Establishment of the Center for Soft Power

The Centre for Soft Power (CSP), the fourth centre of India Foundation, will give an impetus to the study of ‘soft power’, an area of increasing global significance. The Centre will engage with practitioners, academics, policy makers and other stakeholders to study, promote and disseminate knowledge, with an emphasis on an India-centric view of the confluence of cultures. The Centre, apart from carrying out research, also proposes to maps the various elements of India’s cultural influence such as Ayurveda, cinema, cuisine, design, handicrafts, sports, literature, music, performing arts, spirituality, tourism, visual arts and yoga, conduct workshops on its cultural markers, and promote employment opportunities through the soft power economy. The Centre seeks to host conferences, seminars and other events highlighting India’s cultural influence, and will collaborate with similar institutions around the world to enable knowledge sharing and promotion of India’s confluence of cultures.

India’s wide diversity of cultural forms needs study and networking. The Centre for Soft Power (CSP) will be the first centre in India with a focus on soft power research, initiatives and leadership. With this is mind, some of the key activities of the Centre are research, establishing a network of cultural entrepreneurs, collaborating with states to promote religious tourism, and hosting conferences and training programs for various stakeholders.

India Foundation’s Bilateral Interaction with Chinese Delegation

24 April 2018, New Delhi

Theme: “India-China Relations in the New Era”

India Foundation organised a round-table discussion with a visiting Delegation from China on 24 April 2018 at Pravasi Bhartiya Kendra, New Delhi. The theme of discussion was “India-China relations in the New Era”. The interaction witnessed scholarly and candid exchange of views from both sides on all important issues. The discussions covered a wide agenda spanning bilateral, regional and international issues of mutual interest.

 

The delegates on both sides agreed that to fully realize the potential of closer development partnership between India and China, the two nations have to explore new innovative ways to get along with each other. There was a common understanding on both sides that informal set up of Wuhan Summit will help in longer term in increasing the mutual trust, managing and controlling disputes and deepening cooperation and will lead to a new phase in India-China relations.

Both sides agreed that as two major countries and large emerging economies, healthy development of India-China relations is very important for the emergence of Asian Century because commonalities between two nations outweigh the differences and thus both countries must build on the convergences, while seeking mutually acceptable resolution of the differences. Indian side reaffirmed that in making efforts to progress the bilateral relations in diverse areas, both sides needs to maintain peace and tranquillityon the borders because it is an essential pre-requisite for the smooth development of bilateral relations.

Indian side reiterated its position to the Chinese delegates that China should recognize the common threat posed by terrorism and should strongly condemn terrorism in all its forms and manifestations.On Indo-Pacific, Chinese delegates opined that the Indo-Pacific strategy is an idea for the United States and other countries to connect the Indian Ocean and the Pacific region, to constrain China’s rise from a geopolitical perspective, and to safeguard its own leadership and interests in the region.On the question related to Belt & Road initiative, Indian side made it clear that China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) violates India’s sovereignty and territorial integrity and no country would accept a project that ignores its core concerns.

The 7 Member Delegation from China was headed by Mr. RuanZongze, Vice President, China Institute of International Studies and other member of the Delegation were Mr. Zhang Sheping (Counsellor, Department of Asian Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China), Mr. Zhang Yansheng(Principal Researcher,China Center for International Economic Exchanges), Mr. Zhang Hui (Associate Dean of School of Economics of Peking University), Mr. Wang Xu (Professor of Center of South Asian Studies of Peking University), Mr. Lu Daming(Third Secretary of Division of Information and Public Diplomacy of Department of Asian Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China) and Dr. Yao Yuanmei, Second Secretary, Political Division, Chinese Embassy, New Delhi. On Indian side, Shri Ram Madhav, (National General Secretary, BJP and Director, India Foundation), Shri Ashok Kantha (Director, Institute of Chinese Studies), Vice Admiral Shekhar Sinha (FormerC-in-C, Western Naval Command, Indian Navy), Shri Shakti Sinha (Director, NMML), Prof.Srinkanth Kondapalli (Professor, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi), Dr Sonu Trivedi (Assistant Prof, Delhi University), Maj Gen Dhruv C Katoch  (Director, India Foundation), Shri Alok Bansal (Director, India Foundation), Shri P. Stobdan (Former Ambassador and Senior Fellow, IDSA) and Senior Research Fellows of India Foundation participated in the round-table discussion.

 

CIVIC RECEPTION IN HONOUR OF H.E. K.P. SHARMA OLI, PRIME MINISTER OF NEPAL

India Foundation in association with the Nehru Memorial Museum and Library hosted a Civic Reception in honour of the Prime Minister of Nepal, Shri K.P.Sharma Oli on 7 April 2018, at Hotel ITC Maurya, New Delhi. Present at the civic reception were Shri Suresh Prabhu, Union Minister of Commerce and Industry and Civil Aviation, Government of India and Director, India Foundation; Shri Ravi Shankar Prasad, Union Minister of Law and Justice and Electronics and Information Technology, Government of India, Gen. (Dr) V.K.Singh, Minister of State for External Affairs, Government of India and a host of prominent citizens representing civil society to include political leaders, officers from the defence and police forces, bureaucrats, diplomats, journalists, scholars, academics and others. The Prime Minister of Nepal was accompanied by his wife, Smt Radhika Shakya Oliand by Shri Pradeep Kumar Gyawali, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Nepal.

Delivering the Welcome Address of the evening, Shri Suresh Prabhu termed the India – Nepal relationship as one that is ‘unique and incomparable’. He stressed on building a new trade relationship with Nepal, which will in turn drive the economy of both the countries. He spoke about his aim of being able to create more job opportunities in Nepal by means of Indian investments, skill development and setting up food processing industries. He also laid emphasis on the need of having a Nepal-India joint tourism circuit, to enable the tourists visiting South Asia to not miss out on visiting Nepal. He concluded by thanking the Prime Minister of Nepal and expressed optimism on having a continued warm and friendly relationship between the two countries.

In his address, the Union Law Minister Shri Ravi Shankar Prasad spoke of the cultural and historical linkages between the two neighbours which makes them natural allies rather than just the fact of being geographic neighbours. The minister also highlighted the success of India’s transformational program of digitally empowering the citizens of the country and assured the Prime Minister of Nepal that India would provide assistance to Nepal in following a similar path towards digital empowerment.

In his address to the gathering, Prime Minister Oli spoke of his vision of being able to structurally realise the constitutional spirit of “Government at Doorstep” for the citizens of Nepal. He elaborated on his government’s mandate to work for the long-cherished socio-economic transformation of the country and highlighted his dream of a prosperous Nepal, where people will have decent living and youths will have decent jobs; where the infrastructure will be better and vast and untapped resources will be converted into economic benefits and wealth. He then called upon the countries of the neighbourhood to help the landlocked Himalayan country in realising this dream by sharing their experiences of development.

Speaking of the India-Nepal relationship, Prime Minister Oli called it a relationship blessed by the wisdom of saints and sages. He said that the India-Nepal relationship has grown multi-dimensional in the 21st century and that intermittent glitches will not hamper the age old ties that bind the two countries from the pre-historic times. He assured the people of India that Nepal would not allow any external power to use its soil against the sovereign interests of the Republic of India. Touching upon the bilateral trade relationship, he expressed hope on being able to cover the trade deficit that exists between Nepal and India and also spoke on the scope of cooperation on hydropower and tourism projects.

Moving from the immediate neighbourhood to an extended neighbourhood of Asia, Prime Minister Oli spoke of the Asian Renaissance and how the region has been home to the world’s oldest and most affluent civilisations. This region has given the world the best of artists and architects; physicists and meta-physicists; and the most sophisticated education system with the most enlightened writings of government and statecraft. Not only intellectually but also culturally and geographically the Asian region is one of the most diverse regions and is moving steadfast on the path of development despite the regional challenges. The Asian values of universal fraternity, peaceful co-existence, respect for diversity and sense of equality guide the way as these are the values that stand as fortress to ensure peace and security in the world and sustainability of its development.

He concluded by optimistically speaking of seizing the opportunity to boost the enablers of the bilateral relationship and explore new vistas of collaboration. He said that a peaceful, stable, prosperous and democratic Nepal is in the interest of India as well as that of the larger neighbourhood and expressed hope of being able to build upon the mutually beneficial relationship between the two countries in the 21st century.
Delivering the concluding remarks of the evening, Gen. (Dr) V.K.Singh expressed optimism on the age old relationship becoming even stronger and broader after the bilateral consultations between the Heads of Governments of the two countries.

The vote of thanks was delivered by Shri Shakti Sinha, Director, Nehru Memorial Museum and Library.
Please Click Here to access the photographs of the evening.

Civic Reception in honour of PM of Nepal


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India Foundation Idea Series

India Foundation Idea Series is an extension of the ‘Study Group’. The study group was planned to create a network of individuals who are aware of the foreign policy issues, events taking place across the globe and their impact on India. It was successful in creating a close knit group of individuals having similar interest and culminated into the Foreign Policy Workshop.

IF Idea Series will expand into realm of ideas which are disruptive. There are lot of individuals, scholars, entrepreneurs, activists, journalists working in varying fields. There is a wealth of knowledge that is being produced and as a premier think-thank, India Foundation aims to interact with such knowledge.

  • The ideas series will range from being a talk, conversation or presentation by invited speakers.
  • Duration of each session would be one hour.
  • Registrations for this shall close on April 20, 2018.
  • First talk in this series will take place on May 04, 2018.
  • Participation is subject to the approval of  Organising Committee

 

Please click here to register

 

MILAN 2018: Fostering Cooperation through Naval Exercise in the Indian Ocean Region

MILAN 2018 was held at Port Blair from 06 March to 13 March 2018. MILAN 2018 was hosted in the beautiful Andaman & Nicobar Islands of India which is home to India’s unified Military Command, the Andaman and Nicobar Command (ANC). With the underlying theme of ‘Friendship across the Seas’, MILAN2018 witnessed a diverse mix of professional exercises and seminars, social events and sporting fixtures. MILAN has evolved from an initiative of the Indian Navy in the early nineties which aimed to create a forum for the littoral Navies of the Indian Ocean region to exchange thoughts in maritime cooperation and ‘Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief’ (HADR). MILAN is an effective platform for social, cultural and professional interactions and promoting maritime cooperation as well as inter-operability during humanitarian missions.

The interactions during MILAN 2018 encompassed sharing of views and ideas on maritime order and enhancing regional cooperation for combating unlawful activities at sea. MILAN is a congregation of littoral navies which is being conducted biennially by Indian Navy at the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, under the aegis of the Andaman and Nicobar Command. Besides fosteringco-operation through naval exercises and professional interactions, MILAN also provides an excellent opportunity to the participating navies to come together in a spirit of collaboration and mutual understanding to nurture stronger ties.

MILAN made modest beginnings more than two decades ago when it was first held in 1995. The first MILAN was held in 1995 with five participating nations; India, Indonesia, Singapore, Sri Lanka and Thailand. Since then the event has been held every two years except in 2001, 2005 and 2016.

The 10th edition of Milan this year was concluded with Milan Exercise Sea (MILES), conducted from 11 to 13 March 2018, which saw participation of 28 warships including 17 from India and 11 from Australia, Bangladesh, Indonesia, Malaysia, Myanmar, Singapore, Sri Lanka and Thailand participating in the exercise and thus making it the largest multilateral exercise to be conducted in the Andaman Sea. Maldives, which is reeling under political crisis, had declined India’s offer to participate at the exercise citing the current situation in the island nation. The aim of MILAN 2018 exercise was to enhance interoperability between navies of the region and to exchange best practices. Weapon firing, Search and Rescue operations, Air Defence exercises, Cross-deck flying, Boarding Operations and  Medical Evacuation drills were conducted during the exercise. The foreign ships participating in the exercise include, HMAS Larrakia of Australia, BNS Dhaleshwari of Bangladesh, KRI Cut NyakDien and Lemadang of Indonesia, KD Lekiu of Malaysia, UMS Inlay and King Sin Phyu Shin of Myanmar, RSSD auntless of Singapore,S LNS Samudura and Suranimala of Sri Lanka and HTMS Narathiwat of Thailand. The Indian ships participating in the exercise include INS Sahyadri, Jyoti, Kirch, Kulish, Saryu, Kesari, Baratang and Bangaram and INLCUL51.

The successive editions of MILAN have witnessed the participation of littoral navies of the Indo-Pacific region. The MILAN event has achieved strident succession recent years owing to high standards of professional content of the event. The growing participation over the years bears testimony to the success of this multilateral initiative in the maritime domain of Indo-Pacific region. From an event of sub- regional context earlier, MILAN has now grown into a prestigious international event and encompasses participation by maritime forces from not just the Bay of Bengal and South East Asia but the larger Indian Ocean Region (lOR).

Geostrategic significance of Indian Ocean and role of MILAN in fostering the relations among navies of Indian Ocean Region:

MILAN exercise also highlights the Geo-strategic significance of the Indian Ocean Region. In the Geo-political context of this naval exercise , we also need to look into the India’s approach and strategy towards the Indian Ocean Region. India is essentially a maritime nation and the Indian Ocean has been at the vortex of intense maritime activity over centuries. The last two decades has witnessed substantial expansion in India’s dependence on her maritime environment. The Indian Ocean Region, which is an area of primary interest for the Indian Navy, has also emerged as the world’s center of gravity in the maritime domain. The MILAN exercise truly sums up the evolving dynamics in the Indian Ocean Region and encapsulates India’s maritime approach.

A unique factor which differentiates the Indian Ocean from the other two major oceans–the Pacific and the Atlantic–is that almost 80% of the oil and trade that emanates in the Indian Ocean Region is extra-regional in nature. It implies that any impediment to the free movement of oil or trade through the Indian Ocean Region, will have an impact not just on the economies of the region, but the rest of the global economy as well. It is in the Indian Ocean Region where interests of the rim countries, as well as major Geo-political entities like US and Chinaetc intersect. The Indian Ocean has therefore become a cross-road of geopolitical dynamics in context of rising economies of China and India and their increasing dependence on the maritime trade along with other countries in the region. These characteristics of the Indian Ocean Region underscore its maritime nature, and point to the need for maintaining stable, secure and safe seas and MILAN naval exercise has certainly helped in building the capacity and interoperability among various nations in the region.

Under the broad framework of MILAN naval exercise, Indian Navy has initiated a series of capacity building and capability enhancement initiatives to establish an environment of peace and stability in the Indian Ocean Region. Such initiatives have certainly strengthened the capacity of the partner navies in order to provide maritime security in its own area of operation, and thus has helped in improving net security in the regional maritime environment as well as strengthening bilateral relations and maritime interoperability. The capability enhancement initiatives of the Indian Navy under MILAN exercise include measures for cooperative development through training, technical support and maintenance and hydrographic cooperation.

Through MILAN, India has aimed to shape a favorable and positive regional maritime environment in the Indian Ocean region with similar, like-minded endeavors of other regional partners. Through MILAN, India has given a clear signal that in order to strengthen the global maritime partnerships and networking amongst the navies of the new order in the 21st century, there is an urgent need to address common maritime threats and challenges. It is a fact that stability in a well-networked and interdependent maritime domain is the shared responsibility of coastal states. MILAN can be helpful in achieving such objectives through synergized, inclusive and cooperative efforts facilitated by maritime engagements.

In future also through MILAN naval exercise, India should try to continue to operate in cooperation with friendly maritime forces in the Indian Ocean Region to address shared security concerns, and look towards promoting peace, security and stability in the maritime neighborhood, through open, transparent, inclusive, balanced and cooperative measures. This forms the basis and the core of India’s strategy and approach to the Indian Ocean Region.

India Economic Summit 2018

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India Foundation, in association with Bombay Stock Exchange, is organising India Economic Summit 2018 from April 27-28, 2018 in Mumbai.

In his Independence Day speech last year, the Hon’ble Prime Minister Shri Narendra Modi shared his vision of a New India. The bedrock of New India will be a globally competitive and innovation-driven New Economy that can create meaningful jobs and a better quality-of-life for India’s 1.25 billion citizens. Accordingly, the theme for India Foundation’s India Economic Summit is A New Economy for a New India.

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India – Nepal: Old Book, New Chapter

May the friendship between India and Nepal live long, and may Nepal rise higher than the Himalayas, were Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s words while addressing the Constituent Assembly of Nepal in 2014 . Being the first foreign leader to be addressing the assembly and the constitution drafting committee of Nepal he had expressed India’s desire to stand by Nepal in the process of transition to a Federal Democratic Republic.

It was to echo these sentiments that the External Affairs Minister of India paid a goodwill visit to the Himalayan Kingdom on the first day of February. As the EAM touched down, Nepal had double the reasons to be joyous on her arrival, the second one being an almost 75% increase in the allocation of funds for Nepal to the Ministry of External Affairs in the then being announced Union Budget for fiscal 2018-19.

In doing so, External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj became the first foreign leader to have visited Nepal after the successful conclusion of their three tier elections. The visit, her seventh since the NDA government assumed office, was largely aimed at showing India’s support to Nepal’s government in waiting and re-asserting that India will stand by the landlocked nation in whatever they choose to do.

She met the top leadership of the victorious alliance and extended cooperation in working with the new government for the peace, progress and prosperity of the populace of both the countries and the region at large. She also called on the President of Nepal, outgoing Prime Minister Sher Bahadur Deuba and leaders of the Madhesi parties. Ranging from extending cooperation and infusing optimism by meeting the electoral winners to thanking the old mates, the visit had it all.

Elections to the federal parliament and seven provincial assemblies of Nepal were held in two phases on November 26 and December 7, 2017. The outcome was a thumping majority received by the two left leaning parties of K. P Sharma Oli’s CPN (UML) and P K Dahal’s CPN (MC). The two parties together have not only secured a majority on 174 seats in a 275 member assembly but have also won in 6 out of 7 provinces with the second province being the only exception.
The elections concluded peacefully and Oli led UML came out to be the single largest party winning 80 of the 165 seats under the FPTP voting system and 33.25% votes under Proportional Representation, thus registering triumph on 121 seats out of the 275. However, the absence of a pre poll alliance between the two partners (UML and MC) had initially placed hurdles in the swearing in of the new government with a few more posed by the challenges of demarking an administrative capital in each of the 7 provinces and the constitution of an upper house.
However, it wasn’t a long wait for a new political dawn in Nepal. With Khadga Prasad Sharma Oli now sworn in as the 38th Prime Minister of the country, the populace expects a stable government working for the all-inclusive development of Nepal.

Having achieved political stability the Nepalese leadership is now looking at economic self-reliance. Former President of India Shri Pranab Mukherjee while addressing a Conference in Kathmandu in November 2016 had spoken of Trade and Co-operation being the foundational pillars of the Nepal – India partnership. He had spoken of the importance of the growing trade between the two countries and called upon the Indian private sector to enhance their engagement with Nepal.

Trade between India and Nepal has grown more than seven times (32,294 Crores INR in 2015-16 from 1,755 Crores INR in 1995-96) since 1996 and Nepal’s exports to India have grown more than eleven times since the same time (2468.3 Crores INR in 2015-16 from 230 Crores INR in 1995-96 ). Currently, a total of about 150 Indian firms are operating in Nepal in both the manufacturing and the service industry.

Moving away from trade, the Indian establishment has also been magnanimous in extending a helping hand to the electorate and directorate of Nepal in times of distress. The total Indian relief assistance to Nepal under Operation Maitri (the relief operation carried out by the Government of India when a 7.4 magnitude earthquake struck Nepal) was to the extent of 67 million USD. An additional assistance of 1 Billion USD was also extended during the International Conference on Nepal’s Reconstruction held in 2015 which included 250 million USD of grant and 750 million USD concessional Line of Credit .

Tourism and religion too define the relationship between the two countries. As per the Statistics released by the Government of Nepal for the year 2016, almost 1.28 lakh Indian pilgrims had visited the revered Pashupatinath temple in Kathmandu. Indians also rank as first amongst the tourists of all other nationalities that visit the kingdom for tourism and holidaying .

The relationship between these two neighbours is unique in a way that it is not defined by the MoUs and agreements between the governments but by the language, culture, concurrence and cooperation amongst its populace which have fought against all odds in this journey of highs and lows. With 6 million Nepali citizens currently residing and working in India and close to 6 lakh Indians domiciled in Nepal the communities are growing big and strong .

Former Prime Minister of India Shri Atal Bihari Vajpayee had described the relationship between India and Nepal to be higher than the Himalayas and deeper than the Indian Ocean. Akin to the Himalayas and Indian Ocean which stand strong irrespective of the extremities of the weather, time tested ties between India and Nepal also have their roots dug deep in ancient cultural ethos and amity.

References:

  1. https://www.narendramodi.in/pms-historic-address-to-constituent-assembly-of-nepal-6421
  2. https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/economy/finance/mea-gets-an-increase-of-rs-213-cr-nepal-gets-rs-650-crore-for-projects/articleshow/62744264.cms
  3. http://fsi.mea.gov.in/Portal/ForeignRelation/India_Nepal_Relations_11_04_2017.pdf
  4. http://fsi.mea.gov.in/Portal/ForeignRelation/India_Nepal_Relations_11_04_2017.pdf
  5. http://www.tourism.gov.np/downloadfile/Nepal%20Tourism%20statistic_Final-2016_1498990228.pdf
  6. http://fsi.mea.gov.in/Portal/ForeignRelation/India_Nepal_Relations_11_04_2017.pdf

 

(Deeksha Goel is a Senior Research Fellow at India Foundation. The views expressed are personal. The article originally appeared in The Pioneer on 18 February 2018.)

 

 

Smart Power at Play

The International Solar Alliance aptly demonstrates the value of soft power in the pursuit of a specific initiative. It is India’s chance to lead the climate change challenge

The distribution of global power is rapidly evolving, precipitating far-reaching economic and political changes affecting nations of every size and standing, reads the introductory sentence of the The Soft Power 30 report of 2015. This comment aptly summarises the underlying power of the International Solar Alliance (ISA), a brainchild of India, that was launched along with France at the COP21 United Nations Climate Change Conference in Paris in 2015.

In just three years, the alliance has become a reality, a quick progression, generally unseen in the diplomatic community. India along with France has created an international treaty-based intergovernmental organisation that may affect the world order, at least in terms of energy and create a new developmental model.

The alliance, according to the Paris Declaration on the International Solar Alliance, is open to membership from 121 solar resource-rich countries that lie fully or partially between the Tropic of Cancer and the Tropic of Capricorn. Membership is on a voluntary basis with no targets or legal obligations imposed on member countries and is based solely on shared collective goals.

Unlike hard power, whose stratagem focuses on military intervention, coercive diplomacy and economic sanctions to achieve international objectives, the International Solar Alliance eschews traditional foreign policy tools of the carrot (reward and punishment to induce desired behaviour) and the stick (coercion), emphasising instead on using its network, attractiveness and appeal to persuade and draw member nations into its structure. India, sitting in the driver’s seat of this alliance, has the power to both steer the organisation and frame the agenda.

If hard power is push, soft power is pull; and India has pulled over 60 countries to the founding summit of the International Solar Alliance hosted in New Delhi. It is interesting to note that French President Emmanuel Macron’s maiden visit to India signalled stronger cooperation between the two nations.

Joseph Nye, a proponent of soft power, contends that a nation can increase its soft power through engaging, informing and influencing the Governments and citizens of other countries. Drawing from this argument, India can advance its soft power status through the International Solar Alliance  in three possible ways.

First, a majority of the potential members of the International Solar Alliance are developing countries with large agrarian populations who face similar challenges like energy deficiency and are in need for a stronger voice in the international community.

The alliance will give these nations a voice and act as a platform to share experiences and narrow technological gaps through cooperation and increased engagement between Governments, businesses and the citizenry. India will also be instrumental in shaping the International Solar Alliance’s agenda as it houses the Secretariat and is a member of the steering committee — two factors that will raise India’s soft power.

Second, India, along with France, is driving the “world’s largest renewable energy expansion programme”, that will help transform the lives of people through simple devices like solar lanterns, cookers, water pumps and solar street lights. This soft, relatively cheaper and sustainable approach provides a positive development pathway. This may be done by skilling people and utilising indigenous renewable resources for industrialisation and employment generation.

Western nations benefited from a cheap carbon-based economy to fuel their development, ushering in improvements in productivity, income and standard of living. However, the model is clearly not sustainable and the world is witnessing the ill-effects of a carbon-economy such as deforestation and climate change.

Today, the International Solar Alliance can be an enabler and act as a launch pad for nations to reap the same benefits from renewable energy, but through a better and sustainable model. It can, therefore, be argued that this is an initiative that serves to demonstrate the value of soft power in the pursuit of a specific initiative. It is India’s chance at climate leadership.

Third, the International Solar Alliance  will seek to achieve the seventh UNDP Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) to “ensure access to affordable, reliable, sustainable and modern energy for all” by enhancing international cooperation, upgrading technology, promoting investment and increasing infrastructure by 2030. India has assumed a leadership role and has successfully created an organisation that aims to tackle this important universal goal.

In fact, the International Solar Alliance  is the only agency under the United Nations system that is working on achieving these goals, giving India an opportunity to demonstrate its leadership capacity, especially in the developing world. The appeal of India’s soft power rests in its promise to deliver key international objectives without high costs and unpopularity associated with hard power.

India has attracted the attention of the West and central African nations such as Nigera, Ghana, Gabon and Sudan, with whom it has traditionally not shared deep-rooted ties as it does with some east African countries such as Kenya and Zanzibar. India can use the International Solar Alliance  as a strategic, monetary and knowledge transfer platform to smartly counterbalance other nation’s aggressive and growing presence in the African continent.

In this summit, India has extended a $1.4 billion Line of Credit to support 27 projects in 15 countries, of which 23 projects are in African nations. The summit witnessed the participation of 60 countries, 23 of whom were represented by Heads of States, indicating the keenness of nations to be a part of this new alliance.

The success of this alliance in part hinges on India and France’s credibility and willingness to take the International Solar Alliance  forward. India, for its part, has demonstrated both. Its commitment to solar energy is evident from the increase in installed solar power capacity from three gigawatts in 2014 to 20 GW in 2017, as reported by Bridge to India.

Moreover, India also played a crucial role in according the status of a treaty-based international intergovernmental organisation to the International Solar Alliance.

Finally, the summit also signalled India’s ability to engage with and attract global audiences and is proof that India has developed and communicated a compelling narrative, established an international norm and drew on key resources to allure one country to another.

Indeed, this approach is soft, long-term and tangible: It is smart power at play.

The author is a Research Fellow at the India Foundation. The views expressed above belong to the author(s). This article originally appeared in The Pioneer on 15 March, 2018.

References:

1. https://www.business.com/articles/the-impact-of-green-energy-on-the-economy/

2.http://www.world-nuclear.org/information-library/current-and-future-generation/world-energy-needs-and-nuclear-power.aspx

3.http://ourrenewablefuture.org/chapter-8/

4.https://www.e-ir.info/2014/05/14/the-effectiveness-of-soft-hard-power-in-contemporary-international-relations/

5.https://portland-communications.com/pdf/The-Soft-Power_30.pdf

 

COUNTER TERRORISM CONFERENCE 2018

The changing contours of global terror in today’s time poses a direct threat to the security of the citizens of any country as well as to international stability and prosperity. The 4th Counter Terrorism Conference (CTC) was organised by India Foundation in Gurugram, Haryana, in collaboration with the Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India, Government of Haryana and the Bureau of Police Research and Development (BPR&D). Thirty-three countries sent their delegates/speakers for CTC 2018, the total attendance including from Indian participants being in excess of 350 delegates.
The delegates engaged in intellectual brainstorming to address the theme for CTC 2018, ‘Changing Contours of Global Terror’. The theme was addressed in six sub-themes as under:

  • Ideological Challenges;
  • Trends of the New Age Terrorism;
  • Af-Pak Region as the Epicentre of Global Terror;
  • Constructing Effective Counter Narratives;
  • Politics of terror and
  • Future of Terrorism and Terrorism of Future.

 

Day 1, March 14, 2018: Inaugural Session

The inaugural session was addressed by Mr Rajnath Singh, Union Minister of Home Affairs, Government of India, Dr YubrajKhatiwada, Minister of Finance, Government of Nepal, Mr Manohar Lal Khattar, Chief Minister, Haryana, and Mr Jayant Sinha, Minister of State for Civil Aviation, Government of India and also Director, India Foundation.


In his introductory remarks, Mr Jayant Sinha, highlighted the fact that the annual series of Counter Terrorism Conferences organised by India Foundation since 2015 have created greater awareness among the global community on the widespread tentacles of terrorism and have provided a forum for thought leaders to express their views on the subject and come out with viable policy options to combat the menace.

Thereafter, in his welcome address, Mr Manohar Lal Khattar, while welcoming the delegates, focused on the global consequences of terrorism and committed his government to provide further support for future editions of the CTC, as a step in addressing the problem and coming up with viable solutions.

In his Special Address, Dr Yubraj Khatiwada emphasised the point that terrorism as a phenomenon is not confined to a particular society, country or a region, but is a global problem which has a deleterious impact on society. He said, “Terrorism does not only cause destruction of lives and properties, but it also seeks to uproot the very foundation of our civilization and values.”
While delivering the Inaugural Address, Mr Rajnath Singh reiterated that terrorism has become a global phenomenon which poses major threat to international peace, security and stability.

While commenting on the concerns and challenges related to growing radicalisation, he said, “Radicalisation of populace, particularly youth, is another trend and one of the most challenging problems being faced the world over. Several countries in the world have identified this problem and have taken measures to check and control the process of radicalisation and I am happy to state that India has timely busted some modules that were planning to orchestrate terrorist attacks on her soil.” He also outlined the initiatives of Government of India, stating, “Government of India in tandem with all the state governments has adopted a multi-pronged approach to deal with the emerging situation. What we need is a sustained united effort, to identity and neutralise the terror modules operating across the globe. Only then, our dream of ‘New India’ can be realised, which aims to eliminate terrorism completely.”

Day 1, March 14, 2018: Keynote Address
The keynote address was delivered by Mr Rehmatullah Nabil, Former Director, National Directorate of Security, Afghanistan. Mr Nabil in his address spoke of the security challenges being faced by Pakistan, both externally from Pakistan and internally from an unstable society. He gave details of the involvement of the Pakistani State in supporting terror activities in Afghanistan, stating, “Pakistan has played an important role in the catastrophic failure simply by using religious extremism and terrorism as a foreign policy tool. Pakistan has not been a reliable ally of the international community; its army and intelligence continue to play a double game with the international community on fighting terrorism and extremism.”
Pre Conference Workshops

Two Counter Terrorism Simulation Labs were organised before the inaugural session, both by Mr Marc Kahlberg, Head, Vital Cyber Int and his colleague Mr Amir. They gave a detailed presentation on how technology, especially radio waves, could be exploited to detect and prevent terrorist attacks. In fighting terrorism, Mr Marc emphasised the need to adopt a proactive approach rather than a reactionary response. He stressed on using behavioural pattern and profiling to predict and prevent crime and other terror acts. The second workshop or Counter Terrorism Simulation Lab, was on the exploitation of artificial intelligence in collecting intelligence. The need for a shift in emphasis from big data to big knowledge was also emphasised.

March 15, 2018: Session 1 – Global Terrorism: Ideological Challenges

A Special Keynote Address was delivered by Major General Ahmed Mohammed, Chief of Training and Operations, Nigerian Army, before the start of Session 1, which was chaired by Vice Admiral Shekhar Sinha (Retd.), Former C-in-C, Western Naval Command, Indian Navy. Mr. Ahmed gave a detailed presentation on the Boko-Haram and the rise of non-state actors against Government of Nigeria. In his address, he said, “Terrorism and insurgency are not a new phenomenon in Nigeria. These phenomena predate independence but, they have attained a new dimension wearing international outlook based on the linkages between other terrorist groups in the West African sub-region and other parts of Africa.” He highlighted the impact of poverty and inequality prevalent in society in causing insurgency, refugee influx, gender violence, food insecurity and widespread diseases.

The panelists in session 1 comprised Mr. James Dorsey, Senior Fellow, Middle East and North Africa, RSIS; Mr Abdel Bari Atwan, Editor-in-Chief Rai Al-Youm and Founder and Former Editor-in-Chief, Al-Quds Al-Arabi, Palestine; Mr. Syed Salman Chishty, Gaddi Nashin-Dargah, Ajmer Sharif and Chairman, Chishty Foundation, India; and Mr. Yubaraj Ghimire, journalist and writer, Nepal. The session was chaired by Capt (IN) Alok Bansal, Director, India Foundation. Capt Bansal in his opening remarks, stressed on the need to understand the ideology as confronting such an ideology was as important as combatting the physical aspects of terrorist violence. Mr. Dorsey however disregarded the ideological nature of the challenge and opined that the challenge is political in nature, stating, “Social media is just a vehicle in the hand of the terrorists. It is not the driver of terrorism.” He said that counter-narrative against the terrorism can be effectively constructed only if there is a dream and a political will. Mr. Atwan identified military intervention as the basic reason behind formation of failed states, which ultimately gives birth to acts causing terrorism. He suggested good governance, non-intervention and employment opportunities as the basic drivers of safer environment. Mr. Ghimire discussed the ideological challenge behind the insurgency movement in Nepal. Mr. Chisty attributed the lack of awareness about the history of faith as the major ideological challenge in the fight against terrorism. He opined, “Strength of values from all faiths and religion can bring the communities together, weaken the radical outfits and attack their recruiting propaganda.”

Session 2Trends of the New Age Terrorism

As a prelude to this session, Mr Suresh Prabhu, Union Minister of Commerce & Industry and Civil Aviation, Government of India and Director, India Foundation, delivered the Keynote Address. He identified terrorism as having direct and indirect consequences on economic activities worldwide and opined that diversity of religious presence in India makes the country an ideal place to fight the new age terrorism.

The panelists in Session 2 comprised Ms Anne Speckhard, Director of the International Center for the Study of Violent Extremism (ICSVE), Mr Vladimir Andreev, Deputy Head, Department on New Challenges and Threats, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Russia and Mr Syed Ata Hasnain, Former GOC, 15 Corps, India. The session was chaired by Maj. Gen. Dhruv C. Katoch, Director, India Foundation. Ms. Speckhard said that new age terrorism is “selling a dream” and thus, it becomes imperative to dissect this dream and bring out the reality in front of the world. She shared counter-narrative videos, giving out insights on how de-radicalisation can be mobilised. Mr. Andreev discussed the growth of terrorism into a global threat becoming aggressive and effective. He described the modern global terror to include innovative weapons of chemical, biological and nuclear nature. Gen. Hasnain highlighted the challenge in defining the term “terrorism” due to its complex and dynamic nature. He stressed on the changes in technological means and ideological drivers of terrorism. He identified the state sponsored non-state actors as the toughest challengers to fighting new age terrorism.

Session 3Af-Pak Region as the Epicentre of Global Terror

The keynote address in Session 3 was delivered by Mr Amar Sinha, Former Secretary, Ministry of External Affairs, India, with Dr. A. P. Maheshwari, Director General, Bureau of Police Research and Development, Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India chairing the session. Mr. Sinha stressed on the need to shift the focus on Pakistan as epicentre of terrorism as Afghanistan was but a victim of the terror that is being directed from Pakistan. In his address, Mr Sinha stated, “Strong Afghanistan governed from Kabul is in India’s interest.” He appreciated the efforts of Government of Afghanistan to negotiate with Taliban and demanded the rejection of victim-narrative of Pakistani army.

The panelists in session 3 comprised Habil Christian Wagner, Senior Fellow, Stiftung Wissenschaft and Politik, German Institute for International and Security affairs, Germany; Ms C. Christine Fair, Associate Professor, Edmund A Walsh School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University, Washington, USA; Mr AbusamatKhaydarov, Former Ambassador, Uzbekistan and Mr Fredric Grare, Charge de Mission of Asia, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, France. The session was chaired by Mr Rajiv Dogra, Former Ambassador, India. Mr. Wagner differentiated between the western experience and the South Asian experience on the impact of global terrorism. He rejected the act of getting militants in mainstream politics by Pakistan and appreciated India’s greater role in promoting collective security in the region through institutions like BIMSTEC. Ms C. Christine Fair, in her presentation, said that USA aids Pakistan to gain access to Pakistani line of communication and air space to help in its efforts in stabilising the situation in Afghanistan. She expressed her concerns over the use of nuclear coercion and jihadism by Pakistan and suggested the use of sub-conventional deterrence by India against Pakistan. Mr. Khaydarov expressed his concerns over Islamic radicalisation of youth in the Af-Pak region. He opined that economic stability along with upliftment of health and education will help establish a stable Afghanistan. Mr. Fredric Grare highlighted the fight between IS and Taliban for control of territory at few places and their alliance in fighting at other places. He remarked, “It is no coincidence that a country that is the most affected and supports terrorism the most, is the least democratic nation.”

Session 4Constructing Effective Counter Narratives

The panelists in session 4 of the Counter Terrorism Conference comprised Dr A. P. Maheshwari, Director General, Bureau of Police Research and Development, Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India; Mr Shafqat Munir, Research Fellow, Bangladesh Institute of Peace and Security Studies (BIPSS), Bangladesh; Mr Nalin Prabhat, Special Additional DGP (Operations), Government of Andhra Pradesh, India and Mr M. Ashraf Haidari, DG (Policy & Strategy), Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Government of Afghanistan. The session was chaired by Lt Gen. K. Himalay Singh, former Corps Commander, 16 Corps, India. Gen. Himalay Singh highlighted the lack of efforts in constructing counter-narratives which is of strategic importance. Mr Prabhat made his presentation on “Sharia in conflict with democracy” and suggested the need to create counter-narrative by credible voices within the community and focus on long-term measures of perception management. In his presentation, Mr Munir suggested the use of the term “alternative-narrative” instead of “counter-narrative”. According to him, there is no one size fits all policy and therefore, different narratives should be properly calibrated and presented. He suggested the policy-makers to think beyond operational perspective in countering terrorism and stressed on the need to focus on strategic measures in constructing alternative narratives. Dr Maheshwari regarded identification of root cause as the most important task for diagnosing the problem of terrorism. He said that terrorists are also entrepreneurs who are educated and evolved with time to form innovative ideas. Mr. Haidari, in his presentation, emphasised on joint assessment and common understanding by all States on the definition and counter measures to fight terrorism. He suggested that there should be a mutually agreed upon strategy at both international and regional level.

Special Address

A Special address was delivered by Smt. Nirmala Sitharaman, Raksha Mantri, Government of India; Director, India Foundation and Mr Kiren Rijiju, Minister of State for Home Affairs, Government of India. In his address, Mr. Rijiju rejected the difference between good and bad form of terrorism and said that there is no scope of soft approach in dealing with terrorism. He identified financing to be the lifeline of terror activities. On the issue of human rights, he said, “Human rights thrive only when there is security in the society.” In her address, Smt. Nirmala Sitharaman said that feeling of lagging behind in fight against terrorism can be attributed to the very nature of terrorism as it creates newer innovative challenges at every step. She said that nature of terror in today’s world is such that we all are facing newer and newer challenges every day and it is more compounded by the fact that today, technology plays a very big role. Smt. Sitharaman also pointed out that every organised and well-structured response to terrorism sometimes has an Achilles heel which a lone wolf can always target. So, to combat the lone wolf attacks, it becomes imperative to unite and innovate our responses in fighting terrorism.

Day 3, March 16, 2018: Session 5 – Politics of Terror

The keynote address in session 5 was delivered by Gen. V. K. Singh, Minister of State for External Affairs, Government of India. Gen. Singh emphasised on the importance to think on the lines of politics behind terror. He traced the ideological evolution in World War II and commented that Cold War persists in terms of competing to dominate ideological influence and in this context, terrorism is being used as a tool. He said that the politics can be couched in religious or ideological terms and terrorism is being used to further such political aims. In his address, the Minister also expressed his concerns over identification of ‘backers’ of terrorism and their political self-interests. He said that there is no dearth of academic endeavour on the political system that works behind the scene and aids the terrorist movements.

The panelists in Session 5 comprised Mr Stephen Tankel, Assistant Professor, School of International Service, American University, USA; Mr Min ZawOo, Executive Director, Myanmar Institute for Peace and Security; Mr Alexander Evans, Deputy High Commissioner, British High Commission and Mr RinatAbubakirov, Expert, Ministry of Defence, Russia. The session was chaired by Ms Prabha Rao, Senior Fellow, IDSA, India. In his speech, Mr. Evans traced the trans-national terrorist attacks and the political element which indulged in the attacks. According to him, the challenges can be summed up in three words; counting, considering and cooperating. Mr Evans further added that while conducting a political analysis, it is important to remember the information asymmetry and the element of surprise and unpredictability. In his presentation, Mr Tankel expressed his concerns over shift of political element from political violence to terrorism. Mr. Zaw narrated how Myanmar is the field of the longest running civil war. He presented a historical understanding of the peace process in Myanmar and the political elements behind it. Mr. Abubakirov discussed the Russian process of unearthing the politics of terrorism and discussed the Russian involvement in the conflict in Syria.

Session 6: Future of Terrorism and Terrorism of Future

The panelists in session 6 of CTC 2018 comprised Mr Marc Kahlberg, Head, Vital Cyber Int, Israel; Mr Ma Xiangwu, Professor, China; Ms Jacinta Carroll, Director National Security Policy, National Security College, Australian National University and Mr Ismail Ahmed Al Hadidi, Oman. The session was chaired by Mr R. N. Ravi, Chairman, Joint Intelligence Committee, India. Mr. Ravi commenced the session by commenting on terrorism becoming an easy, effective, low cost tool in the hands of self-interested violent outfits. He expressed his concerns over the complication of the situation when States indulge in terrorist activities to achieve their personal objectives. Mr. Mr Ismail described the fragile nature of security in Oman due to its geographical proximity with Yemen, Syria and Iraq. In her presentation, Ms Carroll discussed the emerging tactical trends, technical trends and strategic trends of terrorism. She further stressed on the need of counter-terrorism strategy of every nation and denial of safe heavens. In his presentation, Mr. Kahlberg discussed the threat in relation to global stability. He mentioned the growth of “virtual Caliphate” and the threat it posed to the global citizenry. Mr. Ma Xiangwu discussed peoples’ war against terrorism in China and highlighted the unique nature of counter-terrorism approach in China. He said that the Western world prefers to use military force, but China does not stress on the use of military force.

Valedictory Session

Mr Rajiv Gauba, Home Secretary, Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India, delivered the Valedictory Address. He highlighted the growing overlap between terrorist activities and organised crime and expressed his concerns over justification of terrorism by some countries and providing safe havens to terrorists. He also called for a greater coordinated effort to fight terrorism along with the political view.

 

India Foundation Delegation visit to China

On the invitation of International Department of the Central Committee of Communist Party of China (IDCPC), an eight member delegation of India Foundation visited Beijing and Shanghai from 06 March-10 March 2018.

The Delegation of India Foundation was led by Vice Admiral Shekhar Sinha (Retd.), Former C-in-C, Western Naval Command, Indian Navy. The other members of the India Foundation Delegation were Maj Gen Dhruv C Katoch (Retd.), Director, India Foundation; Shri Gautam Mukhopadhaya, Former Ambassador; Shir Hari Kiran Vadlamani, Director, India Foundation International; Dr Sonu Trivedi, Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, Zakir Husain Delhi College (University of Delhi), Dr. Shristi Pukhrem, Senior Research Fellow, India Foundation; Shri Siddharth Singh and Shri Krishan Bishnoi, Research Scholar, JNU.

The India Foundation Delegation visited the HQ of IDCPC and interacted with Mr GuoYezhou, Vice-Minister of the International Department of the CPC Central Committee and with other Senior officials of IDCPC.

The interactions witnessed scholarly and candid exchange of views from both sides on critical issues such as Sino-India relations in the changing global order of 21st century as well as the possibility of cooperation between India and China in South Asia & Southeast Asia.Both sides agreed to examine the possibility of working simultaneously at bilateral and multilateral fronts to manage their differences and promote a just global order. This could in future create an India-China cooperative model for the future development of both countries. Both countries should keep the momentum of development of bilateral ties, manage existing differences and promote shared development. They should also step up strategic cooperation at multilateral frameworks such as the United Nations, BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) and SCO (Shanghai Cooperation Organisation) and work together to shape the new emerging international order in 21st century.

Mr GuoYezhou, Vice-Minister of the International Department of the CPC Central Committee, hosted lunch for the visiting delegation of India Foundation.

The delegation of India Foundation also visited China Institute of International Studies (CIIS) in Beijing and interacted with Amb. Qi Zhenhong, President of CIIS. Vice President Rong Ying and Research Fellows from Department for Developing Countries Studies of CIISattended the meeting from the Chinese side.

India Foundation Delegation visited Development Research Centre of the State Council (DRC) of People’s Republic of China in Beijing and interacted with Mr HouYongzhi, Director General, DRC and Senior Officials in the Institute. The interaction at DRC were centered around the economic development of China and how both countries can partner in economic development of the region in making 21st century as Asia’s century.

During its interaction in Shanghai, the India Foundation delegation visited Shanghai Institute for International Studies (SIIS). The delegation interacted with Mr Chen Dongxiao, President, SIIS and exchanged views on international and regional situations and bilateral relations. Director of the Institute of International Strategic Studies Wu Jinsi, Associate Professor Liu Zongyi of the Asia Pacific Research Centre, Associate Professor Chen Youjun, and Assistant Professor Zhang Zhexin attended the meeting from the Chinese Side.

In Shanghai, India Foundation delegation visited and interacted with Huayang Communityandalso visited Museum of Cohesion Project in Shanghai.

In its interaction at various institutions in Beijing and Shanghai, both sides agreed that the foreign policy and strategic circles of the two countries need to maintain dialogues and communications on a regular basis. Equally important, people-to-people exchanges are indispensable to consolidate better understanding of the will of the people of the two countries.

 

Factors Responsible for Sectarianism in Gilgit-Baltistan Region

Introduction

Sectarian conflict is not a new phenomenon and has existed in the culture of the sub-continent for many centuries in one form or the other. In its literal meaning, sectarianism refers to a rigid adherence to a particular sect. It often implies discrimination, denunciation, or violence against those outside the sect. The term is most often used to refer to religious sectarianism, involving conflict between members of different religions or denominations of the same religion. Sectarianism may, in the abstract, be characterised by dogmatism and inflexibility, sentimental adherence to an idea, belief or tradition and idealism that provides a sense of continuity, orientation, and certainty. A sectarian conflict usually refers to violent conflict along religious and political lines. It implies political conflict between different schools of thought such as that between Shia and Sunni Muslims.

In Gilgit-Baltistan, sectarian conflict is a matter of deep concern because it is damaging the fabric of society and is becoming a potent existential threat.1 It has risen phenomenally in the region over the past few decades and has extended beyond sporadic clashes over doctrinal issues between Sunnis and Shias and metamorphosed into political conflict around mobilisation of group identity,2 with relations among different religious sects and ethnic groups becoming potentially divisive. One irresponsible move against any particular group can easily ignite emotions and shatter relative peace and harmony.3

Political Development in the Gilgit-Baltistan

Gilgit-Baltistan region has never been represented in the Pakistani Parliament. It became a separate administrative unit in 1970 under the name “Northern Areas” and an Advisory Council with 14 elected members was set up, which was subsequently converted into the Northern Areas Council in 1975. It however was devoid of any legislative or executive powers and was presided over by an Administrator appointed by Islamabad. It was formed by the amalgamation of the former Gilgit Agency, the Baltistan district and several small former princely states, the larger of which being Hunza and Nagar.4 The region was named “The Northern Areas of Pakistan” and placed under the direct control of Islamabad. Unlike Pakistan’s four provinces, the region has no political representation in the parliament or the federal cabinet and no status under Pakistan’s constitution.5

On 29 August 2009, the Gilgit-Baltistan Empowerment and Self-Governance Order 2009, was passed by the Pakistani cabinet and later signed by the then President of Pakistan, Asif Ali Zardari.6 The order granted self-rule to the people of Gilgit-Baltistan, by creating, among other things, an elected Gilgit-Baltistan Legislative Assembly and Gilgit-Baltistan Council. Gilgit-Baltistan thus gained a de facto province-like status without constitutionally becoming part of Pakistan. However, the real power rests with the governor and not with the Chief Minister or elected assembly.7 Currently, Gilgit-Baltistan is neither a province nor a state. It has a semi-provincial status. It is neither a part of what Pakistan calls Azad Kashmir nor is it a province of Pakistan. In fact, Pakistan’s Supreme Court pronounced in 1994 that these areas “are part of Jammu & Kashmir state but are not part of
Azad Kashmir.8

Demography

Gilgit-Baltistan is a multilingual, multicultural and ethnically diverse region. The Shia, Sunni, Ismaili and Nurbakhshi are the four major sectarian groups, found in the region, the Shias at 39 percent being the majority population, followed by the Sunnis with 27 percent and the Ismaili and Nurbakhshi with 18 and 16 percent respectively.9 The geographical distribution of the sects reflects the spatial trajectories of Islamisation: The southern district of Diamer is exclusively Sunni. Nagar in the North and Baltistan in the East is mostly Shia (with a small minority of Nurbakhshis) while Ismailis prevail in Hunza in the North and in Ghizer in the West. The city of Gilgit, being the political and economic centre of the region, which stands at the geographic crossroads of movements from all directions, is religiously mixed. It is roughly estimated that the three major sects are almost equally represented in Gilgit.10Skardu has a predominantly Shia population.

Factors Leading to Conflict

All communities in Gilgit-Baltistan were living peacefully in communal harmony till the 1970s as per the Kashmiri tradition prevalent before 1947. Sectarian conflict reared its ugly head only post 1970 and remains a major cause of concern. The factors responsible for the growth of sectarian conflict are:

l   Theological differences between Shia and Sunni

l   General Zia-ul-HaqIslamisation Policy

l   The Role of Madrasas

l   Afghan jihad and the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI)

l   State Subject Rule (SSR)

l   Divide and Rule Strategy.

Theological Differences between Shia and Sunni

To understand the sectarianism in GilgitBaltistan it is necessary to have at least a cursory understanding of the divisions within the Islamic faith. Islam has two main branches: Shiaism and Sunnism.11The Sunni population subdivides into four major streams – Deobandis, Barelvis, Ahl-e-Hadith and Wahabis, within which there are dozens of subgroups.12 Each sect has its own madrasas in which their own version of Islam is taught.

The crux of their differences is rooted in the question of succession and leadership of Muslims after the Prophet’s death in 632 A.D. The bone of contention between the Shias and the Sunnis has historically been a dispute over questions of legitimate authority. The Sunnis regard the first four rulers, following the Prophet’s death (Abu Bakr, Omar bin Khattab, Osmab bin Affan, and Ali Ibne Abu Talib), as not only legitimate but also as “pious” and “righteous” caliphs worthy of great reverence.13 The Shias consider Ali Ibne Abu Talib alone to have been a legitimate ruler and treat his three predecessors as usurpers. They also believe that the first three caliphs were not really true to the Prophet and his mission. Allegedly they speak ill of them in various other ways in their own gatherings and some of them use insulting vocabulary in referring to them. The Sunnis find these Shia attitudes and interpretations to be intolerably offensive.14 Sunnis regard Ali as one of the four “righteous” Caliphs. One of the major issues of conflict between the two sects is the question of acceptance of the legitimacy of the caliphate.15

To the Shias, most of the companions of the Prophet (sahaba), conspired after the Prophet’s death to dispossess Ali (his son-in-law), and after him his descendants, the imams, of their divinely ordained right to the Muslim community’s leadership. In the Shias view of history, these companions, and their successors, were hypocrites and usurpers who never ceased to subvert Islam for their own interests.16 Public display of mourning is an essential part of the Shia faith, particularly during Muharram, the first month of the Islamic calendar, when they commemorate the Battle of Karbala (680, in Iraq) in which the Omayyads killed the Prophet’s grandson, Hussain, and his family.17 For Sunnis, especially Deobandis and Ahle Hadith, these Shia beliefs and ceremonies are an insult to their religious sensibilities.

There are also differences of opinion about the merits and functions of the successor to the Prophet. “The Sunni Islam considered the Caliph to be a guardian of the Sharia in the community, while Shias saw in the “successor” a spiritual function connected with the esoteric interpretation of the revelation and the inheritance to the Prophet’s esoteric teachings.”18 In contrast to the Sunnis, the institution of Imamate is fundamental to the Shia Islam. “The Imam, besides being a descendant of the Prophet, must possess certain qualities. He must be sinless, bear the purest and cleanest character, and must be distinguished above all other men for truth and purity.”19 Whereas, “the Sunnis believe that the Imamate is not restricted to the family of Mohammad, the imam need not be just, virtuous, or irreproachable in his life, nor need he be the most excellent or eminent being of his time, so long as he is free, adult, sane, and possessed of the capacity to attend to the ordinary affairs of State, he is qualified for election.”20 Later, both the Shia and Sunni schools further split into several sub-sects on different issues related to succession, interpretation of scriptures and political theory of Islam. Each sect blames the violent activities of the other as the reason for its own existence. The fundamental problem of the sectarian organisations is their sectarian identity which cannot be used as an ideology for political mobilisation.

General Zia-ul-Haq’sIslamisation Policy

The Islamisation policy of General Zia was state enterprise based on a series of reforms intended to turn Pakistan into a truly Islamic state.21 A highlight of General Zia’s Islamisation programme was the imposition of Zakat, (an Islamic tax) which the government decreed would be automatically collected from people’s bank accounts.22 Shia and Sunni schools of law differ quite markedly in their stipulations on Zakat, as in many other areas of law.23 The government’s decision to impose Zakat and Ushr(farming tax) ordinances according to the prescriptions of the Hanafi school of Sunni law, created intense resentment among the Shias and proved to be a powerful stimulus towards their political mobilisation in Pakistan. The implementation of the Sunni Hanafifiqh thus became the starting point of Shia resistance in Pakistan.24 Pakistan’s Shia minority, who demanded to be exempted from the tax on religious grounds, fiercely resisted General Zia’s attempts. Following large demonstrations in 1980, they were exempted from the tax but this sowed the seeds of anti-Shia sentiments and a growing sectarian violence. Over time, these differences were manifested in a growth of new types of movements which were virulently anti-Shia. In 1980, the clash over the Zakat issue led to the formation of a Shia movement called the Tehrik-i-Nifaz-i Jafaria Pakistan (TJP).25Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-Fiqh-e-Jafaria’s (TNFJ’s) emergence also marked a radical shift in the intra-Shia scene as the centre of gravity of Shia politics, traditionally associated with big landlords, shifted to the Shia Ulema and the younger militant groups. The increasingly confrontational and aggressive posture of TNFJ, however, led to a Deobandi Sunni backlash that took the form of Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan(SSP), founded in 1985.26

The SSP, under the leadership of Haq Nawaz Jhangvi, started a hard-line anti-Shia agenda and demanded that Shias be termed infidels.27 Thus began the strife between the (Shia) TJP and the (Sunni) SSP, in which leaders and followers alike were killed in bloody encounters and outright assassinations. When the SSP leader was killed in 1990, an even more violent offshoot was created in his name, Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LJ). The formation of the LJ in turn sparked the formation of another militant Shia organisation, Sipah-e-Mohammedi Pakistan (SMP) in 1993.28 Both the LJ and the SMP are more ruthless than their parent organisations (SSP, TJP). In particular the LJ has proved to be the most violent sectarian organisation ever to have existed in Pakistan.29

General Zia’s time is very important to the geopolitical and social dynamics of Gilgit-Baltistan.  Immediately after imposing martial law, Zia extended the subjugating rules to Gilgit-Baltistan and supported Sunni Islam to legitimise his rule. However, Zia’s support to particular Sunni parties and groups and the existing power vacuum in Gilgit-Baltistan provided an opportunity for the ulema to assert their role in public space.30

The impact of the aggressive Sunni Islamisation drive initiated by Zia fell substantially on the Shia-dominated Gilgit-Baltistan region. The importance given by Islamabad to the Sunni ulema (religious scholars), to the Deobandi extremist groups, and to the politics played by the regional administrative officers appointed by Islamabad, was largely responsible for fuelling sectarian clashes in the region. Besides, it was always in the interest of the Army in Pakistan to keep Gilgit-Baltistan divided on sectarian lines to retain tight control over this strategically important area.

The armed Sunni extremists had traveled a long way to reach Gilgit without being stopped by the security forces at any point. Mohammad Shehzad has stated in Friday Times, “a huge lashkar of 80,000 Sunni extremists was sent by General Zia government to annihilate the Shias. Villages inhabited by the Shias-Jalalabad, Bonji, Darot, Jaglot, Pari, and Manawar, were completely ruined. Even their animals were slaughtered. The laskhar had traveled a long distance from Mansehra to Gilgit and the Government did not stop it. Instead, it put the blame on R&AW (an Indian intelligence agency) and CIA (the US external intelligence Agency).31 Besides the Sunni Islamisation policies of General Zia, which were not completely abandoned by the successive governments, Islamabad’s reliance on jihadis for its proxy war in Kashmir and its policy to keep the strategically important region of Gilgit-Baltistan under its absolute control prompted it to fuel the flames of sectarian violence in the region.32

The Role of Madrasas

A major development that served to raise the level of sectarian conflict was the rapid spread of madrasas. The madrasas, sponsored by politico-religious parties and often funded by donors from the Middle East, instruct their students in accordance with the sectarian beliefs of the school’s sponsors. They have spread even to small towns and enroll more students than the public elementary and middle schools in Pakistan and in Gilgit-Baltistan. They teach theology, but many of them also teach their students to disapprove of sects other than their own and also impart to them military training. The phenomenal growth of madrasas has contributed to the promotion of sectarian conflict by producing a large number of indoctrinated students with sect oriented education. Hence, these madrasa students are converted into sectarian militants, readily available to fight for their sectarian organisations against the rival sect.

All the madrasas, including the Shia ones, teach the Dars-e-Nizami though they do not use the same texts. They also teach their particular point of view (maslak) which clarifies and rationalises the beliefs of the sect (Sunni or Shia) and sub-sect (Deobandi, Barelvi and Ahl-e-Hadith).33 Moreover, they train their students to refute, what in their views are heretical beliefs and some Western ideas. They have thus become “…a source of hate-filled propaganda against other sects and the sectarian divide has become sharper and more violent.”34 Muhammad QasimZaman has aptly remarked “…the madrasas not only have their own exclusivist sectarian affiliations, many of them are also intimately associated with particular sectarian organisations. Much of the leadership of sectarian organisations comes from madrasas. The establishment of new madrasas is likewise often sponsored by these organisations led the growth of the sectarian conflict.”35 The network of madrasas is crucial for both Shia and Sunni radical groups to exert and extend their influence and both have profusely used the print media to disseminate their ideas.36Gilgit-Baltistan has witnessed a mushrooming of madrasas that preach sectarian hatred.

The Role of Afghan jihad and The Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI)

The Afghan jihad played an important role in fuelling sectarianism in Gilgit-Baltistan. The USA funded billions of dollars to Sunni sectarian organisations in Pakistan in the cold war politics.37 The Soviet invasion in Afghanistan and the subsequent decision of the U.S. to provide funds to Pakistani authorities, especially the ISI (the intelligence agency of Pakistan), to create a radical Islamist international brigade to fight the Soviet army, worsened the situation in Pakistan by militarising the sectarian groups.The Pakistan’s ISI coordinated and distributed this financial and military aid – especially to radical Islamist groups. “Jihad” entered educational institutions especially in the madrasas, deliberately to mobilise fighters against the Soviets.38The sectarian tensions in Gilgit-Baltistan as well as in other parts of Pakistan are related to this.39 Many local Sunnis who had participated in the anti-Soviet jihad in Afghanistan returned home to join anti-Shia sectarian groups like the SSP and the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ). Local Shia graduates from Iran’s religious schools also returned home and with Iranian financial backing and support joined Shia militant organisations.40

State Subject Rule (SSR)

Pakistan occupied Jammu Kashmir (POJK) is a part of the state of Jammu and Kashmir (J&K), and hence it is an integral part of India. “State Subject Rule” was a law passed by the erstwhile Maharaja of Kashmir defining a hereditary state subject, and forbidding employment of non-state subjects in public services. Also, non-state residents were not allowed to purchase land in the State of Jammu and Kashmir. However, under Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, this law was abolished in 1974, which opened the floodgates of immigration for people from different parts of Pakistan to settle in Gilgit-Baltistan. Interestingly, both on the Indian side of the Line of Control (LoC) as well as in other areas of PoJK, the “State Subject Rule” is still in force.41 This is one of the clearest manifestations of the intent of Pakistan to change the demographic profile of the region. This paved the way for settling outsiders-mostly Sunni ethnic Pathans and Punjabis– in Gilgit-Baltistan region.42

The attempt by successive Pakistani adminis-trations to bring people from various parts of Pakistan has created fear in the minds of the people of the region that the government is aiming at their ethnic marginalisation in their own traditional homeland. From 1998 to 2011, due to large-scale migration, the population in Gilgit-Baltistan surged by 63.1 percent, as against 22.1 percent in Mirpur-Muzaffarabad (PoJK), where the “State Subject Rule” is still in force. The fact that the population in Sunni dominated Diamer district more than doubled during the period, gives some credence to this allegation.43

Divide and Rule Strategy

The sectarian conflict in the Gilgit-Baltistan region developed as a strategy of “divide and rule,” employed by the Government of Pakistan, in order to prevent a further joint uprising of the local people of the Gilgit-Baltistan region. Radical Sunni Deobandiulemas were sent to madrasas in Gilgit to propagate that Shias are not “real Muslims,” and they soon replaced the Barelvimaulvis in the mosques. As such propagation became more vocal and frequent, the Shias too reciprocated. This divide and rule policy is effectively being used by the Pakistani establishment to counter the demand for local self-rule by the people of the region. With the sects engaged in settling sectarian scores with each other, they lose out on taking a united stand to pressurise Islamabad to address their genuine long pending political and economic grievances.

Impact of Sectarianism in Gilgit-Baltistan Region

The region has, however, paid a heavy price under Pakistani occupation. It is reported that, as of January 2001, the old population ratio of 1:4 (non-locals to locals) has now changed to 3:4 (non-locals to locals).44 The Shia pockets of Skardu and Gilgit are witnessing a constant increase in the population of non-Shias. The Pakistani administration has also been involved in efforts to alter the demographic profile of region, reducing the indigenous people to a minority. It is estimated that more than thousands of lives have been lost since the sectarian conflicts surfaced in this region in 1988.45

The entire region does not have any kind of industry and over 85 per cent of the people live below the poverty line.46 Due to the limited means of earning a livelihood, the people of this region mostly depend on government offered jobs and on the tourism industry. The latter has however been badly effected as a result of conflict, which also prevents both foreign and local investors from investing in the region. This in turn increases unemployment, giving rise to further lawlessness and violence in the society.47The region is caught in a vicious cycle and sectarian violence has become a major internal security threat to the Gilgit-Baltistan region.

Conclusion

Gilgit-Baltistan is legally and constitutionally an integral part of India. Unfortunately, successive Indian governments have maintained a stoic silence over the happenings there. Sectarian violence in the region is an attempt by the Pakistani establishment to deny the local residents their legitimate rights by embroiling them in internecine war. By denying Gilgit-Baltistan a constitutional identity, depriving its residents of political rights and recourse to justice and administering it through a highly centralised bureaucracy, Pakistan has created an environment in which increasing numbers, particularly youth, have no outlet to express themselves except through sectarian conflict.

Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s mention of supporting voices from Balochistan and Gilgit during his 2016 Independence Day speech was seen as a positive signal of a shift in Indian foreign policy. India needs to explore mechanisms to communicate its support to Gilgit-Baltistan’s people. It is high time that India’s diplomatic channels reach out to the voices of GilgitBaltistan.

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11 Muhammad Zakir Khan Azmi, “Dialogue between Shia and Sunni,” Himal South Asia (Katmandu), May, 2004, p. 17.

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13 Anwar H. Syed, “The Sunni-Shia Conflict in Pakistan,” in Hafeez Malik (eds.) Pakistan: Founder’s Aspiration and Today’s Realities (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 249.

14 Ibid.

15 Ibid, p. 250.

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17 FaustoBiloslavo, “Pakistan: the Threat of Islamic radicalism: Part II,” Cemiss Quarterly (Roma: Military Centre for Strategic Studies), Autumn 2005, p.66.

18 Mukhtar Ahmad Ali, “Sectarian Conflict in Pakistan: A Case Study of Jhang,” Policy Paper (Colombo: RCSS), Issue 9, January 2000. http://www.rcss.org//policy.html

19 FebeArmanios, “Islam: Sunnis and Shiites,” CRS Report of Congress, February 23, 2004, p. 2.

20 Ibid.

21 Are Knudsen, “Political Islam in South Asia,” C. Michelsen Institute Report (Bergen: Norway), No. 14, 2002, p. 32.

22 Muhammad QasimZaman, n.22, p. 693.

23 N.J. Coulson, A history of Islamic Law (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1964),pp. 113-19.

24 Samina Ahmad, “The Unholy Nexus? Newsline (Karachi), September 1998, p. 249.

25 AfakHaydar, “The Politicization of the Shias and the Development of the Tehrik-e-Nifazz-e-Fiqh-e-Jafaria in Pakistan” in Charles H. Kennedy, (ed.), Pakistan 1992 (Boulder Westview Press, 1993), p. 76.

26 ImtiazGul, The Unholy Nexus: Pak-Afghan Relations under the Taliban (Lahore: Vanguard, 2002), p.100.

27  S.V. R. Nasr, “The Rise of Sunni Militancy in Pakistan: The Changing Role of Islamism and the Ulama in Society and Politics,” Modern Asian Studies (Cambridge), Vol. 34, No. 1, 2000, p. 163.

28 Muhammad Sikandar Khan, “Religious Fundamentalism in Pakistan,” Studying Islam, March 5, 2005. http://www.studying-islam.org/articletext.aspx?id=949

29 “Sectarianism: Tentacles of Hatred,” TheHerald (Karachi), 2001, p. 32.

30 Aziz Ali Dad, “The Sectarian Spectre in Gilgit-Baltistan-Part II”, PAMIR TIMES July 13, 2017.

31 Mohammed Shehzad, “Textbook Controversy in Gilgit,” The Friday Times (Lahore), July 4-10, 2003.

32 “The State of Sectarianism in Pakistan”, ICG Asia Report (Brussels/Islamabad), No. 95, April 18, 2005.

33 Tariq Rahman, “The Madrassa and the State of Pakistan Religion, Poverty and the Potential for Violence in Pakistan,” Himal South Asia, February, 2004. http://www.himalmag.com/2004/february/essay.htm

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35 Muhammad QasimZaman, n.22, p. 690.

36 Ibid.

37 S. Irfani, “Pakistan’s Sectarian Violence Between the Arabist Shift and Indo-Persian Culture,” in Satu P. Limaye, Mohan Malik, Robert G. Wirsing (eds.), Radicalism and Security in South Asia (Honolulu, Hawaii : Asia-Pacific Center for Security  Studies, 2004 ), p. 150.

38 William Maley, The Afghanistan Wars (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002).

39 Behuria, Ashok , “Sunni-Shia Relations in Pakistan: The Widening Divide”, Strategic Analysis (New Delhi: IDSA), Vol. 28 No. 1, 2004, pp. 157–176.

40 ICG, “The State of Sectarianism in Pakistan,” Asia ICG report No. 95 (Islamabad/Brussels: International Crisis Group), April 18, 2005.

41 M Ismail Khan, “Demystifying Kashmir”, The News, January 23 2006.

42  Satinder Kumar Lambah, The Tragic History of Gilgit-Baltistan since 1947″ Indian Foreign Affairs      Journal Vol. 11, No. 3, July-September 2016, p.234.

43  Abdul SattarKhan,“AJK, Fata, GB, Capital Population Goes up Many a Time”, The News, 08 April 2012.

44 DebidattaAurobindaMahapatra, SeemaShekhawat, Kashmir AcrossLoC (New Delhi: Gyan Publication, 2008), p.120.

45 S armad Abbas and Imtiaz Ali Taj, “Brothers with Arms”, The Herald, April 2005, p.63.

46 P. Stobdan, D. SubaChandran (eds.), The Last Colony: Muzaffarabad-Gilgit-Baltistan (New Delhi:       India Research Press, 2008).

47 Ershad Mahmud, “Challenges before the New Government in NAs”, The News December 11, 2004.

 

(Dr.Vivek Kumar Mishra holds Ph.D. from School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi and is currently working as Assistant Professor and Head of the Department of Political Science and International Relations in Gautam Buddha University, Greater Noida, Uttar Pradesh. He can be reached at mishrajnu@gmail.com)

(This article is carried in the print edition of March- April 2018 issue of India Foundation Journal.)

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