Global Commitments, Local Realities: India’s Climate Finance Journey

Abstract

India’s climate transition financing presents a complex landscape where global climate finance mechanisms intersect with domestic innovation needs, especially in the electric vehicle (EV) sector. This article examines the dual challenges India faces in securing sufficient international climate finance while simultaneously developing strong domestic mechanisms to achieve its goal of net-zero emissions by 2070. Through analysis of India’s stance on the New Collective Quantified Goal (NCQG) and emerging challenges in EV financing, this article highlights notable gaps between global climate finance commitments and local implementation realities. The research shows that while India rejected the NCQG’s $300 billion target as insufficient against its $1.5-2.5 trillion climate financing needs by 2030, domestic innovations in EV financing are hampered by structural barriers such as high interest rates (>20% versus 10% for Internal Combustion Engine vehicles), uncertain residual values, and limited institutional support. The article suggests that India’s success in climate transition financing hinges on reforming global mechanisms and fostering local innovations, including government-backed EV financing institutions, battery-as-a-service models, and integration with climate finance taxonomies.

Introduction

India’s approach to financing the climate transition reflects a core tension between global ambitions and local realities, most visibly at the intersection of international climate finance negotiations and domestic challenges to the adoption of electric vehicles (EVs).¹

As the world’s most populous nation and the third-largest greenhouse gas emitter, India simultaneously advocates for increased climate finance from developed countries while also taking a leadership position in its domestic climate action, thereby requiring innovative domestic financing mechanisms².

The scale of India’s financing challenge is unprecedented. Current assessments suggest India requires between $1.5 trillion and $2.5 trillion by 2030 to meet its climate targets and support its transition to net-zero emissions by 2070³. This massive capital requirement, which is equivalent to roughly 1.3% of India’s GDP annually, must be mobilised through a complex ecosystem of global and local financial mechanisms, each with distinct characteristics, constraints, and opportunities⁴.
Recent developments have intensified focus on this dual challenge. India’s rejection of the New Collective Quantified Goal (NCQG) at COP29 as “a paltry sum” crystallised persistent tensions between the needs of the Global South and commitments by the Global North⁵. Simultaneously, India’s domestic EV sector, despite selling over 1.5 million units in FY2024, faces acute financing challenges that threaten to make it difficult for people to access affordable transportation in an increasingly electrified mobility landscape⁶.The EV financing crisis illuminates broader patterns in climate transition financing. While global climate finance mechanisms emphasise market-driven mobilisation and private sector engagement, ground-level realities reveal structural barriers that hinder equitable access to climate solutions⁷. EV buyers face interest rates exceeding nearly 20%, compared to almost 10% for Internal Combustion Engine (ICE) vehicles. Uncertain residual values and limited institutional support create additional barriers, particularly for vulnerable populations⁸.This article argues that India’s climate transition financing challenges cannot be understood in isolation but must be analysed as interconnected dimensions of a broader transformation in global environmental governance. The global dimension reveals that international climate finance mechanisms, despite recent increases, remain inadequate and structurally biased towards solutions that may not serve the priorities of developing countries. The local dimension highlights how domestic innovations encounter institutional and market barriers that necessitate coordinated policy interventions to achieve scale and equity.

The Global Dimension: India and the NCQG

Climate Finance Before NCQG: A System of Loans Disguised as Support

The climate finance architecture that preceded the NCQG was fundamentally flawed in its delivery mechanisms and composition, creating what economists term “debt traps” for the very countries it purported to help⁹. According to the Centre for Science & Environment (CSE) analysis, between 2011 and 2020, a mere 5% of climate finance was provided as grants, while 61% was disbursed as loans and 34% as equity financing. This heavily loan-based approach meant that climate finance, rather than providing relief for climate impacts that developing countries did not cause, actually added to their debt burdens. The limited concessional finance available (grants and low-cost debt constituted only 16% of total climate finance) during this decade led to a vast majority of international climate finance being market-rate loans that required full repayment with interest.

The debt trap arises from the intersection of high climate finance needs and predominantly loan-based delivery mechanisms, which is particularly acute for climate-vulnerable nations. CSE’s analysis reveals that about 30% of low- and middle-income countries face higher annual debt servicing costs than what it would cost to achieve their entire Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs). For instance, countries like Ghana face $3.23 billion in annual debt service while needing only $0.93 billion annually to meet their climate goals. This creates a perverse situation where countries must choose between servicing existing debt or investing in climate action, often trapped in a cycle where climate inaction leads to greater climate-related damages, which further weaken their fiscal position and increase borrowing costs.

Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs), despite being significant sources of climate finance, have perpetuated the debt trap through their lending practices. Between 2010 and 2020, MDBs provided an average of only 20% of their climate finance as grants, with 79% coming as loans. The World Bank, for example, provided 30% of its total operations as climate finance in 2021, but predominantly through debt-creating instruments. This approach is particularly problematic because MDBs hold 22% of the debt of emerging market economies, yet they do not participate in debt relief efforts.

The pre-NCQG climate finance system came with conditionalities that constrained the policy sovereignty of developing countries while adding to their debt burdens. The emphasis on mobilising private sector finance rather than providing direct public support meant that climate finance flows were concentrated in commercially viable projects in middle-income countries. In contrast, the most vulnerable nations, particularly Least Developed Countries and Small Island Developing States, received disproportionately limited support. This market-oriented approach failed to address the fundamental justice dimension of climate finance: that developing countries, having contributed minimally to historical emissions, should receive support as a matter of equity rather than commercial viability, not loans that worsen their fiscal constraints and limit their capacity for future climate action.

The NCQG Framework and Its Limitations

The New Collective Quantified Goal (NCQG) on climate finance represents the most significant recalibration of international climate commitments since the Paris Agreement. Yet, its architecture reveals fundamental tensions between developed and developing country perspectives on climate justice¹⁰. Established at COP29 in Baku with a baseline target of $300 billion annually by 2035, the NCQG was designed to address the acknowledged failure of the $100 billion commitment while scaling up to meet the unprecedented financing needs of developing countries.

The quantitative dimensions of the NCQG, while representing a threefold increase from previous commitments, fall dramatically short of assessed needs. Multiple studies have placed annual developing country climate finance requirements at $1.1-1.8 trillion per year till 2030¹¹. The emphasis on mobilising finance from diverse sources, including private sector investment, multilateral development bank lending, and innovative financing instruments, raises concerns about the commitments of governments and their obligation to meet climate finance targets¹².

India’s comprehensive rejection of the NCQG at COP29 represented more than diplomatic dissent; it articulated a sophisticated critique of contemporary approaches to international environmental governance¹³. Speaking on behalf of the Like-Minded Developing Countries (LMDCs), India’s intervention highlighted both substantive and procedural objections that also illuminate broader questions about democratic legitimacy in climate negotiations.

Substantively, India challenged the fundamental framing of the NCQG as inadequate in quantum, inappropriate in composition, and problematic in timeline. The $300 billion target, while numerically significant, represents what India termed “a paltry sum” when assessed against the scale of climate impacts already affecting developing countries and the accelerating costs of delayed action. The 2035 timeline, moreover, effectively defers substantial scaling up of climate finance for more than a decade while developing countries face immediate adaptation needs and escalating loss and damage costs.

The Local Dimension: EV Financing Challenges in India

India’s electric mobility transformation presents a compelling case study of how global climate objectives intersect with local financing realities, creating both opportunities and barriers for sustainable development¹⁴. With over 1.5 million electric vehicles sold in FY2024 and projections suggesting EVs will account for 30% of all new vehicle sales by 2030, India’s EV market represents one of the world’s fastest-growing sustainable transport transitions.

The fundamental challenge stems from the cost economics of EVs compared to Internal Combustion Engine (ICE) vehicles, which create affordability barriers that disproportionately affect vulnerable populations¹⁵. The upfront cost of an EV typically ranges from 1.5 to 2 times that of an equivalent ICE vehicle, while operating costs are only 10-20% of ICE vehicle costs. This cost structure makes economic sense for high-usage commercial vehicles but creates significant barriers for private vehicles used sparingly by students, rural populations, and low-income urban residents.

The financing landscape exacerbates these challenges through structural biases that penalise EV adoption among vulnerable populations. Interest rates for EV loans typically exceed 20%, nearly double the rates available for ICE vehicle financing. This disparity reflects multiple factors, including perceived technology risks, uncertain residual values, and limited institutional familiarity with EV financing models. For populations that save for months to purchase a two-wheeler or dedicate substantial portions of their monthly income to vehicle loan repayment, these higher costs create insurmountable barriers.

The institutional architecture of vehicle financing in India compounds these challenges. Traditional public sector banks, including State Bank of India, have historically avoided the two-wheeler and three-wheeler financing market, creating space for specialised Non-Banking Financial Companies (NBFCs) such as Bajaj Finance and Mahindra Finance¹⁶. However, these NBFCs have been slow to enter the EV financing space due to technology risks, uncertain asset values, and higher capital costs. The result is a financing gap that threatens to exclude millions of potential EV users, particularly in Tier II and Tier III cities, where formal financial penetration remains limited.

The Intersection of Global and Local: Lessons from India’s Experience

How Global Climate Finance Gaps Affect Local Implementation

The disconnect between global climate finance commitments and local implementation realities is perhaps nowhere more evident than in India’s EV transition, where international funding mechanisms designed to support sustainable transport often fail to address the specific barriers that prevent equitable access to electric mobility¹⁷. This misalignment reflects broader structural issues in international climate finance, which prioritise scalable, commercially viable investments over equity and inclusion as primary objectives.
International climate finance for electric mobility in India, while substantial in absolute terms, reveals several patterns that illuminate broader challenges in global climate governance. The $3 billion mobilised by multilateral institutions for India’s ZEV transition represents significant resources; however, the predominance of loan-based instruments creates debt burdens that may be inappropriate for addressing what are fundamentally global public goods¹⁸. When EV financing carries interest rates exceeding 20% due to perceived risks and limited institutional familiarity, international climate finance mechanisms that rely on market-based cost recovery may exacerbate accessibility barriers.

Case Study: The World Bank-SIDBI EV Financing Program – A Lesson in Implementation Failures

The World Bank-SIDBI Electric Vehicle Risk Sharing Program represents a compelling case study of how well-intentioned global climate finance initiatives can encounter significant implementation challenges when they fail to address local market realities and institutional constraints¹⁹ adequately. Announced in 2021 with considerable fanfare, this program was designed to establish a $300 million “first loss risk sharing instrument” that would ultimately mobilise $1.5 billion in EV financing, demonstrating how international climate finance could catalyse domestic lending for sustainable transportation.

The program’s initial design reflected a sophisticated understanding of EV financing barriers, proposing to reduce interest rates from the prevailing 20-25% to 10-12% through a partial credit guarantee mechanism. Under NITI Aayog’s guidance as the facilitating agency, the initiative aimed to address the fundamental constraint that prevented mainstream financial institutions from entering the EV financing market: the perception of excessive risk due to unproven technology, uncertain residual values, and limited operational experience.

However, the program’s trajectory illustrates how global climate finance mechanisms can struggle with ground-level implementation challenges. The State Bank of India (SBI), originally designated as the program manager, withdrew after conducting due diligence that revealed concerns about the non-viability of this instrument. This withdrawal reflected broader institutional hesitancy among traditional banks in financing two-wheelers and three-wheelers, partially due to losses suffered from financing e-rickshaws powered by unreliable lead-acid batteries.

NITI Aayog’s response to these setbacks demonstrates both the opportunities and limitations of policy coordination in complex financing ecosystems. The institution pivoted from SBI to SIDBI as the implementing agency, recognising that a development finance institution with expertise in MSMEs might be better positioned to navigate the specific challenges of EV financing. This decision reflected NITI Aayog’s sophisticated understanding that successful climate finance requires institutional intermediaries with appropriate risk appetite and sectoral knowledge.

Yet the broader program’s failure to achieve its original scale and timeline highlights structural limitations in how international climate finance engages with domestic institutional realities. Three years after its announcement, the promised fund has not materialised, and interest rates for EV financing remain in the 20-25% range that the program was designed to address. This outcome reflects not institutional incompetence but rather the complexity of addressing market failures that extend beyond pure financial intervention to encompass technology maturity, regulatory frameworks, and ecosystem development.

Local Innovations as Models for Global Reform

India’s domestic innovations in climate finance and EV financing provide important models that could inform broader reforms in international climate finance mechanisms²⁰. The country’s draft Climate Finance Taxonomy, developed by the Ministry of Finance, demonstrates how comprehensive frameworks can support both international and domestic climate investments while maintaining attention to equity and development objectives.

The taxonomy’s emphasis on “country-determined transition pathways” offers an alternative to climate finance driven by the global north, with conditions that often overlook ground-level realities²⁰. By establishing clear criteria for climate-relevant activities while maintaining flexibility to accommodate India’s diverse economic structure and development priorities, the framework demonstrates how technical standards can support rather than constrain climate action in India.
India’s approach to addressing EV financing challenges through proposed government-backed institutions offers insights relevant to international climate finance reform. The recommendations by various stakeholders for an EV-focused financing institution, modelled on successful examples like the Small Industries Development Bank of India (SIDBI) and the National Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development (NABARD), demonstrate how public institutions can address market failures while catalysing private sector engagement²¹.
Battery-as-a-Service models and other innovations that decouple high upfront costs from ongoing operational expenses offer insights for international climate finance design. By reducing initial capital requirements, these models address one of the most significant barriers to climate technology adoption among vulnerable populations²². Global climate finance mechanisms could incorporate similar approaches, providing patient capital for high upfront costs while enabling market-based recovery of operational expenses.

Persistent Challenges and Structural Barriers

The fundamental challenge facing India’s climate transition financing remains the stark mismatch between assessed needs and available resources across all dimensions and scales. At the global level, even if the NCQG’s $300 billion annual target were fully achieved and distributed equitably among developing countries, India’s share would represent only a fraction of its estimated $1.5-2.5 trillion financing needs through 2030²³. This quantitative gap underscores the limitations of the current international climate finance architecture and the continued dependence on domestic resource mobilisation.

The EV sector illustrates how these constraints operate at the level of specific technologies and markets. Despite the remarkable growth in EV financing, expected to reach $19.9 billion by 2030, this amount remains insufficient to support the complete transformation of India’s transport sector, which includes over 200 million vehicles and requires an estimated $60 billion investment by 2030²⁴. The gap is particularly acute for adaptation and resilience investments in transport infrastructure, which receive minimal attention from both international and domestic climate finance mechanisms.

Institutional capacity constraints further compound scale challenges. While India has developed sophisticated frameworks such as the draft Climate Finance Taxonomy, effective implementation requires capacity building across hundreds of financial institutions, thousands of project developers, and millions of potential beneficiaries²⁵. The specialised knowledge needed for climate finance assessment, monitoring, and verification creates bottlenecks that may constrain scaling up even when financial resources are available.

Policy Recommendations: Bridging Global and Local Finance

Reforming Global Climate Finance Architecture

India’s experience with both the NCQG negotiations and domestic EV financing challenges provides essential insights for reforming international climate finance to serve the needs of developing countries better and ensure equitable access to climate solutions. In this context, international climate finance mechanisms must shift from mobilisation frameworks that emphasise private sector engagement towards obligations that acknowledge developed countries’ historical responsibility for climate change. This should be in the form of grant capital, mainly, thus reducing the cost of accessing finance and alleviating the fear of a debt trap in India and other economies in the Global South²⁶.

This shift would entail several concrete changes in the design of international climate finance. Grant-based and highly concessional financing should be prioritised for adaptation, loss and damage, and technology access that serves public goods functions rather than generating commercial returns. The governance structures of international climate funds should be reformed to ensure meaningful representation of developing countries in decision-making, with particular attention to the voices of climate-vulnerable populations.

The integration of climate finance with broader development objectives requires explicit attention in international mechanisms. Rather than treating climate action as an isolated intervention, international climate finance should support integrated approaches that address climate, development, and equity objectives simultaneously. India’s Climate Finance Taxonomy provides a model for how such integration can be operationalised through technical frameworks that maintain rigour while ensuring flexibility.

Scaling up Domestic Climate Finance Innovation in the EV Sector

The domestic dimension of India’s climate finance challenges requires coordinated policy interventions that can address market failures while ensuring equitable access to climate solutions. The establishment of a government-backed EV financing institution should be prioritised as a model for broader institutional development in climate finance.

Such an institution could provide refinancing facilities to NBFCs and microfinance institutions, thereby reducing their cost of capital and enabling more accessible terms for end-users. Initial capitalisation could combine government resources with international climate finance, including funds from the Green Climate Fund and other multilateral mechanisms. This approach demonstrates how global and domestic resources can be effectively combined to address specific market failures while maintaining local ownership and control.

Battery-as-a-Service models and other innovations that reduce upfront costs should be supported through targeted policy interventions. This could include risk-sharing mechanisms that facilitate private sector concerns about technology obsolescence, regulatory frameworks that enable new business models, and integration with broader digital infrastructure initiatives. The proposed Battery Aadhar system, which would track individual battery performance and enable transparent valuations, represents the kind of institutional innovation that could transform EV financing by reducing uncertainty and improving asset quality.

Conclusion: Toward Equitable Climate Transition Financing

India’s experience with climate transition financing reveals both the possibilities and limitations of current approaches to mobilising resources for sustainable development in the context of urgent climate action needs. The country’s rejection of the NCQG and its struggles with EV financing highlight issues of aligning global climate finance mechanisms with local development priorities and ensuring that climate solutions are accessible to all populations²⁷.

The analysis demonstrates that adequate climate transition financing requires addressing both global and regional dimensions simultaneously. International climate finance mechanisms, despite recent increases in commitments, remain inadequate in scale and inappropriate in design for addressing the equity dimensions of climate action. The emphasis on market-driven mobilisation and private sector engagement, while potentially expanding resource volumes, may exacerbate inequalities if not carefully designed to ensure accessibility and affordability.
The World Bank-SIDBI case study illustrates how even well-designed international climate finance programs can struggle with implementation when they encounter institutional constraints and market realities that were not adequately anticipated during program design. The program’s shift from SBI to SIDBI demonstrates the importance of adaptive management and institutional learning in climate finance delivery.
However, India’s innovations in domestic climate finance provide essential models for addressing these challenges. The Climate Finance Taxonomy demonstrates how technical frameworks can maintain rigour while ensuring flexibility and country ownership. Proposed innovations in EV financing, including government-backed institutions and Battery-as-a-Service models, offer pathways for addressing market failures while maintaining development objectives.

The path forward requires continued collaboration between global and local actors, sustained innovation in financial instruments and delivery mechanisms, and unwavering commitment to ensuring that climate finance serves both environmental and development objectives. India’s leadership in these areas, from its principled advocacy in international forums to its institutional innovations in domestic markets, positions the country to influence fundamentally how the world approaches climate finance in the critical decade ahead²⁸.

Author Brief Bio: Mr. Abhishek Saxena is an accomplished climate professional with over a decade of expertise in climate action, global cooperation, clean energy, and sustainable transport, with a particular focus on electric vehicles. He worked with NITI Aayog for more than 5 years where he led pivotal public policy initiatives and was instrumental in shaping India’s electric vehicle landscape, contributing significantly to the nation’s mobility transformation. Previously, Mr. Saxena played an influential role in India’s startup ecosystem, notably optimizing supply chain operations at Flipkart and advancing sustainable transportation and energy projects across leading private sector organizations. He holds an MBA from IIT Delhi and a B.Tech in Computer Engineering from the NIT Kurukshetra.

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