Introduction

Twenty years after its founding summit in 2006, the BRICS is in a decisive and sensitive stage of evolution. After admitting five new members, the organisation is now more diverse and geographically spread out, and it reflects even more clearly the ideals of multipolarity and multiculturalism enshrined in its charter. However, its growing economic and diplomatic ambitions have attracted the hostility of the United States and the suspicion of Western powers, as they pose challenges to the supremacy of the ‘Atlantic’ alliance and its strategic partners. The question is about the durable, tangible benefits that BRICS brings to its members, regardless of the rhetoric, and whether those common gains and interests can keep BRICS together despite their often different political and economic national priorities and needs.

The growth of the BRICS bears witnesses to its success and promise, but it inevitably increases the organisation’s complexity. India’s chairship in 2026 provides an opportunity for a realistic assessment of what this grouping has achieved so far and what it is poised to accomplish in the months and years ahead. Apart from the sheer strategic weight of a partnership that brings together the largest, most populous, militarily potent and economically dynamic nations on earth outside the United States, the achievements of the BRICS must be evaluated objectively now that its members are coming under increasing pressure to break ranks or at least renounce their more critical and significant initiatives, which are considered inimical to American dominance.

In this article, we will briefly consider, first, the current global political and economic situation, and second, the BRICS options and potential, as well as its limitations in bringing about positive change in line with its initial objectives.

The World System Today

The decline of the hegemon of the global order set up in the aftermath of the Second World War is acknowledged even in the United States, where Donald Trump won the Presidency by calling on his countrymen (using Reagan’s earlier appeal) to ‘Make America Great Again’ and deploring the generally decaying state of US society, industry and infrastructure. This condition affects the US Dollar, the pillar of American dominance, which is fast losing buying power and credibility, as out-of-control printing of the fiat currency to service the astronomical debt belies the enormously inflated paper value of stock market valuations and securities.

The quote is from a paper by Palestinian scientist and author Mazem Qumsiyeh, whose academic career unfolded partly in the USA:

The US dollar is weakening not just because of markets, but because of persistent inflation, foreign selling of Treasuries, exploding public debt, declining trust in long-term US fiscal discipline, and gradual global diversification away from dollar dependence (especially by large economies like China, Japan, and Brazil). This has geopolitical effects including 1)decline in ability of the US […] to subjugate other countries via economic sanctions and financial blackmail (that is why there is more risk of US military actions), 2) growing of USD alternatives including self-reliance, trade in local currencies, barter-like arrangements, use of alternative currencies (yuan, rupees, Euros, bitcoins), and increased gold holdings and settlement (that is why gold and silver are rising in price) […] These trends will only accelerate now that the US administration is accelerating instability locally and globally – basically on its way to become a failed state. A large part of this is directly due to policies pursued to please the Zionist lobby (e.g. the wars waged on behalf of Israel cost some $8 trillion of the $38 trillion national debt)…(keep your eye on US movements towards WWIII and BRICS countries’ response).[1]

A corollary of the hegemon’s decline is the erosion of the efficacy and credibility of many institutions built under its watch, beginning with the United Nations, which was designed mainly to benefit the victors of World War II and has been unable to reform itself to reflect the changing global balance of power and wealth. The Bretton Woods Institutions and all UN institutions are consequently affected by the systemic crisis as the USA withdraws from or reduces its participation in these international bodies, which are no longer useful tools for power projection, and seeks refuge not in isolationism but in transactional, opportunistic bilateralism.

In parallel with the US strategic shift, the G-7 Group, NATO, the European Union, the G-20, and many other mainly ‘Western’ groups, such as the Davos Economic Forum, are under increasing strain, in turmoil, or even breaking up. Trump’s haphazard attempt to set up a ‘Board of Peace’ as a one-billion-admission-fee club (by invitation), with a nebulous agenda, under his personal leadership, offers a poor alternative to pre-existing global structures. Indeed, in recent years, the conditionalities imposed by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, both under the effective control of the USA, have led many countries to turn towards new institutions set up outside the mainly Western, G-7 orbit.

Another effect of the gradual collapse of Western US-driven supremacy is the increasingly successful resistance of states that reject it and work to build alternative international regimes, such as Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea, not to mention Afghanistan, which the NATO war machine was unable to subdue in twenty years of nearly constant warfare. The United States is forced to pull back, seek face-saving compromises, or admit defeat abroad, while its internal economic, social, and political stability steadily erodes. Its Western subaltern allies are also facing increasing challenges at home, including mass immigration from non-Western, mainly Muslim regions, shrinking resources, and widening divisions among their citizens.

All these converging trends are steering the international system towards a major socio-economic and financial crash that could trigger a widespread depression, as several leading economists and fund managers are warning with mounting urgency. Whether the crisis will also manifest as a new major war or a series of smaller wars in a chain reaction is a moot point, but dissent, disorder and violence are increasing in many parts of the world. At the same time, several new disruptive technologies are upsetting and transforming economies and ways of life in uneven and unpredictable ways, giving rise to more distrust and anxiety than hope, because while they immensely increase the wealth of a minority, they tend to undermine the professional, social and psychological stability of the less privileged majority.

The BRICS: Alternative or Safety Net?

BRICS is an unusual grouping because it is not justified by geographic, historical, ideological, or ethno-cultural proximity among its members. Its founders also differ markedly in their economic systems, GDPs, and per capita incomes. This disparity has led many to reduce its rationale to a common opposition to American (or Euro-American Atlantic) dominance and its neo-liberal/neoconservative composite agenda. The BRICS countries have nevertheless launched and implemented various cooperative arrangements that have proven mutually beneficial, such as the New Development Bank, popularly known as the BRICS Bank, and a valuable alternative to the Bretton Woods financial institutions.

The BRICS has no agenda to become a military alliance, though military exercises have already been conducted between some of its members, such as the joint Chinese, Russian, Iranian, and South African naval training operation (with Egypt, Ethiopia, and Brazil sending observers) off the South African coast in January 2026, and the Zapad 2025 drills, which involved the armed forces of various BRICS and SCO member states. However, BRICS was officially not involved in those exercises because defence is not part of its charter, though there is a provision for collaboration against terrorism.

In this regard, the US attack on Venezuela on 3 January 2026 and the abduction of the country’s President Maduro and his wife should prompt BRICS members to share information and discuss possible measures to prevent similar illegal assaults on other countries, given that Iran is already a target of special or ‘black’ operations by American and Israeli clandestine units, special forces and regular troops. In the wake of Trump’s declared hostility to BRICS member-nations, which may translate into covert or kinetic actions against some of them, there is good reason to consider preventive cooperation, beginning with the exchange of relevant intelligence.

For instance, the current US administration’s declared opposition to the return of the Chagos archipelago by Britain to Mauritius (that Trump has threatened to prevent) may lead Washington DC to bolster its military presence in the Indian Ocean and, perhaps in this connection, the Pentagon is looking to set up a military facility on an island off the coast of Bangladesh, which has implications for India’s security just as the growing or expected American military presence in the Caribbean, Venezuela, Colombia, Ecuador and other parts of Latin America can be a matter of concern for Brazil, also a target of US anti-BRICS policies. Trump’s claim that the US Government possesses secret weapons of enormous power that no one can effectively neutralise or resist may be another of his unsubstantiated boasts, yet the lethal raid on Venezuela that enabled special forces operatives to capture and abduct the Presidential couple may have utilised some of those special techniques and that in itself represents a grave threat to other nations.

Geostrategic consultations are a useful component of the BRICS dialogue architecture, but they are limited in scope by persisting misgivings and disagreements among some members (e.g. between India and China, Egypt and Ethiopia, China and Indonesia, and the UAE and Iran). More critical and decisive are their investment and trade-related interactions and projects, including currency and financial flows, intended to free intra-bloc business from the oversight and control of major Western banks and clearing vehicles, particularly American ones, which are used as tools and increasingly as weapons for US intelligence-gathering and monitoring of the global marketplace, as a substitute for the erstwhile industrial and technological near-monopoly of the G-7 countries.

New Trade and Reserve Currency Initiatives

Following the already mentioned ‘BRICS Bank’ and the BRICS Contingency Reserve Arrangement, which are regularly and successfully used to provide loans in currencies other than the US Dollar and to stabilise the economies of member countries in the turmoil-prone and uncertain international financial environment, the BRICS countries have jointly explored potential alternatives to the current post-Bretton Woods global regime. The first step is to link the members’ respective CBDCs (Central Bank Digital Currencies) to facilitate transactions between states, businesses, and individuals in real time, using a process similar to those used domestically at the national scale, such as the RUPAY/UPI/PTM in India. India has launched an initiative in this regard as part of this year’s official agenda, and it hopes to launch a working system, the BRICSPAY[2], under its presidency after announcing this proposal shortly before succeeding Brazil in the chair of the grouping. It is estimated that transactions carried out through this channel would be instantaneous and cost 50 to 60% less than the present inter-bank payment system, which uses the US Dollar as the intermediary payment instrument.

A more ambitious, longer-term project has been experimentally tested by the Reserve & Investment Asset System (RIAS). It is the BRICS Unit, which, unlike cryptocurrencies, is backed by tangible assets, primarily gold, and is a ‘hybrid combination of gold and major BRICS currencies’[3], with 40% in the former and 60% in the latter. The gold reserves are held in the vaults of member governments, and the Shanghai-based Gold Exchange allows them to be stored wherever the owners choose.

Each of the five BRICS-founding members accounts for 12% of the total currency backing for the Unit. The Unit’s value fluctuates daily based on real-time exchange rates on foreign exchange markets. It is digitally created on a blockchain-based platform. In commercial transactions, the units paid to the seller can be held as they are and used for other transactions, or converted into the national currency at will. Financial and business operations are conducted through Smart Contracts, and real-time settlements eliminate banking intermediaries.

An important feature of the instrument is that gold is valued by weight, not by its current rate in dollars, so it is largely immune to manipulation and speculation. Consequently, ‘the Unit spreads exchange trade risk across multiple economic cycles’[4], and its multi-currency component provides greater stability by smoothing rate fluctuations. The Unit is currently experimental, serving as a pilot, and may not be fully operationalised on a large scale before 2030, given the technical adjustments and optimisation needed, and in view of opposition from the United States and the Euro-emitting European Union to the rise of this new potential rival.

India, for one, is somewhat cautious about introducing this new currency, given concerns about expected hostile reactions from Washington and London. The government prefers to focus on expanding the use of national currencies in business. There is also concern about China’s overwhelming economic preponderance, whose CIPS system[5] and M-Bridge[6] are increasingly challenging the Euro-American SWIFT system, and whose Yuan is increasingly used for international payments. For that reason, care was taken within BRICS to ensure equal participation and power for BRICS members in the composition and management of the Unit, despite the economic disparity between them.

It must be understood that the current Dollar-anchored system, by its very nature, is unfair and skewed to benefit the United States, to the detriment of all other countries, especially the (formerly?) colonised states of the Global South. The vagaries of the American economy and politics, often swayed by domestic and foreign trends and problems, the individual whims of politicians, and the priorities of Big Business expose weaker nations, comprising the majority of mankind, to a range of negative effects. Self-serving decisions and measures taken by the US Treasury and the Federal Reserve may harm the rest of the world, and at times are specifically intended to hobble and restrict states and economies regarded as potential challengers, or simply not aligned with American interests and strategic objectives.

In an age of declining Western supremacy, high technology, industry, investments, trade, and the currency itself are increasingly wielded as weapons to attack other states, despite all the public talk about mutual benefits and concern for democracy, freedom, and human rights. Threats of financial and military punishment, sanctions, and embargoes are implemented with increasing frequency, and their issuers no longer even pretend to be motivated by moral reasons. They make it clear that they want to force weaker governments to bend to their will and are quite ready to make innocent civilian populations suffer in the expectation that the resulting civil unrest and chaos will topple recalcitrant dispensations. Through the Interim economic agreement reached between the USA and India on 6^th February 2026, Trump claims to have made New Delhi undertake to purchase USD five hundred billion worth of US goods in five years, even though such an obligation would create a 200 billion US$ deficit for India, given its current volume of exports (pre-18% tariffs), according to geopolitical observer Brahma Chellaney[7].

True to form, Trump is behaving like an extortionist posing as a champion of fair trade, and other ‘friendly’ countries such as Canada, South Korea, Japan, Taiwan, and Malaysia are being similarly pressured to import arbitrary amounts of American products, regardless of their cost and quality, as tribute to the nearly bankrupt imperial overlord.

This situation will only change durably if and when the targets of those repressive measures, along with other vulnerable countries, take effective steps to insulate and protect themselves from hegemonic bullying and persecution, which frequently leads to the destruction of an entire nation. Therefore, a multi-lateral, multi-polar vehicle like BRICS could be beneficial to all its members and even to the world at large, which is why so many countries are waiting in the wings to join. This realisation explains why India is no longer a fence-sitter on the issue of non-Dollar trade and is working to cooperatively build a suitable alternative to the Greenback’s hegemony.

Strategic Cooperation for Free Multipolar Access to Space and the Global Commons

BRICS also has the potential to facilitate collaboration in high- and appropriate-technology R&D between its members, some of which are leaders in frontier areas such as hypersonic propulsion, laser applications, robotics, quantum computing, artificial intelligence, biotech, pharmacology (Russia’s new cancer vaccine), advanced surgery, alternative medicine, organic agriculture, and agroforestry.

China, Russia, and India have considerable scientific and technological expertise across multiple domains and vast pools of specialised talent. Their collaboration can be mutually beneficial and help other, less advanced BRICS nations move up the global scientific research hierarchy. They have also established institutions to share and disseminate their knowledge and best practices with other countries in the Global South. These include the Indian RIS, the Brazilian ABC, and the Russian Federation’s Rossotrudnichestvo. China deploys the CIDCA and is launching various pioneering AI tools (Deepseek, Moonshot AI (Kimi), Tong AGI Series) that are equal to or superior to their American rivals and are available as open-source systems, which US private behemoths, funded by high-interest loans and investors focused on short-term profits, may not easily compete with.

Multipolarity in science and technology is at least as important as its economic and military counterparts. A promising example of intra-BRICS cooperation is Russia’s Zorky (Zorkyi 2M) low-orbit communication network project, which, when deployed using some 300 12U nanosatellites providing high-resolution multispectral Earth imagery (with Automatic Identification System (AIS)), is expected to rival Elon Musk’s Starlink. Although ‘formally’ private, Starlink is bound to abide by US government directives and is de facto a tool of the Pentagon’s and Space Force’s power. Russia has proposed making Zorky available to other BRICS nations, and although conditions would apply to any defence-related utilisation, the system could render a very important service to countries that cannot develop similar capabilities. It could limit the endless multiplication and duplication of such LEO networks in the already saturated terrestrial atmosphere.

The rampant militarisation of the United States, in the service of its stated intent to increase its preponderance over the global commons, including nearby space and the oceans, and to defeat any other power if it chooses to, poses a potential threat to many states, especially to those that have joined BRICS, which the Trump Administration has vowed to stamp out in one way or another. While stopping short of building a defensive military alliance, it would seem logical and even necessary for the Group to develop and diversify internal collaboration aimed at strengthening the autonomy and cooperative resilience of its members, given that they are all more or less vulnerable to sanctions and other forms of US ‘compellence’ and threats. It is not for nothing that, for its chairship, India has adopted five goals embedded in the BRICS anagram: Building for Resilience, Innovation, Cooperation, and Sustainability.

The five primary reforms New Delhi is undertaking, apart from expanding the digital public architecture in the Global South, include reforming global governance at the United Nations and in other international bodies, now being systematically undermined and discredited by the current American administration, and developing supply chains and economic resilience, another domain in which the US seeks to retain or gain final decision-making power.

Likewise, in the area of emerging technologies, India’s proposed agenda is to facilitate global collaboration to avoid ‘elite dominance’, which also runs counter to the longstanding American resolve to control advanced research and critical technologies through the IPRs of its government institutions and giant corporations, colloquially known as the GAFAM (Google (Alphabet), Apple, Facebook (Meta), Amazon, Microsoft), to which should be added Nvidia, Palantir, SpaceX, and a steady stream of newcomers.

Conclusion

Retaining sufficient coordination within its growing membership is the greatest challenge BRICS faces, particularly since the partner-governments face strong Western pressure to conclude deals on a bilateral, national basis, ignoring the interests and sensitivities of the other members. One strength of the BRICS is precisely the great leeway it leaves for States to conclude economic and even defence agreements at their discretion, as it often satisfies often divergent nationalistic concerns, contrary to the European Union, whose Commission takes decisions on behalf of all its members, generally with the two Big Ones (Germany and France), and increasingly bypasses the formal requirement of unanimity by sanctioning dissenting governments.

The Indo-US Bilateral Trade Agreement, now in the making, is viewed in the USA as an instrument to tie India to US economic and industrial decisions, through mechanisms such as TRUST (Transforming the Relationship Utilising Strategic Technology), which would surely maintain America’s ownership rights over those technologies and their applications. In the same vein, the expected chapter on supply chain cooperation is expected to nudge India’s trade policies into US-approved channels. A recent demonstration of this modus operandi is Trump’s public assertion that India has agreed, at his prodding, to buy oil from the USA and Venezuela and no more from Russia, just as the EU has had to undertake, under the 2025 trade deal, to purchase vast quantities of American energy to replace the ‘forbidden’ Russian oil and gas.

Options are gradually being reduced for nations that consent to such ‘partnerships’ aimed at creating a string of captive customers bound to trade only in Dollars to acquire the goods and services supplied virtually free of competition by the old but increasingly belligerent hegemon. BRICS members will therefore have to be very wary of US proposals if they wish to retain control over their economic future. For many nations, BRICS may offer a better alternative to the reassertion of American dominance, and agreements between BRICS and the European Union are not out of the question[8], but the active survival and success of the bold and pioneering cooperative experiment that is BRICS depend on the vigilance and lucidity of its largest members.

Author Brief Bio: Mr. Come Carpentier has been, since 2003, the convener of the International Editorial Board of World Affairs – The Journal of International Issues. He has travelled and lectured in more than fifty countries. in universities and institutions of Europe, the Americas and Asia. He has written and co-authored several books and more than 200 articles and essays on subjects related to philosophy of science, geopolitics, international relations and the history of civilisations in more than thirty journals, newspapers and magazines in France, India, Italy, the USA, Russia and Switzerland. He was associated for many years with the World Public Forum Dialogue of Civilisations as a member of the founding association and a regular guest and speaker on that platform. He is a member of the Advisory Sub-Committee of the Paris-Berlin-Moscou Committee and an advisor to the International League of Phoenicia, Chananean and Punic Cities (Lebanon). He has been a consultant to various American and European high-tech corporations and was between 1992 and 1999 the Secretary of the Tissot Economic Foundation (Switzerland).

References:

[1] Mazen Qumsiyeh, US dollar/Empire decline and more. OpEdNews. https://www.opednews.com/populum/page.php?f=US-dollar-Empire-decline-a-Genocide_Genocide-260203-887.html

[2] Think BRICS. (2025, December 29). BRICS pay is live: a new global financial system begins [Video]. YouTube. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cG1rPbg__-0

[3] Team, V. R. (2026, January 13). BRICS Launches Gold-Backed Currency: Understanding “The Unit” and how it works. Ventura. https://www.venturasecurities.com/blog/brics-launches-gold-backed-currency-understanding-the-unit-and-how-it-works/

[4] Ibid

[5] Introduction. (n.d.). https://www.cips.com.cn/en/about_us/about_cips/introduction/index.html

[6] Wikipedia contributors. (2025, October 1). MBridge. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MBridge

[7] https://x.com/Chellaney/status/202003282982092

[8] RAIMONDI, P. (2017). BRICS And The European Union: A NEEDED ALLIANCE. World Affairs: The Journal of International Issues, 21(4), 48–55. https://www.jstor.org/stable/48531304

 

Introduction

India assumed the Presidency of BRICS on 1^st January, 2026. Speaking at the unveiling of the Logo, Theme and Web-site of India’s Presidency on 13^th January, 2026, External Affairs Minister Dr S Jaishankar referred to the various Indian festivals celebrated on the occasion of Makar Sankranti and stated that ‘’just as these festivals convey hope and goodwill, India’s BRICS Chairship will seek to bring together the potential of BRICS countries for the greater global welfare.’’

While recognising the noble sentiments expressed by EAM, it needs to be kept in mind that India has assumed this responsibility at a time when BRICS has been receiving adverse attention from President Donald Trump, even before he assumed office as President of the USA in January 2025. The world has become highly fractured and divided over the last several years. This polarisation between the East and the West, as well as between the North and the South, has been further exacerbated over the last year since Trump came to power. Fissures in the Transatlantic Partnership between Europe and the US, as well as within NATO, have significantly enhanced uncertainty and unpredictability in global affairs. Trump’s peremptory and unilateral actions in the areas of trade and security have increased anxiety and disquiet in the global community.

Alongside the unprecedented uncertainty introduced into global relations, both in the areas of security and the economy, by President Trump over the past year, the last few years have seen an expansion in the membership of the BRICS family, leading to increased diversity and incoherence in the functioning of that body. This presents its own problems and challenges in reaching a consensus on several significant political, economic and strategic issues.

The task will hence be cut out for India to manage the internal contradictions within the BRICS Grouping and to foster positive, collaborative relations with the outside world, particularly with the G7 countries and other members of the developed world, as well as with the large cohort of the Global South that are not member states or partner countries of the BRICS.

This challenge will, however, present opportunities to emerge as a viable and effective ‘bridge builder’ between the BRICS and the Global South, as well as with Western developed countries. India faced a similar, indeed a bigger, challenge when it assumed the Presidency of the G20 in 2023. That Presidency came soon after the onset of the conflict between Russia and Ukraine, with the two sides implacably polarised and opposed to each other. India’s nimble diplomacy won the day by securing a consensus New Delhi Leaders’ Declaration on the first day of the Summit on 9th September, 2023. India also secured consensus on admitting the African Union (AU) as the 21st member of the G20. This issue had been hanging fire for many years, but it needed the leadership of PM Modi and India, with its commitment to promoting the interests of the Global South, to bring all countries on the same page to approve AU’s membership. India was able to integrate all major issues of interest and concern to members of the Global South, such as debt relief, climate finance, development financing, global governance reform, fintech and women’s empowerment, into the New Delhi Leaders’ Declaration.

India hit the ground running as the BRICS Presidency in 2026, when PM Modi, addressing the Summit in Rio de Janeiro in July 2025, stated that India would give a “new form” to the BRICS grouping during its presidency. He proposed redefining BRICS as “Building Resilience and Innovation for Cooperation and Sustainability” (using the five letters of the acronym) and emphasised a people-centric approach, drawing parallels with India’s G-20 presidency, which prioritised the Global South. PM Modi affirmed that India would advance BRICS with a focus on “humanity first,” highlighting the need for joint global efforts to address common challenges such as pandemics and climate change.

The Evolution and Expansion of BRICS

In 2001, Goldman Sachs banker Jim O’Neill coined the acronym “BRIC” to refer to Brazil, Russia, India, and China – countries with large populations, large areas, and large economies – that he predicted would soon have a significant impact on the global economy. The Group evolved into a political grouping in 2009 when leaders of the four countries held their first summit in Yekaterinburg, Russia. South Africa joined a year later. The primary objective of the grouping at its inception was to secure greater voice and space for emerging economies in the evolving financial and trading system. BRICS members felt that, although their weight in the global economy had increased substantially over the previous decades, they were not being given their due by the Bretton Woods Institutions, namely the IMF and the World Bank, which were established as part of the post-Second World War global order.

The BRICS grouping expanded, increasing its membership from the original five to eleven, with six new members added at the 15th BRICS Summit in Johannesburg, South Africa, in August 2023. Four of the six new members, viz. UAE, Egypt, Ethiopia and Iran, joined the grouping on 1st January, 2024. Argentina, however, declined the offer after the election of its new President, Javier Milei, in November, 2023, and withdrew from its planned entry into the Organization. Saudi Arabia, the sixth country, has not yet decided to join BRICS, although its representatives continue to participate in some lower-level official and technical meetings. Indonesia was invited as a new member in 2024 and joined the Group on 1^st January, 2025.

The eleven countries of BRICS (including Saudi Arabia) have a combined area of 47.7 million sq. km and an estimated total population of 3.9 billion. This accounts for about 32% of the world’s land surface and 48% of the global population. Four of the original five BRICS members, viz. Brazil, Russia, India, and China, are among the world’s ten largest countries by population, area, and GDP (PPP). All five original BRICS states are members of the G20, while only Saudi Arabia and Indonesia, which were subsequently inducted as new members at the beginning of 2024 and 2025 respectively, make the cut among the world’s top 20 economies.

The total GDP of the 11 BRICS nations in nominal dollar terms as of 2026 is over US$ 32 trillion, accounting for 28-30% of the global GDP. By comparison, the G7 accounts for US$ 54.52 trillion, accounting for 43% of the global GDP in nominal terms. The picture reverses when figures are calculated in Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) terms. The figure for BRICS11 comes to US$ 78 trillion, exceeding 40% of the global GDP. The corresponding figure for G7 is US$ 60.95 trillion, accounting for 27.8% of the global GDP. The combined economic output of the five original BRICS members, measured in purchasing power parity, first exceeded that of the US-led G7 in 2022. This gap has been growing since then. The BRICS+ nations are expected to grow at an average rate of 3.7% in 2026, while the G7 average is forecast to be a more modest 1.2%. The economic strength of the BRICS can be assessed by their weight in the IMF, where their quota increased from 8.4% in 2001 to 25.8% in 2022, while in the same period the G-7 quota decreased from 64.6% to 42.9%.

The new BRICS members bring more than raw GDP to the bloc. With the addition of Saudi Arabia, Indonesia, the UAE and Iran, the BRICS increased its share of global oil production to more than 40%. As some BRICS members appear interested in establishing an alternative trade and financial system, adding nations with greater natural resources becomes essential.

It is a measure of the importance the member countries attach to this Organisation that BRICS Summits have been held every year without a break since they commenced in 2009. No leader has ever missed a Summit. This is in sharp contrast to the Summits of some other groupings, such as the IBSA, the intergovernmental grouping of three democratic developing countries, viz. India, Brazil and South Africa, all of which are members of BRICS. They have held only six summits since they first started meeting in 2006, i.e. over a period of 20 years. Their last Summit was held in South Africa in 2025!

Russia, which took over the BRICS Presidency from South Africa in 2024, announced in the run-up to the Kazan Summit in October 2024 that more than 30 countries had expressed interest in joining the organisation. The rush to join BRICS was seen as less an outright rejection of Western norms and partners and more a move to hedge and create fresh options beyond those available during the era of undisputed Western global dominance. This was not to suggest that the world was turning its back on the West, and in particular the US. But there was scepticism about the West’s commitment to values such as democratic norms and international law, particularly in conflicts like that between Israel and Hamas, which had caused untold human suffering in Gaza, a sore point for many in the Global South. There was also nervousness about the unilateral use of sanctions and the weaponisation of global financial instruments by the West.

As agreed in Johannesburg, the Kazan Summit decided not to admit any new members but to create a new category of ‘’partner countries.’’ The BRICS decided to focus on integrating the five new members who joined in January 2024. The new category of “partner nations” is designed to act as a stepping stone for possible future membership and includes Algeria, Belarus, Bolivia, Cuba, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Malaysia, Nigeria, Thailand, Turkey, Uganda, Uzbekistan, and Vietnam. The enlargement strategy has allowed a more gradual expansion process, enabling the bloc to assess how new members align with its goals before further growth. The partner countries are allowed to participate in discussions at all levels but may not vote when such an eventuality arises.

Despite the many tensions among them, BRICS members share several common strands of thought that observers often overlook. Most importantly, all BRICS members see the emergence of multipolarity as both inevitable and desirable—and identify the bloc as a means to play a more active role in shaping the post-Western global order. The attitudes and policies pursued by the US and other Western countries in the Russia-Ukraine conflict, as well as in the Israel-Hamas war, have added to the concerns of a large group of countries, particularly the middle powers and those belonging to the global South. They view BRICS as an alternative to global bodies seen as dominated by traditional Western powers, and hope that BRICS membership will unlock benefits, including development finance and increased trade and investment. Dissatisfaction with the global order among developing nations was exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic, when life-saving vaccines were hoarded by rich countries. Those memories continue to haunt several developing countries.

The growing East-West confrontation in recent years, particularly between the US and China over trade and technology, and between the West and Russia over Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, has energised China and Russia to expand the BRICS grouping and move it towards a pronouncedly anti-Western position. This is not to India’s liking. This position is not supported by many new member countries, such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the UAE, which enjoy vibrant ties with the US, although Russia, China and Iran try to steer the grouping towards an unmistakably anti-Western stance.

India as a Bridge-Builder

India’s Presidency of BRICS in 2026 comes at a pivotal moment in its foreign policy trajectory. 2025 has been a difficult year for India, primarily due to strained relations with the USA, marked by the imposition of 50% tariffs on its exports to the US market, the USA’s cosy relationship with Pakistan, pressure on India to weaken its energy and military ties with Russia, the sidelining of the Quad, and pressure on H1B visa holders, among other factors. India has, however, not allowed any of this to slow its pace in instituting domestic reforms and progressing rapidly to diversify its economic partnerships. This resulted in the successful conclusion of several Free Trade Deals with diverse countries and entities in 2025, including the UK, New Zealand, EFTA (European Free Trade Association), Oman, and others.

The pinnacle of the process of economic diversification was reached in early 2026 with the conclusion of the Free Trade Agreement with the European Union, following 18 years of negotiations, on 27^th January, 2026. This was soon followed by an Interim Trade Agreement with the USA, announced by President Trump after a conversation with PM Modi on 3^rd February, 2026. These developments have come as a shot in the arm for India as it navigates the increasing churn and flux in global political, security, strategic and economic affairs.

The international environment in which India must now steer and promote its interests and those of the Global South is, however, becoming more demanding. The return of a Trump administration in early 2025, sceptical of multilateral institutions and non-aligned middle powers, and increasingly transactional in its engagement with the world, has narrowed diplomatic space for countries seeking to pursue independent policy pathways. Against this backdrop, India’s BRICS presidency is both an opportunity and a test: whether it can convert recent diplomatic momentum into sustained influence within a global governance system that is clearly in flux.

India’s chairmanship has followed Brazil’s presidency, which prioritised Global South cooperation to advance more inclusive and sustainable governance. India’s resistance to more radical proposals, such as a BRICS common currency or de-dollarisation, has helped preserve the grouping’s credibility while keeping it accessible to middle powers wary of being drawn into geopolitical blocs. India occupies a distinctive place within BRICS: a Global South leader that remains embedded in the existing international system, committed to reform while avoiding disruptive measures. This offers a stabilising hand at a time when BRICS risks being overstretched by internal diversity and external pressure.

India has declared that its presidency will be guided by continuity, consolidation and consensus—an approach that reflects India’s long-standing preference for pragmatic multilateralism over ideological confrontation. PM Modi has articulated a vision for BRICS centred on four main pillars: Resilience (supply chains, health), Innovation (digital public infrastructure, AI, fintech), Cooperation (reformed multilateralism, deepening partnership), and Sustainability (green finance, energy transition), while emphasising people-centred development and a ‘humanity-first’ approach to global governance.

India’s foreign policy has in recent years been anchored in multi-alignment and strategic autonomy. Washington’s dramatic reassessment of engagement with multilateral institutions and its more adversarial posture towards BRICS illustrate growing constraints on policy independence. President Donald Trump has repeatedly characterised BRICS as an “anti-American bloc” and threatened punitive economic measures against its members, signalling a more confrontational approach that seeks to deter collective action outside US-led frameworks.

In this environment, India’s leadership of BRICS assumes particular significance. Under India’s chairmanship, BRICS is more likely to serve as a platform for negotiated autonomy than as a vehicle for opposition to the West. At the same time, BRICS is not without constraints. The bloc’s recent expansion has introduced a more diverse set of political priorities and economic structures, complicating consensus-building and raising questions about institutional coherence. These internal pressures coincide with a US foreign policy that places greater emphasis on bilateral leverage over multilateral engagement, heightening risks for members of the Global South. However, these dynamics have also reinforced the rationale for collective engagement. A more transactional external environment strengthens incentives for BRICS members to preserve a forum that enables coordination, hedging, and political cover. India’s stewardship offers continuity at a moment when both expansion-related complexity and a more challenging external environment threaten to test the bloc’s cohesion.

India’s BRICS presidency offers a platform to consolidate and extend the agenda that emerging economies have recently promoted during their G20 Chairmanship. BRICS, in contrast to the G20, is explicitly oriented towards the concerns of emerging markets and developing economies. India can leverage the BRICS platform to sustain momentum on issues such as reform of multilateral development banks, innovative financing mechanisms, and enhanced representation of developing countries in global economic governance.

During its BRICS Presidency, India would do well to focus on reform of the global financial architecture. India’s support for International Monetary Fund (IMF) quota reform, expansion of the New Development Bank, and initiatives such as the proposed BRICS Multilateral Guarantee Initiative align closely with the interests of the Global South in fairer access to development finance.

In addition, artificial intelligence, digital public infrastructure, and skills development offer a promising avenue for cooperation. India’s experience with digital public infrastructure offers a practical model for inclusive development. Climate finance and preparedness must remain a priority. Building on Brazil’s COP30 agenda, India can argue for advancing just transition financing, technology transfer, and climate resilience frameworks that reflect Global South realities. India’s presidency aims to position BRICS as a crucial, constructive, and forward-looking bloc in a rapidly changing, polarised world.

India’s Initiatives

Some of India’s key initiatives during its Presidency include:

• Cross-Border Payments: India is pushing for the interoperability of Central Bank Digital Currencies (CBDCs) and real-time payment systems (such as UPI) among members to bypass the high costs of Western intermediarie
• Local Currency Energy Trade: India is increasingly settling oil and gas imports from Russia and the UAE in Rupees and Dirhams, significantly reducing its dependence on the US Dollar.
• The Digital “DPI 2.0” Push: Following the success of the G20, India is making Digital Public Infrastructure (DPI) the centrepiece of its 2026 presidency.
• India Stack Global: A formal proposal to share the “India Stack” (Aadhaar, UPI, DigiLocker) as a free public good to help other BRICS members jumpstart their digital economies.
• Economic and Financial Pragmatism: India’s approach to global finance remains cautious, prioritising stability over radical shifts.
• De-dollarisation Stance: India has clarified that it does not “actively target” the US dollar and has no policy to replace it as the global reserve currency.
• “De-risking” vs “De-dollarising”: Instead of a BRICS currency, India promotes the internationalisation of the rupee through local-currency trade settlements and Vostro accounts to “de-risk” its own trade from exchange-rate volatility.
• Alternative Finance: India continues to use the New Development Bank (NDB) to finance key domestic infrastructure and sustainable development projects.
• AI Governance: Championing “Responsible AI,” India advocates ethical frameworks that consider Global South development needs.

Conclusion

As of 2026, India finds itself at a unique geopolitical crossroads. New Delhi has positioned itself as the “Bridge Builder”—the primary link between the established Western order (the Global North) and the rising powers and developing countries of the Global South. India is possibly the only country in the world that straddles major political, security and economic divides, between the North and the South (Developed and Developing) and between the East and the West, with the US and Europe on one side and Russia and China on the other. India is the only Southern country that is a member of the QUAD, whose other members, the USA, Japan and Australia, are from the North. It has also been a regular invitee to the G7 Summits for the last several years. On the other hand, it is also an active member of both the SCO and BRICS, which include emerging economies such as Russia and China, along with members of the Global South.

India’s clout and influence in the world have grown significantly over the last decade, driven by political stability, robust democracy, free and fair elections, and a growing economy. Today, India is the world’s fourth-largest economy, standing at the threshold of becoming the third-largest over the next two years. It is the world’s fastest-growing major economy, with expected GDP growth of around 7-8% in the coming years. Its foreign policy of Strategic Autonomy and Multialignment has significantly enhanced its prestige and standing. Initiatives such as the ‘’Vaccine Maitri’’ during the COVID-19 pandemic, under which it shared more than 300 million vaccine doses with developing countries, most of them on a gratis basis, and supplied medicines to more than 150 countries, have significantly enhanced its respect and prestige, particularly amongst developing countries. In the words of European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen: “When India succeeds, the world is more stable, prosperous, and secure—and we all benefit”. She emphasised that a strong, democratic India is a vital global partner, with its growth and rising influence contributing to a more secure and balanced world order.

The foreign policy ethos of ‘’Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam’’ (The World is One Family), which formed the basis of India’s Motto of ‘’One Earth, One Family, One Future’’ during its G20 Presidency in 2023, has helped India emerge as a ‘’Vishwamitra’’ (Friend to the World). Through its policies, initiatives and actions, India has earned the trust and confidence of the world. The bold, decisive and visionary leadership of Prime Minister Modi has played a seminal role in raising India’s prestige and stature in the world.

Since India’s G20 Presidency in 2023, developed countries have also recognised the imperative of engaging with the Global South on an equal footing. For this reason, Japan, which held the G7 Presidency in 2023, worked assiduously to coordinate its actions and policies with India in its capacity as Chair of the G20. Earlier this year, French President Emmanuel Macron, who holds the G7 Chair for 2026, made a deliberate, high-profile public offer to PM Modi, framing India as the essential bridge between the G7 and BRICS. This creates a unique window for collaboration. Macron suggested that both BRICS and the G7 should work to prevent ‘’Global Fragmentation’’. He said that the G7 should not be an anti-China or anti-BRICS Club, and that BRICS should not be anti-G7. He invited PM Modi to use India’s leadership of BRICS to foster formal coordination between the two Blocs to prevent the world from sliding into a new Cold War. This collaboration would be a strategic hedge against Trump’s recent pressures on both the EU and the BRICS. It would be designed to preserve sovereignty and maintain independence in an increasingly divisive world.

India’s success as the 2026 Chair will depend on its ability to keep the group focused on functional cooperation (health, climate finance, technology, multilateral reform and trade) rather than on ideological warfare. By acting as the “sensible middle,” India ensures it remains indispensable to both the West and the Global South. Its sterling performance and achievements during its G20 Presidency would give it the requisite confidence and determination to succeed in this challenging but rewarding role.

Author Brief Bio: Amb. Ashok Sajjanhar has worked for the Indian Foreign Service for over three decades. He was the ambassador of India to Kazakhstan, Sweden and Latvia and has worked in diplomatic positions in Washington DC, Brussels, Moscow, Geneva, Tehran, Dhaka and Bangkok. Amb. Sajjanhar writes and speaks on issues relating to international relations and Indian foreign policy.

 

Introduction

As India assumes the BRICS chairmanship, the grouping stands at an inflection point. Since its inception, BRICS has evolved from a consultative platform among a small set of large emerging economies into a broader, more diverse grouping that now represents a substantial share of the global population, output, and development ambition. With this expansion has come a qualitative shift in expectations. For many countries of the Global South, BRICS is no longer viewed merely as a forum for dialogue but as a vehicle for advancing practical alternatives and reforms.

Few areas test these expectations more directly than the international monetary and financial system. For several decades, global trade, capital flows, and development finance have been anchored in a dollar-centric framework. This system has delivered undeniable benefits: deep liquidity, scale efficiencies, and a widely accepted medium of exchange. From a global stability perspective, it has underpinned the expansion of trade and investment across regions. At the same time, experience from emerging and developing economies points to persistent structural vulnerabilities. Exchange rate volatility, sudden reversals of capital flows, and exposure to external monetary tightening have repeatedly constrained macroeconomic management and development planning.

From an operational standpoint, such vulnerabilities translate into concrete development challenges. Currency depreciation raises debt-service costs, complicates infrastructure financing, and erodes fiscal space. Projects that are sound on economic grounds can become financially strained when local-currency revenue streams do not match hard-currency liabilities. These dynamics are well understood by development finance institutions. More recently, geopolitical developments have added a strategic dimension to these concerns. The growing use of financial instruments, payment systems, and access to liquidity as tools of statecraft has highlighted the risks inherent in highly concentrated monetary and settlement systems. For many economies, this has reinforced the case for diversification—not as a rejection of the existing system, but as prudent, forward-looking risk management.

It is in this context that the renewed BRICS focus on local-currency settlement should be understood: a pragmatic search for resilience that reduces friction, manages balance-sheet risk, and preserves policy space while remaining integrated into the global economy.

India’s forthcoming chairmanship, framed around “Building Resilience and Innovation for Cooperation and Sustainability,” offers an opportunity to anchor this debate in institutional realism. The challenge is not to displace the dollar or upend the global system, but to develop complementary mechanisms that better reflect the realities of a multipolar, development-driven global economy.

The Dollar-Centric International Monetary Order

Any serious discussion of alternatives must begin with recognition of why the dollar-centric system has endured. Its dominance stems from deep and liquid financial markets, robust legal and institutional frameworks, and powerful network effects built over decades. For global trade and finance, the dollar has provided scale, efficiency, and predictability that no other currency has yet matched.

From a global perspective, this system has delivered important public goods. Dollar liquidity has facilitated cross-border trade, enabled efficient capital allocation, and served as a reliable store of value during periods of crisis. In moments of global stress, the dollar’s safe-haven role has often stabilised markets, underscoring its continued centrality to the international monetary order.

Yet for emerging and developing economies, the operational consequences of this system are more complex. One of the most persistent challenges is currency mismatch. Revenues are typically earned in domestic currency, while borrowing for trade finance, infrastructure, and sovereign needs is often denominated in dollars. During periods of dollar appreciation, this mismatch can quickly translate into higher debt-service burdens, strained public finances, and heightened financial risk—even when underlying economic fundamentals remain sound.

Closely related is the global transmission of monetary policy. Tightening cycles in the United States routinely propagate across emerging markets through capital flows, exchange rates, and borrowing costs. These spillovers disrupt long-term investment planning and undermine countercyclical policy responses precisely when they are most needed.

In recent years, an additional layer of constraint has become more visible: the strategic use of financial infrastructure. Sanctions regimes, asset freezes, and restrictions on access to payment systems have highlighted the concentration of control within the global financial architecture. While such measures are targeted, their broader implication is to expose the fragility of a system with limited redundancy.

For BRICS economies, these realities underscore the importance of diversification. Reducing excessive reliance on a single currency—through greater use of local currencies in trade and settlement—offers a way to mitigate vulnerability while remaining fully engaged with global markets. The objective is to preserve the efficiencies of the existing system while introducing complementary mechanisms that enhance resilience.

BRICS Diversity and the Limits of Monetary Uniformity

One of BRICS’ defining characteristics is its diversity. The grouping brings together economies that differ markedly in size, structure, stages of development, and approaches to macroeconomic management. This diversity strengthens representativeness and legitimacy—but it limits the scope for uniform or centralised monetary cooperation. From an operational perspective, BRICS economies span a wide range of monetary and exchange rate regimes. China operates within a managed framework that balances external competitiveness and domestic stability. India follows a calibrated, market-responsive approach that combines exchange rate flexibility with macroprudential oversight. Brazil and South Africa maintain relatively open capital accounts with floating exchange rates, while Russia’s monetary framework has been reshaped by sanctions-related constraints and strategic reorientation. The inclusion of additional members further broadens this spectrum.

Experience across regions suggests that monetary arrangements succeed when institutional design aligns with economic structure and political reality. Monetary unions and tightly coordinated exchange rate regimes require deep fiscal integration, credible transfer mechanisms, and strong supranational institutions. Where these conditions are absent, such arrangements tend to amplify rather than mitigate stress. From this standpoint, a single BRICS currency or rigid exchange rate coordination would not only be impractical but also inconsistent with the grouping’s foundations.

BRICS is neither a treaty-based alliance nor a supranational entity. It operates through consensus, voluntary participation, and respect for strategic autonomy. Any attempt to impose a uniform monetary framework would risk eroding trust and undermining the flexibility that makes BRICS relevant. Local currency settlement fits more naturally within this institutional context. It enables deeper economic cooperation without surrendering monetary sovereignty or synchronising policy cycles. Participation can be bilateral or plurilateral, calibrated to trade patterns and financial readiness—enabling experimentation and gradual scaling.

Strategic Rationale for Local Currency Settlement: A Development Finance Perspective

From a development finance perspective, the strategic rationale for local currency settlement is both practical and well established. At its core, local currency settlement involves invoicing and settling cross-border trade and financial transactions in the trading partners’ domestic currencies, rather than through an intermediary reserve currency.

One immediate benefit is reduced transaction and hedging costs. When trade is invoiced in a third currency, firms face exchange rate movements unrelated to the underlying commercial transaction. Managing this risk requires hedging instruments that are often costly or unavailable, particularly for small and medium-sized enterprises. Local currency settlement aligns trade payments more closely with revenue streams, improving predictability and lowering barriers to participation in cross-border commerce.

A second advantage is reduced balance-sheet mismatch. For infrastructure projects and long-gestation investments, financing in hard currency while revenues are generated in local currency creates persistent vulnerability—often a recurring source of project distress and fiscal strain. Greater use of local currencies can better align liabilities with cash flows and improve financial sustainability.

Local currency settlement can also reduce the need for precautionary foreign exchange reserves. While reserves provide stability, they carry opportunity costs. Diversifying settlement currencies can ease these pressures, allowing resources to be deployed more productively. Strategically, local currency settlement enhances resilience by diversifying settlement channels and reducing exposure to external policy shocks. This is diversification, not disengagement: BRICS economies will continue to operate in dollar-based markets, but with greater optionality.

Existing BRICS Building Blocks: What Already Works

Discussions on local currency settlement within BRICS are sometimes framed as experimental. From an operational perspective, however, BRICS already has several functional building blocks—often developed in response to crisis rather than by design.

One such building block is bilateral currency swap arrangements among BRICS central banks. While often modest in size, they signal confidence and provide reassurance: even relatively small swap lines can stabilise expectations, support trade continuity, and reassure markets during periods of stress. Importantly, they reduce short-term reliance on third-country currencies without requiring permanent commitments or policy convergence.

The New Development Bank represents a more structural pillar. Unlike traditional multilateral development banks, the NDB has made local currency financing a stated objective. By issuing bonds in member currencies and extending local-currency loans, it seeks to align financing with revenue streams—central to the sustainability of infrastructure and urban development projects.

That said, local-currency lending remains limited relative to demand, reflecting familiar constraints: shallow domestic capital markets, higher funding costs, and limited hedging instruments. Expanding operations will require sustained market development, credit-enhancement mechanisms, and investor confidence. The NDB’s evolution should be guided by its ability to crowd in private capital, not by its potential to substitute for it.

A limited but instructive illustration is already evident in the NDB’s gradual expansion of local-currency lending and bond issuance in selected member markets. While still modest in scale, these operations have reduced foreign-exchange risk for borrowers and contributed to domestic market development, particularly in infrastructure-related sectors. Similarly, bilateral currency swap arrangements among BRICS central banks—though rarely drawn in full—have played a stabilising role during episodes of market stress by signalling liquidity support. These experiences suggest that incremental, well-designed mechanisms can deliver meaningful resilience even without large headline volumes.

A third building block is national payment system innovation. India’s Unified Payments Interface, Brazil’s PIX, and China’s Cross-Border Interbank Payment System illustrate how digital infrastructure can reduce transaction costs, accelerate settlement, and expand financial inclusion. These systems show that scale, reliability, and user trust can be achieved when governance is clear and incentives are aligned.

Yet these systems also reveal limitations: they remain largely national in scope and are not seamlessly interoperable. Private-sector uptake in cross-border trade remains uneven, reflecting concerns about liquidity, pricing transparency, and dispute resolution. Technology can enable reform, but it cannot substitute for institutional coordination and market depth. In short, BRICS does not lack instruments; it lacks integration.

A Pragmatic Roadmap: Build the Plumbing First

From an implementation perspective, local-currency settlement will succeed only if sequencing is disciplined. BRICS would benefit from prioritising the institutional and operational foundations of settlement over debates about a common currency.

First, trade invoicing must shift. Settlement systems cannot scale if contracts remain denominated in third currencies. Early pilots should focus on high-volume, predictable sectors—energy, commodities, fertilisers, and manufactured goods—where long-term contracts and established counterparties reduce uncertainty. Public financial institutions can catalyse adoption. Export–import banks, development finance institutions, and guarantee agencies can reduce first-mover hesitation by offering preferential financing, insurance, or partial credit guarantees for local-currency transactions. Once benchmarks and liquidity improve, market-driven adoption can follow.

Second, payment interoperability should be the organising principle. Attempts to create new, centralised platforms often falter over governance and adoption. A modular approach—linking national systems through common technical standards, messaging protocols, and settlement arrangements—preserves regulatory control while improving efficiency. Interoperability requires agreement on compliance standards, cybersecurity protocols, and dispute resolution. Pilot corridors—limited and evaluated—are more credible than blanket integration.

Third, risk management tools must deepen. Firms will not take on currency exposure unless hedging is accessible and affordable. Domestic bond markets, derivatives, and swap instruments are therefore not peripheral—they are foundational. This is often the binding constraint, particularly for small and medium-sized enterprises operating across borders. The NDB can help by issuing local-currency bonds, supporting liquidity, and partnering with domestic financial institutions to lower risk premiums. The aim should be to crowd in private capital, not displace it.

Fourth, volatility management must be built in. Exchange rate fluctuations are unavoidable, and stress episodes will test any system. Central bank coordination—through expanded swap lines, liquidity backstops, and structured dialogue—can improve preparedness without requiring policy convergence.

Finally, legal and regulatory frictions must be reduced. Full harmonisation is unnecessary. Mutual recognition, simplified documentation, and credible dispute resolution can significantly improve usability.

Digital Innovation and CBDCs

Digital innovation has transformed payment and settlement systems worldwide. Real-time platforms, digital public infrastructure, and distributed ledger technologies can reduce costs, accelerate settlement, and enhance transparency. However, cross-border use raises issues of data sovereignty, cybersecurity, compliance, and consumer protection.

National experience across the BRICS shows that technology succeeds when governance is clear, regulatory oversight is robust, and user trust is earned. India’s payments ecosystem illustrates how interoperability and scale can coexist with supervision. Brazil’s PIX highlight the role of regulatory clarity. China’s experience underscores both the potential and the complexity of linking domestic systems with cross-border settlement.

Central Bank Digital Currencies (CBDCs) represent a more advanced—and more sensitive—frontier. Several BRICS central banks are exploring CBDCs. From a prudential standpoint, the most relevant near-term use is wholesale and trade-related settlement between financial institutions, not retail substitution. CBDC interoperability raises complex questions—such as data sovereignty, cybersecurity, capital flows, and financial stability. Premature scaling can introduce systemic risks. As such, experimentation should be limited, supervised, and tied to defined use cases. CBDCs should complement existing banking systems, not displace them.

A structured BRICS dialogue on digital settlement could add value by focusing on governance, supervisory frameworks, and risk management. Small, time-bound pilots are the most sensible way forward.

India’s Stewardship in a Period of Transition

India’s BRICS chairmanship in 2026 coincides with heightened uncertainty in global trade and finance and rising demands from the Global South for greater voice. In this context, India’s role is less about sweeping proclamations and more about institutional stewardship. India brings economic scale, policy credibility, and diplomatic experience, along with a tradition of strategic autonomy and inclusive multilateralism. These attributes position India as a convenor—capable of bridging divergent interests and facilitating consensus without diluting sovereignty.

India’s most valuable contribution lies in shaping processes rather than prescribing outcomes. The diversity of BRICS makes uniform solutions neither feasible nor desirable. Progress is more likely when members are offered a menu of options—pilot corridors, modular frameworks, and voluntary participation—rather than a single blueprint. India can institutionalise this by prioritising technical working groups, phased schedules, and measurable pilots.

India’s domestic experience in digital public infrastructure and in managing macroeconomic stability in a large, open economy offers practical lessons for BRICS cooperation. Equally, India’s engagement with global financial institutions positions it as a bridge between BRICS initiatives and the wider system—essential for sustaining investor and partner confidence. Ultimately, India’s effectiveness as chair will be measured not by the breadth of declarations but by implementable outcomes.

Implications for Global Financial Governance: Evolution, Not Disruption

The gradual expansion of local-currency settlement within BRICS signals evolution rather than rupture. The post-war monetary system has delivered efficiency through centralisation, but it has also created concentration risks. Diversifying settlement channels introduces redundancy—a strength in a shock-prone world. For international financial institutions, this underscores the need to adapt. Local-currency settlement initiatives are consistent with country ownership and policy space—provided they are transparent and anchored in sound regulatory practice.

Coordination remains essential. Fragmentation from unaligned standards or opaque arrangements would undermine confidence and increase systemic risk. Successful diversification requires clear rules, robust supervision, and dialogue between regional initiatives and global institutions. For many developing economies beyond BRICS, the credibility of global financial reform increasingly hinges on whether large emerging economies can translate their voice into workable institutional alternatives. In this sense, BRICS local currency settlement efforts will be closely watched not as a model to be replicated wholesale, but as a signal of whether diversification can be pursued responsibly within an open global system.

A more pluralistic monetary system could reduce procyclicality in capital flows and improve alignment between financing and development needs. But these benefits will materialise only if reforms are incremental, well sequenced, and institutionally grounded.

Policy Recommendations: Focus the Agenda

Drawing on operational experience, a small number of priorities stand out: First, advance local-currency settlement through phased, voluntary pilots—not mandates. Focus on high-readiness corridors where volumes are significant and counterparties are established. Demonstrated gains will build adoption faster than communiqués.

Second, prioritise trade settlement over premature monetary integration. Expanding local-currency invoicing for intra-BRICS trade delivers measurable gains without requiring convergence of exchange-rate or monetary frameworks. Currency headlines can wait; settlement usability cannot.

Third, make interoperability of existing payment systems the organising principle. Link national platforms through common technical standards, cybersecurity protocols, and governance arrangements—preserving sovereignty while improving efficiency.

Fourth, strengthen and clarify the NDB’s catalytic role. Expand local-currency lending, bond issuance, and credit enhancement to deepen domestic markets and crowd in private capital.

Fifth, focus central bank coordination on preparedness, not on convergence: swap lines, liquidity backstops, and structured dialogue to manage stress episodes.

Finally, proceed cautiously with digital and CBDC cooperation. Begin with wholesale and trade settlement pilots, with robust safeguards for data sovereignty, cybersecurity, and financial stability. Governance must precede scaling. Across all areas, strategic communication should be consistent: local currency settlement enhances resilience and supports stability.

From Aspiration to Architecture

The renewed focus on local-currency settlement within BRICS reflects a measured response to a transforming global economy. It is not an attempt to dismantle the current system; the dollar will remain central for the foreseeable future. However, excessive concentration creates vulnerability, and carefully designed diversification can strengthen stability. For BRICS, the challenge is to move from aspiration to architecture. Diversity requires flexibility, incrementalism, and trust. Progress will depend less on headline announcements than on usability, market confidence, and disciplined sequencing. What matters most is durability.

India’s 2026 BRICS chairmanship offers a timely opportunity to translate intent into practical outcomes. By emphasising pilots, institutional coordination, and inclusive leadership, India can help BRICS contribute constructively to the evolution of global financial governance.

Ultimately, BRICS local-currency settlement initiatives will be judged by whether they reduce risk, lower costs, and expand opportunities for the economies and people they are intended to serve. That is the standard by which any durable financial architecture should be measured.

Author Brief Bio: Shri Manmohan Parkash is a development finance professional with over two decades of experience at the Asian Development Bank (ADB), where he has held senior leadership positions including Senior Advisor, Office of the President, Deputy Director General for South Asia, Country Director, Head of the Operations Management Unit, and Advisor for East Asia. His work has focused on macroeconomic policy, development finance, regional cooperation, and institutional reform across Asia and the Global South. He writes on international finance, global governance, and development challenges, and continues to engage on issues relating to financial resilience, multilateral reform, and sustainable development.

References

1. Parkash, Manmohan. “It Is Time for the Global South.” The Financial Express, 18 July 2025.
2. Eichengreen, Barry. Globalizing Capital: A History of the International Monetary System. Princeton University Press, 2019.
3. Rey, Hélène. “International Channels of Transmission of Monetary Policy.” IMF Economic Review, 2016.
4. Farrell, Henry and Abraham Newman. “Weaponized Interdependence: How Global Economic Networks Shape State Coercion.” International Security, 2019.
5. De Grauwe, Paul. Economics of Monetary Union. Oxford University Press, 2020.
6. Jeanne, Olivier and Romain Rancière. The Optimal Level of International Reserves. IMF Working Paper, 2011.
7. New Development Bank. General Strategy 2022–2026. Shanghai, 2022.
8. BIS Innovation Hub. Fast Payments and Cross-Border Interlinkages. Bank for International Settlements, 2022.
9. Parkash, Manmohan. “CBDCs and Stablecoins: Set to Redefine the Financial System.” The Financial Express, 20 December 2025.

 

BRICS is at a crucial juncture. There is flux in geopolitics, an imbalance in geoeconomics, challenges to the rule-based multilateral system, and the rise of plurilateralism. While major powers sharpen the contest for global hegemony, emerging economies seek autonomy and space for their economic and diplomatic decisions. As a grouping of emerging powers, BRICS has gained in attractiveness within the community of EMDCs but has also drawn negative attention from certain Western powers. India’s leadership of the movement will seek to advance the core objectives of BRICS for coherence and address misperceptions. India will outline a positive agenda for BRICS that promotes growth and development, advances reforms in global governance, and responds effectively to the opportunities and challenges of our times.

Introduction

India assumed the BRICS chair in 2026 amid challenging circumstances. On the one hand, there are high expectations of a constructive BRICS approach to development, which provides space for the aspirations of emerging powers and its growing popularity among developing countries. At the same time, there are challenges of expansion, integrating new members into the BRICS vision and ethos, and the need to address an emerging negative narrative that BRICS is anti-West. India has the capacity to steer BRICS through the storm and guide the movement towards its goals.

As a 21st-century grouping of emerging economies across continents, BRICS has demonstrated Gen Z-like dynamism, ambition and success. In less than two decades, the BRICS nations have surpassed the GDP of the G7, added new members and partners, and outlined an agenda for development and global governance. BRICS has promoted government-to-government cooperation and also fostered civil society interaction and people-to-people exchanges across diverse areas of engagement.

The importance of BRICS in the globalised world stems from its size and geographic spread, control of and access to global resources, presence in global manufacturing and logistics networks, and progress in technology and innovation. BRICS countries represent almost half the global population, a third of global GDP, over half of global manufacturing, a quarter of merchandise trade, a dominant presence in energy resources, and an overwhelming share of critical materials. It is estimated that over half of global GDP growth comes from BRICS countries. Today, BRICS needs the world, and the world needs BRICS.

A Star is Born

In a 2001 report, Jim O’Neill, Chief Economist at Goldman Sachs, noted that emerging markets and developing countries (EMDCs) such as Brazil, Russia, India, and China (BRIC) were poised for rapid growth. He proposed including BRIC representatives in policy-making forums, particularly the G7. Although the G7 retained its exclusive status, it initiated the G7 Outreach with select EMDC partners. The existing G20 financial track, which included EMDC members, gained greater salience and was upgraded to Summit level in 2008, with a broader agenda that included development and geopolitical issues. The G20 served as a bridge between developed and emerging economies in an era marked by the weakening of multilateralism and the rise of plurilaterals.

Meanwhile, the leaders of Russia, India and China met in 2006 on the margins of the G8 summit in St Petersburg, and the BRIC movement was formally launched by the Foreign Ministers the same year on the margins of UNGA in New York. The first summit was hosted by Russia in 2009, and South Africa was admitted the following year and attended the BRICS summit in 2011. The BRICS group benefited from earlier collaboration in the RIC (Russia-India-China, established in 1998) and the IBSA dialogue (India-Brazil-South Africa, established in 2003). BRICS members shared a good understanding, common objectives and experience of cooperative mechanisms. BRICS built an architecture for development cooperation, seeking to supplement ongoing development efforts but not to replace the umbilical link with the developed world. It also made clear that BRICS was not aimed against any country or group. Since its early days, BRICS has relied on consensus for both agenda-setting and decision-making, a practice that has grown stronger over time. As countries with close bilateral relations, they kept bilateral issues off the BRICS agenda.

Growth of the BRICS vision and ethos

Since its inception, the BRICS focus has been to promote the shared desire for growth and development. As major emerging powers, they have also supported other developing countries in their regions, discussed urgent global issues such as climate change, debt, health, terrorism, etc., and evolved strategies to advance a multipolar world through practical measures. The first BRICS Summit, held in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, reached consensus on seeking reforms in global governance, particularly in financial institutions. The addition of South Africa sharpened resolve to address issues of development cooperation, debt, connectivity and representation in global governance. The addition of new members brings new challenges and opportunities. The BRICS growth trajectory has seen steady expansion in the scope of cooperation, the depth of engagement and influence in regional and global affairs.

In defining its agenda and vision, BRICS attached primacy to economic cooperation. Thus, financing development projects, macroeconomic stability, and a collective push for reforms in global governance, particularly at the World Bank and IMF, assumed priority. Meanwhile, discussions also commenced on the feasibility of setting up its own financial structures. The decision to establish a development bank was taken in 2013, and the New Development Bank was set up in 2014, with headquarters in Shanghai. All BRICS founding members contributed equally to NDB’s capital. The success of NDB projects undertaken outside BRICS countries became the stimulus to add new members to NDB in 2021, based on objective criteria and adherence to BRICS norms. Also in 2014, BRICS set up the Contingent Reserve Arrangement of $100 billion to provide liquidity to members facing balance-of-payment difficulties. In 2014, BRICS also agreed to promote trade in local currencies to expand intra-BRICS trade and investment while lowering transaction costs and increasing the efficiency of financial flows.

BRICS has developed an elaborate architecture of meetings at various levels across sectors to facilitate frequent engagement for practical cooperation. In addition to the annual Summit, BRICS hosts over 20 engagements at the ministerial level and numerous working groups at the functional level. Parliamentary dialogue, mayoral exchanges, meetings of business chambers and women’s business chambers, visits by women’s and youth delegations, policy dialogue for central bankers, think-tank and university networks, sports and cultural activities, and civil society and NGO involvement have enriched collaboration.

The BRICS vision expanded beyond economic engagement to include political and security consultations and people-to-people exchanges, widening representation and participation across communities. The consensus-driven approach to agenda-setting and decision-making made all BRICS members equal partners in a shared vision of development and reforms in global governance.

State of Play and Challenges

Driven by major emerging powers, the growth and contribution of BRICS to its members and to the global community have been spectacular. Economic cooperation through strategic action plans has been the principal reason for progress on development issues. Progress on political and security issues has been limited, but BRICS has accommodated differing perspectives and national interests on climate change, terrorism and regional issues. Exchanges between civil society and NGOs have flourished, bringing citizens together.

Expansion and Integration of New Members

Responding to EMDC enthusiasm to join BRICS, the Johannesburg Summit of 2023 adopted criteria for admitting new members, based on regional representation, economic size, growth potential and adherence to the BRICS ethos. Since then, 6 countries (Egypt, Ethiopia, Indonesia, Iran, Saudi Arabia and the UAE) have joined as new members. At the Kazan Summit in 2024, guidelines were formulated for entry to a second-tier of partner countries, and 10 countries (Belarus, Bolivia, Cuba, Kazakhstan, Malaysia, Nigeria, Thailand, Uganda, Uzbekistan and Vietnam) were invited. The door has been kept open for dynamic economies from the Global South with good relations with BRICS members and the West. It must be recognised that expansion has not been smooth, as certain countries declined invitations, others were excluded and power politics came into play.

Unlike the founding members, which are major emerging economies in their regions, BRICS expansion added smaller economies that are important regional players. BRICS now includes 7 members of the G20, leading ASEAN powers, SCO members and partners from Africa and the Americas. It represents the largest oil-producing nations, has a dominant presence in global manufacturing, trade, critical materials and food production, and has a growing footprint in technology and finance. Post-expansion, its global share of GDP has increased by 3%, the share of exports has risen by 5%, internal trade has grown by 5%, the per capita GDP growth rate has risen, the share of gross fixed capital formation in GDP is at similar levels, and the current account balance remains in surplus. BRICS has more economic heft and is more dynamic, but it is also a more diverse group today.

BRICS founding members continue to play a leading role as regional powers gain recognition. Looking ahead, the diversity among new members, in their economic weight, regional influence, strategic orientation and ideological leanings, can help maintain balance. At the same time, the BRICS will require greater effort from all members to forge consensus, particularly on geopolitical issues.

Review of Agenda and Stocktaking

As a chair-led group, members often share their best practices with partners and, in the process, establish new mechanisms of cooperation. Over time, BRICS engagement has expanded from trade and investment, agriculture and industry, technology and innovation, new industry and the digital economy, to global issues such as climate change, debt, the blue economy and space, as well as regional issues, conflict situations, counter-terrorism, cyber security, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, and others.

A recent stocktaking exercise identified more than 150 mechanisms of cooperation between the parties. The review found that some projects had grown while others had been dormant. This review of BRICS projects also provided a database to share with new members to support wider outreach. Pragmatic steps are needed to maintain focus on the BRICS vision of efficiency and sustainability in jointly undertaken projects.

Development Focus and Financial Instruments

The BRICS agenda since its inception has focused on economic development through intra-BRICS cooperation, leveraging globalisation and supporting MDBs. BRICS projects have delivered economic growth and tangible benefits.

BRICS infrastructure projects have benefited from NDB financing as well as funding from MDBs and other institutions. NDB has extended over $39 billion across 120 projects in BRICS and non-BRICS countries. NDB focuses on development projects, clean energy, water and sanitation, transport, technology flows, sustainability and future-oriented sectors. NDB has modest capital and funding capacity, but is popular for its flexible loans denominated in local currency, the absence of IMF-style conditionalities and access for non-BRICS members. With several new members with significant economic strength, NDB can grow in stature and capacity. NDB can leverage funding options for the private sector through the establishment of an NDB structure based in GIFT City, popularise the use of Central Bank Digital Currency and develop new electronic settlement platforms.

Despite a slow start in 2014, the BRICS call for trade in local currency and new financial settlement mechanisms has gained momentum in recent years. Russia estimates that 90% of its intra-BRICS trade is in local currency. China and India have also made advances, including in energy trade. Certain countries have used it as a response to sanctions imposed on them; for others, it has provided flexibility in trade, opportunities in restricted markets and efficiency in financial transactions. Admittedly, trade, financing and reserves in local currencies will increase over time, but suggestions for a BRICS currency or digital index are premature.

BRICS can highlight policy coordination for trade and development and the reform of multilateralism. However, reform of the WTO and the integration of BRICS with regional arrangements have been difficult. Efforts to establish a BRICS group within the WTO for trade facilitation and to resolve intra-BRICS disputes that are stuck at the WTO and COP financing mechanisms can advance the trade agenda. The use of AI tools can help BRICS countries modernise and integrate trade policy.

Alternative settlement mechanisms based on digital means for cheaper and faster transactions have popularised BRICS local currencies and helped them go international. These include SPFS in Russia, CIPS in China, UPI in India, and PIX in Brazil, all of which have central bank backing and facilitate instant cross-border payments. The recently announced BRICS Pay has potential as an interoperable and decentralised system to link national networks. It can spur reform in global governance towards a multipolar financial system.

Meanwhile, BRICS countries have also seen a spurt in swap arrangements, growth in CBDCs, adjustments to reserve currency holdings, and advances in development assistance in local currency. BRICS initiatives currently under discussion that could affect trade and development include modalities for e-commerce and digital trade, a common logistics platform to integrate intra-BRICS supply chains, and collaboration on investment-technology-innovation.

Global Governance and Global South

Although BRICS has consistently sought reforms in global governance to address the challenges and aspirations of developing countries, consensus within BRICS on promoting an agenda at the UN has fallen short. Reform of global governance will be meaningful only in the multilateral context; the UN, the UN Security Council, the World Bank, the IMF, and other multilateral institutions must have appropriate representation from emerging economies. In the meantime, consensus in plurilateral institutions or groupings can address certain challenges and build leverage in multilateral fora. Within BRICS, consensus on development issues will be easier to obtain, even though differences may remain on geopolitical and strategic developments.

Countering Narratives

BRICS has to contend with two negative narratives suggesting it is anti-West and promotes de-dollarisation. The persistence of the 2008-2009 economic slowdown in the West, the outbreak of conflict between Russia and Ukraine, growing tensions over China’s provocative actions in its periphery and its policies of economic coercion have accentuated the divide between the West and Russia-China, though not directly with BRICS. When bilateral contestation engendered narratives on each side, Western powers suggested that BRICS was led by Russia and China and was anti-West, while Russia and China took adversarial positions vis-à-vis the West. Although the BRICS grouping was not directed against others, the narrative against BRICS gathered momentum. BRICS faces the challenge of addressing this misplaced narrative through strategic communication. BRICS would also benefit from building bridges with G7 members, playing an active role in the G20 and working more closely with MDBs.

Another narrative, which has reached toxic levels, claims that BRICS aims to de-dollarise to weaken the West. From the USA’s perspective, this stems from BRICS efforts to increase trade in local currencies, develop cross-border settlement mechanisms, promote the use of CBDCs, and change the composition of its reserves, all of which reduce the share of the US dollar in global transactions. From the BRICS perspective, these changes are necessary to promote intra-BRICS trade and improve the efficiency of transactions, and are not directed against the role of the US dollar. Given the sensitivity of the subject, it needs closer dialogue between BRICS and G7 (especially the USA) and MDBs.

Relevance of BRICS

A major driver of global growth, the BRICS overtook the G7 in 2022 in terms of GDP. By 2026, it is expected to have higher trade flows than the G7. Expansion of membership and partnerships has extended its outreach and representation. The NDB added six new members (Algeria, Bangladesh, Colombia, Egypt, Uruguay and the UAE) and is considering the inclusion of the new BRICS members. Adding teeth to this expansion, BRICS has increased assistance to the Global South, facilitating development and promoting efficiency in cross-border transactions. On geopolitical developments, BRICS provides a platform for discussion and engagement; its consensus-based approach favours localised options rather than externally imposed solutions.

BRICS has emerged as a significant grouping of developing countries and emerging powers. It provides a platform for the expression of aspirations and enables new forms of cooperative partnerships for mutual benefit. Its agility contributes to innovative ideas, and its success has led to expansion in membership. Although one country in BRICS accounts for a significant share of BRICS GDP, no member dominates, in line with the BRICS ethos and consensus-based approach. The grouping’s vitality is widely distributed, and expansion has further diversified the base for cooperation and opened new possibilities.

India’s leadership of BRICS in 2026

India’s role is as an emerging power of consequence, with influence in regional and global affairs; as the fourth-largest economy and the fastest-growing major economy; and as a partner seeking reform in global governance. India’s stewardship of BRICS in the current phase of challenging circumstances will be important. India will steer BRICS towards its geoeconomic and geopolitical objectives and add momentum to the building of consensus and innovation to meet new challenges and opportunities.

India has helped shape the BRICS vision and ethos, with politics and security, economic development, and cultural exchanges as the fundamental pillars of BRICS cooperation. The Indian way has also entrenched the role of consensus in agenda-setting and decision-making, while a focus on concrete projects has contributed to functional cooperation across sectors.

Under India’s leadership in 2012, 2016 and 2021, BRICS made significant progress in promoting cooperation in key sectors such as agriculture and industry, trade and investment, technology and innovation, green energy and climate change, HADR response, and people-to-people exchanges. Further, India facilitated the development of the institutional framework for cooperation through the piloting of the Economic Partnership Strategy, the integration of MSMEs into supply chains, data sharing to promote trade and investment, the establishment of institutions such as the Vaccine R&D Centre, responses to health challenges such as HIV and COVID-19, the development of think tank and university networks, business partnerships, and youth and women’s exchanges. Particularly noteworthy was India’s promotion of open-source digital public goods, the use of UPI, digital health and fintech for digital inclusivity and efficiency. The dialogue on cyber security and digital governance was strengthened. India also pushed for reform of global governance, particularly in the UN and IMF, to give greater representation and voice to developing countries and EMDCs.

India unveiled the priorities for its BRICS leadership following consultations at the recent Sherpa meeting. India advanced the idea of “humanity first” and “people centric” approach on the theme of “Building for resilience, innovation, cooperation and sustainability”. Taking note off the practical steps that have advanced BRICS cooperation in thematic areas, Indian supported continuity of approach, while advancing action plans and practical milestones to advance the BRICS ethos and vision. New initiatives in health, agriculture, labour and employment, climate change, energy, innovation, ICT, security and terrorism, economic and financial domains, etc. are expected to strengthen the BRICS movement.  India led fruitful discussions on institutional development to integrate new members while providing opportunities for engagement of partners. India emphasised the importance of youth and women connect and cultural engagement and supported the activities of established BRICS institutions such as Academic Forum, Think Tank Council, Civil Forum, Business Council and Women Business Alliance. The Indian approach is based on the spirit of cooperation to address shared challenges in a balanced and inclusive manner. It underscores the importance of strengthening capacities, promoting innovation, and ensuring sustainable development for the benefit of all. India’s BRICS chairship will drive Ministerial and working level engagement towards substantive outcomes, make new advances in BRICS cooperation, discuss geopolitical and geoeconomic issues of importance, bridge differences and involve the citizens.

India will formally unveil the details of its BRICS priorities following consultations with partners. An initial indication suggests a “humanity first” and “people-centred” approach. The theme will focus on “Building for resilience, innovation, cooperation and sustainability”. The approach is grounded in the spirit of cooperation to address shared challenges in a balanced and inclusive manner. It underscores the importance of strengthening capacities, promoting innovation, and ensuring sustainable development for the benefit of all.

India has emphasised that resilience will involve building structural and institutional strength capable of weathering global shocks, with particular reference to resilience in agriculture, health, disaster risk reduction, energy and supply chains, through cooperative frameworks for collective preparedness and response. Innovation, as a central driver of economic development, will focus on new and emerging technologies to address social and economic challenges and enhance cooperation among start-ups and MSMEs to build a more equitable world. At the same time, the importance of sustainability will advance climate action, promote clean energy and support sustainable development pathways that are fair and sensitive to national circumstances.

Given the recent expansion of BRICS membership, the grouping will need to consolidate while promoting its integration through the BRICS way of consensus and a practical approach to problem-solving. Sharing the fruits of its successes since inception will give new members a perspective on BRICS’s focus and how they can contribute to the movement. In general, decisions on the economic agenda have been easier to achieve than on political and security issues. BRICS will continue an action-oriented approach while ensuring that bilateral differences do not come in the way of group objectives.

BRICS will pursue an agenda for economic growth and inclusive development. The use of technology and innovation as vectors for development has been successful in India through the application of digital physical infrastructure and the India Stack. Sharing these with BRICS members and partners can reduce digital asymmetry and promote inclusivity. Another major agenda would be the promotion of sustainability through cooperation in green energy, the circular economy, environmentally friendly lifestyles, and the use of traditional knowledge and technologies. Our capabilities in addressing HADR situations, CDRI, and pandemics and tropical diseases are widely recognised and can be shared in a world of increased incidence of natural disasters and calamities. Finally, we shall harness the strength and energy of citizens to build a people’s BRICS, which can be a milestone in the progress of the movement.

India’s stature as a civilisational power and an emerging power that balances interests and values for inclusivity will enable us to advance commonalities while bridging differences, thereby forging consensus. Building a better understanding of how to handle contentious issues and conflict situations, and promoting plurality and diversity, will not only enable BRICS members to balance geopolitics and geoeconomics but also help address such situations in their own regions.

In terms of working methods, there have been suggestions that BRICS, having grown quite large, should review its agenda to focus on core development and governance issues and to promote members’ capacity to address regional issues. There has also been discussion about the feasibility of establishing a Secretariat, for which India would be an ideal candidate. For the present, it may be appropriate to consider a Troika format, with the previous and incoming chairs joining a group for agenda-setting and outreach. BRICS will benefit from integrating members into the BRICS ethos, a focus on core development and governance objectives, and mechanisms for interaction with developed countries and institutions.

Recommendations

• Working methods. Rationalise the agenda, streamline mechanisms, and conduct stocktaking for efficiency and impact.
• New members. Consolidate modalities for admitting new members and partners and integrating BRICS vision and ethos.
• Technology focus. Establish an AI Centre, an Innovation Bridge Strategy, a BRICS Skill Development Centre, a DPI platform for BRICS members and the Global South, and a Cybersecurity Action Plan.
• Financial issues. Strengthen trade in local currencies, develop central bank-regulated payment gateways, promote CBDCs and blockchain-based transactions, and establish an NDB structure in GIFT City for the private sector.
• Institutional issues. Establish partnership relations with the G7 and the World Bank, and develop BRICS Outreach

Conclusion

There is no doubt that at a time when multilateralism is in crisis, the old rule-based system is in disarray, and there is growing suspicion of the hegemonic tendencies of major powers. Many look to India’s leadership of BRICS to restore balance and credibility. At this crucial juncture, India can play its role in strengthening the BRICS movement’s contribution to EMDCs and in bridging differences between developed and emerging economies for the common good.

Author Brief Bio: Sanjay Bhattacharyya, a former Indian diplomat, was BRICS Sherpa during India’s chairship in 2021. He is currently Professor of Diplomatic Practice at Jindal Global University.

 

Following India’s successful G20 presidency from December 2022 to November 2023, India’s BRICS presidency for 2026 heralds new opportunities, coming at a time of great global flux. India has declared its focus for BRICS as “Building for Resilience, Innovation, Cooperation, and Sustainability”—a clever juxtaposition of the BRICS acronym, theming its presidency on “Humanity First” and Global South Leadership. During its presidency, India intends to focus on the twin pillars of global governance: political and security, and economic and financial. While a year is too short to make fundamental shifts in the world order, the present global upheaval, in which the institutions of global governance are coming under increasing strain, is a good time to shape policies that will have a long-term impact on the emerging world order.

The West has dominated global institutions since the end of World War II, primarily because the Western bloc created the systems of global governance, both political and economic, and the rest of the world followed. However, as economic gravitas shifts from the Atlantic to the Indo-Pacific and the Global South rises, the earlier monetary structures in which the Dollar held sway and the West controlled the narrative are no longer seen as universally applicable or acceptable. While change is inevitable, it is logical to expect that the West, which has benefited from the old order, will resist it. That is a challenge that New Delhi will have to address.

While New Delhi does not view the BRICS as an anti-Western bloc or a substitute for the existing global order, it recognises the need to rebalance global governance structures to reflect contemporary realities. To some in the West, however, the BRICS is seen as an anti-Western bloc. India will have to be mindful of this dichotomy and allay Western fears in this regard, while at the same time pushing the BRICS towards issue-based cooperation. While making efforts to avoid an antagonistic relationship with Western powers, it will also have to work to secure a more equitable role for the Global South in governance and financial structures.

India will likely focus on exerting its influence to reform global institutions such as the United Nations, the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund, while avoiding the creation of blocs like NATO, which could lead to another Cold War. Towards that end, de-dollarisation is unlikely to be on the agenda. Instead, the focus will be on strengthening the New Development Bank (NDB), expanding local-currency trade mechanisms, and improving access to climate and infrastructure finance. This does not mean decoupling from the dollar system, but rather ensuring that unilateral freezing of funds through systems such as SWIFT cannot be used to curtail the sovereign decisions of countries in the Global South. In addition, there will likely be a push to shape global norms through digital public infrastructure.

On governance issues, the United Nations no longer holds sway as a body capable of ensuring the peaceful settlement of disputes or whose decisions will be universally accepted. While it is too early to sound the death knell for the world body, there is a strong case for internal reforms that are more inclusive and reflect current geostrategic and geo-economic realities. Why India, with the world’s largest population and currently the fourth-largest economy by GDP, is not a member of the Security Council is an issue that needs to be addressed. Paradoxically, some NATO members strongly favour expanding the Security Council to include India as a permanent member. That push, however, is opposed by China, a member of BRICS!

India’s BRICS presidency will be a challenge and will also present multiple opportunities. The determinant of success will, in all probability, depend on how far India advances the BRICS agenda towards cooperation rather than confrontation.

Author Brief Bio: Maj. Gen. Dhruv C. Katoch is Editor, India Foundation Journal and Director, India Foundation.