Introduction: Trade Policy in the Context of the Vision for Viksit Bharat

 

India has set itself an ambitious target. The country hopes to transform into a developed economy with commensurate per capita income and quality of life by 2047. This vision of Viksit Bharat envisages a robust economy that is globally competitive and integrated into global value chains, generating economic opportunities for Indian workers and businesses to assist in fulfilling this transformation into a developed economy. Integral to this vision is a diversified and technologically advanced industrial sector that serves as an engine of growth and employment creation and a means to meet India’s security needs, reinforcing India’s emergence as a global power.

 

Achieving this goal would require sustained economic growth of at least 8% for well over a decade. However, such growth would also need to produce relatively well-paying jobs capable of absorbing the millions of working-age Indians. With around 990 million people in its working-age population, India currently boasts the world’s largest cohort of potential workers. This presents both a challenge and an opportunity. If this population is productively employed, it will create a virtuous cycle of production leading to income and demand that will aid India in achieving its target of Viksit Bharat. Generating such productive employment would necessitate a rapid expansion of the manufacturing and services sectors, allowing India to leverage demand drivers in both the domestic and global economies. Consequently, India’s trade and investment strategies are central to its path towards Viksit Bharat.

 

However, this growth path is complicated by the increasingly rapid adoption of automation and robotics in manufacturing, along with AI-led solutions in services. East Asian economies, including China, relied on relatively low labour costs, supported by decent infrastructure and political stability, to attract the labour-intensive segments of the manufacturing value chain to their countries during their industrial transformation from the 1980s to the early 2000s. Indian workers will now have to compete not only with workers from other countries in terms of productivity and cost, but also with robots and AI-led automation in skilled jobs.

 

Autor (2019) presents evidence of a highly polarised labour market due to such technological shocks, with high returns for the highly skilled and increasingly lower returns and opportunities for less skilled workers. This indicates a shrinking number of ‘middle-class’ jobs precisely when India would want millions of its low-wage workers to transition towards better-paying middle-class jobs to drive its economic development. Giuntella et al. (2022) show that China is already facing a challenge from the adoption of robotics despite the scale and depth of its manufacturing sector. The increasing use of robots to enhance productivity and reduce costs diminishes economic opportunities for less-skilled workers in China. Acemoglu and Restrepo (2020) have shown that the growing use of robots reduces wages and employment, while Christiansen and Winkler (2019), using the trade flows between the US and Mexico as an example, provide evidence that increasing automation in developed country industries has reduced export opportunities for developing countries.

 

India would have to contend with this challenging technology transition and what many economists have termed the ‘China Shock’. China’s economy and manufacturing exports have grown at an unprecedented rate over the past three decades since the 1990s. As Table 1 below shows, China’s share of global manufacturing output increased 11.5 times from just 2.5% in 1990 to 28.7% in 2020. Currently, China accounts for close to one-third of global manufacturing output. No other single economy has dominated global manufacturing as China’s does today. China’s global share of manufacturing exports increased marginally from 1.5% to 1.8% between 1990 and 2000. However, it increased exponentially post-2000 after China became a member of the World Trade Organisation (WTO), reaching 14% by 2023.

 

Table 1: Share of Global Manufacturing Output

Countries/Region	1980	1990	2000	2010	2020
China	3.70%	2.50%	6.40%	18.20%	28.70%
Germany	9.00%	9.50%	6.70%	6.30%	5.40%
India	1.10%	1.20%	1.20%	2.70%	2.80%
Japan	11.00%	17.90%	18.60%	11.30%	7.50%
Korea, Republic of	0.50%	1.50%	2.50%	3.00%	3.00%
South-eastern Asia	1.30%	1.80%	2.70%	4.40%	4.90%

 

Source: Author’s calculation based on UNCTAD Data

 

China has not only come to dominate labour-intensive manufacturing exports (global share rising from 11% to 32% between 2000 and 2022), but also high-tech manufacturing exports (global share rising from just 4.5% to 25.6% between 2000 and 2022), as illustrated in Figure 1 below.

Figure 1: Global Share of Manufacturing Exports

High-tech Products

 

Labour Intensive Products

 

Source: Authors’ calculations based on World Integrated Trade Solutions (WITS) UN COMTRADE

 

The impact of this rapid and unprecedented rise has been further exacerbated by the fact that China has largely followed a mercantilist approach, encouraging exports and production while limiting consumption and imports. This gap between China’s exports and imports has been widening since the early 2000s (see figure 2 below). It is important to note that China’s share of global exports has not increased since 2016 and has remained stable at around 13% to 14%. This stagnation is partially attributable to tariff protections targeting Chinese imports implemented during the first Trump administration and protectionist measures in the EU and several other Asian countries. Nevertheless, China’s share of global manufacturing output has continued to grow, supported by state assistance, thereby increasing the risk of creating global overcapacity across various sectors^[1].

Source: Authors’ calculations-based World Development Indicators Database, World Bank

 

This unprecedented and unbalanced growth of China’s manufacturing sector and its domination of manufacturing exports have resulted in severe economic distress and job losses. Caliendo et al. (2019) and Autor et al. (2013) provide evidence of such significant job reductions due to this so-called ‘China Shock’. A Rhodium Group report from 2024 emphasises that developing countries have been particularly adversely affected by China’s mercantilist policies^[2].

 

The western world, particularly the United States, facilitated the entry of China, a non-democratic polity and a non-market economy, into the rules-based trading architecture of the global economy as represented by the WTO in 2000, with the hope that increasing integration with the global economy and rising incomes would lead to a democratic transition. It is clear that developments in China are actually moving in the opposite direction. As long as China’s unfair trade practices predominantly affected labour-intensive industries, with the adverse effects primarily felt by developing countries like India, the Western nations (and Japan) showed little concern (Banerjee et al. 2025a). In fact, many Western economists argued that Chinese subsidies helped manage inflation in their countries and that cheaper Chinese industrial parts and components enhanced the competitiveness of Western industries^[3].

 

However, as China began to challenge the dominance of Western economies in their core tech-intensive sectors, Western countries started to push back with more protectionist policies and state support for their own industries, often in contravention of the global rules they themselves championed a few decades ago. The tariff policies under the Trump administration and industrial policies such as the Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) and the CHIPS Act under the Biden administration are examples of such trade-distorting policies. The EU has been actively using environmental policies, such as the Carbon Border Adjustment Measures or CBAM, as a guise for protectionism. This Western reaction to the global imbalance caused by China is also shrinking the global opportunities available to large developing countries like India, precisely at a time when it needs to leverage such opportunities the most.

 

Another major concern arising from China’s domination of global manufacturing and exports is the vulnerabilities created for global supply chains due to over-reliance on China (or any single country). China has a 65% or greater share of imports in 407 products that are critically important, as they are associated with national security, healthcare, agriculture (fertilisers), renewable energy, or represent key intermediate inputs to industry^[4]. Such dependence can be easily weaponised by China, as demonstrated by the recent instance of China withholding the export of key capital machinery to slow down the shift of smartphone manufacturing to India^[5], or export controls of industrial magnets^[6] that have widespread industrial application including in the automobile industry, are perfect examples of such weaponisation of supply-chains.

 

China has also employed predatory pricing to eliminate any domestic capacity a country has, thereby increasing dependence on Chinese imports. In India, this was evident in the case of several chemicals that are Active Pharmaceutical Ingredients (APIs) critical to India’s pharmaceutical industry. Consequently, reducing dependence, particularly on unreliable trade partners whose geopolitical interests do not align with India, assumes significant importance.

 

Indian trade and investment policy must account for and address these fundamental challenges. India needs to establish trade deals that ensure assured access to key markets and eliminate both tariff and non-tariff barriers to its exports. Such assured market access would attract FDI and enable India to leverage global opportunities to drive its economic growth. However, making such deals requires reducing its own tariff barriers. India must negotiate optimal pathways for tariff liberalisation that allow it to provide strategic short- to medium-term protection to key industrial sectors, enabling them to grow while also safeguarding vulnerable sectors of its economy. Furthermore, India must ensure that it is perceived as a trusted partner and is not denied essential technologies.

 

Another priority would be to address unfair trade practices, particularly those originating from non-market economies. Simultaneously, India would need to advocate for flexibilities in global rules on industrial policy, allowing it to implement strategies that foster manufacturing growth and lift the majority of its population out of poverty and into the middle class. This would require persuading its main economic partners of the necessity for such flexibilities to pursue industrial policies that are intelligent, targeted, and effective, while not being entirely consistent with WTO rules on subsidies and state support for industries.

 

Another key policy objective would be to further enhance India’s competitive advantage in high-skilled services. Increasing digitalisation is amplifying the scale and scope of services trade. As Indian skilled workers bring an increasing level of competition to workers in developed countries across various occupations, there will be mounting pressure on the governments of those countries to protect their workers from such Indian competition. India will need to pre-empt this protectionism and ensure that the economic benefits of services trade, which could generate millions of well-paid jobs and help create an urban middle-class revolution several times the scale of that generated by IT-led development in the 2000s, are not hampered by such protectionist pressures (Banerjee et al. 2025b). As figure 3 below shows, India boasts the world’s largest cohort of college-educated individuals. Effectively leveraging this talent will be a critical aspect of India’s successful transformation into a developed economy.

Source: Global Tech Talent Guidebook 2025, CBRE Research

The following sections will discuss trade policy in relation to specific goals such as ensuring market access for Indian exports, attracting investment, and enhancing technology accessibility for Indian firms. We will also examine the role of bilateral agreements in fostering more resilient supply chains.

 

Trade Agreements and Market Access

 

Sustained growth of Indian manufacturing and services will require leveraging both domestic and global opportunities. Ensuring assured market access to the world’s major economies and growth regions is, therefore, a critical priority for Indian policymakers. India already has FTAs in place with Japan, Korea, ASEAN, the European Free Trade Area (EFTA), and the UK^[7]. It is currently pursuing FTAs with nearly all the other major industrial economies, including Australia^[8], the European Union (EU), and the USA^[9].

 

Having negotiated an FTA with the UAE. India is actively considering initiating agreements with the other Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC) member states, including Saudi Arabia^[10]. India is engaged in discussions with Russia and other member states of the Eurasian Economic Union (EaEU) for an FTA. Additionally, India is actively pursuing negotiations with major economies in Africa and Latin America for FTAs. The overarching objective is to establish FTAS with all G20 economies, excluding China, by 2030, as well as with the key emerging regions in Africa and Latin America.

 

According to WTO rules, India’s so-called MFN tariffs are available to all WTO member states, including non-market trade distorters like China. Therefore, India cannot discriminate and impose higher tariffs on non-market economies while applying lower tariffs on others. However, India can offer reduced tariffs without violating WTO rules to all countries or regions with which it has negotiated an FTA. India should aim to negotiate and finalise such FTAs with all major economies and trade partners by 2030. These FTA partners would account for a significant portion of global trade covered by FTAs^[11]. As Figures 4a and 4b below demonstrate, India’s FTA strategy would integrate the country with economies representing two-thi^rds of global GDP and more than two-thi^rds of global import demand. Consequently, India’s MFN tariffs would effectively apply only to China and other non-market economies with which India has not negotiated FTAs.

 

Figure 4a

Figure 5a

 

Source: Calculations based on World Integrated Trade Solution (WITS)

 

Strategically, this would provide India with the policy space to achieve two important objectives. First, increase such MFN tariffs as high as possible to counter non-market trade-distorting actions by non-market economies while ensuring they do not impact trade with other major market economies, which will be covered by much lower FTA tariffs. Second, use such high MFN tariffs strategically to reduce import dependence and supply-chain vulnerability, and ‘friendshore^[12]’ supplies from preferred FTA partners.

 

India’s FTA strategy aligns completely with the vision of Atmanirbhar Bharat. Thus far, India has largely succeeded in excluding certain sectors from market liberalisation or securing considerably long transition periods before opening its markets to key strategic sectors that are integral to its long-term industrial policy strategy^[13] (which we discuss subsequently). This will provide some breathing space before such sectors are exposed to foreign competition as tariffs decrease. India will need to leverage its domestic market size and enhance scale and competence in these crucial sectors that are set to dominate the global economy in the future.

 

Non-tariff barriers related to product standards, national security, consumer safety, health, and the environment are becoming greater obstacles to trade than tariffs. India must, therefore, ensure that these non-tariff barriers do not hinder its export opportunities. To achieve this, it needs to identify innovative provisions within its FTAs that focus on minimising the costs of complying with these standards and regulations for India’s exporters. India has been relatively less successful in this regard, making it a crucial area for further development and application as the country advances its FTA strategy.

 

Digitally delivered services are set to increasingly dominate the global value chain. India is the hub for Global Capability Centres (GCCs) mediating these emerging value chains. The growth of GCCs is central to fostering the next ‘middle-class’ revolution in India, creating millions of high-paying jobs in the country. India’s FTAs with key economies must include measures that pre-empt any protectionism in market access for Indian services exports. Many of these protectionist measures are currently absent, not discussed, or not applied, so there is still time for pre-emption. While India has secured some binding commitments for the cross-border digital delivery of services, this remains a work in progress, and there is a need for a more comprehensive strategy on this front^[14].

 

Ensuring gainful employment opportunities for India’s large working-age population will require leveraging global demand for workers, particularly in countries with ageing populations where such demand is likely to emerge. Services chapters in FTAs present opportunities for India to secure binding commitments on labour mobility for skilled service workers. Moreover, India must proactively seek stand-alone bilateral mobility agreements outside of FTAs that would enable Indian industrial workers and less-skilled service workers to find employment globally.

 

Investment and Technology

 

FTAs play a crucial role in attracting investments into the country. As mentioned earlier, FTAs provide predictability concerning tariffs through binding commitments on reduced tariffs and on regulatory aspects of trade. Businesses are therefore more inclined to invest due to the reduced risk of policy-induced shocks once an FTA is established. There is robust empirical evidence linking binding tariff liberalisation and regulatory predictability in FTAs to significant increases in FDI. The impact of FTAs on boosting FDI is particularly evident in agreements between developed and developing countries (Laget et al. 2021).

 

India’s FTA policy has been strategised based on the FTA-FDI linkage, which is why India has prioritised its FTAs with major industrialised economies. While the FTA-FDI linkage has traditionally been implicit, India has introduced innovations in FTA disciplines to create an explicit connection. It is important to note that the India-EFTA TEPA is the world’s first FTA explicitly establishing a discipline linking market access outcomes to FDI.

 

The agreement acknowledges that one fundamental trade-off in FTAs with advanced countries is opening up India’s vast and growing market in exchange for access to global value chains dominated by MNCs based in these advanced economies. FDI from these global MNCs and their affiliated suppliers in India will be crucial to India’s capacity to expand manufacturing and exports. It will also be central to technology and skills transfer. The India-EFTA TEPA includes a commitment from EFTA member states led by Switzerland to invest USD 100 billion and create 1 million jobs in India within 15 years of the agreement’s entry into force. This Indian innovation is being closely examined by other large developing economies seeking to emulate it in their FTAs.

 

FDI relies on the ease of doing business (EoDB). India has prioritised EoDB under Prime Minister Modi’s leadership since 2014 and has made significant progress. Over 39,000 compliance requirements have been streamlined, and over 3,400 legal provisions have been decriminalised. A comprehensive programme led by the Department for Promotion of Industry and Internal Trade (DPIIT), involving both central and state governments, has been established to implement reforms. This is crucial since the vast majority of clearances and procedures investors face fall under state governments’ jurisdiction. These ongoing efforts have elevated India’s rank in the World Bank’s EoDB Report from 142^nd in 2014 to 63^rd in 2019^[15].

 

India is also exploring innovations within FTAs to incorporate disciplines on investment facilitation that offer greater assurance to investors. India’s newer FTAs aim to include disciplines on good regulatory practices (GRP) that will help catalyse faster reforms within India, provide opportunities to learn from the best practices of its trade partners, and foster collaborations and capacity building in this area.

 

However, one area where India needs to bring greater policy focus and reform is Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs). BITs protect foreign investors from adverse policy changes or conditions. The current model of BITs that India insists on is generally considered ineffective as it does not include disciplines that would assure foreign investors. For example, it excludes taxation policies from BITs, exposing foreign investors to sudden tax policy changes without any recourse in the investment treaty. They also require investors to exhaust all domestic legal remedies for a set period (e.g., five years) before resorting to international arbitration. This can lead to significant delays and discourage investors who prefer a quicker resolution process.

 

As India becomes an outward foreign investor, seeking access to essential raw materials, critical technology, and infrastructure assets to support its ambition of becoming a significant player in planned global trading corridors like IMEC, its firms will also require investment protection. Therefore, India’s BITs must reflect this dual reality: Indian investment may also need safeguarding in a world characterised by policy uncertainty and shifting geopolitical concerns, where countries may be inclined to alter policies that affect investments.

 

Technology

 

Despite rapid advancements in key areas of technology and engineering and some remarkable achievements in space, defence, biotechnology, and other fields, India has yet to catch up with its peers. In a global economy where competitiveness is defined by the ability to access, adopt, and develop cutting-edge technology, India must implement strategies that minimise impediments to the accessibility and adoptability of technology. Access to technology is critical for India’s successful integration and eventual leadership in two major transformations in the global economy: the green transition to more sustainable energy sources and the digital transition. Figure 5 illustrates India’s relative position among global tech leaders in critical technologies. India is ranked 9^th overall and significantly lags in areas such as semiconductors and quantum computing.

 

Figure 5: India’s relative performance in key technologies among technology leaders

Source: Taken from the Emerging and Critical Technologies Index, published by the Harvard Kennedy School, Belfer Centre for Science and International Affairs, June 2025

 

Technology denial is an inherent aspect of geopolitical tension. Technology leaders like the EU, the US, and Japan increasingly attempt to withhold technological know-how and hardware from less-trusted players. The US policy of restricting the export of high-performance AI chips to only a few trusted countries is but one example of such emerging challenges.

 

India’s independent courts and rule of law, which prevent technology theft and hold violators accountable, provide the foundation on which India could be regarded as a trusted partner for technology transfer by Western firms and countries. As FTAs enhance trade and investment linkages between India and industrialised economies, Western multinational technology leaders would have a significant incentive to engage in technology transfer and cooperation with India. As Table 2 illustrates, India ranks third among large developing and newly industrialised economies as a technology market and is the fastest-growing one.

 

Table 2: India as a market for technology: Relative importance among developing countries and NIE peers

Source: Calculations using the Trade in Services by Mode of Supply (TISMOS) database, WTO

 

India’s vast pool of highly skilled labour (see Figure 2) offers another key advantage in joint technology development and innovation. India has emerged as one of the largest defence procurers in the world. It has successfully leveraged its purchasing power to advocate for licensed production, joint product development, and technology partnerships. The recent successes in indigenous production and development are attributed to reforms in the procurement process and strategy involving the Indian private sector.

 

Military technologies have significant spillovers for non-military commercial applications. The US military-industrial complex is a prime example of cutting-edge commercial product development. From Ray-Ban sunglasses to the internet, the defence sector has been the source of some of the most successful commercial products. A strategic approach to India’s defence procurement, as it expands in scale and scope to facilitate technology transfer, is critical to India’s long-term trade and industrialisation policies. As Figure 3 illustrates, India is the world’s fourth-largest defence spender, and its spending growth is second only to China among the leading countries.

 

Table 3: India as a defence spender: Relative importance among leading economies

Source: Calculations using World Bank Development Indicators Database

 

However, defence is not the only area where India’s influence in government procurement is rapidly increasing. Indian government investment and procurement in renewables, telecommunications, transport, agriculture, and medicine should be effectively leveraged along the same lines as defence. Unlike in the case of defence, procurement in these other sectors is distributed across numerous departments and state governments. This dilutes the advantage of scale. A thought-out planning process is needed where procurement remains independent, yet is conducted in a coordinated manner to capitalise on scale advantages as an incentive for technology transfer and joint development in partnership with the Indian private sector.

 

Finally, as will be discussed later under industrial policy, India would need to engage actively in its multilateral trade strategy within the WTO to seek flexibilities in current WTO rules^[16] to use performance requirements related to investment that is trying to cash in on India’s large and growing market size. Such performance requirements may encompass technology transfer, training, or local sourcing (which facilitates tech transfer to local firms). For instance, a foreign firm keen on obtaining a share of India’s USD 10 billion per year industrial wastewater treatment market could be subjected to technology transfer and local content requirements to enhance India’s domestic capabilities in this vital area.

 

Developing Resilient Supply Chains

 

India depends significantly on foreign suppliers for critical goods and raw materials, including reliance on a single import source. In many instances, this singular source of imports is China, making India vulnerable to the potential weaponisation of supply chains. Figure 6 illustrates key areas of vulnerability for India.

 

Figure 6: Key Sectors and Associated Products of Supply-Chain Vulnerability for India

Source: Internal, unpublished analysis by the author

 

FTAs include disciplines that impose binding restrictions on partners, preventing export controls; that is, they reduce the risk of weaponisation of import dependencies. However, India has been reluctant to pursue deep commitments related to export controls due to its need to restrict exports of predominantly agricultural products to ensure food security and domestic price stability. Furthermore, India’s FTA strategy excludes China as a partner, even though dependencies on China define the majority of India’s supply-chain vulnerabilities. Nevertheless, India would benefit from reconsidering its soft commitments strategy to export controls with other trade partners, as such provisions are an essential mechanism for de-risking the supply chain. It should also be noted that WTO rules broadly prohibit export bans and restrictions, allowing members to apply them temporarily to prevent or alleviate critical shortages of foodstuffs or other essential products. However, WTO rules have been largely ineffective in preventing member states from restricting exports of various products.

 

India has also entered into agreements specific to supply chain security. These include the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF) Supply Chain Agreement, which focuses on cooperation, information sharing, and joint crisis response mechanisms to minimise the impact of disruptions and enhance supply chain efficiency. India is also a signatory to the Mineral Security Partnership (MSP). The objective of the MSP is to coordinate policies among members to ensure effective access to critical minerals and collaborate to reduce dependencies on China overall.

 

India is also seeking to establish disciplines in its FTAs with countries that possess significant reserves of key natural resources, such as critical minerals, which will assist India in securing access to these resources. Examples of this strategy include discussions with Australia and Chile.

Indian policymakers are cognisant of the impact of disruptions at logistical chokepoints such as the Suez Canal and the Gulf of Aden. India has been focusing on creating alternative multi-modal linkages to supplement the routes where such chokepoints are situated. These initiatives include the International North-South Corridor (INSTC), linking India with Central Asia, Russia, and Europe, as well as the India-Middle-East-Europe Corridor (IMEC), which provides an alternative connection between the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean Sea, bypassing the Suez Canal and the Gulf of Aden. Additionally, the trilateral highway offers overland connectivity between India, Southeast Asia, and the South China Sea. Unfortunately, these initiatives are progressing slowly due to geopolitical tensions and other operational challenges. Nonetheless, they remain essential objectives for India’s long-term supply chain resilience.

 

Last but not least, India must expand its domestic capabilities in key industries that are essential for national security, food security, and economic security. Industrial policy aimed at developing and enhancing indigenous capacity is crucial to this goal, and the next section discusses some pertinent issues regarding that topic.

 

Industrial Policy

 

India is increasingly caught between the aggressive use of state-led non-market unfair practices of the world’s largest industrial economy—China—and the well-funded industrial policies of advanced industrialised economies. Between them, these actors are attempting to squeeze out the competition in key sectors that will define the future of the global economy. India’s overall share in global manufacturing is a mere 2.9%, and in global manufacturing exports, it stands at 2.2%. Its share in high-tech sectors is just 2.7%. India must implement policies to support industrial development and competitiveness in these crucial sectors to catch up with dominant players. Since many of these policies could potentially conflict with WTO rules, for example, the performance requirements on foreign investment to aid technology transfer mentioned earlier, or subsidising inputs or credit for private industry, India would need to seek temporary flexibilities from such rules, arguing its developmental needs.

 

India must also find ways to discipline and limit unfair industrial policy actions that increase global developmental inequities and create global imbalances. This would entail countering China’s non-market unfair practices and finding ways to curtail aggressive and excessive industrial policies in the advanced industrial economies.

 

Achieving the above would necessitate independently pursuing each of the three objectives across different platforms with various sets of allies:

 

1. Pursuing flexibilities in global rules to create policy space for India’s industrial policy: India must ally with major developing countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, whose interests align. The group of African nations has already submitted proposals seeking similar solutions at the WTO. With the forthcoming WTO 14th Ministerial Conference, India would benefit from articulating a position that distinguishes the legitimate developmental aims of industrial policy in most developing countries from the predatory and mercantilist industrial policies found in non-market economies like China.

 

2. Pursue reforms in WTO rules that check unfair trade and industrial policies in non-market economies and hold them accountable: India’s interests broadly align with those of the US, EU, and Japan in this objective. India would benefit from making common cause with these developed economies and seeking to include as many developing countries as possible, which are also suffering from such unfair practices, in an alliance. In fact, the US, EU, and Japan might be willing to agree to allow market-oriented developing countries to pursue legitimate development goals with much greater freedom in using subsidies and state support in exchange for assistance in developing international disciplines to hold non-market economies accountable for their policies.

 

3. Ensure that developed economies are held accountable for their trade-distorting policies: India must define parameters of development (per capita income, absolute number of poor people), along with the extent of global economic capabilities that prevent already prosperous countries, which have dominant industrial sectors, from using subsidies and state support that undermine competition and lead to the domination of industrial sectors by global oligopolies.

 

Conclusion

 

India’s goal of Viksit Bharat will need to be achieved under far more challenging circumstances than those faced by countries like Japan, Korea, or China during their respective transitions. The world is experiencing a backlash against globalisation and open markets, geopolitical tensions are disrupting supply chains, and access to key technologies is becoming increasingly restricted for geostrategic reasons. The relatively open markets and globalising trends that had progressed from the twentieth century into the first decade of the 21st century are now being reversed.

 

Furthermore, technological shocks stemming from advancements such as automation and AI have significantly diminished the creation of new jobs linked to economic growth, making it increasingly easier and cheaper to replace human workers with machines. This reduction in space for ‘labour-intensive’ economic activities poses a considerable challenge for India, which must ensure productive engagement for the world’s largest working-age population.

 

Adding to all this complexity is the challenge of imbalance in the global economy due to a huge non-market economy that has not played by the international rules governing trade and has weaponised both access to its market and its sheer dominance of supply chains against its competitors.

 

Finding comprehensive solutions that help India meet its developmental objectives by using access to global markets for goods, services, and human resources will require a focused approach involving deeper bilateral integration with major economies and regions through FTAs. Such FTAs must be complemented by matching initiatives that attract foreign investment and ensure accessibility to key technologies. India must form effective alliances to tackle the challenge of supply-chain vulnerability and the weaponisation of over-dependence on a single trade partner.

 

All of this would require agility. India would often find itself allied with countries in opposing geopolitical camps as it pursues its priorities in the areas mentioned above. Balancing such complexities would demand finesse and a relentless pursuit of Indian interests. More importantly, it would necessitate consistency and continuity in Indian policies over this extended period.

 

 

Author Brief Bio: Dr. Pritam Banerjee is Professor & Head, Centre for WTO Studies, Indian Institute of Foreign Trade, New Delhi.

 

References

 

Autor, David (2019) Work of the Past, Work of the Future, Working Paper No. 25588, National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

 

Autor, David H., David Dorn, and Gordon H. Hanson. 2013. “The China Syndrome: Local Labor Market Effects of Import Competition in the United States.” American Economic Review 103 (6): 2121–68.

 

Acemoglu, D., Restrepo, P., 2020. Robots and jobs: Evidence from US labour markets. Journal of Political Economy 128, 2188-2244.

 

Artuc, E, Christiaensen, L, Winkler, H. (2019) Does automation in rich countries hurt developing ones? Evidence from the us and Mexico. Evidence from the US And Mexico (February 14, 2019). World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 8741

 

Bai, Liang and Sebastian Stumpner. 2019, “Estimating US Consumer Gains from Chinese Imports.” American Economic Review: Insights, 1 (2): 209–24

 

Banerjee, P, Hussain, Z, and Karwal, K. (2025a) Navigating the Development Divide: The Case for Policy Space in India’s Industrial Policy Strategy Amid Rising Global Protectionism, Centre for Research in International Trade (CRIT) Working Paper No. 85

 

Banerjee, P, Vartul, Mandal, S, and Dua, D. (2025b) Negotiating for Digitally Delivered Services- Framework for a Comprehensive Approach, Centre for Research in International Trade (CRIT) Working Paper No. 82

 

Boullenois, C, and Jordan, J.A. (2024) How China’s Overcapacity Holds Back Emerging Economies’, Rhodium Group, June

 

Caliendo et al. (2019) ‘Trade and Labor Market Dynamics: General Equilibrium Analysis of the China Trade Shock’, Econometrica, 87(3),

 

Guintella, O, Yi, L, and Wang, T (2022) How Do Workers and Households Adjust to Robots? Evidence from China, Working Paper No. 30707, National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

 

Jaravel, X and E Sager (2019), ‘What are the Price Effects of Trade? Evidence from the U.S. and Implications for Quantitative Trade Models’, CEPR Discussion Paper No. 13902 and

 

Laget, E, Rocha, N, and Varela, G. (2021) Deep Trade Agreement and Foreign Direct Investments, World Bank Policy Research Paper No. 9829

 

 

 

Endnotes

^[1] Chinese state control of Banking and other investment agencies de-links investment decisions from market risks, and thereby expansion of capacities are not based on market based, risk informed decisions which would have otherwise prevented such investments

^[2] How China’s Overcapacity Holds Back Emerging Economies’, Rhodium Group, June 2024

^[3] Examples include Jaravel, X and E Sager (2019), ‘What are the Price Effects of Trade? Evidence from the U.S. and Implications for Quantitative Trade Models’, CEPR Discussion Paper No. 13902 and Bai, Liang and Sebastian Stumpner. 2019, “Estimating US Consumer Gains from Chinese Imports.” American Economic Review: Insights, 1 (2): 209–24.

^[4] Based on unpublished empirical research carried out by the author

^[5] See China’s export ban on engineers and equipment disrupts manufacturing overseas, Strait Times, Published Jan 20, 2025, Singapore

^[6] See China’s rare-earth curbs hit Indian auto industry, India Today, June 16^th, 2025

^[7] India-UK FTA was finalised in May 2025 and is expected to come into force in early 2026

^[8] India has completed an early-harvest agreement with Australia and is currently negotiating to complete the comprehensive deal

^[9] India is currently pursuing a Bilateral Trade Agreement with the US

^[10] India has on-going negotiations with Oman

^[11] India’s neighbours are already covered by South Asia Free Trade Agreement or SAFTA

^[12] Friendshoring refers to the practice of developing more resilient supply-chains by sourcing imports from countries that are more dependable, politically aligned and generally considered to be market oriented and rules based.

^[13] These sectors typically have the maximum potential for future growth includes electronics, advanced engineering, chemicals, pharmaceuticals, precision engineering included robotics, renewable energy etc

^[14] For a more detailed discussion, see Banerjee et al 2025b

^[15] The Make in India Ease of Doing Business page provides a complete list (refer to: https://www.makeinindia.com/eodb#:~:text=India%20jumps%2079%20positions%20from,of%20Doing%20Business%20Ranking%202020′.&text=To%20further%20enhance%20the%20ease,legal%20provisions%20have%20been%20decriminalized)

^[16] Under the WTO agreement on Trade Related Investment Measures or TRIMS

The brutal massacre of innocent tourists in Pahalgam on 22 April by five heavily armed terrorists of The Resistance Front (TRF), a proxy of the Pakistan-based Islamist terrorist group Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), marked a watershed moment in India’s war against terrorism. The attack, timed to coincide with the visit of U.S. Vice President JD Vance to India, was no coincidence. It was a calculated move intended to internationalise the Kashmir issue and sow communal discord within India. The terrorists and their sponsors failed on both counts. An outraged India rallied together, united in grief, anger, and resolve, and demanded justice for the victims. That justice was delivered on the night of 6-7 May through Operation Sindoor.

 

A press briefing on 23 April by India’s Foreign Secretary, Shri Vikram Misri, set the stage for what was to follow. He informed the media that the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS), chaired by the Prime Minister, had convened to assess the evolving security situation. The CCS resolved to bring the perpetrators of the attack to justice and hold their sponsors accountable. As an immediate response, the Indus Waters Treaty of 1960 was suspended, and the Integrated Check Post at Attari was closed. Visas issued under the SAARC Visa Exemption Scheme (SVES) were also cancelled. Additionally, the military, naval, and air advisors at the Pakistani High Commission in New Delhi were declared persona non grata and instructed to leave the country.

 

Prime Minister Narendra Modi, in a public rally just 48 hours after the deadly Pahalgam attack, assured the nation that justice would be delivered. Switching to English, in his address, he declared, “Today, from the soil of Bihar, I say this to the whole world, India will identify, track and punish every terrorist and their backers.”^[1] This was an unambiguous statement of intent. The promised retribution came fifteen days later, through Operation Sindoor. In multiple attacks carried out by the Indian Armed Forces in the early hours of 7 May, nine headquarters, training establishments and other infrastructure of three terrorist groups—Lashkar-e-Taiba, Jaish-e-Mohammad, and Hizbul Mujahideen were destroyed. Five of these targets were in POJK (Pakistan Occupied Jammu & Kashmir) and four in Pakistan’s Punjab province. About 140 terrorists were eliminated in this attack, and the headquarters of the LeT and JeM were destroyed.

 

Operation Sindoor marked an inflexion point in India’s response to cross-border terrorism. The hesitations of the past in confronting a neighbour that had long employed terrorism as a tool of state policy were gone. The assumption that nuclear weapons would shield such actions from a robust Indian response no longer held true. The doctrine of ‘strategic restraint’ had been decisively set aside, signalling a new assertiveness in India’s national security policy.

Strategic Restraint: the Background

 

‘Strategic Restraint’ characterised India’s approach to terrorism since the early 1990s. It was a defensive strategy aimed at preventing acts of terrorism. To that end, in the hinterland, a specialised counter-insurgency force, the Rashtriya Rifles, was formed from within the Indian Army to address the escalating insurgency in Jammu and Kashmir. The Rashtriya Rifles quickly established dominance, eliminating a significant number of terrorists and containing violence levels. However, as the losses suffered by terrorist groups were rapidly compensated through infiltration from across the LoC, the number of terrorists operating in J&K did not decline.

 

In the early 2000s, a fence was constructed along the International Border (IB) and the Line of Control (LoC) to check infiltration. The BSF was tasked with actively guarding the fence along the IB, while the Army was responsible for securing the LoC. These measures contributed to a reduction in Pakistan-sponsored cross-border infiltration. However, as Pakistan continued to support the terrorists, such infiltration could not be entirely eliminated.

 

The policy of strategic restraint did not envisage the use of force to deter the Pakistani military. The nuclear tests conducted by both India and Pakistan in 1998 provided Pakistan with the leverage to continue supporting cross-border terrorism under a nuclear overhang. Within India’s security establishment, there was genuine concern that military action against a nuclear-armed Pakistan could provoke a potential nuclear response. Ambiguous yet ominous statements from Pakistan’s political and military leadership, suggesting the possibility of using nuclear weapons to counter an Indian offensive, further reinforced this belief. Consequently, when Pakistani forces infiltrated the Kargil heights in early 1999, India intentionally restricted its military operations to its side of the LoC, signalling a cautious yet calculated employment of military power under the shadow of nuclear deterrence.

 

For the Pakistani establishment, cross-border terrorism represented a low-cost option to continue to bleed India by a thousand cuts—a policy first articulated by Pakistan’s Prime Minister ZA Bhutto after the country’s defeat in the 1971 war. For India, maintaining a significant security presence in Jammu and Kashmir to control levels of violence in the state imposed substantial costs in human and material resources. Despite the increased security presence, acts of violence continued, albeit at manageable levels.

 

The Pakistani state and its military were not impacted by the Indian response, which was directed at preventing infiltration and operating against terrorists in the hinterland. This allowed the Pakistani state to operate with impunity and claim deniability over the actions of the terrorist groups. Consequently, a significant number of high-profile terrorist attacks occurred in India during the first decade of the new millennium. These included an attack on India’s Parliament in 2001 by five Jaish-e-Mohammed terrorists, the 2002 Akshardham Temple attack by Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), the 2005 and 2008 Delhi bombings, and the 2008 Mumbai attacks, which were also carried out by the LeT. Predictably, Pakistan denied having a role in these attacks, claiming them to be the handiwork of “freedom fighters”. India’s ‘Strategic Restraint’ policy thus failed to deter Pakistan from sponsoring such attacks. A policy shift was necessary.

 

When the NDA government came to power with a substantial majority in 2014, it initially aimed to improve relations with Pakistan. Prime Minister Modi invited the Pakistani premier to his swearing-in ceremony on 26 May 2014. As the year drew to a close, in a move that surprised most observers, Prime Minister Modi, while returning from Afghanistan, made an unscheduled stop in Lahore to attend the wedding of Nawaz Sharif’s granddaughter on 25 December.^[2] This was intended as an ice-breaker, but the bonhomie lasted only a few days. Just a week later, on New Year’s Day 2016, during the night of 1-2 January 2016, Pakistan-backed terrorists attacked the Indian Air Force (IAF) base at Pathankot. The terrorists were neutralised and prevented from causing damage to the IAF’s strategic assets, but seven defence personnel lost their lives and 25 were injured.^[3] The brief period of bonhomie was over.

 

The Shift to Deterrence

 

Despite this grave provocation, India continued with its strategic restraint policy. The first glimmer of a policy change in the offing came about following the ambush of an Indian Army convoy in Manipur on 9 June 2015, in which 18 soldiers were killed. The terrorist group NSCN-K claimed responsibility for this outrage. A few days later, in a covert operation code-named “Operation Hot Pursuit”, India’s Special Forces targeted the training facilities and camps linked to NSCN-K a few kilometres inside Myanmar.^[4] The success of this operation drew wide applause, but the Pakistani reaction was dismissive. Responding to the then Minister of State for Information and Broadcasting Rajyavardhan Singh Rathore’s remarks that military action in Myanmar to retaliate against rebels who killed 18 soldiers in Manipur was a message to other countries, Pakistan’s interior minister Nisar Ali Khan stated, “Pakistan is not like Myanmar” and warned that the threats from across the border would not intimidate Pakistan.^[5] He and other leaders in Pakistan also obliquely threatened India with nuclear retaliation should India attempt a similar operation against Pakistan.

 

A terrorist attack on an army post in Uri on 18 September 2016 marked a pivotal moment in India’s response to incidents of terrorism emanating from Pakistan. In this attack, claimed by Jaish-e-Mohammed, a Pakistan-based terrorist group, 19 Indian soldiers lost their lives. Responding to the incident, Prime Minister Modi stated, “We strongly condemn the cowardly terror attack in Uri. I assure the nation that those behind this despicable attack will not go unpunished.” Ten days later, on the night of 28-29 October, the Indian Army launched a surgical strike on seven launch pads located a few kilometres across the LoC, in which a significant number of terrorists were eliminated.^[6] During a briefing for the media the following afternoon, the Indian Army’s Director General of Military Operations, Lt Gen Ranbir Singh, provided details of the strikes. “Significant casualties have been caused to the terrorists and those who are trying to support them”, he stated. “We do not have any plans for the continuation of further operations. However, the Indian armed forces are fully prepared for any contingency,”^[7] he added.

 

The surgical strikes represented a significant shift in India’s approach to cross-border terrorism, suggesting that the ‘strategic restraint’ policy was being replaced by deterrence. For the first time, India had demonstrated an intent to strike overtly at terrorist targets across the LoC and, in the process, had also called out the Pakistani nuclear bluff.

 

While Pakistan opted not to respond to the surgical strikes, it continued to support terrorist groups operating within J&K. Consequently, there was no significant change in the number of terrorist acts of violence, which remained relatively consistent over the subsequent three years.^[8] However, there were no targeted acts of violence involving casualties significant enough to impact a large number of people. Also, no terrorist acts took place outside of Jammu and Kashmir.

 

That changed in 2019, when, on 14 February, in Pulwama, a bustling town about 25 kilometres south of Srinagar, a suicide bomber drove his vehicle into a bus that was part of a CRPF convoy, resulting in the deaths of 40 CRPF personnel. The suicide bomber was identified as Jaish-e-Mohammad’s Adil Ahmed Dar.^[9] Two weeks later, India retaliated by attacking the Jaish-e-Mohammad headquarters in Balakot on 26 February.

 

The Balakot air strike was again a departure from the strategic restraint policy. IAF jets flew across Pakistani airspace and hit a JeM facility in Balakote, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, approximately 80 km deep inside Pakistan. The facility, located atop a forest hilltop about 20 km from Balakot, was run by Muhammad Yusuf Azhar, the brother-in-law of Masoor Azhar, a wanted terrorist. It was reportedly a training camp, with a capacity of about 600, training terrorists in the use of weapons and explosives. Indian sources claimed that the attack killed between 200 and 350 terrorists who were in the buildings at that time. Pakistan, predictably, denied any loss of life, but retaliated thereafter with an air strike on an Indian forward post. In the process, an Indian MiG-21 fighter jet piloted by Wing Commander Abhinandan shot down a returning Pakistani F-16 in aerial combat. However, as his jet was also hit, he ejected over Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir and was captured by the Pakistani military. Two days later, he was released, ending the brief conflagration.

 

The Balakot air strike was significant for two reasons. First, it marked India’s first air strike on Pakistani territory since the 1971 war—and notably, in an undisputed area—signalling once again a shift away from its traditional posture of “strategic restraint”. Second, Pakistan’s swift release of the captured Indian Air Force pilot indicated a reluctance to escalate into full-scale conflict, deviating from its usual strategy of leveraging the threat of nuclear confrontation to prompt Indian caution and international intervention, particularly from the United States. India called Pakistan’s bluff, and Pakistan blinked. As Christine Fair put it, “Pakistan has nuclear weapons it cannot use because, while India will suffer tragic losses from Pakistani launches, Pakistan will cease to exist as a geopolitical entity after India responds in kind.”^[10]

 

The Balakot air strike established a new normal in India’s approach to addressing cross-border terrorism. The use of air power, previously seen as a significant escalation, was no longer taboo. Through this strike, India affirmed its right to defend itself by targeting terrorist objectives wherever they may be.

 

The Jammu and Kashmir Reorganisation Act of August 2019, which followed a few months later, was also a significant step taken to restore normalcy in Jammu and Kashmir and break the linkages Pakistan had cultivated with various groups in the state. The Act revoked the state’s special status and divided it into two Union Territories: Jammu and Kashmir and Ladakh, with both coming under the President’s rule. During the following five years, until elections were held in September 2024, the Union Territory of Jammu and Kashmir witnessed a dramatic decline in casualty figures.^[11] In the Kashmir Valley, the significant improvement in the security situation resulted in zero incidents of hartals, shutdowns, or stone-pelting demonstrations, which had been common earlier. Terrorist attacks in the Kashmir Division fell to 126 in 2021, then to 103 and 29 in the following two years, eventually reducing to single digits in 2024.^[12] The number of tourists visiting the valley rose to record levels, with over three million visiting in 2024.^[13]

 

Pakistan’s declining ability to incite separatism in Jammu and Kashmir was likely the underlying cause of the terrorist attack in Pahalgam on 22 April. The cold-blooded murder of 26 tourists, after identifying their religious identity, appeared to be a desperate attempt by Pakistan to maintain its relevance in the Union Territory. Within minutes of the Pahalgam attack, the TRF claimed responsibility.

 

The Doctrine of Compellance

 

In his address to a rally in Bihar, Prime Minister Modi made it clear that terrorists and their sponsors would face the wrath of the Indian state. Fearing a severe backlash from India and the international community, TRF, likely under Pakistani prodding, swiftly backtracked on its claim, but the evidence against it was overwhelming. As Prime Minister Modi had made it clear that India would respond strongly, Pakistan heightened its security nationwide. Nevertheless,  the scale and ferocity of the Indian response took the Pakistan army and political establishment by surprise.

 

‘Operation Sindoor’ was conceived to punish the perpetrators and planners of terror and to destroy the terror infrastructure across the border. Accordingly, on the night of 6-7 May, the Indian Armed Forces launched coordinated and accurate missile strikes on nine terrorist bases—four located in Pakistan (including the headquarters of LeT and Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) in Muridke and Bahawalpur, respectively), and five in Pakistan-occupied Jammu and Kashmir (including Muzaffarabad and Kotli). All the terrorist bases struck were key command centres of the LeT and JeM.

 

What was significant about “Operation Sindoor” was Pakistan’s failure to protect its airspace, despite deploying the much-vaunted Chinese-made equipment: the long-range HQ-9 and the medium-range HQ-16 series of SAMs (Surface to Air Missiles). India successfully destroyed the terrorist camps in under 30 minutes, with none of its missiles being intercepted by the Pakistani air defence system. As India did not wish to escalate the conflict, the Indian Army’s DGMO immediately informed his Pakistani counterpart of India’s strike, stating that India had not attacked any Pakistani military target and that any response by Pakistan to Indian military targets would provoke a suitable response.

 

Pakistan, however, chose to escalate the conflict, and over the next 72 hours, attacked Indian cities and military bases using drones and missiles. India’s air defence system successfully intercepted all incoming threats, resulting in minimal loss of life or property. In retaliation for Pakistani aggression, India deployed kamikaze drones to neutralise Pakistan’s air defence capabilities, and Lahore’s air defence system was disabled. On the night of 9-10 May, India intensified its counter-offensive. Within three hours, 11 military installations, including Noor Khan, Rafiqui, Murid, Sukkur, Sialkot, Pasrue, Chunian, Sargodha, Skardu, Bholari, and Jacocabad, were struck, causing extensive damage. Pakistan’s air capability thereafter stood seriously degraded, forcing it to seek a ceasefire. This was a significant demonstration of India’s military and strategic power.^[14]

 

Through a combination of kinetic and non-kinetic measures, remarkable political leadership, and skilled diplomatic manoeuvres, a new security doctrine has emerged, which I call the doctrine of compellence. The strategic restraint observed from the 1980s was replaced by deterrence in 2016, as exemplified by the surgical and Balakot air strikes. Now, Operation Sindoor has set the stage for a comprehensive strategy to compel Pakistan to desist from supporting terrorist attacks originating from its soil. In the future, the policy’s kinetic impact will focus on the Pakistan military. This was made clear by the Prime Minister in his address to the nation on 12 May, where he stated that Operation Sindoor has established a new benchmark in India’s fight against terrorism and has introduced a new parameter and a new normal. Three significant points emerged from the Prime Minister’s address. One, India will strike at every location from which the roots of terrorism emerge. Two, India will not tolerate any nuclear blackmail, and three, India will not differentiate between the government sponsoring terrorism and the masterminds of terrorism.^[15]

 

The compellence doctrine establishes new paradigms for deterrence and response. Henceforth, all acts of terror against India will trigger a clear, forceful, and coordinated whole-of-government response, encompassing both kinetic and non-kinetic measures. India will no longer distinguish between terrorists and those who sponsor them—both will be held equally accountable and targeted in its responses. All of Pakistan’s territory is now within the scope of potential Indian action, which will be carried out through coordinated tri-service operations. Nuclear threats from Pakistan will not deter India from taking firm and resolute measures to safeguard its national security and respond decisively to cross-border terrorism. As part of reframing its response strategy, India has decoupled the Kashmir issue from its strike narrative and will act solely through the lens of counter-terrorism. In doing so, India will operate unilaterally and will not seek global approval for its actions. Through this doctrine, India has redefined the rules of engagement and established new red lines.^[16]

 

The non-kinetic measures designed to compel Pakistan to abjure terrorism target the Pakistani state. Among these, linking cooperation on sharing the waters of the Indus River and its tributaries to Pakistan abjuring terrorism will have the most significant impact, as it instils uncertainty in Pakistan’s agricultural sector. “Blood and water cannot flow together” is not merely a slogan but a reality Pakistan must now confront. This will severely affect Pakistan’s Punjab province, which holds considerable influence over the country’s polity. This province relies heavily on the waters of the Jhelum and Chenab Rivers and is, consequently, the most severely impacted by Indian actions upstream of these rivers.

 

The other significant aspect of the non-kinetic response is that India’s engagement with Pakistan on any issue will be conditional, requiring Pakistan to dismantle its terror apparatus. There is no change to the Indian stance that talks and terrorism cannot go together. Discussions on the Kashmir issue will be restricted to the return of the territory illegally occupied by Pakistan, which includes Gilgit-Baltistan and the region of Mirpur-Muzaffarabad.

 

The Challenges Ahead

 

While a new doctrine has been enunciated, future challenges revolve around its execution. For instance, what will be the Indian response if Pakistan-based terrorists attack a military convoy, resulting in the loss of a couple of soldiers’ lives? Will the response match the scale of Operation Sindoor? If not, what will be India’s level of tolerance towards Pakistani-sponsored terrorist attacks?

 

How will India respond to instances of cross-border infiltration and violations of Indian airspace by drones operated from Pakistan? There would be a need for greater clarity on these issues. If the policy is to be zero tolerance, then India must be prepared to respond firmly to every act of terror, even if such terrorist acts are thwarted and cause no damage. In any case, each act of Pakistan-sponsored terrorism must be responded to in a manner that imposes heavy costs on the sponsors.

 

There is a view, especially among some former Indian diplomats, that India’s stated policy of no talks with Pakistan till it forsakes terrorism is counter-productive. The view expressed is that any meaningful progress can occur only through talks. However, talks have yielded little so far, and there is nothing to suggest that Pakistan will be more amenable to forgoing terrorism if negotiations are resumed. A more positive outcome could be obtained by making Pakistan bear the brunt of its policies. Hence, combining non-kinetic and kinetic measures to deter Pakistan may serve India’s interests better. The challenge is to keep the pressure on Pakistan, without getting derailed by internal voices seeking peace at any cost. If sufficiently high costs can be imposed on Pakistan, that could elicit a behaviour change.

 

For the policy to be impactful, India must have a decisive military edge over Pakistan. This edge must be maintained at all times.

 

Conclusion

 

India-Pakistan relations remain at a historic low, with little prospect of improvement in the foreseeable future. India is focused on its long-term developmental trajectory, aiming to become a USD 30 trillion economy by 2047. It cannot afford to be distracted by a belligerent neighbour that continues to pursue a policy of bleeding India through a thousand cuts.

Decades of experience have demonstrated that Pakistan is unlikely to alter its hostility unless compelled to do so through the imposition of meaningful costs. In this context, the new strategic framework initiated through Operation Sindoor represents a pivotal shift. It offers India a credible opportunity to reshape Pakistan’s calculus and compel a reconsideration of its priorities.

The doctrine of compellence—a mix of kinetic and non-kinetic instruments—provides the most viable path towards enforcing a peace that Pakistan cannot ignore. In the current environment, a forced peace—rather than an imagined reconciliation—is the most achievable outcome.

 

Author Brief Bio: Maj. Gen. Dhruv C. Katoch is Editor, India Foundation Journal and Director, India Foundation

 

References:

^[1] India Will Identify, Trace, Punish Every Terrorist and Their Backers: PM Modi –. 24 Apr. 2025, www.newsonair.gov.in/india-will-identify-trace-punish-every-terrorist-their-backers-pm-modi.

 

^[2] Rishi, Shubir. “Modi Makes Surprise Visit to Pakistan, Attends Nawaz’s Grand-daughter’s Wedding.” Rediff, 25 Dec. 2015, www.rediff.com/news/report/surprise-modi-to-drop-in-for-nawazs-birthday-in-lahore/20151225.htm.

 

^[3] Terrorist Attack at Air Force Station Pathankot. www.pib.gov.in/newsite/PrintRelease.aspx?relid=136914.

^[4] Dhingra, Ashok K. “Operation Hot Pursuit: The Indian Army’s Surgical Strikes Into Myanmar.” Fair Observer, 16 May 2025,

www.fairobserver.com/region/central_south_asia/operation-hot-pursuit-the-indian-armys-surgical-strikes-into-myanmar.

 

^[5] IndiaToday.In. “Pakistan Is Not Myanmar: Pakistan Minister to India.” India Today, 10 June 2015, www.indiatoday.in/india/story/pakistan-is-not-myanmar-nisar-ali-khan-manipur-ambush-256792-2015-06-10.

 

^[6] Correspondent, Ht. “India’s Surgical Strikes Across LoC: Full Statement by DGMO Lt Gen Ranbir Singh | Latest News India – Hindustan Times.” Hindustan Times, 29 Sept. 2016, www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/india-s-surgical-strikes-across-loc-full-statement-by-dgmo-lt-gen-ranbir-singh/story-Q5yrp0gjvxKPGazDzAnVsM.html.

 

^[7] “Transcript of Joint Briefing by MEA and MoD (September 29, 2016).” Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India,

www.mea.gov.in/media-briefings.htm?dtl/27446/Transcript_of_Joint_Briefing_by_MEA_and_MoD_September_29_2016.

 

^[8] List of Terrorist Killed in India | South Asian Terrorism Portal. www.satp.org/datasheet-terrorist-attack/major-incidents/india.

 

^[9] Haidar, Suhasini. “Latest Pulwama Attack 2019 News, Photos, Latest News Headlines About Pulwama Attack 2019-The Hindu.” The Hindu, www.thehindu.com/topic/pulwama-attack-2019.

 

^[10] Fair, C. Christine. “Pakistan’s Pulwama Game Plan: It Is Obsessed With Changing Maps in Kashmir and Retarding India’s Global Ri.” Times of India Voices, 25 Feb. 2019, timesofindia.indiatimes.com/blogs/toi-edit-page/pakistans-pulwama-game-plan-it-is-obsessed-with-changing-maps-in-kashmir-and-retarding-indias-global-rise.

 

^[11] “Transcript of Joint Briefing by MEA and MoD (September 29, 2016).” Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India,

www.mea.gov.in/media-briefings.htm?dtl/27446/Transcript_of_Joint_Briefing_by_MEA_and_MoD_September_29_2016.

 

^[12] Ramachandran, Sudha. “Jammu and Kashmir: Five Years After the Abrogation of Its Autonomy”

https://thediplomat.com/2024/08/jammu-and-kashmir-five-years-after-the-abrogation-of-its-autonomy/

 

^[13] KL News Network. “Kashmir Sees 9.2 Million Tourists in 6 Years, 1.4 Lakh From Abroad.” Kashmir Life, 20 May 2025, kashmirlife.net/kashmir-sees-9-2-million-tourists-in-6-years-1-4-lakh-from-abroad-391550.

 

^[14] Operation SINDOOR: India’s Strategic Clarity and Calculated Force. www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2128748#:~:text=The%20results%20of%20Operation%20SINDOOR,Mohammed%2C%20and%20Hizbul%20Mujahideen%20facilities.

 

^[15] English Rendering of PM’s Address to the Nation. www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2128268#:~:text=Our%20brave%20soldiers%20displayed%20immense,every%20daughter%20of%20the%20country.

 

^[16] Operation SINDOOR: India’s Strategic Clarity and Calculated Force. www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2128748#:~:text=The%20results%20of%20Operation%20SINDOOR,Mohammed%2C%20and%20Hizbul%20Mujahideen%20facilities.

 

Book: Our Constitution Our Pride

Author: Ram Madhav

Publication: Prabhat Prakashan

Year of Publication: 2025

Pages: 190

 

In the contemporary Indian political landscape, where constitutional debates frequently occupy centre stage, Ram Madhav’s monograph Our Constitution, Our Pride represents a substantial contribution to the discourse surrounding India’s foundational document. Published at a moment when the Indian Republic celebrates seventy-six years of constitutional governance, Madhav’s work offers a meticulously researched historical account that traces the evolution of the Indian Constitution from its conceptual origins through its implementation challenges. The volume navigates the complex interplay between constitutional theory and political practice, presenting a narrative that is both historically illuminating and contextually relevant to current constitutional deliberations.

Madhav starts his analysis by situating the Indian constitutional project within its historical context, demonstrating that the struggle for a constitution began not with the Constituent Assembly in 1946 but much earlier. In his references to President Murmu’s statement that the Constitution emerged from “our long freedom struggle”, the author effectively argues that constitutional aspirations were inherently woven into the independence movement. The detailed examination of early efforts, including opposition to the Government of India Act 1919 and Mahatma Gandhi’s reflections in Hind Swaraj (1909), offers significant historiographical insights that challenge the conventional periodisation of India’s constitutional history. This approach represents a notable shift from typical constitutional histories that often start with the Constituent Assembly deliberations, creating a more comprehensive genealogy of Indian constitutionalism that acknowledges its indigenous intellectual roots alongside its engagement with Western constitutional traditions.

The author’s treatment of the drafting process is notably nuanced, elucidating the intellectual contributions of various political figures while recognising the central role of Dr B.R. Ambedkar. Madhav carefully reconstructs the dialogic processes through which constitutional provisions were negotiated, revealing the complex ideological currents that influenced the final document. His thorough account of the eight committees established by the Constituent Assembly and the extensive deliberative process, comprising 7,635 amendments, 2,473 of which were discussed over 114 working days, provides readers with a nuanced understanding of constitution-making as an intellectually demanding collective endeavour. The biographical sketches of key figures like Ambedkar, who allegedly worked 18-hour days despite his poor health, humanise the constitutional project and highlight the personal sacrifices involved in its creation. This aspect of the narrative effectively counters reductionist views that attribute the Constitution solely to individual genius, instead portraying it as a synthesis of diverse intellectual traditions within Indian political thought.

Madhav’s examination of the Constitution’s core principles, which include democratic governance, an independent judiciary, and fundamental rights, displays significant theoretical depth. His investigation into how the founding generation understood these principles showcases a deep engagement with primary sources. His comparative analysis of Ambedkar’s and Gandhi’s distinct views on democracy highlights their mutual concern over unchecked majoritarianism, despite their perspectives offering different philosophical orientations. The author notes, “For Gandhi, democracy ensured the weak had the same opportunities as the strong. For Ambedkar, it involved amplifying the voices of the unheard.” This interpretive lens provides valuable insights for modern discussions on Indian democracy. Madhav’s meticulous reconstruction of these intellectual lineages allows readers to grasp the theoretical richness inherent in Indian constitutional thought while acknowledging its practical implications for institutional design.

The volume’s historical contextualisation extends beyond familiar narratives, incorporating lesser-known episodes such as Gandhi’s role in developing a constitution for the princely state of Aundh in 1939. Madhav documents how this experience, which emphasised decentralised governance, village panchayats, and fundamental rights, influenced subsequent constitutional thinking. Similarly, his analysis of the Nehru Report 1928, with its 22 chapters and 88 articles addressing fundamental rights, bicameralism, and federalism, illuminates an important but often overlooked chapter in Indian constitutional history. This archaeological approach to constitutional antecedents enriches our understanding of the intellectual ferment that preceded the Constituent Assembly’s work.

The examination of contentious constitutional issues showcases Madhav’s ability to engage with complex legal and political debates in a manner that is both scholarly and accessible. His discussion of Article 370, the Hindu Code Bill, the Uniform Civil Code, and other debated constitutional provisions offers readers a historically grounded understanding of these ongoing controversies. He maintains analytical rigour even when addressing politically charged subjects, presenting multiple perspectives before sharing his interpretations. His study of Ambedkar’s unsuccessful efforts to integrate the Hindu Code Bill into the constitutional framework, along with the subsequent legislative history of this reform, illustrates the intricate relationship between constitutional aspirations and legislative implementations.

In his chapter “Misuse of the Constitution”, Madhav offers a substantive critique of instances where constitutional mechanisms were used for partisan political purposes. His analysis of the misapplication of Article 356 (President’s Rule) and the declaration of Emergency in 1975 is particularly sharp. Drawing on primary sources and legal scholarship, he details how constitutional provisions intended as “dead letters” (in Ambedkar’s phrasing) were invoked to undermine democratic governance. This section represents one of the volume’s most significant contributions, assessing how constitutional provisions can be subverted without formal amendment. The thorough analysis of Indira Gandhi’s invocation of Article 356 fifty times during her tenure as Prime Minister provides an empirical foundation for theoretical discussions of constitutional subversion.

The chapter “Reform to Perform Better” warrants special attention for its engagement with contemporary debates about constitutional reform. Madhav thoughtfully examines various proposals, including those from the M.N. Venkatachaliah Commission established during Atal Bihari Vajpayee’s government. His discussion navigates the tension between constitutional adaptability and the “Basic Structure” doctrine established in the Kesavananda Bharati judgement. While acknowledging the need for reforms to address evolving societal needs, the author emphasises that any modifications must preserve the fundamental character of the Constitution. This nuanced position avoids uncritical constitutional veneration and cavalier reformism, suggesting principled incrementalism guided by constitutional teleology.

Madhav employs a predominantly historical-institutional approach, examining constitutional evolution through political developments and institutional dynamics. The extensive use of primary sources- including debates from the Constituent Assembly, correspondence between key figures, and parliamentary proceedings- represents a significant strength of this work. The inclusion of annexures featuring foundational speeches, such as Nehru’s address when moving the Objectives Resolution and Ambedkar’s speech on the adoption of the Constitution, grants readers direct access to seminal constitutional texts, thereby enhancing the volume’s value as a reference work. The methodological framework integrates legal formalism with historical contextualism, steering clear of both ahistorical textualism and reductionist political determinism. His work demonstrates substantial intellectual independence and scholarly integrity. His critiques of the misuse of constitutional provisions during various administrations reflect a commitment to constitutional principles that transcend partisan alignments. This intellectual honesty enhances the credibility of the work, even for readers who might not share all of the author’s normative orientations. The willingness to acknowledge constitutional failings across different political eras demonstrates an admirable commitment to scholarly objectivity.

The book’s concluding reflections on constitutional morality are particularly thought-provoking. It references Ambedkar’s assertion that constitutional morality is not an inherent attitude but requires cultivation. Madhav emphasises that the Constitution’s efficacy ultimately depends on adherence to constitutional principles and norms rather than merely formal compliance with the constitutional text. This insight resonates with contemporary scholarship on democratic backsliding and constitutional resilience, suggesting potential directions for future research on India’s constitutional trajectory. His invocation of American Supreme Court Justice Joseph Story’s warning further reinforces the essential relationship between constitutional institutions and civic culture.

The author’s prose is characterised by precision while remaining accessible, steering clear of both excessive technicality and overly simplistic generalisations. The synthesis of theoretical analysis with historical narrative results in a composition that is both intellectually robust and narratively compelling. The meticulous organisation of the content, alongside the strategic incorporation of primary sources, illustrates a degree of methodological rigour that is likely to resonate with academic audiences. The book significantly contributes to Indian constitutional scholarship by offering a comprehensive historical account and thoughtfully engaging with contemporary debates. It will prove invaluable to scholars of Indian constitutional history, legal scholars, political scientists, and engaged citizens seeking a deeper understanding of India’s constitutional foundations. Madhav’s commitment to historical precision and analytical nuance makes this book a worthy addition to constitutional literature.

 

Brief Bio: Dr. Manvi Singh is working as an Assistant Professor in Department of English at Sri Venkateswara College, University of Delhi.

“A resilient society featuring democracy, trust in institutions, and sustainable

development lies at the heart of a resilient state.”

Global Strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy, 2016: 24

 

 

Introduction

 

Exploring the long-term threats to India’s strategic autonomy^[i] is crucial for the country. It entails understanding and institutionalising mechanisms to build resilience in 21st-century India and creating decision-making processes and rule-based participation by institutions and organisations in the Indian government, the private and corporate sectors, and NGOs, on an even playing field. To build a specialised focus on resilience, an assessment^[ii] of the same in the Indian context would require an institutionalised network of multi-disciplinary skills. In the limited time, we decided to share the burden of ploughing through the strategic conundrum by uncovering the mosaic of  “World in Transition”^[iii] In the first part, I will first give an overview as to what were the security challenges that were faced globally between 1945 and 2000 and identify how the world remained strictly bipolar till the demise of the former Soviet Union till 1991.

 

More painful was the period between 1992 and 2000. It made the monopoly of nuclear weapons, which had made the construct of superpower into a binary platform crumble and has made cyberspace become dominated by information technology^[iv]. The domination of information technology can be seen more clearly from 2001 to 2022. Therefore, the world or the global order between 1945 and 2000 can be dubbed the “World in Transition”, and from 2001 onwards, it can be labelled the “Age of Uncertainty.”

 

In the deliberation of this paper, the following issues will be covered:

1. Historical Overview of the Strategic Challenges of the 20^th Century
2. Global Security Challenges Facing India in the 21^st Century
3. Great Power Competition
4. Recommendations
5. Conclusion

 

Historical Overview of the Strategic Challenges in the 20^th Century

 

Nuclear weapons^[v] have gained a reputation for providing deterrence in the execution of warfare strategies. Technology and foreign policy were intricately interrelated. Herman Kahn had written “Deadly Logic, ” and Kissinger had perpetuated “Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy.” MacArthur was the role model for every soldier in the Western world, while Mao and Ho Chi Minh served as role models for the developing societies of South and Southeast Asia. There were no takers for Lenin or Che Guevara. War was divided into two levels – conventional and nuclear. Strategic challenges underwent three distinct phases between 1945 and 2000.

 

WW II 1939 – 1945

The impact of technology^[vi] in conducting warfare was fully evident and expanded dramatically in air, land, sea, and underwater warfare. Technology decided policy making, unleashing the power of the Atom. The possible use of weapons of mass destruction became a reality, and the strategic challenge was to win the war.

 

Cold War: 1945-1991

Ideology takes centre stage as the liberal democratic form of governance operates with market forces and competes with centrally planned economies of socialist countries to establish bipolarity. Strategic analysis was based on privileged information, leading to a government monopoly in both systems. A significant reduction in the numerical manpower strength of Western armies focused on high-end technologies to incorporate nuclear weapons “sited for all round defence” through NATO’s military alliance politics to protect Western Europe by creating a ring fence around the southern tier of the Soviet Union, which has a Muslim population, through SEATO and CENTO. West and East, represented by the US and the Soviet Union, prepared for three and a half wars at the height of the Cold War.

 

SALT-I, 1991; SALT-II, 1993; CTBT, 1996; PTBT (Partial Test Ban Treaty, 1963); NPT, July 1968, entered into force March 1970. A Review and Extension Conference was conducted in 1995, deciding that the Treaty should remain in force indefinitely. The ABM Treaty was concluded in May 1972. The Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START-I, 1991) initiated START-II in 1993 but did not come into force. Similarly, the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE, 1990) was also implemented. Soviet revisionism during the Cold War period – from Stalin to Khrushchev to Gorbachev- ultimately led to the balkanisation of the Soviet Union in 1991. The proliferation of nuclear technology and nuclear weapons spread to other nation-states, resulting in a multipolar world.

 

Challenges during the Cold War^[vii] focused on avoiding nuclear holocaust and defining and limiting the periphery of deterrence, which explains the interplay between non-proliferation and proliferation doctrine.

Post Cold War: 1991-2000

What were the conceptual issues at stake? The central question revolved around whether a new world order was emerging.^[viii] Did this signify the collapse of the existing global agenda, prompted by the disappearance of a permanent adversary and the dissolution of bipolarity following the fragmentation of the Soviet Union? Would this global transition mark the decline of the nation-state as the primary unit of international relations and political organisation? Could European integration lay the groundwork for a new supranational political architecture—a potential superstate? What would be the implications for key domains such as politics, economics, fiscal policy, monetary systems (including exchange rate mechanisms), migration, and environmental governance? And in this shifting landscape, does Europe assume the strategic and ideological role once held by the former Eastern Bloc?

What was Europe’s vision for the world in this evolving order? In the context of the so-called New World Order, Europe was confronted with several transformative dynamics:

• The erosion of collective leadership
• The decline of state capitalism
• The intersection of technology and development
• The ethical challenges posed by technological innovation
• The potential retreat of the welfare state
• The rise of the individual as a political and economic actor
• Shifts in international political economy, including regime theory and transnationalism
• Redefinitions of the nation-state, society, and identity
• The impact of technology on transnational structures and governance

 

These conceptual shifts posed fundamental questions about Europe’s role in shaping a new global paradigm.

 

Global Security Challenges facing India in the 21^st Century

 

It is abundantly clear in 2022 that the notion of Russia and China integrating into the liberal international order is beyond imagination. Instead, we are witnessing the emergence of a new era of intensified great power competition in the global arena. This great power competition differs from that of the Cold War and the early 21^st century, which saw the collapse of the Soviet Union and the rise of China as an economic and military power.

 

While the US has maintained its leadership as a superpower with its European allies and Japan, India has been emerging  as an important player in the global order with the fastest-growing economy, demonstrating potential for self-reliance and capacity building for resilience in non-military areas, such as containing the COVID pandemic.

 

While it is necessary to contemplate a world in which the United States and its allies compete with China and other autocratic regimes beneath the threshold of war, we cannot lose sight of the professed traditional mission of post-war U.S. strategy: to deter aggression by adversaries. This situation has also become more complicated as great power rivalry has intensified, along with the emergence of democratic powers like India coming to the centre stage of world events, contributing to a growing influence on world politics and becoming a leading actor in international political economy.

 

We often think of revisionist powers as countries determined to achieve global domination, such as Nazi Germany or the Soviet Union. However, revisionism rarely manifests itself in the form of all-out war. Revisionist states typically target the non-vital interests of their great-power rivals, as this generally does not provoke the kind of retaliatory strike that attacking a vital interest would. Threatening non-vital interests—for example, by attacking a non-ally—leaves the status quo power uncertain about how to respond and whether retaliation is worth the effort.

 

Of course, the term “non-vital interest” is somewhat misleading. It only holds true when viewed narrowly and in isolation. While annexation and unprovoked invasion, like the case of Ukraine, clearly constitute a breach of the peace and threaten vital interests of nation states, seizing small rocks or strips of territory poses a more ambiguous threat. Such moves appear to be of limited strategic importance until, in the aggregate, they acquire much greater value. At the outset, the fact that no treaty has been breached and the territory seems to be of limited importance is highly significant to the dynamics and psychology of any given crisis. The small strategic value of the contested territory causes the dominant power to refrain from going to war at an extraordinary cost, which would be vastly and inversely proportionate to the value the dominant power places on the disputed territory.

 

This is not a new problem. It is textbook revisionism, which poses the most complex challenge that a major power can face. The purpose of revisionism is to make deterrence extremely difficult and to encourage rival great powers to accommodate them diplomatically or to limit their response to the point of being ineffective. While a regular security dilemma between two status quo powers can be addressed through reassurance and transparency, a revisionist power will not be satisfied with the restraint of others.

 

The most crucial piece of the post-war world order is not the United Nations or international financial institutions, important as they are. It is a healthy regional order. It is a truism to accept that America’s greatest success after World War II was to create a system in Western Europe and Northeast Asia that ended German and Japanese imperialism and provided the basis for shared prosperity. One must accept as a realist that if those regional orders fall apart, so will the global order. For example, a war between China and Japan—the world’s second and third largest economies- would have massive repercussions for the global economy. A Russian incursion into the Baltic, catalysed by the Ukraine crisis, would raise the risk of nuclear war between the world’s two largest nuclear powers.

 

It should come as no surprise that China and Russia are regionally focused. After all, major powers are usually primarily concerned with their immediate environment rather than abstract notions of global leadership. However, the vulnerability of regional orders makes the global order vulnerable. If there is a significant challenge to the international order, it is most likely to occur at the regional level. This is why Russian and Chinese activities in their neighbourhoods are more reflective of their approaches to the international order than their explicit policy on global issues, although those are also important. Ultimately, a country’s willingness to honour the norm against territorial conquest is much more important than its compliance with the dispute settlement mechanism of the World Trade Organisation or voting weights at the IMF.

 

Great Power Competition

 

The concept of global security^[x] occupies a foremost position in the minds of international relations policymakers and government officials in most countries. However, maintaining global security holds significance primarily for the so-called ‘great powers’. These powers can influence the international stage, change the lives of millions, and control the future. In his book ‘The World after the Peace Conference’, Toynbee describes the concept of a great power as “a political force exerting an effect coextensive with the widest range of the society in which it operates” (Toynbee, 1926).

 

In other words, a great power is a nation with sufficient scope to exert its influence and interests on the international stage successfully. In critiquing Toynbee, it is essential to argue that a power needs the necessary resources and political will to exert itself globally and to be recognised as a great power by other foreign states and societies. For example, today, Estonia cannot send troops to remote corners of the world or lead international coalitions at the United Nations due to its limited resources and incapacity. In contrast, the United Kingdom can. Metaphorically, it has a seat at the table, and other states acknowledge the ability of the United Kingdom to impose itself on the international stage, thereby establishing it as a global power.

 

In this context, it can be argued that great power competition among the great powers threatens global security by analysing three major global powers: the United States, Russia, and the People’s Republic of China. Each of these countries can exert influence on both the international and domestic stages, which is in coherence with the critique of Toynbee. Unlike the United States, however, Russia and China aspire to ‘steal’ America’s position as world hegemon. Their ambitions to become the undisputed world power are, for now, just aspirations. As long as the United States, whether in prosperity or decline, remains the world hegemon, the security threats posed by China or Russia will remain regionally constrained, thus not posing a menace to global security.

 

I would argue that Russia’s position is not of significant international concern. The Russian threat, or what Westerners perceive it to be, is not the massive bogeyman it was in previous decades. With the Soviet Union dead, the Russian psyche must prioritise defence due to its considerable loss of perceived friendly territory. Moreover, with NATO’s expansion into what Russia could perceive as its sphere of influence, the West risks igniting tensions that shouldn’t exist. Perhaps the duality that Russia seems to embody only needs to be coaxed out to transform into a cooperative member of the European Community. A cooperative Russia would benefit both peace in Europe and global peace.

 

Lastly, when addressing great power competition that threatens global security, the role of China must be analysed. China has a rich and complex history and culture; from the Qin Empire to Xi Jinping, China’s civilisation rivals even the greatest empires of Europe. As Kissinger argues in his book On China, the Chinese view themselves as having a national destiny to be not only the dominant power in Asia but also the world hegemon (Kissinger, 2012). With China’s recent diplomatic overtures in the international arena, incursions into the South China Sea (Sevastopulo, 2021), and threats against Taiwan (Patel, 2021), they, like Russia, are testing the will of the West – but more specifically that of the United States. However, some argue that China cannot, and can never, become the world hegemon due to economic failings and domestic crises.

 

Overall, China’s ambitions to become the world hegemon are undoubtedly evident. The incursions into the South China Sea and the ambitions to overtake the United States as the largest economic power clearly indicate this desire. However, this aspiration will remain merely a dream as long as America remains the top dog. The world may face significant threats to its security in regional areas (India-China border, South China Sea, Korean Peninsula) due to China’s pursuit of being number one. Still, as long as the United States can maintain its position, global security will remain intact.

 

Recommendations

 

India needs to enhance its competitiveness in relation to China and other authoritarian powers to acquire resilience and achieve strategic autonomy. In this regard, the following recommendations are made:

 

1. Pursue military modernisation to continue reorienting India’s defence policy toward addressing major power competitors. The United States must also incorporate initiatives that enhance strategic competitiveness while rebuilding the domestic economy after the pandemic. This includes a strategic approach to technological innovation and reducing the vulnerability of certain sectors of our society to interdependence with adversaries. Strategic thinking must be integrated across all relevant government agencies and departments.
2. Next, competition with China should embody a positive and affirmative vision of the free world, which we would continuously work to strengthen and improve. This would include increasing the free world’s resilience to pressure and shocks from authoritarian states; protecting democracy and the rule of law from illiberal forces; coordinating on technology policy; enhancing cooperation on transnational challenges such as climate change and global public health; and developing a suite of capabilities to shape the international order. It must also involve an ambitious and proactive effort to help free societies and like-minded partners recover from the pandemic, including in the developing world.
3. Continue to deepen the Indo-US alliance and partnerships in the Indo-Pacific by focusing on deterrence through denial, enhancing the credibility and resilience of India’s presence in the region, encouraging cooperation among allies and partners, assisting allies and partners in responding to external coercion and interference, deepening cooperation with the US, Japan, Australia, and Southeast Asian countries while balancing against China. The time has come to strengthen ties with Taiwan.
4. Revise India’s defence spending target to encourage European allies to invest in civilian and military capabilities, such as new technologies, to help them compete with China.
5. Facilitate a national conversation about the type of strategic competition India wants to engage in. Great power competition is not a strategy but a condition we must cope with in all its dimensions. We are still at a relatively early stage in identifying different competition strategies. Over the next ten years, India must refine and develop its thinking on the objectives of the competition and the means to accomplish these accordingly.

Conclusion

 

The idea that great power competition threatens global security is indisputable—history, particularly the horrors of the 20th century, serves as a stark reminder. However, such threats are considerably diminished in a unipolar world dominated by a single hegemon. Under American leadership, the international order has enjoyed relative stability; ideally, this influence will continue to serve as a cornerstone of global security.

 

While rival powers such as China and Russia may aspire to challenge or even supplant the United States as the dominant global force, such an outcome remains improbable. The current world order will likely endure as long as the U.S. maintains its strategic pragmatism—remaining more Machiavellian, if necessary, than its competitors—and preserves internal cohesion. In this context, American hegemony remains the most reliable guarantor of international stability for the foreseeable future.

 

Acknowledgement

While composing this position paper, I have not deviated from the research method by adding many essential footnotes. However, I would be remiss if I did not acknowledge the numerous writings of scholars and professionals in the field, US Congressional Research monographs, UN reports, and several independent papers on the subject. I have taken the liberty to quote and rearrange their thoughts to provide seamless output in this deliberation, which, to my knowledge, has not appeared thus far. I want to acknowledge all the authors whose work has enriched my understanding and assessment.

 

Author Brief Bio: Professor Gautam Sen was Formerly Sawarkar Professor of Strategic Studies (1981-2007), Head Department of Defence Studies (1981-2001), Director Board of Colleges & University Development (2001-2004) Director National Centre of International Security and Defence Analysis (2002-2007) at the University of Pune. He was Director General and Member Board of Trustees, Indian Institute of Education, Pune (2006-2011), Research Professor National Security Council Secretariat, GoI, Delhi (2015-16).  He has been a Visiting Professor at Madras University, Gujrat Vidyapith, Goa University, Institute of Social and Economic Change and UGC Visiting Professor at Gorakhpur University. Air Marshal Subroto Mukherjee Chair of Excellence, United Services Institution, Delhi (2018-19). Sen has also been a FORD FOUNDATION International Fellow at Harvard and Massachusetts Institute of Technology and Twice Fellow at the International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS), London.

 

 

References:

^[i] Muraviev, A.D., Ahlawat, D. & Hughes, L. India’s security dilemma: engaging big powers while retaining strategic autonomy. Int Polit 59, 1119–1138 (2022). https://doi.org/10.1057/s41311-021-00350-z and Boradey, H. (2022, March 11). India- Strategic autonomy through non-alignment policy. The Kootneeti.

https://thekootneeti.in/2022/03/10/india-strategic-autonomy-through-non-alignment-policy/  and  Finding Strategic Autonomy in the Quad: India’s Trial by Fire. (2021, March 18). The Diplomat. https://thediplomat.com/2021/03/finding-strategic-autonomy-in-the-quad-indias-trial-by-fire/

^[ii] Fjäder, C. (2014). The nation-state, national security and resilience in the age of globalisation. Resilience, 2(2), 114–129.

https://doi.org/10.1080/21693293.2014.914771

 

^[iii] This aspect is discussed in the main text of this presentation as “Historical Overview of Strategic Challenges of the 20th Century and Global Security Challenges Facing India in the 21 st Century pp 7-10

 

^[iv]  Mallick, P. (2023). Information, Cyber and Space Domain and Its Application in Future Land Warfare.

 

^[v] For over 50 years, but especially since the end of the cold war, the United States and the Russian Federation (formerly the Soviet Union) have engaged in a series of bilateral arms control measures that have drastically reduced their strategic nuclear arsenals from a peak of around 60,000. The most recent of those measures, the New START Treaty, limits the number of deployed strategic nuclear weapons to 1,550 per State. New START is scheduled to expire on 5 February 2021; should it expire without a successor or not be extended, it will be the first time that the strategic arsenals of the United States and the Russian Federation have not been constrained since the 1970s.*

* The New START Treaty entered into effect on 5 February 2011 for a period of 10 years. It can be extended for up to five years, unless it is replaced earlier by another agreement.
Source: Federation of American Scientists.  Although nuclear weapons have only been used twice in warfare—in the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945—about 13,400 reportedly remain in our world today and there have been over 2,000 nuclear tests conducted to date.  Disarmament is the best protection against such dangers, but achieving this goal has been a tremendously difficult challenge. See https://www.un.org/disarmament/wmd/nuclear/

 

^[vi] In the long-term, nuclear weapons produce ionizing radiation, which kills or sickens those exposed, contaminates the environment, and has long-term health consequences, including cancer and genetic damage. Their widespread use in atmospheric testing has caused grave long-term consequences. See What happens if nuclear weapons are used? – ICAN https://www.icanw.org              catastrophic_harm

 

^[vii] Muggah, R., & Yves Tiberghien. (2018, January 30). 5 facts you need to understand the new global order. World Economic Forum. https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2018/01/five-facts-you-need-to-understand-the-new-global-order/

 

^[viii] Kempe, F. (2022, April 3). Op-ed: A new world order is emerging — and the world is not ready for it. CNBC. https://www.cnbc.com/2022/04/03/a-new-world-order-is-emerging-and-the-world-is-not-ready-for-it.html and Yllmaz, E. M. (2008). “The New World Order”: An Outline of the Post-Cold War Era. https://dergipark.org.tr/tr/download/article-file/19517 and Also see Perspectives on the future of the global order. (n.d.). Brookings. https://www.brookings.edu/articles/perspectives-on-the-future-of-the-global-order/

 

^[ix] Anant, Hardeep. (2015). Challenges facing India in the 21st century: An HRD perspective. 13. 1367-1375 and Also see Siwach, R. S. (2003). India’s Security in the 21^st Century: Challenges, Management and Futuristic Directions. Indian Journal of Asian Affairs, 16(1/2), 145–158. http://www.jstor.org/stable/41960508

 

^[x] Global security includes military and diplomatic measures that nations and international organizations such as the United Nations and NATO take to ensure mutual safety and security. Global security, instead, has five dimensions that include human, environmental, national, transnational, and transcultural security, and therefore, global security and the security of any state or culture cannot be achieved without good governance at all levels that guarantees security through justice for all. Security, like peace, identity and other terminologies in that fold of international political theory has attracted many definitions. Unfortunately, many contributors approach these concepts from their own ideologies. Hence, broad areas of description of the term “security” exist. If defining security is that elusive, there is little wonder why operating within its coverage is so fluid. In the name of security, people and governments have taken actions where intended and unintended outcomes have become difficult to handle. Because of its seeming lack of conceptual boundary, security, as a concept, is used to entice and whip up patronage for many political projects both at the state and international levels of politicking. Hence, Paul D. Williams argued that “security is therefore a powerful political tool in claiming attention for priority items in the competition for government attention”. The following references will be useful: Williams, Paul D. ed. Security Studies: An Introduction, Routledge, UK, 2008. Makinda, Samuel M. Sovereignty and Global Security, Security Dialogue, 1998, Sage Publications, Vol. 29(3) 29: 281-292. McSweeney, Bill. Security, Identity and Interests: A Sociology of International Relations, Cambridge University Press, 1999. Human Security Unit, United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Human Security in Theory and Practice(http://hdr.undp.org/en/media/HS_Handbook_2009.pdf). Musarrat, Jabeen. Governance Divide, Pakistan Horizon, The Pakistan Institute of International Affairs, Karachi, Vol. 56, No. 4, 2003. Beres, Louis Rene. Terrorism and Global Security: The Nuclear Threat, Westview Press Inc., 1979.