The end of the Cold War heralded a brief age of unipolarity with the United States as the sole superpower. After nearly five centuries of Cold War between the US and Soviet Union, or between the forces of liberal capitalism and communism, the Soviet disintegration spelled for some analysts the “end of history.”[i] Events since 1991 have, unsurprisingly, confirmed otherwise. Unipolarity in the international system has been supplanted by multipolarity as the nucleus of power began to shift away from Western Europe and North America.
Power is no more merely gauged by military personnel, arms and ammunition, though their importance in the anarchic international system is abiding. Power has come to be defined in terms of control over supply chains, research and development in frontier technologies, norm-making, and cultural influence. Consequently, the notion of the Global South has attained salience, as countries that had heretofore been subjected to imperial domination have become economic powerhouses, specialising in distinct spheres of economic activity and benefitting from the forces of globalisation. Today, the Global South hosts 85%[ii] of the world’s population, 42% of global GDP,[iii] and over 60% of foreign direct investment inflows. Countries such as India, Indonesia, and Brazil are regional leaders, while China[iv], the world’s largest trading power, is locked in competition with the US for economic and political influence. Whereas institutions are yet to reform to adequately register these changes, the Global South has ceased to be a norm-taker, instead founding institutions steeped in its issues and geopolitical realities, and, instead of taking norms handed down by the West, reflecting the latter’s concerns. The Indo-Pacific region,[v] in particular, sits at the heart of the Global South, home to over 60% if global maritime trade and half of the world’s GDP, and several maritime choke-points like the Bab el-Mandab and the Straits of Malacca.
The Global South: Origins
The Global South has, today, assumed agency: it is no longer the site of great power competition. However, the notion is framed from a sense of inadequacy and a history of colonial domination and resource extraction by the industrialised Global North. When Carl Oglesby utilised the concept in the context of the Vietnam War, he saw the war from the prism of continued imperial domination. The North-South dichotomy was accentuated by the drawing of the Brandt Line,[vi] neatly dividing the world into industrialised and developing/under-developed halves.
In the immediate aftermath of decolonisation and the beginning of the Cold War, the shared experience of exploitation and the resultant poverty served as a strong organising principle for the countries of the Global South that wished to create an alternative to the ideological and geopolitical rivalry between the US and USSR. Leaders of anti-colonial struggles, who eventually became founding figures of their postcolonial nation-states, convened under the banner of anti-imperial solidarity during the Bandung, Asian Relations, and Afro-Asian Conferences, eventually founding the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) in 1961. Besides the NAM, the G77 and the demand for a New International Economic Order (NIEO) accentuated the normative weight of the Global South. Undeniably, these experiments were critical in securing financial and technological assistance from both the superpowers, but the balance was, at best, tenuous: economic and technological aid came with conditionalities, and despite their moralism, members of the NAM had to make strategic and pragmatic calculations at odds with their professed beliefs,[vii] often relying on the support of one superpower or the other.
With the passage of time, it was thus inevitable for the bonds of solidarity to loosen. The countries of the Global South share an experience of colonisation and challenges of human security but little else. They are incredibly diverse[viii] in their geography, political cultures and systems, nature of economy, availability of resources, and other socio-cultural identities like religion and ethnicity. The rate of adoption of new technologies and innovation is not uniform across the Global South, implying that some countries have benefitted more from the opportunities of economic growth and integration with the world economy than others. Distinctive levels of prosperity translate into distinctive national interests and state capacities[ix] to mobilise and exhibit power. Resultantly, the Global South is fragmented, with a few emerging market economies, also influential powers in their respective regions, possessing a relatively higher influence in agenda-shaping than the smaller economies of the Least Developed Countries (LDC)[x] that are in an unprecedented debt crisis[xi] and, consequently, unable to play a decisive role in norm-making. In addition to the economic gulf within the Global South, there are active geopolitical, territorial, and internecine disputes, and wars between developing countries are far more common.
Pragmatism and Nuance
This should not discourage proponents of South-South cooperation, however. Despite what divides them, their challenges continue to unite them. In fact, although the origin of the term “Global South” is in reference to the Global North, particularly in what the latter possesses that the Global South does not, it will not be an overstatement to treat it as an empowering term with which countries wish to get associated. Unlike the pessimism and inadequacy that it conjured in the past, the Global South today stands for pragmatism, innovation, and promise. The stance of these countries during recent crises such as the Israel-Gaza War, Russia-Ukraine War, or the pandemic indicate that they pursue a pragmatic but not value-agnostic foreign policy. For instance, India condemned the terrorist attack in Israel on October 7, 2023[xii] while supporting a two-state solution and immediate ceasefire, supporting 10 of the 13 resolutions in the UN General Assembly introduced by Palestine. India is Israel’s second-largest trade partner in Asia, and the two constitute the I2U2 with the US and UAE. Similarly, whereas it condemned Russia’s violation of Ukrainian territory as an affront to national sovereignty, Brazil has not joined the West’s call to shun Russia, instead calling for a ceasefire, and welcomed the Russian Foreign Minister during a high-profile visit in 2023. Russia is a major supplier of fertilisers[xiii] to an agriculture-dominated economy.
This underscores the Global South’s independent course in its international relations and its defence of the rules-based international order. Its rhetoric and discourses are ensconced in the lexicon of international law and institutionalism. There have been calls for reforms in the policies of global governance for better representation of the people they affect. India and South Africa, for instance, were joined by other members of the World Trade Organisation from the Global South like Kenya, Eswatini, and Pakistan to waive TRIPS obligations[xiv] on COVID-19 vaccines for sharing the technical and scientific know-how in combatting the pandemic.
Countries in the Indo-Pacific, particularly the small island developing states (SIDS) have raised advocacy and awareness around issues of climate change and just, equitable transition that negotiates the need to cut emissions with their unique development challenges. Countries like the Maldives, Seychelles, and Mauritius, which face existential crises from the climate emergency, have raised advocacy and awareness around mitigation and adaptation based on the principles of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities.[xv] At the Conferences of Parties at Sharm El Sheikh, the Global South, particularly, the vulnerable states in the Indo-Pacific, came together on a common platform provided by the G77, led by Pakistan and supported by China, and secured the Loss and Damage Fund for the losses incurred by developing states due to extreme climate events. The demand for compensations from the Global North—which, according to historical data on emissions, are responsible for over 90% excess global emissions and over 50% of the damage sustained by developing countries due to climate-related events—was raised as far back as the 1990s. It took constant pursuit and cataclysmic climate events in the Indo-Pacific, viz. the floods in Pakistan in 2022, drought in China, and heat-waves in South Asia, for the vulnerable states to secure this funding.
The Global South is, as its record shows, not a disruptor. Developing countries try to reform international institutions from within, reposing faith in their utility and the values of multilateralism. This is demonstrated by the voices for reforming the UN Security Council, the voting rights in the International Monetary Fund, and the issues encompassed by the World Trade Organisation and multilateral development banks. But they have engaged with other multilateral and minilateral forums too, depending on their national interests, especially when the procedures and pre-occupations of the US-led order have been too indifferent, reinforcing their pragmatist streak, coupled with enshrining the values crucial to the Global South. These forums have cropped up in their regional milieux, deeply embedded in the issues faced by the countries of the region. China’s regional forum diplomacy, evinced in the Forum for China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), among others, is an attempt at socialising the developing countries irate with the methods of the Global North to a China-centric world order.[xvi] China-led multilateral development banks are among the fastest-growing, providing an alternative and flexible medium of accessing development finance to plug infrastructure gaps.
To conclude, the notion of the Global South, as examined in this article, has undergone consequential shifts since the term gained currency in the context of decolonisation. From a position of inadequacy relative to the Global North, these countries have acquired agency and confidence to assert their demands and influence in regional and international affairs. Politics in the world, and the Indo-Pacific in particular, is being shaped by middle and small powers in the Global South. Whereas the concept is not inclusive of the economic, political, and cultural diversity of these countries, it unites them despite these differences to advocate for a just, rules-based international order. These countries have dexterously utilised multilateral and minilateral platforms to give tangible shape to their policy positions and have gone on to join and introduce new institutions when the existing ones seemed to have ceased to perform their role. The Global South is faced with a myriad challenges, notably climate change, supply chain disruptions, and an unjust international financial architecture. But now, unlike in the past, these countries seem to have the tools of pragmatic, interest-driven (but value-based) foreign policy to weather them and improve the living standards of their citizens.
Author Brief Bio: Parth Seth is a research fellow at the India Foundation. His interest lies in the themes of multilateralism, development, middle powers, and great power competition. He focuses on South Asia, the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), and Chinese foreign policy. While interning at several think tanks, he has assisted researchers in the domains of strategic studies, public policy, and international development. He has written for websites and journals on the themes of South Asia, China, MENA, and the intersection of political philosophy and policy. He completed his postgraduate studies in International Relations from the London School of Economics and Political Science and holds an undergraduate degree in political science from the Ramjas College of the University of Delhi.
References:
[i] Francis Fukuyama. “The End of History?” The National Interest, no. 16 (1989), pp.3–18.
[ii] Jacob Bergstrand, “How Much of the Global South Is on Ukraine’s Side?” Peterson Institute for International Economics, March 8, 2023, https://www.piie.com/blogs/realtime-economics/2023/much-global-south-ukraines-side.
[iii] UN Trade and Development, Rising Global South Needs Development Rethink to Continue Momentum – UNCTAD Deputy, https://unctad.org/news/rising-global-south-needs-development-rethink-continue-momentum-unctad-deputy
[iv] CEBR, “We forecast that China will be the world’s largest economy for only 21 years before the US overtakes again in 2057. And by 2081 India will have overtaken the US. How does this affect geopolitics?” CEBR, July 24, 2023, https://cebr.com/blogs/we-forecast-that-china-will-be-the-worlds-largest-economy-for-only-21-years-before-the-us-overtakes-again-in-2057-and-by-2081-india-will-have-overtaken-the-us-how-does-this-affect-geopoliti/
[v] US Department of State, Indo-Pacific Strategy (Washington, DC: Department of State, 2022).
[vi] Nicholas Lees, “The Brandt Line after forty years: The more North–South relations change, the more they stay the same?” BISA, November 23, 2020, https://www.bisa.ac.uk/articles/brandt-line-after-forty-years-more-north-south-relations-change-more-they-stay-same
[vii] Muhammad Badiul Alam, “The Concept of Non-Alignment: A Critical Analysis,” World Affairs, vol 140, no. 2 (1977), pp. 166-185, https://www.jstor.org/stable/20671723
[viii] C Raja Mohan, “Is There Such a Thing as the Global South?” Foreign Policy, December 9, 2023, https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/12/09/global-south-definition-meaning-countries-development/
[ix] Fareed Zakaria, From Wealth to Power: The Unusual Origins of American Power (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998).
[x] Huang Tran, “Breaking down China and India’s race to represent the Global South,” Atlantic Council, October 20, 2023, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/econographics/breaking-down-china-and-indias-race-to-represent-the-global-south/
[xi] United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, A World of Debt: A Growing Burden to Global Prosperity (Geneva: UNCTAD, 2024).
[xii] Ministry of External Affairs, “Question No-1195 India’s Position in United Nations on the Israel-Palestine Conflict,” [Press Release], December 5, 2024, https://www.mea.gov.in/rajya-sabha.htm?dtl/38685/QUESTION+NO1195+INDIAS+POSITION+IN+UNITED+NATIONS+ON+THE+ISRAELPALESTINE+CONFLICT#:~:text=India%20has%20strongly%20condemned%20the,conflict%20through%20dialogue%20and%20diplomacy.
[xiii] OEC, Brazil-Russia, https://oec.world/en/profile/bilateral-country/bra/partner/rus
[xiv] World Trade Organization, TRIPS Council Welcomes MC12 TRIPS Waiver Decision, Discusses Possible Extension, July 6, 2022, https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news22_e/trip_08jul22_e.htm
[xv] United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, art. 3, sec. 1.
[xvi] Chris Alden and Ana Cristina Alves. “China’s Regional Forum Diplomacy in the Developing World: Socialisation and the “Sinosphere”,” Journal of Contemporary China, vol. 26, no. 103 (2016), pp.151-165, https://doi.org/10.1080/10670564.2016.1206276
