The region’s geopolitical landscape has become significantly more complex, generating deeper anxieties concerning China’s aggressive rise and the escalating US-China rivalry. This situation has been further aggravated by the disruptions caused by the COVID pandemic, followed by the Ukraine-Russia war, the Gaza conflict, and most recently, by the tariff wars. The recent positions taken by the US, which are detrimental to the interests of its closest allies in the region, have compounded the security scenario. How the US will respond to future challenges in the Indo-Pacific is now questionable.

 

Over the past decade, China has adopted an increasingly aggressive stance in pursuing its territorial ambitions. This is evident through its militarisation of disputed islands in the South China Sea, frequent large-scale military exercises, and assertive posturing towards Taiwan. Furthermore, China has asserted expansive claims not only in the South China Sea and East China Sea but also along the India–China border, as observed in Galwan and Doklam.

 

In recent years, Beijing has effectively sown division among smaller regional states, drawing them into protracted, unproductive negotiations over their territorial claims in the South China Sea, while steadily advancing its regional expansion. This hegemonic impulse is also reflected in its state-sanctioned maps, which incorporate vast tracts of neighbouring nations—including India, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Brunei, and Vietnam—into Chinese territory, despite persistent and widespread objections from all affected countries.

 

China’s role during Operation Sindoor, in supplying lethal weapons, aircraft, missiles, and intelligence to Pakistan, was apparent. The efficacy of their defence platforms and equipment was tested for the first time, highlighting the importance of technology. There are lessons to be learnt, not just for India, but for all others in the region, particularly the US, Japan, Taiwan, Korea, Australia, Vietnam, and the Philippines. This also merits an analysis of the reliability of our partnerships in the Indo-Pacific.

 

It also allows India to strengthen defence cooperation with its traditional partners, such as Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, Singapore, and Indonesia, progressing beyond training and capacity building towards defence procurement, in light of the recent success of our indigenous military hardware. Some of this cooperation has already commenced and has advanced over the past decade. The role of grey zone warfare, including cyber-attacks and information warfare, presents additional important lessons for further refining our Act East Policy (AEP).

 

The growing economic dependence of smaller countries on China and the increasing financial burden of Chinese debt weigh heavily on those nations that have entered such unviable financing arrangements. The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has deleteriously affected recipient countries’ local economies and environments while serving Chinese interests. The experiences of Chinese debt in Pakistan, Sri Lanka, the Maldives, Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar offer recent examples. Over-dependence on Chinese loans and markets, as well as its finances and supply and manufacturing chains, has hindered efforts to rein in China’s errant behaviour, as it shifts the balance of power in its favour within the region.

 

Against this backdrop, India’s Act East Policy (AEP) and its vision of MAHASAGAR (Mutual and Holistic Advancement of Security and Growth for All in the Region) have gained greater salience in strengthening relations with its strategic partners. India’s development cooperation programmes with the Global South in this region have also become increasingly significant through loans, grants, capacity building, and technology, encompassing new areas of collaboration in the Indo-Pacific.

 

The past decade of India’s AEP has established a robust foundation. This aligns with its ambitious Sagarmala initiative to upgrade its maritime and port infrastructure, enhancing connectivity, trade, and economic activity throughout the Indian Ocean Region (IOR). Over the last ten years, India’s AEP has matured into a strategic engagement, creating a network of partnerships with ASEAN and related frameworks and with countries further east, including Japan, South Korea, Australia, Russia, the US, and the Pacific Island nations. The AEP has broadened in scope, incorporating enhanced geopolitical, geostrategic, and geoeconomic dimensions. It is action-oriented, revitalising India’s historical, cultural, and people-to-people connections with countries in the East. It has achieved the dual aims of bolstering trade and business relations while generating development opportunities for India’s northeastern states, located at the strategic junction of Bhutan, China, Bangladesh, and Myanmar. Therefore, Commerce, Culture, and Connectivity – the three Cs – are the primary pillars of India’s AEP.

 

At the same time, focused attention has been directed towards regional cooperation. India has actively participated in establishing new plurilateral groups and revitalising existing ones through regular summit-level meetings of the QUAD, FIPIC (Forum for India and Pacific Island Countries), BIMSTEC, IORA, and ASEAN-related frameworks such as EAS, ARF, ADMM+, and MGC. The QUAD has established a pragmatic agenda to address the region’s most urgent challenges, including health security, climate change, infrastructure, resilient supply chains, critical and emerging technology, cybersecurity, humanitarian aid and disaster relief, space, maritime security, combating disinformation, and counterterrorism. All this has been accomplished in just a few years.

 

Another critical emerging group in which India has partnered with other dynamic countries in the Indo-Pacific region is the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity (IPEF). Its other members include the United States, Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Indonesia, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Malaysia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam. These countries are committed to “a free, open, fair, inclusive, interconnected, resilient, secure, and prosperous Indo-Pacific region that has the potential to achieve sustainable and inclusive economic growth.” The IPEF Statement, issued in Tokyo in May 2022, acknowledges that economic policy interests in the region are intertwined and that deepening economic engagement among partners is crucial for continued growth, peace, and prosperity. The participants have agreed to work under the pillars of trade, supply chains, clean energy, tax, and anti-corruption for cooperation.

 

India’s commitment to cooperation with the Pacific Island countries, along with PM Modi’s attendance at the three FIPIC Summits (the 1^st FIPIC Summit in Fiji in November 2014, followed by the 2^nd Summit in Jaipur in 2015 and the 3rd in Papua New Guinea in May 2023), exemplifies India’s efforts to expand its AEP remit to the small island countries in the Pacific, with which India shares strong cultural and people-to-people links. India has partnered with these nations on development cooperation, particularly in addressing the challenges of climate change. Additionally, India has initiated and participated in several other significant bilateral and trilateral project-led collaborations. These include India-Indonesia-Australia, India-Japan-Sri Lanka/Bangladesh, and collaborations with Russia, France, and other European nations, all of whom are stakeholders in peace and development in the region.

 

India has made significant contributions to regional maritime security by ensuring the safety of maritime traffic and enhancing the skills and logistics of countries in South and Southeast Asia. It has signed white shipping agreements with several nations. Furthermore, Indian vessels have participated in coordinated patrolling and EEZ surveillance. India is aiding its maritime neighbours in establishing their coastal surveillance systems to foster shared maritime domain awareness on behalf of its partners. The hydrographic support and capacity-building provided to India’s partners have strengthened navigational safety.

 

India has emerged as the preferred security provider in addressing traditional and non-traditional threats, including piracy, trafficking, illegal fishing, and smuggling. Another notable area of success for India has been cooperation in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR), encompassing risk reduction. India has been the first responder, as demonstrated once again during the region’s COVID pandemic and subsequent natural disasters. Two initiatives led by India in this context include the International Solar Alliance and the Coalition for Disaster Risk Reduction Infrastructure. Cooperation in space and cybersecurity has also emerged as a significant collaboration area.

 

Notwithstanding the current internal turbulence within Bangladesh, the Neighbourhood First policy since 2014 has made significant progress. In Bangladesh, Bhutan, Nepal, and Myanmar, we have witnessed the development of new roads, checkpoints, rail links, waterways, power grids, fuel pipelines, and transit facilities. Much more is in progress. Internally, India is rapidly enhancing its border infrastructure in roads, railways, ports, and waterways. The Indian Railways is undertaking several international projects, including the Jogbani-Biratnagar (Nepal), Agartala to Akhaura (Bangladesh), restoration of Haldibari (India) – Chilahati (Bangladesh), and the Rakhipur (India) to Birol (Bangladesh) 9 km line. Twenty port townships will be developed along the Brahmaputra and Barak river systems to enhance intra-regional connectivity.

 

With ASEAN, the relationship was further upgraded to a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership in 2022. Trade, investment, tourism, and even security have seen steady progress among all members. The recent review of the ASEAN-India Trade in Goods Agreement (AITIGA) is timely and will provide a fresh economic boost to this relationship. The importance of international trade rules, particularly rules of origin, gains significance in this context, offering India and its regional trading partners an opportunity to focus on synergies, complementarities, and mutual interests to diversify supply chains and serve as alternatives in the China plus one strategy. Opportunities in emerging areas such as AI, semiconductors, green shipping, and green hydrogen are also being actively pursued. Several ASEAN countries, including Vietnam, Malaysia, and Thailand, have liberalised visas for Indians, while other ASEAN members have also expanded air connectivity. These developments will contribute to increased trade, tourism, and people-to-people connectivity. Education and skills are further areas of cooperation that are being explored.

 

A crucial aspect of India’s eastward orientation has been to enhance physical, digital, and people-to-people connectivity. India has announced a $1 billion credit line to improve digital infrastructure and connectivity with ASEAN. The construction of the trilateral highway linking India with Thailand via Myanmar and its proposed expansion to Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam is a significant undertaking. This, in turn, will align with the ASEAN Master Plan on connectivity and the ASEAN East-West Corridor. It will also serve as an important land bridge between India’s northeastern states and Southeast Asia. This will be a game changer. Unfortunately, progress is currently hindered by internal strife in Myanmar. Practical solutions will need to be devised.

 

The Kaladan multi-modal transport project will link Kolkata to Sittwe port in Myanmar, extending into Mizoram via river and land routes. Sea links are also vital between India’s eastern seaboard, including the ports of Ennore and Chennai, CMLV countries, and Vladivostok. There is a need to improve transhipment links with Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, and Thailand. Additionally, there is a proposal to connect Dawei port in Myanmar, which is being developed with Thailand, to Chennai port in India, thereby reducing shipping costs and time. For these proposals to succeed, India and ASEAN would need to explore joint ventures and related concessions. An agreement on maritime transport between India and ASEAN could encompass these essential areas. There are immense possibilities, including connecting commercial ports for cruises and enhancing tourism.

 

The Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO) has supported ASEAN and its member countries in developing space technology and its applications. The peaceful exploitation of outer space will continue through the implementation of the ASEAN-India space cooperation programme, which includes the launching of satellites, their monitoring through telemetry tracking and command stations, and the utilisation of satellite image data for the sustainable exploitation of ground, sea, atmospheric, and digital resources for equitable development in the region. Two major ongoing space projects exist in Biak and Ho Chi Minh City. India is also working to enhance cooperation in digitisation, particularly regarding the financial structure and e-governance.

 

The Mekong Ganga Cooperation (MGC), development cooperation, Quick Impact Projects for CLMV countries, and partnership initiatives with the Indonesia-Malaysia-Thailand Growth Triangle (IMT-GT) have enhanced India’s engagement with the region. The bottom line is that Southeast Asia, with a population of almost 700 million—half of India’s—and a GDP of about USD 4.25 trillion, slightly larger than our own, represents a partner of immense significance for mutual prosperity and progress. Increased attention has also been directed towards BIMSTEC, where Act East meets Neighbourhood First.

 

The last summit in Bangkok in April adopted the BIMSTEC Charter in 2022, and it has a regular Secretariat operating from Dhaka. Bilateral relations with each of the BIMSTEC countries are on an upward trajectory. As the largest country in this grouping, India has offered to play a more significant role in contributing to BIMSTEC’s success. The plan to expand its activities, create more centres of excellence, strengthen youth networking, address health challenges, and increase capacity building is an important step. India is also working towards creating common regional and sub-regional power grid infrastructure within bilateral and trilateral frameworks, as well as within BBIN and BIMSTEC.

 

Consolidating India’s ties with this region has also encouraged more ambitious connections with the Indo-Pacific. Both Japan and South Korea have emerged as significant economic players across various sectors within India. India aims to deepen this relationship and give the collaboration a more contemporary character. India’s enhanced capabilities and talent also enable more mutually beneficial endeavours. Japan’s contribution to the Act East Forum, which prioritises development projects in the Northeast, will benefit India’s NE states. India’s engagement eastwards today extends to Australia, New Zealand, and the Pacific Islands. Australia merits particular mention as we witness the benefits of the ECTA (Economic Cooperation and Trade Agreement), alongside a sharp increase in our political and security cooperation.

 

Education and mobility have also been notable features of this relationship. Like Japan, QUAD membership has supported our ties. The path forward should entail the following:

• Building on the existing network of partnerships to advance our economic and strategic interests.
• Vigorous implementation of essential initiatives, both internal and external.
• Staying agile in response to changing and emerging geopolitical, geostrategic, and geoeconomic challenges.
• Enhancing economic and defence capabilities by leveraging the opportunities they present, while focusing on self-reliance and accelerated growth.

 

Author Brief Bio: Amb. Preeti Saran is a member of the UN’s Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. She was the former Secretary (East) at the Ministry of External Affairs. She had also served in Indian missions at Moscow, Dhaka, Geneva and was the Consul General of India at Toronto and the Indian Ambassador to Vietnam. She is a Member of the Governing Council of India Foundation.

 

Come Carpentier:

My first question relates to what is happening in the field of tariffs and free trade agreements, especially regarding President Donald Trump’s unpredictable and somewhat chaotic tariff policies. What is your view on how India should and can respond to Trump’s apparent aim of forcing an open market for American goods in India, while simultaneously imposing high tariffs on Indian exports?

Rajiv Kumar:

Unfortunately for Thomas Friedman, the world is no longer flat, which I find a pity because I believe a flat world is a good world. A flat world allows goods, services, and human beings to travel freely from one place to another, bringing the best talent and products to the world market. This enables consumers everywhere to benefit from what is available globally, creating a more interconnected and resourceful market.

A non-flat world with valleys, cliffs, and precipices essentially means the opposite: that we will divide the world. A fragmented world was what we saw before the Second World War, which is one of the reasons for the Great Depression. I fear I will see this kind of regression in the global economy. As an economist, I hope this will be temporary. Mr Trump himself, as you said, is unpredictable. We don’t know: he started with a 125% tariff for China and ended up with 30%. He also discussed banning TikTok, but it has already had three extensions. Therefore, I am unsure whether his announcement of high tariffs for Indian goods will be implemented; we will have to face it when it happens, but I am uncertain what it will be.

But all of this implies one thing regarding India’s trade policy: we must achieve global competitiveness in all sectors we want to operate. However, it’s not feasible to do so for every sector, so we need to carefully select the industries in which we aim to be competitive globally. The Production Linked Incentive (PLI) scheme, which was initiated when I was at NITI Aayog, serves as a good example. But at present, I believe it has lost focus and become too broad, so we need to refocus and choose 5-6 industries—whatever number you think can succeed—and dedicate efforts to achieving global competitiveness there. If we do that — and it is essential that we do — then any tariffs proposed or imposed by Mr Trump will not matter. Moreover, if his goods are competitive and they enter India, it will only benefit Indian consumers. So, I am not opposed to it. I hope all these issues are addressed with proper diligence in the free trade negotiations proposed with the US, and I look forward to seeing how those proceedings unfold.

Come Carpentier:

In this regard, as you know, India’s focus has been on benefiting from the desired change in supply chains. Particularly concerning high-tech goods, for example, India has been working hard to position itself as an alternative to China in manufacturing a range of industrial goods. As we have seen, Trump has adopted a very hostile stance, stating that no major American companies such as Apple should transfer their manufacturing facilities to India, for the simple reason that he wants them not only to stay in America but also to bring back those that have moved abroad, to sell rather than manufacture overseas. How do you think India should respond to this very new, I would say, mercantilist policy, which seems to imply that I shouldn’t buy from you unless I lack the product, but I should sell to you—especially high-value goods—so that I accumulate profits and you do not? In other words, the idea is that the deficit should not be mine but yours. What is your opinion on that?

Rajiv Kumar:

A mercantilist attitude or policy often appeals to the domestic constituency and is primarily pursued for that reason. It is not a genuine policy because mercantilism has limited scope; it assumes that being competitive depends on having the resources to become a producer and exporter in any chosen field. America, however, is not so abundant in skilled labour, and I believe they or Trump’s advisors recognise this. Therefore, it will be impossible for the US to become a producer across all industries and to reshore them as they wish. The best example currently is Nippon Steel. There were threats to block the US Steel merger, but yesterday, Nippon Steel completed the deal and took over US Steel.

So, you know mercantilism is a losing, a lose-lose proposition, while free trade based on your competitive advantages is a win-win. I believe this won’t last, and reality will catch up sooner rather than later. Moreover, the US has been successful in the services economy and the high-tech, network economy, including the Internet. I respect the US for its innovative capabilities and technological advancements. I think it would be better for them not to get entangled in China Plus One but instead to follow their own path and direction in providing the world with goods and services at which they excel and are innovative. I believe they will stay as vibrant an economy as ever. So, I see this as a detour that could cost the US quite a bit, and I hope it won’t continue. It is risky to turn the US into a manufacturing giant when much of its GDP now comes from services, around 60-70%.

Come Carpentier:

Yes, and I believe the primary concern in the US is that China is surpassing them in some of their key areas of excellence, which is very difficult for them to accept. That said, as you know, since 1998, the World Trade Organisation has exempted electronic goods from the usual restrictions that govern exports of goods. India has been a significant beneficiary because it is now probably the third-largest digital economy in the world. If this were to change and some tariffs and duties were imposed on the export of electronic communication goods, how should India respond to that?

Rajiv Kumar:

When we signed a treaty on electronic and hardware goods, agreeing to zero tariffs internationally, many people criticised it as impractical for India. A well-known Stanford professor, Paul Yograj, holds the best patent in this area. He pointed out that under this scheme, electronic hardware imports into India would be many times higher than oil imports because electronics hardware will be the foundation of everything, especially the digital economy and artificial intelligence driven by algorithms. He estimated imports could reach up to 500 billion. I mention this because I would prefer a tariff-based electronics hardware economy, as it would allow India, a late starter by all accounts, to develop its electronic hardware industry and make it competitive, aligning with its skills and competitiveness in the software sector.

So far, we have always been a software giant. We have taken advantage of wage arbitrage. I believe it’s time to recognise that, as you’ve seen over the past year, the government’s MeiTY department has focused significantly on enhancing our capacities in semiconductors, chips, foundries, and related areas. I believe we must continue this effort and attract major companies like TSMC and others to our country. I wouldn’t oppose the idea of tariffs if necessary. My main concern would be restrictions on technology transfer, which is a possible next step Mr. Trump might consider. Therefore, we need to seek diversified sources of technology. Fortunately, such sources exist globally. The US is a significant one, but not the sole technology provider. The electronics hardware industry, which I emphasise is essential going forward, requires us to be largely self-reliant- not entirely self-sufficient, as that wouldn’t be appropriate- but capable of absorbing innovation and developing our advancements as we proceed.

Come Carpentier:

This leads me to the topic of trade pacts and trade associations, which are both debated and embraced in this world. For example, the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) has been primarily shaped between China and ASEAN. India has so far declined to join, despite considerable pressure or at least encouragement from China and other member countries to include India, as it is seen as a very important potential partner in that association. Do you think it was right for India to remain out, or are there conditions under which India might join in the coming years?

Rajiv Kumar:

This question has persisted since the inception of RCEP. I was part of the discussions about how and why India should join. The concern India has is that RCEP could become another pathway for Chinese goods to enter the country. As you know, China accounts for over 30% of global manufacturing today. There are several industries where they hold near monopolies. Therefore, there has been a fear that if India joins, its industry could suffer greatly or even be wiped out. I am not sure if those concerns have changed yet. At that time, I advocated that India should focus on a set of industries where we can be regional and possibly global leaders, which I mentioned at the start of my interview. I believe it is not impossible, but challenging, and once we achieve the necessary scale and global competitiveness, then we should consider opening our doors to RCEP.

Otherwise, we have bilateral trade agreements with all ASEAN economies, including ASEAN itself and its member nations like Thailand, Malaysia, and others. We also continue bilateral negotiations with China, but remember that we face a significant trade deficit with China. They are our largest trading partner, yet the trade deficit is approximately 78 billion dollars out of a total trade of 120 billion dollars. It is unsustainable to maintain this gap. My current suggestion is that we should invite Chinese investment into India and open our doors across nearly all sectors, except the strategic ones. I recently visited Abu Dhabi, where we held bilateral discussions with Chinese experts, who are willing to invest. We aim to make India an export hub for their industries, similar to what Japan and Korea have achieved. Therefore, I believe it is time for us to welcome Chinese Foreign Direct Investment, encourage them to develop export-oriented capacity, and the sooner we join RCEP, the better.

Come Carpentier:

In fact, I was also speaking to someone important in China before yesterday, and they were saying the same thing. Now, we want to enter and establish ourselves in India. Clearly, there is momentum in China that India should probably seize.

Rajiv Kumar:

Absolutely.

Come Carpentier:

I have a question related to the part of the world we haven’t discussed much, apart from perhaps South America and Africa, where things are progressing at their own pace. Regarding the European Union (EU), there has been a long-standing negotiation and discussion about a free trade agreement. However, it always seems to be halted, falling short of reaching the goal. There is clearly a greater momentum from the EU’s side. One of the major issues has been retail trade, right? That’s where India has needed to protect its small and medium manufacturing industries, as well as its small shops. We know that in Europe, many small businesses have been devastated by the invasion of hypermarkets, supermarkets, and huge shopping centres. How do you think the negotiation is progressing now, and do you believe it is close to conclusion? In other words, will India soon have a free trade agreement with the EU, and what would be the main terms of that?

Rajiv Kumar:

It’s been 18 years in the making, hasn’t it? During that time, a generation has passed, and I remember when India’s main objections were to importing expensive cars, including German ones. European objections, driven mainly by the French, were centred on preventing the media industry from opening up to India. They also wanted all their wines imported here, and so on. I have always been a proponent of full liberalisation of retail trade, and I have written papers on the subject. I have even advised the government about it. When I was the Director and CEO of an organisation called ICRIER, I argued that liberalising retail trade globally would mainly bring efficiency to the market. As for the ‘mom-and-pop’ stores, the reality is that organised retail accounts for only 4%. Now, it’s 8% of India’s total retail trade. Even if this grows at whatever rate you might consider, mom-and-pop stores are unlikely to disappear.

What has happened in India, which you may not be aware of, is the growth of quick commerce, with larger companies like Amazon, Flipkart, and even Reliance now joining. This poses a threat to small, family-run stores, not the big supermarkets or hypermarkets, which were never considered a real threat. Retail trade should be liberalised immediately. It has become a factor in the real estate market, and that needs to end. I believe foreign retailers will enter, providing a healthy competitive challenge to Indian retailers, and they will create the employment we need. Therefore, this should happen. I hope that entities like Carrefour and Selfridges, and others present in India, do not become obstacles to the India-EU trade prospects. While I remain sceptical about whether this trade agreement will be completed, because what I mentioned might not be acceptable here, especially regarding France and Germany, and the UK already has a bilateral trade agreement with India—one of the main drivers for this deal is now absent. So, I am uncertain. Nonetheless, I hope it happens, as I believe it would be a very strong win-win for both sides. However, at the moment, I cannot see a definitive date for its conclusion.

Come Carpentier:

I suppose this brings us to the conclusion that, from what I observe, you are definitely an advocate of free trade as much as possible, and therefore you probably wish for many of the tariffs applicable in India to be gradually reduced in most cases, correct? Because, based on what we see now, there is both this pressure to liberalise and open the markets, and on the other hand, a fear that certain sectors of the Indian economy could suffer, which is a very sensitive issue for politicians in particular. But from what you have said, it seems to me that you do not see a significant threat from Trump’s policies, at least in the long term. You believe that India will be able to adapt and may even benefit from removing some of the hurdles to the import of various foreign goods.

Rajiv Kumar:

My own view is that foreign trade is not the primary driver of India’s economy or its progress. It is the domestic economy, given our size and all other factors, and more specifically, our private enterprise, which has been the true engine for millennia. Yes, you know. And perhaps, that’s a big if, but I firmly believe that the day our government shifts from merely regulating and supervising to actively promoting private enterprise, India will be able to compete with any country in the world. We have done so in the past. Our enterprises once stretched from Jakarta to Rome, a footprint well documented by William Dalrymple. That’s the point. The sooner we adopt this approach, the better for us. Otherwise, no matter how many free trade negotiations or agreements we enter into, they will not yield the desired results. Our bilateral agreements with Thailand, Korea, and Sri Lanka show this — they have not produced the outcomes we hoped for, and we are in deficit with these countries. In conclusion, tariffs, non-tariffs, and trade policies will come and go. India must focus intensely on achieving global competitiveness and scale within our domestic economy — and that will only happen if the government becomes a strong champion and supporter of India’s renowned private sector. We are simply waiting for that moment, and once it arrives, everything else will follow.

Come Carpentier:

This is a very apt conclusion that reminds us that despite all the efforts India has made in past years to strengthen economic ties with countries that used to be part of its sphere of co-prosperity, even in those nations, China is making increasingly significant progress, and India is struggling to catch up. This likely indicates that a change in strategy should be considered. I am very grateful to Dr Rajiv Kumar for his wise and experienced comments, and I also thank the India Foundation for facilitating this dialogue.

Rajiv Kumar:

Thank you very much.

 

Brief Bios:

Dr. Rajiv Kumar, former Vice Chairman of NITI Aayog, recently resumed his chairmanship of Pahle India Foundation, a not-for-profit policy think tank, established by him in 2013. He served in the government as Economic Advisor with the Department of Economic Affairs (Ministry of Finance) during 1991-1995 and took over as Vice Chairman of NITI Aayog in September 2017, with the rank of Cabinet Minister and served until April 2022. His stints with the corporate sector include serving as Chief Economist of the Confederation of Indian Industries (CII) from 2004-2006 and later as Secretary General of the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry (FICCI), 2011-2013. Dr. Kumar holds a Ph.D. in Economics from Lucknow University (1978) and a D.Phil. from Oxford University (1982).

 

Mr. Come Carpentier is a Distinguished Fellow with India Foundation.