11th Katha Session “Pirate Gods of the Caribbean”
The 11th Katha Session was held at the India Foundation office on 26 February 2026 on the theme “Pirate Gods of the Caribbean.” The session was chaired by Mr. Côme Carpentier, Distinguished Fellow, India Foundation and witnessed the participation of 32 attendees.
The session was delivered by Ms. Ewa Sapieżyńska, a Polish–Norwegian writer, journalist, and scholar of Latin American studies. She holds a PhD in Social Sciences from Universidad de Chile and has written extensively on Latin America for publications in Norway and Poland.
In her presentation, Ms. Sapieżyńska focused on the religious and cultural traditions of Cuba and Venezuela. She explained how African deities became associated with Catholic saints through the process of religious syncretism, leading to the development of traditions such as Santería. She also discussed how the pantheon of saints has continued to evolve over time, incorporating political and historical figures alongside traditional religious icons.
The session provided participants with insights into the historical and cultural connections between Africa, Latin America, and Christianity in the Caribbean region. The presentation was followed by an interactive discussion, during which attendees engaged with the speaker on various aspects of religion, culture, and identity in Cuba and Venezuela.
IF-IHC Panel Discussion on New Regimes in Bangladesh and Myanmar: India’s Eastern Front at the Crossroads
India Foundation, in collaboration with India Habitat Centre, organised a panel discussion on “New Regimes in Bangladesh and Myanmar: India’s Eastern Front at the Crossroads?” at Gulmohar Hall, India Habitat Centre, New Delhi, on 18 February 2026. The session was moderated by Rami Niranjan Desai, Distinguished Fellow, India Foundation and featured Shri Rajinder Khanna, Former Additional National Security Advisor of India; Professor Sreeradha Datta, Professor, Jindal School of International Affairs, O.P. Jindal Global University; Shree Gautam Mukhopadhyaya, former Ambassador of India to Syria, Afghanistan & Myanmar.
The discussion started by examining Myanmar’s internal political situation, noting that recent elections held under military control lacked legitimacy due to the exclusion of opposition parties and the coercive environment in which the elections took place. It was also mentioned that these elections were unlikely to change the reality on the ground significantly, and the resistance against the military regime remains widespread and deeply rooted in society, including by the pro-democracy groups and ethnic armed organisations that continue to challenge the regime, even with limited coordination and resources, thereby reflecting a greater demand for democratic governance and federal restructuring.
A major concern raised during the conversation was the role of external actors, especially China. It was pointed out that China has intervened strategically to protect its economic and geopolitical interests, influencing developments on the ground and complicating the conflict dynamics. It was suggested that India should rethink its approach, engage more actively with a broader range of stakeholders in Myanmar instead of just focusing on the regime.
The discussion then turned to Bangladesh’s recent elections. It was argued that although the electoral process was relatively orderly and used modern technology, it was not inclusive due to the absence of major opposition parties; there were concerns about the legitimacy and long-term stability of the political system due to the exclusion of key opposition groups, but the voter turnout, especially among young people, was significant, showing ongoing political engagement. It was also noted that social media is becoming an influential factor in shaping political narratives, often leading to misinformation and polarisation. Despite this, Bangladesh continues to focus on economic growth and regional cooperation, expanding its diplomatic ties beyond traditional partners.
The panel also explored the implications of these events for India, emphasising that political changes in neighbouring countries can offer chances for extremist groups or foreign powers to increase their influence, making it crucial to maintain strong intelligence cooperation, effective border management, and ongoing diplomatic engagement. Although Bangladesh is trying to balance its relations with various global actors, India remains an important partner in trade, connectivity, and security.
At the end of the discussion, the panelists concluded that the ongoing political changes in Bangladesh and Myanmar present both challenges and opportunities for India. As these countries go through complex transitions, a balanced and forward-looking strategy based on cooperation, engagement, and strategic awareness will be key to ensuring regional stability and strengthening India’s eastern frontier.
RSS@100: Centenary Reflections by Dr David Frawley
As part of the ongoing lecture series “RSS @100: Centenary Reflections,” organised by India Foundation during the centenary year of the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), a special lecture was delivered by Dr. David Frawley on 16 February 2026. The series seeks to promote informed academic discussion on the history, ideology, and societal contributions of the RSS through interactions with distinguished scholars and practitioners.
David Frawley reflected on his intellectual and spiritual journey from the United States to India, explaining how his early exposure to Indian philosophy, yoga, and Vedic literature shaped his understanding of Indian civilization. He described his study of Sanskrit texts, his engagement with institutions associated with Sri Aurobindo, Ayurveda, and Hindu thought, and his interactions with several RSS leaders over the decades.
Speaking about the RSS, Frawley characterized it as a service-oriented organization dedicated to preserving and promoting India’s civilizational values. He argued that the RSS has contributed not only through social service activities but also by fostering cultural continuity, education, and intellectual engagement. According to him, the organization has played an important role in maintaining and strengthening India’s cultural identity during periods of political and social change. He also highlighted the global influence of Indian traditions such as yoga, Ayurveda, and Vedanta, noting that interest in these traditions continues to grow across different parts of the world.
Looking ahead, Frawley stressed the importance of strengthening civilizational confidence among younger generations and integrating Indian philosophical traditions more deeply into education and public discourse. He argued that India possesses intellectual and spiritual resources that can help address contemporary global challenges, including those arising from rapid technological and social change. Concluding his remarks, he expressed optimism about the future of the RSS and India’s broader civilizational resurgence, emphasizing the need to preserve traditional knowledge while engaging constructively with the modern world.
The lecture was attended by scholars, researchers, policy professionals, and members of the academic community.



Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP): China’s Centrality & India’s Geo-Economic Dilemma
High-Level Policy Dialogue: Electrifying Sectors, Greening Electricity
On January 29, 2026, India Foundation, in collaboration with Dalberg Advisors, hosted a “High-Level Policy Dialogue on Electrifying Sectors, Greening Electricity,” at the Leela Palace, New Delhi. Attended by over 30 representatives of industry, think tanks, and philanthropic foundations, the Policy Dialogue, underscored the need and pathways to the electrification of crucial sectors of the economy, and the combination of the goals of electrification with decarbonisation and India’s net-zero target. It featured the participation of Shri Pralhad Joshi, the Honourable Minister of New & Renewable Energy; and Consumer Affairs, Food & Public Distribution, Government of India, as the Chief Guest. Shri Ghanshyam Prasad, Chairperson, Central Electricity Authority, Government of India, joined the convening as the Guest of Honour.

The discussions commenced with outlining the goals envisaged by the Draft National Electricity Policy, 2026, viz. industrial competitiveness, affordability, and sustainability, while achieving expanded transmission networks, reliability, and increasing the reliance on renewable energy to 500 GW. The discussions underscored the distinction between states relying on hydrocarbons to fulfill their energy requirements, and states that have transitioned to electricity. While India retained the characteristics of a petro-state, it was suggested that the direction of policy to make it an electro-state is unmistakable, as revealed by its ambitious electrification agenda, encompassing terrestrial logistics, electric mobility, and the solarisation of agriculture production and processing.
Despite clear direction in policy towards electrification and decarbonisation, challenges abound. The policy thrust towards renewables has not translated into quicker decarbonisation and capacity generation of renewables, in stark contrast to the Chinese experience. Not only has the consumption of hydrocarbons increased; but shifting to renewable energy sources has not been accompanied by efficiencies and affordability. The micro-,small-, and medium-scale enterprises continue to rely on traditional sources of energy, and renewables have not tapped India’s rural economy. Although the exposure to climate assets has ballooned, transitions have increased the debt of the utility. Long approval windows and poor inter-state coordination have hampered electricity transmission and modernisation projects. The gap between the transmission and generation of electricity owes to the paucity of demand.
However, the discussants noted with optimism that India has been continuously outperforming on its energy transition targets. Optimising its vast solar potential, over 132 GW of installed capacity is being followed by 80 GW, which is currently in the pipeline. By 2030, India foresees an investment of USD 350 billion in the electrification of its sectors and energy transition. 5,00,000 sq/km oft transmission lines have already been set up, though the state transmission and reliability of discoms need to be improved. India has taken significant steps towards grid stabilisation and integration, allowing load-sharing. Investments worth INR 90,000 crores in green corridors will help achieve the concerns of a sustainable transition. The proliferation of data centres and electric mobility will push the demand for power near an 8-9% CAGR, which will inevitably impel robust and dynamic plans for achieving adequacy.
The event ended on a note of cautious optimism, emphasising that, at the current stage of development, stability of grids and achieving a balance between electrical and hydrocarbon-led energy is paramount. Dynamism in approach and implementation needs to be coupled with a more comprehensive participation of states in grid stabilisation and its sustainable transition. Building access, affordability, and adaptability, alongside boosting capabilities in grid storage and hydro-power potential will ensure a just, timely, and economically and environmentally sustainable transition.

Naxal Security Tracker 2025
RSS @100: Centenary Reflections
As part of the centenary year of the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), India Foundation launched the lecture series “RSS @100: Centenary Reflections” to facilitate academic discussions on the organisation’s hundred-year journey.
The series aims to encourage informed reflection on the historical, ideological, and societal dimensions of the RSS by bringing together scholars, researchers, and practitioners who have either been associated with the organisation or have studied it extensively.
The inaugural lecture was held on 29 January 2026 at the India Foundation office. The session featured Mr. Walter Anderson, renowned author and scholar, whose work on the RSS is widely recognised for its depth and academic rigor. During the discussion, Mr. Anderson shared insights from his long-standing research on the organization. The lecture provided participants with an opportunity to engage with the historical trajectory of the RSS and discuss its continued relevance in contemporary India.
Walter Anderson reflected on his long academic engagement with the RSS, which began in the late 1960s while researching the organisation for his dissertation. He noted that many scholars at the time underestimated the future growth of the RSS, whereas his mentors believed it would become an influential institution. Drawing from his interactions with senior RSS leaders such as Eknath Ranade, M.S. Golwalkar, and later Mohan Bhagwat, Anderson argued that the RSS should be understood not merely as a political organisation but as a social institution that has focused on building networks, community spaces, and organisational discipline. He identified three key elements that shaped the RSS: a strong organisational structure, a shared ideological commitment often expressed through patriotism, and a dedicated cadre of full-time workers who sustain its activities.
Anderson highlighted the concept of the shakha as a social space where individuals from different backgrounds can interact and develop a sense of community. He observed that RSS leaders, particularly Golwalkar and Balasaheb Deoras, recognised social challenges such as caste divisions and sought to address them through organisational practices. He noted Deoras’ efforts to expand the organisation’s social outreach and his emphasis on issues such as untouchability and social inclusion. Anderson also discussed the RSS’s attempts to broaden its engagement with different sections of society, including rural communities, while acknowledging that outreach to Muslims and Christians remains a challenge.
Reflecting on the RSS at its centenary, Anderson argued that the organisation has evolved significantly from a small group founded in 1925 into one of the world’s largest voluntary organisations with influence across education, labour, social service, and politics. He noted that while the RSS has become more visible and politically influential, it continues to function through internal consultation and debate rather than strict top-down decision-making.
The session witnessed the participation of scholars, researchers, and members of the policy and academic community.

10th Katha Session “Ghosts of Thailand”
10th Katha Session of India Foundation was held on 29 January 2026 on the theme “Ghosts of Thailand.”
The session was chaired by Mr. Côme Carpentier, Distinguished Fellow, India Foundation. The speaker for the session was Mr. Putt Punyagupta, a Thai Nehru-Fulbright Scholar currently spending a year in India.
During the session, Mr. Punyagupta introduced participants to Thailand’s rich traditions of folklore, ghost stories, and supernatural beliefs. He discussed the cultural significance of ghosts in Thai society and explained how these narratives continue to influence local customs, religious practices, and popular culture. The presentation also explored the relationship between traditional beliefs and Buddhism in shaping Thai cultural life.
Mr. Punyagupta also shared insights from his academic and cultural experiences, bringing a unique perspective to the discussion.
Virtual Roundtable Discussion on “Sovereign AI and the US-India Strategic Partnership”
On January 29, 2026, India Foundation and the Hudson Institute co-hosted a closed-door virtual roundtable discussion on “Sovereign AI and the US-India Strategic Partnership.”
The distinguished speakers were Shri Jayant Sinha, Former Minister of State for Civil Aviation and Finance, Government of India; Mr. Pablo Chavez, Adjunct Senior Fellow with CNAS’s Technology and National Security Program and former Vice President of Google Cloud’s global public policy; and Shri Sujeet Kumar, Member of Parliament (Rajya Sabha). The discussion was held under the Chatham House Rule and was attended by 25 participants.



IF-IHC Book Discussion on ‘After Me, Chaos: Astrology in the Mughal Empire’
India Foundation, in collaboration with India Habitat Centre, organised a book discussion on the book After Me, Chaos: Astrology in the Mughal Empire by Shri M. J. Akbar, Author & Former Union Minister, Government of India, at the India Habitat Centre, New Delhi, on 21st January 2026. The session was moderated by Captain Alok Bansal, Executive Vice President, India Foundation. The panel featured Shri Sudhanshu Trivedi, Member of Parliament (Rajya Sabha); Ms. Shazia Ilmi, National Spokesperson, Bharatiya Janata Party; and Mr. Come Carpentier, Distinguished Fellow, India Foundation. The discussion examined the intersections of science, governance, and civilisational knowledge in Mughal India, with a focus on reassessing historical narratives surrounding astrology and statecraft.
The panel deliberated on the commonly held perception that astrology and Mughal governance were incompatible and highlighted how astrological knowledge was institutionally embedded within imperial administration. Drawing on primary sources such as the Ain-i-Akbari, Baburnama, Humayunama, Akbarnama, and Tuzuk-i-Jahangiri, speakers noted that astrology informed key decisions, including coronations, military campaigns, succession planning, and court rituals. Extensive astrological references in Mughal chronicles were cited as evidence of its formal role in governance.
A key focus of the discussion was the transmission of Indian astronomical knowledge—particularly Aryabhata-based methods—into Mughal administrative practice. The panelists highlighted the establishment of formal positions such as Jyotishraj and the inclusion of Sanskrit-trained scholars, underscoring a synthesis of Indic, Persian, and Islamic intellectual traditions rather than rigid religious compartmentalisation.
The discussion also addressed how colonial and ideological historiography selectively marginalised astrology in Mughal narratives despite its prominence in original sources. Beyond administrative use, astrology was discussed as a philosophical framework that encouraged humility, detachment, and an understanding of natural order within governance. The session concluded with a consensus that After Me, Chaos restores nuance and complexity to India’s historical understanding and reinforces the idea of knowledge as a shared civilisational inheritance shaped by continuity, assimilation, and intellectual exchange.
KUMBH – Global Summit 2025 – ON DEVELOPMENT AND SUSTAINABILITY
IF-IHC PANEL DISCUSSION ON INDIA’S SUCCESS IN CURBING LEFT – WING EXTREMISM
India Foundation, in collaboration with India Habitat Centre, organised a panel discussion on ‘India’s Success in Curbing Left-Wing Extremism’ at the India Habitat Centre, New Delhi on 6th January 2026. The panel featured Shri Rajiv Gauba, Former Cabinet Secretary, Government of India and Member, NITI Aayog; Shri Pankaj Kumar Singh, Former Deputy National Security Advisor of India; and Shri Shekhar Gupta, Editor-in-Chief, The Print. The discussion was moderated by Shri Alok Bansal, Executive Vice President, India Foundation.
The panel deliberated on India’s multi-pronged approach to tackling Left-Wing Extremism, highlighting improvements in security operations, governance outreach, development interventions, and the importance of winning public trust in affected regions. The discussion offered valuable insights into the evolution of the LWE threat and the strategies that have significantly weakened it in recent years.
The panelists traced the origins of Left-Wing Extremism to the late 1960s and highlighted how governance gaps, socio-economic deprivation, and ideological mobilisation allowed Maoist groups to expand across large parts of central and eastern India. Drawing on first-hand administrative and operational experience, they recalled the gravity of the situation during the early 2000s, when large areas were effectively outside state control, marked by frequent attacks on security forces, civilian casualties, and systematic destruction of infrastructure.
A key focus of the discussion was the decisive shift after 2014-15, when the government adopted a comprehensive national policy and action plan. The panelists emphasised the effectiveness of a “whole-of-government” approach that combined robust security measures with focused development interventions. Expansion of road and telecom connectivity, establishment of forward security camps, welfare delivery through flagship schemes, implementation of forest rights, and strengthening of state police capacities were identified as crucial elements in reversing Maoist influence.
The panelists also underscored the importance of improved intelligence gathering, inter-state coordination, deployment of specialised forces, and sustained action against the financial and urban support networks of extremist groups. These efforts, they noted, have led to a sharp decline in violence, casualties, and the number of affected districts. The discussion concluded with a consensus that while the security gains are substantial, lasting peace will depend on sustained governance reforms, protection of tribal rights, accountability of institutions, and continued vigilance to prevent the resurgence of extremist ideologies.
January-February 2026: India Foundation Journal
From Strategic Depth to Strategic Nightmare: The Collapse of Pakistan-Afghanistan Relations
In the last quarter of 2025, Afghanistan’s Taliban regime performed a political backflip and raced to repair and strengthen strategic and economic ties with India. By far the most striking overture came from Industry and Commerce Minister Nooruddin Azizi, who urged the Afghan Hindu and Sikh community, which had fled to India, to return, stating that the country needed their skills, particularly in healthcare and trade.[1] Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi, the first high-ranking official to visit India in October 2025, met senior Sikh and Hindu community members and assured them of their safety and the rebuilding of their places of worship. It may be recalled that after a deadly attack on a gurdwara in 2022, the Sikh Gurdwara Management Committee in Delhi had urged the Government of India to evacuate the remaining Sikh families from Afghanistan.
New Delhi opened a new chapter in the old ‘Great Game’ on 9 October 2025, recognising the Taliban regime in a masterly act of realpolitik and inviting Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi to visit India. Muttaqi secured a temporary exemption from UN sanctions and arrived directly from Russia, the only country to have fully recognised the regime to date. Thus, Russia, China and India are friendly towards Afghanistan, while Pakistan is inimical. The United States, having ousted Prime Minister Imran Khan, needs Pakistan to help it secure the Bagram airbase again, which it needs to exert pressure on the Iranian regime.
Muttaqi met Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov in Moscow on 7 October. Before departing for New Delhi, Lavrov emphasised, “The military presence of any extra-regional players could only lead to destabilisation and new conflicts.” The Bagram Air Base was built by the Soviet Union during its presence in Afghanistan from 1979 to 1989, and Russia has de facto control over it. [2] Journalist Natiq Malikzada observes that America needs the airbase because it overlooks China’s western Xinjiang region and its nuclear programme at Lop Nur.[3] It would strengthen America’s position vis-à-vis China, Iran, Russia, and Central and South Asia.
Strategically, Afghanistan lies at the intersection of several non-Western connectivity projects: China’s Belt and Road Initiative, Russia’s “Greater Eurasian Partnership” linked to the Eurasian Economic Union, and north-south routes linking the Caspian Sea to the Indian Ocean. Beijing has been working on a Kabul-Islamabad channel to expand the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). By formally recognising the Taliban, Russia secured a foothold in Central Asia’s transport redesign. In fact, the geopolitical interests of Russia, India, and China align in Afghanistan and across the broader Central Asia.
By befriending the Taliban regime, India offset Islamabad’s ties with Dhaka. It signalled to Washington that, following the erasure of its legacy in Bangladesh and Nepal and the return of Pakistan to Dhaka, India would pursue its strategic interests in the region. India has recovered ground in Sri Lanka.
US President Donald Trump’s enthusiastic embrace of Pakistan’s army chief, General Asim Munir, who has already visited the White House three times, came as a shock to New Delhi. Washington is offering Rawalpindi air-to-air missiles for F-16 fighter jets and other equipment, and Pakistan has invited the US to build and operate a new seaport near Iran’s Gwadar, on the same Makran coast. India, however, is being subjected to punitive visa norms, 50 per cent tariffs, and pressure to repudiate the purchase of Russian oil, among other measures.
During Muttaqi’s meeting with Foreign Minister S. Jaishankar, India upgraded its “Technical Mission” in Kabul to an Embassy (October 10, 2025) and allowed the regime to take charge of the Afghan embassy in New Delhi. Unsurprisingly, Pakistan launched airstrikes on Kabul while the delegation was in New Delhi.[4] However, by October 12, 2025, Afghan forces retaliated with airstrikes on Lahore, using US Super Tucano jets left behind during the American exodus. Afghans attacked 27 locations along the border, including Paktia, Khost, Jalalabad, Helmand, Kunar, and the Durand Line, and claimed to have killed 58 Pakistani soldiers (Pakistan admitted 23 dead). Saudi Arabia urged restraint but declined Islamabad’s request to join the hostilities, clarifying that the new defence pact between the two nations was limited to operations against the Houthis of Yemen.
Muttaqi asserted, “Afghanistan will safeguard its borders and its national interest… We achieved our military objectives last night, and our friends, Qatar and Saudi Arabia, have expressed that this conflict should come to an end, so we have paused it from our side for the time being…” He denied that Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) cadres are present in Afghanistan. Despite agreeing to extend the 48-hour ceasefire, the Taliban claimed that Islamabad carried out airstrikes along the Durand Line, killing eight citizens, including three Afghan cricketers, in the Urgun and Bermal districts.
During a second high-level visit to New Delhi on 20 November 2025, Afghanistan’s Commerce and Industries Minister Alhaj Nooruddin Azizi announced that Kabul had halted all transit trade through Karachi and was shifting its global access to the India-backed Chabahar route.[5] Leading a business delegation at the PHD Chamber of Commerce and Industry (PHDCCI), he urged the Indian private sector to invest in the route to make it viable and competitive. Addressing the Associated Chambers of Commerce and Industry of India (ASSOCHAM), Azizi offered the country’s long-idle mines to India for exploration, particularly the gold mines.[6] New Delhi has expressed interest in the mining sector.
A joint study by the Pentagon and the US Geological Survey found that Afghanistan has nearly USD 1 trillion in untapped mineral resources, including copper, gold, iron ore, chromite, barite, coal, lead, natural gas, petroleum, precious and semi-precious stones, salt, sulphur, lithium, talc, and zinc, across more than 1,400 sites. The gemstones include high-quality emeralds, lapis lazuli, red garnet, and ruby. These deposits were surveyed decades ago but never developed.
Accusing Pakistan of blocking trade routes for political purposes, Afghanistan’s Deputy Prime Minister for Economic Affairs, Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, advised Afghan traders to reduce trade with Pakistan and conclude all deals with pharmaceutical firms within three months. Afghanistan’s leading pharmaceutical company, Raoufi Global Group, and Zydus Lifesciences Limited of India signed a USD 100 million memorandum of understanding in Dubai on 27 November 2025.[7] Zydus Life Sciences will export medicines to Afghanistan and help transfer technical know-how for domestic drug production.
Afghanistan has also stopped exporting tomatoes and other vegetables to Pakistan and redirected vegetable and fruit sales to Russia, Uzbekistan, and other countries. Once the largest buyer of Pakistani rice, Afghanistan will now purchase rice from India.
These diplomatic moves have neutralised Pakistan’s strategy of keeping the Taliban hostile to India. Under the Karzai and Ghani regimes, India built dams, power lines, roads, schools, and even the Parliament building as goodwill gestures to the Afghan people. The Taliban, however, aligned with Pakistan and bombed the Indian embassy in Kabul (July 2008), kidnapped Indian engineers (2019), and allowed ISI-backed terror groups to operate camps on its soil.
Under Prime Minister Narendra Modi, India completed all existing projects and provided food and medicines as needed. In 2021, India quietly reopened its embassy to facilitate the shipment of wheat to the country. In his meeting with S. Jaishankar on 10 October 2025, Muttaqi recalled, “Over the past four years, and particularly during the earthquakes, India was the first country to respond. Afghanistan looks at India as a close friend. We want a relationship based on mutual respect and people-to-people ties.” In the joint statement issued at the end of his visit, Muttaqi condemned the terrorist attacks on Pahalgam in Kashmir; both sides reaffirmed support for each other’s territorial integrity.
Professor Mohammad Ayoob of Michigan State University, US, notes that although Pakistan created the Taliban movement in the 1990s, supported its war with the US-backed regime in Kabul, and expected the Taliban’s 2021 takeover of Afghanistan to provide it with strategic depth, the recent clashes along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border showed that the Taliban had turned against its mentors.[8] On deeper reflection, the amicable relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan were “an aberration”, and Kabul had opposed Pakistan’s membership in the UN because of the Durand Line, which divides the Pashtun homelands.
Jaishankar symbolically gifted five ambulances to his Afghan counterpart as part of a larger gift of 20 ambulances and other medical equipment to support the Afghan people. These include MRI and CT scanners, vaccines for immunisation, and cancer medicines. Six new health projects will be finalised later, and drug rehabilitation materials will be provided through the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC).
India has promised to help reconstruct homes destroyed in the Kunar and Nangarhar earthquakes, as well as residences for forcibly repatriated Afghan refugees (from Pakistan), and to support the rebuilding of their livelihoods. India has pledged to maintain and complete existing projects in Afghanistan and to discuss new development priorities identified by Afghan authorities. The two nations will collaborate on water management and irrigation projects.
The India-Afghanistan Air Freight Corridor will support increased trade and commerce between the two countries. India has increased scholarships and university places for Afghan students and offered to support Afghan cricket and other sports. The new visa module (since April 2025) will issue more medical, business, and student visas for Afghan citizens. The two nations reaffirmed their joint resolve to combat cross-border terrorism in all its forms.
A positive outcome of Muttaqi’s visit is enhanced connectivity, with direct flights from Mumbai, Delhi, and Amritsar to Kabul and Kandahar, among other routes. Lauding the increased flights between Kabul and Delhi, Muttaqi said, “An agreement was also reached on trade and economy… We also invited the Indian side to invest, particularly in minerals, agriculture, and sports. We also discussed the Chabahar port… We also requested the opening of the Wagah border as it is the fastest and easiest trade route between India and Afghanistan…”
However, noting continued tensions on the Wagah border, Aam Aadmi Party MP Vikramjit Singh Sahney[9] said, “The biggest game changer is that His Excellency and the Indian government have agreed that flights from Amritsar to Kabul will begin. Pakistan is not letting the Attari-Wagah land route open, and Afghan drivers are not being allowed to come here in trucks. This is our way to fight this…”
Interestingly, soon after the recent border clashes, the Taliban supreme leader, Mawlawi Hibatullah Akhundzada, ordered the Ministry of Water to build dams on the Kunar (Chitral river in Pakistan), which could reduce the flow of water to Pakistan’s northwestern region.[10] With India moving to check the Indus waters, Pakistan could find itself in a tight corner.
Istanbul talks
For many years, Indian generals and strategic analysts have warned of a possible two-front war with Pakistan and China. Now, with Washington forcing New Delhi to improve ties with Beijing, which is being pressured on multiple fronts, it is Islamabad that fears a two-front war with India and Afghanistan! Given the new tensions between Pakistan and Afghanistan, the peace talks between the two countries in Istanbul were crucial.
The Istanbul peace talks collapsed dramatically on 28 October 2025 over US drone operations and cross-border terrorism.[11] The stunned mediators from Qatar and Turkey struggled to continue the dialogue, but to no avail.
The immediate trigger was the Pakistani delegation’s admission that Islamabad has a firm agreement with the US allowing drone operations from Pakistani territory. This enraged the Afghan side, which demanded assurances that Pakistan would not allow US drones to violate Afghan airspace. Although initially agreeable, the Pakistani delegation recanted after an “unknown phone call” from Islamabad and said they had no control over American drones or the activities of the Islamic State (Daesh). The Qatari and Turkish mediators described the breakdown as “sabotage by design.”
Major General Shahab Aslam, head of the Special Operations Division of the ISI and head of the Pakistani delegation, demanded that the Afghan Taliban “summon and control” all groups operating against Pakistan, including the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). The Afghan side countered that TTP members were Pakistani nationals and that Kabul had no authority over them.
The failure of the Istanbul talks stalled the peace process and heightened the risk of military confrontation along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border. Afghan sources warned that any future Pakistani strikes would be met with “reciprocal action” against Islamabad. Pakistan’s Defence Minister Khawaja Asif accused Kabul of acting as New Delhi’s tool.[12] Appearing on Geo News’ primetime show Aaj Shahzeb Khanzada ke Saath, Asif said the Afghanistan-Pakistan negotiations in Turkey collapsed after four or five reversals by the Afghan side. He accused Kabul’s power brokers of sabotaging progress under India’s influence.
Mohammad Suhail Shaheen, the Islamic Emirate’s ambassador to Qatar and a member of the negotiating team in Istanbul, said that Islamabad requested that the Islamic Emirate guarantee no security incidents on Pakistani soil, but the Afghan delegation asserted that each country is solely responsible for its own security.[13] Shaheen said Pakistan was trying to blame the Afghan government for an attack by a former CIA asset of Afghan origin in Washington and for a drone strike against Chinese citizens in Tajikistan, though most of the attacks destabilising the region are organised by Pakistan. Kabul denied that the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) operates from Afghan territory or organises attacks inside Pakistan. After the talks failed, Pakistan reopened the Torkham crossing on 01 November 2025 to allow Afghan nationals who had taken refuge in Pakistan to return home.
Afghanistan has shrugged off Western sanctions and purchased oil directly from Russia. The first fuel-loaded train arrived in Herat on 07 December 2025, after which the authorities announced plans to expand trade and build partnerships without middlemen. This is a significant geopolitical statement against Islamabad’s practice of using trade corridors for political leverage. By diversifying its trade partners, Kabul is mitigating Pakistan’s dominance over its economy.
In the third high-level visit to India in less than three months, the Afghan public health minister, Noor Jalal Jalali, arrived in the capital (Dec 16, 2025) to strengthen health cooperation, exchange expertise, and coordinate joint efforts.[14] The discussions are expected to focus on capacity-building for Afghan health workers, the import of quality medicines and medical equipment, and other health-related cooperation. In November, India delivered 63,734 doses of influenza and meningococcal vaccines, 73 tonnes of life-saving medicines, vaccines, and essential supplements to Kabul to help meet the healthcare needs of the population.
The Taliban regime values India for the humanitarian and health assistance provided despite political turbulence. Kabul is now looking forward to the arrival of an Indian ambassador, even as the border crossings between Afghanistan and Pakistan remain firmly closed. General Zia ul-Haq’s dream of strategic depth in Afghanistan, which mesmerised the military leadership for over three decades, has become a bitter nightmare for Pakistan.
Author Brief Bio: Sandhya Jain is a political analyst, independent researcher, and author of multiple books. She is also editor of the platform Vijayvaani.
References:
1] “Taliban Commerce Minister Urges Afghan Sikh and Hindu Communities to Return.” Afghanistan International, 21 Nov. 2025, www.afintl.com/en/202511218042.
2] Russia Hosts Taliban Delegation and Warns Against Foreign Military Presence in Afghanistan | Military.com. 7 Oct. 2025, www.military.com/daily-news/2025/10/07/russia-hosts-taliban-delegation-and-warns-against-foreign-military-presence-afghanistan.html.
3] Malikzada, Natiq. “The Case for an American Bagram Air Base.” The National Interest, 5 Oct. 2025, nationalinterest.org/blog/silk-road-rivalries/the-case-for-an-american-bagram-air-base.
4] “Taliban FM begins first visit by senior Afghan leader to India since 2021.” Al Jazeera, 9 Oct. 2025, www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/10/9/taliban-fm-begins-first-visit-by-senior-afghan-leader-to-india-since-2021
5] “Afghan Commerce Minister Urges Expanded Use of Chabahar Port, Says Govt. Considering Five-Year Tax Exemption for Arriving Industries.” The Hindu, 20 Nov. 2025, www.thehindu.com/news/international/afghan-commerce-minister-urges-expanded-use-of-chabahar-port-says-govt-considering-five-year-tax-exemption-for-arriving-industries/article70307544.ece
6] “Afghanistan Offers Idle Mining Sites to India; Assocham Urges Caution on Geological Challenges.” The Tribune, 24 Nov. n.d., www.tribuneindia.com/news/business/afghanistan-offers-idle-mining-sites-to-india-assocham-urges-caution-on-geological-challenges/.
7] “$100 Million Boost for India-Afghanistan Trade Marks Setback for Pakistan.” NDTV, 22 Dec. 2025, www.ndtv.com/world-news/100-million-boost-for-india-afghanistan-trade-marks-setback-for-pakistan-9713380
8] “Why Pakistan and Afghanistan Turned on Each Other.” The National Interest, nationalinterest.org/blog/silk-road-rivalries/why-pakistan-and-afghanistan-turned-on-each-other.
9] “Sahney Reveals Amritsar-Kabul Flights as Strategic Move to Counter Pakistan’s Blockade.” MSN, 23 Oct. 2025, www.msn.com/en-in/news/India/aap-mp-sahney-reveals-amritsar-kabul-flights-as-strategic-move-to-counter-pakistan-s-blockade/vi-AA1OnRYl
10] “Afghanistan to Construct Dams on Kunar River Following Border Clashes with Pakistan.” News on AIR, All India Radio, 24 Oct. 2025, www.newsonair.gov.in/afghanistan-to-construct-dams-on-kunar-river-following-border-clashes-with-pakistan/
11] “Pak-Afghan Peace Talks Fail amid US Drone Dispute, Diplomatic Meltdown in Istanbul.” NDTV.com, 22 Dec. 2025, www.ndtv.com/world-news/pakistan-afghanistan-peace-talks-fail-amid-us-drone-dispute-diplomatic-meltdown-in-istanbul-9533115.
12] “Pakistan’s Khawaja Asif Accuses Kabul of Being India’s Puppet, Vows Revenge.” India Today, 29 Oct. 2025, www.indiatoday.in/world/story/pakistans-khawaja-asif-accuses-kabul-of-being-indias-puppet-vows-revenge-glbs-2809917-2025-10-29
13] Ariana News. “IEA Rejected Pakistan’S Demand for Security Guarantees: Shaheen | Ariana News | Afghanistan News.” Ariana News, 1 Nov. 2025, www.ariananews.af/iea-rejected-pakistans-demand-for-security-guarantees-shaheen.
14] Azizi, Ahmad. “Taliban Health Minister Visits India as Contacts Deepen.” Amu TV, 16 Dec. 2025, amu.tv/216277.
