“प्रजासुखे सुखं राज्ञः, प्रजानां च हिते हितम्”
“In the happiness of the subjects lies the ruler’s happiness; in their welfare, his welfare.”[1]
Kautilya’s old test of statecraft is crisp and unsentimental. It treats welfare not as benevolence but as the state’s practical capacity to maintain order, livelihoods, and security when pressures mount. For twenty-first-century Bharat, energy sits at the centre of that compact. A spike in crude prices, a sanctioned payment channel, a tanker delayed by conflict, an LNG cargo diverted, or a mineral supply chain squeezed does not remain confined to ministries and markets. It enters freight rates, fertiliser costs, aviation margins, factory output, household cooking bills, and the everyday confidence of citizens. Energy insecurity, in that sense, is never only about fuel. It is about the state’s ability to protect national life from external volatility.
India’s energy question has therefore moved squarely into the realm of strategic autonomy. India is still building and expanding at continental scale: roads, homes, ports, industrial corridors, data centres, transport networks and manufacturing clusters. As India works towards becoming a leading global power, it must ensure an uninterrupted, sustained supply of energy. The challenge is not only to secure that energy, but also to do so without allowing every external shock to narrow national policy space. The old oil-security instinct was to diversify suppliers. That remains necessary, but the present disorder demands a thicker cushion. Sanctions, shipping insurance, payment systems, maritime chokepoints, LNG contracts, refinery flexibility, solar equipment and critical minerals now sit within the same security conversation.
Former President A.P.J. Abdul Kalam recognised the stakes in development when he called energy independence India’s “first and highest priority.”[2] For India, energy independence cannot mean autarky in every molecule, machine and mineral. That would be economically unrealistic and strategically limiting. The more serious aim is energy autonomy through managed interdependence: using global markets where they serve India, building domestic capacity where dependence poses a strategic risk, and ensuring that no single pressure point can narrow India’s strategic choices.
The evolution of the International Energy Agency reflects this widening. Founded in 1974 to ensure the security of oil supplies, the IEA’s work now extends beyond oil to natural gas, electricity systems and clean-energy supply chains.[3] For India, this widening is not an abstract shift in energy vocabulary. Its challenge is no longer simply to buy enough oil at a tolerable price, but to keep growth steady when risk can arise from crude and LNG cargoes, maritime chokepoints, refinery flexibility, power grids, solar modules, batteries and minerals. Strategic redundancy is India’s answer to this condition. The goal is not to withdraw from interdependence, but to build sufficient depth across suppliers, routes, reserves, technologies and domestic capabilities so that dependence remains manageable and never hardens into vulnerability.
From Diversification to Strategic Redundancy
Daniel Yergin’s warning remains relevant: “The definition of energy security needs to be expanded” to meet the pressures of a globalised world.[4] For India, that expansion now means strategic redundancy. Diversification remains necessary because no large importer can afford excessive dependence on a single supplier, route or political region. But diversification alone is no longer sufficient when disruption can spread through sanctions, insurance, shipping routes, refinery compatibility, LNG contracts, cyber risks, grids, solar factories and mineral processing. India’s task, therefore, is not merely to multiply sources of supply, but to build depth across the energy system so that a shock in one part does not become a national vulnerability.
The older idea of energy security assumed that the main danger lay at the point of supply: an embargo, a war in an oil-producing region, a cartel decision, or a sudden price spike. Countries responded by diversifying their sources of supply. That remains necessary, but it no longer captures the full nature of risk. A cargo may be available yet difficult to insure; a supplier may be willing, but payments may be constrained; a route may remain open, yet freight costs may surge; a clean-energy target may be sound, yet modules, batteries or minerals may be concentrated elsewhere. The vulnerability, in other words, is no longer confined to the energy source. It can sit anywhere along the chain that connects energy to national life.
Strategic redundancy is the discipline that addresses this condition. It is not duplication for its own sake, nor a retreat into autarky. It is the creation of cushions across the system: alternative suppliers when a market tightens, alternative routes when a chokepoint comes under stress, reserves that buy time, flexible refineries and contracts that preserve choice, domestic capacities that reduce exposure, and institutions that can coordinate quickly when pressure builds. In ordinary commerce, redundancy may appear inefficient. In national strategy, it is what prevents dependence from becoming coercion.
Oil Diplomacy in a Sanctions-Heavy Order
Oil remains the first test of this approach because India’s development story is still tied to imported hydrocarbons. PPAC data show the scale of the system that India must manage: crude oil imports stood at 245.769 million tonnes in the latest reported annual cycle.[5] This is not a vulnerability confined to the petroleum sector. It touches freight, food inflation, aviation, fertilisers, the current account and household budgets.
The war in Ukraine gave India’s oil diplomacy a sharper edge. India’s purchase of discounted Russian crude was often interpreted abroad as an alignment. For New Delhi, it was also a matter of economic responsibility. A developing economy cannot treat affordable energy as a diplomatic luxury. Its first obligation is to keep prices, mobility and industrial activity stable for its citizens. Strategic autonomy, in this context, is not a posture but the freedom to make energy choices according to national need.
However, discounted crude is not a doctrine. Replacing one dependence with another would merely shift vulnerability from one point to another. The real strength lies in optionality. India has continued to engage its traditional Gulf partners, bought from Russia when commercial and strategic conditions allowed, and broadened sourcing from other geographies. The Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas has noted that India now imports crude from around 40 countries, with about 70 per cent of crude imports coming through routes outside the Strait of Hormuz, compared with about 55 per cent earlier.[6] That is strategic redundancy in practice.
This matters because oil diplomacy today is not merely a buyer-seller relationship. It encompasses crude grades, refinery configuration, freight, insurance, payment channels and domestic price management. India’s refining system, with its ability to process a range of crude grades, gives the country room to respond to shifting discounts and availability. But refining capacity must be supported by maritime access and financial flexibility. In a sanctions-heavy world, crude availability is only one part of security; the real test is whether shipping, insurance, payments, refining and domestic distribution can continue without interruption.
West Asia will remain central to this equation. India’s ties with Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Iraq, Qatar and other regional partners span energy, diaspora, remittances, investment, logistics and strategic consultation. The evolving Iran-Israel-US crisis has only underlined this logic. India has kept diplomatic channels open across the region, called for de-escalation and dialogue, and remained attentive to the security of key shipping routes.[7] The right direction is already clear: continuity with old partners, expansion of new options, and sufficient route diversity to ensure that no single region becomes a point of compulsion.
Gas and LNG: Transition Fuel Under Geopolitical Conditions
Natural gas is often described as a transition fuel. It is cleaner than coal in many applications and is important for fertilisers, city gas, industry, transport and power balancing. India has set a target to raise the share of natural gas in its energy mix from 6.7 per cent to 15 per cent by 2030.[8] That ambition is sensible, but gas will serve India’s transition only if its price, supply and infrastructure risks are carefully managed. Recent years have shown how quickly gas markets can turn unforgiving. Europe’s search for alternatives to Russian pipeline gas tightened global LNG markets and affected Asian buyers. For India, which has price-sensitive consumers and industries, excessive exposure to spot LNG can be costly. Long-term contracts offer stability, but they must retain flexibility. The 20-year LNG agreement between Petronet LNG and QatarEnergy for 7.5 million tonnes per annum, beginning in 2028, reflects this search for dependable supply.[9] Yet even long-term supply is only one part of security. India also needs sufficient terminal capacity, pipeline connectivity, city gas expansion and pricing arrangements that allow gas to reach consumers without becoming a shock transmitter.
The movement towards a national gas grid, expanded LNG terminals, city gas distribution and policy reforms for a gas-based economy shows that India is not treating gas merely as an imported commodity.[10] It is being integrated into the country’s wider development system. A molecule of LNG matters only when it can be received, re-gasified, transported, priced and used in fertilisers, industry, transport or households. Gas carries its own maritime exposure. LNG may enter India through terminals on its coast, but its reliability is shaped long before it reaches them — in Gulf stability, shipping lanes, freight costs and contract terms. A disruption in West Asia can therefore affect not only crude oil but also LNG flows. Gas may be a transition fuel, but for India it is also a strategic fuel: useful only if it strengthens the energy transition without introducing a new layer of price and route vulnerability.
The Ocean as Energy Infrastructure
The Ocean is integral to India’s energy infrastructure. Tankers and LNG carriers link Indian refineries, fertiliser plants, power systems and households to some of the world’s most politically sensitive passages. Hormuz, Malacca, Bab el-Mandeb, Suez and the Red Sea are not merely map points. They are corridors through which energy, inflation and strategic risk travel. The Strait of Hormuz remains the most visible pressure point. EIA data show that flows through Hormuz in 2024 and the first quarter of 2025 accounted for more than one-quarter of global seaborne oil trade and about one-fifth of global oil and petroleum-product consumption. Around one-fifth of global LNG trade also passed through Hormuz in 2024, primarily from Qatar.[11] The Red Sea system carries a similar warning. In the first half of 2023, the Suez Canal, SUMED pipeline and Bab el-Mandeb handled about 12 per cent of seaborne oil trade and 8 per cent of global LNG trade.[12]
These numbers matter because disruption at sea rarely stays at sea. A vessel forced to reroute incurs additional time, insurance, fuel costs and uncertainty. A delayed LNG cargo can disrupt power, fertiliser and industrial calculations. Higher freight costs can feed into domestic prices long before citizens know which passage was under stress. UNCTAD’s Review of Maritime Transport 2024 notes that over 80 per cent of world trade by volume moves by sea, with chokepoints increasingly exposed to geopolitical tension, conflict and climate stress.[13]
India’s response is already moving beyond the narrow idea of naval presence. Naval capacity is indispensable, but energy security at sea also rests on port resilience, maritime domain awareness, logistics partnerships, white-shipping agreements, island-state cooperation and crisis coordination. The SAGAR vision — Security and Growth for All in the Region — has given India a language for this wider role in the Indian Ocean.[14] It is increasingly part of India’s energy-security vocabulary.
India’s interest is straightforward: sea lanes must remain open, secure and predictable. Chokepoints must not be allowed to become instruments of coercion. For India, keeping the ocean stable is not only a maritime objective; it is also tied to development, inflation management, industrial continuity and the everyday security of households.
Strategic Reserves and Domestic Buffers
Strategic Petroleum Reserves are not merely storage facilities. They are time-buying instruments. In an energy crisis, time is strategic capital: it allows the government to arrange alternative cargoes, calm markets, support refiners, protect essential sectors and prevent uncertainty from turning into panic. India’s Strategic Petroleum Reserve capacity totals 5.33 million tonnes at Visakhapatnam, Mangaluru and Padur. The government has also approved two additional commercial-cum-strategic reserves of 6.5 MMT at Chandikhol and Padur under a public-private partnership model.[15] Such reserves are not intended to carry the economy through an indefinite disruption. Their value lies in the first days of pressure, when they can steady markets, protect essential sectors and give the state time to arrange alternatives.
The value of a reserve lies not only in the volume of crude it holds, but also in how well it is integrated with the wider energy system. Commercial inventories, refinery stocks, port logistics, crude grades, release protocols and demand management all matter. An emergency release is not a mechanical act; it requires judgement on timing, location, refinery compatibility and market signalling. India’s move towards expanding strategic storage and adopting commercial-cum-strategic models reflects a practical understanding of this balance: reserves must remain financially viable, but their purpose is national continuity.
Domestic buffers add a second layer of protection. India advanced its E20 target from 2030 to 2025, and the government has reported 20 per cent ethanol blending for the current Ethanol Supply Year.[16] This marginally reduces exposure to petrol imports, supports rural value chains, and links farmers to the fuel economy. It is not a complete answer to energy dependence, nor should it be treated as one. Feedstock, water use and vehicle compatibility require careful management. But as part of a wider buffer, ethanol has clear strategic value.
Green hydrogen belongs to a different horizon. The National Green Hydrogen Mission, with an outlay of ₹19,744 crore, targets 5 million tonnes of annual green hydrogen production by 2030.[17] Its promise lies in sectors that are hard to electrify directly — refining, fertilisers, steel, shipping and heavy industry. Here again, the point is not a single substitute but system depth. Efficiency is the least dramatic but most durable buffer. Better appliances, industrial energy management, building codes, public transport and logistics planning reduce import pressure without spectacle. In a turbulent world, the energy that is not wasted is ultimately the energy that doesn’t have to be imported.
Solar, ISA and Clean-energy Sovereignty
India’s renewable expansion is now central to its energy future. MNRE reported an installed renewable energy capacity of 220.10 GW as of 31 March 2025, within India’s broader 500 GW non-fossil capacity target by 2030.[18] But capacity addition, by itself, does not settle the sovereignty question. Clean energy reduces dependence on fuel imports, but it can create new dependencies if the equipment, storage and minerals underpinning it remain concentrated elsewhere. Solar power is the clearest case. The IEA notes that China’s share across all major stages of solar-panel manufacturing — polysilicon, ingots, wafers, cells and modules — exceeds 80 per cent.[19] That concentration has helped reduce global costs, but it also carries strategic risk. A country that replaces imported crude with imported clean-energy hardware reduces one vulnerability while creating another.
India’s response has been to deploy at scale while deepening domestic manufacturing. The Production Linked Incentive scheme for high-efficiency solar PV modules aims to create nearly 48 GW of domestic module manufacturing capacity.[20] The emphasis on integrated capacity matters because module assembly alone cannot secure India if cells, wafers, polysilicon and equipment remain externally dependent.
The International Solar Alliance provides India with a broader platform. Its “Towards 1000” strategy aims to mobilise USD 1 trillion in solar investment by 2030, provide energy access to 1 billion people, and install 1,000 GW of solar capacity.[21] ISA is an instrument of development diplomacy and of Global South institution-building. The same sovereignty question now arises in critical minerals. Lithium, cobalt, nickel, graphite, copper and rare earths are central to batteries, storage, EVs, grids, wind turbines, electronics and defence technologies. Vulnerability often lies not only in mining but also in processing and refining. A country can possess reserves and still remain dependent if it lacks the ability to process them.
The IEA’s Global Critical Minerals Outlook 2025 shows the pace of change: lithium demand rose by nearly 30 per cent in 2024, while demand for nickel, cobalt, graphite and rare earths rose by 6–8 per cent.[22] India’s National Critical Mineral Mission, approved with an outlay of ₹34,300 crore over seven years, covers exploration, mining, beneficiation, processing and recovery from end-of-life products; GSI has been tasked with 1,200 exploration projects from 2024–25 to 2030–31.[23] This is precisely the whole-chain thinking the transition requires. The transition must therefore reduce old dependencies without creating new ones. For India, clean energy will become truly strategic only when deployment is matched by manufacturing depth, mineral security and control over the technologies that carry the transition.
Institutions and the Larger Doctrine
Strategic redundancy must move from phrase to practice. India’s energy governance is necessarily spread across petroleum, power, renewable energy, mines, shipping, external affairs, commerce, finance, heavy industries, the environment, regulators, public-sector enterprises and state governments. Each handles part of the system; the strength lies in ensuring risk is not viewed in fragments. India’s current policy direction already contains the building blocks of this approach: crude-source diversification, routes outside Hormuz, SPR expansion, ethanol blending, green hydrogen, solar manufacturing, critical-mineral exploration, maritime cooperation and renewable deployment. These are not scattered initiatives. They show a state steadily building energy depth across fuels, technologies, routes and institutions.
The need for coordination becomes clearest during a disruption. A shipping shock can involve petroleum, shipping, finance, external affairs and ports. A critical-mineral restriction can affect mines, heavy industry, power, commerce and technology. A delay in solar equipment can disrupt renewable targets, grid planning and industrial policy. A cyberattack on port-energy logistics can quickly escalate from a technical incident to an economic concern. The point is simple: energy risk does not respect departmental boundaries. This is why risk assessment, scenario planning and stress-testing matter. Temporary pressure in Hormuz, Red Sea rerouting, LNG price spikes, refinery outages, payment-channel stress or mineral-processing restrictions are not remote possibilities for a large importing economy. Route-risk mapping, supplier concentration assessments, critical-mineral tracking, SPR release protocols and clear public communication during shocks would strengthen the direction India has already begun to pursue.
Industry and states are central to this effort. Refiners, ports, shipping firms, insurers, power producers, miners and manufacturers carry much of the operational burden. States handle land, transmission, industrial clusters, distribution-company health, mining clearances, port capacity and local acceptance. The Union government sets the strategic direction, but energy security becomes real only when that direction moves through markets, ministries and states into everyday execution.
Conclusion: From Scale to Strategic Weight
India’s rise will require more energy, even as the economy becomes more efficient. A country of India’s size and ambition cannot build prosperity on fragile supply lines. It needs oil and gas for the transition period, reliable electricity for industry, clean power for climate credibility, minerals for manufacturing, and institutions that can withstand a hostile external environment. The temptation in energy debates is to seek certainty in one direction. Some speak as if hydrocarbons will remain dominant indefinitely. Others speak as if renewables will dissolve dependence by themselves. India cannot afford either simplification. It must secure oil and gas without allowing them to delay cleaner systems. It must expand renewables without creating new supply-chain captivity. It must use global markets without allowing them to become instruments of coercion.
Strategic redundancy offers a practical way through this tension. It involves building sufficient depth – in suppliers, routes, reserves, contracts, domestic capacity, transition fuels, clean technologies, minerals and institutions – to preserve national choice. As India navigates the demands of growth and the pressures of a fragmented world, energy security will be central to its journey from a large economy to a leading power.
Author Brief Bio: Maitri Sisodia is the Deputy Collector, Ahmedabad and an award-winning author. She is passionate about women empowerment, heritage conservation and social equality.
[1] Kautilya, Arthashastra, bk. 1, chap. 19, “The Duties of a King,” trans. R. Shamasastry, https://archive.org/stream/Arthasastra_English_Translation/Arthashastra_of_Chanakya_-_English_djvu.txt.
[2] A. P. J. Abdul Kalam, “Address at the First Convocation of the University of Petroleum and Energy Studies,” August 27, 2005, President of India Archives, https://presidentofindia.nic.in/dr-apj-abdul-kalam/speeches/address-first-convocation-university-petroleum-and-energy-studies.
[3] International Energy Agency (IEA), “History of the IEA,” https://www.iea.org/about/mission/history-of-the-iea; International Energy Agency (IEA), “Energy Security,” https://www.iea.org/topics/energy-security.
[4] Daniel Yergin, “Ensuring Energy Security,” Foreign Affairs 85, no. 2 (March/April 2006), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/world/ensuring-energy-security.
[5] Petroleum Planning and Analysis Cell (PPAC), Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas, Government of India, “Import/Export of Crude Oil and Petroleum Products,” https://ppac.gov.in/import-export.
[6] Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas, Government of India, “70% of India’s Crude Imports Now Routed Outside Strait of Hormuz; Energy Supplies Remain Secure,” Press Information Bureau, March 11, 2026, https://pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2238525&lang=1®=3.
[7] Prime Minister’s Office, Government of India, “PM Speaks with President of Iran Regarding Prevailing Situation in the Region,” Press Information Bureau, June 22, 2025, https://pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2138687; “Israel, Iran War: India Sourcing Oil, Gas from All Avenues; Efforts to Continue in Coming Days, Says PM Modi,” The Economic Times, 2026, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/india/israel-iran-war-pm-modi-pushes-de-escalation-hormuz-opening-in-rajya-sabha/articleshow/129771404.cms.
[8] Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas, Government of India, “Share of Natural Gas in Total Energy Mix,” Press Information Bureau, December 18, 2023, https://pib.gov.in/Pressreleaseshare.aspx?PRID=1987803.
[9] Petronet LNG Limited, “Petronet LNG Limited Executes Long-Term Contract for Purchase of 7.5 MMTPA LNG with QatarEnergy,” February 6, 2024, https://www.petronetlng.in/w/petronet-lng-limited-executes-long-term-contract-for-purchase-of-7.5-mmtpa-lng-with-qatarenergy-1.
[10] Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas, Government of India, “Government Boosts LNG Use with 100% FDI, New Stations, and Policy Reforms,” Press Information Bureau, August 7, 2025, https://pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2153679; Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas, Government of India, “One Nation, One Gas Grid,” Press Information Bureau, accessed June 17, 2026, https://pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2200386.
[11] U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA), “Amid Regional Conflict, the Strait of Hormuz Remains Critical Oil Chokepoint,” June 2025, https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=65504.
[12] U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA), “Red Sea Chokepoints Are Critical for International Oil and Natural Gas Flows,” 2023, https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=61025.
[13] United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), Review of Maritime Transport 2024 (Geneva: UNCTAD, 2024), https://unctad.org/publication/review-maritime-transport-2024.
[14] Press Information Bureau, Government of India, “Indian Navy’s Maiden Initiatives of Indian Ocean Ship SAGAR and Africa India Key Maritime Engagement,” March 24, 2025, https://pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2114491.
[15] Press Information Bureau, Government of India, “Government Steps to Strengthen Strategic Petroleum Reserves,” March 24, 2025, https://pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2113233.
[16] Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas, Government of India, “Ethanol Blending Update,” Press Information Bureau, https://pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2154355.
[17] Press Information Bureau, Government of India, “National Green Hydrogen Mission,” July 24, 2024, https://pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2039091.
[18] Ministry of New and Renewable Energy, Government of India, “Renewable Energy Capacity Update,” Press Information Bureau, https://pib.gov.in/PressReleaseIframePage.aspx?PRID=2120729.
[19] International Energy Agency (IEA), Solar PV Global Supply Chains: Executive Summary (Paris: IEA, 2022), https://www.iea.org/reports/solar-pv-global-supply-chains/executive-summary.
[20] Press Information Bureau, Government of India, “Government Allocates 39,600 MW of Domestic Solar PV Module Manufacturing Capacity under PLI,” March 28, 2023, https://pib.gov.in/PressReleaseIframePage.aspx?PRID=1911380.
[21] International Solar Alliance, “Towards 1000 Strategy,” Press Information Bureau, Government of India, https://pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2071486.
[22] International Energy Agency (IEA), Global Critical Minerals Outlook 2025: Executive Summary (Paris: IEA, 2025), https://www.iea.org/reports/global-critical-minerals-outlook-2025/executive-summary.
[23] Press Information Bureau, Government of India, “National Critical Mineral Mission: Powering India’s Clean Energy Future,” April 9, 2025, https://pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2120525.
