequent extortion by insurgent groups along the border is the norm along with thinly spread out administration and inadequate social and economic infrastructure, which add to their misery. Concerted efforts are being made by our neighbours through allurements, subversive propaganda and promotion of religious fundamentalism to  generate a feeling of alienation among the border population.  The remoteness of the local administration, its low visibility, illegal immigration, smuggling of arms, explosives and narcotic substances, further accentuate this problem. The Border Area Development Programme (BADP) has been enhanced and now is able to address the special needs of our border population.  In addition, Border Guarding Forces like the BSF and Assam Rifles are now involved in execution of community welfare schemes like holding of medical camps, construction of school buildings and water harvesting structures, building sports facilities etc., where local institutions are weak.  This action greatly enhances their ability to influence the needs of the border villages in a positive manner. This needs to be further enhanced.

Disinformation and Subversive Propaganda 

Forces hostile to India have tended to occupy the vacuum created by inadequate reach of national media. It is, therefore, necessary to initiate measures to combat the subversive propaganda and disinformation unleashed against India through a series of measures which include enabling Internet, mobile and TV coverage for the border areas. Here though many plans exist on paper, there is on ground very little movement in this area. Many villages along the international border still utilse communication networks of Myanmar which is a grave security risk. This needs to be completed with urgency.

Conclusion

What is abundantly clear is that national security is a function of a country’s external environment and the internal situation, as well as their interplay with each other which is influenced by the prevailing international order, its immediate and extended neighbours and the major powers. Further, the internal situation encompasses many aspects of national life, ranging from law and order to economic fundamentals and from the quality of governance to national cohesiveness. The external environment and internal situation of a country do not subsist in watertight compartments but act and react on each other in ways which affect its security. In today’s interdependent world, this earlier distinction between the internal and external security concerns have got blurred thus altering the traditional concept of national security, which in itself has undergone fundamental changes and is no longer synonymous only with sufficient military strength. This now includes economic strength, internal cohesion and technological prowess.   The fundamental security of the individual citizen includes security of life and property, food security, energy security, clean environment, education and health.  A strong sense of nationalism and good governance also form an integral part of national security; as does the ability to retain political and economic sovereignty and autonomy of decision making, in an era of globalisation and increasing economic interdependence. The rise of China, has forever changed the external and internal environment in the North East of India, and now coupled with improvement in nuclear weapons and missiles, the use of cyber technology as a form of warfare, increasing cross-border terrorism, the emergence of non-state actors, the growth of Islamic fundamentalism, the narcotics-arms nexus, illegal migration and left wing extremism, gravely impact upon the security of this region. These rapid technological developments underway at the same time not only facilitate these events by reducing our reaction time but add entirely new dimensions of threats and challenges, forcing us to now plan our own Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) and enhance our capabilities to plan and fight in the domain of information warfare.

Over the last 20 years since the GoM report, the challenges that face the North East have only increased and once again institutions that were created 20 years ago or merely tinkered with following the report, now need to be once again strengthened and restructured in order to cope with the continuing new and emerging challenges facing us in the areas of Intelligence, Internal Security, Border and Defence Management in the North East.

(Lt Gen Shokin Chauhan, PVSM, AVSM, YSM, SM, VSM, after a successful stint of 39 years in the Indian Armed Forces retired in 2018 from the services as the Director General, Assam Rifles.)

(This article is carried in the print edition of July-August 2019 issue of India Foundation Journal.)

Introduction

The international climate change negotiations have been marked by fragmentation since the beginning, even before the establishment of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in 1992. The fragmentation in the negotiations has been attributed to varying interests, concerns, vulnerabilities, resources and other factors among the negotiating parties. It has led to formation of various groupings and blocs within the UNFCCC that negotiate based on issues of common concern. These formations, which emerged at different points of time during the course of the negotiations, are characterised by geographical proximity (regional) and common/shared interests (such as development) among others. It is also important to note that these formations are not ‘exclusive’ and are mostly overlapping, with the members of one grouping or bloc also being represented in others. The fragmentation need not necessarily be seen as either positive or negative, as differing interpretations and perspectives have brought out possibilities of both conflict and cooperation among nation states in the realm of climate change.

South Asia is considered one of the most climate-vulnerable and politically fragmented regions in the world. On the one hand, due to the similarities in geographical features and socio-economic contexts (to a lesser extent), the vulnerabilities (due to climate change impacts such as extreme weather events, sea level rise, glacial recession, health hazards, food insecurity, water stress and so on) are comparable. And on the other, due to varying interpretations of these vulnerabilities and (geo)political/(geo)economic imperatives, they tend to adopt different positions at the climate change negotiations. India, the biggest (in size and economy) country in the region, has played a major role in the negotiations since the beginning, but more so since the Copenhagen Summit in 2009. Bangladesh and the Maldives, two of the most vociferous voices at the negotiations, by framing climate change as an ‘existential threat’ to their survival, have played a pivotal role in driving the negotiations forward. Other countries, namely Nepal, Bhutan, Sri Lanka, Pakistan and Afghanistan have also been leading voices for climate action at the UNFCCC, but to a lesser extent. South Asia, as a region, cannot be treated as a monolith and there is no one-size-fits-all approach to framing or responding to climate change among its countries.

The division among the South Asian countries in terms of their positions at the UNFCCC, is also somewhat reflected in the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), wherein despite the push for regional action plans on climate change targeted at specific sectors or issues, there has been little progress towards achieving climate goals or even reaching a consensus/common position on climate change, unlike other regional groupings such as the African Union (AU). At the same time, all the South Asian countries are also members of the G-77 group of developing countries, a negotiating bloc that is deeply fissured but strongly advocates for equity and climate justice in unison (mainly through the principle of Common but Differentiated Responsibilities and Respective Capabilities or CBDR-RC). In addition, India is a part of major formal and informal groupings such as the BASIC (along with Brazil, South Africa and China), and Major Economies Forum on Energy and Climate among others that makes it distinct from the other South Asian countries in terms of its growing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions (world’s third largest emitter) and growth-first agenda. Bangladesh, the Maldives, Afghanistan, Nepal and Bhutan are members of the ‘Vulnerable Twenty’ (V20), constituted by the world’s 20 most affected states by the catastrophic effects of climate change. In fact, the Climate Vulnerable Forum (CVF) was founded by the Maldivian Government before the 2009 Copenhagen Summit, in order to enhance the level of awareness about the disproportionate effects of climate change on countries that are considered most vulnerable at the international level, despite contributing least to the global GHG emissions.

In this context, this article attempts to analyse the positions of the South Asian countries, which helps provide insights into the existence of various negotiating blocs that consist of the South Asian countries (such as G-77, BASIC and CVF), as well as reflect on the rationale for the differences in their positions. It also attempts to explore opportunities for cooperation among the South Asian nations, using the cases of the International Solar Alliance (launched by India and France in 2015), and the Loss and Damage Mechanism.

Drivers of Negotiating Positions of South Asian Nations

While the South Asian nations have been and continue to be somewhat firmly anchored within the G-77 group of developing countries, they have chosen to forge alliances with “like-minded countries” on different occasions to safeguard their interests. In some cases, their interests converge, while in others they diverge significantly, which is why their negotiating positions are at times poles apart. These divergences were most explicitly displayed at the 2009 Copenhagen Summit, wherein India joined hands with the other leading emerging economies (BASIC) with the primary aim of opposing the industrialised countries’ attempts to impose a deal that dilutes ‘differentiation’ between developed and developing countries on the rest of the world, most other countries of South Asia formed the CVF to voice their demand for more urgent climate action and more importantly, limit warming to 1.5 degrees Celsius above preindustrial levels. Interestingly, while the BASIC was reportedly engineered by India, the Maldives played a pivotal role in the envisioning of the CVF.

South-South Cooperation is at the heart of the G-77, with emphasis on development cooperation that is delinked from North-South Aid, which all South Asian nations identify with in principle. Under North-South Aid, the ‘rich’ or industrialised countries began to provide financial and other forms of assistance/aid to the developing countries, their erstwhile colonies or war-torn economies in the 19th century. The foundation for South-South Cooperation was laid during the 1955 Bandung Conference (wherein most South Asian nations were present) that aimed to pursue an “international partnership for development” based on “respect for national sovereignty, equality and mutual benefit.”1 In the climate change negotiations, the G-77 has consistently demanded greater level of climate action from the developed countries, based on the historical responsibility of the latter in contributing the largest share of GHG emissions in the atmosphere as well as their historically ‘unjust’ act of accumulating ‘relative’ or ‘differentiated’ capacities to undertake climate action through colonialism, imperialism and similar other means.

The South Asian nations have used the platform of G-77 to project a united stance on issues such as CBDR, equity, adaptation as well as financial and technological support. Since poverty alleviation/reduction and economic development/growth are their primary priorities, they have reiterated repeatedly that their climate commitments would be hinged on the principle of equity (equitable allocation of the limited GHG emissions space to meet their developmental needs), and that they would be contingent on support from the industrialised countries. In addition, since their per capita emissions continue to be low, it is morally justifiable to set differentiated goals that do not deprive the developing countries of their right to develop.2 Therefore, some countries of G-77 have also advocated an agreement based on equitable per capita cumulative emission rights, “national emission quotas based on population” etc., especially in the case of an abatement regime that deals with the distribution of costs – of both reduction of GHG build-up in the atmosphere and the impacts of climate change3 – on account of their differentiated/disproportionate responsibility, vulnerability and capacity.

On the issue of adaptation, in general, the South Asian countries, as part of the G-77, have been critical of the industrialised countries’ unwillingness and slowness in funding adaptation efforts in their countries, and concentrating largely on mitigation-related projects/initiatives that are considered more profitable, especially for the private sector. As far as climate finance is concerned, the group has traditionally preferred public sources over private sources and has called for a shift from donor-dominated “assistance formula” to “rights-based resource transfers”, also underscoring the need for “new and additional funds” instead of dislodging the existing development assistance.4 The developing countries have therefore, been always in favour of the UN agencies being in control of the financial mechanisms rather than the Bretton Woods institutions, which already have a major influence on their economic policies due to the development assistance provided by them and which may not strike a balance between socio-economic advancement and environmental gains.

Despite the existence of various common interests and positions at the climate change negotiations, the G-77 is known to be an increasingly fragmented group, split into various groups such as BASIC, Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), CVF, Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) and among others, rendering the sub-groups more influential in agenda-setting and decision-making. Some of the G-77 countries are also members of groupings and coalitions that consist of developed countries. For instance, the Cartagena Dialogue for Progressive Action includes industrialised countries such as the United Kingdom (UK), Germany, France and Australia as well as developing countries such as Bhutan, Bangladesh, the Maldives and Nepal. This informal group was formed after the 2009 Copenhagen Summit with the aim of working towards an ambitious legally binding Post-Kyoto agreement.

The formation of the Cartagena Dialogue, when seen in the light of the failure of the Copenhagen Summit to reach an agreement of consequence, provides insight into the way in which the BASIC emerged as the most instrumental and decisive group, side-lining the developed countries as well as the G-77 to a great extent (since the Copenhagen Accord was accepted only by a select group of 26 countries).5 This was primarily driven by the ‘solidarity’ shown by the BASIC countries to thwart attempts by a few developed countries to push forth the leaked Danish text, which allegedly sought to undermine the role of the UN in climate change finance, scrap the Kyoto Protocol, and force the developing countries also to adopt binding emissions cuts.6 The decision of the BASIC countries to break ranks with G-77 to safeguard its economic interests and the continued framing of climate change as an existential issue by the most vulnerable countries within the G-77 pulled them apart.

One of the significant moments in the history of climate change negotiations was the 2007 Bali Summit, wherein for the first time, the developing countries were also called upon to undertake “nationally appropriate mitigation actions” (NAMAs). In addition, on the decision of “long-term cooperative action”7, the strict differentiation between developed and developing countries, as in the Kyoto Protocol, was also watered down. The international climate regime had moved towards an architecture that did not view the developing countries as a single, homogenous group. Hence, developing countries that are economically better off (including India) would be expected to commit to emissions reduction in a more proactive manner; and by linking all forms of support to mitigation efforts, it was made sure that the post-Kyoto regime would put emphasis on making the former contingent on the latter.

What should also be taken into consideration is the financial crisis that hit the industrialised world in 2007 that spared the emerging economies such as India to a large extent, thereby elevating the latter’s geopolitical weight in the international system considerably. In addition, the framing of climate change as a security threat or a “threat multiplier” began to gain momentum, with the introduction of the issue in the UN Security Council (UNSC) in the same year, under the United Kingdom’s presidency.8 This move has been endorsed by CVF countries, but India has largely been opposed to the idea of introducing the security implications of climate change in the UNSC on the grounds that “a security approach to a critical challenge facing humanity may in fact hinder the global collective effort” and that the UNSC is “structurally unrepresentative institution with an exclusionary approach”, as pointed out by India’s Permanent Representative to the UN Syed Akbaruddin.9

The growing proportion of developing countries’ GHG emissions in the run up to the Copenhagen Summit is considered to have influenced the discourse on the responsibility of the emerging economies towards finding solutions. China overtook the US as the world’s largest emitter of carbon dioxide in 2007.10 India became the third largest emitter of GHGs in 2009, surpassing Russia, whose emissions reduced due to economic recession.11 In addition, the BASIC countries’ contribution to global Gross Domestic product (GDP) and collective share in global trade grew significantly in the 2000s, partially also due to the economic downturn in the developed economies. They have been among the fastest growing economies in the world, particularly China and India12, leading to the assumption/understanding that with growing emissions and economies, they have a bigger responsibility towards international climate action than before (they did not have any commitments under the Kyoto Protocol). Even the developing countries from the CVF had started to demand more climate action from them.

At the Copenhagen Summit and thereafter, the AOSIS and CVF supported an ambitious, legally binding agreement that would limit the temperature rise to below 1.5 degrees Celsius and would require both the developed and developing countries to act in terms of climate change mitigation with the precondition that the latter group would receive support from the former.13 However, the BASIC countries were in favour of a bottom-up approach that is not necessarily legally binding and ensures less intrusiveness NAMAs), thereby also insisting on a loose MRV (Measuring, Reporting and Verification) framework. The BASIC countries, primarily India and China advocated a MRV framework under which, all mitigation actions undertaken by non-Annex I parties (COP) would be subject to domestic MRV, while the ones with international support would be subject to international MRV, as stated in the Copenhagen Accord.14 In the meantime, there has been a mushrooming of bilateral engagements and agreements on climate change, particularly in energy cooperation, between the developed and emerging countries, which is considered to be undermining the G-77 further.15 At the same time, the developed world is also known to be engaged in attempts to split the G-77 by pressurising the poor countries based on their “donor-based relationships”, as alleged by Nozipho Mxakato-Diseko, the leader of G-77 for the Paris Agreement.16

Exploring Opportunities for Cooperation among the South Asian Countries

Ideas and norms coupled with power politics and geopolitical alignments have led to a situation in which India and the other South Asian countries have found themselves on the opposite sides of the climate change debate on many occasions. While on climate finance, there is still a general agreement on the way forward, on climate action, India’s neighbours demand swift action. Contrary to the development perspective that India usually clings to at the climate change negotiations, countries such as the Maldives, even while upholding the socio-economic development agenda, projects a human rights approach to climate change17, based on the question of their survival.  Unlike the AU’s officially stated “African Common Position on Climate Change”18, or a the ASEAN’s (Association of South East Asian Nations) constant attempts to engage in common positions on issues related to climate change19, the South Asian equivalent of SAARC has barely scratched the surface as far as developing a common position on climate change is concerned. The geopolitical factors in South Asia have impeded any meaningful cooperation in the region, despite the existence of a SAARC Action Plan on Climate Change (adopted in 2008).20 At the 2010 Cancun Summit, former Indian Minister of Environment and Forests, Jairam Ramesh made efforts to bring together the SAARC environment ministers, but such moves have been few and far between, having virtually no impact on the overall negotiations strategy as a regional bloc.21

However, despite the fact that in the run up to the Paris Agreement, the SAARC countries continued to negotiate through different groupings, there were various shifts in their positions that led to more convergences and coordination. In a regime that is ‘applicable to all’, which India was opposed to for a long time, all countries, including India, had to make compromises on various aspects of the agreement. India had already committed to decreasing emissions intensity at the Copenhagen Summit by 20-25 percent from 2005 levels by 2020; and under the new regime, India has assumed greater responsibilities by not only coming up with a target of cutting emissions intensity by 33-35 percent from 2005 levels by 2030 in its Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDC)22, which is a 75 percent “jump in ambition over 2020”23 but also launching the International Solar Alliance (with France) at the Paris Summit in 2015, the first treaty-based organisation to be headquartered in India.24 Evidently, the mood was more positive than before in South Asia, as also expressed by former President of The Maldives, Mohamed Nasheed, “In 2009, when Maldives was rooting for urgent action on climate change, India was on opposing side. Its position has changed over the years. Now, India is our most constructive partner. It is working to combat climate change and cares about safeguarding the plant and its neighbours in South Asia.”25

The opportunities for cooperation in practical terms are now redefined. The International Solar Alliance (ISA), launched in 2015 by India and France, for instance, is regarded as a diplomatic victory for India that provides impetus to its desire to be a leader in issues of global governance, thereby further transforming its image as a responsible global power that champions the rules-based global order.26 This organization, that brings together sun-rich countries that lie fully or partially between the Tropics of Cancer and Capricorn under one roof, with its focus on climate justice, is geared towards both climate change mitigation and access to affordable energy. While India has set a target of achieving 100 GW of solar power by 2022, it also plans to invest in solar projects in other countries, including South Asian ones. At the inaugural summit of the ISA in 2018, it was declared that out of the 27 projects being supported by India, two each would be in Bangladesh ($180 million) and Sri Lanka ($100 million).27 The South Asian countries are sun-rich and energy-poor at the same time. The renewable energy sectors in these countries face several policy, technical, economic and other challenges, including the lack of investment due to high initial costs and delayed profits/benefits, paucity of technical and technological capacities and information etc.28 These obstacles could be overcome through cooperation at the ISA, translating into greater understanding at the UNFCCC as well, especially in developing the idea of climate justice.

The Paris Agreement came into force in 2016. However, there are several questions regarding the implementation of the treaty and ratcheting up of ambition that still need to be addressed in greater detail. One such mechanism is the Loss and Damage, which was established at the 2013 Warsaw Summit, at the initiative of world’s most vulnerable countries (including CVF). The vulnerable developing and least developed countries worked towards institutionalising such a mechanism within the UNFCCC as a third pillar (the other two being mitigation and adaptation) for a decade, on the grounds that it is different from adaptation and that they are entitled to compensation (mainly from the developed countries) due to damage(s) caused by climate change.29 The South Asian nations, having suffered losses due to several extreme weather events in recent times, stand united on this issue. By showing moral leadership on this issue, countries such as Bangladesh, the Maldives, India and Sri Lanka, succeeded in setting up such a mechanism despite stiff and persistent opposition from the rich countries. However, there is a need to push for more action on issues such as ‘resilience’ and capacity-building through financial and technological means as an integral part of the post-2020 international climate policy to avoid a form of climate injustice.

Conclusion

The South Asian countries, with their distinct historical experiences (including the colonial past), have been marred by regional rivalries, conflicts, political differences and so on. However, on the issue of climate change – at the UNFCCC – even India and Pakistan have usually shared similar positions on account of their socio-economic imperatives, primarily their right to develop. As the negotiations progressed, these countries forged alliances with different parties at different points of time to get what they wanted in the agreement. Through G-77, they pushed for differentiation between the developed and developing countries, equity and climate justice through principles such as CBDR-RC, in light of different national circumstances. At the same time, the region has had a fragmented response when it came to the legally binding nature of the agreement, the level of ambition and the role of the emerging economies in the new regime, which led to the division between the South Asian countries, as manifested through the BASIC and CVF.

In recent times, with India in the process of throwing weight behind its goal of being on the global high table of climate governance through various initiatives, such as the ISA, other South Asian countries expect constructive partnership with it, which is geared towards more urgent action on climate change. At the 2009 Copenhagen Summit, the BASIC and the CVF were on opposite sides, but since then, the gap has been bridged to some extent, particularly with more positive signals from the Indian side, reflecting its willingness and readiness to take on greater responsibility. Thus, the scope for cooperation among them has increased. Energy, being a common requirement in the region – with the growing population and developmental needs – is a sector in which cooperation has already been kick-started through international organisations such as the solar alliance, which could help build energy self-sufficiency and self-reliance in them. Nevertheless, whether this cooperation could facilitate common understanding and position on various issues concerning climate change at the UNFCCC is debatable. This is not only due to the inherent political differences that pervade the region, but also because of the differentiation among the developing countries themselves. However, what could be deduced is the fact that by developing a common position, the South Asian nations can have greater bargaining powers than by staying alone. India has been isolated in the negotiations a number of times, especially before the Paris Summit when even the BASIC group began to wither. By forming a strong bloc with the other South Asian countries, India could strengthen its own footing. Similarly, countries like Bangladesh and the Maldives can leverage the status and power of a country like India to achieve its goals at the UNFCCC, whether it is in the case of mechanisms like loss and damage, or in terms of securing greater technological and financial support for adaptation and mitigation from the developed world.

(Dr. Dhanasree Jayaram is Assistant Professor, Department of Geopolitics and International Relations,
and Co-Coordinator, Centre for Climate Studies, Manipal Academy of Higher Education, India; Postdoctoral Fellow, University of Lausanne, Switzerland; and Research Fellow, Earth System Governance Project. She can be reached at dhanasree.j@manipal.edu  Twitter: @dhanasreej )

References:

1     Wenxing Cui. 20116. “Comparison between North-South Aid and South-South Cooperation: Based on the Analysis of the New Development Finance Institutions.” Journal of Shanghai Jiaotong University 21 (1), p. 27.

2     Mathias Friman and Mattias Hjerpe. 2015. “Agreement, Significance, and Understandings of Historical Responsibility in Climate Change Negotiations.” Climate Policy 15 (3): 302-320.

3     Ambuj D. Sagar. 2000. “Wealth, Responsibility, and Equity: Exploring an Allocation Framework for Global GHG Emissions.” Climate Change 45, p. 514.

4     Kathryn Ann Hochstetler. 2012. “The G-77, BASIC, and Global Climate Governance: A New Era in Multilateral Environmental Negotiations.” Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional 55: 53-69.

5     Praful Bidwai. 2014. “The Emerging Economies and Climate Change: A Case Study of the BASIC Grouping.” Transnational Institute’sShifting Power Working Paper Series, p. 6. https://www.tni.org/files/download/shifting_power-climate.pdf.

6     John Vidal. 2009. “Copenhagen Climate Summit in Disarray after ‘Danish Text’ Leak.” The Guardian. December 8. https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2009/dec/08/copenhagen-climate-summit-disarray-danish-text.

7     For more information on the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action under the Convention (AWG-LCA), see https://unfccc.int/awg-lca-bodies-page.

8     United Nations Security Council. 2007. “Security Council Holds First-Ever Debate on Impact of Climate Change on Peace, Security, Hearing over 50 Speakers.” United Nations. April 17. https://www.un.org/press/en/2007/sc9000.doc.htm.

9     Urmi Goswami. 2019. “India Urges Caution on ‘Actions’ to Tackle Climate Change from Security Perspective.” The Economic Times. 28 January. https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/politics-and-nation/india-urges-caution-on-actions-to-tackle-climate-change-from-security-perspective/articleshow/67720559.cms.

10 Nicola Jones. 2007. “China tops CO2 Emissions.” Nature. June 20. https://www.nature.com/news/2007/070618/full/news070618-9.html.

11 Chetan Chauhan. 2010. “India is World’s Third Largest Carbon Emitter.” Hindustan Times. October 4. https://www.hindustantimes.com/delhi-news/india-is-world-s-third-largest-carbon-emitter/story-wX9gHnxHMcqv4OrownkZ0H.html.

12 K. Hallding, M. Olsson, A. Atteridge, A. Vihma, M. Carson and M. Román. 2011. “Together Alone: BASIC Countries and the Climate Change Conundrum.” Nordic Council of Ministers, Copenhagen, p. 31. https://mediamanager.sei.org/documents/Publications/SEI-2011-Report-TogetherAloneBASICCountries.pdf.

13 Radoslav S Dimitrov. 2010. “Inside UN Climate Change Negotiations: The Copenhagen Conference.” Review of Policy Research 27 (6), p. 807.

14 Urmi Goswami. 2010. “Ramesh’s ICA Proposal Gets Support from BASIC Countries.” The Economic Times. December 8. https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/economy/foreign-trade/rameshs-ica-proposal-gets-support-from-basic-countries/articleshow/7063637.cms?from=mdr.

15  Sjur Kasa, Anne Therese Gullberg and Gørild Heggelund. 2008. “The Group of 77 in the International Climate Negotiations: Recent Developments and Future Directions.” International Environmental Agreements 8 (2): 113-127.

16  Yolandi Groenewald. 2015. “Exclusive: SA Slams ‘Attempt to Break up G77 Unity’.” Earth Journalism Network. December 11. https://earthjournalism.net/stories/high-ambition-coalition-attempt-to-break-up-g77-unity.

17  Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights. 2008. “Human Rights and Climate Change.” September 25. https://www.ohchr.org/documents/issues/climatechange/submissions/maldives_submission.pdf.

18  African Union. 2009. “Decision on the African Common Position on Climate Change.” July 1. https://au.int/sites/default/files/documents/30876-doc-executive_council_decision_500_-_july_2009_engl.pdf.

19  Association of Southeast Asian Nations. “ASEAN Cooperation on Climate Change.” https://environment.asean.org/asean-working-group-on-climate-change/.

20  South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation. 2008. “SAARC Environment Ministers Dhaka Declaration on Climate Change.” July 3. https://thimaaveshi.files.wordpress.com/2009/10/saarc-declaration_dhaka.pdf.

21  The Third Pole. “A Divided South Asia at COP21.” Thethirdpole.net. December 1. https://www.thethirdpole.net/en/2015/12/01/a-divided-south-asia-at-cop21/.

22  Apurba Mitra, Puneet Chitkara, Katherine Ross, Manpreet Singh, Suruchi Sawhney, Sandip Keswani, Juan Carlos Altamirano, Taryn Fransen, Sarishtha Majumdar and Priyanka Batra. “Pathways for Meeting India’s Climate Goals.” World Resources Institute. June. https://www.wri.org/sites/default/files/pathways-meeting-indias-climate-goals.pdf.

23  Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change. 2015. “India’s Intended Nationally Determined Contributions – Towards Climate Justice.” http://envfor.nic.in/sites/default/files/press-releases/revised%20PPT%20Press%20Conference%20INDC%20v5.pdf.

24  United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. 2008. “Report of the Conference of the Parties on its thirteenth session, held in Bali from 3 to 15 December 2007.” United Nations. March 14. https://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2007/cop13/eng/06a01.pdf.

25  Srishti Choudhary. 2019. “Maldives to Set More Ambitious Targets for Climate Action, Says Mohamed Nasheed.” Live Mint. February 14.

       https://www.livemint.com/news/world/maldives-to-set-more-ambitious-targets-for-climate-action-says-mohamed-nasheed-1550155902902.html.

26  Urmi Goswami. 2018. “How India-backed International Solar Alliance Can Expand its Outreach and Capacity.” The Economic Times. March 10.

       https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/industry/energy/power/how-india-backed-international-solar-alliance-can-expand-its-outreach-and-capacity/articleshow/63241320.cms?from=mdr.

27  Sridhar Kumaraswamy. 2018. “India, France Launch Solar Alliance, Promise Funds.” The Asian Age. March 12. https://www.asianage.com/india/all-india/120318/india-france-launch-solar-alliance-promise-funds.html.

28  Akash Kumar Shukla, K. Sudhakar and Prashant Baredar. 2017. “Renewable Energy Resources in South Asian Countries: Challenges, Policy and Recommendations.” Resource-Efficient Technologies 3 (3), p. 344.

29  Elisa Calliari, Swenja Surminski and Jaroslav Mysiak. 2018. “The Politics of (and Behind) the UNFCCC’s Loss and Damage Mechanism.” In Loss and Damage from Climate Change: Concepts, Methods and Policy Options, by Reinhard Mechler, Laurens M. Bouwer, Thomas Schinko, Swenja Surminski and JoAnne Linnerooth-Bayer. London: Springer.

(This article is carried in the print edition of July-August 2019 issue of India Foundation Journal.)

India has been seen as fastest emerging economy of the world. This has been possible due to strengthening of internal economic system necessary for overall growth as well as transformation in the foreign policy especially towards economic ties with many countries. India has also been seen by the world as a believer of multilateral relations instead of unilateral favourism.  India does not agree to uni-polar or bi-polar world order. It believes in mutual growth by means of cooperation in all fields with as many countries as possible given that the understanding is mutual.

Towards this, India has always been part of multilateral forums which are growth oriented. Being the key player in the South Asian as well as the Indian Ocean Region, India has been engaging many Asian and littoral countries on regular basis. It realised importance of the East Asian countries in 1990 and started active dialogue process with Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN). The then Look East policy has been transformed into Act East Policy and is the foundation of India-ASEAN relationship. Putting the Indian perspective for the IOR, of mutual growth in a secured environment as a priority, India also has shared vision SAGAR (Security And Growth for All in the Region) with all its oceanic neighbours. ASEAN is very important for India for competing in world economy especially against China. India aspires to grab 5% of global trade by 2020 and for that, friendship with ASEAN can prove to be an effective measure. China has been ahead of India in trading with SE Asian countries for more than a decade because of lack of connectivity and institutional linkages between India and these countries.

India has also been paying great attention to its neighbours under the ‘neighbourhood first’ policy. Out of the 10 ASEAN countries, Myanmar is the only one which shares its borders with 4 states of India and hence attains great importance as a bridge to ASEAN-India future relationship. Myanmar’s membership of ASEAN, BIMSTEC and Mekong Ganga Cooperation has introduced a regional/sub-regional dimension to bilateral relations and imparts an added significance to Myanmar in the context of India’s “Act East” policy.

Myanmar : An Old and Important Neighbour

India shares a long land border of over 1600 kms with Myanmar as well as a maritime boundary in the Bay of Bengal. Four north-eastern states – Arunachal Pradesh, Nagaland, Manipur and Mizoram – have a boundary with Myanmar. Both countries share a heritage of religious, linguistic and ethnic ties. India and Myanmar share close cultural ties and a sense of deep kinship, given India’s Buddhist heritage. Building on this shared heritage, India is undertaking some key initiatives in the restoration of the Ananda Temple in Bagan and the repair and conservation of a large number of damaged pagodas. Work on restoring and renovating two historic temples in Bodh Gaya built by Myanmar rulers King Mindon and King Baygyidaw have also been completed.

The origin of the Indian community in Myanmar is traced to the mid-19th century with the advent of British rule in Lower Burma in 1852. Yangon and Mandalay had a dominating presence of Indians in civil services, education, trade and commerce during British rule. There are varying estimates of 1.5-2.0 million people of Indian origin living and working in various parts of Myanmar. A large number of the Indian community (nearly 150,000) live in Bago (Zeyawaddy and Kuayktaga) and Tanintharyi Region and Mon State, primarily engaged in farming.

Present Relations with Myanmar

Trade Cooperation :  India is the fifth largest trading partner of Myanmar – its fifth largest destination for exports and sixth largest source of imports. Agriculture sector dominates the trade, particularly supply of beans and pulses to India ($809 million in 2016-17) and timber ($156 million). India’s exports to Myanmar include sugar ($424 million in 2016-17 & $67 million in 2017-18), pharmaceuticals ($178 million in 2017- 18), etc. A bilateral Trade Agreement was signed in 1970. Bilateral trade has been growing steadily and reached US $2.18 billion (2016-17) but declined to $1.6 billion in 2017-18, mainly due to imposition of quantitative restrictions by India on import of beans and pulses. India is presently the eleventh largest investor in Myanmar with an approved investment of US $743.642 million by 26 Indian enterprises. Most of India’s investments have been in the oil & gas sector.

Defence Cooperation : Defence cooperation between the two countries continues to strengthen. Exchanges of high-level visits, enhanced training cooperation, capacity building and support in provision of specific equipment and technologies have led to a more wholesome relationship and better understanding of mutual security concerns. Present Chief of Indian Army and Chief of Air Staff have visited Myanmar in 2017 and 2018 respectively and we hosted senior officers of Myanmar defence forces in reciprocation. Myanmar Army has displayed enhanced understanding of India’s security concerns and initiated measures to address them.

Disaster Relief : India has responded promptly and effectively in rendering assistance following natural calamities in Myanmar – during Cyclone Mora (2017), Komen (2015), earthquake in Shan State (2010), Cyclone Nargis in 2008 and the outbreak of influenza virus in Yangon in July-August 2017. Indian defence forces have actively participated in these HADR missions.

Development Cooperation : India has extended development assistance to Myanmar on generous terms and our assistance portfolio is now over $1.75 billion. The bulk of the assistance is grant-funded. The projects include the Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Transport Project (KMMTTP); the Trilateral Highway Project, which is an East-West corridor connecting our Northeast with Myanmar and Thailand; the Rhi-Tiddim road; assistance for border area development in Chin State and the Naga Self-Administered Zone by financing bridges, roads, schools and small health centres; assistance in setting up institutions for higher learning and research, namely Myanmar Institute of Information Technology, Advanced Centre for Agricultural Research and Education, Myanmar-India Centre for Enhancement of IT Skills, India-Myanmar Industrial Training Centres; capacity assistance in public health by supporting upgradation of Yangon Children’s Hospital and Sittwe General Hospital and the construction of a 200-bed women’s hospital at Monywa; the Rakhine State Development Programme; restoration and conservation of Ananda Temple in Bagan and the repair and conservation of 92 earthquake damaged pagodas; reconstruction of Yamethin Women Police Training Centre, etc.

Ongoing Projects

According to a statement issued by the Indian Embassy in Myanmar, “the landmark Land Border Crossing Agreement between India and Myanmar, signed on May 11, 2018, has been brought into effect with the simultaneous opening of international entry-exit checkpoints at the Tamu-Moreh and the Rihkhawdar-Zowkhawtar border between Myanmar and India.”

The idea is to have better connectivity by all means. It is in the interest of both the countries as Myanmar also is not a supporter of BRI and the infrastructure cooperation between India and Myanmar can counter Chinese debt oriented run-over. The tri lateral highway between India, Myanmar and Thailand is likely to be completed by next year. Similarly India-funded Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Transport Project (KMMTTP) will allow for sea-access for the landlocked North-eastern states of India via the Kaladan River in Myanmar. As far as air connectivity goes there are hardly any flights flying to Yangon directly from Indian cities. There is only one weekly Air India flight from Kolkata to Yangon and twice in a week from Delhi via Gaya. Most other flight services such as Thai Airways reach Yangon via Bangkok. On the other hand, the flight services from Myanmar to other East and Southeast Asian countries like Singapore, Malaysia, Taiwan, Japan and Bangkok are much more frequent and larger in number.1 Airlines from ASEAN countries carry twice the size of international passengers from and to India, compared to the passengers carried by all Indian airlines together.2

Connectivity of main land to NE states of India has been improving gradually and easy trans-border commute including by means of air, will further give an impetus to overall development of EAST.

Suggestions

Air Connectivity : Unlike earlier days, the NE states are better connected with major Indian cities nowadays. However it still has scope of getting better. Other than road connectivity, the air connectivity to major cities of NE can be improved. The Indian aviation sector is growing and is bound to prosper in future. Investment in NE aviation sector will not only connect local people better but also will offer faster and convenient passage to travelers from eastern neighbours, either for tourism or meeting business partners/relatives across borders. Given the terrain characteristics and short distances involved, small scale airlines having ATR aircraft with seating capacity varying from 50 to 100 shall be encouraged for operations within the local air space including Myanmar or maybe Bhutan, Nepal and Bangladesh also. For example there is a flight from Bhutan to Dhaka via Guwahati already.

The airline operators from Myanmar can be given permissions to land in small airports of NE states. The IAF can regulate the prohibited air space of NE states depending on timing of inbound and outgoing flights from Myanmar and same can be tied up for Indian operators. The entry and exit points can be fixed for ease of traffic management.

Bus Services : Other than having better trade opportunities at two border opening points (mentioned earlier), we can also improve bus services to connect local villagers or commuters for deepening the cultural bond. Assisting Myanmar authorities in improving road conditions to reduce travel time to selected cities like Mandalay (region of Ananda temple), Yangon etc will also boost tourism across borders. For example with better roads and widened bridges, the present travel time of 11 hours from Moreh (Manipur) to Mandalay can be reduced to about five hours.

Port Connectivity :  Work on the Kaladan project began after the governments of India and Myanmar entered into a framework agreement in 2008. The project aims to provide an alternate outlet to the landlocked North East which is heavily dependent on the narrow ‘Chicken’s Neck’ at Siliguri. Originally, the project was scheduled to be completed by 2014, but is expected to be operational only by 2019-2020 as all components of the project, including Sittwe port and power, river dredging, Paletwa jetty, have been completed, except the under construction Zorinpui-Paletwa road. However there is a need of actively pursuing the timely construction and starting the port to port service as soon as possible as we have seen that this delay is directly causing dent in India’s ambition to boost trade and economy in East Asian countries.

Medical Tourism : More high standard hospitals should be constructed in NE region so that it not only benefits Indian citizens staying in far flung areas of the region but it can boost medical tourism from neighbouring countries. Delhi and Mumbai hospitals are generally full with patients for West Asian countries. Similarly, for East Asian countries, NE cities can be preferable destination.

Educational Tourism : Many students from Myanmar are studying in China because of the proximity and China has made few concessions in students’ visa rules for Myanmar. But if we see number of Chinese students across the globe (mainly US, UK and Australia), we can understand that it is not China’s education system but soft power policy that is drawing students from SE Asian countries. India has much affordable and well reputed educational institutes, not only in metropolitan cities but important cities of NE India as well. Imphal in Manipur has good Regional Institute of Medical Sciences (RIMS), In Assam, Guwahati has Indian Institute of Technology (IIT) and Dibrugarh also has reputed technical colleges, Shillong in Meghalaya has North East Hill University (NEHU) and Indian Institute of Management (IIM) and then there are good National Institutes of Technology (NITs) in many states. We should boost educational tourism in order to attract students from Myanmar and other SE Asian countries in order to have a positive image of India in young minds of these countries and ensure a long lasting relationship in years to come.

Defence Interaction: In Dec 2018, delegation of military personnel from both countries exchanged visits as CBM. The Indian Air Force facilitated the travel of the Myanmar’s military officials in IL-76 aircraft, some of whom were accompanied by their spouses. It was a goodwill gesture and same if continued can further strengthen defence cooperation. Families of government officials can also enjoy touring if LTC facility is provided. Joint exercises between defence forces while paying attention on HADR drills also will have close ties established. The Myanmar air force has fleet of mix of Russian and Chinese aircraft. They should be invited for joint exercise in India as goodwill gesture to increase interoperability. These joint exercises will benefit both the counties in long run. The border areas are infected with rebel groups’ activities which are hampering timely completion of connectivity projects as well as economic growth of the region. These groups are funded and supported by other countries for thwarting the bi-lateral ties between India and Myanmar. Joint operations against such groups should be conducted as active defence cooperation.

Conclusion

Myanmar’s opening-up in recent years has made the country an arena of competition among established and new players. The democratisation, along with economic reforms, has unleashed new opportunities for India, which is determined to make up for lost time. With a creative blend of diplomacy and culture, the India-Myanmar relations can only scale new heights in days to come. We need to ACT EAST using SAGAR vision to have credible and reliable relation with this strategically important neighbour which is also a key link between India and ASEAN partnership.

(Wg Cdr Vikas Kalyani is a Senior Research Fellow at India Foundation. The views expressed are personal.)

References:

1     https://www.orfonline.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/IndiaMyanmar.pdf – India-Myanmar connectivity : Possibilities and challenges

2     http://ris.org.in/sites/default/files/Final_Air_Connetivity_Report-web.pdf

(This article is carried in the print edition of July-August 2019 issue of India Foundation Journal.)

As manifestations of definitive core-national interests and evolving aspirations, foreign policies are inherently dualistic constructs that involve elements of both strategic continuity and tactical dynamism. In addition to national interests and aspirations, foreign policy dynamics are governed by a country’s ideological underpinnings and outlook, and the overarching narrative of international politics. It is this interplay between continuity (in pursuing strategic national interests) and change (in the style and normative ideals of diplomacy) that constitutes the defining theme of India’s foreign policy towards China since 2014.

Any nuanced analysis of continuity or perceived departures in a country’s foreign policy template vis-à-vis another country needs to be foregrounded in a study of evolving strategic dynamics between the two nations. In the context of India-China relations, it can be persuasively argued that the strategic environment has continued to be defined by the same set of issues that existed prior to 2014.

While Indian foreign policy since 2014 has largely followed the established doctrine vis-à-vis the long-standing border dispute, new policy narratives have been fostered to deal with the  Belt and Road ‘grand-strategy’, skewed bilateral- trade economics, and China’s selective reading of terrorism. Further, there has been an enhanced effort to integrate India’s cultural ethos with its foreign policy outreach to counter China’s gradual penetration within India’s civilizational space through a state-funded and meticulously crafted strategy of embracing and appropriating Buddhism1.

To counter China’s growing footprint in South Asia and Indian Ocean Region, the country’s Foreign Policy has begun conferring an enhanced thrust upon geopolitics. This approach has been articulated through the idioms of ‘extended neighborhood’ and ‘Act East’, ‘neighborhood first’, and ‘Indo-Pacific’. Most Importantly, India has moved beyond the shibboleths of ‘non-alignment’ and has embraced the concept of ‘strategic and issue-based alignment’.2 While these formulations signify India’s larger strategic interests, their importance in India’s China policy cannot be over-emphasized.

In addition to the aforementioned issues, India-China dynamic is also governed by the PRC’s efforts to undermine India’s status as a global nuclear power under the pretext of its ‘all-weather friendship’ with Pakistan. The alliance with Pakistan and heavy investments in the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) have also fuelled Chinese ambitions to foresee a mediation role for itself in the Kashmir dispute. On both these issues, Indian foreign policy has followed strategic continuity that upholds India’s credentials as a responsible nuclear power, and reaffirms India’s traditional position on Kashmir being a bilateral issue.

While strategic contestation remains the overarching theme of India-China dynamic, the Doklam crisis of 2017 marked the watershed in this relationship. Not only did the 73-day-face-off demonstrated India’s firm position and resolve on the issue of territory and sovereignty, it made China recognize India as a strategic challenge almost for the first time3. Additionally, India’s robust stand at Doklam reaffirmed the country’s leading role in the South Asian geopolitics.4

India’s China Policy Since 2014: Breaks and Continuity with the Past

Beginning with the contentious issue of boundary demarcation between India and China, it is justified to assert that the 1988 paradigm continues to define the larger contours of India’s foreign policy approach towards the dispute. While the 1988 rapprochement between the two countries was noteworthy in many respects, it has tacitly relegated the boundary question as secondary in India-China dynamic5. The reluctance or inability on part of successive policy dispensations to establish a new modus vivendi to deal with this vexed issue has allowed the stalemate to linger on for several decades now.

Since 1988, India-China border dispute is largely managed by a framework that involves the   Agreement on the Maintenance of Peace along the Line of Actual Control in the India-China Border of 19936, the expert group talks, and the Special Representative (SR) Mechanism of 2003. While it is conventional wisdom to cite BPTA7 and its various avatars as ‘instruments of success’ in maintaining peace and tranquility along the India-China border, it is equally important to recognize that the SR mechanism has not yielded any tangible results even after 21 rounds of talks. However, it is important to recognize that since 2014, the mechanism has been approaching the boundary dispute with a more assertive vocabulary that emphasizes upon achieving ‘a fair, reasonable and mutually acceptable solution to the India-China boundary question at an early date’8. This constitutes a significant departure from the earlier formulations that committed the two countries to ‘discussions on a framework for a resolution of the Boundary Question’9.

In terms of political approach to the dispute, a new discourse was added to India’s foreign policy during Xi Jinping’s maiden visit to India in 2014 and Modi’s 2015 State visit to China. In a significant move, Prime Minister Modi raised the boundary issue at public forums as against keeping it confined as a recurrent topic in bilateral documents10. Ironically, this momentum and dynamism was not maintained during the Wuhan Summit – which in fact came under the backdrop of a border stand-off.

The very bedrock of the Wuhan summit was built on India’s sacrifice of the ‘Thank You India’ celebrations. This constituted a strategic retreat from the policy narrative that the country had initiated on Tibet in 2014 when SikyongLobsangSangey was invited to Prime Minister Modi’s oath-taking ceremony along with the Heads of all SAARC nations. If this invitation had signaled a new posturing by New Delhi, Wuhan provided the Chinese with a ‘new normal’ to deal with India. In the final analysis, while the summit achieved strategic compromise by India on Tibet, it did not secure any commitment from the Chinese side regarding India’s core national concerns.

It is important to note here that the joint statement issued at the end of the Wuhan summit included the formulation of ‘fair, reasonable and mutually acceptable settlement’ with regards to the boundary dispute11. The crucial missing link in this position is the emphasis upon ‘early settlement of the boundary question’ that was an integral component of the joint statements that were issued after the Modi-Xi State-level meetings in 2014 and 201512. In this context, the ‘strategic guidance’ issued to the officials at the end of the Summit largely constitutes yet another appendix to the CBMs (confidence building measures) regime that began with the 1993 Agreement. When read alongside the joint statement, the much hyped ‘strategic guidance’ appears to be a reiteration of the lexicon of ‘border management’ that has come to characterise the Border Question.

While it can be argued that the Wuhan Summit was directed towards restoring normalcy in India-China relations, it is equally pertinent to under-score that the summit came at a time when China was faced with an increasingly unfavorable domestic and international climate due to the trade war with the US and growing internal unrest (albeit muted) against the decisions taken during the 19th Party Congress. Though it is never advisable to undermine an adversary’s strength, times like these require countries to design foreign policy templates that offer a skillful combination of realpolitik and constructivist approaches and not commit themselves to a liberal positioning.

Notwithstanding the above discussed criticism, the Wuhan Meet can be justifiably credited for introducing the concept of ‘informal summits’ within the scope of India-China strategic dialogue. If institutionalized as an annual event, this mechanism of informal exchanges between the top leaderships of the two countries can go a long way in addressing the ‘political-will deficit’ that has kept the boundary issue in an imbroglio for several decades now.

With regards to ‘One China’, while India’s foreign policy continues to abide by the 2010 decision to not endorse this formulation, certain developments on this issue merit attention. In the middle of 2018, India’s national carrier, Air India was made to replace ‘Taiwan’ with ‘Chinese Taipei’ in the list of destinations on its website. While this move could have easily been projected as a business decision – if only for tactical reasons, the MEA decided to dub it as a reiteration of its official policy on Taiwan13. Though this turn of events does not exactly represent a departure from the 2010 policy, it certainly dilutes the strategic impact of this robust initiative. The fact that this development came in the post-Wuhan context makes it all the more crucial.

In yet another significant move on the ‘One China’ construct, India recognized Tibet as ‘Tibet Autonomous Region of People’s Republic of China’ in the 2014 joint statement and followed it up with the 2015 joint statement14. Needless to say, this move contradicted India’s consistent position since 2010 to not recognize Tibet as a part of China in any joint statements between the two countries. As against these initiatives, ‘One India’ policy has not found any mention in India’s recent dealings with the PRC.

Inarguably, the most successful demonstration of India’s foreign policy approach towards China has been on the issue of Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). BRI is not only China’s flagship foreign policy project, it bears Xi Jinping’s ‘personal signature’ in more ways than one. While the country has reiterated its unflinching position on India’s territorial integrity through its opposition to CPEC, India should be credited for shaping the emerging global narrative on connectivity and infrastructure finance by highlighting the predatory nature of China’s ‘debt trap diplomacy’.  In fact, India has not restricted itself to the criticism of BRI and has proposed an alternative in the form of ‘Asia-Africa Growth Corridor’.

Additionally, BRI has become China’s primary platform to advance its penetration within the South Asian landscape. In order to deal with increasing Chinese footprint in the country’s immediate periphery, India’s foreign policy re-invented the doctrine of ‘neighborhood first’. While the idea itself is not new, the concept was imbued with renewed strategic salience that involved reiteration of India’s cultural links with the South Asian nations and an enhanced thrust upon the issue of regional connectivity.

However, in spite of these initiatives, India still needs to address the perennial irritants in its relations with the South-Asian region. This policy vacuum has been utilized by China to acquire strategic space within this region.

Over the years, oppositional political discourse in all South Asian states (barring Bhutan) has expressed itself through an anti-India rhetoric. Moreover, alignment with China is employed as a tool in South Asian polities to demonstrate their strategic autonomy vis-à-vis India to their domestic audience. While this narrative has continued to define India’s regional  environment, India has not been able to create permanent constituencies in South Asian states that can safeguard its strategic interests across the entire political spectrum in these countries. Though this lack of strategic template has characterized all foreign policy establishments, the 2015 Nepal-blockade has proved to be the most negative articulation of India’s neighborhood policy in a long time. Even on the issue of connectivity, the progress has largely remained mixed. As a result, China’s increasing strategic thrust in the South Asian region continues to remain a challenge for India.

With regards to the Maritime Silk Road (MSR) component of the BRI, while continuity has been maintained in the policy of deepening strategic interests in the region, India’s stand on the Indo-Pacific construct remains in stark contrast to the much touted policy of ‘issue-based alignment’. While more negotiations regarding the scope and nature of the proposed architecture were due, India did not have to altogether reject the concept’s credentials of being a ‘strategy’15.

Furthermore, India crafted the novel approach of reimagining its strategic geography and extending it to Southeast Asia. In order to fully realize the scope of this ‘extended neighborhood’, a constructive effort was made to connect the South and Southeast Asian spaces through the idiom of Buddhism and physical connectivity. The evolution of ‘Look East’ into ‘Act East’ was integral to this strategic outlook. Another dimension of this policy is that it allows India greater strategic presence within the South China Sea.

Inclusion of cultural diplomacy within the dynamics of the ‘Act East’ construct has been one of the novel and most significant foreign policy conceptualizations by India in recent times. While this policy is important for varied reasons of diplomacy, it entails definitive strategic component with regards to China. By placing Buddhism on India’s diplomatic agenda, India has offered a potent counter to China’s consistent efforts at assuming the leadership of the global discourse on this philosophy.

In fact, Buddhism is one of the key pillars of China’s outreach to Nepal. Moreover, ownership of Buddhism narrative is indispensable to China’s hold over Tibet and its attempts to place pro-China spiritual leaders within the pantheon of Tibetan Buddhism.

Further, in pursuance of its policy of ‘strategic alignment’, India has forged closer ties with US, Japan and Vietnam. While these partnerships have evolved over the consistent work of several decades, it needs to be recognized that the last five years have imbued them with a new momentum and energy. Today, India’s relations with these countries have moved beyond the dynamics of bi-laterals and have acquired the status of ‘comprehensive strategic partnerships’16 that involve an ever increasing military dimension. As has been mentioned elsewhere in this article, while such developments need not be viewed entirely from the perspective of India-China binary, they nevertheless remain central to India’s foreign policy approach vis-à-vis China.

The issue of Trade Deficit continues to be a work in progress. While India has reportedly reduced the deficit by 10 percent recently, this largely remains an outcome of the US-China trade war. As such, India needs to continue with its efforts to secure more favorable and justified trade terms with China – both at the bilateral level as well as under the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) framework.

With regards to the domination of India’s smartphone sector by the likes of Huawei and ZTE, India urgently needs to revisit its policies. While an outright ban is neither advisable nor tangible, India should participate in the global narrative being led by the US regarding the strategic designs of these companies, and insist upon operational transparency by these Chinese giants.

Finally, it can be concluded that ‘dynamism’ and ‘assertive posturing’ constitute the two recurrent themes of India’s foreign policy approach towards China since 2014. In the last five years, the most articulate expressions of this policy narrative have been the Doklam issue and India’s position on the BRI. Additionally, India’s foreign policy template towards China is now governed by the ideal of ‘strategic and issue based alignment’. This newly crafted ideology and India’s thrust upon cultural diplomacy have allowed the country greater maneuverability space against China’s expansionist policies in India’s sphere of interests. With these elements, India’s new foreign policy constitutes a template for its leadership role in world politics.

(Ms. Shikha Aggarwal is a Senior Research Fellow at India Foundation. Views expressed are personal.)

References:

1     One of the primary initiatives by China in this regard is the ‘World Buddhist Forum’.

2     This conceptualization was introduced by Foreign Secretary Vijay Gokhale at the 2019 edition of the ‘Raisina Dialogue’.

3     This assertion is borne out of at least two articles that have been written by well-established Chinese commentators Yi Guoming and Li Yang. The Papers can be accessed at http://www.cwzg.cn/politics/201707/37313.html, and http://www.kunlunce.com/gcjy/zxzz1111111/2017-12-21/121772.html. Additionally, one of China’s foremost strategic experts, Prof. Shen Dingli has described Doklam incident as one of China’s five major foreign policy failures. This comment can be accessed at https://www.voanews.com/a/china-great-power-diplomacy/4038160.html

4     This assertion is rooted in the fact that Doklam is a disputed territory between Bhutan and China. India had stopped China’s incursion in Doklam under the spirit of ‘India-Bhutan Friendship Treaty’ of 2007. The treaty can be accessed at https://mea.gov.in/Images/pdf/india-bhutan-treaty-07.pdf

5     This assertion is borne out of the fact that while India-China relations in areas of political, cultural, economic and defense exchanges have deepened steadily, progress has been elusive in terms of actual demarcation the boundary between the two countries. The status report on India-China bilateral relations for the years 2014, 2015, 2016, 2017 can be accessed at:

       https://www.mea.gov.in/Portal/ForeignRelation/China_September_2014.pdf

       http://www.mea.gov.in/Portal/ForeignRelation/Indiachina_bilateral_relations.pdf

       https://www.mea.gov.in/Portal/ForeignRelation/China_07_12_2016.pdf

       https://www.mea.gov.in/Portal/ForeignRelation/China_October_2017.pdf

       The status report on bilateral relations for 2012 can be accessed at:

       https://mea.gov.in/Portal/ForeignRelation/China-January-2012.pdf

6 The agreement is available at: https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/CN%20IN_930907_Agreement%20on%20India-China%20Border%20Areas.pdf

7     The 1993 agreement is referred as the Border Peace and Tranquility Agreement (BPTA) is general discourse

8     The formulation appears in the official Press Releases of the SR mechanism. The press releases for the talks since 2014 can be accessed at: https://www.mea.gov.in/media-advisory.htm?60/Media_Advisory

9     The formulation appears in the official Press Releases of the SR mechanism. The press releases for the talks prior to 2014 can be accessed at: https://www.mea.gov.in/media-advisory.htm?60/Media_Advisory

10 The Prime Minister’s Press Statement during President Xi Jinping’s 2014 India visit can be accessed at https://www.mea.gov.in/Speeches-Statements.htm?dtl/24014/

11  The joint statement can be accessed at : https://www.mea.gov.in/press-releases.htm?dtl/29853/IndiaChina_Informal_Summit_at_Wuhan

12  The two joint statements can be accessed at : https://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/24022/Joint+Statement+between+the+Republic+of+India+and+the+Peoples+Republic+of+China+on +Building+a+Closer+Developmental+Partnership,  https://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/25240/Joint_Statement_between_the_India_and_China_during_Prime_Ministers_visit_toChina

13 The statement by the MEA spokesperson can be accessed at: https://www.mea.gov.in/media-briefings.htm?dtl/30035

14 ibid 9

15 India declared its official policy on the Indo-Pacific at the 2018 Shangri La Dialogue. The PM’s speech can be accessed at https://www.mea.gov.in/Speeches-Statements.htm?dtl/29943/Prime+Ministers+Keynote+ Address+at+Shangri+La+Dialogue+June+01+2018

16 India-Vietnam ties were elevated to ‘comprehensive strategic partnership’ in 2015.

       India – Japan relations were upgraded to ‘Global and Strategic Partnership’ in 2014.

    (This article is carried in the print edition of May-June 2019 issue of India Foundation Journal.)