Introduction:
Recently, the Indian authorities seized a dual-use item during its port call in India. Upon inspection, it was discovered that the item was being shipped from China to Pakistan, marking the second seizure[1] in the last few months.
The Pakistan Foreign Ministry has issued a statement[2] stating that the delivery of its ‘commercial goods’ was being disrupted as the material was a supply part for an automobile industry in Pakistan. Further, the Pakistani Spokesperson stated[3] it was a ‘violation of international norms and taking arbitrary measures in violation of international law’. This has garnered a response[4] from Beijing, as the Spokesperson of China’s diplomatic mission in New Delhi stated that the ‘materials were no means a piece of military equipment or a dual-use item covered by China’s non-proliferation export control regime’. Such incidents need to be analysed from national security and international law perspectives.
This is not the first instance where China and Pakistan have been involved in concerted efforts to circumvent the global export system. The Chinese government’s support in enabling Pakistan’s network of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) procurement activities has long been a fundamental concern for the Indian authorities.
China’s consistent support in enabling Pakistan’s illicit acquisition of dual-use items and sensitive technologies has been a practice. This deepening nexus between China and Pakistan poses a grave threat to India’s national security, as well as flouts numerous rules regarding non-proliferation and international cooperation for strategic trade control of such items. Through this article, we will explore the nexus between China and Pakistan’s nexus to circumvent the global strategic trade norms with instances.
India, Wassenaar Arrangement, and International Export System:
In December 2022, India assumed the G20 presidency and, concurrently, the Plenary Chairmanship of the Wassenaar Arrangement (WA).[5] As the 42nd participating state, India joined this multilateral export control regime. The WA promotes transparency and responsibility in the transfer of conventional arms and dual-use technologies through regular information exchange among its members. By preventing destabilising accumulations, the WA aims to preserve international peace and security and reduce the likelihood of armed conflicts. Notably, neither Pakistan[6] nor China[7] is a member of this arrangement. The Plenary, the decision-making body of the WA, operates on consensus and works closely with other member states. India’s assumption of the Plenary Chairmanship in January 2023 marked a one-year term, during which it was responsible for updating the control lists annually in consultation with other members.[8]
The authorities seized two Computer Numerical Control (CNC) machines, which have recognised military applications and limited civilian use. Customs Authorities detained the goods because they are classified as dual-use items, a category addressed by the Wassenaar Arrangement. Historically, North Korea has utilised CNC machines to advance its nuclear program, even in the face of international sanctions.
Dual-use items[9] can have both civilian and military applications or, worse, be used for terrorism. This leads to higher due diligence on the export of these materials. Throughout history, states and territorial entities have restricted the export of arms and related equipment for national security reasons. However, the scope of exporting such goods has significantly broadened, including technologies, software, and others that may also have civilian and military applications. Nations under sanctions or tight scrutiny resort to exploiting the international export control system to get hold of these materials and technologies – thus inherently – exploiting the international export control system.
India’s Strategic Trade Control Laws:
Nations on the watchlist often develop front companies to procure equipment, materials, and technologies for their weapons programs. These exports typically reflect capabilities built over the years by creating elaborate networks of shell companies, procurement agents, and complex documentation for years to facilitate such transfers. Due to the volume of ship movement, the use of ships is the most preferred method of transfer – which further complicates the task for security agencies, leaving them to search for a needle in a haystack.
In early May this year, the Indian customs authorities at the Kattupalli port in Tamil Nadu seized[10] and intercepted a consignment bound for Karachi originating from Shanghai. The consignment contained the chemical Ortho-Chloro Benzylidene Malononitrile (CS), which is primarily used for riot control but can also be a potential chemical weapon. The dual-use nature of this chemical led to its inclusion on the lists of the Wassenaar Arrangement and the Chemical Weapons Convention, thus being a ground for Indian authorities to seize it. The seizure of the chemicals had an interesting timing; as tensions continue to mount in the Balochistan region of Pakistan, this covert supply by China would not be a far-fetched idea. Furthermore, considering the number of attacks on Chinese nationals and Pakistan’s inability to secure several CPEC (China-Pakistan Economic Corridor) projects[11]can be one of the reasons for such transfers in the region.
India’s strategic trade control laws and regulations[12] manage the flow of goods, services, and technologies across borders. These laws and regulations are the culmination of national and international laws and codes of conduct that balance a country’s commercial and security considerations. The United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540[13] obliges all member states to prohibit the access of WMD and their delivery system to non-actors. It creates a universal obligation for all states to take and enforce measures to establish domestic controls to prevent the proliferation of such weapons. This prohibition includes the delivery of it as well to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. Typically, a standard resolution is not binding on countries unless passed by the Security Council, in which case it becomes binding in international law. India is a party[14] to three major multilateral export control regimes—the Wassenaar Arrangement, the Australia Group, and the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). These international rules on export control are laid down by international agreements concluded among states.
India has robust rules based on proliferation and strategic trade, which have evolved over the last few decades. It is based on the elements of international law that prohibit access to WMD and its delivery to non-state actors. Some relevant legislations include the Weapons of Mass Destruction and their Delivery Systems (Prohibition of Unlawful Activities) Act of 2005; the United Nations (Security Council) Act of 1947; the Customs Act of 1962; the Foreign Trade (Development and Regulations) Act of 1992; the Arms Act of 1959; the Atomic Energy Act of 1962; the Chemical Weapons Convention Act of 2000; the Explosives Act 1884; among the others.
Furthermore, the Export-Import Policy 1995 includes controls on the export of specified goods, services, and technology, including the regularly updated SCOMET list. The Department of Atomic Energy, Directorate General of Foreign Trade, and Ministry of Defence have jurisdiction over the development of these regulations. Additionally, the scope of such lists is determined through an Inter-Ministerial Working Group that assesses the associated risks.
China-Pakistan Nexus, Scrutiny, and Challenges to Compliance:
When an export authorisation is granted, several key questions are typically raised – ‘what‘, ‘where‘, ‘who‘, and ‘how‘ are evaluated. First, the specific products being exported are listed and carefully classified based on their technical specifications and capabilities. This categorisation helps determine whether the items are considered military, dual-use, or commercial. Second, the destination country for the export is an important factor, as the geopolitical situation and potential for diversion or misuse in that region are closely evaluated. Third, whether the recipient state is subject to international sanctions or embargoes is a crucial consideration, as these legal restrictions limit the legitimate transfer of such sensitive goods. Finally, the end-user and their intended use of the items are thoroughly examined to ensure the exports will not be used for malicious or unauthorised purposes. These comprehensive parameters help guide the legitimate and responsible transfer of weapons and other strategically controlled items. Additionally, sanction laws strictly restrict the export of military and dual-use items to embargoed states and entities, as these factors are meticulously evaluated at every level of the decision-making process.
However, challenges remain when nations such as China violate international commitments even after agreeing/not agreeing to these export regimes through consensus, creating its own export rules which fit its understanding. In recent years, the author has collated[15] a list of instances wherein the nexus between China and Pakistan has continued to grow:
| No | Route | Year | Supplier | Supplied | Caught | Analysis |
| 1. | Jiangyin to Qasim | 2020 | M/s General Technology (China) | National Development Complex (NDC) (Pakistan) | Kandla, India | Ship hauled was named Dai Cui Yun (Singaporean Flagged from Hong Kong)
Industrial Dryers – Meant for National Development Complex (NDC), a Pakistani Entity involved in the development of Pakistan’s long-range ballistic missiles. |
| 2. | Ningbo to Karachi | 2021 | M/s Hangzhou Chengyingyi Energy Technology Co. Ltd. (China) | M/s Ghani Global Holdings (Pakistan) | Nhava Sheva, Mumbai | Cryogenic Oxygen Tanks for the usage in Pakistan’s Space and Upper Atmosphere Research Commission (SUPARCO)
The Carrier name was “Felixstowe Bridge” which was seized. |
| 3. | Shanghai to Karachi | 2022 | M/s Taiyuan Mining Import and Export Co Ltd (China) | Cosmos Engineering (Pakistan) | Nhava Sheva, Mumbai | Consignment of thermo-electric instruments sourced from an Italian Company M/s DistekStrumenti&Misure SRL (DSM) by Cosmos Engineering allegedly for AQ Khan Research Laboratory. |
| 4. | Shanghai to Karachi | 2022 | M/s Suzhou Kanjia Clean Technology Ltd (China) | DESTO (Pakistan) | Nhava Sheva, Mumbai | The container vessel ‘Kota Megah,’ sailing under the Singaporean flag, was shipping four containers. These containers held high-end equipment intended for producing/manufacturing chemical materials |
| 5. | Qingdao Port to Karachi | 2023 | World Panda Logistics Co Ltd (China) | Emerging Future Solutions Pvt Ltd (Pakistan) – a shell company associated with Pakistan’s Defence Science and Technology Organization (DESTO) | Nhava Sheva, Mumbai | Jacketed glass reactors and other key laboratory equipment required for WMD programs were found on a Malta-flagged ship named CMA CGM Figaro.
Pakistan’s DESTO is a sanctioned entity by the BIS of the United States Commerce Department for its involvement in WMD programs. |
| 6. | Shekou Port to Karachi | 2024 | Shanghai JXE Global Logistics Co Ltd (China) – Taiyuan Mining Import & Export Co Ltd (China) | Pakistan Wings Pvt Ltd (Pakistan) | Nhava Sheva, Mumbai | The customs officials flagged a Malta-flagged merchant ship named CMA CGM Attila, which was carrying CNC (Computer Numerical Control) machinery.
Pakistan Wings Pvt Ltd have been involved in shipping of restricted items from destinations such as China, Turkey, and Italy among the others for Pakistan. |
| 7. | Shanghai to Karachi | 2024 | Chengdu Shichen Trading Company Ltd (China) | Rohail Enterprises (Pakistan) | Kattupalli, Chennai | A ship bound for Karachi, named ‘Hyundai Shanghai’ and sailing under the Cyprus flag, was confiscated with a chemical called ortho-Chloro Benzylidene Malononitrile or CS.
This shipment contained 2,560 kg of this chemical, which has varied applications. |
Thus, the deepening nexus between Pakistan and China, exemplified through these covert transfers of dual-use technologies and sensitive items, underscores the ongoing challenges of nations circumventing global strategic trade control systems. Despite robust measures taken by India, these continued transfers highlight the complexities of regional and international peace in the South Asian Region. With this, there is a need for monitoring, sanctioning, and plugging holes in the illegal proliferation of nuclear items, dual technologies, and items that can further develop the nuclear program.
Pragmatism in Balancing Interests:
In the past, China had a troubling record of assisting various states with their nuclear and missile programs, despite its public commitment[16] in 2000 to refrain from aiding any country in the development of ballistic missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons and sharing sensitive technologies. The lack of a standardised global approach to control the trade of dual-use goods and sensitive technologies has allowed China to become a supplier[17] of such items to countries like Iran, Libya, North Korea, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan, among others.
Furthermore, the fact that China is not a member of the major international export control regimes, such as the Australia Group, Missile Technology Control Regime, and Wassenaar Arrangement, further complicates the implementation and enforcement of regulations on these sensitive goods[18], as the applicable rules and procedures may vary widely across different countries and jurisdictions. This creates a significant risk of diversion, including through the falsification of documents and the circumvention of export controls. There is an urgent need for robust screening and scrutiny of such investments and trade activities to mitigate the risks, particularly regarding the end user and the intended use of the goods and technologies.
Moreover, the rapid evolution of technologies, especially in the military application of artificial intelligence[19] and space sectors, and troubles in the neighbourhood[20] regarding Bangladesh will pose significant challenges for policymakers and regulators to keep pace with these advancements while maintaining effective export control measures. This challenge will continue to haunt the security apparatus of countries enforcing export control as they struggle to adapt their policies and procedures to address the constantly changing technological landscape. The involvement of non-state actors, such as terrorist groups or nations that use terrorism as a strategic tool, further complicates the issue, as these entities may exploit the weaknesses in the export control system for their illicit purposes.
Author Brief Bio: Mr. Arpan A. Chakravarty is a Research Fellow at India Foundation. Currently, he is a Doctoral Scholar at the School of Law, Auro University, India. His research interest includes the interdisciplinary study of law, national security, and foreign affairs. His focus particularly lies in the South Asian neighbourhood. He is a lawyer by training, holding BA LLB (Hons) from Christ University, Bangalore, and LLM (Gold Medallist) from Auro University. In the past, he had the opportunity to serve at institutions that play a vital role in nation-building, such as Rashtriya Raksha University, Gandhinagar (An Institute of National Importance), and the Indian Institute of Science (IISc), Bengaluru, in various capacities. Previously, he has been part of the prestigious Defence Correspondents Course (2022) by the Ministry of Defence, India, where he was invited from academia for his role as a Contributing Editor (National Security and Foreign Affairs) at The Pulse India. He has experience of interning with the Ministry of External Affairs, India; Observer Research Foundation (ORF); Centre for Land Warfare Studies (CLAWS); and Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative (CHRI), among others.
References:
[1] Peri, D. (2024) Chinese Dual-Use Cargo heading to Pakistan seized, The Hindu. Available at: https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/ship-suspected-to-contain-dual-use-consignment-for-pakistans-nuclear-programme-stopped-at-nhava-sheva-port-in-mumbai/article67906937.ece (Accessed: 06 December 2024).
[2]Pakistan condemns India’s ‘high handedness’ in seizure of ‘commercial goods’, 2024, The Hindu. Available at: https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/pakistan-condemns-indias-high-handedness-in-seizure-of-commercial-goods/article67909816.ece (Accessed: 06 December 2024).
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[10]Security agencies seize Chinese shipment of banned chemicals for Pakistan at Tamil Nadu Port, The Economic Times. (2024) Available at: https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/india/security-agencies-seize-karachi-bound-consignment-from-china-of-banned-chemicals-at-tn-port/articleshow/111660319.cms?from=mdr (Accessed: 06 December 2024)
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[17] Refer 9; Proliferation Record.
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[19] Lederer, E.M. (2024) Un adopts Chinese resolution with US support on closing the gap in access to Artificial Intelligence, AP News. Available at: https://apnews.com/article/un-china-us-artificial-intelligence-access-resolution-56c559be7011693390233a7bafb562d1 (Accessed: 06 December 2024)
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