Introduction

Hinduism is often regarded as the oldest living civilisation in the world and can be traced back approximately 4,000 years. We have examined numerous texts regarding Buddhism’s influence across many regions outside India, yet there is less evidence of Hinduism’s impact globally. Indian culture and Hinduism appear to be closely intertwined in various ancient texts, and this paper focuses explicitly on the influence of Hinduism in Champa. This region encompasses central and southern Vietnam. Champa was a long, narrow strip of territory, bordered by mountains to the west and the sea to the east and intersected by countless hills. The influence of Hinduism on the land of Champa also provides profound insight into the integration of Hindu civilisation within a foreign context.

As mentioned in India’s Contribution to World Thought and Culture^[1], the unifying aspect of Indian culture extended beyond the mainland of the Indian subcontinent, reaching the Southeast Asian nations and thereby enhancing the cultural bond. References to Southeast Asia in Indian literature can be traced back to the last centuries B.C. and the early centuries C.E. in texts such as the Arthasastra, the Maha Niddesa, the Ramayana, the Mahabharata, the Dharmasastras, as well as in various Puranas and Jataka tales.^[2] Sanskrit inscriptions evidence the establishment of Indian kingdoms in Southeast Asia found at Champa (second to third century C.E.), the Kutei inscriptions of Mulavarman from East Borneo (fifth century C.E.), and the Taruma inscriptions from West Java.

The Chinese records mention Kiu-liens, a tribe from beyond the frontier of Chinese territories that attacked their southernmost districts, destroyed the Chinese forts, and ravaged the whole country in the year 137 CE.^[3] These individuals, possessing great military skill and organisation, ultimately formed the kingdom of Champa from the conquered territory of the Chinese empire^[4] and left epigraphic records in Sanskrit.

A.P. Patnaik^[5] says that these Kiu-liens were quite likely a branch of the Kula people of Burma, whom G.E. Gerini has described as people from Kalinga. According to Gerini,^[6] the term Kula was used in Burma to designate Western foreigners in general and the people from south India in particular. H.B. Sarkar,^[7] a scholar on the history of Southeast Asia, has also identified the Kula people of Burma with the Kalinga people. Thus, it was possible that sometime in the first century CE or even before, the Kula people, also known as Kiu-liens, migrated in considerable numbers from Kalinga to Burma and other lower regions of Indo-China via land or sea. This was one of the theories on the beginnings of the Champa kingdom.

The other mentioned in the Chinese chronicles, around 192 C.E., is a kingdom established in the region of the present city of Hue in Vietnam, which the Chinese named Linyi but which Sanskrit literature referred to as Champa. Champa derived its name from the term Chams, yet it lacked epigraphical proof until the beginning of the seventh century; however, earlier historical records do mention the term ‘kingdom of Chams.’ The Cham people were believed to be of Austronesian origin, belonging to an Indonesian linguistic group, and they were ethnically and culturally distinct from the Viets in the north and the Khmers in the west. Wen-Hsien T’ung-k’ao, a Chinese work by the author Ma Tuan-lin, also provides a clear picture of Cham society in the second half of the fourth century CE when it had already adopted a significant measure of Indian culture traditions.^[8]

 

Historical Context: The Initial Introduction of Hinduism

Communication between any two regions in ancient times was established through trade exchanges, as seen in the relationship between India and Southeast Asia. Archaeological evidence indicates that trade developed in these regions around the 2nd century C.E. The discovery of items such as shouldered adzes, knobbed ware, and glass beads from various sites in India and modern Vietnam (ancient Champa) points to interactions between the two regions in prehistoric times.^[9] The oldest cultural evidence in Champa is of a Buddha statue in Amaravati style^[10] in Dong Duong in the Quang Nam province of Vietnam.^[11]

The nature of the cultural elements that were transmitted from India to Southeast Asia has been enumerated into four points by Prof D.G.E. Hall^[12]: (1) a conception of royalty characterised by Hinduism and Buddhism, (2) literary expression through Sanskrit (3) mythological expressions from Ramayana, Mahabharata, and Puranas that were reflected in the traditional genealogies of the royal families of the region (4) the observance of Dharmasastras or the ‘Laws of Manu’, incorporated in the region’s religious texts. The author also explained the spread of Hinduism; when states came to be set up after the Indian pattern, the gods from many sites came to be united under one supreme god, Siva^[13], and the king was named Deva-raja (god-king, as people used to address) which in turn influenced the local society.^[14] The influence of Hinduism in Southeast Asia revolved around Siva and Visnu, at least during the initial period.^[15]

Siva was regarded as the ‘titular deity’ of the kingdom of Champa. Saivism was the more influential of the Brahmanical sects, thus profoundly influencing the entire course of religious development compared to Buddhism and Vaisnavism. Brahmanism adhered to an Indianised form of Hinduism that thrived since the adoption of Hindu culture in the ancient era of Champa. In ancient times, vast temple complexes were constructed, primarily dedicated to Siva. These temple structures honoured Siva as the founder and protector of the Champa dynasty, and extravagant arrangements, fueled by the wealth and resources of the kingdom, were made for his worship. The most important of these is known as My Son. Unfortunately, the main tower of the My Son complex was destroyed during the Vietnam War in 1969.

 

Spread of Hinduism: The Role of Trade and Cultural Exchange

Based on excavations in Thailand, it has been argued that India’s maritime contact with Southeast Asia dates back to the 4th century B.C.^[16] Contact between India and Southeast Asia likely began earlier, but intensified around the start of the Christian era. One of the primary trade routes linking India and China passed through the coast of Champa, which became a vital hub for Indian merchants engaged in maritime trade in the Southeast Asian region. Hinduism was introduced to Champa through trade with the Indian subcontinent. As trade flourished, Indian merchants sought spices and gold, bringing with them Buddhist monks and Brahmans of Hinduism, who played a crucial role in transmitting Indian religious and cultural practices, including Hinduism, Sanskrit, and temple architecture. Thus, the Buddhist-Hindu culture established in Champa emerged from the commercial relations between Vietnam and India.

Due to their coastal location, the Chams favoured a seafaring culture, with trade primarily focused on spices and silk. From the second to the sixth century CE, OcEo was a significant and prosperous harbour city for trade, serving as an ‘entrepot’ for voyagers. Excavations at OcEo port have unearthed beads, seals with Sanskrit inscriptions, gold medallions, and rare pieces of sculpture, providing evidence that the area was a vital hub for international trade between the Malay Peninsula and other regions of the world.^[17]

We can also find a reference to the maritime contact between Kalinga and Champa in the Uttaradhyayana Sutra^[18], one of the sacred Jain texts. It highlights the significance of Pithunda, a port in the Kalinga region, utilised by both pilgrims and traders from Champa since the time of Mahavira, and the port town also became a centre of Jain religion. The Pithunda port is mentioned in the Hathigumpha inscription of Kharavela, located in the Udaygiri caves in present-day Odisha. Additionally, the Uttaradhyayana Sutra refers to a merchant from Champa named Palita, who came to Pithunda port for trade, settled there, and married a Kalingan merchant’s daughter.^[19] While returning to Champa, Palita’s wife gave birth to a boy on the ship during the voyage^[20], and the boy was named Samudrapala.

In addition to commercial relationships, strong cultural ties developed between the people of Vietnam and India, reflected in their art, architecture, literature, and social life. The socio-cultural and political centres were established at Vijaya (Binh Dinh), Kauthara (Nha Trang), Panduranga (Phan Rang), Indrapura (Dong Duong), and Amaravati (Quang Nam), all of which were significantly influenced by elements of Hinduism.

 

Architectural and Artistic Influences

The historical archaeological sites of Tra Kieu, My Son, Dong Duong, and Po Nagar provide significant evidence of the holy land of Champa. The Cham kingdom was divided into several natural provinces based on the coastal plains. Artistic developments began around the seventh century, primarily at My Son and Tra Kieu. The temple architecture in Champa, which still exists today, began to take shape around the eighth and ninth centuries, characterised by a syncretic blend of outside influences and artistic originality. However, the earlier architectural remains have disappeared over time.

The regions that exhibited archaeological evidence include (1) Quang Nam, specifically the Thu Bon Valley, which encompasses the sites of My Son, Tra Kieu, and Dong Duong; (2) the area of Nha Trang featuring the Po Nagar complex; and (3) the region of Phan Rang.^[21] These were the centres of power on the territory of Champa, extending from the central to southern regions of present-day Vietnam. In addition to vast architectural complexes such as in Dong Duong, the art of the Chams included small, freestanding sculptures such as the sculpture of Uma, an elegant Goddess and wife of Siva. The earlier Cham architecture at My Son was similar to towers and arcades, with carved stone altar tables supporting images. In Binh Dinh, there are silver towers with pointed horseshoe chaitya arches. Later on, Indian influence declined, and huge, crude figures were executed in place of fine art.^[22]

Champa’s earliest inscriptions, found in the Quang Nam and Phu Yen regions of Vietnam, have been associated with King Bhadravarman. The figures, similar to those of Gupta-Vakataka and Pallava-Chalukya sculptures in Champa, suggest the region’s affinities to the mainland and the persistence of Indian culture in the region.

Most Indian-style monuments belong to the reign of Prakasa-Dharma, who adopted the regnal title of Vikrantavarman after his coronation. Several of these monuments are dedicated to Visnu, whose worship appeared for the first time in Champa during his reign. Around the eighth century, more emphasis was placed on Saivism, and linga worship became increasingly significant. There are many examples of Mukhalinga, a stone covered with metal and decorated with one or more human faces, symbolising the king’s identification with Siva.^[23] This particular depiction is an interesting example of ‘symbiosis’ where the traditional and important cults were united to broaden the basis of the religion of the state.

There also has been contact established between Kalinga and Champa on archaeological lines. The finding of bar celts from the Sankarjang excavation site in the Angul region of Odisha demonstrated that the state’s earliest musical instruments were similar to those found in Vietnam.^[24] Another significant fact is about the srivatsa motif of the Hathigumpha Inscription of emperor Kharavela which later became common in the coins of OcEo port from Vietnam to Myanmar (earlier named Arakan).^[25]

Similar lines can also be drawn between Bhubaneswar and My Son, as both places are identified as temple cities due to the construction of numerous Hindu temples. Like the early Odishan temples, the Cham temples feature a primary shrine at the center and a subsidiary one. The window openings were beautifully designed, reminiscent of the Rajarani temple in Bhubaneswar, Odisha, with their “baluster-shaped mullions”.^[26] The decorative motifs of the temples in My Son, especially the makara torana (crocodile-shaped archways), depict exquisitely carved makara heads seen in the archways of the Muktesvara temple in Bhubaneswar. Certain Champa monuments also illustrate the dancing form of Siva balancing on the back of the bull, a common occurrence in the temples of Odisha Bengal.^[27]

In essence, all of the temples in Champa belong to a single type. They are often perched at an altitude and constructed of brickwork. Major temples of Champa are arranged on a square terrace with three towers above. The image of God, which usually faces east, is at the centre of the sanctuary. Another structure with a similar design that runs from east to west is the porch. Occasionally, two auxiliary shrines, which could be regarded as later extensions, are constructed in the same north-south orientation as the main sanctuary. Each of these structures is surrounded by a wall, and the only way to enter is via an eastward-facing gate tower. The sanctuary’s interior is a square room. The exterior of the sanctuary consists of a square tower topped with a shikhara.

My son, Don Duong, and Po Nagar are three significant temple groups; the second is Buddhist, while the other two are Shaivite in nature. The Chams incorporated new elements into their designs without fully replicating the Indian prototypes; however, their overall appearance was derived from the fundamental and distinctive features of Indian style. ^[28]

Indravarman II founded a new capital named Indrapura in Quang Nam province and is credited with establishing Buddhism in Champa. Along those lines, the ruins of a monastery have been located in Dong Duong, which is situated southeast of My Son. This is the first evidence of Mahayana Buddhism’s existence in Champa. Indravarman II established the sixth dynasty in Champa’s history. The kings of this lineage were more involved in the country’s religious life than their predecessors. They constructed new sanctuaries and protected and restored religious foundations after desecration. Additionally, they erected inscriptions detailing their donations to temples and monasteries.^[29]

The inscriptions of Bhadravarman were the first documents of the Indian religion. The inscriptions reveal the dominance of the worship of Siva-Uma, and Bhadresvara was represented as the oldest known royal linga in “Farther India”^[30]. The inscriptions of Champa contain references to ritualistic rites and Vedic sacrifices. In Champa, the worship of the Hindu trinity—Brahma, Vishnu, Mahesvara, or Shiva—was widely recognised. The influence of writing, mainly from southern India, has also been carried over to Southeast Asian countries through the transmission of customs.

There also has been a reference to the partially damaged Vo Canh Rock Inscription (on palaeographic grounds from the second or third century CE), found near the village of Vo-Canh in the province of Khanh Hoa and has been regarded as the first epigraph in Champa^[31] which in Sanskrit refers to the first kingdom in Champa by the royal family of Sri Mara, who was considered to be a Kalingan.^[32] According to the Chinese chronicles, King Sri Mara was a Saiva by faith and called himself in the Vo Canh Inscription for having a Kalingan origin. It could be concluded that Sri Mara founded a Hindu dynasty in Champa in the second century CE.^[33] In the latter years of the Eastern Ganga dynasty’s rule in Odisha, in the early mediaeval period, the practice of setting loose an elephant to select the heir in the absence of an heir was also followed in Champa.

Two Cho Dinh Rock Inscriptions were discovered in the village of Nhan Thap, situated in what is now Phu Yen province in Vietnam. The inscriptions featured the names DharmamaharajaBhadravarman and Bhadresvarasvamin. The second name refers to Siva, to whom King Bhadravarman constructed a temple named Bhadresvara, as mentioned in his inscription from My Son.^[34]

Indian epigraphy has significantly contributed to the dissemination and evolution of script, alongside the region’s linguistic development. Inscriptions discovered in Champa primarily utilized two languages: Cham and Sanskrit. The Sanskrit inscriptions demonstrate considerable rhetorical skills, indicating that Indian linguistics was in early use beyond the region India.^[35]The earliest known use of Sanskrit in Champa inscriptions dates to the latter part of the fourth century, just before similar works from Borneo and Java’s Malay Peninsula became available. The first known inscription in the Cham language, based on palaeographic evidence, dates from the fourth century and is from Dong Yen Chau, which is near Tra Kieu.^[36] The early development of the Thu Bon Valley, where My Son is situated, is linked to the first cohesive collection of inscriptions. There are twenty inscriptions, all in Sanskrit, dating from the fifth to the late eighth century, except for two that are in or near My Son.^[37]

As mentioned in R.C. Majumdar’s Champa^[38], out of 130 inscriptions discovered in Champa and published in his volume, about 21 do not refer to any religious sect in particular. Of the rest, 92 refer to Siva and the gods associated with him, three to Visnu, five to Brahma, and seven to Buddha, while two refer to both Siva and Visnu. The two principal regions for these temples in ancient Champa were My Son and Po Nagar.

 

Syncretism and Adaptation of Hinduism

Since Southeast Asians may have had contact with India before the arrival of the Aryans, it is likely that they did not perceive Indian culture as distinct from their own. In mainland Southeast Asia, kingship most likely developed in two ways. The first occurred when an Indian, as in the case of the founding of the kingdom of Funan, married the daughter of a local chief and then proclaimed himself king. The second instance, exemplified by numerous incidents in Indonesia, involved a local chief inviting Indian brahmins to perform rituals for him according to Indian custom. Although other regions of the Indian subcontinent also had an influence, the southern part of the region was primarily responsible for Indian influence. These factors would have been a major catalyst for ingraining and spreading the values of Indian culture within the local community.

The Hinduism practiced in Champa was profoundly influenced by Saivism. As ancient texts reveal, Bhadravarman (also referred to as Bhavavarman in some accounts) was the founder of the first Hindu sanctuary in Champa by erecting a Siva-linga named after himself, Siva-Bhadresvara, which linked the name of the god with his own. It is the earliest royal linga on record in mainland Southeast Asia^[39] and was constructed in the Cirque of My Son, the reference to which is found in the inscriptions. Bhadravarman’s capital was discovered on the eastern side of My Son, at the location of present-day Tra Kieu. The surroundings of this site have yielded stone inscriptions in a script that matches the existing inscriptions.  An intriguing insight mentioned in R.C. Majumdar’s Champa^[40] is that the kings of Champa competed to place images of Siva, as this was considered pious. Furthermore, they identified or associated themselves with the gods by adding their names to the god’s name and occasionally making the god’s image resemble their own

The influence of Saivism in Champa was depicted through Siva-linga worship, which became a very popular cult in the region. The primary emblems included the lingam, Mukhalinga, segmented liṅgam, jaṭāliṅgam, and kośa Saivism.^[41]Adapting this form of worship also influenced the neighbouring regions of Java and Cambodia, as evidenced by the cultures and traditions of their local populations today. An example can be found in an inscription from Tra Kien in Champa, which indicates that King Prakasa-Dharma dedicated an image and temple to Valmiki. This also serves as evidence of the influence of Hinduism and its religious texts.^[42]

By the end of the ninth century, the Cham people had adapted to Hinduism. They used royal rituals to invoke God Siva to protect their territories and lineage.^[43] The Chams’ spirituality was dominated by Siva worship, and their artistic achievements reflected the same.

The second deity associated with the Siva cult was Ganesa, also called Vinayaka. It is known from an inscription^[44] that he was worshipped in a distinct temple at Po Nagar. He also had two temples at My Son. The image of Ganesa has often been found in other Saiva temples, sometimes alongside those of Goddess Bhagavati (Uma or Parvati) and Kartikeya, his mother and brother, respectively. The extant images of Ganesa at Champa are so numerous that at one time, he seemed even more popular than that of Uma, his mother.^[45]

Although not as prominent as Saivism, Vaisnavism also played an important role in Champa. While there are not many inscriptions that are distinctly Vaisnavite, the widespread influence of Vaisnavism in the region was evident from the numerous incidental references to Visnu. He was known by various names, such as Purusottama, Narayana, Hari, Govinda, Madhava, and Vikrama Tribhuvanakranta.^[46] We also studied the prevalence of worshipping Visnu alongside Goddess Lakshmi in both regions of Kalinga and Champa, highlighting their cultural and religious connections in earlier times. Prakasa-Dharma constructed a temple for Visnu Purushottama in the seventh century CE at Dong Duong. The worship of Visnu in the kingdom of Champa, as well as Jagannath at Puri in Odisha, also indicates a profound cultural relationship between the two regions.^[47]

Laksmi, also referred to as Padma and Sri in some texts, was a well-known goddess of Champa. She is mentioned multiple times in different inscriptions, and her “proverbial inconstancy” has been emphasized in various accounts. It is also well-known from the inscriptions that Laksmi is considered a symbol of sovereignty in Indian tradition. The inscriptions state that she was born in the Kailasa mountain, although Indian tradition regards her as emerging from the ocean of milk during the churning of the ocean.^[48] There is evidence of the prevalence of the worship of Goddess Shakti during the seventh and eighth centuries CE in the Kauthara region (present-day Nha Trang region) of southern Champa. Vicitrasagara constructed a temple for Devi Bhagavati in the eighth century CE and was one of the presiding deities of Champa. Conversely, around the same period, the worship of Goddess Bhagavati began at Rankada or Bankada (present-day Banapur in Odisha) on the coast of Kalinga.^[49] Therefore, it seems there was a strong cultural connection between ancient Kalinga and Champa during that period. Evidence has also shown the presence of icons of various other gods and goddesses such as Indra, Surya, Kubera, and Sarasvati, among others.

There was also a system of ‘Devadasis’—‘female dancers’—who dedicated their lives to the service of the god, a characteristic feature of Indian temples that persists in many places in both Vietnam and India. The Chams were significantly influenced by Hindu culture; they did not eat beef, widows did not remarry, and the queen performed sati after the death of the king.^[50] The enormous wealth of the temples of Champa also reminded the wealth and grandeur of the temples of India. The prevalence of Hinduism in Champa was interrupted for a time in the ninth and tenth centuries CE during the reign of Indravarman II when he built a giant Buddhist monastery^[51] in Indrapura (modern Dong Duong in the Quang Nam Province) and adopted Mahayana Buddhism as its faith. He built a giant Buddhist monastery and meditation halls for the monks.

Around the tenth century CE, Hinduism again rose as the predominant religion. Other sites that yielded important works of religious art and architecture aside from My Son were Khuong My, Chanh Lo (Quang Nam province), and Thap Mam (Binh Dinh province).

R.C. Majumdar^[52] mentions a characteristic feature of the religious development in Champa, which entailed the spirit of tolerance marked from beginning to end. Despite the prevalence of sectarianism and the coexistence of two or three major Brahmanical sects alongside Buddhism, there is no mention of religious animosity in the region. By the late 15th century, Annam had annexed the entirety of Champa. The Chinese recognised a succession of kings from Champa until 1543; however, most of the Chams later fled to Cambodian territories in the south.^[53]

 

Conclusion

The growth of Hinduism and its religious traditions in the ancient kingdom of Champa significantly shaped the region’s religious beliefs, cultural practices, and socio-political structures. Hinduism, particularly the worship of Shiva and Vishnu along with other deities, became deeply intertwined with the spiritual lives of the Cham people, influencing everything from temple architecture to daily rituals. The construction of grand temples by the rulers symbolised their religious devotion and efforts to legitimise their authority by aligning themselves with divine powers and associating their names with the Siva-linga. Hindu epics like the Ramayana and Mahabharata played a pivotal role in disseminating Hindu ideals, values, and traditions, assisting in the establishment of a unique religious identity in Champa. Over time, Hinduism in Champa facilitated a rich exchange of spiritual ideas between the Indian subcontinent and Southeast Asia while also fortifying local religious institutions.

Though the decline of Hinduism’s legacy in Champa, prompted by the rise of Islam, eventually brought both traditional and geographical changes for the Cham people, it left an enduring mark on Cham art and culture, as well as contemporary spiritual practices. The theoretical focus should be on how religious pluralism and cultural adaptation fostered traditions that endured through centuries of transformation. There was a cultural alignment between the two regions of the world, observable through the lens of adaptation rather than mere transplantation.

Lastly, the major point to highlight is that the Indian influence had no political implications, unlike the Chinese influence, which involved absorption by the native societies in Southeast Asia. Although Vietnam was under Chinese rule and subjected to intensive Sinicisation, the Vietnamese people developed a culture that nonetheless preserved its own identity, with roots tracing back to a pre-Chinese past.

 

Author Brief Bio:Shivani Badgaiyan was a Research Fellow at India Foundation and was associated with the ongoing ICSSR-sponsored project, “History and Cultural Traditions of Kalinga and Champa: Retracing the Cultural and Civilisational Linkages,” awarded to India Foundation. She holds a postgraduate degree in Political Science from the University of Delhi.

 

References:

Basa, Kishor K. “Indian Writings on Early History and Archaeology of Southeast Asia: A Historiographical Analysis.” Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, vol. 8, no. 3, 1998, pp. 395.

Basa, Kishore K. “Cultural Relations between Orissa and South-East Asia: An Archaeological Perspective.” Comprehensive History and Culture of Orissa: Early Times to 1568 A.D, Vol.1, Pt.II, edited by P.K. Mishra and J.K.Samal, Kaveri Books, 1997, pp. 737.

Behera, K.S. “Maritime Contacts of Orissa: Literary and Archaeological Evidence.” Utkal Historical Research Journal, vol. 5, 1994, pp. 64.

Bhargava, Piyush. “On the Art of Champa.” Proceedings of the Indian History Congress, vol. 68, 2007, pp. 1460.

Boisselier, Jean. “The Art of Champa.” Hindu- Buddhist Art of Vietnam: Treasures from Champa, Emmanuel Guillon, Weatherhill, 2001, pp. 39.

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Diskul, M.C. Subhadradis. “Ancient Kingship in Mainland Southeast Asia.” Kingship in Asia and Early America, edited by A.L. Basham, Colegio de Mexico, 1981, pp. 144.

Charpentier, J. (ed.), Uttaradhyayana Sutra, Uppasala, 1922, Pt. II, pp. 61.

Chhabra, B. Ch. Expansion of Indo-Aryan Culture, Oriental Publishers & Booksellers, 1965.

Gerini, G.E. Researches on Ptolemy’s Geography of Eastern Asia (Further India and Indo-Malay Archipelago), Royal Asiatic Society, 1909.

Guy, John (2011), “Pan-Asian Buddhism and the Bodhisattva Cult in Champa”, in Lockhart, Bruce; Trần, Kỳ Phương (eds.), The Cham of Vietnam: History, Society and Art, Hawaii: University of Hawaii Press, pp. 300–322.

Hall, D.G.E. A History of South-East Asia, Macmillan and Company Limited, 1955.

Hubert, Jean-François. The Art of Champa, 2005.

Majumdar, R.C. Ancient Colonies in the Far East Vol. 1 Champa, The Punjab Sanskrit Book Depot, 1927.

Majumdar, R.C. Hindu Colonies in the Far East, General Printers and Publishers Limited, 1944.

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Mishra, P.P. Cultural Rapprochement between India and South East Asia, National Book Organisation, 2005.

Patnaik, A.P. “Kalingan Link with Countries of South-East Asia.” Orissa Review, vol. 48, no. 9, 1992, pp. 29.

Patra, Benudhar. “Kalinga and Champa: A Study in Ancient Maritime Relations.” Odisha Review, 2017, https://magazines.odisha.gov.in/Orissareview/2017/November/engpdf/22-26.pdf.

Rath, P.C. “Maritime Activities of Kalinga.” Journal of Kalinga Historical Research Society, vol. 1, no. 4, 1947, pp. 350

Sarkar, H.B. Cultural Relations Between India and Southeast Asian Countries, Indian Council for Cultural Relations and Motilal Banarsidass, 1985.

Sivaramamurti C. and Deva, Krishna. “Indian Scripts and Languages in Asian Countries” India’s Contribution to World Thought and Culture, (abridged and revised edition) Vivekananda International Foundation and Aryan Books International, 2022, pp. 101.

Vickery, Michael. “Champa Revised.” The Cham of Vietnam, edited by TrầnKỳ Phương and Bruce M. Lockhart, NUS Press, 2011, pp. 364.

Yule, P. “Shankarjang- A Metals Period Burial Site in the Dhenkanal Uplands of Orissa.” South Asian Archaeology, 1987, pp. 581-584.

 

Endnotes:

^[1]Sivaramamurti C. and Deva, Krishna. “Indian Scripts and Languages in Asian Countries” India’s Contribution to World Thought and Culture, (abridged and revised edition) Vivekananda International Foundation and Aryan Books International, 2022, pp. 101.

^[2]Basa, Kishor K. “Indian Writings on Early History and Archaeology of Southeast Asia: A Historiographical Analysis.” Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, vol. 8, no. 3, 1998, pp. 395.

^[3] Majumdar, R.C. Hindu Colonies in the Far East, General Printers and Publishers Limited, 1944.

^[4]Patnaik, A.P. “Kalingan Link with Countries of South-East Asia.” Orissa Review, vol. 48, no. 9, 1992, pp. 29.

^[5] Ibid.

^[6]Gerini, G.E. Researches on Ptolemy’s Geography of Eastern Asia (Further India and Indo-Malay Archipelago), Royal Asiatic Society, 1909.

^[7] Sarkar, H.B. Cultural Relations Between India and Southeast Asian Countries, Indian Council for Cultural Relations and Motilal Banarsidass, 1985.

^[8] Patra, Benudhar. “Kalinga and Champa: A Study in Ancient Maritime Relations.” Odisha Review, 2017, https://magazines.odisha.gov.in/Orissareview/2017/November/engpdf/22-26.pdf.

^[9] Mishra, P.P. Cultural Rapprochement between India and South East Asia, National Book Organisation,  2005.

^[10] An ancient Indian art style that evolved in the Amaravati region of present-day Andhra Pradesh from the 2nd century BC to the 3rd century CE.

^[11] Bhargava, Piyush. “On the Art of Champa.” Proceedings of the Indian History Congress, vol. 68, 2007, pp. 1460.

^[12] Hall, D.G.E. A History of South-East Asia, Macmillan and Company Limited, 1955.

^[13] Ibid, pp. 144

^[14] People of Champa, Khmer, and Funan referred to their king as Deva-raja, and the king was considered to be the protector of the faith of the region.

^[15] Siva is the god of creation and destruction and was the incarnation of creative energy, and the linga, or phallus is his symbol. Visnu is the ruler of the destinies of mankind and is known for his blessings for auspiciousness.

^[16] Basa, Kishor K. “Indian Writings on Early History and Archaeology of Southeast Asia: A Historiographical Analysis.” Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, vol. 8, no. 3, 1998, pp. 408.

^[17] Mishra, P.P. “India’s Historical Impact on Southeast Asia.” Education about Asia, vol. 26, no. 1, 2021, pp. 3.

^[18]Charpentier, J. (ed.), Uttaradhyayana Sutra, Uppasala, 1922, Pt. II, pp. 61.

^[19] Ibid.

^[20] Ibid.

^[21] Vickery, Michael. “Champa Revised.” The Cham of Vietnam, edited by Trần Kỳ Phương and Bruce M. Lockhart, NUS Press, 2011, pp. 364.

^[22] Bhargava, Piyush. “On the Art of Champa.” Proceedings of the Indian History Congress, vol. 68, 2007, pp. 1460.

^[23] Hall, D.G.E. A History of South-East Asia, Macmillan and Company Limited, 1955.

^[24] Yule, P. “Shankarjang- A Metals Period Burial Site in the Dhenkanal Uplands of Orissa.” South Asian Archaeology, 1987, pp. 581-584.

^[25] Behera, K.S. “Maritime Contacts of Orissa: Literary and Archaeological Evidence.” Utkal Historical Research Journal, vol. 5, 1994, pp. 64.

^[26] Brown, Percy. Indian Architecture (Buddhist and Hindu Periods), D. B. Taraporevala Sons & Co. Pvt. Ltd., 1959.

^[27] Basa, Kishore K. “Cultural Relations between Orissa and South-East Asia: An Archaeological Perspective.” Comprehensive History and Culture of Orissa: Early Times to 1568 A.D, Vol.1, Pt.II, edited by P.K. Mishra and J.K.Samal, Kaveri Books, 1997, pp. 737.

^[28] Bhargava, Piyush. “On the Art of Champa.” Proceedings of the Indian History Congress, vol. 68, 2007, pp. 1460.

^[29] Hall, D.G.E. A History of South-East Asia, Macmillan and Company Limited, 1955.

^[30] Ibid, pp. 49.

^[31] Chhabra, B. Ch. Expansion of Indo-Aryan Culture, Oriental Publishers & Booksellers, 1965.

^[32] Rath, P.C. “Maritime Activities of Kalinga.” Journal of Kalinga Historical Research Society, vol. 1, no. 4, 1947, pp. 350

^[33] Majumdar, R.C. Ancient Colonies in the Far East Vol. 1 Champa, The Punjab Sanskrit Book Depot, 1927.

^[34] Chhabra, B. Ch. Expansion of Indo-Aryan Culture, Oriental Publishers & Booksellers, 1965.

^[35] Mishra, P.P. “India’s Historical Impact on Southeast Asia.” Education about Asia, vol. 26, no. 1, 2021, pp. 3.

^[36] Vickery, Michael. “Champa Revised.” The Cham of Vietnam, edited by Trần Kỳ Phương and Bruce M. Lockhart, NUS Press, 2011, pp. 366.

^[37] Ibid, pp. 367.

^[38] Majumdar, R.C. Ancient Colonies in the Far East Vol. 1 Champa, The Punjab Sanskrit Book Depot, 1927.

^[39]Diskul, M.C. Subhadradis. “Ancient Kingship in Mainland Southeast Asia.” Kingship in Asia and Early America, edited by A.L. Basham, Colegio de Mexico, 1981, pp. 155.

^[40] Majumdar, R.C. Ancient Colonies in the Far East Vol. 1 Champa, The Punjab Sanskrit Book Depot, 1927.

^[41] Hubert, Jean-François. The Art of Champa, 2005.

^[42] Patra, Benudhar. “Kalinga and Champa: A Study in Ancient Maritime Relations.” Odisha Review, 2017, https://magazines.odisha.gov.in/Orissareview/2017/November/engpdf/22-26.pdf.

^[43] Boisselier, Jean. “The Art of Champa.” Hindu- Buddhist Art of Vietnam: Treasures from Champa, Emmanuel Guillon, Weatherhill, 2001, pp. 39.

^[44] Majumdar, R.C. Ancient Colonies in the Far East Vol. 1 Champa, The Punjab Sanskrit Book Depot, 1927.

^[45] Ibid.

^[46] Ibid, pp. 193.

^[47] Patra, Benudhar. “Kalinga and Champa: A Study in Ancient Maritime Relations.” Odisha Review, 2017, https://magazines.odisha.gov.in/Orissareview/2017/November/engpdf/22-26.pdf.

^[48] Majumdar, R.C. Ancient Colonies in the Far East Vol. 1 Champa, The Punjab Sanskrit Book Depot, 1927.

^[49] Patnaik, A.P. “Kalinga Influence and Colonies in South-East Asia.” Orissa Review, vol. 42, no. 9, 1986, pp. 24-25

^[50] Mishra, P.P. “Contact between Orissa and Southeast Asia.” Journal of Orissan History, vol. 1, no. 2, 1980, pp. 18.

^[51]Guy, John (2011), “Pan-Asian Buddhism and the Bodhisattva Cult in Champa”, in Lockhart, Bruce; Trần, Kỳ Phương (eds.), The Cham of Vietnam: History, Society and Art, Hawaii: University of Hawaii Press, pp. 300–322.

^[52] Majumdar, R.C. Ancient Colonies in the Far East Vol. 1 Champa, The Punjab Sanskrit Book Depot, 1927.

^[53] Hall, D.G.E. A History of South-East Asia, Macmillan and Company Limited, 1955.

Introduction:

Recently, the Indian authorities seized a dual-use item during its port call in India. Upon inspection, it was discovered that the item was being shipped from China to Pakistan, marking the second seizure^[1] in the last few months.

The Pakistan Foreign Ministry has issued a statement^[2] stating that the delivery of its ‘commercial goods’ was being disrupted as the material was a supply part for an automobile industry in Pakistan. Further, the Pakistani Spokesperson stated^[3] it was a ‘violation of international norms and taking arbitrary measures in violation of international law’. This has garnered a response^[4] from Beijing, as the Spokesperson of China’s diplomatic mission in New Delhi stated that the ‘materials were no means a piece of military equipment or a dual-use item covered by China’s non-proliferation export control regime’. Such incidents need to be analysed from national security and international law perspectives.

This is not the first instance where China and Pakistan have been involved in concerted efforts to circumvent the global export system. The Chinese government’s support in enabling Pakistan’s network of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) procurement activities has long been a fundamental concern for the Indian authorities.

China’s consistent support in enabling Pakistan’s illicit acquisition of dual-use items and sensitive technologies has been a practice. This deepening nexus between China and Pakistan poses a grave threat to India’s national security, as well as flouts numerous rules regarding non-proliferation and international cooperation for strategic trade control of such items. Through this article, we will explore the nexus between China and Pakistan’s nexus to circumvent the global strategic trade norms with instances.

 

India, Wassenaar Arrangement, and International Export System:

In December 2022, India assumed the G20 presidency and, concurrently, the Plenary Chairmanship of the Wassenaar Arrangement (WA).^[5] As the 42nd participating state, India joined this multilateral export control regime. The WA promotes transparency and responsibility in the transfer of conventional arms and dual-use technologies through regular information exchange among its members. By preventing destabilising accumulations, the WA aims to preserve international peace and security and reduce the likelihood of armed conflicts. Notably, neither Pakistan^[6] nor China^[7] is a member of this arrangement. The Plenary, the decision-making body of the WA, operates on consensus and works closely with other member states. India’s assumption of the Plenary Chairmanship in January 2023 marked a one-year term, during which it was responsible for updating the control lists annually in consultation with other members.^[8]

The authorities seized two Computer Numerical Control (CNC) machines, which have recognised military applications and limited civilian use. Customs Authorities detained the goods because they are classified as dual-use items, a category addressed by the Wassenaar Arrangement. Historically, North Korea has utilised CNC machines to advance its nuclear program, even in the face of international sanctions.

Dual-use items^[9] can have both civilian and military applications or, worse, be used for terrorism. This leads to higher due diligence on the export of these materials. Throughout history, states and territorial entities have restricted the export of arms and related equipment for national security reasons. However, the scope of exporting such goods has significantly broadened, including technologies, software, and others that may also have civilian and military applications. Nations under sanctions or tight scrutiny resort to exploiting the international export control system to get hold of these materials and technologies – thus inherently – exploiting the international export control system.

 

India’s Strategic Trade Control Laws:

Nations on the watchlist often develop front companies to procure equipment, materials, and technologies for their weapons programs. These exports typically reflect capabilities built over the years by creating elaborate networks of shell companies, procurement agents, and complex documentation for years to facilitate such transfers. Due to the volume of ship movement, the use of ships is the most preferred method of transfer – which further complicates the task for security agencies, leaving them to search for a needle in a haystack.

In early May this year, the Indian customs authorities at the Kattupalli port in Tamil Nadu seized^[10] and intercepted a consignment bound for Karachi originating from Shanghai. The consignment contained the chemical Ortho-Chloro Benzylidene Malononitrile (CS), which is primarily used for riot control but can also be a potential chemical weapon. The dual-use nature of this chemical led to its inclusion on the lists of the Wassenaar Arrangement and the Chemical Weapons Convention, thus being a ground for Indian authorities to seize it. The seizure of the chemicals had an interesting timing; as tensions continue to mount in the Balochistan region of Pakistan, this covert supply by China would not be a far-fetched idea. Furthermore, considering the number of attacks on Chinese nationals and Pakistan’s inability to secure several CPEC (China-Pakistan Economic Corridor) projects^[11]can be one of the reasons for such transfers in the region.

India’s strategic trade control laws and regulations^[12] manage the flow of goods, services, and technologies across borders. These laws and regulations are the culmination of national and international laws and codes of conduct that balance a country’s commercial and security considerations. The United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540^[13] obliges all member states to prohibit the access of WMD and their delivery system to non-actors. It creates a universal obligation for all states to take and enforce measures to establish domestic controls to prevent the proliferation of such weapons. This prohibition includes the delivery of it as well to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. Typically, a standard resolution is not binding on countries unless passed by the Security Council, in which case it becomes binding in international law. India is a party^[14] to three major multilateral export control regimes—the Wassenaar Arrangement, the Australia Group, and the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). These international rules on export control are laid down by international agreements concluded among states.

India has robust rules based on proliferation and strategic trade, which have evolved over the last few decades. It is based on the elements of international law that prohibit access to WMD and its delivery to non-state actors. Some relevant legislations include the Weapons of Mass Destruction and their Delivery Systems (Prohibition of Unlawful Activities) Act of 2005; the United Nations (Security Council) Act of 1947; the Customs Act of 1962; the Foreign Trade (Development and Regulations) Act of 1992; the Arms Act of 1959; the Atomic Energy Act of 1962; the Chemical Weapons Convention Act of 2000; the Explosives Act 1884; among the others.

Furthermore, the Export-Import Policy 1995 includes controls on the export of specified goods, services, and technology, including the regularly updated SCOMET list. The Department of Atomic Energy, Directorate General of Foreign Trade, and Ministry of Defence have jurisdiction over the development of these regulations. Additionally, the scope of such lists is determined through an Inter-Ministerial Working Group that assesses the associated risks.

 

China-Pakistan Nexus, Scrutiny, and Challenges to Compliance:

When an export authorisation is granted, several key questions are typically raised – ‘what‘, ‘where‘, ‘who‘, and ‘how‘ are evaluated. First, the specific products being exported are listed and carefully classified based on their technical specifications and capabilities. This categorisation helps determine whether the items are considered military, dual-use, or commercial. Second, the destination country for the export is an important factor, as the geopolitical situation and potential for diversion or misuse in that region are closely evaluated. Third, whether the recipient state is subject to international sanctions or embargoes is a crucial consideration, as these legal restrictions limit the legitimate transfer of such sensitive goods. Finally, the end-user and their intended use of the items are thoroughly examined to ensure the exports will not be used for malicious or unauthorised purposes. These comprehensive parameters help guide the legitimate and responsible transfer of weapons and other strategically controlled items. Additionally, sanction laws strictly restrict the export of military and dual-use items to embargoed states and entities, as these factors are meticulously evaluated at every level of the decision-making process.

However, challenges remain when nations such as China violate international commitments even after agreeing/not agreeing to these export regimes through consensus, creating its own export rules which fit its understanding. In recent years, the author has collated^[15] a list of instances wherein the nexus between China and Pakistan has continued to grow:

 

No	Route	Year	Supplier	Supplied	Caught	Analysis
1.	Jiangyin to Qasim	2020	M/s General Technology (China)	National Development Complex (NDC) (Pakistan)	Kandla, India	Ship hauled was named Dai Cui Yun (Singaporean Flagged from Hong Kong)   Industrial Dryers – Meant for National Development Complex (NDC), a Pakistani Entity involved in the development of Pakistan’s long-range ballistic missiles.
2.	Ningbo to Karachi	2021	M/s Hangzhou Chengyingyi Energy Technology Co. Ltd. (China)	M/s Ghani Global Holdings (Pakistan)	Nhava Sheva, Mumbai	Cryogenic Oxygen Tanks for the usage in Pakistan’s Space and Upper Atmosphere Research Commission (SUPARCO)   The Carrier name was “Felixstowe Bridge” which was seized.
3.	Shanghai to Karachi	2022	M/s Taiyuan Mining Import and Export Co Ltd (China)	Cosmos Engineering (Pakistan)	Nhava Sheva, Mumbai	Consignment of thermo-electric instruments sourced from an Italian Company M/s DistekStrumenti&Misure SRL (DSM) by Cosmos Engineering allegedly for AQ Khan Research Laboratory.
4.	Shanghai to Karachi	2022	M/s Suzhou Kanjia Clean Technology Ltd (China)	DESTO (Pakistan)	Nhava Sheva, Mumbai	The container vessel ‘Kota Megah,’ sailing under the Singaporean flag, was shipping four containers. These containers held high-end equipment intended for producing/manufacturing chemical materials
5.	Qingdao Port to Karachi	2023	World Panda Logistics Co Ltd (China)	Emerging Future Solutions Pvt Ltd (Pakistan) – a shell company associated with Pakistan’s Defence Science and Technology Organization (DESTO)	Nhava Sheva, Mumbai	Jacketed glass reactors and other key laboratory equipment required for WMD programs were found on a Malta-flagged ship named CMA CGM Figaro. Pakistan’s DESTO is a sanctioned entity by the BIS of the United States Commerce Department for its involvement in WMD programs.
6.	Shekou Port to Karachi	2024	Shanghai JXE Global Logistics Co Ltd (China) – Taiyuan Mining Import & Export Co Ltd (China)	Pakistan Wings Pvt Ltd (Pakistan)	Nhava Sheva, Mumbai	The customs officials flagged a Malta-flagged merchant ship named CMA CGM Attila, which was carrying CNC (Computer Numerical Control) machinery.   Pakistan Wings Pvt Ltd have been involved in shipping of restricted items from destinations such as China, Turkey, and Italy among the others for Pakistan.
7.	Shanghai to Karachi	2024	Chengdu Shichen Trading Company Ltd (China)	Rohail Enterprises (Pakistan)	Kattupalli, Chennai	A ship bound for Karachi, named ‘Hyundai Shanghai’ and sailing under the Cyprus flag, was confiscated with a chemical called ortho-Chloro Benzylidene Malononitrile or CS.   This shipment contained 2,560 kg of this chemical, which has varied applications.

 

 

Thus, the deepening nexus between Pakistan and China, exemplified through these covert transfers of dual-use technologies and sensitive items, underscores the ongoing challenges of nations circumventing global strategic trade control systems. Despite robust measures taken by India, these continued transfers highlight the complexities of regional and international peace in the South Asian Region. With this, there is a need for monitoring, sanctioning, and plugging holes in the illegal proliferation of nuclear items, dual technologies, and items that can further develop the nuclear program.

 

Pragmatism in Balancing Interests:

In the past, China had a troubling record of assisting various states with their nuclear and missile programs, despite its public commitment^[16] in 2000 to refrain from aiding any country in the development of ballistic missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons and sharing sensitive technologies. The lack of a standardised global approach to control the trade of dual-use goods and sensitive technologies has allowed China to become a supplier^[17] of such items to countries like Iran, Libya, North Korea, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan, among others.

Furthermore, the fact that China is not a member of the major international export control regimes, such as the Australia Group, Missile Technology Control Regime, and Wassenaar Arrangement, further complicates the implementation and enforcement of regulations on these sensitive goods^[18], as the applicable rules and procedures may vary widely across different countries and jurisdictions. This creates a significant risk of diversion, including through the falsification of documents and the circumvention of export controls. There is an urgent need for robust screening and scrutiny of such investments and trade activities to mitigate the risks, particularly regarding the end user and the intended use of the goods and technologies.

Moreover, the rapid evolution of technologies, especially in the military application of artificial intelligence^[19] and space sectors, and troubles in the neighbourhood^[20] regarding Bangladesh will pose significant challenges for policymakers and regulators to keep pace with these advancements while maintaining effective export control measures. This challenge will continue to haunt the security apparatus of countries enforcing export control as they struggle to adapt their policies and procedures to address the constantly changing technological landscape. The involvement of non-state actors, such as terrorist groups or nations that use terrorism as a strategic tool, further complicates the issue, as these entities may exploit the weaknesses in the export control system for their illicit purposes.

 

Author Brief Bio: Mr. Arpan A. Chakravarty is a Research Fellow at India Foundation. Currently, he is a Doctoral Scholar at the School of Law, Auro University, India. His research interest includes the interdisciplinary study of law, national security, and foreign affairs. His focus particularly lies in the South Asian neighbourhood. He is a lawyer by training, holding BA LLB (Hons) from Christ University, Bangalore, and LLM (Gold Medallist) from Auro University. In the past, he had the opportunity to serve at institutions that play a vital role in nation-building, such as Rashtriya Raksha University, Gandhinagar (An Institute of National Importance), and the Indian Institute of Science (IISc), Bengaluru, in various capacities. Previously, he has been part of the prestigious Defence Correspondents Course (2022) by the Ministry of Defence, India, where he was invited from academia for his role as a Contributing Editor (National Security and Foreign Affairs) at The Pulse India. He has experience of interning with the Ministry of External Affairs, India; Observer Research Foundation (ORF); Centre for Land Warfare Studies (CLAWS); and Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative (CHRI), among others.

 

References:

 

^[1] Peri, D. (2024) Chinese Dual-Use Cargo heading to Pakistan seized, The Hindu. Available at: https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/ship-suspected-to-contain-dual-use-consignment-for-pakistans-nuclear-programme-stopped-at-nhava-sheva-port-in-mumbai/article67906937.ece (Accessed: 06 December 2024).

^[2]Pakistan condemns India’s ‘high handedness’ in seizure of ‘commercial goods’, 2024, The Hindu. Available at: https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/pakistan-condemns-indias-high-handedness-in-seizure-of-commercial-goods/article67909816.ece (Accessed: 06 December 2024).

^[3] Bhaumik, A. (2024) Pakistan, China outcry over India’s seizure of dual-use items aboard vessel, Deccan Herald. Available at: https://www.deccanherald.com/india/pakistan-says-seizure-of-commercial-goods-by-india-unjustified-2920079 (Accessed: 06 December 2024)

^[4]Statement by the Chinese Embassy in India (2024). Available at: https://x.com/ChinaSpox_India/status/1764201726117126146?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed%7Ctwterm%5E1764201726117126146%7Ctwgr%5E92fbbf588161b99ba052307fad3ad8d0a424efa9%7Ctwcon%5Es1_&ref_url=https%3A%2F%2F (Accessed: 06 December 2024)

^[5]India to assume chairmanship of Wassenaar Arrangement (2022). Available at: https://www.mea.gov.in/press-releases.htm?dtl/35937/India_to_assume_Chairmanship_of_Wassenaar_Arrangement (Accessed: 06 December 2024)

^[6]Arms Control and Proliferation Profile: Pakistan (2024), Arms Control Association, Available at: https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/pakistanprofile (Accessed: 06 December 2024)

^[7]Arms Control and Proliferation Profile: China (2023) Arms Control Association. Available at: https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/arms-control-and-proliferation-profile-china#:~:text=the%20regime’s%20guidelines. (Accessed: 06 December 2024)

^[8]Control lists (2023) The Wassenaar Arrangement. Available at: https://www.wassenaar.org/control-lists/ (Accessed: 06 December 2024).

^[9] Maletta, G. et al. (2023) Dual-use Export Controls, SIPRI. Available at: https://www.sipri.org/research/armament-and-disarmament/dual-use-and-arms-trade-control/dual-use-export-controls (Accessed: 06 December 2024)

^[10]Security agencies seize Chinese shipment of banned chemicals for Pakistan at Tamil Nadu Port, The Economic Times. (2024) Available at: https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/india/security-agencies-seize-karachi-bound-consignment-from-china-of-banned-chemicals-at-tn-port/articleshow/111660319.cms?from=mdr (Accessed: 06 December 2024)

^[11] Shahid, B.B.| S. (2024) Agreement elusive as Baloch Yakjehti Committee demands release of workers, Dawn. Available at: https://www.dawn.com/news/1849542/agreement-elusive-as-baloch-yakjehti-committee-demands-release-of-workers (Accessed: 06 December 2024)

^[12]Handbook on India’s Strategic Trade Control System (2024). Available at: https://www.dgft.gov.in/CP/?opt=handbook-indias-strategic-trade-control-systems (Accessed: 06 December 2024)

^[13]UN Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) (2004) United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs. Available at: https://disarmament.unoda.org/wmd/sc1540/#:~:text=In%20resolution%201540%20(2004)%2C,delivery%2C%20in%20particular%20for%20terrorist (Accessed: 06 December 2024)

^[14]Arms control and proliferation profile: India (2024) Arms Control Association. Available at: https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/indiaprofile#:~:text=India%20developed%20nuclear%20weapons%20outside,in%20a%20nascent%20nuclear%20triad (Accessed: 06 December 2024)

^[15] Gokhale, N. (2024) Shipped but not delivered: The China-pakistan nuclear nexus exposed, StratNews Global. Available at: https://stratnewsglobal.com/world-news/shipped-but-not-delivered-the-china-pakistan-nuclear-nexus-exposed/ (Accessed: 06 December 2024)

^[16]China’s Record of Proliferation Activities – records from 2001-2009 (2003) US Department of State Archives . Available at: https://2001-2009.state.gov/t/vci/rls/rm/24518.htm (Accessed: 06 December 2024)

^[17] Refer 9; Proliferation Record.

^[18]Panyue, H. (2023) China ready to jointly regulate military use of AI with different parties: Defense Spokesperson – Ministry of National Defense. Available at: http://eng.mod.gov.cn/xb/News_213114/NewsRelease/16270127.html#:~:text=China%20has%20submitted%20position%20papers,military%20applications%20of%20AI%20technologies; Lee, J. (2024). ‘Overtaking on the Curve’? Defense AI in China. In: Borchert, H., Schütz, T., Verbovszky, J. (eds) The Very Long Game. Contributions to Security and Defence Studies. Springer, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-58649-1_21

(Accessed: 06 December 2024).

^[19] Lederer, E.M. (2024) Un adopts Chinese resolution with US support on closing the gap in access to Artificial Intelligence, AP News. Available at: https://apnews.com/article/un-china-us-artificial-intelligence-access-resolution-56c559be7011693390233a7bafb562d1 (Accessed: 06 December 2024)

^[20] Arpan Chakravarty, India Foundation, 2024. The Dhaka Trials: Bangladesh’s International Crime Tribunal – A Renewed Pursuit or a Judicial Overreach? [online] Chintan – India Foundation. Available at: https://chintan.indiafoundation.in/articles/the-dhaka-trials-bangladeshs-international-crime-tribunal-a-renewed-pursuit-or-a-judicial-overreach/ (Accessed 9 December 2024).

Introduction

German philosopher Jürgen Habermas extensively theorised the concept of the public sphere.^[1] According to Habermas, the public sphere is a space where individuals come together to discuss and debate matters of common interest, free from external pressures and influences. It is a realm of social life where public opinion is formed, and it plays a crucial role in democratic societies by allowing citizens to participate in the decision-making process. The public sphere is characterised by open communication and rational debate, ideally leading to consensus on important societal issues.

Undoubtedly, many public spheres can co-exist; we can call them split public spheres. In India, there are separate public spheres where women, Dalits or LGBTQ+ can interact freely and promote their ideas unapologetically. The strongest public sphere, which has a rich intellectual history in independent India and which received support from the government of the day and abroad, is the liberal public sphere. The liberal public sphere has dominated the intellectual discourse and made its presence felt everywhere, including academia, media, NGO, arts and literature. The liberals are connected well in India, and their umbilical cord is attached at the international level, where they draw inspiration and support from time to time. Other views and spheres require validation from liberals as they control public discourse. Those who do not ally with the liberal public sphere are summarily cancelled. In recent years, it has been observed that the liberal public sphere is dominated by Communists, Islamists and the Wokes, who have deviated from the core principles of liberalism. There is a need for a counter-public sphere to make space for other ideas to flourish.

 

Conservatism Public Sphere

Conservatism, as an ideology, developed in Europe and the US in the last 200 years. It believes in the ideas and institutions of nationalism, family, faith and tradition. In party systems of democracies like the US and the United Kingdom, one pole is represented by Conservative parties. In India, conservatism has seen many ups and downs, both pre-independence and after. It became a marginalised idea during the era of the Nehruvian Consensus of socialism, secularism and non-alignment. It started gaining ground with the emergence of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) as the other pole of Indian politics. After 1990, we saw a shift in Indian politics, with the BJP emerging as an important player. Later, it also formed governments – first under Atal Bihari Vajpayee’s leadership and then under Narendra Modi. Along with liberal voices, now conservative streams have also started gaining ground – beginning in politics and slowly moving to other sectors.

Today, the ideological contest between liberalism and conservatism is shaping the future of India’s democracy. As liberalism continues to influence the mainstream discourse, there is a growing recognition of the need for a more balanced approach that allows conservative ideas to coexist and contribute to the national dialogue. This recognition underscores the importance of creating a conservative public sphere in India, where diverse perspectives can be debated and where the values of tradition, culture, and continuity can be preserved and respected.

The Conservative public sphere in India encompasses the arenas of discourse and practice where conservative values and ideas are articulated, debated, and promoted. This sphere reflects a distinctive vision of Indian society, shaped by a commitment to traditional values, cultural heritage, and national identity. It manifests across various domains, including politics, media, education, and social institutions, and plays a crucial role in shaping the country’s ideological landscape.

 

The Imperative

While liberalism remains dominant in contemporary discourse, the increasing visibility of conservative thought reflects a broader need for ideological pluralism. For India to thrive as a diverse and vibrant democracy, both liberal and conservative voices must be given space in the public sphere, ensuring a more inclusive and balanced national conversation. Due to the influence of the current government, a conducive environment is being created, which emboldens conservative ideas in India. However, despite this political support, the conservative narrative remains somewhat underdeveloped. This stems from the significant gap between the flourishing of conservative thought during the independence struggle and its recent revival. Unlike liberal ideas, which have enjoyed a continuous evolution, conservative traditions in India have faced interruptions and have not been as deeply ingrained in the nation’s political and intellectual framework.

Today, social media influencers, media outlets and some authors and columnists are aligned with conservative principles, primarily due to the presence of the BJP government. However, the real challenge lies in determining how deeply rooted these conservative ideas and thinkers are within society. The conservative tradition has not yet experienced the natural, grassroots growth that would make it resilient in changing political landscapes. If the current government were to lose power, there is a real risk that this nascent conservative ecosystem could weaken or dissipate.

The central argument here is that for conservative ideas to thrive genuinely, they must do so independently of government power. Conservatism must evolve into a robust intellectual tradition with a strong public sphere that stands independently, regardless of which political party is in power. Just as the liberal public sphere continues to influence society independently, so should a conservative public sphere. This conservative sphere should be solid enough that conservative scholars, researchers, and intellectuals are embedded in various sectors, from academia to media to arts, ensuring these ideas have a permanent and influential place in public discourse.

For example, the liberal public sphere in India has thrived in universities, think tanks, and cultural institutions, often independent of the political environment. Whether or not the government is sympathetic to liberal ideologies, these institutions continue to nurture and promote liberal thought. Similarly, the conservative public sphere must be developed to a point where it becomes a permanent peg that balances the Indian society, capable of sustaining and promoting conservative ideas even without political backing. The dominance of left-liberal discourse in academia and media has often marginalised conservative perspectives and distorted the understanding of Indian history and culture. This critique of the current intellectual environment highlights the challenges conservative viewpoints face in gaining recognition and influence. Addressing this imbalance is crucial for fostering a more inclusive and diverse intellectual landscape.^[2]

A thriving democracy depends on the coexistence and competition of diverse ideas. Since India’s independence, socialist, secular and left-liberal values have dominated the political discourse. However, for a truly balanced democratic discourse, there must be an alternative sphere where other ideas can also flourish. In a modern democracy, the presence and interaction of liberal and conservative spheres are essential, and each must be given space to develop and contribute. While a government sympathetic to conservative ideals can help accelerate the creation of this sphere, the conservative public sphere must grow strong enough to stand independently, ensuring that conservative ideas continue contributing to India’s intellectual and cultural landscape regardless of political shifts. With the current environment being conducive, building and solidifying this conservative public sphere should be urgently pursued, ensuring it becomes a lasting and influential force in India’s democratic dialogue process.

 

Nurture Indian Conservatism

While conservative values may resonate with many, the lack of coherent and thoughtful defence often leaves these principles vulnerable to misinterpretation or dismissal. John Kekes observes, “There is no shortage of conservatives, but there is a shortage of systematic, articulate and reasonable attempts to defend conservatism.”^[3] This insight underscores the pressing need for a well-defined conservative public sphere. A robust conservative public sphere is essential for articulating and defending conservatism’s intellectual and cultural foundations and countering the negative trends spreading in the name of liberalism. A multifaceted approach that integrates ideological, cultural, and political strategies is essential to cultivating a thriving conservative public sphere in India. This endeavour begins with strengthening the ideological foundations of Indian conservatism. By articulating a clear and coherent vision that addresses contemporary issues while remaining rooted in traditional values, conservatism can establish a robust and relatable identity. This ideological clarity is crucial for engaging effectively with other political and social ideologies, ensuring that conservative principles resonate with a diverse audience and address current challenges.

Educational outreach is another cornerstone in nurturing a vibrant conservative public sphere. Integrating conservative perspectives into educational curricula and promoting initiatives emphasising traditional values and cultural heritage can shape the next generation’s understanding of conservatism. Support for research, academic seminars, and the development of educational materials reflecting conservative thought can enrich public discourse. Collaborations with academic institutions to offer programs and courses on Indian conservative principles can foster informed and engaged individuals who contribute meaningfully to the conservative conversation.

Intellectual and cultural engagement further enriches the conservative public sphere. Encouraging scholarly research and debate on conservative theories and values can deepen public understanding and support for conservative principles. Think tanks, academic journals, and intellectual forums provide platforms for conservative scholars to share insights and influence broader discussions on policy and governance. Concurrently, promoting cultural activities that celebrate traditional values and heritage—such as festivals, exhibitions, and literature—can reinforce the cultural dimension of conservatism and engage the public on a profound level. Building community support is vital for sustaining a conservative public sphere. Engaging with local communities and addressing their specific concerns through grassroots initiatives can translate conservative values into tangible benefits. Community-driven social programs and advocacy can demonstrate the practical impact of conservative principles, fostering broader acceptance and support. By addressing local issues and promoting community welfare, the conservative public sphere can gain credibility and resonance among the populace.

In the political realm, conservative parties and leaders must navigate the complexities of coalition politics and governance. Forming alliances with like-minded groups and focusing on key policy areas that align with conservative values can enhance political influence. Effective policy advocacy and pragmatic solutions to contemporary issues help advance conservative agendas within the political system. Balancing ideological purity with practical governance is essential for maintaining a credible and influential conservative presence. Finally, adaptability and inclusivity are crucial for the conservative public sphere. Engaging with diverse perspectives and addressing societal changes ensures that conservatism remains relevant and appealing to a broader audience. The conservative public sphere can build a resilient and dynamic presence by demonstrating how conservative principles can address contemporary challenges and respect diversity while upholding traditional values. Fostering a thriving conservative public sphere in India requires a nuanced approach that integrates ideological clarity, media engagement, educational outreach, intellectual discourse, community support, political strategy, and inclusivity. By implementing these strategies, conservatism can establish a prominent and influential role in shaping India’s public discourse, policy, and cultural life.

The role of media and digital platforms is pivotal in advancing the conservative public sphere. Strategic use of traditional media—such as newspapers and television—coupled with innovative digital outreach through social media platforms can significantly expand the reach of conservative voices. Crafting compelling content that speaks to modern issues from a conservative perspective and employing data analytics to tailor messages can enhance the visibility and influence of conservative discourse. Such a comprehensive media strategy helps shape public perception and foster a broader engagement with conservative ideas.

 

Engagement with the Western Conservativism

In his concluding remarks in What is Conservatism, John Kekes asserts, “The strongest version of conservatism is then moral, reflective, moderately sceptical, pluralistic, traditionalist, and realistically pessimistic.”^[4] This formulation offers a robust framework for Indian conservatism, suggesting that a balanced approach —one that is rooted in moral principles, open to reflection and scepticism, respectful of diversity, anchored in tradition, and tempered by a realistic view of human nature, holds the greatest promise for fostering a stable and just society. By embracing these characteristics, Indian conservatism can distinguish itself as a compelling alternative, capable of guiding the nation toward a harmonious future that honors its cultural heritage while navigating the complexities of modern life.

Howard L. Erdman, in his work Conservative Politics in India, observed that “Indian conservatism is, thus, more potent than might be suggested to the casual eye,” noting that much of this conservatism was latent or disguised, not always visible through the explicit positions of political parties.^[5] Erdman predicted that with the passing of Nehru, there would be “an increase in overt conservative activity,” a forecast that has indeed materialised over time. Today, we see the realisation of Erdman’s insights as Indian conservatism has moved from the shadows into the mainstream. What was once a latent force has become a prominent influence in shaping the nation’s political and cultural landscape. The groundwork for a robust conservative movement in India has been laid, and it continues to grow, reflecting the deep-seated values and traditions that Erdman identified decades ago.

This transformation underscores the enduring strength of Indian conservatism, which now plays a pivotal role in guiding the nation’s future. In discussing the influence of Western thought on India, Swapan Dasgupta highlights that while figures like Bentham and Marx significantly shaped modern Indian intellectual life, the influences on Indian conservatism have mainly been indigenous.^[6] Rooted in Sanskrit literature, culture, and tradition, Indian conservatism diverges from its Western counterpart, drawing on local sources of authority and wisdom. This indigenous conservatism has not been as thoroughly studied or documented, making it a fertile area for further exploration. Understanding this distinct trajectory is crucial for appreciating the uniqueness of Indian conservatism, particularly in how it blends with or resists Western ideological frameworks.

In the past 200-300 years, liberalism has evolved significantly from its classical roots, adapting to new global challenges and contexts. Contemporary liberalism has grappled with a range of complex issues, including radical Islam, cultural Marxism, and the impact of globalisation. These developments have brought to the forefront new threats to democracy, societal cohesion, and international order. Issues such as China’s expansionist policies, radical Islamist movements, and challenges related to illegal immigration have raised concerns about global stability and democratic integrity. As a response, new conservative parties and ideologies are emerging worldwide, aiming to address these threats and restore balance. This resurgence of conservatism is not merely a reaction but a proactive attempt to navigate the evolving global landscape and counteract threats that jeopardise peace, socio-cultural stability, and national security.

India faces similar challenges, with its geopolitical position making it vulnerable to issues such as radical Islamism and the expansionist tendencies of China. Additionally, the issue of illegal immigration from neighbouring Bangladesh and Myanmar adds another layer of complexity. In this context, the revival of conservatism in India is a political phenomenon and a response to these pressing challenges. Comparing Indian and Western conservatism provides valuable insights into their respective trajectories and impacts. This comparison can help illuminate the similarities and differences between these two forms of conservatism and their implications for the global ideological landscape.

The conservative public sphere in India has grown stronger politically and is increasingly shaping other areas of public life, including culture, academia, and media. The demographic strength of India, combined with its robust conservative forces, provides a unique opportunity for Indian conservatism to align with its Western counterparts. This alignment can be beneficial in addressing common threats and navigating shared challenges. While there are contentious issues and differences between Indian and Western conservatism, there are also significant areas of commonality. Both face similar global challenges and threats, and their collaboration could enhance their ability to respond effectively.

By focusing on shared objectives and finding common ground, Indian and Western conservatism can work together to safeguard democratic values, maintain peace, and preserve cultural integrity in the face of evolving global dynamics. As conservatism continues to shape political and cultural landscapes in both contexts, a collaborative approach could provide a stronger, more unified response to the complex issues facing democracies worldwide. Embracing this collaboration while navigating contentious issues can lead to a more resilient and effective conservative movement that benefits India and the broader international community. The case for fostering a conservative public sphere in India is not merely about bolstering a particular political ideology but ensuring a balanced and pluralistic environment where diverse perspectives can engage meaningfully.

Conservatism, as a philosophy, does not claim to offer ultimate answers to society’s complex and evolving challenges. Instead, it serves a vital function by reminding us of the institutional prerequisites of social order—those foundational structures that underpin stability and continuity. When these institutional pillars are threatened or weakened, conservatism becomes relevant and essential, providing the necessary counterbalance to rapid change and ideological upheaval.^[7]

 

Conclusion

In conclusion, the case for building a conservative public sphere in India is deeply intertwined with the need for a robust, pluralistic environment that transcends transient political landscapes. While the current political dispensation may provide a platform for conservative ideas, this alone is insufficient for conservatism’s long-term sustainability and intellectual legitimacy. A conservative public sphere must be grounded in the deeper currents of India’s cultural and intellectual heritage, cultivated through continuous engagement with a broad spectrum of ideologies.

The health of any democracy relies on the diversity of voices and perspectives that challenge, refine, and balance each other. A space where conservatism thrives naturally—not because it is imposed or politically advantageous but because it is a vital part of the national discourse—ensures that Indian conservatism remains dynamic and evolves organically within the fabric of society. To achieve this, a vibrant conservative public sphere must be rooted in intellectual rigour and public engagement, ensuring it does not remain isolated from other ideological frameworks. It should be a space where conservatism is not merely reactionary or nostalgic but a forward-looking philosophy that adapts to contemporary challenges while preserving core values. This requires engagement with diverse ideas—liberal, progressive, socialist, and others—thus fostering an arena where ideas are contested, debated, and refined. Such a sphere would safeguard the integrity of conservative thought and allow it to evolve in response to societal needs and global developments, preventing it from becoming dogmatic or outdated.

Moreover, a thriving conservative public sphere must emerge from civil society, academia, media, and cultural institutions, which play crucial roles in shaping public opinion and discourse. These spaces should nurture thoughtful conservative intellectuals, writers, and public figures who can articulate conservative ideas in ways that resonate with the broader public. The role of conservative think tanks, educational institutions, and cultural forums is paramount in this regard, as they provide platforms for sustained ideological exchange and reflection, allowing conservatism to articulate its responses to contemporary issues such as globalisation, technological change, and shifting social values. Building such a public sphere also ensures that conservative ideas are not marginalised in academia or the media. A truly inclusive and democratic public sphere must resist the temptation to sideline any ideology. Instead, it should promote a balanced discourse where all ideologies, including conservatism, can critically engage. In this setting, conservatism would not merely be a counterpoint to progressivism but would emerge as an influential and constructive force that contributes to nation-building and social cohesion.

By making space for conservatism in the broader intellectual and public discourse, India can foster a dynamic interplay of ideas essential for a thriving democracy. In this pluralistic environment, conservatism would find its place as one of many competing and cooperating ideologies that shape the contours of Indian society. This is not merely about achieving ideological balance but about recognising that a flourishing public sphere, where different viewpoints engage meaningfully with each other, strengthens the social and political fabric of the nation. Through this approach, conservatism would be seen not as a relic of the past or a fleeting political trend but as a vital, evolving force within the spectrum of India’s ideological landscape, contributing to its democratic vitality.

 

Author Brief Bio: Dr. Swadesh Singh teaches Political Science at Delhi University and is a Distinguished Fellow at India Foundation.

 

References

 

^[1] Habermas, J., Lennox, S., & Lennox, F. (1974). The Public Sphere: An Encyclopaedia Article (1964). New German Critique, 3, 49–55. https://doi.org/10.2307/487737

^[2] Singh, S. ‘In Quest of an India Right’ India Foundation Journal, August, 2017 Vol. 5 (4), p. 13-18

^[3] Kekes, J. (1997). What Is Conservatism? Philosophy, 72(281), 351–374. http://www.jstor.org/stable/3751738

^[4] Kekes J. 1997. What is Conservatism? Philosophy.;72(281):351-374

^[5] Erdman, H. L. (1966). Conservative Politics in India. Asian Survey, 6(6), 338–347. https://doi.org/10.2307/2642383

^[6] King’s College London. (2015, December 16). Indian conservatism and the compulsions of political power [Video]. YouTube. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xnVKXvDEKP4

^[7] Huntington, S. P. (1957). Conservatism as an Ideology. The American Political Science Review, 51(2), 454–473. https://doi.org/10.2307/1952202

Joyeeta Basu:The leaders of the BRICS nations met in Kazan in October 2024 for the 16th BRICS summit. What were India’s key priorities and contributions at that summit, and what goals did India achieve in the BRICS at this particular summit?

 

D.B. Venkatesh Varma:As you know, Prime Minister Modi represented India at the 16th BRICS summit. It was held in Kazan, Russia. The host was President Putin. India has been a founding member of BRICS, and its status has evolved over time. At the last summit, it was expanded. More countries came on board: Egypt, Ethiopia, Saudi Arabia (which has yet to join, but it has been admitted), Iran, and at least 13 countries have been asked to join as partner countries. So, there is great interest in BRICS.

BRICS began as a platform for discussing international economic issues. However, given the troubled state of the world, I believe that politics and security issues are now included in these primarily economic agendas. The Prime Minister’s approach to representing India was extremely well-received. It focused on moderating political and security conflicts while prioritising the economic agenda, which is the original mandate of BRICS. At the same time, this should be advanced in a people-centred way and, secondly, to amplify the voice of the Global South.

As you know, when we hosted the G-20 Summit last year, the Prime Minister organised three virtual summits of the Global South, which is referred to as the voice of the Global South. To ascertain the views and sentiments in the Global South on issues that concern them, India has advanced these topics into BRICS. Of course, the economic agenda also involves stabilising both the international economic and trade systems, as well as the financial systems, which are under considerable stress due to the sanctions imposed by the West on Russia. There is a trend towards de-dollarisation, along with the New Development Bank that was established some time ago. Now, we aim to further this initiative. The Prime Minister emphasised that BRICS should address Global South issues.

The New Development Bank should also address those requirements. A proposal has been made to involve the New Development Bank in the Gift City in Gujarat, which is developing significantly. The Prime Minister also presented India’s priorities for the BRICS Startup Initiative, aimed at bringing together young entrepreneurs, particularly in the technology sector, to contribute to the BRICS agenda. Additionally, I believe India consistently puts forward our proposals for the common global good. We have demonstrated this to the G-20 and brought it up in the United Nations. This includes the International Solar Alliance and initiatives to protect critical infrastructure, alongside the Prime Minister’s initiative for a lifestyle focused on tackling climate change and environmental issues.

There have been several initiatives put forward. I believe that India has a leadership role. India also plays a part in balancing extremes within BRICS. Different dimensions emerge from various perspectives. I feel that India’s role has been appreciated, and this will be advanced at the next summit, which will take place in Brasilia, Brazil, next year. Overall, I consider India’s and the Prime Minister’s participation in the BRICS summit to be a success.

 

Joyeeta Basu:Yes, but no summit is without its challenges. What challenges has India faced, and what opportunities exist for India regarding its strategic interests? How can India navigate the obstacles that have arisen and ensure that both its interests and those of BRICS are served?

 

D.B. Venkatesh Varma:Absolutely. I think you know it’s no secret that we live in a troubled world. There is a shift towards multipolarity, though it is rather uneven in some respects. The world remains unipolar since the dollar still dominates the international system. However, in terms of manufacturing, China has emerged as a significant manufacturing power. Additionally, there is a rise of subaltern quests for multipolarity from regional figures in Southeast Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America. Therefore, this shift towards multipolarity should be advanced by India in a negotiated manner that benefits humanity. India certainly views BRICS as a platform for promoting stable and organised multipolarity.

Sometimes, this is interpreted as anti-Western. Of course, there are differing views within BRICS, just as there is a quest for multipolarity in the broader world. We are also seeking multipolarity in Asia. In fact, there are multipolar tendencies within BRICS. While, for instance, China or Russia may have a very strong anti-Western agenda, this is not necessarily shared by other BRICS members. Moreover, BRICS includes a significant number of countries that are influential in energy issues. India and China are major consumers of energy resources, while Russia, Saudi Arabia, Iran, the UAE, and others are substantial producers. I believe this also serves as a platform for dialogue between energy producers and consumers. Furthermore, we aim to advance the reform of international institutions, whether it be the United Nations Security Council, the IMF, the World Bank, or multilateral lending institutions. Our goal is to move forward in a manner that benefits not only BRICS countries but also the larger international community.

If one examines India’s approach, the same issues we promote in the G-20, and those we advocate for the sustainable development goals of the United Nations, are also priorities in BRICS. India is neither anti-West nor pro-West; rather, it is pro-India. Additionally, India is gaining recognition for raising issues significant to the Global South. Claiming that BRICS is dominated by China is an exaggeration; there are diverse perspectives within BRICS and even among external countries that value India’s active participation. This involvement not only helps to counterbalance the West but also China. Overall, I believe BRICS serves as an evolving mechanism—a platform for multipolarity and for reforming international institutions. On each of these agenda items, India’s role is not only recognised but also highly valued welcomed.

 

Joyeeta Basu:In this context, may I ask a quick question about the BRICS currency? You mentioned China and Russia, and we know they have been advocating for a BRICS currency. What is India’s stance on it, and what future do you foresee if a BRICS currency is established?

 

D.B. Venkatesh Varma:You see, the BRICS currency has been discussed; it’s more in the realm of speculation rather than specific proposals. What BRICS is definitely examining is the increase in the use of national currencies in bilateral and multilateral trading arrangements. The use of national currencies has been driven by the securitisation of global interdependence due to issues like sanctions. Each country within BRICS has drawn its lessons. There is a common interest in reforming the international financial system to enhance its resilience and develop more robust supply chains. However, in my view, which is widely shared among experts analysing BRICS, the concept of a BRICS currency is a bridge too far; it will not materialise in the near future. The market conditions for a BRICS currency simply do not exist. Nonetheless, what is possible and what BRICS hopes to achieve is the creation of a basket of currencies that could serve as a reference point for international financial transactions. This is not intended to replace the dollar; it is, I think, a supplement to the dollar.

 

Joyeeta Basu:Ambassador, you have served as India’s envoy to Russia. Considering BRICS within the context of the India-Russia relationship, along with the strong interpersonal bond between Prime Minister Modi and President Putin, how is this fostering progress within BRICS? Additionally, there are many adverse perspectives from the West; how is India managing this? Could you also provide some insights into the future of the India-Russia relationship?

 

D.B. Venkatesh Varma:That’s an excellent question. As you are aware, before the Prime Minister went to the Kazan Summit in BRICS, he had a bilateral summit with President Putin earlier in the summer in Moscow. President Putin and Prime Minister Modi have met more than 30 times. They are amongst the seniormost world leaders today in terms of how much public political office experience they have. They have been leaders of their countries for a considerable period, and they personally enjoy an extremely good rapport. In these troubled times, the personal relations between world leaders are vitally important, especially with the generational change happening in the West, as many leaders like Chancellor Merkel, who led for a very long time, have moved on. We are getting a new crop of leadership with the election of President Trump in the US.

The personal relationship between Prime Minister Modi and President Putin, of course, serves as an anchor for the India-Russia relationship. The India-Russia relationship is one of strategic partnership, which has flourished for over 70 years. However, it has been periodically renewed, and I believe that the Prime Minister’s visit in July significantly contributed to this renewal, particularly by introducing new drivers, especially regarding energy security. India and Russia view each other as partners in energy security—one being a major supplier and the other a major consumer. In fact, the past three years have demonstrated that India and Russia can engage and collaborate in a manner that is not only mutually beneficial but also helps stabilise global energy prices and markets. This, I believe, has made a substantial contribution to stabilising the international economic system. We intend to build on this progress.

There are also ways to expand bilateral trade, address connectivity issues, and improve the North-South Corridor and the Chennai-Vladivostok Corridor. India has been a longstanding partner in the field of defence, and we are eager to renew that relationship. It is well known internationally that the India-Russia relationship is vital for India. This is not merely a legacy relationship; it is one that looks towards the future, which has been acknowledged to some extent by the United States. We maintain excellent relations with the US, having established a strategic partnership. The US recognises that there is a certain irreducible minimum in the India-Russia relationship that India will not forsake, and that is undeniably our intention. One of the significant successes of our diplomacy over the past few years has been our ability to navigate the troubled waters of the international system, characterised by substantial conflict between the major powers, particularly between the United States and Russia over Ukraine, and the evident conflict between the US and China. We have advanced our relations without allowing our ties with other countries to influence this dynamic.

The reason for our success also lies in the increased stature and capabilities of India within the international system. India holds significance in various ways for different countries. This totality means that all nations expect India to play an active role. There is no exclusivity in our major power relations, and we intend to advance both our relationship with Russia and our partnership with the United States moving forward. As you are aware, during the Kazan Summit, an important meeting took place between President Xi Jinping of China and our Prime Minister Modi, which has paved the way for renewed engagement between India and China. Our National Security Advisor, Mr. Doval, was recently in Beijing, and I believe very important and positive steps have been taken. While these may be limited in scope, their impact is significant in alleviating some of the tensions that have developed in India-China relations.

However, the India-China relationship has many dimensions. It is not just the border issue we face—an important challenge—but also the broader economic ties. China’s growth and its assertiveness in our neighbourhood, the South China Sea, and across the larger Eurasian continent are significant. It is clear that India will stand its ground; we do not take pressure lightly. Moving forward, I believe that if there is dialogue, discussion, and mutual accommodation of interests, this is something we would certainly advocate for. We can also expect a degree of stability in our relationship with China. With some stability between us and China, we enjoy an excellent relationship with the United States and a long-standing rapport with Russia. This bolsters India’s credibility and stature in the international arena, demonstrating that, even amidst great global turbulence, India can maintain a certain level of relationship across various fronts and sustain significant momentum in others.

 

Joyeeta Basu:Yes. This raises a perhaps detailed question specifically about China. When we consider India and China, we know that there are border issues and other challenges as well. Would you say that this summit and the meeting you mentioned have injected a modicum of trust into the relationship? Can we trust the Chinese? In which direction are India-China relations headed?

 

D.B. Venkatesh Varma:Well, you know, trust is always a byproduct. It is never the driver of any relationship, especially not with China. I think the Prime Minister’s meeting with President Xi was useful in the sense that the Chinese have clearly understood that while India will firmly protect its interests, it is also open to dialogue to resolve outstanding issues through discussions and diplomacy, as has always been the case. This trend was disrupted not by India but by China, where a unilateral assertion of rights through the use of force was met with firm resistance from our side. That is not the path we wish to pursue, but if the Chinese have come to realise that they wish to see India as a partner and aim for a gradual normalisation of our relationship, the border problem remains critical. India and China can achieve a lot in Asia as long as there is mutual accommodation of interests, both in Asia, in the Indo-Pacific, and in global affairs. Having said that, we also need to consider that there is a significant power differential between India and China

Our economic growth will support us as we move forward. India is among the fastest-growing economies of the major economies in the world. I believe we need to invest more in defence. Additionally, we must strengthen our international partnerships, including with Russia and the United States, as well as with QUAD. Our connectivity projects, such as IMEC to the west, the Chennai-Vladivostok Corridor to the east, and the International North-South Corridor through Iran into Eurasia, are vital. All these initiatives align with India’s emergence as a major economic and technological power. The economic fundamentals of India are sound. We must accelerate our growth. We possess all the necessary factors; however, I believe that in the next ten years, if we achieve a growth rate of 7 to 9%, we can expect a long-term stabilisation of the India-China relationship. I am fairly confident that this positive shift, though limited and of tactical significance, can be leveraged into strategic advantages for India over the next decade.

 

Joyeeta Basu:This brings us to the final question: The biggest world power currently is the United States. Donald Trump is stepping in for his second term, and Mr. Modi is here as well. How do you think India-US relations will evolve in Mr. Trump’s second term and Mr. Modi’s third term? What challenges and opportunities do you foresee, given that we hear many sound bytes from Mr. Trump? How do you envisage the relationship developing, and will there be any differences compared to the relationship India has had during Mr. Biden’s term?

 

D.B. Venkatesh Varma:There are two points to consider. President Trump is returning to office for a second term with a very specific domestic agenda. He and his supporters have been clear about this, and there is every expectation that he will pursue this agenda, which is focused on an America First approach. He seeks to revive the American economy, strengthen national defense, reduce bureaucracy within the United States, limit illegal immigration, and enhance America’s role in the world by decreasing its involvement in various wars. His foremost priority, as he has stated, is to achieve a swift return to peace in the Russia-Ukraine conflict, which I believe is a very positive goal for us. If this can be accomplished sooner rather than later, it would be something we would certainly welcome. It would restore peace to Europe, help reintegrate Russia into the international system, and lessen the strain that the Russia-US conflict has placed on our relationships with both Russia and the United States. Overall, that’s a positive development.

President Trump holds very strong views on tariffs as a method for addressing international trade issues. We are fortunate in a sense to have a robust foundation for the India-US relationship, which exists in Congress. There’s bipartisan support from both political parties, and a significant advantage we possess is that President Trump has formed an extremely positive impression of India during his first term. Of course, we cannot expect the second term to be merely an automatic continuation of the first. However, his relationship with Prime Minister Modi and his awareness of various issues concerning India provide us an advantage that many other countries, in a sense, do not share. That said, President Trump assumes power at a time of considerable domestic change within the United States, and we must observe how this unfolds. It also occurs against a backdrop of significant international turbulence. Thus, while we have every reason to be confident, we should not take this for granted. Although the relationship is built on very solid foundations, it requires nurturing and progression through productive engagement.

The United States is absolutely critical for us in two respects. I would say, in terms of technology, the United States is truly a global power—a superpower. I mean, all these advancements in AI, semiconductors, biotechnology, and space technology. And if there is one criterion for India that is absolutely essential for our growth, it is technology. Thus, a partnership with the United States, indeed a technology alliance, is something that India desperately needs, and we should do everything in our power to promote it. The second area is energy. The United States is not a direct or major supplier of energy for India. However, it is now one of the biggest and most powerful factors driving the global energy markets, as it is itself a significant energy producer and exporter. Moving forward, I think we would like to collaborate with the United States to explore how this entire energy structure evolves—not just in fossil fuels, but also regarding climate change, green technology, and green finance.

The third point I would highlight is defence, particularly as warfare is evolving so much; we can greatly benefit from our partnership with the United States. Lastly, of course, is the strong community-to-community relationship we have built, which stands as one of the significant pillars of our connection between India and the United States. We have observed their contributions in the past, and moving forward, these contributions will only increase. Thus, I remain quite optimistic about the India-US relationship, and I believe President Trump has some quite imaginative ideas, particularly with regard to addressing the Russia-Ukraine conflict. The United States is undoubtedly an overextended superpower. It is in our interest that the United States becomes a more focused global power, which is precisely what President Trump intends to achieve. Many of his administration appointments align with the points I have just mentioned. Therefore, I am genuinely positive and optimistic about the relationship between India and the United States.

 

Joyeeta Basu:Overall, you remain optimistic about BRICS, which is, of course, on the right path, as you mentioned. It’s good to hear from you that India’s relationships with Russia, China, and the US are on the right track. Thank you, Ambassador, on behalf of the India Foundation.

 

D.B. Venkatesh Varma:Thank you so much.

 

Brief Bios:

 

D.B. Venkatesh Varma: Ambassador D.B.Venkatesh Varma served in the Indian Foreign Service from 1988 to 2021. During his diplomatic career, he worked in the Office of the External Affairs Minister and in the Prime Minister’s Office. He served as India’s Ambassador to Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, to the Kingdom of Spain and to the Russian Federation, until October 2021.He has vast experience in India’s Security and Defence policies and served as Joint Secretary in charge of Disarmament and International Security in the Ministry of External Affairs. He was the first Recipient of the S.K.Singh Award for Excellence in the Indian Foreign Service in 2011 for his contribution to the negotiations of the Civil Nuclear Initiative.

 

Joyeeta Basu: Joyeeta Basu is the Editor, The Sunday Guardian.

The BRICS grouping has solidified its position as a prominent and diverse international organisation in the past two decades. This powerful alliance has significantly impacted the global stage and is now recognised as one of the most influential non-Western blocs in today’s multipolar world. According to major financial institutions, with the recent addition of nine new members, BRICS Plus now represents over 40% of the world’s population and nearly 37.3% of global GDP (PPP).^[1]

Despite their considerable influence and potential, BRICS members face several pressing challenges that demand immediate attention. Sustainable development, social inequality, and climate change are critical issues. These complex problems can no longer be overlooked and must be prioritised on the BRICS agenda. Before exploring potential solutions, it is essential to understand the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), assess the progress of BRICS members in achieving these goals, examine the concept of climate justice, and identify effective strategies to address these challenges.

 

United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)

In 2015, following extensive multilateral consultations, the United Nations adopted a comprehensive framework of seventeen Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) to be achieved by 2030.^[2] Building on the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), these interconnected goals address various issues, including social inequality, education, poverty, clean water, economic growth, and climate action.

Source: United Nations

 

The ambitious UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) were established before the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic and the Russia-Ukraine conflict. These unprecedented global crises have significantly hindered the progress of BRICS nations, particularly given their large populations, developing economies, and, in the case of Russia, direct involvement in the conflict.

For instance, COVID-19-induced lockdowns led to widespread school closures, impacting millions of students’ quality of education (SDG 4). Additionally, economic disruptions caused by the pandemic negatively affected industrialisation, innovation, and infrastructure development (SDG 9). As nations strive to revive their economies, there is a risk of increased reliance on fossil fuels, potentially undermining climate action efforts (SDG 13). Furthermore, the pandemic-related economic downturn limited the availability of green financing, further complicating efforts to transition to sustainable practices.

 

Internal Contradictions within the SDG Framework

A closer examination of the SDG framework reveals inherent contradictions that can hinder effective implementation. The all-encompassing nature of the SDGs often necessitates trade-offs between different goals. For example, industrialisation (SDG 8) may conflict with clean water and sanitation (SDG 6), sustainable cities (SDG 11), and climate action (SDG 13). Similarly, balancing environmental goals, such as reducing carbon emissions, with social and economic objectives, like improving education and reducing poverty, can be challenging, especially for developing countries.^[3]

The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’s (IPCC) 2019 report on oceans and the cryosphere highlights the urgent need for global cooperation to address climate change. It warns of rising sea levels—potentially 1.4 feet by 2100, even under low-emission scenarios. The report calls for stronger global and regional cooperation to protect the cryosphere. However, the financial implications of implementing necessary measures pose significant challenges, particularly for developing nations. Securing adequate funding from developed countries and attracting private sector investment will be crucial to achieving the SDGs and mitigating the impacts of climate change.

 

Interdependencies between SDGs

While the SDG framework may contain inherent contradictions, it is essential to recognise the deep interconnections between these goals. SDG 3: Good Health and Well-being has emerged as a pivotal focus for global efforts, including those of the BRICS nations. Robust public health programs not only protect individual well-being but also contribute significantly to broader sustainable development. India, for instance, exemplifies this interconnectedness by playing a crucial role in global vaccination efforts. As a leading producer of vaccines, India supplies a substantial portion of the world’s vaccine needs, particularly benefiting developing countries.^[4]

It is important to note that health is not an isolated issue. It is intricately linked to various other SDGs, such as SDG 8: Decent Work and Economic Growth, SDG 9: Industry, Innovation, and Infrastructure, SDG 10: Reduced Inequality, SDG 6: Clean Water and Sanitation, SDG 2: Zero Hunger, and SDG 1: No Poverty. Addressing public health challenges requires a holistic approach that considers these interdependencies.

The COVID-19 pandemic, which struck as the world was making significant strides towards achieving the 2030 SDG targets, has further underscored the interconnectedness of these goals. Beyond its direct impact on health, the pandemic has disrupted education systems, hindered industrial and infrastructural development, exacerbated inequality, and weakened institutions. This complex web of interconnected challenges necessitates a comprehensive and coordinated response. By addressing the SDGs holistically, nations can work towards a more sustainable and equitable future. Refer to the figure below:

 

Source: Stockholm Resilience Centre^[5]

 

 

The Impact of Geopolitical Tensions on SDG Achievement

The Russia-Ukraine conflict has further underscored the interconnectedness of the SDGs. The war has significantly impacted SDG 16: Peace, Justice, and Strong Institutions. The imposition of sanctions on Russia has led to increased reliance on fossil fuel exports, exacerbating climate change and hindering progress towards SDG 13: Climate Action. By mid-2024, more than 41% of Russian federal budget revenues came from the export of oil and gas.^[6] Moreover, the conflict has disrupted global supply chains, particularly for wheat and grain, contributing to food shortages and poverty in many parts of the world, especially in Africa. This has had a direct impact on SDG 2: Zero Hunger.

The recent strained relations between some BRICS countries and the West could lead to further polarisation, which may hinder international cooperation and impede progress towards the SDGs. Achieving the SDGs requires a stable geopolitical environment; any significant conflict or global crisis can derail these efforts. As nations prioritise economic growth and address domestic challenges, the pursuit of sustainable development may be compromised. Geopolitical stability, a commitment to multilateralism and diplomacy, and a shared vision of a sustainable future are necessary to achieve the UN SDGs.

 

BRICS Members Standing on Meeting SDGs

Each BRICS member takes a different approach to achieving climate-related goals. The Multidisciplinary Digital Publishing Institute (MDPI) published a study on the vision and mission statements of the top 25 companies in the BRICS countries (five from each country), revealing differing levels of alignment with the UN SDGs. The study concludes that China appears more closely aligned with the UN’s sustainable development agenda, as reflected in the corporate statements analysed. This suggests a stronger emphasis on environmental and social responsibility among Chinese companies. In contrast, India, Russia, Brazil, and South Africa recognise the importance of sustainability but may prioritise economic growth and social development in the short term. This divergence in approaches can be attributed to factors such as economic disparities, resource endowments, and national priorities.

To effectively address climate change and achieve the SDGs, BRICS nations must find common ground while respecting their unique circumstances. Collaborative efforts, knowledge sharing, and technology transfer can help bridge these gaps and promote sustainable development across the bloc.

 

Source: Overall country-wise adoption of UN SDGs by BRICS.^[7]

 

Competing Priorities and Social Inequalities

There are tangible reasons for failing to meet all of the United Nations Social Development Goals. All BRICS members (except Russia) are developing countries trying to escape poverty. Also, there is a big gap between the economic standings of China, India, Russia, Brazil, and South Africa. The social inequalities in each of these countries are massive.

For example, China’s nominal per capita GDP is $12,600 US compared to India’s meagre of $ 2,700 US and Ethiopia’s at $ 1,350 US. If you compare with UAE (the new BRICS Plus member), the gap is manifold as its per capita GDP is around $ 50,000 US.

Beyond doubt, all members are at different stages of social, political and economic development, and it is not fair to treat them equally when it comes to meeting UN sustainable development goals. The geography and demography vary hugely. The differences are significant between BRICS members and within each country. Chinese cities like Beijing and Shanghai are much more advanced than the cities in the provinces of Gansu and Heilongjiang.

Delhi and Goa are economically advanced in India compared to states like Bihar and Jharkhand. However, the capital state does not compare with the hinterlands, where indigenous communities live. Basic infrastructure, consisting of concrete roads connecting each village, still needs to be improved in many parts of India, though the country has constructed 60% more highways since 2014 than between 1947 and 2014.^[8]

These economically backward members must develop their infrastructure to lift people out of poverty, and to do this, they need to consume enough energy. Energy sources are still heavily dependent on fossil fuels (crude oil, coal, gas, etc.), which are cheaper to afford and easier to produce. Renewables are growing but will only partially replace fossil fuels for at least two to three decades.

BRICS countries face a dilemma: should they halt infrastructure development to connect villages, towns, and cities? Because the material used to build these roads and highways leads to CO2 emissions and air pollution. You must melt steel to build highways, bridges, factories, and industrial infrastructure. To melt steel, you will end up using coal, gas, etc. China and India are the biggest producers and consumers of this product in BRICS, and at least 10% of CO2 emissions come from the steel industry.

China and India are experiencing significant industrial growth, striving for sustained economic progress to lift millions out of poverty. India is aiming to become a developed nation by 2047. The Chinese government is aiming to be fully developed and prosperous by 2049.^[9]And why not? After all, this should be the goal of any nation. Western Europe, the USA, and other developed nations did this decades ago, and now it’s the social responsibility of developing countries and their leaders to do the same. That’s why climate justice is fundamental in all UN forums when discussing sustainable development goals, where decisions are made and goals are set for the entire world. We can’t ignore historical injustices around environmental damage as they bring the correct perspective and lead us towards a more sustainable world with shared responsibility.

 

Climate Justice can’t be Ignored

Historically, from 1850 until 2015, a few wealthy and highly industrialised countries (including Russia) caused more than 92% of CO2 emissions, as per a research paper in the Lancet.^[10] However, underdeveloped countries, mostly Global South ones, are paying the price. The yearly floods and droughts which we see in many Global South countries are the result of centuries of exploitation of natural resources led by former colonial and imperialist powers for their industrial growth. Still, significant oil, gas, and natural mineral exploration corporations are from the Global North, and they get most of their supplies by exploring Global South countries. Global North countries are dumping tonnes of electronic and plastic waste^[11] into Global South countries, which leads to soil degradation, water contamination, and many diseases. This waste colonialism must be challenged. ^[12]

This massive environmental exploitation has led to increasing temperatures, melting ice, increasing floods, changing agriculture patterns, conflicts, wars and loss of livelihoods. Each year, climate refugees are growing in millions and entering poverty. There could be 1.2 billion climate refugees by 2050.^[13]

Climate-related damages are badly affecting the economic growth of developing nations. Whatever progress they made in years or decades is lost within weeks or months, slowing down their work on climate mitigation programmes.

Even when climate finance is provided through world bodies, it is provided as loans, not aid. In its 2020 report, Oxfam estimated that in 2017, 40% of public climate finance was issued as market interest loans.^[14] BRICS members must challenge this practice.

Considering the complexities around geopolitics and the socio-economic world, the blame game won’t solve the climate-related issues. There is only one planet, and we all live here. Today, floods and forest fires are not only happening in the Global South but this year, Europe and the USA saw many natural calamities leading to climate refugees and billions of dollars of damages.^[15] If the rich nations are severely affected by climate change, then better BRICS members, mainly developing countries, must prepare for the coming future, which looks very challenging.

 

Progress on Climate Mitigation

The BRICS countries have much to tackle regarding meeting the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and the 2015 Paris Climate Agreement. Even though challenges remain, some positive developments around sustainable development goals exist.^[16]

Brazil, for example, has set ambitious goals, like cutting greenhouse gas emissions by half by 2030 compared to 2005 levels. It also plans to reach net-zero emissions by 2050 and end illegal deforestation by 2028. Former Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva promised in Egypt at the COP27 meeting to achieve zero deforestation in the Amazon by 2030. Amazon forests are essential for the world as they are considered the ‘lungs of the planet’ and act as a carbon sink, absorbing and storing carbon dioxide from the atmosphere.^[17]

Russia aims to achieve carbon neutrality by 2060. About 45% of its energy comes from low-emission sources, such as nuclear power. The country also invests in hydrogen production, which could significantly influence future energy systems.

India has been making steady progress. It has reduced its emissions intensity by 24% since 2005, showing that economic growth doesn’t have to mean more pollution. India’s future goals include getting half of its electricity from non-fossil fuel sources by 2030 and cutting carbon intensity by 45%. By 2070, it plans to achieve net-zero emissions. Forest cover is also expanding, and the country now has South Asia’s largest network of Ramsar-protected wetlands. India is the only G20 nation on track to meet the 2015 Paris Climate Agreement.^[18]

China aims to peak carbon emissions before 2030 and become carbon neutral by 2060. It’s already working on a national carbon market and is helping other developing countries switch to greener ways of doing things. Chinese electric car vehicles have already captured 76% of the world market, which helps in the green transition. Today, China has the world’s largest renewable and hydroelectric capacity and is the second largest in nuclear power after the US.^[19]

A report by the International Energy Agency (IEA) in January also noted that China commissioned as much solar PV capacity in 2023 as the world did in 2022 and installed 66% more new wind turbines than the year before.^[20]

South Africa has established a Presidential Climate Commission and created a plan for adapting to climate challenges. The country also has systems for monitoring emissions and is developing a long-term strategy for lowering them.

The journey isn’t easy, but these examples show progress. The BRICS countries are moving forward, bit by bit, to tackle climate change and build a more sustainable future.

 

Future Steps Towards Climate Change Mitigation

The joint communique released in 2024 by BRICS Members clearly stated the importance of climate and environment.^[21] BRICS nations aim to alleviate poverty, climate action, mitigation, adaptation, and financing to achieve sustainable development goals. To achieve this, they should focus on some of these aspects:

Knowledge Sharing

BRICS members should share technological expertise to mitigate climate change on the following:

• China’s early warning systems for natural disasters can be adapted for use in South Africa and India’s drought-prone regions.
• China can lead BRICS members with its vast knowledge of renewable energies through solar and wind.
• India’s water management projects, such as rainwater harvesting in rural areas, can serve as a blueprint for water-scarce regions in Ethiopia, Egypt and South Africa.
• Brazil can share its advanced biofuel technology, particularly ethanol production, with countries like South Africa to diversify energy sources and reduce reliance on fossil fuels.
• Russia’s investment in hydrogen production infrastructure can be scaled across BRICS nations through joint R&D initiatives. India and China, with growing energy needs, could collaborate on hydrogen production and distribution technologies.
• BRICS members have a vast culture of indigenous communities living closer to nature, and they can learn from them.

 

Agriculture

China has made significant progress in the agriculture sector in the past four decades and must share its expertise with the rest. For example, China, with less cultivable land, produces double the food grains, at 415 million tons per year, compared with India’s 208 million tons per year. In agriculture, Indian yields per acre are well below the international norms. With less fertile land, China produces double the number of food grains that India produces.^[22] A country like India, where more than 40% of the population depends on agriculture, must learn from Chinese agriculture practices.

Brazil and South Africa, facing agricultural vulnerabilities due to climate change, can partner with India to develop climate-resilient crop varieties through shared research.

 

AI Solutions

The power of AI can’t be overlooked. It can help us mitigate climate change and predict climate disasters faster. In Brazil, a company called Sipremo uses AI to predict where and when climate disasters will occur. This helps the government, social organisations, and citizens be prepared much in advance.

AI can help industries decarbonise by optimising manufacturing schedules, designing lighter and stronger materials, and forecasting process conditions.[23] We can also use AI technology in reforestation projects where AI-powered computers with drones define the targets and number of seeds to be dropped. This is already happening in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. This technology can also be used in faster deforestation mapping through satellite images and in tracking causes of pollution and the melting of icebergs. China is the most advanced nation in AI, and it could help other BRICS members by sharing knowledge.

 

Financing

Achieving sustainability goals requires a proper financing mechanism. Fortunately, the BRICS have the New Development Bank (NDB) and the Contingent Reserve Arrangement (CRA). Economically, this bloc is growing, and with BRICS Plus, it has become much stronger than the G7.

Source: Reuters, the World Bank ^[24]

Considering the strong economies of BRICS, NDB and CRA should guide and finance BRICS members on some of these projects:

• Solar parks and wind farms to reduce dependency on fossil fuels.
• Conservation programs to protect vital ecosystems like the Amazon and Siberian permafrost.
• Researching renewable energy sources and transitioning to green energy.
• Financing Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) housing schemes and green loans for electric vehicles.
• Financing urban and rural planning projects considering ESG norms.
• Giving aid to affected BRICS members in times of crisis and floods.

 

Urban Planning

China has pioneered smart city initiatives, focusing on renewable-powered grids, energy-efficient buildings, and electric public transport systems. These models can be replicated in India and South Africa to create greener cities.

Collaboration on innovative city projects with China to develop South Africa’s urban centres can help reduce emissions and improve quality of life. The Delhi government is running close to 2000 environment-friendly electric buses used by millions of commuters daily. They can help South Africa and Ethiopian cities implement these.^[25]

 

Diplomacy at Global Forums

Through platforms like the United Nations, UN Conference of the Parties (COP), WTO, SCO, and G20, BRICS nations can advocate for equitable climate finance and technology transfer from developed countries. Their leadership can help bridge the gap between developed and developing nations in tackling global environmental challenges. BRICS members must ensure that Global North countries meet the promises made in the past at UN COP summits. For example, in 2009, at the COP15 summit in Copenhagen, climate finance funding of $100 billion a year by 2020 was agreed, but it was delivered quite late and after enough diplomatic battles.^[26]

 

Conclusion

We live in a complex world, and considering recent geopolitical setbacks and extreme peer competition, the coming years will be difficult. BRICS members will face challenges while implementing the UN SDGs, but these are achievable through governmental reforms, critical thinking, public financing, and international diplomacy. These objectives require collective action from political and business classes, including constructive participation by NGOs, think tanks, private investors, and citizens. While each country faces distinct hurdles, their shared experiences and resources provide a foundation for meaningful collaboration.

The growing economic and geopolitical influence of BRICS members can also be leveraged at international forums to bring reforms, which should lead to a win-win situation. BRICS has come a long way since its inception, and today, it is much stronger than ever, and dozens of nations are eager to join. World citizens are noticing each move, and their expectations are high. They are the hope for over 40% of the world’s population and have the means to achieve sustainable development goals and mitigate climate crisis, provided they help each other. BRICS has become a hope for the entire Global South, and they can lead the world towards a greener planet.

There is a Sanskrit phrase, “VasudhaivaKutumbakam” (The world is a family). BRICS members and the rest of the world must practice this while marching towards sustainable development goals and a greener and better planet.

 

Autor Brief Bio:Chittranjan Dubey is an author and environmentalist raising awareness about the ecological crises in India and Europe. His work has been covered by media houses like BBC, The Telegraph, Reuters, Ouest-France, RFI, London Review of Books, TRT World, Bangkok Post, The Straits Times, Times of India, Hindustan Times, etc. He has given many talks on climate change in India and Europe. He has given many meditation workshops in African and European countries. By education and profession, he works as an IT consultant with multinational corporations and has worked on many continents. He lives in Berlin but was born in Buxar (Bihar). His areas of interest are spirituality, climate and geopolitics.

 

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https://www.weforum.org/stories/2024/11/brics-summit-geopolitics-bloc-international/#:~:text=The%20BRICS%20economies%20also%20account,account%20for%20roughly%2014.5%25%20each

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^[5]Contributions to Agenda 2030. (2017, February 28). Stockholm Resilience Centre. https://www.stockholmresilience.org/research/research-news/2017-02-28-contributions-to-agenda-2030.html

 

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^[14]OECD report confirms far too much climate finance given as loans that force poorer nations into debt. (2022, May 25). Oxfam International. https://www.oxfam.org/en/press-releases/oecd-report-confirms-far-too-much-climate-finance-given-loans-force-poorer-nations

 

^[15]Billion-dollar weather and climate disasters | national centers for environmental information(Ncei). (n.d.). Retrieved 16 December 2024, from https://www.ncei.noaa.gov/access/billions/

 

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^[22]Sarabu, Vijay. (2015). Comparative Study of Agriculture in India, China and USA

 

[23]Center on Global Energy Policy. (2024, January 18). Artificial intelligence for climate change mitigation [Video]. YouTube. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7jHPqD0ojQ0

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^[26]Rowling, M., &Civillini, M. (2024, May 29). Rich nations meet $100bn climate finance goal – two years late. Climate Home News. https://www.climatechangenews.com/2024/05/29/rich-nations-meet-100bn-climate-finance-goal-two-years-late/