What can explain the fact that one of the most beautiful places on earth has been turned into a living hell? Much of the troubles faced by the state can be attributed in the initial years to the ambitions of two men—Maharaja Hari Singh, who was looking at ways and means to remain in power and Sheikh Abdullah, who was determined to oust the Maharaja and take over the reins of the state. The Maharaja acceded to India on 26 October 1947, following Pakistan backed tribal invasion of India. It was fortuitous that Indian forces, which were flown into Srinagar Airfield on the very next day, reached just in time to halt the raiders at the outskirts of Srinagar. Over the next 14 months, the Pakistani backed forces were pushed back, till a ceasefire was declared, leaving Pakistan in control of Gilgit-Baltistan and the region of Mirpur-Muzaffarabad. With minor modifications, this has, since the Simla Accord of 1972, been sanctified as the Line of Control.

Plenty of political shenanigans took place since the accession of the state to India on October 1948. But what is generally not known is how a small coterie of people, whom the author of K File: The Conspiracy of Silence, Mr Bashir Assad describes as the Mullah caste—the Geelanis, Muftis, Shah, Handanis, Naqshbandis, Andrabis, Bukharisetc, achieved a stranglehold over the state, dominating the state’s political landscape as well as its bureaucracy. This was the clan which moved into Kashmir from Arabia, and slowly established dominance over the original inhabitants of Kashmir. Today, this small group, representing just about 3 per cent of the Valleys Muslim population, has a stranglehold on the state’s politics and its bureaucratic structure. Surprisingly, this aspect of the politics of Kashmir has been so well hidden from the public gaze.

Article 370 was never a demand of the people of Jammu and Kashmir. It was not even the demand of Sheikh Abdullah! Why India’s first Prime Minister, Pt. Jawaharlal Nehru insisted on including it in the Constitution remains a mystery. DrBhimraoAmbedkar was vehemently imposed to the same and he made this known in no uncertain terms, while the Constitution was being drafted. That is why it was kept as a temporary provision. Would the history of the State have taken a different trajectory if such a provision had not been placed on the statute book? The answers can only be hypothetical. However, one thing cannot be denied. The seeds of separatism were sown with the inclusion of Article 370 in the Constitution. And later, with the promulgation of Article 35A through a Presidential Ordinance, free rein was given to the politicians of the Valley to keep the embers of a separatist philosophy alive.

These aspects are not covered in the book, which is rightly focussed on a singular theme; the radicalisation of a society that had absolutely no reason to take to that path. How is it that a society, which for millennia symbolised a culture of inclusiveness, now celebrates death through jihad as a means of gaining salvation? Why is death celebrated? Why is the word of the hate mongers and terror perpetrators taken as the truth? Why have the scholarly institutions of traditional Islamic jurisprudence been demolished in Kashmir? How and why have we allowed the youth of Jammu and Kashmir to be swayed by the force of a radical ideology which seeks the killing of those not conforming to the Muslim faith as a righteous act; which believes that it is a moral imperative to take up arms against the state; and which is ideologically primed to the extent of believing that laying down one’s life for the cause of jihad is an act that will win rewards in heaven? Once we find answers to these questions, we will be a step closer to understanding the causative factors of violence in the state of J&K. Only then, can we begin to look at policy options to address the alienation that has taken place.

Bashir Assad is a son of the soil. Born in South Kashmir and having being educated in a Madrassa, he was privy to every aspect of life in the state and thus is perhaps more competent than others to expound on the radicalisation that has swept through the Valley and destroyed its Sufi culture. Unknown to many,Assad has laid bare the fact that the spread of radicalisationin the state is linked to the growth of the Jamaat-e-Islami in Kashmir. The process started sometime in the mid-1960’s, when Maududi’s literature was first made available. It gained impetus after 1977, ostensibly with Pakistani backing—a throwback to the Pakistani defeat in the 1971 Liberation war. With the advent of armed insurgency in 1989, the process took on a menacing hue.

All these aspects are well covered in the book. Most alarmingly, while the government banned the Jamaat-e-Islami and its Falah-e Aam Trust (Educational Wing) in 1992, it simultaneously issued orders for the absorption of the teachers of Falah-e-Aam Trust in government schools. And thus began the onslaught of radical ideology on young and impressionable minds. It is incomprehensible to understand why this was done by the State. A charitable explanation is that the state leadership was naive. More likely however, is the possibility that they were complicit. Be that as it may, the result today is that the educational system has been taken over by a radicalised clergy and even government jobs are available only to those who support the Mullah caste. A small group of people, who had no Kashmiri roots and who comprise barely three per cent of the Muslim populace, are thus now ruling the roost.

Why did we allow this to happen? Both the Centre and the State must accept responsibility for the mess that has been created in Kashmir. The Mullahs mentioned earlier—the Geelanis, Muftis, Shah, Handanis, Naqshbandis, Andrabis, Bukharis et al, are the ones spearheading the Azadi narrative, and linking it with Islam. Thus the slogan—‘Azadikamatlabkya, La illahaillallha’. The factors which drive the terrorist movement in the state have been variously attributed in public discourse to poverty, a sense of alienation, joblessness, and many other factors. But the real cause, radicalisation of the minds of the youth, is rarely discussed. That is the nature of the secular state, where to speak of an issue in religious terms gets the individual labelled as communal! But unless the facet of radicalisation—something that has been ongoing for close to over five decades—is addressedpeace cannot return to the Valley.

Surprisingly, the Mullahs exhort the common Kashmiri, the original inhabitants of the land to make sacrifices for the cause. Yet they keep their children safely ensconced in other parts of India, where they receive a good education. These Mullahs have amassed fortunes in the name of the poor and have cornered political and administrative power. Their shackles need to be broken if Kashmir is to return to peace. The abrogation of Article 370 and 35A is but a first step in this direction. The road ahead is, however, going to be long and arduous one, but it is one that must be traversed.

Bashir Assad’s book must be read to understand the way the narrative has been shaped and exploited by a small group for their ends. It gives out a facet of Kashmir from the perspective of a son of the soil that has never before been penned, because of the risk to life and limb that such an account would invariably bring. It is thus a brave account, giving out in explicit detail how the Valley got radicalised and in the process, exposing the author and his family to great risk. The author appears to have a soft corner for Sheikh Abdullah and his brand of politics, but that is par for the course. There is also an oblique reference in passing, linking the growth of the Jamaat to the rising influence of the RSS. This may be the popular narrative in Kashmir but it is devoid of substance and is a mere rationalisation of the acts of the Jamaat. The radicalisation of the Valley was a deliberate act, well thought out and planned by a rabid clergy, supported from across the border and was not a result of internal causes. It is a sad reflection of our times, and of the state of India’s professed secularism, that this philosophy was not nipped in the bud and allowed to flourish till it had all but consumed the state.

For those looking at conflict resolution in the State of Jammu and Kashmir, post the dramatic revocation of the special status of the state on 5 August 2019, this book must be read. It provides an essential backdrop to understanding the situation in the Valley, which makes it an indispensable read for policymakers, think tanks, personnel form the Armed Forces, Police personnel and even the lay public. A few printers devils have entered into the book which otherwise has been well produced by Vitasta Publications. These need to be corrected in the next edition. Overall, a very brave book on Kashmir, for which the author must be commended.

Reviewed by Devrath JhunJhunwala

The ‘rise’ of China has emerged as a major theme of inquiry within academic and policy-making echelons across the world. Every aspect of Chinese politics, economics and society has seen rapid changes as China seeks to position itself as the ‘hegemon’ of the world order. ‘China ascendant: Its rise and implications’ is yet another addition to the voluminous literature on the subject. Through a series of essays focusing on various aspects of China’s growth and its effects, the editor, Harsh V. Pant, through a series of skilfully arranged book chapters, presents a coherent picture of a rising China and its implications for India and the rest of the world. The book is rich in the fluid use of statistical data and political analysis and seeks to juxtapose China’s rise in relation to India, and in doing so, suggests policy options for dealing with China.

China’s penetration, diplomatically and economically, within the Indo-Pacific region is viewed as compromising Indian strategic objectives. Essays in the book portray Chinese growth as a challenge to India’s foreign policy objectives and look into response options in terms of Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s ‘Act East’ policy. It presents an unbiased factual study of the hard power asymmetry between India and China through key economic and military indicators, which bring out the fact that India still has a long way to go to match Chinese capabilities. To come to par with China on the economic and military front, would require huge financial outlays for many years, and a peaceful investment climate. In his book chapter titled ‘Can India counter emerging Chinese capabilities like stealth aircraft?’ Pushan Das bluntly states that Indian capabilities are limited. The chapters on Space Militarisation and Cyber Security once again emphasise the need for India to step up efforts in Research and Development (R&D), if India is ever to catch up with China on this score.

Beyond hard power projection, the book analyses Chinese involvement across the world, especially in South Asia. China’s growing relationships with countries such as Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Afghanistan, traditional allies of India, are seen as solely for the benefit of China and describe economic dependency issues that could prove to weaken such nations. A key facet of this is Chinese presence in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR), which India has strategic interests in. China’s economic investments, military presence and diplomatic relations with nations in the IOR has raised concerns of Chinese intentions with respect to India, with the likelihood of China attempting a strategic encirclement of India. The IOR has been elaborated on as a key determinant of Chinese foreign policy goals with respect to India. With billions of dollars’ worth of goods and, more importantly, energy flowing through the IOR, both China and India see great strategic value in maintaining close ties with nations such as Sri Lanka, Maldives and Myanmar. India is unable to match Chinese economic inducements to these countries, but there is no reason why India should do so. There are other aspects which determine foreign policy which are India’s strengths such as soft power and a strong cultural connect, which India needs to exploit in its relations in the IOR.

The book devotes two chapters on Chinese naval power. ‘Sea Drones: Implications of the great underwater wall of China’ by Sylvia Mishra and ‘China’s naval power and prestige’ by Tuneer Mukherjee put forward the key instruments of such regional power projections. Both essays stress on growing technological development in both stealth and long-range weapon systems, especially with UUV’s (Unmanned Underwater Vehicle) with the Chinese navy. The need for a strict international code governing such modern naval technology is seen as a way to prevent Chinese challenges to national sovereignty of regional nations.

Building on South Asian affairs, a country that has been naturally focused on in the book is Pakistan, where China has found an opportunity to carry out a multitude of foreign policy objectives successfully. These include access to the Arabian Sea, a market for Chinese goods and a method to direct Indian attention away from wider regional issues. The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) is stressed as a massive undertaking that greatly enhances Chinese power in the region with little gross benefit to Pakistan. CPEC remains a concern for India as is the larger strategic partnership between China and Pakistan, the former using the latter as an instrument to keep India confined to the backwaters of South Asia and not emerge as a global power. The China-Pakistan axis also leads to the possibility of India being engaged in a two front war, and the same is discussed in detail in another book chapter by Abhijnan Raj titled “The sobering arithmetic of a two-front war”. The book thus places great emphasis on Chinese involvement in South Asia in an Indian context, viewing it as a potential threat for India and a growing imbalance in the status quo of the region. Diplomatic and strategic responses, notably ASEAN and BIMSTEC, are mentioned as possible counterweights.

Outside the South Asian region, China’s engagement with countries across the globe is viewed as an attempt by China to overturn the Western dominated world order. A Chinese policy deliberated upon is the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), a key action by the Xi Jinping regime. The initiative, while stressing trade and investment, is seen as a Chinese tool for global engagement and relevance. Debt traps, strategic dependence and disregard for international law is often mentioned when criticising this policy. China’s involvement in South Asia, Africa, South America and even the Arctic through massive unmatched investments and trade relations demonstrates the wide reach of China as well as its desire to establish a China-centric world. China hopes to back such engagement with economic superiority, through its strengthening Yuan and a ‘digital silk road’ of supportive infrastructure. The book also delves into China’s abysmal record on human rights and respect for the law. The Uighur problem in the Xinjiang province of China as well as domestic repression is viewed as a clear cut example of China’s indifference towards international law, which makes a future China based world order not something that would be welcomed.

China’s economic growth and its success in bringing millions out of poverty is certainly a success story. While this has been achieved through the government’s protectionist regulations, and while China’s authoritarian capitalism is criticised for its inefficiencies and inequalities, it cannot be denied that the country has achieved great success in improving the lives of its citizens, for which it must be lauded. The growth in China is termed as “selective liberalisation” where pro-market policies are only implemented in sectors imperative to growth. This helped China gain both employment and productivity, leading to a compound growth of 13% between 1989 and 2017. The book also lays focus on climate change, a field that is now increasingly relevant in areas of politics, economics and society world-wide. China’s environmental protection laws are hailed as a great first step, for their strict enforcement and their reduction of smog in urban centres. Such ‘lessons’ are painted as vital for Indian society, one that suffers greatly from high levels of pollution. In addition to that, essays such as ‘China’s innovation boom: Lessons for India’ by Meghna Bal seeks to emulate Chinese success in India, nevertheless stressing the inability of India to match the central planning that China gained from. As a critique to Chinese planning, another book chapter titled ‘The mystery of China’s shrinking cities’ by Sayli Udas-Mankikar berates China’s cruel population redistribution policies in its megacities. Forced evictions, relocations and demolitions are portrayed as inhumane, leading to an aged population without economic opportunities and more expensive living conditions for those remaining. Economic analysis in the book, therefore, both cheers and criticises the China economic model, painting it as unstable in the long-run but one that India should seek to implement with appropriate modifications.

Harsh V. Pant as the Editor has done an exemplary job in putting together a series of articles in a coherent manner, which brings out with distinct clarity the role that China is likely to play in the world, while highlighting India’s response options. There will be both competition and cooperation in the India-China relationship and how India negotiates the challenges ahead, with respect to both its security and economic concerns will have to be watched. The book offers valuable insight into certain aspects of China’s politics, military and economic advancement and diplomatic outreach across the world, which makes it a valuable addition to those wishing to delve into the subject.

Kashmir is all that Pakistan talks about these days. On 14 August, the day on which Great Britain created Pakistan in 1947, Imran Khan was in Muzaffarabad instigating Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (POK)“nationalists,” (the long-time adversaries of Pakistan), that India had snatched away Kashmir from them. He purported to convey through them a message to POK expatriates in the UK who responded by making a massive protest demonstration in front of the Indian Mission in London. The London police made a mock show of preventive measures.

Armed insurgency and ‘azadi’ (freedom) slogan were actually initiated by POK’s UK-based diaspora in the early 1980s on the behest of ISI. These criminals had kidnapped and murdered Ravindra Mhatre, the Indian Counsellor in Birmingham in 1982. In 1993, when JKLF had spread its fangs in the Valley, the PoK-based activists, under the leadership of Amanullah Khan, led a march to force entry into Kashmir Valley by violating the LoC. Apprehensive of JKLF carrying the day, and that Kashmiris would rally round freedom and not for accession to Pakistan, The Pakistan military stopped the JKLF marchers at Chakoti, a small village in POK near the LoC. Violence erupted and the Pakistan army opened fire on them in which 27 persons are reported to have been killed or seriously wounded. Since then, PoK “Kashmir nationalists” and Pakistan authorities have been locked in a seesaw relationship. But now, PoK expatriates have forgotten that bloodshed as well as the untold oppression unleashed by Pakistan on freedom fighters, intellectuals, ideologues, writers and media persons of PoK. Many of them were banished who sought asylum in western countries.

The Pakistani premier, MrImran Khan, made frantic telephone calls to President Trump raising alarm on India bringing certain constitutional and administrative reforms in Kashmir. Pakistan’s foreign minister made a jaunt to Beijing to secure China’s support at the Security Council where Pakistan lodged a complaint and called for an emergency meeting, which, however, did not materialise. Only a closed-door clueless meeting was held. Turkey’s President TayyipErdogan promised steadfast support without condemning India and the Malaysian Prime Minister, Tun Mahathir made only a lukewarm expression of concern. OIC second rung representatives passed the usual farcical resolution that finally goes to the dust bin and UAE as well as SAARC countries called it India’s internal affair.

Yes, China gave limited support, though she concentrated more on Ladakh and her border security concerns. But the world knows that China has no principled foreign policy. However, the Tiananmen Square carnage, trampling of the rights of Tibetans and suppression of Sunni Uighur Muslims of Xinjiang cannot be washed away that soon. Pakistan usually misleads the people in believing that Muslim countries support its Kashmir stand. But how the Muslim states reacted in the present case proves that what binds modern societies into the strings of a partnership are economic interests. China’s annual trade with India amounts to USD 95 billion compared to USD 13 billion with Pakistan. Turkey’s trade with India stands at USD 8.6 billion against USD 1 billion with Pakistan. Malaysia-India trade at USD 14 billion is 14 times more than the USD 1 billion of goods and services which Malaysia exchanges with Pakistan.^[1]

On Pakistan creation day, Imran Khan chanted only India and Modi in his Muzaffarabad outburst. He could not get rid of the genie. At the UN, at its embassies and missions abroad, the talk is only about Kashmir. Pakistan foreign office shot SOS to perceived patrons and dubious international organisations shedding crocodile’s tears on India’s masterstroke in Kashmir and begging for intervention. People in Pakistan have gone hysterical about the bolt from the blue. But the reality is that Imran Khan and his foreign minister have demonstrated feigned hysterics only to lure the Pak Army into thinking that its hand-picked civilian government is doing all it can to carry forward its agenda. Some observers even say that Imran Khan’s decision of taking the COAS and the ISI boss along with him to Washington was taken because he had apprehensions of a military coup in his absence. The arrest and detention of some of the terrorist leaders including Hafiz Saeed, no doubt an eyewash, did not go well with the army.

Pakistan has downgraded diplomatic relations with India, stopped bilateral trade which is ridiculously insignificant and cancelled the Samjhauta and Thar Express. Frustration speaks loudly. It shows how Modi has gravely incapacitated Pakistan. All that remains of seven-decade-old Kashmir dispute is to fulfil the 1994 unanimous resolution of the Indian Parliament of taking back the area of the original State of Jammu and Kashmir under Pakistan’s illegal occupation since 1947. Pakistan must come forward and talk about its withdrawal from POK (Mirpur Muzaffarabad and GilgitBaltistan), and also persuade China not only to return the Aksai Chin area of original J&K State but also return to India the part of Shaksgam Valley that Pakistan ceded to China in 1963.

The state raised by Maharaja Gulab Singh in 1846 has finally integrated into the Indian Union. The Indian nation must pay tribute to that Dogra ruler, a great army commander and a visionary statesman. J&K’s communally oriented Constitution of 1956, and the entire separatist edifice is razed to the ground. The falsely constructed superficial notion of identity stands eroded, and only one identity—that of an Indian—remains valid henceforth.  Forget about its reversal of constitutional reform measures,attack on any part of the Union Territory means war, and the Defence Minister cleared all doubts about India’s determination to recover its territory now under illegal occupation of the neighbouring countries. In the context of how and when to take back, POK, India must, among other things, take into account the fierce opposition in POK to Pakistani domination. It is the moral duty of India to come to their rescue. Many political dissenting parties in PoK and G-B are willing to be the part of Indian Union. India must consolidate her position there and liberate the people of those areas from the shackles of Pak slavery.

As far as Pakistan’s accusation of India violating the defunct UNSC resolutions on Kashmir is concerned, we may remind Pakistan that she has repeatedly altered the status of the parts of Kashmir it controls, weakening its current protestations. In April 1949, Pakistan took over Gilgit-Baltistan (then called the ‘Northern Areas’) through an agreement with the government of Azad Kashmir and the political party, All Jammu and Kashmir Muslim Conference. No accredited representative from GB was party to this clandestine agreement.^[2]

Recently, former Pakistani diplomat Husain Haqqani, who currently is the Director for South and Central Asia at Hudson Institute, wrote in one of his articles how in 1969 a Northern Areas Advisory Council (NAAC) was created in the region, followed by the Northern Areas Legislative Council (NALC) in 1994. Pakistan’s Ministry of Kashmir Affairs and Northern Areas retained all law-making powers until the 2009 Gilgit-Baltistan Empowerment and Self-Governance Order, which created an elected legislature and the office of the chief minister. According to him, Pakistan’s stance that the status of the princely state of Jammu and Kashmir was yet to be settled also did not come in the way of the 1963 Pakistan-China boundary agreement that resulted in China ceding some territory to Pakistan and Pakistan recognising Chinese sovereignty over hundreds of square kilometres of land in Northern Kashmir and Ladakh. He posits that in this scenario the Kashmiri separatist leadership now has three choices: it could take the matter to the Indian Supreme Court and argue that the decision violates Indian constitutional principles. This option has been exhausted with the Supreme Court declining to meddle in the administrative matters. Secondly, it could mobilise protests that could turn the Kashmir Valley into a South Asian West Bank, along with the misery that might bring for the Kashmiri people.^[3]

In doing so, Pakistan cannot afford to ignore the Damocles sword hanging on her neck in the shape of UN’s Financial Action Task Force (FATF) warning of blacklisting Islamabad. The way India has taken preventive measures clearly indicates that New Delhi will not allow a theocratic region on the territory of the Indian Union.  If massive protests ensue and India puts them down with a heavy hand, one can expect denunciation of human rights violations from detractors of India. It can be argued that in today’s world, human rights violations have, regrettably, lost their salience as instigators of international pressure. In the case of Kashmir insurgency, no power has an iota of doubt that it is a jihadi terrorist movement aimed at breaking the Union. India’s show of the might of the state cannot be challenged by China with Tiananmen Square massacre hanging around her neck like an albatross.

Finally, it could try and see how to extract maximum advantage from the new order. This is the only right option for the dissidents in Kashmir and it depends on their vision how best they can put it into practice. In conclusion, a heavy responsibility devolves on Indian policy makers in the background of the fundamental reason of scrapping Article 370 and doing away with State’s special status. It is the responsibility of development, of growth of infrastructure, of providing employment and other reforms. India has no time to waste in executing these weighty tasks, for which huge private as well as public investments would be required.

(*The writer is the former Director of the Centre of Central Asian Studies, Kashmir University)

^[1]Haqqani, Husain. “Pakistan Needs to Stop Thinking of Kashmir as an Unfinished Business of Partition.” By Husain Haqqani, www.hudson.org/research/15233-pakistan-needs-to-stop-thinking-of-kashmir-as-an-unfinished-business-of-partition.

^[2] Ibid.

^[3] Ibid.

Ministry of Power has just announced Ujjwal Discom Assurance Yojana (UDAY) 2.0 is under making. Like its predecessor, it is once again aimed at turning around operational & financial performance of distribution utilities in India. In film industry sequels to a hit movie is a common phenomenon, however their success again is depended on the script. It is early to say whether UDAY-I is a blockbuster or not (in terms of achieving its objective) but now UDAY II is on the floors. In this blog, I argue rather than providing ambitious targets in terms of tariff hike, in next five years Govt should focus on increasing quality & reliability of power. Once customers are accustomed to good quality power supply, they may not hesitate in paying actual tariffs

UDAY-I was launched by the Ministry of Power, Govt. of India on November 20, 2015, amidst much fanfare and hope that it will do what no other scheme could achieve i.e. bring about operational and financial turnaround in the State-owned Distribution Companies (DISCOMs). It was a tripartite agreement between the Central Govt. of India, State Govt. and State DISCOM whereby the respective state governments would take over 75% of the debt of the DISCOM’s in lieu of certain achievements to be made by the utilities. The two important achievements to be made by the end of FY 2018-19 were, a) reduction inAggregate Technical & Commercial loss (AT&C)to 15% and
b) reduction in gap between Average cost of supply (ACS) and Aggregate Revenue Required (ARR) to zero.

Table 1: ARR-ACS Gap for the FY 2018-19 (INR/Unit)

Source: UDAY portal (www.uday.gov.in)

[1] States like AP, Bihar & Rajasthan have signed MoU for each of their DISCOMs
[2] Negative indicates recovery from tariff would be more than the cost incurred

The above table shows data for ten states from UDAY portal (www.uday.gov.in). Only three states out of ten have managed to ensure that the gap between ACS and ARR is zero. In fact, in these three states gap is negative indicating DISCOMs revenue are higher than the cost. However, one should keep in mind that the number in ‘Actual’ column for FY 2018-19 indicate tariff determined based on certain projections (like sales and power purchase cost etc.) andfinals results would only be found out while truing-up (reconciliation) exercise for FY 2018-19 is taken up (should be done while determining tariff for FY 2020-21).
Seven out of ten states not meeting their target of reducing ACS-ARR gap should not be surprising considering tariff hike is still a political matter in India.As a thumb rule no tariff increase takes place in the states in the year of elections, for example, even though Madhya Pradesh and Chhattisgarh agreed to undertake tariff increase of 3% and 5% respectively in FY 2018-19, no increase happened in Madhya Pradesh and tariff was reduced by 3% in Chhattisgarhin the same year as elections were due.
Credit must be given to UDAY for trying to solve legacy problems through mixture of competitive federalism and state support (75% of DISCOM debts were taken over by respective State Govts.), however going forward it must also be pragmatic about politics around power tariff. Setting targets like reduction of AT&C losses to 15% in next five years is unwarranted asstates like Madhya Pradesh and Jharkhand have AT&C losses higher than 30%. Reducing it by half would require a massive capital investment (along with regular expenses such as O&M, employees etc,), which in turn would require tariff increase to a quantum which would not be politically feasible. On the other hand, not allowing such tariff increase would again create unmanageable liabilities in the commercial book of DISCOMs thereby maintaining the vicious cycle which it is trying to break from.
The popular Sharp magazine in one of its articles (dated 27 May, 2015) had given three rules for making movie sequels. First rule is ‘Don’t take your time’, second rule is ‘The same, only different’ and the third rule is ‘Dare to dream’. In all probability UDAY 2.0 would fulfil first and second rule, the challenge would be to fulfil the third rule. Can our policymakers dare to think of something which would ensure that in medium to long term, DISCOMs actually undergo financial and operational turn around?
One of the daring risks to take could be to follow what companies like Amazon or Flipkart do i.e. charge consumers less than what is required but at the same time provide high quality service so that when in near future prices are hiked consumers may not think twice in paying as they are satisfied with the services. This may not be the apt example in totality because these companies face competition pressures whereas the DISCOMs don’t since they are owned by the state governments. However, an analogy can be drawn from this i.e.keeping in mind that tariff increase beyond a certain limit is not politically feasible, UDAY 2.0 can focus towards increasing power reliability and quality and limit tariff increase to say 3-5% (so that consumers do not acquire the habit of not having tariff increase). Once consumers have enough confidence on government service delivery, they may not mind paying the ‘just tariff’. For example, residential consumers in Mumbai pay one of the highest tariffs in the country. Though there is a discontent post increase, yet they pay because power reliability and quality in Mumbai is the best in the country and consumers don’t face power cuts or have to buy power inverters. Further, improved service delivery would also bring efficiency ensuring reasonable tariff increase (Rajasthan DISCOMs in their FY 2018-19 tariff petition did not propose tariff increase and sought to increase revenue through cutting losses).
This is just one of the many ideas UDAY 2.0 can dare to dream of. The challenge is can they dare to dream of? Numerous bailout packages have been issued to DISCOMs in the past and UDAY 2.0 certainly won’t be the last. It is time to be pragmatic and understand there would be UDAY 3.0 or 4.0, however, it is important that each sequel builds onto the other hoping it is no more than a trilogy or a quartet.

*  Shashwat Kumar is a Predoctoral Fellow, Marie S. Curie European Training Network, H2020, Global India. He is based out of Institut Barcelona d’Estudis Internacionals, Barcelona (Spain)

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July 31, 2019, will be remembered as the day when the democratic fabric of India was upheld and reaffirmed. After receiving the President of India’s assent, the Muslim women community were afforded protection from the incivility and regressive nature of talaq-e-biddat, also known as ‘instant triple talaq’ under the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Marriage) Act of 2019.

What is talaq-e-biddat? It is a type of divorce practiced under the Hanafi Sunni school of jurisprudence, where the husband can divorce his wife by communicating ‘talaq’ three times in one sitting. On completion of this communication, the marital tie is broken instantly and irrevocably. With the utterance of those words, the woman loses all her rights to the household and is rendered homeless. The absurdity and inherent inequality of practicing instant talaq is hidden from no one. The government is rightly being credited for not only addressing a topic as sensitive as personal laws for the Muslim community, but also for ensuring an effective redressal to a regressive practise. Unfortunately, the issue has taken a political hue, with some clerics seeing the passage of the Act not as a social issue and a fight for gender equality but as undue interference in the religious affairs of the Muslims. The hypocrisy of certain lawmakers also stood out. Mehbooba Mufti, a Muslim woman politician and the leader of a regional political party based in Kashmir, directed her party members to stage a walk out in the Upper House (RajyaSabha) when voting on the Bill took place. She later tweeted “…abstention is essentially a no vote.” Instead of registering dissent against the proposed bill in the parliament by voting against it, Mehbooba Mufti’s People’s Democratic Party (PDP) adopted the political gimmick of staging a walk out. This was political duplicity and subterfuge of an exceptionally high order, even for a regional party not known for political propriety.

Before India’s Parliament enacted the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Marriage) Act of 2019, pronouncing ‘talaq’ thrice in one sitting had the effect of immediate annulment of the marriage. This was in stark contrast to the practice of ‘talaq-ul-sunnat’ which requires pronouncing ‘talaq’ three times over a three month period. The three-month period of ‘iddat’ would commence after ‘talaq’ was pronounced for the first time. The marriage stood annulled only if ‘talaq’ was pronounced for the third time at the end of the said ‘iddat’ period. The rationale behind giving three months ‘iddat’ period was to safeguard the woman by providing a cushion against decisions taken on impulse, while also providing time for negotiation or reconciliation. An additional reason was to ensure that the woman is not pregnant as pregnancy could directly or indirectly affect the decision of divorce, issue of maintenance or custody. Instant triple talaq, on the other hand, instantly leaves the wife and in most cases the children, in a miserable and helpless situation.

Recent years have witnessed the growing popularity of social media as a means of communication. This became a bane to the victims of instant triple talaq as the husbands started resorting to means such as Messenger, WhatsApp, fax, email etc to seek divorce by sending ‘talaq’ thrice by message to the wife. It is regrettable that Muslim clerics not only validated the divorce given under instant triple talaq, but went on to validate even the ones given via text messages. In one incident, a Muslim woman along with her young children were thrown out of their residence by her husband in Tamil Nadu. When the wife protested, the husband simply uttered ‘talaq’ three times, and the hapless woman, along with her children were rendered homeless with limited recourse to justice. In another such incident, a Muslim woman was divorced through instant triple talaq to make way for a younger bride who could pay more dowry. Incidents like these not only reflect on the regressive nature of this obnoxious practice, but also denies to Muslim women, the rights guaranteed to all citizens in the Constitution of India.

There is no gainsaying the fact that under the Constitution of India, personal laws, i.e.laws dealing with marriage, inheritance, etc are entitled to certain latitude in practice. However, the same document as reflective of the collective will of the people and spirit of the nation becomes the guardian of equality. On August 22, 2017, Supreme Court in the Shayara Bano judgment declared the practice of instant triple talaq as violative of the Constitutional spirit and the fundamental right of equality under Article 14. Both the parties to the case agreed that the practice of ‘talaq-e-biddat’ is “bad in theology, but good in law.” When a phenomenon is governed by personal laws in consonance with religious doctrines, it is absurd to argue in favour of its validity when the very same religious doctrines consider it ‘bad’. When the believers of the same faith consider an otherwise socially repulsive practice as a sin, in broader framework continuing it is nothing short of violating both, constitutional and societal morality. The court while extensively examining the instant and irrevocable nature of talaq-e-biddat held that the arbitrariness of the practice where a Muslim man can “capriciously and whimsically” break a marital tie without “any attempt at reconciliation”, is violating right to equality and thus, is invalid in the eyes of the law.

The inhumane version of instant triple talaq has already been outlawed either directly or indirectly in many Islamic countries. In Algeria, Iraq, Libya, Kuwait, Morocco, Sudan, Tunisia, UAE and Yemen, where the official religion is Islam, there are effective laws in place wherein divorce under ‘talaq-e-biddat’ is invalid. Even secular states with majority sunni population such as Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon and Syria have express provisions for protecting Muslim woman from the incivility of instant triple talaq. In Southeast Asia, Indonesia, a country with six official religions including Islam, expressly mentions that divorce will be declared final only by the court. Malaysia, with Islam as its official religion, has written laws regulating the divorce under Islamic Family Law Act 1984. The said Act does not recognise instant triple talaq. The law in Philippines, while acknowledging the importance of reconciliation during the ‘iddat’ period, outlawed practice of instant triple talaq. Theocratic states of Bangladesh and Pakistan with Islam as the official religion have written laws detailing the procedure to be followed for a valid divorce.

It must be noted that the practice of ‘talaq-e-biddat’ despite being declared as unconstitutional by the Supreme Court of India in August 2017, continued unabated across the country. There was no deterrence attached to the unconstitutionality of the practice, which gave the Muslim male the leeway to continue with the practice with impunity. In order to protect Muslim women in India from this Damocles sword of harassment and summary abandonment, and to ensure deterrence against resorting to the practice of instant triple talaq, The Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Marriage) Act of 2019, made the practice a criminal offence. Use of ‘talaq-e-biddat’ would now attract imprisonment which could extend to three years, a fine which would be decided by the court or both.

This move of providing a strong safeguard to victimised Muslim women, has raised the hackles of some in the Muslim clergy as also of some law makers, who are against the criminalisation of the practice. Some have viewed this legislation to protect Muslim women as anti-Islam and an assault on their religious practises, as guaranteed in Article 25 of the Constitution. This reasoning has been struck down by the Supreme Court of India, which had declared the practice of talaq-e-biddat or triple talaq as illegal, and held it to be not an essential religious practice.

A major inhumane fallout of the regressive practice of triple talaq is the resort to Nikah Halala which a divorced Muslim woman has to follow for reconciliation. Nikah Halala is a regressive custom which again discriminates against the female. If a divorced woman is to be reconciled with her former husband, she has to go through Nikah Halala. This means that she has to first marry another man and consummate the marriage with him. There is a waiting period up to the woman’s menses, after which the second husband gives a divorce, enabling her to marry her first husband. Victims of triple talaq have often been forced to undergo Nikah Halala, when they have been divorced by their husband in a moment of rage and later, the husband realising his error, wants her back. This has also become a tool for exploiting Muslim women, besides ridiculing her status as of being of little consequence. This was another reason why deterrence had to be built into the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Marriage) Act of 2019.

An instance reported in July 2018 revealed the horrific reality behind this practice. A woman was divorced multiple times and forced to consummate her marriage in the name of Nikah Halala with multiple men including her father-in-law and brother-in-law. On protesting against this nauseating behaviour, she was threatened not only to be declared as an outcast, but also threatened with her life. It is rumoured that Meena Kumari, the famous Bollywood actress of 1950s was also a victim of instant triple talaq and had to undergo Nikah Halala with the husband’s best friend. When asked about the incident, it is claimed that she said, “If in the name of religion, I have to handover my body to another man, then is there a difference between me and a sex worker?”. In the absence of any recorded evidence, it is possible that this event never took place. On the other hand, it is possible that it did, but considering the state of society in those times, it was kept under wraps. But regardless of the veracity or otherwise of the incident, such cruelty is not an uncommon occurrence and is reflective of the plight of Muslim women in India. That is why it becomes essential to see such practices as criminal offences and not just social evils. It ensures that a man respects the individuality of his wife and does not consider her to be an object that can be ridiculed or toyed around with as per his whims and fancies. It is important for men to realise that mere payment of a fine will not undo the agony a woman has to go through when she is left abandoned after a “manifestly arbitrary” pronunciation of ‘talaq’.

Talaq-ul-sunnat, as opposed to talaq-e-biddat gives the aggrieved Muslim woman time and space for reconciliation and negotiating the terms of divorce, including the maintenance. However, the instant and irrevocable nature of talaq-e-biddat immediately renders the Muslim woman helpless. In the backdrop of this reality, the criminalisation of instant triple talaq, while respecting the integrity of a woman, empowers her by providing the time and space to negotiate the terms on which to end the marriage. It is this criminalisation that fulfils the sociological goal of protecting and empowering the Muslim women community. Further, the law balances the rights of both, the aggrieved and the aggressor. Where the Muslim husband has the right to avail bail from a magistrate, the law also makes sure that the Muslim woman herself can file a complaint as can anybody related to her by blood or marriage. The law also ensures that upon the request of the aggrieved woman to a magistrate, the legal proceedings will be stopped and the dispute will be settled outside the set legal framework. The law has reiterated the right of the Muslim woman to seek subsistence allowance and custody of her children.

A similar rationale has been followed for criminalising another deplorable practice – that of dowry harassment. Over the years, thousands of women have been exploited, tortured and harassed on the pretext of dowry. In many reported cases the wife was tortured to death. It was the criminalisation of the act that deterred men and induced a behavioural change. It is nobody’s case that a legal framework facilitated a complete end to the practice of dowry harassment, but it did assist in vastly reducing the number of cases. Similarly, the triple talaq law, while creating a deterrence amongst Muslim men, will provide a legal recourse to safeguard the rights and dignity of Muslim women. A mere critique that law can be misused holds no ground when it is serving such a noble purpose.

Another critique that a jailed man will not be able to support and provide for the wife is nothing short of an absurdity. It is the irrational and unsupportive behaviour of the husband which has landed him in jail. Further, it is the responsibility of the courts to put in place a practical scheme for providing support to the Muslim woman when the husband is in jail. This is a responsibility that courts have been fulfilling since their inception not only in cases concerning rights of divorced woman, but every case involving right of the aggrieved party to receive compensation.

The exact number of triple talaq victims might not be available in the official records, but according to one of the petitioners in the Shayara Bano case, Bhartiya Muslim Mahila Andolan (BMMA), the number of reported cases is going down. Further, in an interview with a leading newspaper, the BMMA said that there has been a behavioural change where more men are now approaching the organisation for marriage counselling, where otherwise they could have resorted to the easier route of ‘triple talaq’. The Mumbai chapter of BMMA alone had received 31 complaints of oral triple talaq in 2016. After making it a criminal offence, the number of complaints went down to 6 in 2017 and 2 in 2018.

The law may be challenged for judicial scrutiny on the grounds of criminalisation. However, it is this deterrence created from imprisonment that has given hope and confidence to the Muslim women. A practice “bad in theology, but good in law” has been declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court of the country. The impetus is now on Parliament as the representative of the collective conscience of the people, to motivate behavioural change in compliance with the legal provision while making sure the infrastructure to facilitate the said change is in place. The Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Marriage) Act of 2019 is the manifestation of this infrastructure and conscience.

In Shayara Bano judgment, Supreme Court acknowledged that “…90 percent of the Sunni Muslims in India, belong to the Hanafi school, and that they have been adopting ‘talaq-e-biddat’ as a valid form of divorce, is also not a matter of dispute”. In a country where presumably 90 percent from a sub-community of Muslims constituting nearly 14 crore of the total population believe in the validity of instant triple talaq and regard it as an available option, it is but democratic to protect women from it, while also ensuring effective deterrence against such an abhorrent practice. The evils of patriarchy have always determined the contours of personal laws in India. However, over the decades, these evils have been reformed and codification has played an important role in this regard. It is important to consider that when the uncivil and barbaric nature of Muslim criminal law has been acknowledged and made inapplicable, the community itself should step up and reform the regressive nature of personal laws under Shariat. It is not to argue that the journey to empower Muslim women stops at criminalising instant triple talaq. There are many creases to be ironed out, but a strong policy action like this must not be downplayed. In the twenty-first century, it is unacceptable that a Muslim woman’s constitutional right to equality be held ransom to antediluvian and patriarchal personal laws. An inherently patriarchal practice cannot and should not be sustained in a world progressing towards gender equality.

References

(i) ShayaraBano vs. Union of India & Others (2017) 9 SCC 1, para 15.
(ii) @MehboobaMufti, 9:10 PM, Jul 30, 2019, available at https://twitter.com/MehboobaMufti/status/1156228065510318081?s=20
(iii) Supra note i, para 127.
(iv) Ibid, para 57.
(v) Ibid, para 28.
(vi) QaziFaraz Ahmad, July 16, 2018, “Woman Forced to Sleep With Father-in-law Under NikahHalala, Faces Death Threats for Speaking Out”, News18, available at https://www.news18.com/news/india/woman-forced-to-sleep-with-father-in-law-under-nikah-halala-faces-death-threats-for-speaking-out-1813621.html.
(vii) “Flashback: Did you know that MeenaKumari was also a victim of ‘triple talaq’?”, DNA India, Aug 22, 2017, available at https://www.dnaindia.com/bollywood/report-flashback-did-you-know-that-meena-kumari-was-also-a-victim-of-triple-talaq-2538427.
(viii) Zeeshan Shaikh, “’After ordinance, there has been a drop in number of women reporting triple talaq’: NoorjehanSafiaNiaz, co-founder of the Bhartiya Muslim MahilaAndolan, speaks to The Indian Express about the efficacy of the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Marriage) Bill, 2019 and the organisation’s fight to bring in a comprehensive law on Muslim marriage”, The Indian Express, June 17, 2019, available at https://indianexpress.com/article/india/triple-talaq-ordinance-supreme-ocurt-bhartiya-muslim-mahila-andolan-5783641/.
(ix) Supra note i, para 144.

On 26 July 2019, the Indian nation, but more particularly the great Indian Army will commemorate the 20^thanniversary of “Operation Vijay”, the code name of Kargil operations with the theme ‘Remember, Rejoice and Renew.’ Troops from three battalions will undertake expeditions to the peaks where their units had fought under impossible conditions (15000 to 18000 feet high peaks) to drive out Pakistani intruders. “We ‘remember’ our fallen heroes by revisiting their sacrifices which instils pride and respect. We ‘rejoice’ by celebrating the victory in Kargil and we ‘renew’ our resolve to safeguard the honour of the tricolour, an Army official said on the theme of this year’s celebration.

Pakistan’s Kargil adventure codenamed “Operation Badr” was planned in good time which included the construction of logistical supply routes. On more than one occasion, the army had given past Pakistani leaders (Zia ul Haq and Benazir Bhutto) similar proposals for infiltration in the Kargil region in the 1980s and 1990s, says General (Rtd) V.P Malik, the then Indian army chief.  However, the plans had been shelved for fear of drawing the nation into all-out war. Some analysts believe that the blueprint of attack was reactivated when Pervez Musharraf was appointed aschief of army staff in October 1998.

In a disclosure Nawaz Sharif, the then Prime Minister of Pakistan stated that he was unaware of the preparation of the intrusion, and it was an urgent phone call from Atal Bihari Vajpayee, his counterpart in India, that informed him about the situation. Responding to this, Musharraf asserted that the Prime Minister had been briefed on the Kargil operation 15 days ahead of Vajpayee’s journey to Lahore on February 20. Sharif had attributed the plan to Musharraf and “just two or three of his cronies”, a view shared by some Pakistani writers who have stated that only four generals, including Musharraf, knew of the plan.

In early May 1999, the Pakistan Army moved to occupy the Kargil posts, numbering around 130, and thus control the area and the highway linking Ladakh with the rest of the country.  It deployed the elite Special Services Group as well as four to seven battalions of the Northern Light Infantry (a paramilitary regiment not part of the regular Pakistani army at that time) backed by the jihadists from PoK and Punjab and Afghan mercenaries. Covertly or overtly, they set up bases on the vantage points of the Indian-controlled region.

Pakistan had opened heavy artillery fire across the Line of Control to provide cover for the infiltrators. A shepherd from Garkhon village, Tashi Namgyal, had first spotted the intruders at Jubar ridgeline in Batalik on May 3, 1999, and alerted the Army. He, along with two of his friends, had gone looking for a lost yak. While peering through his binoculars, he saw six Pakistani soldiers dressed in black Pathani outfits

Our army brought in about 250 artillery guns to clear the infiltrators in the posts that were in the line of sight. The Bofors field howitzer played a vital role and the IAF used laser-guided bombs to destroy well-entrenched positions of the Pakistani forces. It is estimated that in the war, nearly 700 intruders were killed by air action alone.

The Indian Navy also readied itself for an attempted blockade of Pakistani ports primarily Karachi port. Later on, Prime Minister of Pakistan Nawaz Sharif disclosed that Pakistan was left with just six days of fuel to sustain itself if a full-fledged war had broken out. As Pakistan found itself entwined in a tricky position, the army had covertly planned a nuclear strike on India. The US President, Bill Clinton issued a stern warning to Nawaz Sharif. Two months into the conflict, an estimated 75%–80% of the intruded area and nearly all high ground was back under Indian control.

Following the Washington Accord on July 4, where Sharif agreed to withdraw the Pakistani troops, most of the fighting came to a gradual halt. In spite of this, some of the militants still holed up did not wish to retreat, and the United Jihad Council (an umbrella for all extremist groups) rejected Pakistan’s plan for a climb-down, instead deciding to fight on. Following this, the Indian army launched its final attacks in the last week of July; as soon as the last of these Jihadists in the Drass subsector had been cleared, the fighting ceased on July 26. The day has since been marked as Kargil Vijay Diwas (Victory Day) in India. By the end of the war, India had resumed control of all territory south and east of the Line of Control, as was established in July 1972 as per the Shimla Accord.

The unparalleled bravery and fighting spirit exhibited by the Indian soldiers and officers can be gathered from the contents of the following paragraph from a PTI reportage; “ A treacherous ridgeline in the Batalik sector, Khalubar saw a major battle with 1/11 Gorkha Rifles leading the fight. Lt Manoj Kumar Pandey led the final assault and was awarded the country’s highest gallantry award Param Vir Chakra. The terrain of Batalik-Yaldor-Chorbatla sector is the most rugged after the Siachen Glacier, with heights ranging from 15,000 feet to 19,000 feet. The temperatures in winter range from minus 10-15 degrees Celsius on a sunny day to minus 35-40 degrees Celsius at night. Even in summer, the night temperatures hover around minus 5-10 degrees Celsius. In the heights of Kargil, The signs of the battles may have long obliterated, but the locals still vividly recall the Indian Army’s bravery. “We are proud of our Army which fought a deadly short war in these rugged, remote and inhospitable sectors and reclaimed all our posts,” a resident of Garkhon village in Batalik sector, TseringDolkar, told PTI”

Pakistan’s perspective

Pakistan’s first perspective of its Kargil misadventure in which a large number of her troops especially those of the Northern Light Infantry were killed besides many irregulars, isthat while there is broad consensus that Kargil-like operations are not viable in the current international environment, violence in various forms remains a legitimate—if not the only—means to achieve Pakistan’s political objectives in Kashmir.  Pakistan understands it paid heavily for its adventurism and the international community did not support the use of overt force to alter the status quo. Thus Islamabad has concluded that the use of Pakistani troops in Kargil invited political failure, and consequently, its incentive to repeat such an operation is verymeager.

The second perspective is that in the calculus of Pakistani Generals, their Kargil strategy of total secrecy of this conspiracy has succeeded in keeping the Pakistani state and the nation both in complete darkness about the ground reality of Kargil war. Pakistanis believe and so do their Kashmiri henchmen that Kargil war was part of Pakistan-sponsored so-called freedom movement in Kashmir.

The third perspective isthat Kargil-like operations are disavowed, but violence remains a legitimate tool to achieve political objectives. Given these constraints, Pakistan believes that one of its few remaining successful strategies is to “calibrate” the heat of the insurgency in Kashmir and possibly pressure India through the expansion of violence in other portions of India’s territory. Security managers and analysts widely concur that Pakistan will continue to support the insurgency in Kashmir, and some have suggested it could extend such operations to other parts of India. Incidentally, notice has to be taken of the recent statement of an ISIS operative that they have established twocentres of operation, one in South Kashmir and the other in Pakistan. A few days before the Ansar Ghazavatul Hind commander Zakir Musa was gunned down in South Kashmir he had said in a statement that they were fighting neither for the “Azadi” of Kashmir nor for Pakistan but for the Islamic Caliphate for which Kashmir was central.

The third and the most dangerous take of Pakistan from Kargil war is that ultimately not able to face India in a conventional war, Pakistan must not turn down the option of using the WMD. She has developed tactical local delivery of the dirty bomb. As we have seen in this paper, at one point of time in the Kargil war, Pakistan was thinking of using the WMD. US President Bill Clinton summoned andwarned the Pakistani Prime Minister.

While we are remembering and paying homage to our martyred soldiers on the Kargil Divas and are fondly acknowledging the sacrifices of our armed forces, we also need to remind our leaders and policy planners what take Pakistan has taken from the Kargil war and how the enemy is changing strategy of befriending inimical elements within our people for their nefarious designs. Kargil success should not make us complacent nor should we underestimate the known and unknown the Jaichands in our society.

(Prof. K.N. Pandita is the former Director of the Centre of Central Asian Studies, Kashmir University, Srinagar. Views expressed are personal.)

Kargil is a small town located along the Suru River, a tributary of the Indus, in the Ladakh region. Historically, it served the purpose of transit and trading point between Skardu, Leh and Zanskar valley. Approximately 200 kilometres from Srinagar and situated on the Srinagar-Leh National Highway, the region is sparsely populated with diverse ethnic and religious groups. Isolated valleys, separated by some of the world’s highest mountains in the Himalayas, offer very tough living conditions.

Historical Context of Kargil War

Historically, Kashmir region has seen little peace as invaders have come in hordes, for plunder, loot and rape. Over time, large scale conversions have also taken place, which has changed the demography of the region. The partition of India and the subsequent accession of the state of J&K left behind its own legacy for the future generations to cope.

When partition took place, Pakistan laid claim to the princely states of Junagadh, Hyderabad and Jammu and Kashmir. As Pakistan bordered J&K, it tried to wrest the state by force, sending in hordes of armed invaders duly supported by elements of the Pakistan army. For India, it was the first bitter taste of things to come and the future did not bode well. Fearing rout of its people, Maharaja Hari Singh of Kashmir signed the “Instrument of Accession” with India, which enabled the Government of India to send in the Indian Army to restore the situation. The first unit of the Army was flown in to Srinagar airfield on 27 October 1947. The troops quickly moved out and made contact with the raiders who were on the outskirts of Srinagar. From then onwards, the raiders were steadily pushed back from the Kashmir valley.

The war however was far from over, with regions in Gilgit, Gurais, Skardu and Kargil still remaining under Pakistani control. Leh too was threatened and needed to be defended. Once again, the Indian Army played a stellar role. Leh airfield was captured by Indian troops by a small column sent under Major Prithi Chand. Under the command of Brigadier K.L. Atal, Lieutenant Colonel Rajinder Singh Sparrow deployed tanks on Zoji La Pass to open the Srinagar-Leh National Highway, a feat never attempted before by anyone in the world1. The problem of weak bridges was circumvented by removing the parts like turrets of the tanks and moving them on mules. By November 1948 the entire area was liberated. Since the matter was referred to the United Nations (UN), it established a Commission—United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan (UNCIP). On 21 April 1948, another resolution was passed to secure withdrawal of all Pakistanis and tribesmen from Jammu and Kashmir and the Government of India was requested to reduce its forces to the minimum strength, after which the circumstances for holding a plebiscite should be put into effect on the issue of accession to either India or Pakistan. In August 1948 a further resolution was adopted by UNCIP along similar lines.

There were three main clauses of the UN Resolution; the first was to accept and implement the ceasefire, the second was the withdrawal of all Pakistani troops and raiders from the entire State of Jammu and Kashmir and finally, both the countries were to reaffirm that the future of the State shall be determined in accordance with the will of the people. The Indian position on the issue remains clear – that the Instrument of Accession on 26 October 1947 gave the right to control the defence, communications and external affairs of the state to India and that the Pakistani aggression violated legal norms and ground realities.

The ceasefire came into effect from 1 January 1949, and was monitored by UN Military Observer Group India Pakistan (UNMOGIP). Approximately one-third of the J&K state remained with Pakistan, effectively dividing the state of J&K. Despite the UN Resolution, Pakistani troops and raiders continued to remain in occupied areas at many places. In the meantime, on 2 March 1948, Sheikh Abdullah was installed as Prime Minister and Maharaja was obliged to relinquish control of the state. First round of elections in Kashmir were held in 1951.

An understanding of the First J&K war is necessary because it highlighted the use by Pakistan of irregular troops, intermingled with regular forces for achieving military objectives. Pakistan’s penchant for using irregulars or nonmilitary means to attempt annexing Kashmir from India has continued since then. Terrorism from across the border and fomenting trouble in Kashmir are part of the same design. Operation TOPAC, Operation GIBRALTAR and GRANDSLAM were launched by Pakistan to annex Kashmir which involved riding on the back of militants or terrorists. The fourth round at Kargil in 1999 was yet another attempt in the same series and was a manifestation of continuing India-Pakistan hostilities over Kashmir.

Destabilisation of Kashmir in one form or the other has continued ever since the days of UN Resolution. India has been willing to resolve differences and towards this objective, the then Prime Minister of India, Shri Atal Behari Vajpayee, took the initiative and visited Pakistan from 20-21 February 1999, on the inaugural run of the Delhi-Lahore bus service in response to an invitation by the then Prime Minister of Pakistan, Muhammad Nawaz Sharif.2 Cordial discussions were held on the entire range of bilateral relations, regional cooperation within SAARC, and issues of international concern. Pakistan and India signed a Memorandum of Understanding on 21st February 1999, identifying measures aimed at promoting an environment of peace and security between the two countries and the two Prime Ministers signed the Lahore Declaration embodying their shared vision of peace and stability between the two countries and of progress and prosperity for their peoples.3

But, the peace seemed to be elusive and despite the overtures by the Indian Prime Minister, Pakistan continued with its old game. The bus from Lahore had not yet reached Delhi when the Pakistani Army, once again, began pushing in regular forces, disguised as militants, into the Kargil heights, catching the Indian establishment by surprise. This was to be a costly failure for India.

 Surprise and Detection of Intrusion

From a purely military point of view and taking into consideration the peculiar characteristics of the area, rugged, treacherous terrain and inhospitable climate, the area was divided into two separate parts based on the enemy threat and infiltration, namely the high threat and low threat areas. It was felt that any enemy movement into this area would be along the existing roads and tracks. Consequently, Indian deployment was based on this perception with strength varying according to the threat. The heavy snow accumulation along ridge lines made any movement impossible and hence the troops were deployed along various nalas and rivers to check infiltration during summers. Enemy intrusion to occupy heights and sustaining it during the harsh winters was considered impracticable and as such, the peaks were not patrolled. The planners of the operation in Pakistan took full advantage of this fact.

Pakistan’s Strategic Calculations

Intrusion in Kargil was a result of miscalculations of the Pakistani military elites who felt that the successful management of insurgency in Kashmir by the Indian Army was diluting their Kashmir cause. According to Sumit Ganguly4, an expert on India Pakistan relations, the planners were emboldened by Pakistan’s nuclear acquisition and resultant assumed annulment of Indian conventional superiority. Under the nuclear umbrella, Pakistani military decided to risk the intrusion in Kargil.

Kargil was chosen as it presented the opportunity to dominate the National Highway from Srinagar to Leh, a lifeline to Ladakh region which if denied would isolate Ladakh from Kashmir. If this was successfully implemented, holding Siachen would have become untenable. But, it was not to be; Pakistani military elites miscalculated the might of the Indian Army and the will of the people.

Pakistani diplomats denied any intrusion and presence of their army by the simple expedient of calling the infiltrators as militants who were not under their control. Dr. Shireen Mazari, from Islamabad Institute for Strategic Studies and others from Pakistan, gave several arguments during Kargil Conference held at Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California in 2002. The Indian side was led by Gen. V.P. Malik and the author too was in the Indian side. Participants from Pakistan argued that Kargil was the continuation of the five-decade old India-Pakistan dispute over Kashmir. According to them, a small number of senior officials in the Pakistan army planned the Kargil operation as a reaction to the Indian army’s forward military policy, which culminated in occupation of the Siachen Glacier in 1984. They contended that Pakistan’s military planners worked on the premise that occupation of un-held areas in Kargil would enable them to choke Indian defences in Leh and Siachen. Hence, it was the Siachen dispute that eventually spilled over into a new territorial dimension in 1999 – Pakistan army’s intended control over the Kargil heights.5

Pakistan further tried to mislead the world and the lies made progressively were proved wrong in time:

l   Initially Pakistan maintained that “Militants had infiltrated in Kargil and it was not a military intrusion.” Capture of Prisoners of War and the military equipment and personal diaries indicated Northern Light Infantry troops were dressed as Mujahideen who occupied the peaks. Pakistan denied Northern Light Infantry was part of regular army.

l   Subsequent lie was, “Kargil intrusion was an initiative taken by local military commanders who adventured to occupy a few places close to the LoC but found unheld peaks resulting into inching forward unopposed till they found themselves looking down at the National Highway around Kargil.”  In her recent publication Naseem Zehra maintains that, “Operation KP (Koh Paima), planned as a smooth, unhindered military operation in IHK, had turned into a Pakistan-India mountain battle of attrition. The die had been cast. Op Kargil had turned into the Battle of Kargil.”6

Kargil War

Kargil had been comparably peaceful with little or no incidents worth reporting taking place for long periods. Winter also meant vacating inaccessible posts for the season. Intelligence inputs did indicate some heightened activities across the LoC in this region but it did not raise any alarms and surprise and deception used by Pakistan was successful in taking advantage of it. Patrols in Batalik sector did notice some movement in the area when a shepherd corroborated having seen presence of foreign troops in Banju in the month of May 1999. Quick reaction teams and patrols were rushed to several places confirming the worst of the doubts.

Indian military commanders read the inputs and realised the gravity of the situation. Although the troops were rushed from within the available resources, it was not enough. The number of peaks that were occupied in Batalik, Yaldor, Kargil and Mashkoh was large. Conventional military wisdom is to apply 3:1 ratio of troops for attacking enemy in the plains but in the mountains and especially high altitudes, the ratio can go as high as 9:1.  It would take time to mobilise fighting echelons to arrive. Need for acclimatisation for few days compounded the situation. Attacks had to be launched soon to prevent the enemy firming up on the peaks. For a well coordinated attack, ground troops needed the support of the artillery and the Air Force.

Dynamics of War, Diplomacy and Indian Restraint

Strategy to deal with the situation presented a dynamic that needed swift and firm action but demanded restraint to be exercised. The movement of artillery across Zoji La would take time. Air effort could be provided immediately but the decision to use the Air Force against the militants and crossing of the LoC or violation of the Pakistan air space could only be taken with deliberations by the Centre as the situation could escalate and a localised battle could turn into a full-fledged war. A war between two nuclear-armed neighbours was a source of concern for the international community. Diplomacy thereafter went into overdrive. ‘Firm and swift response but with restraint’ became the mantra to deal with the situation.

Indian Air Force began participating in the operations from the end of May 1999. The intruders shot down an Indian helicopter in Dras area on 28 May and thereafter the IAF decided to launch airstrikes to degrade the well entrenched enemy on the peaks. During the operations, India lost two MiG 27 air crafts to hostile fire. One of the pilots, Flight Lieutenant K. Nachiketa was taken prisoner of war and the other, Squadron Leader Ajay Ahuja, unfortunately, did not survive.

The young soldiers of the Infantry displayed exemplary valour and grit and rose up once again to show their true mettle. The first breakthrough came at Tololing in Dras sector and thereafter, there was no looking back.7 An Israeli media man in Kargil commented that it was only the Indian Infantry who could breach the strong defences at such high altitudes under freezing conditions8. Pakistanis were first driven out of Dras, then Batalik, Yaldor, Chorbat La and Mashkoh. By the first week of July 1999, it was clear to Pakistan that a rout of their forces was complete if they continued to hold on to their positions.

Prime Minister of Pakistan, Nawaz Sharif flew to the United States on 4 July 1999 to seek US intervention and halt of Indian operations, but Indian diplomacy too was in an overdrive. None of the countries condemned India’s response; instead they tacitly approved it. Pakistan stood isolated and beaten very badly. Upon ceasefire Pakistani troops were allowed to withdraw. Pakistan violated ‘DGMO’s Understanding’ several times during their withdrawal. Operation Vijay in Kargil finally terminated on 26 July 1999.

Aftermath of the Kargil War

Loss of face in Kargil resulted in turmoil in Pakistan and a military coup awaited Nawaz Sharif on his return. General Pervez Musharraf took charge as the President of Pakistan. Pakistan Army was yet again exposed. Pakistan as a country had lost but the army in Pakistan had won in their designs to own a nation. The history of Pakistan would indicate that the prosperity of its people dips each time military rulers have usurped power and this time it was no exception. Pakistan’s economy has nosedived to such an extent that today, Pakistan is out with a begging bowl to survive. It is not difficult to conclude that the current realty is a direct outcome of military rule in Pakistan for long periods of time. Pakistani military officers have become the landlords of large tracts of land and the military has taken control of large corporations. Even though Kargil was a decisive diplomatic and military defeat of Pakistan, it has still not abandoned harbouring, mentoring and pushing terrorists across the LoC into Kashmir.

Strategic Reckoning

On the Indian side, the victory was euphoric but loss of lives and casualties was tragic. Indian Army had restored the pride of the country and Indian diplomacy had very successfully secured the international opinion in favour of the country. Introspection however was needed regarding the failure of intelligence that cost the nation gravely. The Government of India appointed a Kargil Review Committee (KRC) a few days after the Kargil war was over. The Report brought out grave deficiencies in India’s security management system, particularly in the areas of Intelligence and Border and Defence Management. Following the KRC Report, Prime Minister of India constituted a Group of Ministers (GoM) to go into the Report and formulate specific proposals for implementation.9

Based on the recommendations of the GoM, several issues pertaining to the national security, such as setting up of Integrated Defence Staff, efforts to integrate the intelligence agencies and having a full time National Security Advisor have been made or addressed. The progress on the organisational changes with respect to appointment of a Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) to provide single point military advice to the Government, to improve the jointness and resolve inter-service doctrinal, planning, policy and operational issues however remain.10 The pace of modernisation of defence forces has been slow and deficiencies in the inventories must be made up and the process is to be expedited. Kargil war threw up many security challenges but none of them could stand in front of the competence, courage and determination of the armed forces; will of the government, and the support of the nation.

(An Infantry Officer, Col Satish Tyagi (Retd) was commissioned in the RAJPUT Regiment and has taken part in the IPKF in Sri Lanka and in Operation Vijay in Kargil. He had authored “The Fourth Estate: A Force Multiplier for the Indian Army” post Kargil besides contributing several articles and his next book “Kargil: As It Happened; Eye Witness Accounts of the War” is due for release shortly.)

References:

1     Tyagi Satish, “Kargil: As It Happened-Eyewitness Accounts of the War”, USI of India: Speaking Tiger

2     https://mea.gov.in/in-focus-article.htm?18997/Lahore+Declaration+February+1999, Accessed on 23 May 2019.

3     https://mea.gov.in/in-focus-article.htm?18997/Lahore+Declaration+February+1999,  Accessed on 23 May 2019.

4     Interaction of author with Sumit Ganguly during the conference on “Asymmetric Conflict in South Asia: The Cause and Consequences of the 1999 Limited War in Kargil” at NPS, Monterey, CA, May 29 – June 1, 2002.

5     Author’s notes during the conference on “Asymmetric Conflict in South Asia: The Cause and Consequences of the 1999 Limited War in Kargil” at NPS, Monterey, CA, May 29 – June 1, 2002.

6     Naseem Zehra, “From Kargil to the Coup; the Events that Shook Pakistan”, www.bookmaza.com, PDF version circulated on Social Media .

7     Tyagi, SC, “Kargil As It Happened: Eyewitness Accounts of the War”, USI of India publication, Speaking Tiger.

8     Israeli media person interacted with the author in Batalik sector.

9     GoM Report on National Security.

10  “Defence planning remains tardy…inventories of the armed forces are deficient in many items even now”, Times of India, June 5, 2019

(This article is carried in the print edition of July-August 2019 issue of India Foundation Journal.)