THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP OF COUNTRIES such as India and the United States (US) has become the most significant influence on their national and international responses to global climate issues as these problems continue to intensify. Both are among the largest democracies, as well as major contributors to greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. India is currently the third-largest emitter, with an increasing per capita contribution, while the US is the historical leader in cumulative emissions. Their climate politics, therefore, not only have an effect on domestic policy but also set a precedent for global cooperation (United Nations, 2026). The necessity of this leadership is underlined by common vulnerabilities, including extreme weather, biodiversity loss and economic instability. These require a careful balance between developmental priorities and sustainable practices. This paper reviews how governance ideologies, institutional structures and international interactions in these countries have evolved under their leaders. These include the Indian Prime Minister, Narendra Modi, and successive US administrations, from Donald Trump to Joe Biden, and again to Donald Trump in his second term, which began in 2025. Through these dynamics, the paper emphasises the interplay between domestic agendas and global imperatives. It also identifies opportunities for visionary leadership to build climate resilience amid increasing risks (Goniewicz et al., 2025).
The climate politics of India under Modi’s governance is one such example, as national development priorities are merged with environmental ones, and developmental equity and sustainable growth are regarded as the primary concerns. India’s climate policy rests on the National Action Plan on Climate Change (NAPCC), which was launched in 2008. Ever since taking office in 2014, the Modi administration has carried it forward, with a focus on missions such as solar energy expansion and sustainable agriculture. This is an indication of a dedication to the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities (CBDR). Under this principle, India seeks equitable sharing of responsibilities across all forums of international agreements. It holds that technology transfer and financial aid by developed countries should help India in its transition without holding back economic growth (Yadav & Kirk, 2023). India is now a constructive actor with commitments such as the “Panchamrit” announced at the 26th Conference of the Parties (COP26) to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). These include achieving net-zero by 2070 and huge renewable energy plans. India has made strong progress on these plans. In 2025, it crossed the target of 50 per cent non-fossil installed power capacity, five years ahead of the 2030 deadline. By March 2026, its renewable energy capacity stood at about 275 GW, including about 150 GW of solar and 56 GW of wind power (Press Information Bureau [PIB], 2026). In 2025, record solar and wind additions also helped India reduce fossil-based power generation for the first time this century (Fulghum et al., 2026). At the same time, coal continues to play an important role in meeting India’s growing energy needs and in supporting livelihoods in coal-producing regions. As of 2026, and in line with the current administration’s priorities in this sector, India continues to engage in strategic hedging. It participates selectively in multilateral processes while seeking diversified sources of finance and markets for decarbonisation. This progressive attitude stands in contrast to the retreat of some major economies from their climate commitments, making India a prospective leader in the norms of equity in climate change (Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change, Government of India, 2022).
