India faces a complex and often challenging landscape in its immediate neighbourhood, shaped by a mixture of historical, geopolitical, economic, and internal factors. This article explores the various dimensions of India’s relationship with the Maldives, including maritime security, economic ties, and its diplomatic reset, placing it within the broader context of Indian Ocean geopolitics and economic cooperation.

^[1]

Introduction

The Maldives, located at a strategic point in the Indian Ocean, has traditionally maintained close relations with India, based on geographic proximity, cultural links, and development cooperation. However, in recent years, the Maldives has increasingly engaged with China, attracted by large-scale infrastructure investments under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and promises of economic growth. This shift has introduced new dynamics into India–Maldives relations, as China’s expanding presence in the Maldives brings significant strategic implications for the balance of power in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR). As the Maldives navigates a path between its traditional partnership with India and growing ties with China, India faces the challenge of balancing strategic assertiveness with diplomatic subtlety.

For India, maintaining influence while avoiding resentment requires a careful balance of soft power, economic outreach, and strategic vision – ensuring this remains one of the region’s most closely observed bilateral relationships. In this context, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit to the Maldives in July 2025, at the invitation of Maldivian President Mohamed Muizzu, marks an important step in strengthening bilateral ties between the two nations. Currently, the future of India-Maldives relations is likely to involve a mix of rivalry and collaboration due to the fluid political dynamics within the Maldives.

Geography of the Indian Ocean Region

The IOR is a maritime crossroads of global trade and geopolitics, shaped by its vast geography, diverse nations around it, strategic waterways, and abundant resources. Understanding its geography is essential for assessing the strategic calculus of regional and global powers, and the island nations, especially in the 21^st century’s shifting maritime order.

The IOR, which is the western part of the Indo-Pacific Region, is the third-largest oceanic region in the world, covering around 70 million sq km. It extends from the eastern coast of Africa to the western shores of Australia. The region is home to thirty-three nations and nearly three billion people. Major sub-regions in the IOR include the Arabian Sea, bordered by India, Pakistan, Oman, and Yemen; the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, which connect the IOR to the Mediterranean via the Suez Canal; the Bay of Bengal, surrounded by India, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and Myanmar; and the Andaman Sea and Malacca Strait, which are on the crucial link between the Indian and Pacific Oceans. The Mozambique Channel lies between Madagascar and mainland Africa.^[2]

The IOR also includes some of the world’s most critical maritime choke points. The Strait of Hormuz, situated between Oman and Iran, serves as a gateway for Persian Gulf oil. The Bab-el-Mandeb, located between Djibouti and Yemen, connects the Red Sea to the Arabian Sea. The Strait of Malacca, lying between Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore, is the busiest shipping lane between the Indian and Pacific Oceans, with the Sunda and Lombok Straits acting as alternative routes south of the Malacca Strait.^[3]

Within its expanse lie several key island nations and territories – the Maldives, Sri Lanka, Seychelles, Mauritius, Madagascar, and Comoros – which hold considerable strategic value. Besides these, the strategic island territories in the IOR include the Andaman and Nicobar Islands of India, Diego Garcia – a UK/US military base, and French territories such as Réunion and Mayotte. The region contains vital Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCs) used for energy and trade between the Middle East, Asia, and Africa. It is abundant in marine resources, fisheries, hydrocarbons, and undersea minerals.^[4]

Approximately 80 per cent of the world’s seaborne oil trade passes through the choke points of the Indian Ocean, making it a crucial connector between the East and the West. As a result, the region has become a key geostrategic arena in the modern international system. The Indian Ocean Region (IOR) has evolved into a battlefield of growing strategic rivalry among major powers—including India, China, the United States, the United Kingdom, and France. Its position at the centre of global maritime trade and geopolitics makes its island nations and territories strategically vital.

In today’s contested IOR and the wider Indo-Pacific, island states have increased their strategic importance by leveraging their geographic location and resources to promote national interests. It exemplifies how these island nations can strengthen their presence and assert themselves by engaging with regional powers on transactional terms. Situated at the crossroads of these key Indian Ocean trade routes, the Maldives holds significant strategic value in the IOR, acting as a crucial player in balancing the competing interests and influence of global powers.

Indian Strategy in the IOR

India’s overarching strategy in the IOR is driven by the need to ensure maritime security and freedom of navigation, safeguard SLOCs that are vital for trade and energy imports, counter China’s expanding naval presence, promote regional stability and economic growth, and reinforce its role as a net security provider in the Indian Ocean. Its broader foreign policy approach in the IOR reflects a careful balance of hard and soft power. It highlights India’s efforts to position itself as a counterbalance to China through development aid and security cooperation.^[5]

India launched the SAGAR Doctrine (Security and Growth for All in the Region) in 2015 and the Neighbourhood First and MAHASAGAR (Mutual and Holistic Advancement for Security and Growth Across Regions) initiatives in 2025 with the aim of promoting collective security, enhancing capacity-building for littoral states, and encouraging economic and environmental cooperation. It also introduced the Neighbourhood First Policy, emphasising strong bilateral relations with the Maldives, Sri Lanka, Mauritius, Seychelles, and others, while providing development assistance, capacity-building, and infrastructure projects.

India has transformed its Look East policy into the Act East Policy to strengthen maritime engagement with ASEAN nations and promote a free, open Indo-Pacific.^[6] Its Indo-Pacific Strategy supports a Free, Open, and Inclusive region in partnership with like-minded nations, notably the Quad (India, the U.S., Japan, and Australia). As a rapidly growing economic power, India is projecting its military and maritime influence by modernising its naval forces and utilising its island territories for extended regional reach.^[7] To enhance Maritime Domain Awareness, it has established the Information Fusion Centre for real-time surveillance, integrated coastal radar networks with friendly IOR states, and built strategic partnerships across the IOR and Indo-Pacific.^[8]

While India remains a natural leader in the Indian Ocean, it faces a complex web of strategic, diplomatic, and environmental challenges. China’s expanding presence through funded ports and infrastructure across the IOR, combined with its increasing naval patrols, submarine deployments, and debt-trap diplomacy, diminishes India’s influence in smaller IOR nations like the Maldives and Sri Lanka. Extra-regional powers such as the U.S., France, the UK, Japan, and Australia are also boosting their military and diplomatic engagement in the IOR. Although some are partners strategically, they also compete for influence, particularly in African littorals and island nations.^[9]

India’s approach in the IOR combines hard power, soft power, and regional diplomacy. It aims to sustain influence by being a reliable partner, enhancing maritime capabilities, and promoting a rules-based, multipolar maritime order.

Maldives in the IOR

The Maldives is an archipelagic nation comprising 26 atolls and over 1,200 coral islands, spanning more than 750 km in the central Indian Ocean. This gives it an EEZ of approximately 900,000 km², abundant in marine biodiversity and economic opportunities. Renowned for its white-sand beaches, turquoise waters, and diverse marine life, it is one of the most geographically dispersed countries in the world. With none of its coral islands rising more than 1.8 metres above sea level, the nation is highly vulnerable to even minor sea-level rises caused by global warming. Its economy relies heavily on tourism, fisheries, and related services, with luxury tourism being a major source of revenue. Politically, the Maldives transitioned to a multi-party democracy in 2008 after decades of single-party rule under President Maumoon Abdul Gayoom. Since then, the country’s politics have seen frequent shifts in power, polarised party competition, and occasional instability, influenced by both internal and external geopolitical factors. Mohamed Muizzu was elected president in September 2023, defeating incumbent Ibrahim Mohamed Solih. He is considered a supporter of China’s interests in the country.^[10]

Strategically situated along key global shipping lanes, especially the Eight Degree Channel, which is vital for maritime trade and energy routes connecting the Middle East and East Asia, the Maldives holds significant geopolitical importance and drawing the attention of major powers such as India and China. Located just 700 km southwest of India, the Maldives is strategically positioned between India’s Lakshadweep Islands and the Horn of Africa, making it a central hub in the IOR.^[11]

The Maldives derives its strategic importance from its location near key SLOCs and its proximity to vital chokepoints, enabling the monitoring of maritime traffic between the Strait of Hormuz, the Strait of Malacca, and Bab-el-Mandeb. This positioning allows it to serve as a hub for naval surveillance and anti-piracy operations in the central Indian Ocean, as well as an air and naval logistics node supporting regional navies such as those of India, the U.S., and China. Its unique geography has also made the Maldives a potential buffer state between competing regional and global powers.^[12]

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India-Maldives Relations

The geographical proximity has fostered centuries-old cultural, economic, and people-to-people exchanges between India and the Maldives. Shared maritime traditions, linguistic similarities, and religious ties have laid the groundwork for mutual understanding. India was among the first countries to recognise the Maldives’ independence in 1965. Formal diplomatic relations were established in 1965, shortly after the Maldives separated from British protectorate status.^[14]

India-Maldives relations have been strong for decades, characterised by thriving economic and security cooperation. Thousands of Maldivians have studied in India and visited the country for medical treatment. A pivotal moment occurred in 1988 during ‘Operation Cactus’, when India swiftly intervened within hours to prevent a coup attempt against President Maumoon Abdul Gayoom, led by mercenaries. This gained India significant political goodwill and cemented its reputation as a reliable security partner.^[15]

India has consistently been the first responder during crises — whether the 2004 tsunami, the water shortage in 2014, or the COVID-19 pandemic. It has assisted the Maldives in areas such as defence training, coastal surveillance, hydrography, and joint military exercises. Economic relations between India and the Maldives encompass sectors like trade, investment, and developmental aid. India remains a dependable partner in the Maldives’ human resource development, infrastructure, healthcare, and education sectors. Indian grants and Lines of Credit have financed vital projects, including the Indira Gandhi Memorial Hospital (IGMH) in Male, the Faculty of Engineering Technology, and the Greater Male Connectivity Project (GMCP) – India’s largest infrastructure initiative in a neighbouring country.^[16]

The rise of China’s influence in the Maldives, especially under President Abdulla Yameen (2013–2018), caused a temporary strain in India-Maldives relations. Maldives joined China’s BRI and took on significant Chinese debt. However, relations with India improved under President Ibrahim Solih (2018–2023), who adopted an “India First” policy and revived strategic cooperation. This trusted relationship, however, again faced strain when President Mohamed Muizzu took office in November 2023, riding on his ‘India Out’ campaign and calling for the withdrawal of Indian military personnel from Maldivian soil. Nearly two months later, he reiterated this demand, stating that the Maldives must ensure no foreign military is present on its territory. His request for India to withdraw armed forces personnel—who had been providing search-and-rescue support to Maldivian aircraft—not only signalled a reevaluation of policy towards India but also marked a clear shift towards, and outreach to, China.^[17]

The diplomatic row was worsened by derogatory comments made by three Maldivian ministers about India and Prime Minister Narendra Modi. It sparked exchanges on social media, a boycott of Maldivian tourism, and increased promotion of Lakshadweep as a tourist destination, leading to a significant decline in Indian tourism, which is vital for the archipelago’s economy.^[18]

Tourism is the Maldives’ largest industry, accounting for 28 percent of its GDP and over 60 percent of its foreign exchange earnings. According to recent data released by the Maldivian tourism ministry, of the 1.8 million foreign tourists who visited the Maldives in 2023, 11.2 percent were from India, followed closely by Russia (11.1 percent) and China (10 percent).^[19] Adding salt to India’s wounds, Muizzu headed to China even as the row over the disparaging remarks raged on social media. He asked the Chinese to increase tourist numbers to the Maldives. Several investment and other deals were signed during this visit to China. This incident highlighted the fragility of bilateral relations and the impact of domestic political rhetoric on foreign policy.

China has been expanding its influence in the Maldives through infrastructure investments under the BRI. Its investments in the Maldives, including the $200 million China-Maldives Friendship Bridge, housing projects, airports, and maritime infrastructure, have increased economic dependencies, with Chinese loans making up nearly 40% of the Maldives’ external debt by 2023.^[20] China became the Maldives’ largest trading partner and a major creditor, raising fears of debt-trap diplomacy. The strategic motivations behind China’s engagement with the Maldives can be summarised as the need for geopolitical positioning, protecting critical SLOCs through which China’s energy supplies pass, continuing the strategy of encircling India via a network of ports and bases in the IOR, using port visits and infrastructure investment to increase its presence and reach in the region until the establishment of proper dual-use facilities, and undermining Indian influence.

However, ultimately considering the strong reaction from India and its economic consequences, President Muizzu suspended the Maldivian ministers and issued a statement distancing his government from their comments, emphasising the importance of maintaining ties with India. This shift from an overtly anti-India stance to a more balanced approach by President Muizzu stemmed from both domestic and geopolitical realities. While his initial posture catered to nationalist sentiments and electoral promises, the Maldives’ heavy economic dependence on Indian tourism, development aid, and emergency assistance made prolonged hostility costly. Additionally, rising regional competition with China and the increasing strategic importance of the Indian Ocean compelled Muizzu to recalibrate, recognising that maintaining workable ties with India was essential for economic stability, security cooperation, and preserving the Maldives’ leverage in balancing major powers.

As far as India is concerned, despite tensions and the Maldives’ tilt towards China, India continued its developmental assistance, humanitarian aid, and security cooperation, underscoring its commitment to long-term partnership and regional stability. The underlying strategic logic being that sustained engagement, even during periods of strain, preserves India’s influence, counters rival presence, and reinforces its image as a reliable and indispensable partner in the IOR. While periodic political shifts create challenges, the depth of bilateral engagement, strategic alignment in the IOR, and people-to-people ties ensure the relationship remains fundamentally strong and enduring in counter-terrorism.

China Factor: Implications for India

The Chinese forays into the Maldives and other island nations such as Sri Lanka, Seychelles, and Mauritius, among others, in the Indian Ocean Region carry significant geopolitical, economic, and security implications, especially for India and other regional powers. China aims to reshape the region’s strategic environment by expanding its footprint—particularly through economic and political influence. This strategy has far-reaching strategic, economic, and security implications. It aligns with China’s broader vision of building a chain of ports and bases from the South China Sea to the Horn of Africa, enabling it to monitor key shipping lanes and improve PLA Navy (PLAN) access to critical sea routes and chokepoints. Its activities in the Maldives are therefore not isolated incidents, but part of a larger strategic agenda to expand China’s influence and secure vital footholds across the Indian Ocean Region. This necessitates ongoing vigilance, proactive diplomacy, and strong regional cooperation to safeguard freedom of navigation, defend sovereignty, and maintain stability in the Indian Ocean Region.^[21]

For decades, India has been regarded as the main security provider in the Indian Ocean Region, responding promptly in times of need and working closely with island nations, including the Maldives, to support their development and safeguard their security. However, the growing influence of China and the Maldives’ shift towards it pose a significant concern for India. The Maldives, once under India’s strategic influence, has started hedging its bets by playing China against India. This could weaken India’s influence and foster a more competitive strategic environment in India’s neighbourhood. It risks a serious loss of India’s diplomatic leverage in the region and its neighbourhood-first policy. In the long term, it could limit India’s ability to operate freely in the region.

Chinese investments in ports, such as Hambantota in Sri Lanka, Gwadar in Pakistan, and potential future port deals in the Maldives, raise concerns about their civilian-military dual use. They could be exploited during crises or conflicts for military logistics, surveillance, or even deployment. China’s debt-trap diplomacy is now a well-established phenomenon. The Maldives’ debt to China, estimated to exceed $1.4 billion, is a point of concern.^[22] This disproportionately high debt for the small economy of an island nation like the Maldives gives China leverage over its national policies, foreign policy alignment, voting behaviour at the UN, and defence procurement decisions. India observed this in the ‘India Out’ campaign and Muizzu’s directive asking the Indian Military to leave Maldivian soil.

Chinese forays into the Maldives require India to be vigilant, pursue proactive diplomacy, and foster regional cooperation to safeguard freedom of navigation, sovereignty, and stability in the IOR. India’s challenge will always be to curb the growing Chinese influence while maintaining its own, without appearing overbearing.

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Resetting Relations

Rebuilding a damaged relationship between two countries requires ongoing diplomatic effort, including open dialogue, resolving core issues, and promoting mutual understanding. It also involves establishing trust through economic collaboration, cultural exchange, and people-to-people links.^[24] The shifting geopolitical winds in the IOR, with the Maldives serving as a key example of this trend, require continuous realignment of relations – strategically, economically, and diplomatically.

For India, the Maldives is not just a neighbour defined by geography, history, and shared maritime interests. It is also a strategic maritime partner. The level of influence India has over the Maldivian islands affects its ability to monitor the central Indian Ocean, approach India’s west and south coasts, and respond swiftly to maritime contingencies. China’s increasing influence over the Maldives, by fostering dependence on it, is diminishing India’s primacy in its near-seas approach. The current strategic landscape in and around the Maldives therefore requires agile navigation to maintain a lasting relationship.

On a positive note, although President Muizzu came to power on an anti-India plank and initially focused on strengthening relations with China, he swiftly recognised the risks of increasing debt, the dangers of regional influence competition, and the inherent contradictions in balancing strategic interests amid rivalry between India and China. He understood that the Maldives cannot give the impression that it wants to distance itself from India and the associated economic and developmental support that entails.

Within about a year of his presidency, President Muizzu increasingly recognised that a confrontation with India would not bring any advantages. Understanding that constructive engagement with India would better serve Maldivian national interests than conflict, he started adjusting the Maldives’ foreign policy. Realising that having diverse partnerships, rather than depending too much on a single external actor, provides greater security and economic stability, he aimed to maintain India’s goodwill and acknowledge its key role in the region. This has led to a softening of anti-India rhetoric and a renewed willingness to engage, indicating a careful shift in approach that seeks to assert sovereignty while avoiding the strategic costs of alienating India.^[25]

His visit to India in October 2004 reaffirmed the Maldivian commitment to developing “continued close relations” and enhancing bilateral cooperation. During that visit, a vision statement for a comprehensive economic and maritime security partnership was adopted, emphasising connectivity, capacity building, and counterterrorism cooperation. “The Maldives is India’s key maritime neighbour in the Indian Ocean Region,” India’s Ministry of External Affairs stated in announcing Muizzu’s visit. On this occasion, Prime Minister Narendra Modi discussed “energy, trade, financial linkages and defence cooperation” with him. India approved a $400 million currency swap agreement to support the cash-strapped Maldivian economy and also discussed a free trade agreement with him.

This visit of President Muizzu in October 2024 laid the groundwork for Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit to the Maldives in July 2025. During the Prime Minister’s visit, the two sides announced the start of negotiations for an India–Maldives Free Trade Agreement (IMFTA), which will significantly enhance bilateral trade, tourism, and investments. Defence cooperation received a major boost through the joint inauguration of a new Ministry of Defence building in Malé, constructed with Indian assistance. Infrastructure development also took centre stage during Prime Minister Modi’s visit – 3,300 social housing units in Hulhumalé were handed over; projects in Addu City and six High Impact Community Development Projects were inaugurated; and 72 vehicles and assorted equipment were provided to support public services. India gifted two Bharat Health Initiative to Sahyog Hita and Maitri (BHISHM) health cube sets for emergency medical and disaster relief.^[26]

Mutual security was another important aspect of the reset, during which President Muizzu condemned the April 2025 Pahalgam terror attack in India, which killed 26 civilians. President Muizzu called India the Maldives’ “closest and most trusted partner” and stated that “no one can break India–Maldives ties”.^[27] Prime Minister Modi’s response to the Maldives’ “special place” in India’s Neighbourhood First policy, describing the relationship as “not just diplomacy, but a relation of deep affinity,” signalled a mutual desire from both leaders to foster political capital centred on stability and cooperation rather than confrontation.^[28]

Learning lessons from the past, India has also increased its engagement across party lines. During his visit, Prime Minister Modi interacted with prominent figures from the ruling party, including those who played a crucial role in the “India Out” campaign and are close to China. He also held a meeting with notable figures from the Jumhooree Party, Maldives National Party, and Maldives Development Alliance. Separate meetings took place with the main Opposition, the Maldivian Democratic Party, and former President Mohamed Nasheed. These engagements emphasise India’s efforts to make relations non-partisan and resilient to turbulent domestic politics.^[29]

Prime Minister Modi’s recent visit to the Maldives indicates that India is moving past previous issues and remains optimistic about future cooperation. There is confidence that the Maldives will recognise that regional security is a shared concern. However, it must be acknowledged that the Maldives’ economic stability will continue to pose a significant challenge for India. The Maldives will persist in engaging with China to seek assistance and investments to diversify and avoid over-reliance on India. Therefore, India should stay alert and continue to leverage its influence to protect and advance its interests.^[30]

Conclusion

The Chinese ventures into the Maldives and other island nations in the IOR are not isolated events, but part of a wider strategic approach with significant strategic, economic, and security repercussions. The Maldives is at a crucial strategic turning point. While India cannot impose its will on the Maldives’ sovereignty, it must defend its maritime interests through patient diplomacy, strategic investments, and regional partnerships. Securing a stable and cooperative Maldives is essential for protecting India’s strategic frontiers in the Indian Ocean. It requires vigilance, proactive diplomacy, and regional collaboration to uphold freedom of navigation, sovereignty, and stability in the IOR.

President Mohamed Muizzu’s October 2024 visit signalled that Malé regarded engagement with New Delhi as vital. It not only reoriented India–Maldives relations towards mutual benefit but also opened the door for the Indian Prime Minister’s visit. Prime Minister Modi’s 2025 trip to the Maldives was a comprehensive effort to restore and enhance strategic, economic, and environmental ties with the island nation. By addressing past tensions, bolstering economic support, and aligning security interests, India reaffirmed its role as a reliable partner in a geopolitically competitive region.

For the Maldives, its leadership recognised India’s centrality and reliability, while understanding that sustained outreach to China does not need to come at the expense of ties with India. The lesson was clear: burning bridges with India could incur long-term costs. The Maldives must therefore avoid zero-sum geopolitical games, while India must continue to deliver on its commitments with speed, scale, and sensitivity.

Moving forward, the focus must remain on strengthening this trust. As Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri noted during the special briefing by the MEA on the Prime Minister’s visit to the Maldives, “There will always be events that will impact or try to intrude on the relationship. But I think this is testimony to the kind of attention that has been paid to the relationship, including attention at the highest levels… We’ve continued to work at it, and I think the result is there for you to see.”^[31]

Author Brief Bio: In his distinguished career spanning four decades, Air Marshal P.K. Roy PVSM, AVSM, VM, VSM, has played a crucial role in strengthening India’s maritime and aerial capabilities. He has served as the Commandant of the renowned National Defence College of India and later as the Commander-in-Chief of the Andaman and Nicobar Command, India’s only tri-service integrated command. After retiring, he remains actively involved in strategic and security debates and discussions in India.

 

References:

^[1] Picture: India: A Credible Leader for the Indian Ocean Region, Vikas Kalyani, January 27, 2021, https://chintan.indiafoundation.in/articles/india-a-credible-leader-for-the-ior/

^[2] Mapping the Indian Ocean Region, by Darshana M. Baruah, Nitya Labh, and Jessica Greely, https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2023/06/mapping-the-indian-ocean-region?lang=en Published 15 June 2023

^[3] Indian Ocean Rising: Maritime Security and Policy Challenges Edited by David Michel and Russell Sticklor, ISBN: 978-0-9836674-6-9

^[4] ibid

^[5] The Chatham House 2024 Asia-Pacific Report

^[6] Reinvigorating India’s ‘Act East’ Policy in an age of renewed power politics, Chietigj Bajpaee, 12 August 2022, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09512748.2022.2110609#abstract

^[7] https://www.narendramodi.in/reader/act-east-journey-india-s-strategic-design-for-the-indo-pacific

^[8] Information Fusion Centre – Indian Ocean Region, https://ifcior.indiannavy.gov.in/ ,

^[9] Towards a Cohesive Maritime Security Architecture in the Indian Ocean, Sayantan Haldar, dt 26 September 2024, https://www.orfonline.org/research/towards-a-cohesive-maritime-security-architecture-in-the-indian-ocean

^[10] Maldives country profile, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-south-asia-12651486

^[11] SIGNIFICANCE OF THE MALDIVES TO INDIA, Ritika V Kapoor, 09 April 2020, https://maritimeindia.org/

^[12] ibid

^[13] https://www.worldatlas.com/maps/maldives

^[14] https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2022/11/the-maldives-tug-of-war-over-india-and-national-security%3Flang%3Den

^[15] Strategic Synergy in the Indian Ocean: India-Maldives Relations, Dr Gedam Kamalakar,  https://www.researchgate.net/publication/388279376_Strategic_Synergy_in_the_Indian_Ocean_India-Maldives_Relations ,

^[16] Blue Diplomacy: The Way Forward for India- Maldives Ties in the Indian Ocean Region, By Aishwarya Singh Raikwar, https://www.wgi.world/blue-diplomacy-the-way-forward-for-india-maldives-ties-in-the-indian-ocean-region/

^[17] ibid

^[18] India-Maldives War of Words on Social Media Triggers Diplomatic Row by Sudha Ramachandran https://www.drishtiias.com/daily-updates/daily-news-editorials/shifting-tides-of-india-maldives-diplomacy

^[19] https://thediplomat.com/2024/01/  ,

^[20] The Observer Research Foundation reported in its 2024 South Asia Brief that

^[21] Maritime Security issues from the Perspectives of India, Sri Lanka and Maldives, By M P Muralidharan, NDIA AND THE ISLAND STATES IN THE INDIAN OCEAN Evolving Geopolitics and Security Perspective, INDIAN COUNCIL OF WORLD AFFAIRS 2023.

^[22] https://asia.nikkei.com/politics/international-relations/maldives-owes-china-1.4bn-says-finance-minister

^[23] Picture: India And China face off, April 22, 2019, Dr. David Brewster, https://ipdefenseforum.com/2019/04/india-and-china-face-off/

^[24] DIPLOMATIC BLUEBOOK OR 1972, Review of Foreign Relations, PIB Ministry of Foreign Affairs Japan

^[25] Why is pro-China Maldives leader Muizzu seeking to mend India ties? https://www.aljazeera.com/news Sarah Shamim 10 October 2024

^[26] https://www.idsa.in/publisher/comments/resetting-ties-modis-visit-reinvigorates-india-maldives-relations

^[27] [5] “Maldives President Mohamed Muizzu Calls India ‘Most Trusted Ally’, Hails First Responder Role”, Hindustan Times, 26 July 2025.

^[28] “India-Maldives Relations are Centuries Old: PM Modi in Malé”, ANI News, 26 July 2025.

^[29] PM Modi’s engagement with the Maldives shows India is playing the long game,  Aditya Gowdara Shivamurthy,  Originally published in The Indian Express 02 Aug 2025, https://www.orfonline.org/research

^[30] ibid

^[31] Transcript of Special Briefing by MEA on Prime Minister’s visit to the UK & Maldives (22 July 2025), https://www.mea.gov.in/media-biefings.htm?dtl/39815/Transcript_of_Special_Briefing_by_MEA_on_Prime_Ministers_visit_to_the_UK__Maldives_July_22_2025

 

A country’s foreign policy relies on the stability of its government, national unity, and the clarity of its economic strategy—and on the state’s ability to implement it. Geopolitical relationships become strong, friendly, or strategic only when the domestic government is stable and has widespread public support. An interim government indicates systemic collapse.

That Bangladesh’s current government is weak is clear—and acknowledged by its advisers. On 10 August 2025, at a discussion hosted by a prominent think tank, Brigadier (ret.) Sakhawat Hossain—an adviser to Bangladesh’s interim government—stated that core state structures have collapsed and have yet to be restored. It remains uncertain whether the present government can move swiftly to credible elections. Given the parties it seems willing to include, there is little hope for a genuinely inclusive contest.

The Awami League (AL) government collapsed due to a street movement and had numerous faults. Nevertheless, it is a historic party: through its politics, a government formed by elected MPs, and an armed struggle waged under that government, Bangladesh came into being. Although the AL later adopted policies seen as appeasing religious fundamentalists, the principles on which Bangladesh was founded—Bengali culture and Bengali nationalism—and the soft power rooted in that tradition remain important national assets.

The Islamist tilt and the ‘King’s Party’

The interim government has, to a great extent, put that asset at odds with itself. It is supported by the centre-right Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP). It maintains close links with religious groups such as Jamaat-e-Islami (an Islamist political party), Hizb ut-Tahrir (a transnational Islamist organisation), and Hefazat-e-Islam (a clerical network). It is also trying to form a so-called “king’s party” (a pro-government group made up of select student leaders from last July’s movement) that similarly aligns with hardline factions.

Holding an election while sidelining constituencies rooted in Bengali culture and nationalism will not be inclusive—and, more importantly, is unlikely to change Bangladesh’s unstable, religion-influenced political landscape. Fundamentalist forces risk gaining greater freedom to operate. The political and state character of the country could shift, raising questions about Bangladesh’s acceptability on the international stage.

The rise of fundamentalism is recognised not only within Bangladesh but also by its partners, who are geopolitically and economically connected to it. Even if the government manages to conduct the election it desires, Bangladesh’s foreign policy is unlikely to change significantly; the next administration would be little different from the current one.

India Ties: From Routine Friction to Open Chill 

Since this government assumed office, relations with India have steadily worsened, marked by repeated actions that have disrupted bilateral trade. Bangladesh’s interim leader (Chief Adviser), Muhammad Yunus, had a brief informal interaction at a hotel lobby with the Indian prime minister on the margins of the 6th BIMSTEC Summit in Bangkok (4 April 2025). Additionally, Bangladesh’s foreign affairs adviser, Md. Touhid Hossain, met with India’s external affairs minister, S. Jaishankar, on the sidelines at the UNGA in New York (September 2024) and again in Muscat (16 February 2025). Over the past year, these exchanges—and an August 2024 telephone call from the Indian prime minister—have effectively been the only visible direct contacts.

Following the BIMSTEC meeting in Thailand, when Bangladesh’s interim head of government met India’s head of government in the hotel lobby, the two sides issued conflicting press statements. This is not a good sign in diplomacy or foreign policy.

Earlier, during a visit to Dhaka, India’s Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri delivered a solo media statement on 9 December 2024, stating that New Delhi would maintain its daily engagement with the current authorities but would earnestly work with any government formed from an inclusive election. He also expressed India’s call to put an end to the persecution of minorities (Hindus, Buddhists, Christians, and indigenous communities) and to bring the perpetrators to justice.

Later that same day, following the foreign secretary’s remarks, Bangladeshi government adviser Syeda Rezwana Hasan told a press briefing that a certain number of attacks against minorities had been recorded and that the cases were under police investigation. Nevertheless, the government later reaffirmed its previous stance: the ongoing abuses were political, not communal, because the victims supported or voted for the previous ruling party.

Having adopted this stance, it remains unclear what position, ultimately, not only India but also other countries that champion human rights will take. Furthermore, compared to many other nations, the issue of minority rights in Bangladesh has long been overlooked; consequently, it has seldom featured in Dhaka’s foreign policy considerations. Even the United Nations— which allocates considerable attention elsewhere to minority persecution and related issues—has paid little heed to Bangladesh’s minority concerns. For this reason, the matter is unlikely to significantly influence foreign policy—unless and until international organisations and Western partners recognise the realities on the ground.

Trade as a Pressure Valve: Project Pauses and Border Frictions

Conversely, India has pulled back from several ongoing economic initiatives in Bangladesh and has not launched any new development programmes during this government’s tenure. There has been no apparent effort from Dhaka to revive or sustain those projects. While India is reducing its economic activities, Bangladesh has halted purchasing the yarn that was previously imported from India via the land border. In response, India has restricted the entry of various Bangladeshi products at land ports—most recently jute products—a move that Bangladeshi business analysts describe as a major blow to the jute sector.

Meanwhile, Bangladesh’s Commerce Minister has stated that not importing yarn from India will benefit the domestic industry. Conversely, Indian authorities have not commented on whether India has gained or lost from restricting the entry of several Bangladeshi items via land borders. After India closed the facility that allowed Bangladesh to export garments and other goods using Indian airports, the Bangladeshi government issued no formal response—only some reciprocal trade steps—though businesspeople have said privately that losing this facility has been seriously damaging.

Additionally, India has tightened visa issuance for Bangladeshis across all categories. This has caused practical difficulties for many countries that keep their main embassies in New Delhi and require Bangladeshis to apply there. After these difficulties emerged, Bangladesh’s interim chief adviser summoned the heads of those countries’ offices in Dhaka and invited their New Delhi-based representatives to come and consider opening primary or issuing offices in Bangladesh—but this has not happened so far.

Visas Tightened—Beyond India

India has not clarified why it tightened visa issuance. Although the initial restrictions seemed to mainly impact Bangladeshis seeking Indian visas, it now appears that not only India but also many countries in Southeast Asia and the Middle East, the European Union’s Schengen zone, and especially the United States have limited visa issuance. Even Thailand, the next destination after India for Bangladeshi tourists and patients, where visas had long been easily accessible, has made the process significantly more complicated and markedly reduced the quota. Visas that once took seven working days to process now require considerable effort to obtain, and far fewer are being granted. Those countries have not given a clear reason for restricting Bangladeshi citizens’ access to visas, nor has the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Bangladesh provided any explanation. Despite repeated media reports, the ministry has not issued an update to the public on the issue.

When a country’s citizens face widespread visa restrictions, it is generally assumed that, for various reasons, other states have raised concerns about that country’s foreign or domestic policies. The arrest of 36 Bangladeshi militants in Malaysia has also entered the public mind as a potential factor. Beyond India, the countries that have limited visas for Bangladeshis have not issued any official statements. Even when India has officially spoken, it has maintained that its visa policy remains unchanged. The reality seems to be different, and there is no visible effort between Bangladesh and India to move beyond the current situation.

The Coldest Phase in Bilateral Ties

It is also true that Bangladesh’s relations with India are now at a level of coldness not seen before. In the past, India alleged that separatists were being sheltered and trained inside Bangladesh—allegations later borne out. Conversely, Bangladesh alleged that India trained and sheltered separatists from the Chittagong Hill Tracts and, at one point after 1975, even provided armed training to young Awami Leaguers; some of them carried out attacks inside Bangladesh—claims that likewise proved true. It also became clear that Indian separatists based in Bangladesh carried out attacks in Assam, Tripura, and other Indian states.

Yet even then, ties in trade, diplomacy, and at the level of heads of government were never as frigid as they are today. Even before General Ziaur Rahman and General Ershad became elected leaders, there were state visits between the two countries at various levels, including at the very top. Under the present government, aside from routine official-level meetings, there have been no state visits at any level. Over the past year, there have been no visits at the policymaking level.

Competing Narratives: Security Concerns versus Political Hosting

No one is pinpointing the exact cause of the problem. What has consistently emerged is that India is concerned about its internal security, and that, according to Indian media and several think tanks, fundamentalists heavily influence Bangladesh’s current government and are anti-India.

Bangladesh’s position is clear that Dhaka does not accept India’s granting of refuge to former Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina or her using social media platforms from there to discuss or participate in Bangladesh’s politics. Bangladesh insists that India must cease this. Additionally, the Bangladeshi government has issued an executive order banning activities of Sheikh Hasina’s party, the Awami League.

India is the only country whose foreign ministry spokesperson has said that banning the Awami League’s activities is unreasonable and unjustified. India’s Prime Minister has also informed Bangladesh’s interim Chief Adviser that India is a democratic state and that its government does not have the authority to deprive anyone of the fundamental right to use their social media or forum for personal expression.

Extradition Request versus “Honoured Guest” Status

Because Sheikh Hasina’s trial has begun in Bangladesh, the government has repeatedly stated that the Indian government should return her. However, in practice, neither country has revealed much about how formally Dhaka has sought her return, leaving the issue shrouded in ambiguity. Conversely, India, through an all-party decision, has granted Sheikh Hasina refuge as an honoured guest.

Do such incidents explain the downturn? Even so, it is hard to argue that one or two such episodes alone could cause a deterioration of relations on this scale. There is little precedent for that – not in international diplomacy, nor in Bangladesh’s diplomatic history. Bangladesh’s pattern is that governments do not typically change through routine electoral processes; they change through street movements or military coups. It is therefore unsurprising that victors on the streets are not benevolent towards the previous government: they haul them to court or apply other forms of pressure.

The present government has limited options to deviate from that pattern. Although it initially sought to portray its street victory as a “revolution,” it lacked the ideology, programme, and explicit political stance that typically define a revolution. Now, it has shifted to prosecuting the previous government and listing its faults—partly to secure the future safety of those who mobilised on the streets and to strengthen the new government’s legitimacy. This, to some degree, reflects the political culture in Bangladesh. The previous administration likewise prosecuted—or kept under prosecution—many leaders of its main rival, the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), including Tarique Rahman, who lives in London.

Tarique Rahman was not granted asylum in the United Kingdom in the same way that India has hosted Sheikh Hasina. However, the former Bangladeshi government did not accuse Britain of any wrongdoing regarding the proceedings against him, and relations with the UK remained unaffected. Therefore, the argument that India’s sheltering of Sheikh Hasina harmed India–Bangladesh relations is not particularly convincing in diplomatic terms.

Is There a Deeper Cause Behind the Freeze?

A natural question arises: beyond the fact that the previous Dhaka government was friendly to India and India’s hosting of Sheikh Hasina, is there a deeper internal complexity driving these ties to an impasse? Sheikh Mujib’s government was friendly to India; after its fall, once General Ziaur Rahman’s military government quickly restored stability, ties with India largely normalised. Nor does the claim hold that relations must worsen simply because Sheikh Hasina is in Delhi: Tarique Rahman’s presence in London did not cool Sheikh Hasina’s government’s relations with Britain—indeed, they remained warm. Therefore, Sheikh Hasina’s being in Delhi is not the main reason relations have become their coldest to date.

Since Dhaka claims it attempted but failed to build relations with India, analysts might wonder whether the key difference this time is that, although past street-led changes of government took place, the country nonetheless maintained stability; fundamentalists did not flood the streets; and no government established a local UN human rights office, thus preventing the country from being categorised like Gaza or Sudan. Is that the main reason? Are neighbours avoiding a state marked by political instability, law-and-order issues driven by fundamentalist mobs, and the presence of a UN local office?

The China Factor

Many argue that the increasing distance between India and Bangladesh has created an opportunity for China to strengthen its influence in Bangladesh. Beijing has already invited leaders of Bangladesh’s fundamentalist parties to visit. It has also approached the centre-right Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), which has held power several times. Over the past year, BNP sent a high-level delegation led by Secretary-General Mirza Fakhrul Islam Alamgir to China for party-to-party discussions at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing (June 23–28, 2025). Within Bangladesh, Chinese representatives have also engaged with leaders from religious parties. In mid-July 2025, Jamaat-e-Islami’s leadership visited China at the invitation of the Chinese authorities for meetings with CPC bodies and institutions.

When India limited medical visas for Bangladeshis, China tried to establish an alternative treatment route centred on Kunming. However, since lower‑income Bangladeshis—who most often travel to India—might find the Kunming option less affordable or practical, much of this remains at a pilot stage.

At the same time, China has not initiated new visible investments over the past year. Previously, in 2021, Beijing withdrew from several Bangladesh Railway projects (including the Joydebpur–Ishwardi double-tracking and parts of the Akhaura–Sylhet conversion). China’s promise to build a hospital in northern Bangladesh is mainly a former plan: China has established an industrial zone in that region where many Chinese workers and officials live, and a China‑run hospital (featuring Chinese doctors and medical protocols) is primarily intended to serve that expatriate community and nearby operations.

Although Muhammad Yunus did meet China’s president at a private forum, China’s Bangladesh policy—namely, interest‑bearing lending for Bangladesh (the model linked with its large project financing)—has not been prominently active over the past year. Here, as with several other partners, the indication is that Beijing has adopted a “wait‑and‑see policy” towards Bangladesh’s current circumstances.

It is worth recalling that when the Taliban took control of Afghanistan, China was the first to initiate talks with Taliban representatives. However, Beijing seems to be resuming its copper-mining venture there (for example, the long-discussed Mes Aynak project) only now, at a time when countries like India are also engaging with the Afghan Taliban.

Another idea gaining prominence is that many of China’s investments in Africa, the Middle East, and other nations affected by fundamentalist movements are not in a positive state; likewise, its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) experience in Taliban‑controlled Afghanistan has been problematic. Conversely, in South Asia, the Sheikh Hasina government in Bangladesh was the first to sign a BRI agreement with China—and it did so during a period when Dhaka had created a relatively stable environment by suppressing fundamentalist groups.

Pakistan’s Power Chess: Risks to China’s Stakes

Although China maintains friendly relations with Pakistan, the suggestion that the United States is encouraging Pakistan’s army chief to orchestrate a change of power raises two significant considerations for Beijing. Pakistan’s most popular leader, Imran Khan, is more favourable towards China, but the army chief is not aligned with him; many believe Washington has backed the army chief, who already holds informal influence that surpasses that of the prime minister. Observers perceive two apparent reasons for this U.S. tilt: to distance Pakistan somewhat from China and to prepare Pakistan for potential future contingencies involving Iran. For China, the main issue is its investments in Iran and Pakistan—investments that could face problems if Asim Munir consolidates power as a military ruler in Pakistan.

Conversely, considering Bangladesh’s growing ties with Pakistan, it is important to evaluate how beneficial the likely impacts within Bangladesh would be from China’s perspective. As Pakistan’s relationship with Bangladesh strengthens, Bangladeshi fundamentalists are likely to gain influence; and if that occurs, Rohingya fundamentalists based in Bangladesh will also become more powerful. There is already some evidence that Rohingya militants have conducted activities within Bangladesh, and more will likely emerge in the future. These Rohingya militants could particularly threaten China’s plans to utilise Myanmar’s Arakan (Rakhine) coast commercially as a seaport, along with its gas pipeline and EPZ projects in Arakan. Furthermore, the issues caused by Rohingya militants in Myanmar might eventually impact Bangladesh, India, and China alike. Much will depend on how far Pakistan’s government and the militant groups it supports can, under various pretences, establish operational spaces inside Bangladesh. If their activities extend into India, China’s role at that point is a matter that cannot be ignored.

“An Amazing Meticulous Design”: External Hands?

Whatever anyone says about how the change of government occurred in Bangladesh, we must take as true what the country’s chief adviser has said in his own words: “It is an amazing, meticulous design.” He conveyed that this was not merely a student uprising but the product of a meticulous design—and he said so in the United States at the Clinton Foundation, informing his close acquaintance, former U.S. president Bill Clinton. The very act of informing Clinton in this way indicates that Clinton did not know beforehand. Although Clinton is a former president, why was he not informed about such a “meticulous design” despite their close relationship? If an external state was heavily involved in that meticulous design, does that not more strongly suggest Pakistan—acting outside the knowledge of both the United States and China?

Clearly, after the change of government in Bangladesh, Dhaka has moved closer to Turkey and Pakistan than to China and America. In the early days of Sheikh Hasina’s government, Turkey, like Pakistan, was strongly opposed to her administration. Later, around the Rohingya refugee issue and for less obvious reasons, relations with Turkey began to improve. Of course, by then the policies of the Hasina government had also changed significantly: those in power were busy appeasing fundamentalists, and many influential figures—whether in the administration, politics, or business—were essentially aligned with fundamentalist forces.

If Turkey and Pakistan—both close to America—find opportunities to enter Bangladesh under various guises, we will have to wait to see how that reshapes Bangladesh’s politics and its geopolitical stance, and how investment-friendly or politically congenial that will be for China.

Trade and Tariffs

The new tariff war waged by America worldwide can be seen as an economic form of a Third World War. America’s targets are China’s vast market and India’s large market. India and China are likely to compete based on their respective capabilities. Although there are differences in economic and military strength between India and China, countries of that size rarely limit their alliances to just one or two nations; they primarily build influence on their own strength. One more point worth noting is that birth rates are falling in America, while China’s aging population has grown. In contrast, the labour force in India is considerably younger. For that reason, America will find it difficult to sustain a long-term trade war against these two large markets and a workforce like India’s.

A key question now is whether this trade war will, in effect, shift the maritime contest—the struggle over the Quad or the South China Sea, involving sea lanes and maritime resources—towards a trade-off. At the most recent Quad foreign ministers’ meeting, trade gained greater emphasis. Conversely, the pressure generated by America’s trade war will open up more opportunities for China in Southeast Asian countries. India and Japan will also look to capitalise on some opportunities.

In this context, as an economic game changer for Bangladesh and parts of neighbouring India, the previous Bangladeshi government began work on the Matarbari deep-sea port, which was supposed to reach full operation quickly. Many believed the port would play a significant role in both a global trade war and any maritime conflict. Bangladesh’s economy suffered a shock from the street-driven change of the previous government—particularly from the attacks on factories after the change of power—making it now much harder to regain the confidence of foreign investors. In economic diplomacy and many other diplomatic arenas, Bangladesh has been pushed to the sidelines. In this situation, the future of the Matarbari deep-sea port and its importance to Japan, China, the United States, and India have come into question.

Japan’s Vector—and India’s Land Ports

In Asia, Japan is the central pillar of the Quad/Indo-Pacific coalition for the United States. Japan is undertaking a major investment drive in India’s Northeastern states. That investment was intended to extend into Bangladesh, specifically around the Matarbari deep-sea port. At this moment, India has closed imports and exports of many Bangladeshi goods through most of its land ports; naturally, that will lead Japan and India to channel the momentum of Japan’s investment in a different direction. Meanwhile, Japan and the United States appear to be expanding the economic profile of the Quad to include the Philippines, Indonesia, and Malaysia. In South Asia, the maritime-resource states of the Maldives and Sri Lanka, as they move closer to India, likewise imply a linkage with the Quad economy.

For now, all that can be said about the current global trade war is this: its pace will sometimes slacken, sometimes intensify, and at times change direction. In reality, no one can say for certain who will turn the compass needle and when. Everything will depend on time. Although it is often assumed that the world remains under the control of a single great power, the economic positions of many countries have already altered that reality. During this period, Bangladesh has largely fallen behind the economic curve. With fundamentalists moving openly, will that easily make the country credible to America, China, and India? Conversely, the realities of those countries where America and the United Nations end up as enablers of fundamentalism are also recognised around the world.

A Culture-Based Nationalist Force—What Remains?

Bangladesh’s distinction from those countries, however, lies in a culture-based nationalist force. Only once it becomes clear how much of that force remains will it be possible to determine whether, in this triangular position among India, China, and America, that nationalist force can assert itself—and how and when it can strengthen itself as circumstances demand. As Dr. Hossain Zillur Rahman, a former adviser to the Bangladesh caretaker government and BRAC chair, states, the current government has “replaced justice with vengeance.”

In the arena of world politics, any country must act based on its strength. Bangladesh, too, will need to wait to build its capacity. That will only happen once Bangladesh can establish the rule of law through an inclusive election. Only then will Bangladesh gain the measure of strength needed to decide how, and to what extent, it will engage with two major economies and neighbouring countries—and how much support it will receive from each.

Author Brief Bio: Swadesh Roy is a journalist and editor honoured with Bangladesh’s highest civilian state award. He is the Editor of Sarakhon: The Present World.

 

Introduction 

Myanmar has been in a state of chaos since the military coup in February 2021, when the Tatmadaw seized power from the Aung San Suu Kyi-led National League for Democracy (NLD). The country entered a period of civil war, with the military junta facing numerous opposition groups, including armed ethnic organisations and the civilian-led People’s Defence Force (PDF), which was formed under the National Unity Government (NUG) in response to the military coup.

What was once seen as a military effort to restore the Constitution’s integrity and uphold the rule of law has come full circle. The Tatmadaw, which regards itself as the guardian of national unity, is now confronting Ethnic Armed Organisations (EAOs), launching attacks on military assets and democratic forces fighting to dislodge the military junta.

The junta^[1], on the other hand, has announced elections in December 2025 with the caveat that Myanmar achieve a state of relative peace and stability. The national census conducted last year in preparation for the polls was also opposed by the EAOs and prevented from being carried out in the EAO-controlled areas. Initial reports suggest that if elections were to take place, they would be in 102 out of the 330 townships in the country, as the remaining are predominantly EAO-controlled areas. While the resistance has pledged to oppose the outcome of the elections, the junta remains firm in asserting the unity of Myanmar.

Finally, the increasing internal complexity in Myanmar has significantly impacted India, which shares over 1643 km of porous land borders with the northeast region and has transnational ethnic links. Furthermore, countries such as China, Russia, and the United States have also expanded their influence, either through the EAOs or the junta, and in China’s case, through both. There are signs of intense competition over critical earth minerals and other natural resources. Therefore, the effects of the civil war-like conflict go well beyond a refugee crisis for India, leading to lasting consequences for the northeastern region.

Myanmar – Traversing From Elections in 2021 to Elections in 2025

There has been much debate about territorial control in Myanmar, with the main question being ‘who controls more territory in the ongoing conflict?’. This assessment aims to identify the ‘winning side’. While some argue that the EAOs have gained more territory, others believe it is roughly evenly split. However, when considering the population, it becomes evident that the junta controls a larger number of people.

The other issue that arises is governance and administration. While most Tatmadaw-controlled areas are functional concerning basic necessities and relative peace, the EAO-controlled regions have been isolated. With the absence of proper administration and essentials such as electricity, petrol, or even functioning schools, the outlook for the future remains bleak. The current circumstances are negatively impacting ordinary people, leading to increased migration.

However, while the junta has announced elections in Myanmar to restore democracy, it is important to note that the polls can only be held in areas under military control. UEC, via notification No. 56/2025 dated 20th August, announced the schedule for the first phase of the general election, which is set to take place on 28th December 2025. Elections will be held in 102 townships, including six in Kachin State, two in Kayah State, three in Kayin (Karen) State, two in Chin State, twelve in Sagaing Region, eight in Bago Region, nine in Magway Region, eight in Mandalay Region, five in Mon State, three in Rakhine State, twelve in Yangon Region, twelve in Shan State, eight in Ayeyarwady Region, and eight townships in Naypyitaw (National Union Territory).

EAOs and the NUG have boycotted the elections, vowing to continue their struggle for liberation against the regime of the Tatmadaw. The NUG is an umbrella body that emerged after the coup in February 2021. It has brought together, albeit loosely, most of the EAOs except for some, such as the Arakan Army from Rakhine State, among others. The EAOs under the NUG are demanding a complete separation of the Tatmadaw from politics in Myanmar, which would require amending the 2008 Constitution, as it reserves 25% of the seats in national and local parliaments. A statement by the NUG on 24^th August 2025, in response to the announcement of elections, stated that “the results of the 2020 elections remain valid” and that “they (NUG) will continue to resist by every means available – any attempt to impose a sham election at gunpoint”.

Regarding geography, Myanmar borders India and Bangladesh to the west, China to the north and northeast, and Laos and Thailand to the east and southeast. It also has coastlines along the Andaman Sea and the Bay of Bengal in the south and southwest. India shares 1643 km of porous borders with Myanmar, mainly in large EAO-controlled areas like Chin State, Sagaing Region, and Kachin State. Additionally, southern Chin State borders India and is controlled by the Arakan Army from Rakhine State.

Therefore, it becomes essential for India to remain vigilant about security implications in the near future. Against the backdrop of increased migration due to conflict and shortages of necessities, which have led to a surge in illicit activities along the border, India must develop a viable strategy to address the inevitable threats. There is also an added risk of Indian Insurgent Groups (IIGs) reviving in Myanmar, as well as international vested interests exploiting these fault lines for more intense geo-strategic confrontations.

^[2]

Increase in International Presence

China

Since the coup in 2021, China’s influence in Myanmar has only grown. Not only do they control some of the EAOs, but they also pressure the Tatmadaw when necessary. They also have a special envoy for Myanmar who often negotiates between the Tatmadaw and the EAOs. The most recent example of this assertion of influence was when Chinese special envoy to Myanmar Deng Xijun arrived in Lashio^[3] to supervise the handover of the capital of the northern Shan State to the military junta by the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA). Surprisingly, MNDAA suffered significant losses, including hundreds of soldiers who lost their lives fighting for Lashio. This territorial expansion made the military junta uneasy, leading to Chinese involvement in negotiations for a withdrawal.

The challenge for China is that the Tatmadaw has not been able to stabilise Myanmar or effectively consolidate its power. Consequently, this threatens China’s infrastructure investments. Whether it is the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC), its oil and gas pipelines, or the Kyaukphyu deep seaport, without political stability and control over EAOs, China’s alternative to its “Achilles’ heel”, the Strait of Malacca, will remain vulnerable. China’s natural gas and oil pipeline, which begins in Kyaukphyu city of Myanmar’s Rakhine State, passes through the Magway Region, Mandalay Region, and Shan State before entering China’s Yunnan region, serving as China’s springboard to ASEAN, just as the northeast region is a springboard to ASEAN for India. Importantly, Gwadar port, part of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), and Kyaukphyu port provide China with an advantage in strategically containing India and blocking access to the West and East.

Additionally, Western policies have over the years almost coerced Myanmar into turning towards China and Russia for support. Washington had even accused Myanmar’s defence ministry of importing nearly USD 1 billion worth of materials and raw materials to manufacture arms.^[4] China continues to be Myanmar’s main source of foreign investment, with 40% of its foreign debt owed to China.^[5] Furthermore, there is a risk that sanctions could worsen China’s debt trap strategy. Considering China’s projects in Myanmar that have advanced under the junta, and the ambitious Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), India has every reason to be concerned about China’s interest in a ‘back door’ access to the Indian Ocean. Additionally, Myanmar’s rich oil and natural gas reserves, along with its fragile geographical position, have made it a key focus in China’s future plans.^[6]

United States of America

The US has recently changed its stance towards the military junta and lifted sanctions on its allies after Senior General Min Aung Hlaing praised President Donald Trump. While Human Rights Watch described the move as extremely worrying, the shift in US policy is significant and abrupt.^[7]

Of late, Myanmar ranks among the top four countries in the world for producing rare earth elements. The highly profitable illegal mining, coupled with political instability, has prompted EAOS and other groups to seek markets beyond China. Unregulated mining and ongoing political turmoil have fostered an environment of clandestine dealings and profit sharing among militias and insurgent groups. Chin and Rakhine States, along with Sagaing Region and Kachin State, are also rich in resources such as aluminium, nickel, iron, chromite, oil, and gas. Most notably, these areas are abundant in heavy rare earth elements (HREE), like dysprosium and terbium, which are considered the most critical elements among rare earths.^[8] EAOs are actively seeking partners for exploration in territories under their control.

The US seems to have a vested interest in the market. Early in August 2025, with the lifting of sanctions, some junta leaders reported that the Trump administration had been approached with proposals to access Myanmar’s critical earth minerals and HREE.^[9] Incidentally, the US also lifted sanctions from the military junta leadership in July 2025, which has been seen as a thawing of relations between the US and the military junta. If the US were to get involved and shift its policy towards the military junta, India can be assured of contestations between China and the US in its own backyard.

Conclusion 

As the military junta moves forward with its plans for elections, it is expected that the offensive against the Tatmadaw by the EAOs will intensify. However, without a central figure like Aung San Suu Kyi, the resistance will find it difficult to coordinate a united offensive and develop a cohesive political strategy. Reports indicate that Suu Kyi is in poor health and under house arrest. Furthermore, the NLD has not registered for the elections. Given the current situation, it is likely that the military-backed USDP will assume power, supported by smaller political parties from EAO-controlled areas and some EAOs involved in the peace process. Considering that the 2008 Constitution grants 25% of seats to the Tatmadaw, it is probable they will remain in control.

Furthermore, the contours of the civil war have changed drastically. After the 2021 coup, it seemed like the resistance forces were gaining influence and territory, but recent counter-attacks by the Tatmadaw have altered the scenario. Multiple towns, such as Nawngkhio and Mobye, as well as towns in the Sagaing region, have been retaken by the military. This will have repercussions on India’s border states. Porous as they are, the refugee influx will remain constant.

To add to the emerging complex dynamics, the presence of international players in India’s backyard may lead to further conflicts. However, while India should closely monitor developments in Myanmar, it must also recognise that Myanmar is not easily dominated by China. India arguably shares more goodwill with the military junta, the NUG, and some EAOs than China ever will.

While China may manoeuvre strategically across faultlines in Myanmar, the reality remains that China and the Chinese do not enjoy the same level of goodwill as Indians do in Myanmar. The Chinese are perceived as purely transactional. In an interview^[10] given to Associated Press, Richard Horsey of the International Crisis Group said, “There is a deep well of anti-Chinese sentiment in Myanmar, particularly in the military, and Min Aung Hlaing is known to harbour particularly strong anti-Chinese views. I don’t think China really cares whether it is a military regime or some other type of government in Myanmar. The main issue with the regime, in Beijing’s view, is that it is headed by someone they distrust and dislike, and who they see as fundamentally incompetent.”

However, with anxieties increasing about China’s presence in Myanmar, India could respond to situations more skillfully. For instance, China is concerned about its assets in Myanmar, and to that end, it has introduced the Joint Security Venture Company (JSVC) initiative, whereby international companies can bring their own security to protect their assets. It is reported that there are over 500 Chinese nationals in Rakhine State. India could take similar steps to safeguard its Kaladan Multimodal Transit Transport Project (KMTTP). India’s best strategy is to engage with stakeholders and defend its own interests in Myanmar while providing all necessary humanitarian aid and leveraging the existing goodwill across the spectrum.

Although India’s soft power remains strong, mainly through its Buddhist connections, relying on it alone is unwise. Myanmar is likely to attract many international players competing for influence. Furthermore, the US and China may contend through Myanmar, potentially affecting India as well. Therefore, India should start strategically building strong relationships with local communities along its northeastern borders. The locals need medical aid, higher education, and other essentials. India can help by fostering a generation of Myanmarese who feel a connection to India. This involves providing basic medical support and equipment to states like Chin and Rakhine. Additionally, India can make special arrangements for conflict-affected students to study there.

For border security, it is crucial to spread accurate information to locals on both sides. There is widespread anxiety caused by rumours that the borders will be completely shut down on both ends. The Indian government’s policy should be clarified and must reassure those who legitimately trade through border haats or have family ties across the border.

The mesh wire fencing in the “Hybrid Fencing” pilot project, as observed in some areas near Pangsau Pass in the northeast, may not be adequate. There are risks of misuse. However, the electronic surveillance system is a welcome development. It is crucial that tracking and biometrics of all individuals entering are made compulsory to prevent any illegal infiltration. Refugees seeking temporary shelter must be registered.

Finally, India must strengthen its engagement with Myanmar at all levels. The more foresighted India is at this stage, the more secure its northeastern borders will become in the future. Policymakers, civilians, NGOs, scholars, religious groups, and the military must work together systematically. Myanmar is crucial for regional stability, and if India aims to maintain stability in its vicinity, it must act as a stakeholder. Although India has shown a mature diplomatic approach towards Myanmar so far, the unpredictable nature of the conflict there means that even elections might not resolve the issues. Therefore, India should develop a long-term strategic plan and engage accordingly.

Author Brief Bio: Rami Niranjan Desai is an author, anthropologist and researcher with subject expertise in the north east region of India and India’s neighborhood. She has studied at King’s College, London where she received her degrees in Anthropology of religion and Theology. Rami has spent over two decades studying insurgency, ethnic armed organisations, religion and identity issues. Her vast repository of work is based on her groundbreaking fieldwork over the years in the northeast region and in India’s neighborhood such as Myanmar. She is also well known for her research and analysis and is invited regularly by private and government organisations as a subject expert. She has also collaborated and published books on various occasions with organisations and universities such as Manipur University and Indira Gandhi National Tribal University. She regularly writes for various journals and national publications such as India Today, Open Magazine and has a weekly column called “Ramification” in Firstpost. She is also a regular television panelist appearing on all major English and Hindi news channels. As Distinguished Fellow at India Foundation she focusses on current affairs, the northeast region of India and the neighbourhood. She also curates India Foundation’s flagship event India Ideas Conclave and podcast Insight while leading other significant initiatives.

 

References:

^[1] The Tatmadaw is referred to the armed forces and the military junta to the governing power held by a council from the Tatmadaw.

^[2] Source: https://testbook.com/question-answer/imphal-is-the-capital-of-which-indian-state–602b91a8a8f29940c971bec0

^[3] Chinese Envoy in Lashio to Broker Return of Myanmar Military. (2025, April 22). Retrieved from The Irrawaddy: https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/myanmar-china-watch/chinese-envoy-in-lashio-to-broker-return-of-myanmar-military.html

^[4] The Billion Dollar Death Trade: The International Arms Networks. (2023). Retrieved from Human Rights Council: https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/countries/myanmar/crp-sr-myanmar-2023-05-17.pdf

^[5] Thein, H. H. (2022, November 22). China is pouring money into junta-ruled Myanmar to secure a ‘back door’ to the Indian Ocean. Retrieved from Scroll: https://scroll.in/article/1037882/china-is-pouring-money-into-junta-ruled-myanmar-to-secure-a-back-door-to-the-indian-ocean

^[6] Desai, R. N. (2024, November 4). From Shared Past to Uncertain Future: India’s Strategic Calculus in a Coup-Stricken Myanmar. Retrieved from India Foundation: https://indiafoundation.in/articles-and-commentaries/from-shared-past-to-uncertain-future-indias-strategic-calculus-in-a-coup-stricken-myanmar/#_ednref1

^[7] https://www.thehindu.com/news/international/us-lifts-sanctions-on-myanmar-junta-allies-after-general-praises-trump/article69853784.ece

^[8] Desai, R. N. (2023, September 29). The New Great Game. Retrieved from Open Magazine: https://openthemagazine.com/columns/the-new-great-game/

^[9] Poling, G. B. (2025, August 1). The Dangerous Allure of Myanmar’s Rare Earths. Retrieved from Centre for Strategic and International Studies: https://www.csis.org/analysis/dangerous-allure-myanmars-rare-earths

^[10] Peck, G. (2024, August 14). China’s foreign minister meets with Myanmar’s military boss as civil war strains their relations. Retrieved from APnews: https://apnews.com/article/myanmar-china-foreign-minister-civil-war-277613b65eae72e7e1dbd442232b6481

 

If India and its neighbourhood are to be summed up in one sentence, it would be ‘uncertain terrestrial and uneasy maritime neighbours’. A closer look at each is necessary.

Bangladesh has experienced turbulence over the past year since PM Sheikh Hasina was ousted in a so-called student agitation. The army facilitated her safe exit to India, where she has remained. How Prof Yunus Mohammed, a Nobel laureate, was appointed as an Advisor to an unconstitutional government comprising six Advisors makes it clear that the entire regime change was orchestrated by a major power’s deep state—a combination of foreign service and intelligence agency.

The events leading up to the downfall of the Sheikh Hasina regime highlight US concerns about China’s growing influence in the region, which could provide easier access to the Bay of Bengal. The PRC already exerts significant influence over the Junta in Myanmar, as well as the warring factions. It may be noted that China has operational control of Kyaukphu deep-sea port (located in Rakhine State and under the control of one of the warring factions), which China uses to offload Gulf crude for further transport to the oil refinery in Kunming. The port also functions as a key hub for managing container traffic from China.

The Bay of Bengal gives China access to the adjoining Indian Ocean without needing to navigate through the Straits of Malacca. The Chinese have long seen passage through the Malacca Straits as their vulnerability due to the threat of interdiction by the US and Indian navies during periods of increased tension. Hu Jintao called it the ‘Malacca Dilemma’. To challenge the Chinese, the US aimed to control Bangladesh’s St Martin’s Island, located a few miles from Myanmar. Sheikh Hasina’s refusal to agree to this demand was possibly one of the reasons behind the regime change in Bangladesh.

Post-Hasina, law and order have deteriorated significantly in Bangladesh. Large-scale killings of minority Hindus, Christians, and Sikhs have alarmed the world, particularly India. Mass migration across the porous India-Bangladesh border has compelled India to tighten border controls. Additionally, Advisor Yunus has started engaging with China and Pakistan. Chinese engineers have surveyed an abandoned airfield at Lalmunir Hat (about 135 km from the Chicken’s Neck area) for development into a fully operational airport. This could pose a security threat to India. Recently, a Pakistani general declared that they will negotiate with Bangladesh and open another front against India in the eastern theatre.

The great power competition is emerging in the Bay of Bengal region, which has so far been free from any geopolitical contestation. This could limit the Indian Navy’s operations and DRDO’s missile programme, which might come under surveillance.

That brings us to three northern neighbours, Bhutan, Nepal and the Tibet Autonomous Region (under Chinese occupation). Bhutan is a nascent democracy which shares borders with Tibet, Nepal and India. There have been some attempts by the PLA resorting to salami slicing into Indian territory through the Bhutan border, with Doklam being one such example in recent times. Bhutan has also been under pressure from China to cede some part of its northern forested territory, claiming historic rights.

Politically, Bhutan is a fledgling democracy; as such, some political parties, when in power, tend to hedge between India and China. China’s economic coercion and inducements of individual graft are effective in South Asia. The supreme authority lies with HRH the King of Bhutan, who understands geopolitics quite well and has avoided any decisions that could pose a security threat to India, which has traditionally supported Bhutan’s economic development. The Indian government regards Bhutan as its closest ally and has been supporting its education, power generation, and tourism sectors, helping it attain self-sufficiency.

Nepal is somewhat unique. Historically, some political parties in power have balanced between India and China to get the best advantages from both, despite India’s strong support in various aspects of Nepal’s development. Sectors such as tourism, transport, culture, religion, education, security, training, access to maritime trade, and oil supply are areas of close cooperation. Cultural and religious ties, along with a large Indian-origin population, in the Terai region, lead to cross-border marriages. The borders have generally remained open, and the border security forces on both sides maintain very friendly relations.

On the maritime front, India has two neighbours: Sri Lanka and the Maldives. Sri Lanka is a long-established democracy with a multiparty parliament. It has a directly elected President who wields almost all executive power. However, some issues require parliamentary approval, which the Prime Minister oversees. Much of its foreign policy is based on its understanding of geopolitical realities. The country has been observed hedging between India and China at times. Given its strategic location in the Indian Ocean and China’s energy security concerns, appeasing Sri Lanka remains a central aspect of the PRC’s foreign policy.

Under the guise of development, China has invested substantial sums in Sri Lanka, mainly through large loans for infrastructure projects. Overestimating its repayment ability, Sri Lanka has fallen into a debt trap. Consequently, public unrest emerged, leading to the president fleeing the country. An interim government was established under the leadership of HE Ranil Wickremesinghe as the consensus candidate. India stepped in to provide a loan or aid of approximately $3.3 billion, and many economic reforms were introduced. The economy appears to have stabilised. Chinese debt for equity also resulted in the leasing of Hambantota and Colombo South ports to China. It has been noted that, although China generally utilises these ports for commercial purposes, warships, submarines, and ocean survey ships occasionally use them, raising security concerns for India. The PLAN shipborne radars can monitor India’s maritime activities and missile developments. When considered alongside China’s recent attempts to ingress the Bay of Bengal via land routes through Bangladesh and Myanmar, it does not bode well for India.

The Maldives is another neighbour with a developing democracy. Having transitioned from Abdul Gayum’s dictatorship, Mr. Nasheed was elected as the first President. His approach to India was that of a friendly neighbour. India responded positively by providing developmental aid and essentials to remote islands. Given the Maldives’ geographical location, India is very significant. China saw an opportunity for economic coercion by offering large sums and faster developmental infrastructure work. Gradually, Chinese influence began to grow and aligned with the String of Pearls concept, which involves encircling India with Chinese-influenced states for long-term strategic advantage. Indian contractor GMR was asked to leave even before its contract expired. Clearly, the future of India-Maldives relations requires reconsideration.

Following the general elections, Mr Yameen came to power, and his inclination towards the PRC was well known. Although he made prudent diplomatic moves to convince India that the Maldives was its closest friend and a good neighbour, his policies were pro-China. There came a point when a specific island, which was nearest to India’s Minicoy island, was being leased to China. This caused concern in South Block, prompting senior Indian diplomats to travel to Male and express India’s serious concerns. Crossing the red line was not expected from a neighbouring state. The remaining five years under Yameen’s presidency remained challenging. Nonetheless, India maintained its friendly stance and honoured all commitments. The next election cycle resulted in a government led by Mr Solih, who was optimistic about India’s contribution to its development. However, five years later, Coalition candidate Mr Moizzu won the election on the slogan of ‘India Out’. The clear direction of his policies was towards closeness to the PRC. He observed protests on the streets by people demanding closer ties with India. This was followed by two or three severe shortages in the country, which were addressed with equal urgency by New Delhi. The President recognised the importance of India and its stature in the public eye. He called on the Prime Minister in Delhi to reset the relations and withdrew most of the proposals that were pending approval for the PRC.

Overall, there has been a fluctuating cycle of alliances. The Government of India has upheld its supportive stance, honouring every agreement and signing new ones. China’s influence operation is likely to continue as part of its foreign policy.

India’s immediate neighbourhood narrative cannot be complete without reflecting upon the most irritating neighbour, Pakistan. Born out of the two-nation theory, Pakistan is yet to find itself. Currently, the country is struggling with financial problems. Yet, it continues to harbour terrorist organisations that have been the source of terrorism worldwide. To annexe the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir, Pakistan has launched a low-intensity conflict using terrorist groups. It has practised bleeding India with a thousand cuts. On several occasions, this has escalated into a full-fledged war.

In 1971, when India intervened in East Pakistan, the region was under martial law and subjected to repression of Bengali-speaking citizens. That war led to the disintegration of Pakistan and the creation of Bangladesh. Since the current government led by Shri Narendra Modi came to power in 2014, India has responded to cross-border terrorism with military actions against known terrorist camps in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK). Terror incidents in J&K have been met with military responses across the border. There is substantial evidence that the Pakistan Army and its intelligence agency, ISI, are the main perpetrators of terrorism, financing terror groups to attack innocent civilians in J&K. Most recently, 26 innocent tourists were killed in Pahalgam. India responded through Operation Sindoor, striking at the heart of the terror network in Pakistan and causing severe damage to Pakistan’s air defence capabilities. Having achieved its objectives, India accepted Pakistan’s request for a ceasefire. However, India has made it clear that, henceforth, any terrorist attack will be treated as war and responded to accordingly.

India’s immediate neighbourhood is anything but peaceful. Maintaining peace to enable India’s growth story will remain the defining challenge of the coming decade.

Author Brief Bio: Vice Admiral Shekhar Sinha was the Commander in Chief of the operationally active Western Naval Command, responsible for maritime security of Sea Lanes of Communication in Arabian Sea and both, Gulf of Aden and Persian Gulf. Prior to assuming this assignment he was Chief of Integrated Defense Staff to Chiefs of Staff committee. He has been awarded the ParamVishishth and AtiVishishthSewa Medal for exceptional service to the Navy. He has also been conferred with two Gallantry awards.

 

In the post-COVID era, three conflicts have set in motion the process of shifting alliances: The Russia-Ukraine War, the Israel-Iran War, and the brief four-day India-Pakistan War.

The Russia-Ukraine war, which is still ongoing, started on 24 February 2022, when Russia launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine. However, the conflict can be traced back to 2014, when Russia annexed Crimea, and fighting erupted in eastern Ukraine between Ukrainian forces and Russian-backed separatists in the Donbas region.

Crimea has a fascinating history. It was a part of the Ottoman Empire till its annexation by the Russian Empress Catherine the Great in 1783, following the Russo-Turkish Wars. In the mid-19th century (1853–56), Britain, France, and the Ottoman Empire fought and defeated the Russians in Crimea. Crimea, however, remained under Russian control and increased in strategic importance, with Sevastopol established as the base of the Black Sea Fleet. Following the 1917 Russian Revolution, Crimea was established as the Crimean Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic within the Soviet Union in 1921. It was occupied for a brief period by Nazi Germany from 1941 to 44. In 1945, after the end of World War II, Crimea’s autonomy was abolished, and it became the Crimean Oblast of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR). In 1954, on administrative grounds, Nikita Khrushchev transferred Crimea from the RSFSR to the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. After the collapse of the USSR in 1991, Crimea became part of independent Ukraine, though with a majority ethnic Russian population and continued presence of Russia’s Black Sea Fleet in Sevastopol. Disputes over Crimea simmered until 2014, when Russia annexed it following Ukraine’s political upheaval.

The Russia-Ukraine war is now into its fourth year. Whether US President Trump’s efforts lead to lasting peace or not, the conflict is unlikely to persist much longer, as fatigue has set in among the leading players and their supporters. However, conflict termination will likely be on Russian terms, where Russia would retain the territories it has taken, namely the Donbas region and the Zaporizhzhia and Kherson Oblasts. It will also require some form of assurance that Ukraine will not be admitted to NATO. The deal will involve economic assistance to Ukraine. Some European powers may not be pleased with such a deal, but the U.S. could push for it to gain access to Ukraine’s mineral wealth. In April of this year, a joint Reconstruction Investment Fund was established under the Ukraine–United States Mineral Resources Agreement signed between the two countries. Under this agreement, Ukraine will contribute 50% of future revenue from government-owned natural resources, including rare-earth elements, oil, and gas. There is also a proposal that Exxon will re-enter Russia’s Sakhalin-1 and the US will purchase Russian nuclear icebreakers, while Russia will purchase U.S. equipment for Arctic LNG-2.^[i] In the final analysis, the deals will be a win-win for the US and Russia and could bring an end to the war.

With trade as leverage, another notable outcome is the agreement reached between Armenia and Azerbaijan in early August at the White House, which commits both parties to ending a four-decade-long hostility. At the centre of the dispute is the Nagorno-Karabakh region. This mountainous enclave is internationally recognised as part of Azerbaijan but is predominantly populated by ethnic Armenians. In the second Nagorno-Karabakh War in September 2020, Azerbaijan emerged victorious, regaining control of the region. Azerbaijan also took the remaining Armenian-held areas of Nagorno-Karabakh in their 2023 offensive. Now, under the deal signed between the two nations, the US has been granted a 99-year lease over the Zangezur Corridor—a narrow strip of land that will serve as a vital trade and energy route to Europe, completely bypassing Tehran. Named the Trump Route for Peace & Prosperity (TRIPP), it secures a direct role for Washington in supervising the flow of Caspian hydrocarbons to Europe, with the US managing rail and road infrastructure, telecom networks, and energy pipelines running through the corridor. US companies will now dominate regional transit for oil, gas, and goods. Essentially, the peace agreement has been established by anchoring US security guarantees, such as the economic-focused initiatives like the Abraham Accords.^[ii] This is a notable win for the US and NATO. Tehran, however, loses leverage as its ability to shape energy and trade flows in the Caucasians is degraded.

The Israel-Gaza war, which resulted from the dastardly 7 October 2023 attack on Israeli civilians, is still ongoing. This conflict spilt over into a war between Israel and Iran on 13 June, with Israel launching hundreds of air strikes on Iran’s military and nuclear infrastructure. Several key Iranian leaders were also assassinated at the start of this war. Iran responded with attacks on Israel using missiles and drones. The US entered the conflict on 21 June and struck three Iranian nuclear sites—Natanz, Fordow, and Isfahan. The U.S. brokered a fragile ceasefire that took effect on June 24, 2025. While the war has once again underscored the central role of the US in maintaining peace in the region, it has also highlighted its limitations. Iran has been weakened, and the capabilities of its proxies, Hamas in the Gaza Strip and Hezbollah in Lebanon, are considerably degraded. Iran’s nuclear facilities have also been degraded. However, Iran’s missile and drone attacks on Israel demonstrated reach and resilience, which would impose some form of deterrence. Geo-politically, the situation is still unravelling, but any future peace deal will, in all probability, have a substantial economic commitment to make it durable.

The unfolding events in Syria are also impacting the geopolitical environment in West Asia. The fall of Bashar al-Assad in December 2024 ended the civil war that was raging in Syria. But that has not brought about peace, which remains elusive. Ahmed al-Sharaa, aka Abu Mohammad al-Julani, who heads the transitional government, was an al-Qaeda operative who spent many years in U.S. detention. He founded the al-Nusrat Front in 2011. In 2016, he merged various factions to create the Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS). After taking over power in Syria, he met with President Trump in Saudi Arabia in May, following which all sanctions against Syria were lifted. This signals possible normalisation within the framework of the Abraham Accords, though such an outcome is still far from being achieved.

The situation in Syria remains fragile. Julani does not govern a unified country. In Northeast Syria, Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) control the area, including Hasakah, Qamishli, much of Raqqa, and Deir ez-Zor. The U.S. and the West support the SDF. Turkey backs the Northern Aleppo region, including Jarabulus, Afrin, and Azaz, and also has its troops stationed there. The Druze in the Sweida Province of southern Syria and the Alawites in coastal Latakia are all opposed to the Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), led by Ahmed al-Sharaa. Syria is thus fragmented and will probably remain so in the near future.

This has set in motion a different set of dynamics. Russia now faces a challenge in maintaining its military bases and political influence. Its military bases include the Khmeimim Air Base, which has been its central operational hub since 2015 and which functions as its command and control centre for its military presence in Syria. It also includes the Tartous Naval Facility, Russia’s only naval base in the Mediterranean till 2066, which serves as a logistics and supply hub for Russian naval operations. While the change of regime in Syria has decreased Russian influence there, it is exploring alternative ways to sustain it. This may involve efforts to infiltrate the Syrian economy through new front companies, creating outright dependencies, building personal networks involving Syrian political, economic, and military figures, exploiting societal divisions, and portraying itself as a protector of minority interests. Russia’s leverage would increase in a fragmented Syria, which in turn could help it maintain its influence in the country.^[iii] For the moment, the interim government in Syria is willing to temporarily legitimise the continued use by Russia of its bases in Syria, to extract concessions from the Kremlin. How this plays out remains to be seen.

Turkey is opposed to the Russian bases and views them as an obstacle to Syria achieving full national sovereignty. The regime change in Syria is also a setback for Iran, which has lost considerable influence. Its ability to support Hezbollah in Lebanon has been reduced. Israel, on the other hand, has strengthened its hold over the Golan Heights and, in conjunction with the Druze, has the capacity to extend its influence up to Damascus. For the U.S. and Western Europe, an economic deal would be viewed as a conflict resolution measure. They could also use the situation in Syria as a bargaining chip, offering concessions in Ukraine for a Russian withdrawal from Syria. Regardless of what the future holds, Syria has become a bargaining chip. The actors are the U.S., Turkey, Russia, Israel, Iran and Western Europe. The country could be carved up to accommodate the interests of the major powers.

The India-Pakistan conflict following the dastardly attack by Pakistan-based and supported terrorists has also set in motion a new set of dynamics. Pakistan was forced to seek a ceasefire within four days after its air-defence capability was severely degraded. President Trump claimed credit for the ceasefire, stating that he offered trade deals to stop the war. India debunked his claim. There is friction in India-US relations, not so much because India debunked the US President’s claim, but because India is charting its own foreign policy, in consonance with its interests, rather than seeking to please the US. A different set of dynamics is now playing out, with Pakistan cosying up to the US. India will not change its policy of strategic autonomy, regardless of the carrot of a trade deal, which, in any case, has not been offered.

While India-US relations have been strained, the long-term impact is likely to be contained. India’s interests in the Indo-Pacific converge, and neither country will want to allow the relationship to deteriorate. Temporary tensions, especially with respect to the steep tariffs imposed by the US on India, are a dampener, but India will ride the storm. Eventually, long-term interests will triumph over short-term gains. In this game of shifting geopolitical alliances, India must continue to maintain its focus on the Prime Minister’s 2047 Vision Statement. If India is to be a developed country by then, supporting its strategic autonomy is essential. The crosswinds blowing will have to be deftly navigated without giving in to the dictates of any power.

Author Brief Bio: Maj. Gen. Dhruv C. Katoch (Retd.) is a third-generation officer of the Indian Army with nearly four decades of distinguished service. An alumnus of Sherwood College, Nainital, the National Defence Academy, Khadakvasla, the Defence Services Staff College, Wellington; the Higher Command Course, Mhow; and the National Defence College, New Delhi, he holds an MPhil in Defence Studies from Madras University and was conferred a Doctor of Philosophy (Honoris Causa) by Indira Gandhi University, Rewari, in 2016. He regularly speaks on national security, defence, and foreign policy issues at conferences, on news channels, and in academic forums. He has edited/co-edited eight books and contributed chapters to over a dozen publications. His articles have been published in leading defence journals, magazines, and newspapers. He has served as the Director of the Centre for Land Warfare Studies (CLAWS), the Indian Army’s premier think tank and is presently the Director of India Foundation

 
References:

^[i] https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/us-russian-officials-discussed-energy-deals-alongside-latest-ukraine-peace-talks-2025-08-26/

^[ii] https://www.consultancy.eu/news/12340/the-armenia-azerbaijan-peace-deal-aims-to-end-decades-of-conflict

^[iii] https://www.mei.edu/publications/russias-military-presence-post-assad-syria-growing-security-liability-undermining