Introduction

Conventional wars are not the norms or strategic choice for state on state conflicts due to huge cost and collateral damages. As a result grey zone conflicts, which fall in duality of neither war nor peace, are becoming new arena of strategic competition between states. Cross border terrorism is a conflict that falls in the category of grey zone conflict. It is an undeclared war and considered to be highest form of strategy to bleed a nation for prolonged period by small efforts. It is an asymmetric war strategy employed by an adversary at a point in time when it cannot compete on a traditional battlefield, and adversary looks to where you are vulnerable.1 In this war the principle followed by an adversary is to avoid to go at the enemy blow by blow, strength against strength since it is considered un-strategic.2 India has unresolved borders with two of its nuclear neighbours and surrounded by politically, economically and militarily unstable nations. The state and non-state actors have taken advantage of such a scenario to cause military and economic friction to weaken India internally.

India has land borders with six countries, and except for Bhutan, the threat of terrorists, insurgents and criminals illegally crossing over always remain a possibility. Out of the total 29 states of India except for five states, rest all states have either maritime boundary or land border with other nations. 17 Indian States have border with other countries and 9 states have maritime boundary (Gujarat & West Bengal have both international border and maritime boundary as well). There are only five states that have no access to international border by land or by ocean/ sea. Of these five states, four of them are facing Left Wing Extremism. Such a geographical disposition is an advantage but also becomes a vulnerability especially when certain nations are not favourably disposed towards India. Major General AfsirKarim writes that, terrorism in India takes two forms: one is of domestic origin, the other is terrorism that is sponsored by external agencies. The domestic terrorist threats in India basically arise from separatist tendencies, ethnic and linguistic demands, religious radicalism, socioeconomic deprivation, and, at times, bad governance.3 Insurgency in the North East is surviving since 1950s primarily due to its external linkages. Terrorism in Punjab had its root in Pakistan when Khalistan terrorists were armed, trained and supported by ISI. The objective was to strike at the food bowl of India and to create secessionist movement across the northern states of India. Similarly, Pakistan sponsored cross border terrorism in Jammu & Kashmir has become one of the major internal security threats. The Problem with such a prolonged conflict is that it has the potential to spill over to other states on the basis of religion, community and perception of just cause to pick up arms for unresolved grievances of the people. Another dimension of cross border terrorism through maritime boundary was added during 26/11 terror attack when Pakistan sponsored terrorists struck at Mumbai, the financial capital of India. Thus not only contiguous Border States with land borders with other countries are vulnerable today to the cross border terrorism but even the coastal areas are equally vulnerable that has critical infrastructure of vital importance. Asia Economic Institute study which calculated that the overall damage to India’s economy in the wake of the Mumbai attacks was about $100 billion arising from crucial institutions, such as the stock exchanges, commodities, money markets, and business and commercial establishments which remained closed.4 Such attacks also impact future investment potential and the insecure environment that gets created have enduring psychological impact on the citizenry of the state. It is assessed that Foreign Direct Investment was hit by an estimated $20 billion5 post Mumbai terror attacks. Prof Daniel L. Byman of Georgetown University wrote that, “Terror itself is often a tool of war, used to sow an atmosphere of fear and undermine governments”.6 Cross border terrorism has become a part of new wars because conventional wars have become unaffordable due to lethality and cost. In a nutshell North East, Jammu & Kashmir and Punjab have emerged as the main threat to cross border terrorism. All the three are concentrated at the outer limits of India adjoining a neighbouring country that has the desire and the ability to create problems in India’s internal security.7 Threat to maritime boundary of India is now more than ever because that gives deniability to inimical states for sponsoring terrorism.

Factors Giving Impetus to Cross Border Terrorism

Terrorist groups and insurgents do not emerge from nowhere, they emerge out of social, cultural, political, economic, communal and religious fault lines. Al-Qaeda and ISIS are products of regional wars that now aspire for political space and a Caliphate on religious grounds. These organisations got political, religious and logistic support from the nations that wanted them to be used as strategic assets to pursue their perceived vital national interests. However, some of these organisations grew in strength and became autonomous and spiraled out of control of their sponsors. The factors that give impetus to the cross border terrorism are as under:-

 Geography assists in border transgression and infiltration of terrorists. Proximity of vulnerable areas to a rogue nation ensures continuous flow of terrorists and war like support to sustain momentum of conflict.

 Identical ethnic demography gives support and sustenance to the terrorists during and post infiltration.

 Political patronage to terror movement is provided by network of unarmed terrorists, over ground workers and separatists so that they can establish linkages and identity with the larger population of a community.

 Poor and corrupt governance gives space for non-state actors to create a conducive environment on ground for making it a popular mass movement.

 Subverted government institutions give impetus by their inactions and inability to protect vital public space.

 Unsettled borders, competing strategic interests, unstable or ungoverned territories in the neighbouring countries and spillover effect of communal or religious conflict in these countries also adds to the vulnerability from cross border terrorism.

 Illegal and mass displacement of population due to communal and economic reasons also adds to the vulnerability.

 Children of war or conflict are easy cannon fodder and can be motivated to pursue the agenda of state and non-state actors.

 Lack of stability and contiguous land border with hostile nations is one of the major causes of cross border terrorism.

 Most important is the factor of availability of willing terror recruits. Ideal situation is when the terror recruits are available on both sides of the international borders. The case of J&K is an apt example where you have terror factories on both sides and they operate in tandem with each other.

 The motivation for terrorists on both sides is different, foreign terrorists join the conflict due to religion, economic reasons, identical ethnic affiliation and a perceived notion of just cause for Jihad. The domestic terrorists in addition to the factors attracting foreign terrorists is also due to political alienation, personal failure and an escape route for redemption in society and to fight for self-determination/ homeland.

 Nexus between drug cartels, gun runners and terror organisations give a source of funding and sustenance.
The motivation for involvement of a foreign power to continue with the cross border terrorism or proxy war comes from the fact that fighting wars is uneconomical, but it is always a wise course of option to make the opponent waste as much of the resources as possible.8 Cross border terrorism does give an adversary deniability and no collateral damage as a blow back impact. Thus, it is a cheap war to achieve high dividends at low risk. Cross border terrorism is considered to be part of grey zone conflict; with the passage of time these conflicts are becoming sophisticated and complex. There is a possibility that cross border terrorism if not handled with efficiency and precision could go on to become a hybrid war.

Nature of Threat from Cross Border Terrorism

Monopoly of the state over wars is reducing and non-state actors with or without support of the states are now taking control of proxy wars, or grey zone conflicts making new wars ambiguous and difficult to fight. Terror is not only state sponsored but it also manifests due to political aspirations of terror organisations based on religious or communal ideology. Islamic state and al-Qaeda are terror organisation that have long-term political objectives to create Islamic State. Cross border terrorism features unconventional tactics, from cyberattacks to propaganda and political warfare, to economic coercion and sabotage, to sponsorship of armed proxy fighters, to creeping military expansionism.9 The tactics adopted by the non-state actors or terror organisations is shrouded in misinformation and deception,10 thus making it extremely difficult for the conventional forces to defeat or eliminate it. Their objective is to create a sense of invincibility and perception of just war by prolonged engagement.

The threat of cross border terrorism is military and nonmilitary in nature. Threat is against the infrastructure, democratic institutions, economic institutions, law enforcing agencies, coercion of masses by threat to life, threat to cultural heritage, disruption of communication, threat to international community and multinational agencies. In fact the target is cognitive, physical, public and private space. The threat is not only restricted from land, it now can manifest from air (swarm drone attack), from the sea (26/11), on the high sea, cyber and psychological space. It can be composite threat consisting of cyber, perception and physical attack simultaneously or it can be sequential. Surprise is the biggest weapon for terrorists.

Today even perception and cyber war should also be categorised as cross border terrorism because cyber and perception war can cause greater damage than the physical attack. The strategy adopted by Pakistan in Kashmir is to destroy culture, history, cohesion among various communities, the enshrined values of Kashmiriyat and the moderate Islam by imposing a hardlineSalafi- Wahhabi Islam that is not indigenous to the Kashmir valley. Now cross border terrorism is attacking the established order and grass root democracy. It is detrimental to the basic tenant of existence of a state. The objective is to create anarchy and uncontrolled chaos thereby demonstrating to the world that people of Kashmir or conflict area have rejected the democratic institutions or have no faith in the established order.

Military and Non Military Response Options

There is no moral taint in fighting against the adversary in a similar manner the way adversary has chosen to fight. Gijs de Vries, an expert on cross border terrorism said, “We are familiar with terrorism. But indiscriminate, cross-border, religiously motivated terrorism is new.” We need to first understand that, national security in the contemporary era is not cheap, it requires long term investment. When we talk about response it need not be military in nature, it requires a whole of nation approach. It requires theoretical understanding of the new wars that are fought in grey zones and below the threshold of conventional wars. The problem of cross border terrorism is when it is deemed to be a military problem without developing capabilities of the military to fight this new war that is highly sophisticated. This war cannot be fought with conventional capabilities and without infusion of technology and well researched perception warfare. The focus is primarily on elimination of terrorists and rarely on elimination of terrorism. If we examine it empirically, India has done very little to end the cross border terrorism because it can be eliminated when the root of terrorism is eliminated or threatened by making state and non-state actors pay the price for their culpability. Pakistan is aware that India will not retaliate and take actions against the rogue agencies or against the ideologues, as a result the fear of retribution is not there. Unless the source of energy of terrorism is attacked elimination of terrorists in Kashmir will yield little result. One surgical strike is not enough. The strike has to be through multiple channels to make the ideologues and rogue agencies unsafe and dry up their source of funding. There are following fundamental structural flaws in handling cross border terrorism in India;

 As on date the cross border terrorism is being handled by multiple agencies operating under different ministries, as a result the entire efforts of fighting cross border terrorism lacks synergy. Intelligence agencies and Central Armed Police Forces are operating under Ministry of Home Affairs, Army under Ministry of Defence and police under state government. All operations of critical nature must be handled under single operational command who has the resources and capability to influence the outcome of operations.

 The intelligence must function under the operational commander and it cannot be operating under bureaucracy or National Security Advisor through remote control. It must be first accountable to commanders on the ground and then to the rest because it is the field commander who is going to act on that intelligence. The consequences of delayed intelligence will be faced by men on the ground.

 Lack of military and strategic culture among the political leadership is leading to our lackluster approach in dealing with cross border terrorism. There is little indication that Indian leaders have even thought through the question of how they want to apply military force and to what purpose or that they have given any direction to the Indian military11in J&K or North East. The cross border terrorism cannot be classified as simple terrorism shooting with the AK 47. It is today convergence of technology, perception, cyber and raw military power. Thus a deeper understanding of conceptual aspect for fighting this war is must. The leadership must understand that it is non-military and military in character and creates a crisis on many fronts.12

 In the last 30 years not even one Pakistani terrorist has been given life or death penalty for waging war against India. In 2010 there were more than 100 Pakistani terrorists arrested over a period of time during encounters or injured in encounter. Some of them have either been repatriated back to Pakistan or are still in jails. There is no deterrence of law and as a result the recruitment continues uninterrupted.

 Former Defense Secretary of US, Leon E. Panetta warned that state and non-state actors are capable of creating “cyber-Pearl Harbor”.13 The loss and destruction can be unimaginable. Therefore, cross border terrorism through cyber threat has huge potential. Exploitation of cyber, perception and social media space by and large has remained uncontested. Pakistan and its proxies have been able to completely dominate this space and have used it to create anti India sentiment among the people. More cyber and social media platforms have been exploited by proxies of Pakistan to radicalise youth woman and children. There is no political direction or long term policy for dealing with cross border terrorism and as a consequence the Indian approach can at best be called fragmented.
Military Options

 Doctrine for Cross Border Terrorism (Grey Zone Conflict): All complex operations are required to have doctrines and concept of operations. Our approach more often is adhoc and without getting into theoretical understanding of the conflict. Doctrines act as guiding principle and assist a nation in forecasting and working out future course of actions so that a nation is not surprised by the adversary and there is no capability gap that may arise due to inability to visualise. Doctrine of punitive deterrence or proactive defence for waging undeclared war must be formalised.

 Border Surveillance: It is not possible to monitor and keep entire borders under surveillance through human intelligence. It is time for India to keep vulnerable areas on land, sea and air under electronic and digital surveillance. It would require military grade satellite, aerial drones, radars and even hand held devices such as Long-Range Observation Systems (LOROS) or Hand Held Thermal Imagers (HHTIs).

 Counter Infiltration Grid: Counter infiltration grid in J&K and North East must have accountability and unity of command. With non-state actors becoming more and more sophisticated in their operations, the response mechanism has become complex and require sophistication in intelligence gathering and speedy response. Reactive and smart fence concept must be brought in phases. Sooner or later we will have to bring in the concept of air cavalry to improve reaction time along the borders and in depth areas. The current night fighting capabilities of troops engaged in cross border terrorism are inadequate and thus it needs improvement.

 Capability Development to Fight Cross Border Terrorism: Cross border terrorism is an act of war and fall in the category of military operational domain. Future wars will be willy-nilly in the domain of grey zone conflict that could get upgraded to hybrid threat. India must move in the direction of specialisation of military to fight this new emerging threat. So far we have been fighting irregulars with regular and conventional capabilities which is a flawed and fatigued strategy. Such capabilities require long term vision and investment. Endeavour should be to prevent cross border terrorism becoming a hybrid war.

 Precision Engagement Capabilities: Precision engagement can only come when the ground forces have the wherewithal to identify and then engage the target with accuracy. With increase in intensity of trans-border terrorism, precision engagement is an ideal tool to strike, because surgical strikes can be used only as an exception and not as routine. Military should also look at alternative means to strike at the terror camps across the Line of Control.

 Niche technology Infusion Is Imperative: The level of threat will increase with terrorists getting access to the technology such as drones, and radiation or dirty bombs. It would require surveillance, detection and neutralisation. Artificial Intelligence modules for intelligence, logistics, perception war and counter radicalisation is becoming a must now.

 Cyber and Information War is here to Stay: Leon E. Panetta had said that there is a threat of hacking of vital systems including critical switches, which could derail trains, disorient air traffic, paralyse banking systems, interference in air defence, radars and marine navigation system. Thus this field require urgent attention so that adequate offensive and defensive capabilities can be developed. It will require military and nonmilitary efforts to develop a robust system.

Non Military Options.

 Enunciation of Clear Foreign Policy: The foreign policy doctrine with respect to cross-border terrorism must be enunciated by the Prime Minister as the executive head of the state.14 Mere criticism is not enough. There is a need to define and declare fall outs of continuation of cross border terrorism. It must be made clear that it will be deemed an undeclared war by inimical forces. Though we may be late in doing so but there should be no hesitation in declaring it.

 War of Perception – A Highly Specialised Field: War of perception is a potent tool and terrorists and ideologues have been able to exploit it in Kashmir. It has been one of the main source of radicalisation and mobilisation of civil population for Intifada. The government policy to deal with war of perception has been incoherent and inconsistent as a result, ISI and separatist have been able to take advantage of this vacuum. To plan and execute perception war there are certain fundamental principles such as credible information, continuous and sustained flow of perception management contents, mass engagement and creation of positive narrative. It would require research, confidentiality and credible agencies for wider acceptability.

 Security of Human Resource Assets: The State has to ensure that the own constituency is protected and not allowed to be targeted by the terrorists. One of the main mission of the cross border terrorism is to disrupt and erode the established order and eliminate those who are seen to be working to undermine the efforts of proxies and terrorists. Killing of prominent citizens and grass-root politicians is detrimental to strengthen the established order. Terrorists cannot be allowed to force rejection of democratic process by violence and coercion.

 Legal Provisions: Cross border terrorism is a war being waged against the nation. The government must create separate court for war crimes and take all such cases out of the state for speedy trial. If need be, government could bring appropriate Ordinance or Act to try all foreigners by special courts, especially when they are engaged in waging war against India. Terrorism is not an adventure game. The deterrence has to be imposed or else it cements the perception that you can attack India without any exemplary punishment for the crime.
 Fighting through Global Institutions & Co-operations: The history of counter-terrorism suggests that all states, regardless of public pronouncements to the contrary, will strike deals with foreign terrorists in order to keep their own citizens safe from attack.15 Not with standing, inimical state and rogue agencies should be kept under pressure diplomatically. The diplomatic initiative and cooperation with Bangladesh and Myanmar has yielded results and large number of terrorists were handed over to the Government of India and the safe havens have been denied to the prominent secessionist and insurgent leaders. This can be considered a huge success and pressure on Pakistan must be maintained.

Conclusion
The unique nature of India’s terrorist problem, which is both of a cross-border and state-sponsored variety and its closest fellow-victim is Israel.16There is no alternative to building capabilities of the armed forces to fight sophisticated cross border terrorism and grey zone conflict. It will be a cardinal mistake if the government keeps military out of the loop of decision making. They must respect and value military advice in a structured manner.
The biggest failure in Kashmir to manage conflict has been political because they failed to take advantage of negative peace (a period immediately after the conflict where violence may have ended but the conflict resolution is yet to take place) between 2006 to 2010. Management of negative peace is vital since it is fragile and has the potential of reversal. India has been a reluctant power and New Delhi is still concerned of escalation. As long as India continues to fear escalation, it has little chance of deterring Pakistan’s support for cross-border terrorism.17 India needs to evolve an integrated approach to deal with this complex problem. The conflict should be dealt with through an integrated approach and debated academically.

References:

1 AnjaKaspersen, Espen Barth Eide& Philip Shetler-Jones, 10 trends for the future of warfare, World Economic Forum, Nov 03, 2016.
2 Robert Greene, The 33 Strategies of War, Viva Books, 2006, p 103.
3 Major General (Retired) AfsirKarim, Terrorist Threats in India, Science and Technology to Counter Terrorism: Proceedings of an Indo-U.S. Workshop, Published by The National Academies Press, 2007.
4 DilipBobb, The fast lane: Economic cost of terror, Financial Express, January 25, 2015.
5 Ibid
6 Daniel L. Byman, How war drives terrorism, Brookings, June 23, 2016.
7 Harshit Singh Jadoun, Cross Border Terrorism And Home Grown Militancy, Published on November 14, 2015, Accessed from https://www.lawctopus.com/academike/cross-border-terrorism-home-grown-militancy/ on June 17, 2018.
8 Greene N 2
9 Hal Brands, Paradoxes of the Grey Zone, Foreign Policy Research Institute, Feb 05, 2016.
10 Ibid.
11 Rajesh Rajagopalan, India’s clueless deterrence “strategy”, Observer Research Foundation, Mar 09 2018.
12 Colonel Qiao Liang and Colonel Wang Xiangsui, Unrestricted War, Beijing, 1998.
13 Elisabeth Bumiller and Thom Shanker, Panetta Warns of Dire Threat of Cyberattack on US, New York Times, Oct 11, 2012
14 Dhruv C Katoch, Combatting Cross-Border Terrorism: Need for a Doctrinal Approach, CLAWS Journal Winter 2013, p 9.
15 PremMahadevan, India and the global discourse on state-sponsored terrorism, Observer Research Foundation, Dec 20, 2017.
16 Ibid.
17 Rajgopalan, N 11.

(Brig. Narender Kumar (Retd) is a former Infantry officer and currently a Distinguished Fellow at The United Service Institution of India.

(This article is carried in the print edition of July-August 2018 issue of India Foundation Journal.)

Introduction

November 26, 2018 will mark the 10thanniversary of the Mumbai attack when ten terrorists from Pakistan landed on the shores of Mumbai and carried out a coordinated attack killing 166 persons and injuring scores. The attack had not only made India aware of the enormity of threats from the sea but also propelled the Government to undertake a series of measures to overhaul the coastal security of the country. While implementation of these security measures over the years has improved the security of the country’s coasts, but possibility of an attack from the sea continues to remain a clear and present danger. Presently, India’s coasts face threats that are primarily sub-conventional in nature. Terrorist attacks causing extensive damage to life and property is one of the most potent of these threats. These terror attacks can take place in various forms. For example, like in Mumbai terrorists can sneak into the Indian waters in the guise of fishermen and carry out attacks on coastal cities and also on strategic installations located along the coast.

The episode of failed hijacking of the Pakistani naval ships by terrorists indicates that radicalised elements of the state forces can be commandeered by terrorist groups to launch attacks on ports and ships.1 On September 6, 2014 the operatives of the al-Qaeda in the Subcontinent (AQIS), an outfit of the al-Qaeda tried to capture two Pakistani naval ships, PNS Zulfiqar and PNS Aslat, from the naval dockyard with an intention to attack the US oil tanker, USS Supply, as well as the frigates which were guarding it. In a communiqué, the group claimed that the attack was carried out by Pakistani serving naval officers and not by intruders as projected by the Pakistani authorities.2 Other scenarios could involve terrorists ramming an explosive laden boat against an oil tanker or a port thereby causing extensive oil spills and blocking navigational channels as it happened with an oil tanker, M V Limburg, off the Yemeni coast in 2002.3 Terrorists can also target vital installation using rockets and missiles from sea based platforms. Any such attack would not only cause enormous loss of men and material but can also potentially cripple the country’s economy.

While the world since long has been witnessing various forms of maritime terrorism perpetrated by various rebel and terrorist groups such as the Palestinian, Sri Lankan Tamil, Filipino and Irish insurgents as well as al-Qaeda and Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT), the RAND terrorism database reveal that sea borne attacks have constituted only two per cent of all international terrorist related incidents over the last 30 years.4 Experts believe that terrorist groups have not been able to fully exploit the maritime domain primarily because – a) operating at sea requires specialised training, skills and assets, b) the high cost and unpredictable nature of the domain constrain cash strapped terrorist groups from undertaking maritime operations, and c) the mobile and relatively ‘out of sight’ nature of the maritime targets, which fail to elicit the kind of publicity usually desired by terrorist groups.5
Despite these considerations, concerns about sea borne terrorist attacks have heightened the world over in the past two decades, given a modest yet evident increase in high-profile terrorist attacks and plots at sea. These incidents have galvanised fears that terrorists, especially militants connected with the international jihadist network, are moving to decisively extend operational mandates beyond purely territorially bounded theatres.6
Reasons behind choosing sea route for terror attacks:A combination of factors have contributed to the decision of the terrorist groups and networks to shift to the sea. Some of them are detailed below:

Secure land borders: Unlike the sea, every inch of the land is under the jurisdiction of a sovereign state. Also in recent years, particularly after the September 11, 2001 terror attacks, many governments have invested heavily in the land based homeland security systems. The Indian government has also implemented widespread security measures, including maintaining strict vigil along the borders, erecting border fences and floodlighting them, installing detection and scanning devices at the various land customs stations and immigration check points, and thoroughly checking goods and people at the entry and exit points along the borders.7 These kinds of elaborate security arrangements serve as a major deterrence for criminals and terrorist groups alike to travel and operate over land. For example, if one has to send a consignment from Pakistan to Thailand over land, the consignment has to pass through several well-guarded international borders. On the other hand, if the consignment is sent through the sea route then it will be subjected to checks only at two places – port of exit and port of entry. But if the consignment is a contraband, then it can be put on a craft, launched clandestinely, sail and land at a suitable landing point in Thailand without being interdicted throughout.

Ungoverned seas: The maritime domain, most of which takes the form of high seas, lie beyond the jurisdiction of any one state. Consequently, policing is lax and difficult in the sea. The Freedom of Navigation8 codified in the United Nations Convention on Laws of Seas (UNCLOS) provides that every sovereign state, whether coastal or landlocked, has the right to sail ships carrying its flag in the high seas and shall not suffer interference from other states. No ship can be intercepted, boarded or searched unless and until it is firmly grounded on the suspicion that it is involved in piracy or transferring slaves or engaging in unauthorised broadcasting and the consent of the flag state is acquired. If seizure of a ship is carried out without adequate grounds, then the State which has seized the vessel has to pay heavy compensation to the state whose flag the seized ship was flying. Thus, international conventions put constraints on policing the high seas.

9Unpatrolled coastal waters:While the high seas remain unregulated, the territorial sea and the contiguous zone are subjected to the sovereignty of the coastal states and therefore are governed by their laws, rules and regulations. However, here also international conventions and practices restrict the authority of the coastal state. The right of innocent passage10 to foreign ships through territorial waters obliges the states to allow ships to sail too close to the shores as well as prohibits them from boarding and searching ships without prior permission. In addition, the trend to employ large numbers of Privately Contracted Armed Security Personnel (PCASP) by shipping companies and their functioning has resulted in insecurity and threats because most often than not the PCASP do not adhere to specified guidelines.11 Absence of well-defined international regulations regarding the employment and operation of PCASP jeopardises security in the coastal waters. The MV EnricaLexie incident of February 2012 where two fishermen from Kerala were killed by Italian marines off the coast of Kerala is a case in point.12
Most coastal countries, including India are also struggling to secure their coastal waters because of technological constraints, shortage of manpower and resource crunch. In recent years, there has been an increase in the maritime activities as a result of which the coastal waters are dotted with numerous big and small vessels. Boarding and searching each and every vessel for suspected persons or contraband is next to impossible. To address this problem, the Government of India has made it mandatory for every vessel which is more than 20 meters in length to be fitted with Automatic Identification System (AIS). It is also made mandatory for the ships entering Indian territorial waters to furnish pre-arrival notice (PAN) to concerned authorities. But the authorities are finding it hard to monitor them as ships fitted with AIS manipulate data. In recent years, there has been 30 per cent increase in ships reporting false identities world over.13 There is also a growing tendency among merchant ships to shut down AIS, and ‘go dark’ and spoofing i.e. generate false transmissions. These practices seriously undermine the capabilities of the authorities to track and monitor potentially dangerous vessels. This problem is further compounded by the fact that small boats, do not have any identification and tracking devices making it impossible for the authorities to monitor them.14 This constraint allows criminals and terrorists to hide their crafts and blend effortlessly among the fishermen.

Furthermore, all organisations involved in coastal security are coping with the problem of manpower and assets shortages, but it is more acute in the case of marine police which is at the cutting edge. The Coastal Security Scheme (CSS), which resulted in the establishment of Marine Police Force, mandates that the coastal states and union territories should sanction adequate executive and technical manpower to man the coastal police stations and carry out coastal patrolling. Unfortunately, many states do not sanction the stipulated numbers of posts for the coastal police stations. In places where posts are announced, the state administrations find it difficult to recruit personnel as there are either few takers for the job owing to high risk involved or persons with required qualifications are not found. Consequently, these posts remain vacant. The issue is more severe in the case of technical posts as it is difficult to find people with the technical expertise to operate and maintain boats. Although fishermen proficient in handling boats are preferred, but because of lack of awareness and required educational qualifications they do not get selected. In order to address this problem, a scheme to recruit retired navy and coast guard personnel in the technical posts was launched, but it has not proved to be a complete success. While recruitment of coast guard and navy personnel has taken place in all coastal states, in most cases the state governments have not been able to retain them. Absence of suitable rank and remuneration given to the retired personnel is one of the main reasons for large scale attrition in the technical work force.15
Besides manpower shortage, lack of infrastructure such as patrolling boats also hampers patrolling of the coastal waters. Under the CSS, fast interceptor boats along jeeps and motorcycles have been sanctioned to the Marine Police. In reality, many coastal police stations are yet to receive them. In places, where boats have been delivered, absence of technical manpower to operate and maintain the boats have made them ineffective. Most boats also do not operate because of lack of fuel. The amount sanctioned by the Union government is not adequate to operate the boats on a daily basis and the state governments are either unable or unwilling to provide additional fuel citing financial crunch. Improper repair and maintenance of the boats in case of severe wear and tear is also an issue. Faulty repair of engines and other functional parts by the agency has rendered a number of boats unusable.16 As a result coastal waters of the country remain unpatrolled. In fact, CAG reports have highlighted that there is 85 to 95 per cent shortfall in daily patrolling of coastal waters by the marine police in the coastal states. 17
Conduits for smuggling arms and terrorists: The quest for an accessible and flexible maritime trade has discouraged enactment of stringent maritime security regime, thereby providing terrorists with a viable conduit for covert movement of weapons and personnel. This is quite apparent in the practice of flag of convenience or open registry. Presently, more than half of the world’s merchant ships operate under flag of convenience, in which a merchant ship is registered in a country other than the ship owner’s. The purpose for this practice is to reduce overhead charges or to evade regulations of the owner’s country. Panama, Liberia, and Marshall Islands offer open registry and their flags account for almost 40% of the entire world fleet.18 Flag of convenience is considered detrimental for security and is criticised on the ground that a) most of the states offering open registry are not signatories to important international maritime conventions and have low levels of maritime regulations and, b) most of them do not have the ability or the inclination to enforce rules and regulations, c) open registry makes it difficult to establish genuine links between the real ship owner and the flag of the ship.19 These gaps allows ship owners to be legally anonymous and evade prosecution in civil and criminal actions. Taking advantage of these loopholes, some ships with flags of convenience have been found engaging in crime such as arms smuggling, trafficking of narcotics and people, and other illegal activities. The most recent case being the one in which the Indian coast guard intercepted a Ship MV Prince II or MV Hennry which was flying the flag of Panama and was found to be trafficking about 1500 kg of narcotics.20
The innovation of the container shipping has added to the speed and efficiency of the maritime trade.21 However, only a fraction of the containers entering any port is subject to checks. Added to this problem is the fact that many littoral states including India have poor port security systems. India has 207 non-major ports. Of these 64 ports handle EXIM cargo, but only 55 of them are International Ship and Port Security (ISPS) code compliant.22 The security of rest of the non-major ports is a major cause of concern because it is observed that in most of the non-major ports, physical protection arrangements such as deployment of security personnel, fencing of the perimeter, monitoring the access points, installation of screening and detecting machines, etc. do not exist. These ports also fail to routinely vet dock workers, do not insist that “truck drivers present valid identification before entering an offloading facility, and frequently over-look the need to ensure that all cargo is accompanied by an accurate manifest”23. The absence of uniform and concerted dockside safeguards works to the direct advantage of the terrorists, because it is virtually impossible to inspect containers once they are on the high seas and secondly only a tiny fraction of boxed freight is actually checked on arrival at its destination.
High value maritime targets: The age-old hunt for publicity remains the primary objective of any terrorist group to attack. Sea based terrorism provides the terrorists an additional means to inflict coercive punishment with maximum publicity. While huge tankers and ships in high seas away from population centres and news cameras are not preferred targets, cruise ships and passenger ferries plying in coastal waters are relevant because they cater to large numbers of people who are confined in a single physical space and are inherently vulnerable. Targeting these high prestige iconic targets not only cause massive loss of life but elicit considerable media attention as desired by the terrorist groups. The bombing of the SuperFerry 14 in the Philippines graphically underscores how easily mass casualties could result from a concerted attack against passenger shipping.24 Similarly, there are many cities, industrial and commercial centres as well as strategic installations such as naval bases, atomic power plants and rocket launching centres along the coast, which are potential high value targets for terrorists.
Economic disruptions: Terrorist groups like al- Qaeda recognise the economic impact of an attack which would shut down a port or choke important sea lanes of communication. Such an attack would disrupt the “just in time” mechanics of global maritime trade complex and could cause massive economic slump. The attack on MV Limburg in 2002 off the coast of Yemen is a case in point. The image of the burning oil tanker not only provided spectacular visuals but also directly contributed to a short-term collapse of international shipping business in the Gulf. The Yemeni economy lost an estimated $3.8 million a month in port revenues as war risks premiums levied on ships calling in Aden was tripled.25
In sum, the international laws advocating freedom of navigation and right to innocent passage in territorial sea have inadvertently facilitated the abuse of the maritime domain by terrorist groups to move their operatives and dangerous weaponry with ease, while at the same time putting constraints on coastal states in vigorously pursuing security measures. To further aggravate the precarious situation, inability of the coastal states to maintain law and order and security in their territorial waters because of inadequate resource and manpower as well as technological limitations have added to their vulnerability to terrorist strikes.
Ensuring Coastal Security
Given that India has been a victim of sea borne terrorism which resulted in massive loss of life and property and given that terrorist attacks from the sea remain a potential threat, the country has to remain ever vigilant against threats from the sea. As mentioned above, following the Mumbai attack of 2008, the Government of India has implemented a slew of measures to reduce, counter and eliminate threats of attack from sea. Some of these measures include strengthening the system of multi-layer patrolling and surveillance involving the navy, the coast guard, the marine police, the customs and an informal layer of fishermen; ensuring gapless electronic surveillance of the shores and coastal waters by establishing the Coastal Surveillance Network (CSN) and National Automatic Identification System (NAIS); installing ISPS code and vessel traffic management system in various ports and shipping channels for regulating maritime traffic and preventing potentially dangerous cargoes from entering the ports; installing navigation and communication devices on vessels more than 20 meters, their online registration, and issuance of biometric cards to fishermen and coastal villagers for the safety and security of the fishing vessels and their crew; and establishing the Information Management and Analysis Centre (IMAC) for enhancing maritime domain awareness.
Furthermore, the Government, in recent years, has reviewed and revised the Indian maritime laws to provide enabling legal framework for mercantile trade and maritime practices for maritime and coastal security. To begin, in April 2012, the Regulation of Entry Ships into (Ports, Anchorages and Offshore facilities) Rules, 201226 was notified to check and prevent entry of ships without valid documents into Indian ports and territorial waters. In 2015, the Merchant Shipping (Amendment) Act, 2014 was passed to revise Maritime Labour Standards along with various other sections of Marchant Shipping Act of 1958. In July 2017, the Admiralty (Jurisdiction and Settlement of Maritime Claims) Bill was passed which “provides for prioritisation of maritime claims and maritime liens while providing protection to owners, charterers, operators, crew members and seafarers at the same time”.27 The Act replaced five obsolete British statutes on admiralty jurisdiction in civil matters28 and conferred admiralty jurisdiction on all High Courts of the coastal states of the country.
All these measures have been, to a large extent, effective in making various stakeholders aware of the threats coming from the sea as well as their respective mandates during coastal security operations thereby strengthening coastal security of the country. However, a number of shortcomings have prevented the coastal security mechanism to function optimally. Top down approach and application of some of these measures without proper understanding of the ground realities have created a number of hindrances such as shortage of manpower and resources, inadequate coordination among concerned agencies, lack of proper training, technological constraints, lackadaisical attitude of state governments, etc. The next step for the Government, therefore, is to urgently address these ground situations so that the country’s coast and coastal waters are secured.
References:
1 Syed Raza Hassan and Katharine Houreld, “In attack by al Qaeda, lines blur between Pakistan’s military, militants”, Reuters, October 1, 2014, at https://www.reuters.com/article/us-pakistan-militants-attacks-insight/in-attack-by-al-qaeda-lines-blur-between-pakistans-military-militants-idUSKCN0HP2MM20141001 (Accessed on May 18, 2018)
2 “AQIS claims plot to strike US warships was executed by Pakistani Navy officers”, The Long War Journal, September 18, 2014, at https://csc.asu.edu/2014/09/18/aqis-claims-plot-to-strike-us-warships-was-executed-by-pakistani-navy-officers/ (Accessed on May 18, 2018)
3 “Guantanamo prisoner al-Darbi admits MV Limburg attack”, BBC News, February 20, 2014, at http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-26277556 (Accessed on May 18, 2018)
4 Michael D. Greenberg, et al., “Maritime Terrorism: Risk and Liability”, RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, 2006, p. 9, at http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/ monographs/2006/RAND_MG520.pdf. (Accessed on May 18, 2018).
5 ibid, p. 10-11.
6 Peter Chalk, “The Maritime Dimension of International Security, Terrorism, Piracy, and Challenges
for the United States”, RAND Project Airforce, Santa Monica, 2008, p. xiii,
at https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2008/RAND_MG697.pdf (Accessed on May 18, 2018)
7 “Infiltration along borders”, Unstarred Question No. 2667, LokSabha, August 1, 2017, at http://164.100.47.190/loksabhaquestions/annex/12/AU2667.pdf (Accessed on May 18, 2018).
8 “Article 87- Freedom of the high seas”, Part VII- HIGH SEAS, Section 1-GENERAL PROVISIONS, United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, p. 57. At http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/unclos_e.pdf (Accessed on May 18, 2018)
9 Ibid.
10 “Article 17- Right to Innocent Passage”, Section 3- INNOCENT PASSAGE IN THE TERRITORIAL SEA, SUBSECTION A. RULES APPLICABLE TO ALL SHIPS, United Nations Convention on the Law of the
Sea, p. 57, at http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/unclos_e.pdf (Accessed on
May 18, 2018)
11 “Chapter 2- Maritime Security Imperatives and Influences”, Ensuring Secure Seas: Indian Maritime Security Strategy, (New Delhi; Naval strategic Publication, 2015), p. 41.
12 “Italian Marines case: Two killings at sea, an international legal battle”, The Indian Express, January 20, 2016, at http://indianexpress.com/article/explained/simply-put-2-killings-at-sea-an-international-legal-battle/ (Accessed May 20, 2018)
13 Vijay Sakhuja, “India Reinforces Maritime Domain Awareness”, The Maritime Executive, December 2, 2014, at https://www.maritime-executive.com/article/India-Reinforces-Maritime-Domain-Awareness-2014-12-02#gs.3CGgD1k (Accessed on May 20, 2018)
14 Annual Report 2017-18, Ministry of Home Affairs, New Delhi, 2018, p. 41.
15 Pushpita Das, “Coastal Security: The Indian Experience”, IDSA Monograph Series No. 22, September 2013, pp. 72-73.
16 Ibid.
17 “Odisha achieves 3 per cent patrolling target in 11 years of coastal security scheme: CAG”, The Indian Express, Bhubaneswar, September 26, 2016, at http://indianexpress.com/article/india/india-news-india/odisha-achieves-3-per-cent-patrolling-target-in-11-years-of-coastal-security-scheme-cag-3051552/ (Accessed on May 20, 2018); “CAG: Coastal security plan running behind schedule”, The Times of India, New Delhi, April 9, 2018, at https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/cag-coastal-security-plan-running-behind-schedule/articleshow/63673501.cms (Accessed in May 20, 2018); “CAG report exposes holes in coastal security”, DNA, Mumbai, April 11, 2015, at http://www.dnaindia.com/mumbai/report-cag-report-exposes-holes-in-coastal-security-2076479 (Accessed on May 2018).
18 “Flags of Convenience – Advantages, Disadvantages & Impact on Seafarers”, Sea News, October 27, 2017, at http://seanews.co.uk/flags-of-convenience-advantages-disadvantages-impact-on-seafarers/ (Accessed on May 28, 2018).
19 Michael A. Becker, “The Shifting Public Order of the Oceans: Freedom of Navigation and the Interdiction of Ships at Sea”, Harvard International Law Journal, Volume 46, Number 1, Winter, 2005, pp. 141-142.
20 “Coast guard catches Panamanian ship with 1500 kg heroin worth Rs 3,500 crore off Gujarat coast”, The Indian Express, Mumbai, July 30, 2017, at http://www.newindianexpress.com/nation/2017/jul/30/coast-guard-catches-panamanian-ship-with-1500-kg-heroin-worth-rs-3500-crore-off-gujarat-coast-1635759—1.html (Accessed on May 28, 2018).
21 Michael A. Becker, “The Shifting Public Order of the Oceans: Freedom of Navigation and the Interdiction of Ships at Sea”, n. 18, pp. 141.
22 Annual Report 2016-17, Ministry of Home Affairs, New Delhi, 2018, p. 52.
23 Rupert Herbert-Burns, Sam Bateman and Peter Lehr, (eds.), Lloyd’s MIU Handbook of Maritime Security, (Boca Raton; CRC Press, 2009), P. 119.
24 “Bomb caused Philippine ferry fire” BBC NEWS, October 11, 2004, at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/3732356.stm (Accessed on May 28, 2018).
25 Michael D. Greenberg, et. Al., Maritime Terrorism: Risk and Liability, n. 4, p. 16.
26 Merchant Shipping (Regulation of Entry of Ships into Ports, Anchorages and Offshore facilities) Rules, 2012, at http://www.chennaiport.gov.in/downloads/mer.pdf (Accessed on May 28, 2018).
27 “The Admiralty (Jurisdiction and Settlement of Maritime Claims) Bill, 2017 Passed Unanimously by RajyaSabha”, Press Information of India, July 24, 2017, at http://pib.nic.in/newsite/PrintRelease.aspx?relid=168943 (Accessed on May 28, 2018).
28 Abhay Kumar Singh, “The Admiralty (Jurisdiction and Settlement of Maritime Claims) Bill 2016 – The Long Journey of an Important Maritime Legislation”, IDSA Comment, October 3, 2016, https://idsa.in/idsacomments/admiralty-maritime-claims-bill-2016_aksingh_031016 (Accessed on May 28, 2018).

(Dr.Pushpita Das is a Research Fellow at Institute for Defence Studies and Anlyses (IDSA), New Delhi.)
(This article is carried in the print edition of July-August 2018 issue of India Foundation Journal.)

The challenge of drug trafficking, fake currency, illegal migration, human trafficking and civic unrest amongst others are common law and order issues that are faced by most countries. With time, these crimes have witnessed growing sophistication, given the dramatic improvement in communications. This has brought the benefits of a globalised marketplace to criminal activities.1 Criminal groups have often been the pioneers in innovating new methods and exploring ingenious efficiencies, well before intelligence and law enforcement agencies incorporate the benefits of similar advancement. This globalised outlook of criminal groups has been facilitated by technological innovations. As an illustration, the need to physically move money through couriers is being overtaken by options to pay in cryptocurrencies like Bitcoin, even though it is still a small percentage presently.2 While these issues are common and afflict countries in varying degrees, it is the threat of these criminal activities either indirectly or directly feeding into terrorist networks that poses a much more serious challenge to countries like India. “Transnational organised crime and international terrorism increasingly share both organisational and operational characteristics, and at times even partner with one another.”3 This emanates from symbiotic interests, even if these are not shared, as would be the case in most instances. Often, the core interest of a criminal group is profitability. On the other hand, the primary interest of a terrorist organisation is driven by political or ideological motivations. However, the nexus between crime and terrorism finds active collaboration between the two. As a result, the criminal group gets business opportunities, while a terrorist organisation can employ the existing channels of crime for supporting their activities and generating the requisite funds.

It is critical to make this linkage as crime and terrorism often tend to be treated and addressed in water tight compartments by organisations that tend to function in stove-piped channels, despite being a part of the same state apparatus. This is not only true for their functioning at the tactical level, but also in terms of drafting and implementing legal provisions and collation of intelligence. As a result, agencies often tend to remain satisfied with superficial criminal proceedings resulting in light sentences, given the pursuit of peripheral offences, rather than terrorism. This results in the failure of the enforcement system to act as a deterrent and give a sense of impunity to criminal gangs, which gain the confidence to weather any legal storm that may come their way.
This article will analyse some of these threats in the context of not merely law and order, but more importantly how these crimes support terrorism. In doing so, the channels that are employed by criminal groups and terrorist networks will be examined and related with the actions initiated against them. This will indicate the adequacy, or otherwise, of the steps that have been initiated in the past and measures required to enhance focus and capacity in the context of the relation between crime and terrorism. The case studies will also link global patterns to establish evolving trends and the specific relation to India.

Drug Trafficking

Drug trafficking is a well-established criminal activity and has lucrative economies of scale. This lends it the requisite incentive for profitability and resultantly gain political influence. The economic potential of drugs arises from its production, extraction and trading. The lucrative business opportunity provided by drugs has witnessed a sharp increase in its usage, trade and production over the years. One of the foremost examples of the same is the growth trend witnessed in Afghanistan. Afghanistan survey report of United Nations Office on Drugs and Crimes (UNODC) estimates indicate that in 2017, opium poppy cultivation increased sharply to an unprecedented record high of 3,28,000 hectares from an estimated 2,01,000 hectares in 2016. This led to a raise in the potential opium production from 4,800 tons in 2016 to 9,000 tons in 2017. The value of this opiate economy was further estimated at 20-32 percent of Afghanistan’s USD 4.1-6.6 billion economy.4It is also evident from the report that the markets in Europe and the US, which are the most important consumption source for high quality drugs, have also become the indirect facilitators of terrorism. Drug trafficking and its illegal sale in these regions, might be seen merely as a law and order challenge locally, however, the profits that drug sales help generate for criminal and terrorist groups, allow organisations like the Taliban to emerge as amongst the best funded and richest terror groups in the world.

An analysis of criminal groups involved in drug related trafficking suggests that most groups which are involved in this illegal activity, are also similarly linked with other crimes like human trafficking, smuggling of weapons and other goods. A UNODC report indicates that, “Drug trafficking groups in Europe are frequently also involved in the counterfeiting of goods, trafficking in human beings, smuggling of migrants and trafficking in weapons.”5
This reinforces the trend of mutual benefit between criminal groups in Europe and the Taliban, even if there is no direct linkage between the two. Criminal groups increase their profits in Europe and this provides the incentive for the Taliban, to increase production of drugs and its trafficking from the areas under its control in Afghanistan. The Afghan example further suggests that a criminal activity like extortion, becomes a major source of funding. The 2017 UNODC survey indicates that approximately 62 percent of the farmers in Afghanistan paid some sort of a tax, ranging from 2 and 20 percent of the sale value and half of them between 4 and 10 percent. This brings the taxed amount to approximately USD 74 million. If a similar percentage is added to trafficking of opiates, it increases Taliban revenues to USD 220-350 million.6

In contrast, India does not figure as a major drug producing country. There have been limited incidents of the same, restricted to some areas in the Naxal affected areas and Northeast India. Instead, India is referred to as one of the vital links between the Golden Crescent in the west and the Drug Triangle in the east. In 2017, this saw seizure of 1,991 kg of opium, 2,189 kg heroin, 1,96,792 kg ganja, 2,657 kg hashish and 67 kg cocaine.7 The trafficking, of drugs through India allows large sums of money to be raised in the process. Since several drug routes pass through areas either under the influence of or in some cases controlled by terrorist organisations, they levy a charge on its movement.8 Border areas along Western India are also prone to smuggling of drugs, often in the form of composite loads. These take place in the form of packages that include not only drugs but also fake currency and weapons.9The market for these criminal proceeds in India, not only supports the criminal network, but also allows terrorist groups to exploit the same.

Human Trafficking

Human trafficking, despite advances in policing and border management, continues to impact the security situation in India. The figures for 2016 indicate that a total of 8,132 cases were reported. This was despite 23,000 victims being rescued including 182 foreigners. The maximum cases were reported in West Bengal at 3,579. In 2015, Assam had reported more cases than West Bengal, however these came down to 91, suggesting that a concerted effort to curb the same can yield requisite results. In 2016, West Bengal was followed by Rajasthan, Gujarat, Maharashtra and Tamil Nadu as states that witnessed the highest trafficking numbers.
Security concerns related to terrorism get linked with human trafficking, as inputs suggest the possibility of terrorist groups exploiting these channels for recruitment. The second meeting hosted by the Office of the Special Representative and Co-ordinator for Combating Trafficking in Human Beings (OSR/CTHB), underlined the instances and future possibility of “increasingly widespread phenomenon of deceptive and forced recruitment of adults and children across the OSCE region for terrorism-related exploitative practices.”10 This could be a sign of similar instances in other areas to include South Asia as well.

Fake Currency

The threat of fake currency has remained a constant source of concern for security agencies. In 2011, 98 of the 100 countries surveyed reported to the INTERPOL of the incidence of fake currencies.11 The instance of fake currency is prevalent in most major economies of the world to include the US dollar, Euro, Chinese Yuan, Swiss Franc, British Pound Sterling and the Indian Rupee. Amongst these, the Indian currency is one of the most counterfeited with 5,75,747 notes reported as counterfeited by India.12 This has since 2011 increased substantially. Financial Action Task Force research indicates that counterfeiting of currency has several adverse effects. This includes loss of trust in the currency, adverse impact on the integrity of the financial sector, linkage with drugs and other offences, linkage with finance of terrorism and as proceeds of crime. All these factors are relevant to India, especially given the motivation for introducing FICN into the Indian economy. Fake currency trade is undertaken by individuals in need of money, semi-professional and professionals. Over time, the advancement in technology has led to improved techniques and equipment availability to even amateurs, which was not the case in the past.13 However, it is the challenge posed by institutional involvement of foreign countries that poses the greatest threat. This brings together, as is the case of India, the financial and technological capability of a country like Pakistan and its intelligence services, with the criminal networks that they exploit to transfer and distribute FICN. The involvement of Pakistan has been confirmed by India in a court of law, where a judgement indicted the involvement of the Pakistani state in 2014.14 In addition, the FATF, in its report also confirms the detection of FICN in containers moved from Pakistan via Hong Kong, to Nepal, a fact confirmed by Hong Kong to the FATF.15 The involvement of the Pakistani state in producing and distributing FICN, is a trend that is reinforced through other terror groups elsewhere in the world. Chechen terrorists have been involved with the distribution of US dollars and the Russian ruble.

The Indian example brings together the crime-terrorism nexus in case of fake currency. While a state terrorist establishment in Pakistan prints and controls the supply chain, criminal groups are involved in the induction and distribution network inside India. This not only funds terrorist activities inside the country, but also creates a profit venture for criminal groups.

One of the measures that was undertaken to disrupt the currency in circulation was the decision to demonetise the 500 and 1,000 rupee notes in 2016. This decision did have an immediate impact on the financing of terrorism. The hawala dealers, who were the biggest conduit for cash into India, were suddenly left with large sums, which were difficult to exchange. Terrorist group war chests were affected, as indicated by the sudden reduction in stone throwing in J&K and the decision of terrorist groups to resort to criminal activities like looting cash vans.16 Similarly, groups in Northeast India and Naxal zones with large amounts of stacked currency were placed in a challenging situation.17 The success of the initiative hinged on two elements. First, a stringent control on the receipt of currency in banks and second, scrutiny of fake currency while doing so. Initial indicators suggest that a subsidiary element, which is critical for success of enforcement actions constrained the success of the initiative. This was the adverse impact of corruption and weak enforcement at the functional level.18A recent report suggests that the instance of fake currency reports increased by 3.22 lakhs in 2016-2017, the year demonetisation was undertaken. The report claimed, “A noteworthy growth was also seen in the number of counterfeit currency reports (CCRs), which increased from more than 4.10 lakh in 2015-16 to over 7.33 lakh in 2016-17, which may also be attributed to the demonetisation exercise.”19

Civic Unrest

The linkage of civic unrest as an instrument of creating an internal security challenge must be related to not only stoking mob violence in a state like J&K, but also to fomenting unrest in other areas of the country to create or further discord and dissension.

It has been documented with a degree of accuracy and in reasonable detail, how violent mobs have been employed to mislead the youth and create a situation that fuels a cycle of violence in J&K. The conditions that have emerged in the state, clearly indicate how law and order situations like street protests, facilitates, encourages and provides a fillip to terrorism. Under normal conditions, a 14-year-old throwing stones and protesting might be seen as the pent-up anger of youth and may not even enter police records. However, the very same activity, when employed as an instrument of direct and indirect abetment to terror acts, becomes a serious concern. There have been instances in J&K, where terrorists have managed to escape cordons laid by security forces. In other cases, security force personnel have received grave injuries as well.20

In yet another instance of crime and terrorism acting in concert, several schools were burnt in J&K.21The intent of the action became clear by the location of these institutions, which coincided with an increase in terror related violence in South Kashmir. Further, the targeting of primarily government schools instead of both government and private institutions, indicated an intent to destroy state infrastructure, even as private local investment remained safe.22 The instances also ensured that children who would have otherwise remained engaged with academics, were now forced to become an instrumentality for stone throwing on the streets of the state.
The instances of civic unrest are not only peculiar to disturbed areas like J&K, but also other areas where social cleavages can be created and widened. These instances like the Kudankulam protests against the nuclear plant, clearly highlighted how interested groups could exploit local sentiments through misinformation and misrepresentation of facts for furthering their parochial interests.23 The possibility of generating and exploiting similar social conditions, fuelled by caste divides, as was the case with dalit protests in Maharashtra, Patel protests in Gujarat, river water disputes between Karnataka and Tamil Nadu, communal situations in Uttar Pradesh cannot be ruled out in the future. These are all examples of situations that can move beyond law and order challenges driven by criminals, to internal security threats if not scrutinised for the possibility in time.

Concluding Observations

Internal security was and shall remain a challenge in the years to come. However, it is the growing complexity and sophistication of the means adopted by adversaries, criminals and terrorists alike, that has changed the character of the threat. Much like war, wherein, its nature remains the same, even as its character changes, internal security challenges too have evolved with increasing regularity. The inflection point for this change is brought about by the same factors as was the case in the past. This article highlights two of these: corruption and technology, since the growing impact of these factors has made emerging challenges more pervasive and difficult to discern.

Crime, money laundering and terrorism need an ideal breeding ground, which creates the requisite conditions that can facilitate exploitation of structures and systems in place. This is not peculiar for India or South Asia and is a universal condition. It only varies in the degree and extent of its contributory impact. As an illustration, a UNODC report indicates that successful movement of drugs through its supply chain is made possible by corruption at every level. “At the production level, farmers may bribe eradication teams, producers may bribe judges and police officers, and manufacturers may exploit workers in chemical companies in order to get hold of precursor chemicals. Further down the chain, traffickers bribe custom officials and take advantage of weaknesses in transport firms. At the consumer level, users can get drugs through corrupt doctors and pharmacists.”24
An example of corruption in the banking system adversely affecting the success of demonetisation was earlier highlighted in the article. This instance demonstrated the result of complicity of a few officials within the system, willing to subvert it, thereby limiting the intended effect of the decision.

The second constituent that deserves emphasis is technology. This is a double-edged sword. It can both deny an opportunity to criminals by making the systems transparent and accountable. Simultaneously, if the criminals and terrorists remain ahead of the curve, which is often the case, then technology becomes the biggest threat since it creates a sophisticated adversary, with the ability to successfully subvert existing instruments of intelligence and enforcement.

It is beyond the scope of this paper to enunciate a detailed roadmap to address the challenges highlighted. However, five areas of emphasis emerge from the threats and challenges that deserve attention. First, there is a thin line between crime and terrorism. It is imperative for intelligence and enforcement agencies to constantly remain vigilant for this possibility. The state must empower them to deal with the threat accordingly through the necessary legal framework. Second, even as major wars recede in their probability, the possibility of lesser constituents like terrorism, subversion and civic unrest could gain further in significance. Rather than seeing these as isolated incidents, the threats must be recognised as part of a larger pattern, which has the footprint of known adversaries. Third, given the integration of various constituents of hybrid war by the adversary requires that all elements of the state must function with equal if not more cohesiveness as part of an all of government approach. Fourth, electronic trails will become the most important linkage for tracing crime and terrorism. This is especially related to financial linkages, which can be established better through the digitisation initiative that is underway. Fifth, capacity building which remains a perpetual constraint, must not only be addressed in terms of numbers, but more importantly by increasing capabilities that focussed threat-based training can provide.

References:
1 “Organised Crime”, UNODC, http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/organized-crime/intro.html, accessed on May 22, 2018.
2 “The Drug Problem and Organized Crime, Illicit Financial Flows, Corruption and Terrorism”, World Drug Report 2017, UNODC, May 2017, http://www.unodc.org/wdr2017/field/Booklet_5_NEXUS.pdf, accessed on May 23, 2018, p 9.
3 Thomas M. Sanderson, “Transnational and Organized Crime: Blurring the Lines”, SAIS Review Vol. XXIV no. 1 (Winter – Spring 2004),http://www.shirleymohr.com/JHU/Sample_Articles_JHUP/SAI_2004_24_1.pdf, accessed on May 22, 2018, p. 49.
4 “Afghanistan Opium Survey 2017: Challenges to Sustainable Development, Peace and Security” United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, May 2018, https://www.unodc.org/documents/crop-monitoring/Afghanistan/Opium-survey-peace-security-web.pdf, accessed on May 23, 2018, p. 4.
5 “The Drug Problem and Organized Crime, Illicit Financial Flows, Corruption and Terrorism”, World Drug Report 2017, n. 2, p 9.
6 “Afghanistan Opium Survey 2017: Challenges to Sustainable Development, Peace and Security” n. 4, p. 9.
7 “India’s location makes it vulnerable to narcotic drug trafficking: Rajnath Singh”, The New Indian Express, March 24, 2018, http://www.newindianexpress.com/nation/2018/mar/24/indias-location-makes-it-vulnerable-to-narcotic-drug-trafficking-rajnath-singh-1791976.html, accessed on June 3, 2018.
8 Bikash Singh, “Intelligence inputs say militant outfits in North East trading opium”, The Economic Times, January 26, 2016, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/politics-and-nation/intelligence-inputs-say-militant-outfits-in-north-east-trading-opium/articleshow/50727295.cms, accessed on June 03, 2018.
9 VivekChadha, “Terrorism Finance: Sources and Trends in India”, Journal of Defence Studies, Vol. 8, No. 3, July-September 2014, p 70.
10 “Second expert meeting on trafficking in human beings for terrorist activities concludes in London”, Office for Security and Cooperation in Europe, February 20, 2018, https://www.osce.org/secretariat/373001, accessed on May 25, 2018.
11 “Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Related to Counterfeit Currency”, FATF, June 2013, http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/money-laundering-terrorist-financing-related-to-counterfeit-currency.pdf, accessed on May 24, 2018, p. 13.
12 Ibid, p. 14.
13 Ibid, p. 15.
14 VivekChadha, Lifeblood of Terrorism: Countering Terrorism Finance, Bloomsbury, New Delhi, 2015, p. 71.
15 “Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Related to Counterfeit Currency”, FATF, June 2013, http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/money-laundering-terrorist-financing-related-to-counterfeit-currency.pdf, accessed on May 24, 2018, p. 18.
16 J&K: Militants kill 5 cops, 2 bank officials while looting cash van in Kulgam district”, The Indian Express, May 01, 2017, http://indianexpress.com/article/india/j-k-terrorists-kill-4-cops-2-bank-officials-while-looting-cash-van-in-kulgam-district-4635740/, accessed on June 04, 2018. A number of similar incidents came to light in J&K in the aftermath of demonetisation.
17 VivekChadha, “Demonetisation and Beyond: Addressing the Finance of Terrorism”, November 18, 2016, IDSA,https://idsa.in/policybrief/demonetisation-and-beyond-addressing-the-finance-of-terrorism_vchadha_181116, accessed on June 04, 2018.
18 Deepak Patel and Sunny Verma, “Demonetisation: 208 bank employees under scrutiny”, The Indian Express, February 7, 2017, http://indianexpress.com/article/business/banking-and-finance/demonetisation-208-bank-employees-under-scrutiny-rbi-4511202/, accessed on June 04, 2018.
19 “Banks received alarming amounts of fake currency post demonetisation; detected 480% jump in suspicious transactions”, Firstpost, April 20, 2018, https://www.firstpost.com/business/banks-received-alarming-amount-of-fake-currency-post-demonetisation-detected-over-480-jump-in-suspicious-transactions-4440067.html, accessed on May 24, 2018.
20 M. SaleemPandit, “1 soldier, 4 civilians killed in anti-terror operation in Kashmir”, The Times of India, April 22, 2018, https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/1-soldier-4-civilians-killed-in-anti-terror-operation-in-kashmir/articleshow/63721509.cms, accessed on May 25, 2018 and “Army Chief warns of tough action against stone-throwers”, The Tribune, February 16, 2017, http://www.tribuneindia.com/news/jammu-kashmir/community/army-chief-warns-of-tough-action-against-stone-throwers/364643.html, accessed on May 25, 2018.
21 “Burning of schools: J&K government sees separatist hand”, Indian Express, October 31, 2016, http://indianexpress.com/article/india/india-news-india/burning-of-schools-jk-govt-sees-separatist-hand-3731406/, accessed on May 25, 2018.
22 Kashmir unrest: Nearly 20 schools burnt down as education becomes biggest casualty of protests”, Firstpost, October 27, 2016, https://www.firstpost.com/india/kashmir-unrest-19-schools-burnt-down-in-kashmir-in-three-months-students-languish-as-studies-suffer-3075590.html, accessed on May 25, 2018.
23 Kaipullai, “Kudankulam protests: Highjacked by the church and the foreign hand?”,Firstpost, March 26, 2012, https://www.firstpost.com/india/kudankulam-protests-hijacked-by-the-church-and-the-foreign-hand-255466.html, accessed on May 26, 2018.
24 “The Drug Problem and Organized Crime, Illicit Financial Flows, Corruption and Terrorism”, World Drug Report 2017, n. 2, p 10.

(Col. VivekChadha (Retd) is a Research Fellow at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA),
New Delhi. He has written extensively on the financing of terrorism in India and is the author of
the book ‘Lifeblood of Terrorism: Countering Terrorism Finance.’)

(This article is carried in the print edition of July-August 2018 issue of India Foundation Journal.)

While on a holiday in Kenya last year to witness the Great Migration and spot the Big Five in action, I noticed a group of people, possibly Europeans, doing asanas at our hotel. While aware that yoga had spread far and wide from its birthplace in India, I was amazed to see it had become an integral part of their daily routine. Indeed yoga is India’s wellness gift to the world. By de-emphasising the religious aspects, yoga has permeated borders and gained multicultural acceptance for its health benefits, both physical and mental.

Some airports like Frankfurt, Dallas and Heathrow offer yoga mats for practitioners. Even Ayurveda, another wellness export from India, never gained the kind of mass acceptance that yoga has.
This global acceptance is India’s soft power, evidenced by the passing of the UN resolution 69/131 co-sponsored by 177 countries. During the first International Day of Yoga in 2015, every UN country, except Yemen, celebrated the occasion. This translates to 192 country ‘hearts’ won! India deserves to pat its back.
The growth in the practice of yoga has been phenomenal.

While there are no official numbers, it is estimated that at least two billion people practice yoga. Unlike America’s and even China’s institutionalised soft power strategy that actively pushes its culture abroad, the growth in the practice of yoga has been organic. American soft power has sometimes been intrinsically linked with its economic goals and its culture is often seen as imperialist. Yoga on the other hand is not seen as a threat to local identities. If anything, yoga, especially in the West, is in threat of being metamorphosed from the ancient pristine practice into unrecognisable weird forms—beer, dog, goat, nude, hot and aqua yoga. Moreover, as yoga becomes a victim of cultural capitalisation, India stands the risk of slowly being removed from the branding and cultural portrayal of yoga.

But is India losing its ownership of yoga? No. It has just not tapped the commercial aspect of yoga. If India can produce entrepreneurs who can compete with brands like Lululemon and Nike to manufacture yoga merchandise, it can regain its market share, for no story sells better than the word ‘authentic’. The Centre is in fact actively owning yoga as its own by sending yoga teachers abroad, publishing a Common Yoga Protocol, organising roadshows and yoga classes at embassies and leading the yearly celebrations on June 21. It is clear that yoga is a brand—an Indian brand. And it is India’s biggest gift to the world.

 

Shreya Challagalla is a Research Fellow at India Foundation. The article originally appeared in The New Indian Express on 21 June, 2018.