Introduction: Naming the Logic, Not the Place

A new strategic geography is taking shape along the arc stretching from India’s western seaboard, through the Arabian Sea and the Gulf, across the Levant, and into the Mediterranean. Its threads are the seaborne trade of three continents, the energy that powers them, the undersea cables that carry their data, and the financial systems that settle their transactions. Strategic discourse in India and Europe has begun to call this space the Indo-Mediterranean. In a joint statement, the leaders of India and Italy described the emergence of “what might be termed the Indo-Mediterranean, an important corridor for trade, technology, energy, data and ideas tying the Indian Ocean to Europe.”¹ The phrase is more than a diplomatic ornament. It recognises that a single band of physical geography now carries the systems on which two continents depend.

The temptation is to define this space as the Indo-Pacific’s western extension, applying the same logic of maritime competition beyond the Arabian Peninsula. This paper argues that this temptation should be resisted, as it obscures what is genuinely new about the space and therefore disarms strategy before it begins. Naming a place is the work of cartographers. Naming the logic by which a place must be understood is the work of strategy. Mahan did not name the oceans; he named sea power. Mackinder did not name Eurasia; he named the pivot. The Indo-Mediterranean does not need another mapmaker. It needs its organising logic identified.

This paper offers a logic and gives it a name: correlated risk. The argument proceeds through five propositions, each contestable and consequential. The paper claims no new theory. It applies established reasoning, drawn from reliability engineering, portfolio theory, and the scholarship on weaponised interdependence, to an emerging strategic space. Its single contribution is that application, demonstrated through the crisis of 2026.

Proposition I: A New Geography Exists, and It Is Not the Indo-Pacific

The claim that the Indo-Mediterranean is a distinct strategic geography must be earned, not asserted, because the obvious objection is that it is merely a sub-region of the Indo-Pacific or an arena of European neighbourhood policy. The distinction rests on three structural features that together give the space a logic the Indo-Pacific framing cannot capture.

The first is the absence of a hegemon. The Indo-Pacific, as a strategic construct, is organised around a single peer competitor. For the United States, India, Japan, and Australia alike, the central question is how to balance China’s rising power, and the characteristic instruments are those of balance: presence, deterrence, and alliance. The Indo-Mediterranean has no such organising pole. China is present through its commercial reach, from Indian Ocean ports to the Mediterranean terminus at Piraeus, but it is not hegemonic there; nor are the United States, the European Union, India, or the Gulf states. The space is genuinely plural: several powers of comparable but partial weight, none able to impose order.

The second feature is chokepoint density. No comparable stretch of the world’s surface concentrates so many critical maritime passages in such a confined space. The Strait of Hormuz, the Bab el-Mandeb, the approaches to the Suez Canal, and the contested waters of the eastern Mediterranean lie within a few days’ sailing of one another, and through them passes a share of the world’s energy and trade out of all proportion to their physical extent. The Indo-Pacific has its chokepoints, Malacca above all, but they are dispersed across an ocean. The Indo-Mediterranean is defined by chokepoints, strung close together along a single thread. A geography defined by the proximity of its chokepoints behaves differently under stress, because a single disturbance can affect several at once.

The third feature is the coupling of domains. Across the Indo-Mediterranean, the energy, trade, data, and financial systems do not run on parallel tracks; they run along the same physical geography. Undersea cables follow the shipping lanes through the same straits; energy flows and container traffic traverse the same passages; financial settlement tracks trade. In the wider Indo-Pacific, these systems retain some independence through sheer dispersion. In the Indo-Mediterranean, they are bundled so tightly that they constitute a single coupled system. A coupled system is defined by the fact that its parts fail together.

These three features define a category of strategic space that requires a distinct doctrine. While the Indo-Pacific asks how to balance a rival, the Indo-Mediterranean asks how to keep a coupled, chokepoint-dense system from failing all at once in a space where no one is in charge. While the Indo-Pacific rewards the accumulation of presence, the Indo-Mediterranean rewards the building of resilience. The Indo-Pacific is a balance-of-power geography. The Indo-Mediterranean is a resilience geography. They are distinct categories of strategic space, and they require different doctrines.

The structural forces shaping this geography are not transient. The gravitational shift of the world economy towards the Indian Ocean, the rewiring of the strategic map by the energy transition, the superimposition of a digital and data layer over the physical one, and the return of multipolar competition are deep currents, not cyclical fluctuations. They will not reverse with an administration or a ceasefire. The resilience geography is emerging because the foundations of the world economy, the energy system, the information order, and the balance of power are shaping it. The only open question is what logic will be brought to bear on it.

Proposition II: The Governing Logic Is Correlated Failure

If the Indo-Mediterranean is a resilience geography, its governing strategic question is how its components fail, and specifically whether they fail together. This is the heart of the paper, and it can be stated as a principle that, once seen, is hard to unsee.

The case for connectivity infrastructure rests on redundancy. If one route closes, another absorbs the traffic; alternative corridors are an insurance policy against disruption. The India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC), whose Memorandum of Understanding was signed on 9 September 2023 at the G20 summit in New Delhi by India, the United States, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, the European Union, France, Germany, and Italy, is routinely justified in exactly these terms.² But redundancy delivers resilience only if the failure modes of the alternative are independent of the risks that disable the primary. A backup that fails for the same reason, and at the same moment, as the primary provides no protection at all.

This is not a novel insight in other fields. In reliability engineering, it is known as common-cause failure: an event that causes the simultaneous failure of two or more redundant channels, thereby defeating the redundancy intended to guarantee the system.³ In portfolio theory, it is the problem of correlation, formalised by Harry Markowitz, who demonstrated that diversification reduces risk only to the extent that the assets held are not correlated with one another.⁴ A portfolio of assets that all move together is no safer than a single holding. Applied to strategic geography, the principle is simple: two routes that pass through, or depend on, the same conflict-prone zone is correlated. Building the second does not hedge the first.

There is a counterpoint worth confronting. In 1990, Edward Luttwak argued that the post-Cold War world would see “the methods of commerce” displace military methods, with “disposable capital in lieu of firepower” and “market penetration in lieu of garrisons and bases.”⁵ On that expectation, corridors would be governed by the grammar of commerce. However, the corridors of the Indo-Mediterranean have instead been weaponised. As Henry Farrell and Abraham Newman have shown, states with jurisdiction over the central nodes of global networks can exploit that position through a “chokepoint effect,” denying adversaries access to flows of energy, goods, and information.⁶ The corridor is not neutral plumbing. It is an instrument, and coercion is applied at its nodes.

The comparative evidence supports the correlated-failure reading. The Middle Corridor across the Caspian has gained relevance precisely because it offers a route independent of both Russian territory and the volatile maritime chokepoints. A World Bank assessment concluded that it could provide resilience and route diversification for China-Europe trade, thereby shielding supply chains from geopolitical shocks.⁷ By contrast, the International North-South Transport Corridor has struggled because its nodes are linked to sanctioned or conflict-prone jurisdictions in Iran and Russia, so the risks it carries are correlated with the very disruptions a hedge is meant to avoid.

Proposition III: The 2026 Crisis Was the Proof

The theoretical case became empirical in early 2026. The sequence warrants careful attention. Following the Gaza ceasefire of October 2025, the Houthis suspended their campaign against commercial shipping, and traffic through the Red Sea began to partially recover.⁸ That recovery was interrupted. On 28 February 2026, the United States and Israel launched strikes against Iran; Iran responded by attacking targets across the region and moving to close the Strait of Hormuz.⁹ The waterway was effectively shut within days. The stakes were considerable: in 2025, an average of 20 million barrels of crude oil and oil products per day moved through the strait, around one quarter of the world’s seaborne oil trade, while the Qatari and Emirati LNG passing through it represented almost one fifth of global LNG exports.¹⁰ By early April, an estimated 1,000 vessels were caught in a holding pattern in and around the Gulf.¹¹ QatarEnergy declared force majeure on long-term LNG supply contracts as Ras Laffan output was disrupted.¹² On 28 March 2026, the Houthis fired a ballistic missile at Israel, their first attack since the ceasefire, threatening the Red Sea once again.¹³ Hormuz and the Red Sea were now disrupted simultaneously, a condition without recent precedent. A conditional ceasefire was announced in April, but shipping did not recover: well into 2026, Suez Canal traffic remained roughly half of its pre-crisis peak.¹⁴

Here is the analytical point. The proposed overland alternatives within IMEC, the Levant leg linking the Gulf through Jordan and Israel to the Mediterranean, run through the very conflict zone whose instability closed the sea lanes. The corridor’s redundancy and the risk it is meant to hedge are correlated. Had the rail spine existed in February 2026, it would have failed at the same moment and for the same reason as the maritime routes it was intended to back up. The conditional phrasing is deliberate: the IMEC rail does not yet exist. That is precisely why the point is a warning about sequencing rather than a post-mortem.

The crisis also clarifies how the corridor’s benefits have been presented. The claim that IMEC will make trade between India and Europe forty per cent faster is attributed to European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen’s 2023 State of the Union address.¹⁵ The companion figure of thirty per cent lower cost has no verifiable official measurement behind it.¹⁶ Both are political projections for a route that has not been built. In a resilience geography, projected efficiency gains are worth little if they are not weighted by the independence of the route’s failure modes.

The lesson is not that the Indo-Mediterranean lacks strategic value. The diversification imperative argues powerfully for it, and the crisis once again demonstrated that concentrating the world’s energy and trade through a handful of narrow passages is a first-order fragility. The lesson is that the corridor’s value must be built on components genuinely independent of regional conflict risk, not asserted on the basis of redundancy the geography does not in fact provide. That requirement turns the logic of correlated risk into a strategy.

Proposition IV: The Strategy Is Sequencing by Independence

If correlated failure is the governing risk, the operational doctrine is to sequence investment by the product of standalone value and failure-mode independence. A component earns priority when it delivers benefit on its own, without waiting for the rest of the corridor, and when its vulnerabilities are uncorrelated with those already in place.

The corridor’s substantive agenda can be organised around six pillars: strategic security; economic integration, anchored by the free trade agreement between India and the European Union, concluded on 27 January 2026;¹⁷ digital and artificial-intelligence infrastructure; the energy transition; innovation and human capital; and adaptive governance. None of these pillars is presented as original. They synthesise established frameworks, including the G20 Principles for Quality Infrastructure Investment, endorsed at Osaka in 2019.¹⁸ The contribution lies in the ordering rule applied to them, which produces three tiers.

Tier one comprises the independent foundations, the elements that stand alone and whose failure modes are least correlated with regional conflict. The India-Gulf maritime leg is already operational; bilateral India-UAE trade reached 65 billion US dollars in 2024, supported by the intergovernmental framework agreement on IMEC, signed on 13 February 2024.¹⁹ An interoperable digital layer for trade documentation and payments can be built without laying a single rail, does not prescribe any single nation’s platform, and is largely immune to land-based conflict. The western, Mediterranean section of the Blue-Raman submarine cable is complete and in service, while its Red Sea segment has been delayed due to security risks.²⁰ Cheapest of all and highest in leverage is a permanent coordinating secretariat: the corridor still lacks one, and creating it costs almost nothing relative to the value it would unlock.

Tier two comprises conditional investments, to be made only when specified enabling conditions are met: cross-border digital identity, port-clustered manufacturing, and the exposed segments of the data-cable network. Tier three comprises what should be held in reserve: the Gulf-Levant rail spine and the cross-Israel connection, the components most correlated with regional conflict and carrying the least standalone value until the entire chain is complete. This is not an argument for abandoning them. It is an argument for hedging them by advancing alternative routings, for instance via Egypt or around the Arabian Peninsula through Oman, thereby bypassing Hormuz entirely. Atlantic Council analysts estimate that a network of such corridors could displace roughly sixty per cent of the container traffic now vulnerable to Hormuz disruption.²¹

The financing profile reinforces the point. An Atlantic Council assessment finds that IMEC faces about 5 billion US dollars in costs to become minimally operational, with costs concentrated in the Jordan-Israel segment, exactly the leg most exposed to the conflict that closed the sea lanes.²² Meanwhile, India has committed some 10 billion US dollars to port modernisation, and Saudi Arabia has pledged around 20 billion US dollars towards corridor-linked infrastructure, investments whose value does not depend on the Levant leg.²³ Sequencing by independence prevents states from pouring capital into the most vulnerable nodes first.

Proposition V: India Anchors the Order Through Independent Capability

An honest analysis must address an objection. By conventional measures, India is the weakest of the major actors in the western half of this space. Its naval reach beyond the Arabian Sea is limited; it maintains no presence in the Mediterranean; and its economic weight in the Gulf, though growing, is surpassed by China’s. If the Indo-Mediterranean were a balance-of-power geography, these facts would settle the question: India could not lead.

The resolution lies in the distinction drawn at the outset. In a balance-of-power geography, leadership flows from presence. In a resilience geography, leadership flows from providing the independent capabilities that keep the system functioning when parts of it fail. India’s position is strong. India operates digital public infrastructure at a scale few states can match, in payments, identity, and data exchange, exactly the kind of low-correlation, standalone capability that a resilience geography rewards. It provides maritime security across the Arabian Sea and the western Indian Ocean, the eastern approach on which the whole corridor depends. Through the free trade agreement of January 2026, it anchors the corridor’s economic integration with Europe. And its long tradition of strategic autonomy suits the plural governance of a space with no hegemon, allowing it to engage all parties without being captured by any.

India leads, therefore, not by being present everywhere, which it cannot be, but by owning the independent capabilities that geography rewards. This is a role that fits India’s actual capabilities rather than its aspirational ones, and it is a more durable role for exactly that reason: it does not depend on parity of presence India will not soon achieve, but on leadership in capability India already holds. The weakest power by the old measure becomes the natural anchor by the new one, provided it understands geography correctly and acts on the logic that geography demands.

The Doctrine

The five propositions constitute a single doctrine, and a doctrine, to be worth the name, must be expressible in one sentence and then unfolded. Here is the sentence. In a chokepoint-dense geography without a hegemon, strategic advantage comes not from controlling routes but from building capabilities whose vulnerabilities are independent of one another; and India’s role is to anchor an open Indo-Mediterranean order by leading in precisely those independent capabilities. From that sentence, everything in this paper follows. The geography’s distinctiveness makes control of routes the wrong objective and resilience the right one. The logic of correlated failure makes independence of vulnerabilities the measure of value. The 2026 crisis proves that the measure is real and that the conventional redundancy rationale is unsafe. The sequencing strategy is the doctrine’s operational form. And India’s role is its application to the one power whose capabilities fit the logic.

Four working principles are derived from the same sentence: independence over redundancy, because an alternative route has strategic value only if its failure modes are independent of the primary’s risks; capability over geography, because influence in a non-hegemonic space belongs to the provider of resilient standalone capabilities rather than to the power with the largest footprint; sequencing over completion, because staging investment by independence keeps the corridor valuable even if the full physical link is never completed; and openness over control, because connectivity organised as a commons lowers costs for all participants, whereas connectivity organised as an instrument of exclusion invites the very coercion the doctrine is designed to escape.

Conclusion

This paper has argued that the Indo-Mediterranean is not the Indo-Pacific extended westward but a distinct category of strategic space, a resilience geography, chokepoint-dense and without a hegemon, and that the logic governing it is the logic of correlated risk. It has argued that the redundancy on which the strategic case for the space conventionally rests is, when the alternatives’ failures are correlated with the risks they hedge, no redundancy at all; that the 2026 crisis demonstrated this in a contemporary case; that the strategy the logic demands is to sequence investment by standalone value and independence; and that India’s role is to anchor an open order by leading in the independent capabilities the geography rewards.

Looking towards 2050, the objective is a resilient, sequenced, and open Indo-Mediterranean order: one in which investment is staged for failure-mode independence rather than headline efficiency, in which no single conflict can sever energy, trade, data, and finance at once, and in which India stands as the indispensable anchor rather than an aspirant hegemon. The corridor’s promise is real, but it will be realised only if its builders treat correlation, not distance or cost, as the variable that matters most. The 2026 crisis was a rehearsal. The lesson it taught was sequencing by independence, and that lesson is available to anyone willing to read established reasoning into a new map.²⁴

Author Brief Bio: Suryanarayanan Dinakaran is the Founder and Director of Webronic Industries Private Limited, India, and Co-Founder of Thingsatweb Sweden AB, where he has led technology and infrastructure ventures spanning India and Scandinavia for over a decade. He is a Research Scholar in Public Administration, with research interests at the intersection of geopolitics, geoeconomics, and strategic decision-making under uncertainty. His current work examines how states should plan, sequence, and build resilient infrastructure and connectivity in an increasingly multipolar world, with particular attention to India’s emerging strategic role across the Indo-Mediterranean.

 Endnotes

1. Narendra Modi and Giorgia Meloni, “Italy and India: A Strategic Partnership for the Indo-Mediterranean,” joint op-ed, The Times of India and Corriere della Sera, 2026.
2. “Memorandum of Understanding on the Principles of an India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor,” 9 September 2023, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India.
3. Marvin Rausand and Mary Ann Lundteigen, “Common Cause Failures,” in Reliability of Safety-Critical Systems: Theory and Applications (Hoboken, NJ: Wiley, 2014); International Electrotechnical Commission, IEC 61508: Functional Safety of Electrical/Electronic/Programmable Electronic Safety-Related Systems (Geneva: IEC, 2010).
4. Harry Markowitz, “Portfolio Selection,” Journal of Finance 7, no. 1 (1952): 77–91.
5. Edward N. Luttwak, “From Geopolitics to Geo-Economics: Logic of Conflict, Grammar of Commerce,” The National Interest, no. 20 (1990): 17–23.
6. Henry Farrell and Abraham L. Newman, “Weaponized Interdependence: How Global Economic Networks Shape State Coercion,” International Security 44, no. 1 (2019): 42–79.
7. World Bank, Middle Trade and Transport Corridor: Policies and Investments to Triple Freight Volumes and Halve Travel Time by 2030 (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2023).
8. “Timeline of the Red Sea Crisis,” gCaptain, 2025.
9. House of Commons Library, US-Iran Ceasefire and Nuclear Talks in 2026, Briefing Paper CBP-10637 (London: UK Parliament, 2026).
10. International Energy Agency, “Strait of Hormuz,” factsheet, 2026; U.S. Energy Information Administration, “Amid Regional Conflict, the Strait of Hormuz Remains Critical Oil Chokepoint,” Today in Energy, 2025.
11. Congressional Research Service, The Strait of Hormuz in Brief: Non-Oil Shipments and Effects on U.S. Shippers, Report R48903 (Washington, DC: CRS, 2026).
12. “QatarEnergy Declares Force Majeure on Some LNG Contracts Due to Iran War,” Al Jazeera, 24 March 2026.
13. “A Houthi Missile Attack on Israel Raises Concerns About Red Sea Shipping Routes Being Blocked,” Associated Press, 28 March 2026.
14. House of Commons Library, Israel/US-Iran Conflict 2026: Reopening the Strait of Hormuz, Briefing Paper CBP-10636 (London: UK Parliament, 2026); Niels Rasmussen, “Suez Canal Traffic Stalls at 60% Below Normal Despite 100 Days Without Houthi Attacks,” gCaptain, January 2026.
15. Ursula von der Leyen, “2023 State of the Union Address,” European Commission, Strasbourg, 13 September 2023.
16. Asher Fredman and Joseph Rozen, The India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor: A Catalyst for Regional Integration and Global Prosperity (Jerusalem: Misgav Institute, 2025).
17. European Commission, “EU and India Conclude Landmark Free Trade Agreement,” press release, 27 January 2026.
18. G20, G20 Principles for Quality Infrastructure Investment, Osaka Summit, June 2019.
19. Press Information Bureau, Government of India, “Cabinet Approves Inter-Governmental Framework Agreement between India and the United Arab Emirates on Cooperation for the Empowerment and Operation of the IMEC,” 13 February 2024; Allison Minor et al., “It Is Europe’s Time to Shine on IMEC,” Atlantic Council, 2025.
20. “Blue-Raman,” Submarine Networks, updated 2026.
21. Nicholas Shafer and Afaq Hussein, “A Network of Corridors Is the Only Reliable Hedge Against Middle East Chokepoint Disruptions,” Atlantic Council, 2025.
22. Nicholas Shafer and Afaq Hussein, The India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor: Connectivity in an Era of Geopolitical Uncertainty (Washington, DC: Atlantic Council, 2025).
23. Shafer and Hussein, The India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor; Begin-Sadat-Center for Strategic Studies, “IMEC: A Corridor for Peace and Regional Stability,” 2025.
24. The analytical instruments applied here are established: common-cause failure in reliability engineering, portfolio diversification, weaponised interdependence, and decision-making under deep uncertainty; see Vincent A. W. J. Marchau et al., eds., Decision Making under Deep Uncertainty: From Theory to Practice (Cham: Springer, 2019).

Abstract

The India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC), announced at the 2023 G20 Summit, has emerged as a major connectivity initiative linking India to Europe via the Arabian Peninsula and the Eastern Mediterranean. While supporters present IMEC as a framework to enhance trade, supply chains, energy connectivity, and regional integration, Iran has responded with considerable scepticism. This article examines the geopolitical, economic, and strategic factors underpinning Tehran’s reservations. It argues that Iran views IMEC not merely as a commercial project but as part of a broader geopolitical realignment associated with the Abraham Accords and emerging minilateral frameworks such as I2U2.

From Tehran’s perspective, the corridor is an exclusive model of regional connectivity that strengthens the strategic positions of the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, and the Israeli regime while bypassing Iranian territory. Iranian policymakers also view IMEC within an emerging “war of corridors,” in which competing infrastructure initiatives—including the International North–South Transport Corridor (INSTC) and China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)—serve as instruments of geopolitical competition. Beyond concerns about lost transit revenues and reduced strategic influence, Iran advocates a more inclusive model of Eurasian connectivity in which IMEC complements rather than competes with the INSTC. Such an approach, Tehran argues, would promote regional interdependence, improve transport efficiency, and contribute to a more stable and cooperative regional order.

Keywords: IMEC; Iran; International North–South Transport Corridor; Belt and Road Initiative; regional connectivity; geopolitics; West Asia

Introduction

Connectivity has become a central instrument of geopolitical competition in the twenty-first century. Infrastructure projects increasingly shape not only trade and investment but also political influence, strategic partnerships, and the regional order. Railways, ports, logistics hubs, and digital networks are now regarded as tools of geoeconomic statecraft, enabling states to enhance resilience, strengthen supply chains, and expand their regional influence.[1]

The announcement of the India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) at the 2023 G20 Summit illustrates this transformation. Backed by India, the United States, the European Union, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), France, Germany, and Italy, IMEC aims to connect India to Europe through integrated maritime and rail networks spanning the Arabian Peninsula and the Eastern Mediterranean. Beyond facilitating trade, the initiative promotes cooperation in energy, digital infrastructure, customs harmonisation, and resilient supply chains.[2]

While participating governments emphasise the corridor’s economic benefits, Iran interprets IMEC through a broader geopolitical lens. Iranian policymakers argue that major transport corridors are inherently non-neutral, as they determine which states become indispensable transit hubs, attract foreign investment, and occupy strategic positions within regional supply chains.[3] Consequently, Tehran views IMEC not merely as a transport project but as part of a wider geopolitical realignment reshaping West Asia.

These concerns are closely linked to Iran’s long-term connectivity strategy. Over the past two decades, Tehran has invested heavily in developing the International North–South Transport Corridor (INSTC), Chabahar Port, Bandar Abbas, and related infrastructure to position Iran as a principal gateway linking the Indian Ocean to Central Asia, the Caucasus, Russia, and Europe.[4] From this perspective, initiatives that bypass Iranian territory have implications that extend beyond commerce, affecting the country’s long-term geopolitical influence.

Iranian analysts increasingly characterise this competition as a “war of corridors,” in which infrastructure projects embody competing visions of regional order. Alongside the INSTC and China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), IMEC is regarded as one of several major connectivity initiatives through which states pursue strategic influence and institutionalise new political partnerships.[5]

Another factor shaping Tehran’s assessment is the broader political context of the Abraham Accords and the expanding cooperation among Israel, several Arab states, India, and the United States. Iranian officials argue that IMEC should be understood within this evolving regional architecture rather than as an isolated economic initiative. The inclusion of Israeli Mediterranean ports in the proposed corridor reinforces Tehran’s perception that IMEC supports an exclusive model of regional integration that marginalises Iran.[6]

This article argues that Iran’s scepticism towards IMEC is best understood through the lens of geopolitical exclusion. Tehran views the corridor as an infrastructure project that reroutes trade flows, strengthens rival regional actors, and diminishes Iran’s strategic importance in emerging Eurasian transport networks. Nevertheless, Iran does not reject regional connectivity. Instead, it advocates a more inclusive framework in which IMEC complements existing transport initiatives, particularly the INSTC, thereby maximising regional economic integration while minimising geopolitical fragmentation.[7]

The article is organised into five sections. It first examines Iran’s understanding of connectivity as an instrument of geopolitical power, then analyses Tehran’s interpretation of IMEC as an exclusive regional project. It then explores the concept of the “war of corridors,” assesses Iran’s economic and security concerns, and concludes by evaluating Tehran’s alternative vision for inclusive regional connectivity.

1. 1. Iran’s Geopolitical Understanding of Connectivity

Iran’s response to the India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) reflects a strategic understanding of connectivity that extends well beyond economic considerations. In Iranian foreign policy, transport infrastructure is viewed not merely as a means of facilitating trade but as an instrument of national power. Railways, ports, logistics hubs, energy corridors, and digital networks shape regional influence, economic resilience, and political partnerships. Consequently, connectivity has become a key component of Iran’s geoeconomic and security strategy.[8]

This perspective reflects Iran’s geographical position at the intersection of South Asia, Central Asia, the Caucasus, the Persian Gulf, and the Middle East. Historically, the Iranian plateau was a major crossroads linking East and West along the Silk Roads. Iranian policymakers continue to regard this location as a key strategic asset and argue that geography can confer long-term political and economic leverage when supported by modern transport infrastructure.[9]

The importance of connectivity became even more pronounced after the expansion of international sanctions in the 2000s. As sanctions restricted Iran’s access to international finance and markets, Tehran increasingly viewed transit diplomacy as a means to reduce economic vulnerability. By positioning itself as an indispensable transit hub linking the Indian Ocean to Eurasia, Iran sought to strengthen economic resilience while raising the geopolitical costs of its international isolation.[10]

These developments coincided with broader shifts in the global political economy. Major infrastructure initiatives, including China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), the International North–South Transport Corridor (INSTC), and the European Union’s Global Gateway, demonstrate that connectivity has become a central arena of geopolitical competition. Infrastructure increasingly serves both economic and strategic objectives by shaping trade routes, investment flows, and regional political relationships.[11]

In this context, the International North–South Transport Corridor (INSTC) plays a central role in Iran’s foreign and economic policy. Established in 2000 by India, Iran, and Russia, the INSTC aims to link the Indian Ocean with the Caspian Sea, Russia, Central Asia, and Northern Europe through integrated maritime, rail, and road networks. For Tehran, the project is more than a transport route; it is a long-term strategy to transform Iran into a major Eurasian transit hub and to capitalise on its geographical advantages.[12]

Iran has complemented the INSTC by making substantial investments in Chabahar Port, Bandar Abbas, the Makoran coast, and national railway infrastructure. These projects aim to connect southern ports with inland markets and neighbouring regions, thereby strengthening Iran’s role in regional logistics. These investments demonstrate that Tehran views infrastructure as a source of strategic influence rather than merely a source of commercial revenue.[13]

Iranian officials also link connectivity to strategic autonomy. Diversified transport corridors reduce reliance on vulnerable maritime chokepoints and provide alternative trade routes during periods of geopolitical tension. In this sense, transport infrastructure contributes directly to national security by strengthening economic resilience and mitigating the effects of sanctions and political pressure.[14]

This strategic outlook explains why Tehran assesses new regional transport initiatives primarily on their geopolitical consequences. Major corridors shape patterns of investment, industrial development, and diplomatic engagement by determining which states become indispensable transit hubs. Countries along these routes often gain political influence alongside economic benefits, whereas those bypassed risk a gradual decline in strategic relevance.[15]

Accordingly, Iran interprets IMEC not merely as another commercial route linking India and Europe, but as an initiative that redistributes geopolitical influence towards rival regional actors while excluding Iranian territory. Although Tehran does not oppose new transport corridors in principle, it argues that infrastructure projects should promote inclusive regional connectivity rather than reinforce geopolitical divisions. From this perspective, IMEC is assessed primarily by its implications for Iran’s long-term strategic position rather than by its immediate economic benefits.[16]

Ultimately, Iran’s understanding of connectivity underpins its scepticism towards IMEC. Infrastructure is viewed as an instrument of geopolitical competition that shapes the regional order, political partnerships, and economic influence. This perspective also underpins Tehran’s growing characterisation of contemporary Eurasian infrastructure development as a “war of corridors,” in which competing transport networks increasingly serve as tools of strategic rivalry rather than merely facilitating international commerce.

2. 2. IMEC through Tehran’s Strategic Lens: Geopolitical Exclusion and Regional Realignment

Iran interprets the India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) differently from its principal sponsors. While participating governments present the initiative as a means to improve trade, supply-chain resilience, digital connectivity, and sustainable economic development, Tehran views it primarily as a geopolitical project within a broader regional realignment. From the Iranian perspective, transport corridors are not politically neutral; they shape regional power relations, institutionalise strategic partnerships, and influence the distribution of economic and political power.[17]

This interpretation is closely linked to Iran’s long-standing effort to capitalise on its strategic geography. Successive governments have sought to transform Iran into a major Eurasian transit hub by investing in the International North–South Transport Corridor (INSTC), Chabahar Port, Bandar Abbas, and related transport infrastructure. Consequently, a major corridor connecting India and Europe, which bypasses Iranian territory, is perceived not merely as an alternative commercial route but as a challenge to Iran’s long-term geoeconomic strategy.[18]

A central concept shaping Tehran’s assessment is geopolitical exclusion. Iranian analysts argue that transport corridors create durable patterns of economic interdependence by channeling trade, investment, logistics, and diplomatic engagement towards participating states. Countries along these routes often gain greater strategic importance, whereas those excluded risk gradual marginalisation. From this perspective, IMEC redistributes regional influence by strengthening alternative transit hubs and reducing Iran’s potential role in Eurasian connectivity.[19]

Iranian concerns are reinforced by the political context in which IMEC emerged. Tehran associates the corridor with broader regional developments following the Abraham Accords and the expansion of cooperation among India, the United States, Israel, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates. Although IMEC is officially presented as an economic initiative, Iranian policymakers contend that its implementation depends on sustained political cooperation among these partners. As a result, the corridor is interpreted as an institutional expression of an emerging regional order rather than a purely commercial undertaking.[20]

Within Iranian strategic discourse, IMEC therefore represents an exclusive model of regional connectivity. Tehran argues that economically efficient transport networks should include all geographically relevant states, regardless of political differences. Iranian officials contend that excluding countries occupying central geographic positions reduces economic efficiency and reinforces geopolitical divisions. In this view, connectivity should function as a regional public good that promotes interdependence and stability rather than political polarisation.[21]

A particularly significant concern is the role assigned to Israel within the proposed corridor. Under IMEC, Israeli Mediterranean ports, especially Haifa, would become major gateways linking the Arabian Peninsula with European markets. Iranian policymakers believe that such a role would strengthen Israel’s position in regional logistics, attract investment, and deepen its integration into regional supply chains. Beyond economic implications, Tehran views this development as enhancing Israel’s strategic influence within West Asia.[22]

Iranian analysts further argue that infrastructure fosters long-term institutional relationships. Transport corridors promote customs harmonisation, regulatory cooperation, investment coordination, and technological integration among participating states. Over time, these arrangements strengthen political partnerships and enhance their resilience. Consequently, Tehran regards IMEC as reinforcing the broader political consequences of Arab–Israeli normalisation by embedding the Israeli regime more deeply in the region’s economic architecture.[23]

International sanctions have further intensified Iran’s concerns. As sanctions have constrained foreign investment and economic integration, Tehran has increasingly relied on transit diplomacy to preserve its regional relevance. Becoming a major transit hub has therefore become an important element of Iran’s strategy to mitigate economic isolation. Exclusion from a high-profile initiative such as IMEC is viewed not only as a potential loss of transit revenue but also as a weakening of one of Iran’s principal geopolitical assets.[24]

Nevertheless, Iran does not reject regional connectivity. Iranian officials consistently emphasise that expanded transport infrastructure can promote trade, economic development, and regional cooperation. Their principal criticism concerns the design of IMEC rather than the broader objective of connectivity. Tehran argues that integrating existing infrastructure—including the INSTC, Chabahar Port, and Bandar Abbas—into wider Eurasian transport networks would yield greater economic efficiency while reducing geopolitical fragmentation.[25]

In sum, Iran’s interpretation of IMEC reflects a broader understanding of infrastructure as a strategic instrument. The corridor is seen not merely as a transport project but as part of an evolving regional order that strengthens rival actors, institutionalises new political partnerships, and diminishes Iran’s geopolitical significance. These concerns underpin Tehran’s broader conception of an emerging “war of corridors,” in which competing connectivity initiatives increasingly serve geopolitical as well as economic objectives.

3. 3. The Emerging “War of Corridors”: Iran’s Perception of Strategic Competition

The announcement of the India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) has reinforced an increasingly influential concept in Iranian strategic thinking: the “war of corridors.” Although not a formal theory of international relations, the term is widely used by Iranian policymakers and scholars to describe the growing competition among major transport and connectivity initiatives. In this view, infrastructure has evolved from a purely economic asset into a strategic instrument through which states compete for influence, shape regional integration, and redefine the political geography of Eurasia.[26]

This perspective reflects a broader transformation in international politics. Whereas geopolitical competition traditionally centred on military power and territorial control, contemporary rivalries increasingly focus on infrastructure, trade routes, logistics hubs, energy networks, and digital connectivity. Transport corridors shape not only the movement of goods but also patterns of investment, technological cooperation, and diplomatic engagement. As a result, geoeconomics has become an increasingly important dimension of statecraft, with infrastructure serving as a means of projecting influence without direct military confrontation.[27]

Iranian analysts argue that this evolution has produced competing visions of regional order. From Tehran’s perspective, the International North–South Transport Corridor (INSTC), China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and IMEC are not merely transport projects; they represent alternative geopolitical frameworks, each backed by distinct political coalitions and strategic objectives. The competition among these initiatives therefore concerns not only trade routes but also the future organisation of Eurasia’s political and economic landscape.[28]

For Iran, the INSTC remains the cornerstone of its connectivity strategy. Established in 2000 by India, Iran, and Russia, the corridor aims to link the Indian Ocean with the Caspian Sea, Russia, Central Asia, and Northern Europe via integrated maritime, rail, and road infrastructure. Tehran regards the project as the most effective way to utilise Iran’s geographical position while strengthening economic resilience and regional influence. Since 2022, cooperation with Russia has further heightened the INSTC’s strategic significance as both countries seek alternatives to Western-controlled transport routes and financial networks.[29]

Against this backdrop, IMEC is seen as a competing connectivity architecture. Iranian officials generally avoid portraying the initiative as a direct replacement for the INSTC, yet they recognise that both projects seek investment, cargo flows, and international political support. Tehran therefore fears that future infrastructure financing and commercial traffic may increasingly favour routes that bypass Iranian territory, thereby reducing the strategic value of decades of domestic investment in ports, railways, and logistics infrastructure.[30]

Iran also assesses IMEC in the broader context of China’s Belt and Road Initiative. Since deepening its strategic partnership with Beijing, Tehran has viewed the BRI as complementary to its ambition to become a principal Eurasian transit hub. Some Iranian analysts therefore interpret IMEC as part of a wider effort by the United States and its partners to promote alternative connectivity networks that reduce dependence on Chinese-led infrastructure and, indirectly, on Iran’s strategic location.[31]

Nevertheless, Iranian scholarship generally avoids reducing this competition to a simple binary choice between rival blocs. Many analysts argue that Eurasia is witnessing the emergence of multiple, overlapping connectivity initiatives that both compete and coexist. The central concern is therefore not the existence of alternative routes but whether they are designed to encourage cooperation or geopolitical fragmentation. This distinction explains why Iranian commentators increasingly describe connectivity itself as the principal arena of strategic competition in the twenty-first century.[32]

Another important theme in Iranian strategic discourse is the securitisation of connectivity. Tehran argues that transport infrastructure can become an instrument of political pressure if participation depends on strategic alignment rather than universally accepted commercial principles. In such circumstances, connectivity ceases to function as a regional public good and instead becomes a mechanism for strengthening preferred political coalitions while excluding rival states. Iranian analysts believe that IMEC reflects this trend, as participating countries have simultaneously expanded cooperation across economic, technological, and security domains.[33]

From Tehran’s perspective, exclusion from major transport networks has consequences that extend beyond commerce. Countries along strategic corridors often attract manufacturing investment, logistics, financial services, and diplomatic engagement, thereby enhancing their geopolitical influence. States outside these networks risk a gradual decline in regional relevance, regardless of their geographical advantages. Consequently, Iran views the “war of corridors” as a competition for long-term strategic influence rather than merely for transport efficiency.[34]

At the same time, Iranian scholars acknowledge that connectivity need not be a zero-sum contest. Several analysts argue that Eurasian transport would benefit more from complementarity than from rivalry. Integrating the INSTC, IMEC, and other regional initiatives into a broader multimodal network could diversify trade routes, improve supply-chain resilience, and reduce unnecessary duplication of infrastructure investment. Such a framework, however, would require a more inclusive approach to regional connectivity than Tehran currently adopts in the design of IMEC.[35]

In summary, Iran’s concept of the “war of corridors” reflects a broader transformation in international politics, in which infrastructure has become a central instrument of geopolitical competition. Transport corridors increasingly shape regional influence, economic partnerships, and strategic alignments. From Tehran’s perspective, IMEC is therefore not merely a commercial initiative but part of a wider contest over the future political and economic order of Eurasia.

4. 4. Iran’s Security Concerns: IMEC, Regional Realignment, and the Politics of Connectivity

Iran’s scepticism towards the India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) goes beyond concerns about trade diversion and transit competition. Tehran regards the initiative as part of a broader transformation of the security and political landscape of West Asia. In Iranian strategic thinking, infrastructure projects increasingly shape regional alliances, economic interdependence, and security arrangements. Consequently, IMEC is viewed not merely as a transport corridor but as part of an emerging geopolitical architecture involving the United States, India, Israel, and several Arab states.[36]

A key factor shaping this perception is the evolving political landscape following the Abraham Accords and the expansion of minilateral initiatives such as I2U2. Iranian analysts argue that these developments show that economic cooperation, technology, infrastructure, and security are increasingly interconnected. From Tehran’s perspective, transport corridors institutionalise political partnerships by creating long-term networks of trade, investment, and regulatory cooperation. Accordingly, IMEC is seen as reinforcing a regional order in which Iran plays only a limited role.[37]

The most sensitive aspect of the corridor concerns the enhanced position of the Israeli regime. Under the proposed route, Israeli Mediterranean ports—particularly Haifa—would serve as gateways linking the Arabian Peninsula to European markets. Iranian policymakers believe this role would significantly strengthen Israel’s geoeconomic position by integrating it more deeply into regional supply chains and logistics networks. Beyond commercial gains, Tehran argues that infrastructure generates lasting political influence by encouraging sustained diplomatic, technological, and institutional cooperation among participating states.[38]

Iran also views IMEC as reinforcing the broader political consequences of Arab–Israeli normalisation. Increased economic interdependence, supported by shared infrastructure, may deepen cooperation among participating governments and make these partnerships more durable. From Tehran’s perspective, the corridor therefore contributes to the consolidation of a regional order that is increasingly independent of Iranian influence.[39]

Another important concern is the securitisation of connectivity. Iranian scholars argue that transport infrastructure has become closely linked to national security because it determines access to markets, technology, investment, and strategic partnerships. In an era of geopolitical competition, railways, ports, digital networks, and energy corridors influence not only economic development but also diplomatic leverage and crisis resilience. Consequently, infrastructure planning has become an integral part of national security policy.[40]

Closely related is the notion of the weaponisation of connectivity. Tehran argues that transport networks may increasingly be organised along political lines rather than by commercial efficiency, rewarding strategic partners while excluding rival states. Although governments supporting IMEC reject this characterisation, Iranian officials contend that the composition of participating countries reinforces perceptions that geopolitical considerations played a decisive role in the corridor’s design.[41]

These concerns are closely linked to Iran’s transit strategy. Over the past two decades, Tehran has invested heavily in Chabahar Port, Bandar Abbas, and the Makran coast, which are key components of the International North–South Transport Corridor. Chabahar, in particular, is regarded as the cornerstone of Iran’s eastern connectivity strategy because it provides direct access to the Indian Ocean outside the Strait of Hormuz. Iranian policymakers fear that if IMEC attracts future investment and cargo flows, the strategic and commercial potential of these infrastructure projects could be significantly diminished despite their favourable geographic location.[42]

Iran also assesses IMEC in light of the Strait of Hormuz’s long-term significance, one of the world’s most important maritime chokepoints. Although IMEC is unlikely to replace maritime trade through the Persian Gulf, Iranian analysts argue that expanding overland transport corridors could gradually diversify regional logistics. Over time, this diversification may reduce the Strait’s geopolitical importance and, by extension, diminish one of Iran’s longstanding strategic advantages.[43]

Overall, Tehran regards IMEC as more than an infrastructure initiative. It is seen as part of a broader restructuring of regional politics, combining economic integration, political realignment, and strategic competition. This perspective explains why Iran continues to advocate an alternative model of regional connectivity based on inclusiveness and complementarity rather than on competing geopolitical blocs.

5. 5. Iran’s Alternative Vision of Regional Connectivity: From Strategic Competition to Inclusive Regionalism

Although Iran has consistently criticised the India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC), it does not oppose regional connectivity per se. On the contrary, Iranian policymakers argue that expanding transport networks is essential to promote trade, economic growth, and regional stability. Their principal objection concerns what they perceive as the corridor’s exclusive institutional design, which favours politically aligned states while bypassing geographically central actors such as Iran. Tehran therefore advocates a more inclusive model of Eurasian connectivity in which transport initiatives complement rather than compete with one another.[44]

This vision is rooted in Iran’s longstanding aspiration to serve as a bridge between South Asia, Central Asia, the Caucasus, the Persian Gulf, and Europe. Successive governments have regarded the country’s strategic location as one of its greatest comparative advantages and have invested in railways, ports, highways, and logistics infrastructure to translate that geographic position into sustainable economic and political influence.[45]

The cornerstone of this strategy is the International North–South Transport Corridor (INSTC). Linking the Indian Ocean with the Caspian Sea, Russia, Central Asia, and Northern Europe, the INSTC remains central to Iran’s economic diplomacy. Tehran argues that the corridor offers one of the shortest and most cost-effective routes between South Asia and Eurasia, while diversifying regional supply chains and reducing dependence on traditional maritime routes.[46]

Within this broader framework, Chabahar Port holds a particularly important position. Situated on the Gulf of Oman, outside the Strait of Hormuz, Chabahar provides direct access to the Indian Ocean and serves as the focal point of Iran’s eastern connectivity strategy. Together with Bandar Abbas and the ongoing development of the Makoran coast, these projects aim to integrate maritime trade with inland transport networks extending towards Central Asia, the Caucasus, and Russia.[47]

Rather than viewing IMEC and the INSTC as inherently incompatible, many Iranian analysts argue that the two corridors could complement each other within a wider Eurasian transport network. Linking these initiatives through multimodal infrastructure would offer greater flexibility for international trade, strengthen supply-chain resilience, and maximise the economic benefits of existing investments. From Tehran’s perspective, cooperation among regional transport projects would yield greater long-term efficiency than competition among rival corridors.[48]

This approach reflects Iran’s broader preference for inclusive regionalism. Iranian officials maintain that connectivity initiatives should remain open to all geographically relevant states, regardless of political disagreements. They argue that infrastructure should serve as a regional public good, encouraging economic interdependence, reducing political tensions, and supporting sustainable development. Excluding countries from major transport networks on geopolitical grounds risks increasing regional fragmentation and reducing overall economic efficiency.[49]

Iran has sought to reinforce this vision through a more diversified approach to regional diplomacy. Improved relations with several Arab neighbours, stronger partnerships with Russia and China, and participation in emerging Eurasian institutions all reflect Tehran’s effort to promote a multipolar regional order based on overlapping economic partnerships rather than exclusive geopolitical blocs.[50]

Iranian strategic discourse therefore distinguishes between competitive and cooperative connectivity. The former emphasises infrastructure as a tool for strategic rivalry and political exclusion, whereas the latter views transport networks as mechanisms for promoting shared prosperity and regional stability. Tehran consistently presents the INSTC within this second framework, arguing that long-term regional development depends on integrating rather than dividing Eurasian transport systems.[51]

Nevertheless, Iranian policymakers recognise that this vision faces substantial obstacles. International sanctions, geopolitical rivalries, unresolved regional conflicts, and competing interests among major powers continue to impede the development of an integrated Eurasian transport architecture. Despite these challenges, Tehran maintains that sustainable regional stability ultimately requires greater economic interdependence rather than competing geopolitical corridors.

In this sense, Iran’s response to IMEC should not be read as a rejection of connectivity. Rather, it reflects a preference for a regional order in which transport infrastructure promotes cooperation, inclusiveness, and mutual economic benefit, rather than reinforcing political divisions.

Conclusion

The India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) is one of the most significant connectivity initiatives to emerge in West Asia in recent years. While its supporters emphasise trade facilitation, supply-chain resilience, and economic integration, Iran interprets the project within a broader geopolitical framework. As this article has argued, Tehran regards IMEC not merely as a transport corridor but as part of an evolving regional order that redistributes strategic influence and reshapes Eurasian connectivity.

Iran’s scepticism stems from its view of infrastructure as an instrument of geopolitical power. Transport corridors shape not only the movement of goods but also patterns of investment, political cooperation, and regional influence. Because Iran has invested heavily in the International North–South Transport Corridor (INSTC), Chabahar Port, Bandar Abbas, and related infrastructure, initiatives that bypass its territory are seen as challenges to its long-term geoeconomic strategy rather than merely alternative commercial routes.

The article shows that Tehran interprets IMEC through the lens of geopolitical exclusion. Iranian policymakers associate the corridor with broader regional realignments, including the Abraham Accords, expanding Arab–Israeli cooperation, and emerging minilateral partnerships. From this perspective, IMEC reflects an exclusive model of connectivity that strengthens rival regional actors while diminishing Iran’s strategic role in Eurasian transport networks.

The analysis has also shown that Iranian strategic thinking increasingly frames contemporary infrastructure development as a “war of corridors.” Competing initiatives—including IMEC, the INSTC, and China’s Belt and Road Initiative—offer alternative visions of regional order in which connectivity serves both economic and geopolitical objectives. Infrastructure has therefore become a central instrument of geoeconomic competition.

At the same time, Iran does not oppose regional integration. Rather, it advocates an inclusive model of connectivity in which major transport corridors complement one another and foster broader regional interdependence. Such an approach, Tehran argues, would improve economic efficiency while reducing geopolitical fragmentation.

Ultimately, the debate over IMEC reflects a broader transformation in international politics. Connectivity is no longer merely an economic issue but a key dimension of strategic competition and regional governance. The future success of Eurasian transport initiatives will depend not only on infrastructure investment but also on their ability to reconcile competing geopolitical interests. Whether regional actors pursue rivalry or complementarity will significantly shape the evolving political and economic landscape of West Asia.

Author Brief Bio: Prof. Mohammad Reza Dehshiri is the Dean of the School of International Relations (SIR), since 25 July 2023 and Full Professor of Political Science and member of Scientific Board at School of International Relations (SIR), Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Islamic Republic of Iran (Since Sep. 2004)  

Endnotes:

[1] Robert D. Blackwill and Jennifer M. Harris, War by Other Means: Geoeconomics and Statecraft (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2016); Parag Khanna, Connectography: Mapping the Future of Global Civilization (New York: Random House, 2016).

[2] G20, “G20 New Delhi Leaders’ Declaration” (New Delhi: G20, 2023); G20, “Memorandum of Understanding on the Principles of an India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor” (New Delhi: G20, 2023).

[3] Khanna, Connectography.

[4] Hamidreza Azizi, “Iran’s Regional Connectivity Strategy and Eurasian Geopolitics,” Iranian Review of Foreign Affairs 15, no. 1 (2024): 23–49.

[5] Bruno Maçães, Belt and Road: A Chinese World Order (London: Hurst, 2018).

[6] Anoushiravan Ehteshami, “Iran and the Emerging Geopolitics of Connectivity,” Asian Affairs 54, no. 2 (2023): 185–205; Sanam Vakil, “Regional Order and Strategic Competition in the Gulf,” Survival 63, no. 2 (2021): 7–28.

[7] Seyed Hossein Mousavian, “Iran and Regional Connectivity in Eurasia,” Iranian Review of Foreign Affairs 14, no. 1 (2023): 45–72.

[8] Blackwill and Harris, War by Other Means.

[9] Richard N. Frye, The Heritage of Persia (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1962).

[10] Rouhollah K. Ramazani, Iran’s Foreign Policy: Both North and South (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1992); Shireen T. Hunter, “Iran’s Foreign Policy in a Changing Regional Environment,” Middle East Policy 27, no. 3 (2020): 28–45.

[11] Blackwill and Harris, War by Other Means; Khanna, Connectography.

[12] International North–South Transport Corridor Coordination Council, “Agreement on the International North–South Transport Corridor” (St Petersburg, 2000).

[13] Azizi, “Iran’s Regional Connectivity Strategy.”

[14] Mousavian, “Iran and Regional Connectivity.”

[15] Ehteshami, “Iran and the Emerging Geopolitics of Connectivity.”

[16] Maçães, Belt and Road.

[17] Blackwill and Harris, War by Other Means.

[18] Azizi, “Iran’s Regional Connectivity Strategy.”

[19] Blackwill and Harris, War by Other Means.

[20] Vakil, “Regional Order and Strategic Competition.”

[21] Ehteshami, “Iran and the Emerging Geopolitics of Connectivity.”

[22] Jonathan Fulton, “The Gulf, China, and Emerging Connectivity Corridors,” Asian Affairs 51, no. 3 (2020): 347–65.

[23] Vali Nasr, The Dispensable Nation: American Foreign Policy in Retreat (New York: Doubleday, 2013).

[24] Hunter, “Iran’s Foreign Policy in a Changing Regional Environment.”

[25] Mousavian, “Iran and Regional Connectivity.”

[26] Blackwill and Harris, War by Other Means.

[27] Khanna, Connectography.

[28] Maçães, Belt and Road; Nadège Rolland, China’s Eurasian Century? Political and Strategic Implications of the Belt and Road Initiative (Seattle: National Bureau of Asian Research, 2017).

[29] INSTC Coordination Council, “Agreement on the INSTC”; Azizi, “Iran’s Regional Connectivity Strategy.”

[30] Fulton, “The Gulf, China, and Emerging Connectivity Corridors.”

[31] Mohsen Shariatinia, “Iran and China’s Belt and Road Initiative: Opportunities and Challenges,” China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly 18, no. 2 (2021): 59–81.

[32] Ehteshami, “Iran and the Emerging Geopolitics of Connectivity.”

[33] Henry Farrell and Abraham L. Newman, Underground Empire: How America Weaponized the World Economy (New York: Henry Holt, 2023); Vakil, “Regional Order and Strategic Competition.”

[34] Blackwill and Harris, War by Other Means.

[35] Mousavian, “Iran and Regional Connectivity.”

[36] Vakil, “Regional Order and Strategic Competition.”

[37] Jonathan Fulton, The Gulf and the New Regionalism (London: Routledge, 2022).

[38] Jonathan Fulton, “China, the Gulf, and the Belt and Road Initiative,” Asian Affairs 50, no. 1 (2019): 84–103.

[39] Vali Nasr, The Shia Revival (New York: W. W. Norton, 2006).

[40] Blackwill and Harris, War by Other Means.

[41] Farrell and Newman, Underground Empire.

[42] Azizi, “Iran’s Regional Connectivity Strategy.”

[43] Geoffrey Kemp and Robert E. Harkavy, Strategic Geography and the Changing Middle East (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1997).

[44] Mousavian, “Iran and Regional Connectivity.”

[45] Ramazani, Iran’s Foreign Policy.

[46] INSTC Coordination Council, “Agreement on the INSTC.”

[47] Azizi, “Iran’s Regional Connectivity Strategy.”

[48] Khanna, Connectography.

[49] Ehteshami, “Iran and the Emerging Geopolitics of Connectivity.”

[50] Hamidreza Azizi, Iran’s Regional Policy after the Arab Uprisings (Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2024).

[51] Blackwill and Harris, War by Other Means.

Abstract

Strategic competition and war are reshaping the routes linking the Indian Ocean to the Mediterranean. The Indo-Mediterranean is best understood as the space formed by the movement of goods, energy and data, and by the security arrangements that sustain them. It is more than a commercial corridor. Its viability depends on infrastructure, political alignment and the ability to keep connections open during crises.

Israel is the only viable candidate to serve as the western anchor of India’s Indo-Mediterranean strategy. No other node combines access to the Gulf-Levant route, an Indian-operated port asset, and a mature security and technological relationship with India. Haifa alone, however, cannot fulfil this role. Greece, Cyprus and Italy provide the anchor with European reach and redundancy; they do not replace it. The attacks of 7 October 2023, the Gaza war, disruption in the Red Sea and the wider West Asian crisis culminating in March 2026 exposed how politically and operationally fragile the proposed corridor remains.

The crises did not render IMEC irrelevant. They clarified what the project would need to survive: alternative routes, protected infrastructure, regulatory coordination and practical cooperation among regional partners. Israel can anchor the western segment only as a secure node within a wider Eastern Mediterranean network, not as a single point through which every flow must pass.

Keywords: Indo-Mediterranean; IMEC; India; Israel; Eastern Mediterranean; strategic connectivity

The Indo-Mediterranean as a strategic space

The Memorandum of Understanding announced at the New Delhi G20 summit in September 2023 described the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) in functional terms. An eastern corridor would connect India with the Gulf; a northern corridor would link the Gulf to Europe via maritime routes, railways, roads, and associated energy and digital infrastructure.¹ The map, however, advanced a broader proposition. It brought together regions usually treated as separate theatres: the Indian Ocean, the Arabian Peninsula, the Levant, and the Mediterranean. IMEC thus provided a material basis for thinking about an Indo-Mediterranean space.

This article argues that Israel is the only viable western anchor for India’s Indo-Mediterranean strategy because it uniquely combines geographic access to the Gulf-Levant segment with an established security and technological partnership capable of safeguarding the corridor’s critical infrastructure. Greece, Cyprus and Italy extend this anchor into Europe; they do not constitute alternatives to it.

The Indo-Mediterranean is neither a settled region nor simply the Indo-Pacific extended westward. It is a form of connectivity-based competitive regionalism: trade, capital, energy and data flow through infrastructure that is itself subject to political competition. Recent studies place IMEC at the intersection of India, the Gulf, the Abraham Accords and European initiatives. Banerjee and Singh treat it as collaborative infrastructure linking North-South and South-South trade with transport, digital and energy systems.² The 2026 ISPI report likewise reads the corridor through the lens of diversification and supply-chain resilience.³

The Gulf states’ ongoing ties with China prevent the Indo-Mediterranean from becoming an exclusively Western bloc. Chinese firms already operate infrastructure that could be part of IMEC, while India continues to pursue the International North-South Transport Corridor through Iran and Eurasia. IMEC adds a route to India’s multi-alignment strategy rather than replacing its other options.

A western anchor must do five things. It must link the Gulf-Levant land segment to Mediterranean routes, transfer goods, energy and data across multiple infrastructure types, and connect the Levant to more than one European gateway. It must also support India’s capacity to coordinate partners on standards, investment and security, and keep flows moving or restore them quickly after disruption. These are practical tests of geographic centrality, multimodal capacity, network reach, coordination and resilience. A node that concentrates traffic without providing alternatives is a chokepoint. A port without cross-border political access is an endpoint.

IMEC is more likely to supplement the Suez Canal than replace it. It can provide selective redundancy for time-sensitive, high-value trade while supporting energy and digital links.4 Banerjee and Singh’s simulations also reject simplistic claims of universal gain: network expansion distributes opportunities more widely, but economic and emissions objectives create policy trade-offs, especially for Asian members.

The analysis draws on the September 2023 government announcement, policy reports published between 2024 and March 2026, and assessments of conflicts along the route. It asks why Israel is the only viable Western anchor and what conditions must be met for it to fulfil that role. It defines the anchor as an assessable strategic function rather than a geographic metaphor. For India, this approach links resilient connectivity and secure supply chains directly to the national interest.

India’s capacity to coordinate partners under regional pressure

IMEC was announced at a moment of optimism about regional integration. The Abraham Accords had created formal ties between Israel and several Arab states; I2U2 brought India, Israel, the United Arab Emirates and the United States into a practical minilateral framework; and Washington was attempting to advance Saudi-Israeli normalisation. India’s relations with both Israel and the Gulf had deepened without forcing New Delhi to choose between them. IMEC appeared to translate those diplomatic changes into infrastructure.

The attacks of 7 October 2023 and the war that followed broke the political sequence on which the proposed northern corridor tacitly relied. The original memorandum did not list Israel or Jordan among its signatories, even though the projected railway had to cross both countries to reach the Mediterranean. After October 2023, cooperation with Israel became far more difficult for Arab governments to justify publicly. Saudi-Israeli normalisation stalled, while fighting in Gaza, clashes on Israel’s northern front and Houthi attacks on commercial shipping widened the conflict’s geographical reach.⁵

The Red Sea crisis offered a paradoxical lesson. It complicated investment, raised insurance and transport costs, and showed that infrastructure could be targeted for political purposes. Yet it also strengthened the case for alternative connections. A corridor designed solely to reduce costs under normal conditions would be difficult to justify against established maritime shipping. A corridor that provides additional options during disruption has a different strategic rationale. This distinction explains why the language surrounding IMEC shifted from efficiency to resilience and redundancy.

The escalation of the West Asian crisis in March 2026 sharpened that logic. US-Israeli strikes on Iran and Iranian retaliation threatened energy infrastructure and shipping around the Gulf, while the Strait of Hormuz again became a focal point of global risk.⁶ For India, the exposure was immediate: energy imports, trade, investment and the welfare of Indian citizens across the Gulf all depended on regional stability. The crisis also exposed an important limit to corridor thinking. A route that links several chokepoints is not resilient merely because it is new. Resilience requires spare capacity, alternative ports, interoperable procedures and institutions able to respond when a segment fails.

India’s exposure can be measured. An estimated 40–50 per cent of its crude-oil imports pass through the Strait of Hormuz. In 2024–25, Saudi Arabia and the UAE supplied about 22 per cent of India’s crude-oil imports and 54 per cent of its liquefied petroleum gas imports, while the UAE alone supplied roughly 13 per cent of its liquefied natural gas imports.⁷ More than nine million Indian citizens live in the Gulf, and their remittances account for an estimated 38 per cent of the total remittances received by India. A regional crisis would therefore affect not only energy prices but also household incomes in states such as Kerala, Uttar Pradesh and Bihar.⁸

India already has several ways to shape this environment. Its market creates demand and lends commercial weight to new connections. Indian firms can also secure positions at selected nodes, as the Adani investment in Haifa demonstrates. New Delhi’s distinctive advantage, however, lies in combining security and technology cooperation with diplomacy. Its trust with Israel, relations with the Gulf, participation in I2U2, engagement with Greece, and cooperation with the United States and Europe allow it to connect partnerships that no single regional institution presently governs. Used together, these relationships could give India a steadier strategic presence in a region where its economic exposure has long been greater than its political influence.9

India’s capacity to coordinate partners is limited. New Delhi can modernise its own ports and support investment abroad, but it cannot build the missing Saudi-Jordanian-Israeli links by itself, compel Saudi-Israeli normalisation, or set European customs and rail standards. It also lacks the financial weight of the Gulf states and the infrastructure portfolio China has accumulated across the region. Its citizens and energy imports remain exposed to crises around Hormuz and the Red Sea. India must also preserve the Iran-centred INSTC to protect the strategic autonomy and flexibility at the heart of its multi-alignment. It can sponsor, invest and coordinate, but it cannot command the corridor.

Indian influence diminishes as the route moves west of the Gulf. An anchor would not give New Delhi control over that space, but it would provide a partner able to organise the transition from the Arabian Peninsula to European markets and to protect the infrastructure on which that transition depends. Israel is the only viable candidate. No alternative combines access to the Gulf-Levant segment, an Indian-operated port asset, established defence and technology cooperation with India, and the capacity to secure physical and digital infrastructure.

Geographic centrality, multimodal capacity and security provision

Geography gives Israel its initial claim to the role. Goods moving by rail from Saudi Arabia and Jordan would reach the Mediterranean through Israel, most plausibly at Haifa. The railway from Haifa to Beit She’an already exists. What is missing is the short, politically difficult connection to the Jordanian network. Haifa matters because it is where an overland Gulf-Levant route could return to sea and divide among several European ports.

The physical gap is limited but strategically significant. The operational Haifa–Beit She’an railway is approximately 60 kilometres long. An additional 15 kilometres would be required to connect Beit She’an to the Sheikh Hussein crossing and the Jordanian network. Haifa’s annual cargo capacity has been estimated at roughly 30 million tonnes, while its pre-war container capacity was reported at about 1.5 million TEU. The tonnage and TEU figures measure different forms of throughput and should be assessed separately when judging whether the port can absorb additional IMEC traffic.¹⁰

Indian investment turns this geographic connection into a bilateral one. By acquiring a controlling interest in the older Haifa port, the Adani Group placed an Indian operator at the prospective western end of a corridor shaped in part by Indian strategy.¹¹ The acquisition preceded IMEC and should not be recast as an IMEC project. Its importance lies in giving India a commercial presence in a location where it already has a diplomatic interest. It also sits alongside Chinese involvement in the newer Haifa Bay terminal and in Piraeus. IMEC’s Mediterranean segment will not be insulated from Chinese infrastructure. India’s more realistic aim is to avoid dependence on any single operator.

The deeper foundation is the India-Israel security and technology relationship. Years of cooperation have built trust in sectors where states do not readily share access. For IMEC, the relevant question is not which weapons system India buys from Israel. It is whether the relationship can protect ports, digital networks and maritime traffic through cyber defence, intelligence exchange, maritime-domain awareness and continuity planning. Israeli policy studies argue that this experience could improve the corridor’s reliability.¹² The claim needs qualification: exposure to missile attack does not make a state a secure logistics hub. Israel’s value lies in its ability to recover quickly and keep essential systems operating under pressure.

The security requirement also alters the meaning of bilateral cooperation. Corridor security is a collective-action problem: protecting a port does not secure its railway, and hardening a cable landing station does not prevent interruption elsewhere. India and Israel would therefore need to move beyond a supplier-client model towards joint standards and risk assessment with Jordan, Gulf partners and European operators. Shared threat assessments, port-recovery exercises, cyber-incident reporting and links among maritime fusion centres can begin below the level of a formal alliance. Israel meets the resilience criterion only if these arrangements lower risk across the route rather than merely strengthen Israeli assets.

Digital infrastructure also requires route-wide protection. Submarine cables carry the bulk of intercontinental data, and damage to cables in the Red Sea after the Rubymar was struck in February 2024 showed how an attack on shipping could interrupt data flows between Asia and Europe.¹³ Israel’s land bridge and the Blue-Raman cable system offer geographic diversification, but they also create new landing stations and terrestrial segments that require protection. A resilient network needs alternative landing points and repair capacity, not a single cable presented as an escape from Suez.

Blue-Raman is designed to connect India with Europe via Saudi Arabia, Israel and Italy, adding a digital layer to the corridor’s ports and railways. Its strategic value also reflects competition over data routes. The China-linked PEACE cable, which connects Pakistan with Djibouti, Egypt and France, has a reported capacity of 192 Tbps. Blue-Raman should therefore be assessed not only as commercial infrastructure but also as part of India’s effort to diversify secure data connections to Europe.¹⁴

Energy links add another layer. The Eastern Mediterranean already hosts overlapping projects involving Israeli and Cypriot gas, Egyptian liquefaction capacity, and a proposed electricity connection linking Israel, Cyprus, Greece and continental Europe. The Great Sea Interconnector has faced financial and political obstacles, but it illustrates what an Indo-Mediterranean architecture would look like: the Levant connected to the European system via Cyprus and Greece.¹⁵ Green hydrogen remains a longer-term prospect. Electricity, gas and renewable-energy cooperation offer more immediate foundations.

Israel meets more of the anchor criteria than any alternative. Haifa provides geographic centrality; the port, railway, cable and energy projects offer multimodal capacity; and the India-Israel relationship provides the required security and technological foundation. Network reach still depends on improved relations and functioning links with Jordan, while the full overland corridor requires progress towards Saudi-Israeli normalisation. Cyprus, Greece and Italy provide onward reach and redundancy, but none can secure or replace the Gulf-Levant segment. For India, Israel is therefore the indispensable partner for protecting the western end of its secure supply chains.

Network reach: the Eastern Mediterranean

Haifa does not, by itself, connect India to Europe. Cargo must then move to ports capable of handling transhipment and distributing goods to European rail and road networks. Greece and Italy are therefore part of the strategic argument, not decorative additions to it.

Greece is close to the Levant and has strengthened political relations with both India and Israel. Its accession to the Three Seas Initiative in 2023 also offers a potential link between Eastern Mediterranean ports and Central and Eastern Europe.¹⁶ Yet COSCO’s control of Piraeus makes it difficult to present IMEC as a clean alternative to the BRI. Piraeus still matters. Its ownership shows that competition with China will occur within shared infrastructure networks, not only between rival corridors.

At the European end, Italy adds depth and choice. ISPI’s comparison of Piraeus, Marseille-Fos, Genoa and Trieste shows that no port meets every requirement. Trieste offers rail access to Central Europe and a free-port regime; Genoa provides scale and links to northern Italy; Marseille offers another western outlet.¹⁷ Using several ports would reduce congestion and political dependence while allowing cargo to follow its destination and type. It would also address the concern that IMEC merely replaces one chokepoint with another.

Cyprus matters for a different reason. It is not a major rail gateway, but it links the energy and security systems of Israel and Greece. Electricity interconnection, gas development and maritime cooperation give the island a role that exceeds its market size. Israel, Cyprus and Greece can form the bridge; Italy can connect it to the European interior.

India has already moved towards this broader geometry. Its engagement with Greece has expanded, and Indian strategy increasingly treats the Mediterranean as the western extension of its maritime interests rather than a distant European periphery. Italy’s formal participation in the IMEC memorandum and its renewed promotion of Trieste reinforce this trend. The western anchor should thus be understood as a distributed system: Israel is its central Levantine node, while Greece, Cyprus and Italy provide that node with reach and redundancy.

The network also needs practical governance. IMEC’s signatories should establish a small coordinating mechanism for transport, digital systems, energy and infrastructure protection, including Israel, Jordan and other indispensable non-signatories in technical bodies. Border-crossing times, rail capacity, port dwell time, cable-repair arrangements, insurance premiums and interoperable customs procedures would provide measurable benchmarks of performance. For India, these arrangements would turn diplomatic access into resilient connectivity with European markets.

Resilience and political limits

The hardest problem is political. Israel cannot establish a complete overland corridor without Saudi cooperation, and Saudi-Israeli normalisation remains absent. Das’s warning that the corridor places India within an unstable and asymmetric framework of normalisation is therefore well founded. The Gaza war raised the domestic cost of visible cooperation with Israel across the Arab world, while the March 2026 crisis exposed ports, railways and energy routes to direct attack. Treating normalisation as inevitable would turn a strategic preference into an analytical assumption.

Political legitimacy is not a secondary issue to be resolved after construction. A corridor marketed as a framework for regional prosperity will remain fragile if its gains accrue mainly to distant markets and large infrastructure firms. Jordan bears the costs of transit, border management and new construction; Palestinian exclusion would make the project easier to attack as an attempt to bypass the conflict rather than to change regional conditions. This does not mean that IMEC can deliver a peace agreement. It means that planners should identify concrete local benefits, including logistics employment, industrial zones, energy access and improved Palestinian trade capacity. Functional inclusion would not eliminate opposition, but it would make cooperation less dependent on elite diplomacy alone.

Phased implementation offers a more credible path than either waiting for comprehensive Saudi-Israeli normalisation or ignoring the political obstacle. Partners can improve port, border, digital and energy connections, which have independent value, develop technical standards among willing states, and preserve the option to join the full rail corridor when diplomatic conditions permit. Normalisation would enable the complete route, but it cannot replace planning.

IMEC still lacks binding commitments on financing, governance and construction. Rail links remain incomplete, border procedures are slow, and customs systems are not integrated. Private investors require predictable volumes, risk guarantees, transparent regulation, and evidence that multimodal transfers can compete on time and cost. Analysts have therefore called for private-sector participation, competition among ports and operators, and two-way trade rather than a conveyor belt serving only India-to-Europe traffic.¹⁸

China’s position in Gulf infrastructure, Haifa Bay and Piraeus makes exclusion expensive and perhaps impossible. The Gulf states are unlikely to abandon BRI relationships for an underfunded alternative. India’s national interest lies in competitive diversification, not rigid alignment: it should prevent any single state, company or route from controlling the system while preserving its own multi-alignment.

India must also safeguard its interests in Iran and the International North-South Transport Corridor. Disengaging from Iran would weaken the strategic autonomy that makes New Delhi a valuable partner. At the same time, Iranian capabilities and allied armed groups can threaten the maritime and physical infrastructure on which IMEC depends. India must manage this competition without assuming that economic interdependence will resolve security conflicts.

Israel can fulfil the anchoring role only if it reduces risk rather than concentrates it. That requires four practical shifts: completing and modernising links to Jordan; embedding Haifa in a multi-port Mediterranean network; protecting physical, digital and energy infrastructure through shared protocols; and creating benefits for transit states and neighbouring populations. These steps would advance India’s national interest by combining strategic autonomy with resilient connectivity and more secure supply chains. Without them, “anchor” will remain a metaphor.

Conclusion

Israel is the only viable western anchor, combining the necessary geography and infrastructure with a security and technological relationship that can support India’s westward strategy. Greece, Cyprus and Italy are essential to the network’s European reach, but they extend the anchor rather than replace it. Even so, Israel cannot fulfil this role fully without improved relations and operational connectivity with Jordan, as well as progress towards Saudi-Israeli normalisation.

India can advance this architecture by combining security-technology cooperation with diplomatic coordination, thereby translating extensive economic interests into a more visible regional presence. It cannot impose normalisation, finance every missing link, or control the regulatory systems through which the corridor must pass. The strategy therefore depends on a division of functions: India supplies investment, technology cooperation and diplomatic coordination; Israel anchors and secures the Gulf-Levant transition; Eastern Mediterranean partners provide European reach and redundancy.

Author Brief Bio: Dr. Lauren Dagan Amoss is a researcher specialising in India’s foreign and security policy, with a regional focus on the Indo-Pacific. She is a Senior Fellow at the Begin-Sadat Centre for Strategic Studies (BESA) and a lecturer at Bar-Ilan University. Her doctoral research examined India’s policy toward the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, analysing the evolution of New Delhi’s diplomatic positioning from independence through the contemporary period. Her current research interests include strategic realignment in the Indo-Pacific, India’s security doctrine, and India–Israel relations. Dr. Dagan Amos is a member of the Deborah Forum, which promotes women’s leadership in Israel’s foreign and defence policy community.”

References

1. Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, “Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment (PGII) & India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC),” September 9, 2023, https://www.mea.gov.in/press-releases.htm?dtl/37091/.
2. Adam Krzymowski, “India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor in Strategic Connection with the Abraham Accords and the Three Seas Initiative,” Journal of International Studies 17, no. 4 (2024): 179–94, https://doi.org/10.14254/2071-8330.2024/17-4/11; Suvajit Banerjee and Surendar Singh, “Examining the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) as a Collaborative Infrastructure for Transcontinental Policymaking: An ICIO-LP Analysis,” Asia Europe Journal 22 (2024): 482–84, https://doi.org/10.1007/s10308-024-00712-1.
3. Filippo Fasulo, Nicola Missaglia, and Valeria Talbot, eds., IMEC: The Backbone of an Indo-Mediterranean Region-Italy and the Future of Transcontinental Connectivity (Milan: ISPI, 2026), 6–
4. Fasulo, Missaglia, and Talbot, IMEC, 20–45; Navdeep Suri et al., India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor: Towards a New Discourse in Global Connectivity (New Delhi: Observer Research Foundation, 2024), 3–8; Banerjee and Singh, “Examining IMEC,” 500–
5. Suri et al., India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor, 3–6; Fanny Sauvignon and Stefania Benaglia, “An India-Middle East-Europe Corridor for Peace: The EU’s Role in Transforming a Grand Announcement into an Inclusive Forum,” Policy Brief no. 136 (Barcelona: European Institute of the Mediterranean, 2024), 2–
6. Drishti IAS, “The Escalating Crisis in West Asia,” March 6, 2026,https://www.drishtiias.com/daily-updates/daily-news-editorials/the-escalating-crisis-in-west-asia.
7. Sukalp Sharma, “With Red Sea Disrupted, India May Have to Import More Russian Oil. That Comes with Risks,” The Indian Express, updated July 28, 2026, https://indianexpress.com/article/explained/explained-economics/india-oil-supply-saudi-disruption-russian-crude-10806998/
8. Ivy Handique, “Indian Migrant Workers in the Gulf Amid the West Asia Crisis: Challenges, Vulnerabilities and Policy Responses,” Vivekananda International Foundation, July 2, 2026, https://www.vifindia.org/article/2026/july/02/Indian-Migrant-Workers-in-the-Gulf-Amid-the-West-Asia-Crisis.
9. Research and Information System for Developing Countries, India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC): Strategic Choices and Way Forward (New Delhi: RIS, 2025), 1–12; Debasish Das, “Revisiting the Contours of the Evolving Middle Eastern Order through the India-Middle East-EU Corridor: Mapping India’s Scopes and Limitations,” Asian Journal of Political Science 32, no. 1 (2024): 35–56, esp. 35–37, 49–51, https://doi.org/10.1080/02185377.2024.2322498; Banerjee and Singh, “Examining IMEC,” 484–
10. Nilanjan Ghosh, “IMEC and the Future of Global Connectivity,” Observer Research Foundation, January 8, 2026, https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/imec-and-the-future-of-global-connectivity. length and operational status of the Haifa–Beit She’an railway; proposed 15-kilometre connection to the Sheikh Hussein crossing.]
11. Sauvignon and Benaglia, “Corridor for Peace,” 5; Asher Fredman and Joseph Rozen, The India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor: A Catalyst for Regional Integration and Global Prosperity (Jerusalem: Misgav Institute for National Security and Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung Israel, 2025), 31.
12. Gopi Bhamidipati, “India’s Tightrope Walk: Navigating U.S.-Israel-Iran Tensions,” New Lines Institute, March 25, 2025, https://newlinesinstitute.org/strategic-competition/indias-tightrope-walk-navigating-u-s-israel-iran-tensions/; Fredman and Rozen, India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor, 31–
13. Ned Leadbeater, “Fiber Optics and the Hidden Politics of Connectivity,” Middle East Report, October 20, 2025, https://www.merip.org/2025/10/fiber-optics-and-the-hidden-politics-of-connectivity/ ,
14. “Blue-Raman,” Submarine Networks,https://www.submarinenetworks.com/en/systems/asia-europe-africa/blue-raman
15. Fasulo, Missaglia, and Talbot, IMEC, 46–
16. Krzymowski, “India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor,” 179–
17. Fasulo, Missaglia, and Talbot, IMEC, 11–19, 20–
18. Amir Hayek, “What’s Needed to Unlock the Power and Promise of IMEC,” Atlantic Council, August 22, 2025, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/whats-needed-to-unlock-the-power-and-promise-of-imec/

Abstract

The growing attention to the Indo-Mediterranean reflects more than the emergence of a new economic corridor linking the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean Sea. Rather, it signals a broader transformation in the spatial organisation of international politics. This article argues that the Indo-Mediterranean should be understood as an emerging geopolitical macro-space, shaped by the ongoing transition from a predominantly Atlantic-centred international system to an increasingly polycentric global order.

Moving beyond approaches that interpret the India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) primarily as an infrastructure or connectivity initiative, the article develops a broader geopolitical framework in which maritime routes, logistics, digital networks, energy infrastructure, and political partnerships become instruments through which new configurations of power are territorialised.

The analysis examines how India, the Gulf region, the Eastern Mediterranean, Southern Europe, and East Africa are increasingly forming an interconnected macro-space characterised by multiple centres of political, economic, technological, and maritime power. By proposing the Indo-Mediterranean as a geopolitical macro-space, the study contributes to the theoretical debate on the relationship between power, space, and the transformation of the international order.

Keywords: Indo-Mediterranean, Geopolitical Macro-Space, Polycentric Order, Connectivity, IMEC, Geopolitics

Introduction

The emergence of the Indo-Mediterranean as a strategic concept reflects a profound transformation in the contemporary international system. Rather than a simple expansion of an existing geographical framework or the addition of a new economic corridor, the Indo-Mediterranean embodies a broader reconfiguration of political, economic, technological, and maritime interactions, driven by the ongoing redistribution of global power.

The growing prominence of the Indo-Mediterranean should be understood within the broader context of the transition from a predominantly Atlantic-centred international system towards an increasingly polycentric order. This transition is reshaping the spatial organisation of global politics, generating new patterns of connectivity that integrate maritime routes, logistics, digital infrastructure, energy networks, production chains, and strategic partnerships into broader geopolitical configurations.

From this perspective, the India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) is neither the origin nor the sole expression of the Indo-Mediterranean. Rather, it is one of the most visible manifestations of a deeper historical process through which a new geopolitical macro-space is taking shape. Building on this premise, this article proposes interpreting the Indo-Mediterranean as an emerging geopolitical macro-space. It argues that understanding this evolving configuration requires moving beyond conventional regional approaches and analysing the reciprocal relationship between power, connectivity, and the production of geopolitical space within the emerging polycentric international order.

The Transformation of International Order and the Emergence of New Geopolitical Macro-Spaces

The emergence of the Indo-Mediterranean cannot be understood as an isolated regional development or as the outcome of a single infrastructure initiative. Rather, it reflects a broader transformation of the international system, in which the redistribution of power is progressively reshaping the spatial organisation of global politics and the very architecture of international order. As international orders evolve, so too do the geopolitical configurations through which power is projected, connectivity is organised, and strategic interaction is structured.

Historical experience shows that geopolitical spaces are neither permanent nor solely determined by physical geography. Their strategic relevance varies with the prevailing configuration of political authority, economic interdependence, technological development, and military capabilities. The Mediterranean, for example, was the principal centre of political and commercial interaction in classical antiquity; the Atlantic acquired global centrality with the rise of European maritime expansion and the consolidation of the modern international system; similarly, the Indo-Pacific has emerged over the past two decades as the predominant strategic framework for understanding the redistribution of economic dynamism and maritime power towards Asia.

These examples suggest that geopolitical spaces are best understood as historically contingent political constructions, an understanding consistent with broader debates that have challenged purely territorial conceptions of international politics and emphasised the spatial dimension of political authority. International orders do not merely operate within geographical space; they actively produce their own strategic spatiality. Each historical configuration of international order generates a corresponding spatial organisation through which political authority, economic interaction, technological innovation, and strategic connectivity become territorially embedded. In this sense, geopolitical macro-spaces are not the passive settings of international politics but one of its principal historical products.

The current transition towards an increasingly polycentric international order is generating precisely such a transformation. The relative diffusion of economic capabilities, technological innovation, demographic dynamism, and political influence beyond the traditional Atlantic core has produced multiple centres of strategic initiative. Within this evolving context, connectivity assumes significance that extends well beyond the construction of physical infrastructure. Maritime routes, ports, logistics platforms, digital networks, energy corridors, submarine cables, financial mechanisms, and technological standards become essential instruments through which political actors organise space and project influence. Connectivity therefore constitutes one of the principal mechanisms through which contemporary geopolitical macro-spaces are progressively formed.

The Indo-Mediterranean should be understood within this broader analytical framework. Its emergence does not stem solely from the implementation of the India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor or from the growing importance of maritime trade between South Asia and Europe. Rather, it reflects the progressive integration of multiple strategic subsystems—including the Indian Ocean, the Arabian Peninsula, the Gulf, the Red Sea, the Eastern Mediterranean, and Southern Europe—into an increasingly coherent geopolitical configuration.

This perspective builds on the classical geopolitical insight that political power and geographical space are inextricably linked. However, whereas traditional geopolitical theories primarily focused on strategic regions, continental balances, and the distribution of power among states, the contemporary transformation of the international order calls for analytical categories capable of explaining the emergence of new macro-spatial configurations shaped by connectivity, technological infrastructure, transregional interactions, and multiple centres of political authority. The notion of macro-space inevitably recalls Carl Schmitt’s concept of the Großraum; unlike Schmitt’s construction, which presupposed a hegemonic power ordering the space around it, the macro-space discussed here is defined precisely by the absence of a single ordering centre.^[1]

The concept of the geopolitical macro-space proposed in this article is intended as a contribution to this renewed theoretical agenda, extending contemporary geopolitical reflection on the organisation of strategic spatiality^[2] by providing an analytical framework for understanding how international orders reorganise space amid polycentric transformation.

From Connectivity to Geopolitical Macro-Space: The Making of the Indo-Mediterranean

The growing relevance of the Indo-Mediterranean cannot be explained solely by the proliferation of infrastructure projects or the expansion of commercial exchanges between South Asia, the Gulf, and Europe. Rather, it reflects the progressive convergence of multiple geopolitical dynamics that are reshaping the strategic architecture of a vast transregional area stretching from the Indian Ocean to the Mediterranean Sea.

Connectivity is a principal manifestation of this transformation, but it should not be confused with its underlying cause. Ports, maritime corridors, railways, energy pipelines, digital infrastructure, and logistics networks are not merely instruments that facilitate trade; they also help reorganise political influence, strategic interdependence, and regional hierarchies. In other words, infrastructure does not simply connect existing geopolitical spaces; it actively participates in constructing new ones.

At this point, a conceptual distinction is necessary. Connectivity refers to the material and immaterial networks that facilitate the circulation of goods, capital, information, energy, technologies, and people. In recent years, connectivity has become a central analytical concept for understanding the reorganisation of global interactions. By contrast, geopolitical integration denotes the political process by which such networks become embedded in stable patterns of strategic interaction, institutional cooperation, and long-term political alignment. Connectivity creates networks; geopolitical integration creates geopolitical macro-spaces. Infrastructure alone does not generate geopolitical space. A geopolitical macro-space emerges only when connectivity is transformed into a durable framework of political, economic, technological, and strategic relationships.

This distinction is analytically significant. Conventional approaches often treat connectivity as an essentially economic phenomenon, emphasising efficiency, trade facilitation, and market integration. While these dimensions remain important, they only partially explain the strategic significance of contemporary transregional corridors. The Indo-Mediterranean exemplifies this multidimensional process. Its emergence stems from growing interaction among several strategic subsystems that have historically been studied separately: the Indian Ocean, the Arabian Peninsula, the Gulf, the Red Sea, the Eastern Mediterranean, and Southern Europe. Increasing maritime exchanges, energy interdependence, digital connectivity, financial cooperation, technological partnerships, and security dialogues have progressively eroded the analytical boundaries separating these regions, giving rise to a more integrated strategic environment.

Within this framework, the India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC), formally launched via a Memorandum of Understanding signed on the margins of the G20 New Delhi Summit in September 2023, should be understood as an expression of a broader geopolitical transformation rather than its primary cause. The corridor institutionalises and accelerates trends already reshaping the region, including India’s westward strategic projection, the Gulf monarchies’ growing geopolitical role, the renewed strategic importance of the Eastern Mediterranean, and European actors’ search for diversified economic and logistical partnerships.

The Indo-Mediterranean thus constitutes an emerging geopolitical macro-space, the coherence of which stems from the interplay of maritime geography, infrastructure development, political cooperation, technological integration, and the evolving distribution of power across Eurasia and its surrounding maritime domains.

The Indo-Mediterranean as a Polycentric Geopolitical Configuration

The emergence of the Indo-Mediterranean illustrates one of the most significant spatial consequences of the ongoing transformation of the international order. Unlike traditional geopolitical regions, whose coherence often rested on geographical proximity or institutional integration, the Indo-Mediterranean is being shaped by the interaction of multiple centres of power, whose relationships are increasingly defined by strategic complementarity rather than hierarchical dependence.

The distinction between multipolarity and polycentrism is particularly relevant in this context. Multipolarity primarily concerns the distribution of power among sovereign states and therefore remains conceptually rooted in the Westphalian understanding of international politics. It describes a system of several major state powers whose interactions determine the overall balance of power.

Polycentrism, by contrast, offers a broader analytical framework. While states remain the principal actors, the international order is increasingly shaped by the interaction of multiple centres of political, economic, technological, financial, normative, and infrastructural power across different scales. These centres include not only states but also regional organisations, transnational infrastructure networks, financial hubs, technological ecosystems, maritime corridors, and other strategic actors capable of influencing the organisation of international space.^[3]

Accordingly, multipolarity concerns the distribution of capabilities, whereas polycentrism concerns the organisation of the international order and the production of geopolitical space. This evolving configuration spans a vast maritime and continental continuum linking the Indian Ocean, the Arabian Peninsula, the Gulf, the Red Sea, the Eastern Mediterranean, and Southern Europe. Its coherence derives not from a single political authority or security architecture, but from the growing convergence of economic interests, technological cooperation, infrastructure development, maritime security, and diplomatic engagement among its principal actors.

Within this macro-space, India occupies an increasingly prominent position. Its sustained economic growth, demographic weight, technological capabilities, expanding naval presence, and proactive diplomatic initiatives have progressively transformed the country into one of the principal centres of the emerging polycentric order. India’s strategic engagement with the Gulf monarchies, partnerships with Mediterranean countries, and growing participation in transregional connectivity projects demonstrate an increasingly westward geopolitical orientation that complements its established role in the Indo-Pacific.

The Gulf region has undergone a profound strategic transformation. No longer viewed primarily as an energy-exporting periphery, the Gulf monarchies have become active geopolitical actors, investing in logistics, finance, advanced technologies, renewable energy, artificial intelligence, and maritime infrastructure. Their sovereign wealth funds, global investment strategies, and expanding diplomatic networks have significantly enhanced their capacity to shape the geopolitical evolution of the wider Indo-Mediterranean.

The Eastern Mediterranean and Southern Europe occupy a strategic position within this evolving configuration. Rather than marking the western terminus of Asian connectivity, they increasingly serve as active interfaces linking European markets, North African economies, West Asian energy systems, and maritime routes connecting the Mediterranean with the Indian Ocean. The growing Indian presence in Mediterranean port infrastructure—exemplified by Adani Ports’ acquisition of a controlling stake in the port of Haifa in early 2023—illustrates this evolving role. Their significance therefore derives not merely from geography but from their capacity to facilitate multidirectional political, economic, and technological exchanges.

East Africa also acquires renewed geopolitical importance within this framework. Ports, maritime infrastructure, digital connectivity, and expanding commercial relations increasingly integrate the eastern coast of Africa into Indo-Mediterranean dynamics. As maritime trade and investment intensify, East Africa is increasingly becoming an indispensable component of this broader macro-spatial configuration. These dynamics are already evident: Gulf logistics operators have invested extensively in ports along the Horn of Africa and the East African seaboard; India has framed its engagement with the western Indian Ocean through its SAGAR and, more recently, MAHASAGAR maritime visions; and the India–Italy Joint Declaration of May 2026 explicitly envisages trilateral development projects in Africa, combining India’s digital public infrastructure with Italy’s Mattei Plan.^[4] Far from being on the periphery of the emerging configuration, East Africa is one of the arenas where the polycentric character of the Indo-Mediterranean will be tested.

The consolidation of this macro-space is, however, contingent rather than inevitable. The attacks on commercial shipping in the Red Sea since late 2023, which forced a substantial share of Europe–Asia trade to reroute around the Cape of Good Hope, have exposed the vulnerability of the maritime backbone underpinning Indo-Mediterranean connectivity. The stalling of normalisation processes in West Asia following the war in Gaza has likewise slowed the political alignments that IMEC presupposes. Competing connectivity frameworks—most notably China’s Belt and Road Initiative and the European Union’s Global Gateway—alongside persistent intra-regional rivalries further complicate the emergence of a coherent strategic configuration.^[5]

External great powers may equally shape its consolidation: the United States remains a central security actor in the Gulf and may seek to embed the new connectivity schemes within existing US-centred security architectures, while Russia promotes the International North–South Transport Corridor as an alternative Eurasian axis and maintains close relations with the Gulf monarchies, notably through energy coordination. These constraints do not invalidate the macro-spatial dynamics analysed here, but they underscore that geopolitical macro-spaces are political constructions whose consolidation depends on sustained agency, not on geographical destiny.

The Indo-Mediterranean should therefore not be interpreted as a geopolitical space dominated by a single hegemonic actor. Its defining characteristic is the coexistence of multiple centres of decision-making, each with distinct political priorities, economic capabilities, and strategic interests. Cooperation and competition coexist within a framework of selective interdependence that reflects the broader logic of an increasingly polycentric international order.

This emerging macro-space differs from both traditional regional systems and classical geopolitical spheres of influence. It is neither an alliance nor a homogeneous geopolitical bloc. Rather, it constitutes a flexible strategic configuration in which multiple actors simultaneously contribute to the production of geopolitical space while preserving significant degrees of political autonomy. These characteristics make the Indo-Mediterranean one of the clearest contemporary manifestations of the transition towards a polycentric world order.

Italy as a Mediterranean Strategic Interface

The emergence of the Indo-Mediterranean macro-space also invites a reconsideration of the geopolitical role of Southern Europe, particularly Italy. Traditional interpretations have often portrayed Italy as Europe’s southern frontier or as a logistical gateway between the Mediterranean and continental markets. Such perspectives, however, underestimate the broader strategic implications of the ongoing reconfiguration of the international order. Within an emerging polycentric system, Italy’s geopolitical significance derives less from its position within Europe than from its location at the intersection of multiple strategic spaces. Situated at the centre of the Mediterranean, Italy occupies a privileged position, linking the European continent with North Africa, the Balkans, the Eastern Mediterranean, the Middle East, and, via the Suez Canal and the Red Sea, the wider Indo-Mediterranean maritime system.

In this context, the notion of a strategic interface proves analytically useful. A strategic interface is more than a geographical crossroads or a logistical gateway: it designates a geopolitical space where different macro-spatial configurations intersect and interact, generating durable political, economic, technological, and security relationships. Strategic interfaces facilitate the articulation of geopolitical macro-spaces without dissolving their respective centres of decision-making. They are therefore essential to a polycentric international order, enabling differentiated forms of cooperation while preserving the autonomy of the actors involved.

This centrality is not merely geographical. It depends on the country’s capacity to participate actively in the political, economic, technological, and infrastructural networks that increasingly structure the Indo-Mediterranean macro-space. Ports, logistics platforms, digital infrastructure, energy interconnections, industrial cooperation, scientific partnerships, and maritime security all contribute to redefining Italy’s strategic role within this evolving geopolitical configuration. Relations between Italy and India take on particular significance in this context. Italy is today India’s fourth-largest trading partner within the European Union, with bilateral trade of around €14 billion in 2025.^[6]

Over the past decade, bilateral cooperation has broadened beyond traditional commercial exchanges to encompass defence, maritime security, advanced manufacturing, space technologies, digital innovation, renewable energy, and higher education. The elevation of bilateral relations to a Strategic Partnership in 2023 and the adoption of the India–Italy Joint Strategic Action Plan 2025–2029 have provided this convergence with an explicit institutional framework.^[7]

In May 2026, the relationship was elevated to a Special Strategic Partnership: the Joint Declaration adopted in Rome sets a bilateral trade target of €20 billion by 2029, reaffirms both governments’ commitment to IMEC—encouraging its first ministerial meeting to take concrete steps to advance the initiative in 2026—and envisages interconnected port networks through a dedicated maritime transport agreement. Significantly, the joint article signed by the two Prime Ministers for the occasion explicitly referred to the emergence of the Indo-Mediterranean as an interconnected space linking the Indian Ocean to Europe.^[8] These developments reflect broader structural changes in the international system, as medium and major powers increasingly diversify their strategic partnerships beyond traditional alliance frameworks.

The Indo-Mediterranean consequently offers Italy the opportunity to develop a more autonomous and multidimensional geopolitical projection. Rather than acting exclusively within an Atlantic or European framework, Italy may increasingly contribute to consolidating a wider strategic space linking Europe with the Indian Ocean through mutually beneficial partnerships based on economic complementarity, technological cooperation, maritime security, and political dialogue.

For India, Italy is more than a European trading partner. It is one of the principal Mediterranean gateways through which relations with Southern Europe, North Africa, and the wider Mediterranean basin can be strengthened. The growing convergence of Italian and Indian strategic interests therefore illustrates how the Indo-Mediterranean is progressively fostering new patterns of cooperation that transcend conventional regional boundaries.

From this perspective, Italy should not be seen as the western endpoint of Indo-Mediterranean connectivity. Rather, it is one of the political and strategic interfaces through which the emerging macro-space acquires coherence and functional integration. Its future relevance will depend less on geographical determinism than on its capacity to formulate a long-term geopolitical strategy consistent with the evolving polycentric order.

Conclusion

The concept of the Indo-Mediterranean reflects far more than the emergence of a new geographical label or the implementation of a major infrastructure initiative. It represents one of the most significant spatial manifestations of the ongoing transformation of the international system. This article has argued that the Indo-Mediterranean should be understood as an emerging geopolitical macro-space rather than merely a corridor of connectivity linking India, the Middle East, and Europe.

The India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor is undoubtedly one of the most visible expressions of this transformation. Nevertheless, it should be understood as part of a broader historical process rather than as its origin. The Indo-Mediterranean represents neither the replacement of existing geopolitical regions nor the establishment of a new hegemonic sphere of influence. Rather, it exemplifies the emergence of a polycentric spatial order in which multiple autonomous centres interact through differentiated forms of cooperation, competition, and strategic interdependence.

The concept of the Indo-Mediterranean as a geopolitical macro-space is intended not merely as a regional category but as a contribution to a broader theoretical understanding of the evolving relationship among power, space, and international order in the twenty-first century.

Author Brief Bio: Tiberio Graziani is the Chairman of Vision & Global Trend -International Institute for Global Analyses. He currently teaches at the International Doctoral School in “Law and Social Change: The Challenges of Transnational Regulation” at Roma Tre University. He is the Editor-in-Chief of Geopolitica which is a Journal of Geopolitics and Related Matters. He is a Member of several scientific committees of academic journals, including World Affairs (India), GeoPolitica (Romania), Sicurezza e Giustizia (Italy). He is also a Member of the: Advisory Board for the Political Science Area of Link Campus University; Advisory Committee of the Degree Program in “Diplomatic, International and Global Security Studies”, University of Salerno.

Bibliography

Acharya, Amitav. The End of American World Order. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2014.

Agnew, John. “The Territorial Trap: The Geographical Assumptions of International Relations Theory.” Review of International Political Economy 1, no. 1 (1994): 53–80.

Bull, Hedley. The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics. London: Macmillan, 1977.

Buzan, Barry. From International to World Society? English School Theory and the Social Structure of Globalisation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004.

Carpentier de Gourdon, Côme. “India’s Quest for Strategic Autonomy in the New (Cold?) War.” In India: A Eurasian Power. The Challenges of Economic Growth, Strategic Positioning, and Evolving International Relations, edited by Alberto Cossu and Tiberio Graziani, 45–56. Callive Edizioni, 2026.

Cohen, Saul Bernard. Geopolitics: The Geography of International Relations. 2nd ed. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2009.

“India–Italy Joint Declaration.” Rome, May 20, 2026.

Khanna, Parag. Connectography: Mapping the Future of Global Civilization. New York: Random House, 2016.

“Memorandum of Understanding on the Principles of an India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor.” New Delhi, September 9, 2023.

Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India. “India–Italy Joint Strategic Action Plan 2025–2029.” Joint Statement, November 2024.

Modi, Narendra, and Giorgia Meloni. “Italy and India: A Strategic Partnership for the Indo-Mediterranean.” Joint op-ed published in several international outlets, May 20, 2026.

Pigliucci, Michele. “Unione Europea e India: un partenariato strategico alla sfida delle tensioni globali.” In India: A Eurasian Power, edited by Alberto Cossu and Tiberio Graziani, 167–178. Callive Edizioni, 2026.

Schmitt, Carl. “The Großraum Order of International Law with a Ban on Intervention for Spatially Foreign Powers.” In Writings on War, edited and translated by Timothy Nunan, 75–124. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2011.

Endnotes

^[1] Carl Schmitt, “The Großraum Order of International Law with a Ban on Intervention for Spatially Foreign Powers: A Contribution to the Concept of Reich in International Law (1939–1941),” in Writings on War, ed. and trans. Timothy Nunan (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2011), 75–124.

^[2] Saul Bernard Cohen, Geopolitics: The Geography of International Relations, 2nd ed. (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2009).

^[3] For a cognate account of the emerging order as a “multiplex world,” see Amitav Acharya, The End of American World Order (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2014). Whereas Acharya’s multiplex describes the coexistence of multiple actors, layers, and regional orders, polycentrism as employed here is a spatial category: it concerns the way an emerging international order produces and organizes geopolitical space.

^[4] “India–Italy Joint Declaration,” Rome, May 20, 2026, which envisages trilateral initiatives with African partners in fields including digital public infrastructure, agriculture, health, education, artificial intelligence, connectivity, and renewable energy, in connection with India’s development partnerships in Africa and Italy’s Mattei Plan.

^[5] On the EU–India partnership and the Global Gateway as a connectivity axis alternative to the Belt and Road Initiative, see Michele Pigliucci, “Unione Europea e India: un partenariato strategico alla sfida delle tensioni globali,” in India: A Eurasian Power, ed. Alberto Cossu and Tiberio Graziani (Callive Edizioni, 2026), 167–178.

^[6] Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, “India–Italy Bilateral Relations,” country brief, 2026.

^[7] Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, “India–Italy Joint Strategic Action Plan 2025–2029,” Joint Statement, November 2024.

^[8] “India–Italy Joint Declaration,” adopted on the occasion of the elevation of the bilateral relationship to a Special Strategic Partnership, Rome, May 20, 2026. See also Narendra Modi and Giorgia Meloni, “Italy and India: A Strategic Partnership for the Indo-Mediterranean,” joint op-ed published on the occasion of the visit, May 20, 2026.

Introduction

On 20 May 2026, in a joint op-ed titled A Strategic Partnership for the Indo-Mediterranean, published across various Italian and Indian media outlets, the Indian and Italian leaders, Narendra Modi and Giorgia Meloni, welcomed “the emergence of the Indo-Mediterranean.”^[1] This raises two issues. Firstly, the paradigm shifts that have brought India and Italy to a common adoption of an Indo-Mediterranean strategic framework. Secondly, the nature of their Indo-Mediterranean partnership.

In 2021, Vas Shenoy spoke of “the seeds… for the creation and development of a new, expanded Indo-Mediterranean” in the context of Modi’s discussions with Mario Draghi, the Italian Prime Minister, during which the two leaders announced a Strategic Partnership on Energy Transition and a Statement of Intent on Textiles Cooperation.^[2] These “seeds” have since flowered with the advent of the Meloni administration in late 2022, when Italian and Indian strategic convergence over the Indo-Mediterranean directly informs their burgeoning defence and economic partnership. It also reflects their strong mutual support for economic and digital corridors across the Indo-Mediterranean.

Paradigm Shifts

Strategic paradigms often overlap and shift. The 1980s arrival of the “Asia-Pacific” was a Pacific Rim initiative launched by Australia, Japan and the US, which led to the creation of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) in 1989. China joined in 1991, but India was excluded. The 2010s arrival of the “Indo-Pacific” marked a westward shift, bringing the Indian Ocean into the geographical frame and India into the political one. As a term, the “Indo-Mediterranean” has entered strategic discourse in recent years, as noted in 2021 by the previously cited Vas Shenoy.

Geographically, the Indo-Mediterranean represents a further westward shift from the Indo-Pacific. Literally, the Indo-Mediterranean could be understood as spanning the whole Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean from Singapore to Gibraltar. In practice, it has been seen as running from the Eastern Mediterranean to the Arabian Sea, from Italy to the west coast of India, as “strategic space in the making.”^[3] As Ambassador Gurjit Singh put it, India and Italy are “partners in peninsularity”.^[4] Their peninsular locations, Italy’s extending into the Mediterranean and India’s into the Indian Ocean, enable their mutual projection and thereby their mutual encounter. Geopolitically, their strategic neighbourhoods have expanded and now overlap across the Indo-Mediterranean. India has moved westwards across the Red Sea and the Mediterranean towards Italy, while Italy has moved eastwards across the Red Sea and the Arabian Sea towards India. Italy’s Ambassador to India, Antonio Bartoli, has commented that “there is a common space that we could call Indo-Mediterranean, that is the link between two vital basins for our respective nations”.^[5]

India: Extending Westwards beyond the Arabian Sea

India’s adoption of the term Indo-Mediterranean reflects its strategic push westwards. During the 1990s, India’s existing “immediate neighbourhood” focus within South Asia was overlaid with an “extended neighbourhood” outreach, initially eastwards towards South-East Asia.^[6]

The Look West policy announced in 2003 was economics-oriented towards the Gulf. Modi’s Act West reformulation has embraced security cooperation in the Gulf and a wider application elsewhere in the Middle East.^[7] This Middle East outreach took India to the shores of the Mediterranean, where close defence ties with Israel, established in the 2000s, have accelerated under Modi, the first Indian Prime Minister to visit Israel in 2017. In 2023, India’s Adani Group acquired a 70% stake in Israel’s Haifa port, a designated Mediterranean anchor for IMEC, the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor. Modi’s visit in November 2025 brought an MoU on Defence Cooperation.

India’s naval projection has been “westward-bound” this century.^[8] Indian naval thinking has consequently shifted. The 2015 Indian Maritime Security Strategy (IMSS) expanded India’s area of “primary interest” (identified as the Indian Ocean in the 2007 IMSS) to include the Red Sea (a “secondary” interest in the 2007 IMSS), while the Mediterranean (absent from the 2007 IMSS) was added as an area of “secondary” strategic interest.^[9] This was accompanied by a maritime posture (like Italy’s) to safeguard choke points and strategic conduits in the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea, an extended naval theatre of operations first seen with anti-piracy deployments commencing in 2008 and strengthened in 2023, in the wake of Houthi disruption, with Operation Sankalp “safeguarding India’s maritime interests.”^[10]

India has extended its “extended neighbourhood” into the Mediterranean. India’s Minister for External Affairs, Subrahmanyam Jaishankar, emphasised in 2022, “I want to drive home the point that where the Mediterranean is concerned, it is a region of growing interest to us…. in the last few years…. there has been very visible intensification of those ties.”^[11] Geoeconomics is also on display. At the India Mediterranean Business Conclave, Jaishankar argued that “Mediterranean ports and maritime routes have long facilitated East-West trade”, that “our task is to make history work positively in the contemporary era”, and that, consequently, “we want to deepen our engagement with the Mediterranean region.”^[12] Moving across the Eastern Mediterranean, India has developed close security ties with Cyprus and Greece, which were consolidated during Modi’s 2025 visits, with an Indo-Mediterranean rationale, tacitly, to counter close defence ties between Turkey and Pakistan. Last, but certainly not least, India has developed close ties with Italy following Meloni’s visit to India in 2023.

Italy: Extending Eastwards Beyond the Mediterranean

The Mediterranean is Italy’s starting point and immediate neighbourhood, giving rise to the old Roman view of the Mediterranean as Mare Nostrum, “Our Sea.” The Roman Empire not only controlled the Mediterranean but also held power in the upper Red Sea, at times pushing down to Yemen and the gates of the Indian Ocean. From that Red Sea position, a flourishing trade with India was established. The colonial period saw Italian colonies spread across the Eastern Mediterranean (Albania, Libya, Dodecanese), the Red Sea (Eritrea), and the Indian Ocean (Somalia). In the 1990s, the concept of a “Wider/Extended Mediterranean” (Mediterraneo allargato) arose in Italian naval circles, accompanied by a maritime posture (like India’s) to safeguard choke points and strategic conduits: in the Persian Gulf in the early 1990s, since 2008 in the Gulf of Aden with the Atalanta operation, and since 2024 in the Red Sea with the Aspides.

Meloni extended the Meditterraneo allargato concept in her Press Statement with Modi in March 2023, “when we talk about the wider Mediterranean, we must consider that it extends all the way here”, i.e. over the Arabian Sea to India.^[13] India’s ambassador, Vani Rao, reciprocated, “We welcome Italy’s wider Mediterranean strategy… in which India is a key player.”^[14] Meloni’s Italy has taken an active role beyond the Mediterranean, with high-level visits and links established with Eritrea, Saudi Arabia, Djibouti and the Gulf countries, as shown when Meloni attended the Gulf Cooperation Council Summit in 2026 as a privileged invitee. Most significantly, Italy has deepened its cooperation with India, in an accelerating and explicit Indo-Mediterranean partnership.

An Indo-Mediterranean Partnership.

In this “Indo-Mediterranean era”, Italy’s and India’s policies have shifted from parallel “resonance” to strategic “convergence”.^[15] Jaishankar’s strategic logic is simple: “it makes eminent sense to connect what Italy is doing in the Mediterranean with what India is doing in the Arabian Sea for mutual benefit.”^[16] As Italy increasingly operates in the Indian Ocean, it cannot ignore India; and as India increasingly operates in the Mediterranean, it cannot ignore Italy. Italy plays a “growing role in India’s maritime and defence calculus”, and vice versa.^[17]

Under Modi and Meloni’s leadership, India-Italy cooperation has surged across trade, defence and emerging technologies, amid mutual talk of their “Indo-Mediterranean strategic axis.”^[18] A Strategic Partnership was announced during Meloni’s visit to India in 2023. The following year, the joint Italy-India Strategic Action Plan 2025-2029 opened with Indian and Italian affirmations of “awareness of the unparalleled potential” of their Strategic Partnership.^[19] This Strategic Partnership was formally elevated to a Special Strategic Partnership, marking a “new era” announced during Modi’s 2026 visit to Italy.^[20] Modi captured the personal warmth between the two leaders by presenting Meloni with a bag of ‘Melody’ toffees from the Indian firm Parle upon his arrival in Rome; Meloni video-posted it on X under the nickname “Team Melodi”, making it an instant viral meme! Their evident camaraderie underpinned their equally strategic deals.^[21]

Jaishankar emphasises maritime strategic logic; “India, as part of its Indo-Mediterranean… our maritime interests… bring the two countries closer.”^[22] Maritime cooperation has been evident since 2023, with India’s Navy exercising with the Italian Navy in the Mediterranean and Italy’s Navy exercising with India’s Navy in the Arabian Sea. The joint carrier-to-carrier exercises between India’s INS Vikramaditya and Italy’s ITS Cavour in October 2024, off the west coast of India, were a particularly potent and substantive moment of bilateral maritime cooperation and seapower projection. Both navies participated in the Bright Star Exercise 2025, held off Alexandria, involving other Indo-Mediterranean actors. In 2026, both countries agreed to establish a Maritime Security Dialogue focused on their shared Indo-Mediterranean space.

Defence cooperation has deepened, reflecting their Defence Cooperation Agreement signed in 2023. This represents a determined effort to move beyond the AugustaWestland helicopter issue, the order cancelled by India in 2014 following a bribery scandal involving the Italian company Augusta. Fincantieri secured contracts in December 2025 to fit heavyweight torpedoes to India’s Scorpene submarines, which “fits into a broader Indo-Mediterranean security strategy.”^[23] Leonardo (which had taken over Agusta) and Adani agreed in February 2026 to collaborate on the production, maintenance and phased indigenisation of advanced AW169M and AW109 TrekkerM helicopters for the Indian military. In April 2026, the Indian and Italian Defence Ministers signed the Military Cooperation Plan 2026-2027.^[24] A Defence Industrial Roadmap was announced during Modi’s visit to Rome in May 2026, along with a Joint Declaration of Intent on Strengthening the Bilateral Defence Industrial Cooperation.

Italian and Indian politicians emphasise similar themes. Italy’s President, Sergio Mattarella, in his official greetings to his Indian counterpart, President Droupadi Murmu, on India’s Republic Day in January 2026, stressed their “converging interests, beginning with the protection of a rules-based international order, the peaceful pursuit of security and stability along the Indo-Mediterranean arc.”^[25] In a similar vein, Jaishankar argued in May 2025, at the National Day Reception for Italy, that “in and across the Indo-Mediterranean, as peninsular nations, India and Italy share maritime interests and a commitment to ensuring freedom of navigation and shipping.”^[26]

Likewise, Italy’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Antonio Tajani, argued, “We share the same concerns as natural maritime powers. In the whole Indo-Mediterranean region, we both promote the principles of freedom of navigation.”^[27] At the India Maritime Week in November 2025, Italy’s Deputy Minister of Infrastructure, Edoardo Rixi, argued that “India and Italy share a common vision of the sea…. we are natural partners in the broader Indo-Mediterranean region…. we shape new geopolitics of the seas.”^[28] Their geopolitics of the sea is a Mahanian focus on seapower and chokepoint security across the Indo-Mediterranean. Geo-economics is also on the cards. Modi explained in his Press Statement in May 2026, in Rome, “as maritime powers, close cooperation between India and Italy in the field of connectivity is only natural;” to be applied across the Indo-Mediterranean through economic and digital corridors.^[29]

Indian and Italian diplomats have embraced Indo-Mediterranean terms of reference for their strategic partnership. Bartoli, Italy’s Ambassador to India since July 2024, argued that “we are both peninsulas projected into the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean. These seas are increasingly interconnected and part of a single Indo-Mediterranean space.”^[30] Vani Rao, India’s Ambassador to Italy since April 2024, likewise considered that “the Indo-Mediterranean… represent one vast maritime and geographical space in which we share common strategic interests” with Italy.^[31] Bartoli argued that, on the geopolitical front, “Italy and India share common interests, but also joint challenges in the Indo-Mediterranean Sea [which] require our joint efforts to ensure a free, open, and prosperous Indo-Mediterranean” (FOPIM?).^[32] This is a deliberate echo of the Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) formulation used further east, with a common challenge to China present in both the FOIP Indo-Pacific and FOPIM Indo-Mediterranean formulations.^[33]

Both Bartoli and Rao attended the Track 1.5 Indo-Mediterranean Initiative, announced at the India Forum 2024 in Rome, which was co-chaired by Vas Shenoy, appointed as the Indian Chamber of Commerce Representative in Italy in November 2023, and Senator Giulio Terzi di Sant’Agata, President of the India-Italy Parliamentary Friendship Group.^[34]  Shenoy and Sant’Agata agreed that the India-Italy partnership serves as “champions for the Indo-Mediterranean.”^[35] Both Bartoli and Rao attended the workshop Indo-Mediterranean: Italy and India, a Special Relationship, held in November 2024 by Rome’s Med-Or Foundation and New Delhi’s Strategic and Defense Research, “with a particular focus on maritime security and the Italian and Indian naval cooperation, the IMEC corridor project.”^[36]

Economic Corridors

The India-Italy partnership makes geo-economic sense, given their self-perceived role as the two main pillars or anchors of the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC), which runs from Mumbai to Trieste. This underpinned their Memorandum of Understanding on cooperation in ports, logistics and infrastructure, signed during Modi’s visit to Italy in May 2026.

History from the past informs the present, as Tajani notes that “Italy and India have been for ages two natural terminals in the common Indo-Mediterranean area, tied by an intense exchange of trade.”^[37] More specifically, the Ambassador to India, Antonio Bartoli, noted that “Rome and India were already trading two thousand years ago… the future Indo-Mediterranean corridor IMEC, for goods and data, is a modern re-edition of an ancient route.”^[38] As Italy’s Special Envoy for IMEC, Antonio Talò explained, IMEC was “a vision directly connected to the concept of the Indo-Mediterranean: a geopolitical reading based on seas and connections” linking India and the Mediterranean.^[39]

Deliberately invoking the earlier Roman-period trade system, Italy labels IMEC la via del cotone, “The Cotton Road/Route.” As Jaishankar noted in November 2023, “what, Senator, you call the Cotton Road, which in many ways is like a revival return of history…. we are very happy to see Italy there.”^[40] This Cotton Road invocation also ties into the Cotton Route 3-year project, which focuses on older links and was funded in 2015 by India’s Ministry of External Affairs. This was undertaken as a “counter” to China’s Maritime Silk Road (MSR) initiative announced in 2013, which also invoked historical flows along the old Silk Route from China to the Roman Empire.^[41] New Delhi and Rome’s immediate and strong support for IMEC has been dubbed a “Cotton Route alliance between Italy and India to counterbalance China.”^[42]

IMEC was launched in September 2023 at the G-20 summit in New Delhi. Two corridors were proposed. The first was a relatively simple eastern maritime corridor from Mumbai to the Gulf (UAE). The second was a more complex northern corridor through the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan, to the Israeli port of Haifa, from which maritime routes to Italy (Taranto and Trieste) and France (Marseilles) extend. To serve the overland route from the Gulf to the Mediterranean, a railway transit network was proposed to supplement established road routes.

Both Italy and India are strong supporters of IMEC.^[43] Modi explained that IMEC “is going to become the basis of world trade for hundreds of years to come, and history will always remember that this corridor was initiated on Indian soil.”^[44] Similarly, at the 2024 Rome Mediterranean Dialogue, Meloni noted, “Italy played a key role in launching this initiative within the G-20 and it intends to remain at the forefront.”^[45] IMEC serves as a counterweight to China’s Maritime Silk Road (MSR), which also crosses the Indian Ocean into the Mediterranean. India has boycotted the MSR, while Meloni’s government quickly withdrew from it on taking power in 2022.

Digital Corridors

Digital infrastructure is another area for Italy-India cooperation, exemplified by the Europe-Africa-India Digital Corridor linking Italy (Genoa) to India (Mumbai). Tajani noted that “connectivity is becoming an increasingly strategic dimension of our cooperation. A significant example is the Blue & Raman submarine cable project.”^[46] Italy’s telecommunications giant Sparkle is installing undersea cables across the Mediterranean to Haifa as part of the BlueMed wing, with a Raman wing envisaged extending down the Red Sea from Aqaba and across the Arabian Sea to Mumbai, where Sparkle signed a “strategic” partnership agreement with the Indian company Airtel in September 2024.^[47] Reflecting its importance to Italian digital strategy, the Meloni government took a controlling 70% share in Sparkle in April 2026. The Blue-Raman scheme is counterpoised by China’s Pakistan and East Africa Connecting Europe (PEACE) initiative; planned from Gwadar in Pakistan across to Djibouti, up the Red Sea to Egypt and then the Mediterranean. This is part of China’s Digital Silk Route (DSR) initiative, which concerns both India and Italy.

Conclusion: Looking Forward

The India-Italy strategic partnership looks set to deepen further across the Indo-Mediterranean. With India and Italy less sure of US support under Donald Trump, and with their common concerns over China remaining evident, the strategic logic for the India-Italy partnership, mutual support, is all the more relevant. India may be the bigger partner, but both benefit.

Defence technology transfers should increase under the Defence Industry Roadmap agreed in 2026. Fincantieri’s Landing Platform Dock expertise offers another area for collaboration with India, enabling greater Indian maritime reach across the Indian Ocean. Similarly, military exercises should increase, given India and Italy’s growing deployments into each other’s strategic backyards. Their 2023 Defence Cooperation Agreement awaits further, but eminently achievable, development into a Logistics Support Agreement, similar to those that India and Italy both enjoy with Japan.

Trade is likely to increase under the EU-India Free Trade Agreement, signed in January 2026, with the Modi-Meloni summit in May 2026 setting a bilateral trade target rising from €14 billion in 2025 to €20 billion by 2029. With regard to IMEC and the Digital Corridor, the Mediterranean (Italy’s sphere) and Arabian Sea (India’s sphere) wings of both projects are well established. However, first the Gaza conflict in late 2023 and then the Gulf War disruption of the Strait of Hormuz during 2026 have complicated the construction of IMEC’s Land Rail Corridor running across the Arabian Peninsula to exit at Haifa, as well as the Digital Corridor’s Aqaba-Haifa link. This is compounded by Houthi disruption of the Red Sea, first in sympathy with Hamas/Gaza in 2023 and then in sympathy with Iran in 2026. Middle East volatility makes completion of these linking land-bridges all the more important, but all the more hostage to fortune outside Italy and India’s control.

Author Brief Bio: Dr David Scott is a member of the Centre for International Maritime Security (CIMSEC) and is a prolific writer on India, the Indian Ocean, the Indo-Pacific and Indo-Mediterranean maritime geopolitics.

Endnotes:

^[1] Narendra Modi and Giorgia Meloni, “Italy and India. A Strategic Partnership for the Indo-Mediterannean,” May 20, 2026, https://www.narendramodi.in/italy-and-india-a-strategic-partnership-for-the-indo-mediterranean-20th-may-twenty-twenty-six-605524. Also Emanuele Rossi, “Indo-Mediterranean Doctrine enters the Strategic Mainstream,” Decode39, May 20, 2026, https://decode39.com/14874/indo-mediterranean-doctrine-enters-the-strategic-mainstream/.

^[2] Vas Shenoy, “Exploring Draghi’s Italy and its Relation with India,” Decode39, December 30, 2021, https://decode39.com/2580/draghi-italy-india-vas-shenoy/.

^[3] David Scott, “The ‘Indo-Mediterranean’: Strategic Space in the Making,” Journal of Territorial and Maritime Studies 13, no. 2 (2026): 86-105.

^[4] Gurjit Singh, “India and Italy: Partners in Peninsularity,” Gateway House, March 16, 2023, https://www.gatewayhouse.in/india-and-italy-consolidate-partnership/.

^[5] Antonio Bartoli, “Interview” (Italy Backs India’s Defence Ambitions!), WION, July 13, 2026, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vNXxFW5PPu8.

^[6] Scott, “India’s ‘Extended Neighborhood’ Concept: Power Projection for a Rising Power.” India Review 8, no. 2 (2009): 107-143.

^[7] Samuel Rajiv, “Modi’s ‘Act West’ Policy in Motion,” Syama Prasad Mookerjee Research Foundation, March 15, 2017, https://spmrf.org/modis-act-west-policy-motion/.

^[8] Yuval Zur, Tamir Magal and Nadav Kedem, “The Growing Power of the Indian Navy: Westward Bound,” Military and Strategic Affairs 4, no. 2 (2012): 101-116.

^[9] Ensuring Secure Seas: Indian Maritime Security Strategy (New Delhi: Integrated Headquarters, Ministry of Defence (Navy), 2015): 32.

^[10] Ministry of Defence, “Indian Navy’s Ongoing Maritime Security Operations (‘Op Sankalp’), March 23, 2024, https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleaseIframePage.aspx?PRID=2016201. Also Arushi Anthal, “Securing Strategic Conduits: India’s Maritime Posture in Middle East’s Geopolitical Theatre,” in India-Middle East Relations in a Changing Global Order, ed. Anu Sharma (Singapore: Springer-Verlag, 2026), 109-131.

^[11] Subrahmanyam Jaishankar, “Address by External Affairs Minister, Dr. S. Jaishankar at the Business Event in Cyprus,” December 30, 2022, https://www.mea.gov.in/speeches-statements?dtl/36072.

^[12] Jaishankar, “Keynote Address by EAM, Dr. S. Jaishankar at the CII India Mediterranean Business Conclave,” September 6, 2024. https://www.mea.gov.in/speeches-statements?dtl/38267/.

^[13] Meloni, “President Meloni’s Press Statement with Prime Minister Modi,” March 2, 2023, https://www.governo.it/en/articolo/president-meloni-s-press-statement-prime-minister-modi/21964.

^[14] Vani Rao, “Interview” (“India’s Amb. Rao Explains why IMEC is a Strategic Bridge between Europe, Asia, and Africa), Decode39, October 20, 2025, https://decode39.com/12107/indias-amb-rao-explains-why-imec-is-a-strategic-bridge-between-europe-asia-and-africa/.

^[15] Maheep Singh, “India and Italy in the Indo-Mediterranean Era: From Resonance to Convergence,” European Times, May 31, 2026, https://europeantimes.org/india-and-italy-in-the-indo-mediterranean-era-from-resonance-to-convergence/.

^[16] Jaishankar, “EAM’s Remarks at the India-Italy Business, Science and Technology Forum,” April 11, 2025, https://www.mea.gov.in/Speeches-Statements.htm?dtl/39412/.

^[17] Prem Mahadevan, “Italy’s Growing Role in India’s Maritime and Defence Calculus,” Bharat Shakti, May 22, 2026, https://bharatshakti.in/italys-growing-role-in-indias-maritime-and-defence-calculus/.

^[18] Shenoy, “Modi and Meloni’s Indo-Mediterranean Axis,” CNKY, May 12, 2026,

https://cnky.in/modi-and-melonis-indo-mediterranean-axis/; Decode39, “Italy and India:

Forging a Strategic Axis in the Indo-Mediterranean,” Decode39, November 8, 2024, https://decode39.com/9684/italy-and-india-forging-a-strategic-axis-in-the-indo-mediterranean.

^[19] Italy-India Joint Strategic Action Plan 2025-2029, November 18, 2024, https://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents?dtl/38541/ItalyIndia_Joint_Strategic_Action_Plan_20252029.

^[20] Peeush Srivastava, “India-Italy Strategic Partnership Enters a New Era of Global Cooperation,” Economic Diplomacy, May 21, 2026, https://www.economicdiplomacy.in/post/india-italy-strategic-partnership-enters-a-new-era-of-global-cooperation.

^[21] TOI News Desk, “From ‘Melodi’ Camaraderie to Strategic Deals,” Times of India, May 21, 2026, https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/from-melodi-camaraderie-to-strategic-deals-key-takeaways-from-pm-modis-italy-visit/articleshow/131239209.cms.

^[22] Jaishankar, “Remarks by External Affairs Minister Dr. S. Jaishankar at the inauguration of the New Premises of Embassy of India in Rome,” November 24, 2024.

^[23] Decode39, “Italy-India Naval Defence Ties Deepen with Major Fincantieri Contract,” Decode39, December 31, 2025, https://decode39.com/12980/italy-india-naval-defence-ties-deepen-with-major-fincantieri-contract/.

^[24] Shenoy, “Italian Defence Minister Crosetto’s Bilateral Visit Strengthens the Indo-Mediterranean,” Economic Times, May 1, 2026, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/italian-defence-minister-crosettos-bilateral-visit-strengthens-the-indo-mediterranean/articleshow/130682099.cms.

^[25] Sergio Mattarella, “Letter” to Droupadi Murmu,” January 26, 2026,  https://x.com/ians_india/status/2016090804440400084/photo/1.

^[26] Jaishankar, “EAM’s Remarks at the National Day Reception of Italy,” May 28, 2025,

https://www.mea.gov.in/speeches-statements?dtl/39572/.

^[27] Antonio Tajani, “Interview” (India-Italy Ties Enter “Special Strategic Partnership” Phase During PM Modi’s Rome Visit), May 20, 2026, https://www.esteri.it/en/sala_stampa/archivionotizie/interviste/2026/05/i-rapporti-tra-india-e-italia-entrano-nella-fase-di-partnership-strategica-speciale-durante-la-visita-a-roma-del-primo-ministro-modi-caratterizzata-dallimec-e-dallaccordo-di-lib/.

^[28] Edoardo Rixi “Interview” (Edoardo Rixi on Italy-India Maritime Cooperation, IMEC Strategy and the Future of Global Sea Routes), Economic Times, November 15, 2025, https://government.economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/governance/italys-maritime-strategy-enhancing-india-italy-cooperation-and-global-sea-route-security/125328856.

^[29] Modi, “Press Statement by the PM during the Joint Press Statement with the PM of Italy,” May 20, 2026, https://www.pmindia.gov.in/en/news_updates/press-statement-by-the-pm-during-the-joint-press-statement-with-the-pm-of-italy/.

^[30] Sangeeta Saxena, “Italy Sees India as a Strategic Priority: Ambassador Antonio Bartoli at Kalam & Kavach 3.0,” Aviation & Defence Universe, May 16, 2026, https://www.aviation-defence-universe.com/italy-sees-india-as-a-strategic-priority-ambassador-antonio-bartoli-at-kalam-kavach-3-0/.

^[31] Rao, “Interview” (Anche l’Italia trarra vantaggio dalla partnership Usa-India. Parla l’ambasciatrice Rao), Formiche, February 17, 2025, https://formiche.net/2025/02/partnership-usa-india-ambasciatrice-rao-italia/.

^[32] Bartoli, “Why Italy Matters to India.” The Hindu, October 4, 2024, https://www.thehindu.com/opinion/op-ed/why-italy-matters-to-india/article68714657.ece.

^[33] Bartoli, “Why Italy Matters to India.” The Hindu, October 4, 2024, https://www.thehindu.com/opinion/op-ed/why-italy-matters-to-india/article68714657.ece.

^[34] Sibal, “India and Italy Strengthen Ties with Indo-Mediterranean Initiative, WION, June 18, 2024, https://www.wionews.com/world/india-and-italy-strengthen-ties-with-indo-mediterranean-initiative-732626.

^[35] Giulio Sant’Agata and Vas Shenoy, “The India-Italy Partnership as Champions for the Global South and the Indo-Mediterranean,” The Economic Times, August 2, 2025. https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/india/the-india-italy-partnership-as-champions-for-the-global-south-and-the-indo-mediterranean/articleshow/1230550.

^[36] “Indo-Mediterranean. Italy and India, a Special Relationship. The Workshop by Med-Or and CSDR,” Med-Or Foundation, November 6, 2024, https://www.med-or.org/en/news/indo-mediterranean-italy-and-india-a-special-relationship-il-workshop-di-med-or-e-csdr.

^[37] Tajani, “Interview” (Italy Intends to Grow Trade with India by €6 bn), December 11, 2025, https://www.esteri.it/en/sala_stampa/archivionotizie/interventi/2025/12/tajani-litalia-vuole-aumentare-gli-scambi-con-lindia-di-6-miliardi-hindustan-times/.

^[38] Bartoli, “Speech” (Republic Day), June 2, 2025. https://www.ansa.it/english/news/news_from_embassies/2025/06/09/amb.-bartoli-multiplying-italy-india-business-opportunities_72f890c2-9cc5-4b8b-9588-5f3d6cefec9c.html.

^[39] Federico di Bisceglie, “IMEC and Security. Ambassador Talò Reads the New Italy-India Strategic Route,” Decode39, May 21, 2026, https://decode39.com/14928/.

^[40] Jaishankar, “Remarks by EAM, Dr. S. Jaishankar at the Joint Session of the Senates External Affairs and Defence Commission in Rome,” November 3, 2023, https://www.mea.gov.in/speeches-statements?dtl/37234.

^[41] Joydeep Thakur, “India Aims to Revive ‘Cotton Route’ to Counter Chinese Silk Route,” Hindustan Times, March 26, 2015, 4.

^[42] Container News, “Cotton Route Alliance between Italy and India to Counterbalance China’s Dominance,” Container News, December 19, 2024, https://container-news.com/cotton-route-alliance-between-italy-and-india-to-counterbalance-chinas-dominance/.

^[43] Abhishek Agarwal, “India and Italy: Bridging Continents through IMEC,” Centre for Social and Economic Progress, April 24, 2026, https://csep.org/blog/india-and-italy-bridging-continents-through-imec/.

^[44] Modi, “PM’s Address in the 105^th Episode of ‘Mann Ki Baat,” September 24, 2023, https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleaseIframePage.aspx?PRID=1960066&reg=48&lang=Modi.

^[45] Meloni, “President Meloni’s Speech at Rome MED Dialogues 2024,” November 27, 2024, https://www.governo.it/it/node/27243.

^[46] Tajani, “Interview” (India-Italy Ties Enter “Special Strategic Partnership” Phase During PM Modi’s Rome Visit,” May 20, 2026, https://www.esteri.it/en/sala_stampa/archivionotizie/interviste/2026/05/i-rapporti-tra-india-e-italia-entrano-nella-fase-di-partnership-strategica-speciale-durante-la-visita-a-roma-del-primo-ministro-modi-caratterizzata-dallimec-e-dallaccordo-di-lib/.

^[47] “Airtel and Sparkle Sign Strategic Agreement for Enhanced Undersea Cable Capacity Between India and Italy,” Digital Terminal, September 13, 2024, https://digitalterminal.in/telecom/airtel-and-sparkle-sign-strategic-agreement-for-enhanced-undersea-cable-capacity-between-india-and-italy